NEW RULE ON INTERRUPTION OF PRESCRIPTION

BY JUDGE MARLO CAMPANILLA

In Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992 - The proceedings referred to in Section 2
of Act No. 3326 are “judicial proceedings” (which do not include administrative proceedings).
Thus, a crime such as violating an ordinance may prescribe even if the complaint is filed
seasonably with the prosecutor's office, if, intentionally or not, the defendant delays the
institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late.

In Panaguiton vs. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008 and People v.
Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012, Perez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 245862,
November 3, 2020, the Supreme Court abandoned the Zaldivia principle. It was held that, under
Act No. 3326, the running of the prescription for an offense punishable under a special law shall
be interrupted when “judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment” are instituted
against the guilty person. The proceeding is described as “judicial” because when Act No. 3326
was passed on December 4, 1926, preliminary investigations of criminal offenses were
conducted by justices of the peace. Considering that preliminary investigation in criminal cases
for the purpose of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the
term “proceedings” should now be understood as either executive or judicial in character:
executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and
judgment stages. Hence, the institution of proceeding, whether executive or judicial, interrupts
the running of the prescriptive period.

However, Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. vs. Lidua, Sr., G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Zaldivia principle, which interpreted the words “institution of
judicial proceedings,” in Act No. 3326 as filling of information in court. Moreover, the provision
in the Rules on Criminal Procedure regarding the interruption of prescription by institution of
criminal action is not applicable to violation of ordinance because case involving this crime is
covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, which provides that only the filing of an
information (or complaint) in court will commence criminal action that tolls the prescriptive
period. Hence, the filing of a complaint involving a violation of the ordinance for a preliminary
investigation with the prosecutor’s office will not interrupt the running of a 2-month
prescription.

The Jadewell case, which affirmed the Zaldivia interpretation of the phrase “institution of
judicial proceedings,” is not compatible with the Panaguiton case, Pangilinan case, and Perez
case, which rejected the Zaldivia interpretation.
In People vs. Lee, G.R. No. 234618, September 16, 2019, the Supreme Court ruled that the
Jadewell case applies only to violations of ordinances, while the Pangalinan case applies to
violations of special laws.

However, Republic vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 136506, January 16, 2023, the Supreme Court modified
the Lee principle. It was ruled that the Zaldivia case and the Jadewell case apply to violations of
municipal or city ordinances, BP 22, and special laws covered by the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. The prescriptive period is interrupted by the filing of a complaint or information in
court, rather than the institution of a preliminary investigation by investigating agencies or the
filing of a complaint before such agencies. On the other hand, the Panaguiton case, Pangalinan
case, and Perez case apply to special laws, such as a violation of RA 3019, which is not covered
by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. The prescriptive period is interrupted by the
institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation.

It is submitted, however, that the Desierto case, the Zaldivia case, and the Jadewell case do not
apply to cases involving felonies, although they are covered by the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure.

Prescription of a felony is governed by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides “the
period of prescription shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information.”
According to the case of Francisco vs. CA, G.R. No. L-45674, May 30, 1983, the filing of a
complaint for preliminary investigation if the fiscal’s office interrupts the running of the
prescription for simple slander, because Article 91 does not distinguish whether the complaint is
filed in the Office of the Prosecutor for preliminary investigation or in court for action on the
merits.

In People vs. Bautista, G.R. NO. 168641, April 27, 2007, the Supreme Court applied the Francisco
principle to slight physical injuries, which was covered by the 1983 Rules on Summary
Procedure.

The Supreme Court in the Jadewell case and the Desierto case is not sitting En Banc, and thus, it
cannot abandon the principle in the Bautista case. Under Section 5 of Article VIII, of the
Constitution, no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en
banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. Moreover,
Jadewell's case and Desierto's case are interpreting Act 3326 and not Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code, which is the governing law on the prescription of felonies.

However, in Corpus vs. People, G.R. No. 255740, August 16, 2003, the Supreme Court, Second
Division, through Justice Lopez, applied the Desierto principle to the case involving slight
physical injuries.
In summary, in cases involving felonies under the RPC and offenses covered by special laws,
filing a complaint for preliminary investigation in the prosecutor's office had no interruptive
effect on the running of the prescriptive period.

The writer's opinion differs from the rulings in the Jadewell case, the Desierto case, and the
Corpus case. With due respect to the Supreme Court, this writer humbly opines that the
interpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code and Act No. 3326 should be uniform,
regardless of whether the cases are covered by the Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules
on Summary Procedure. In the Pangalinan case, it was held that there is no more distinction
between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the
interruption of the period of prescription. The institution of proceedings for preliminary
investigation against the accused interrupts the period of prescription.

Moreover, under the Expedited Rules of Procedure in the First Level Court, criminal cases
governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure shall be commenced by filing either by complaint
or by information. This new rule seems to have an amendatory effect on the Desierto case and
the Corpus case.

In People vs. Consibido, G.R. No. 258563 April 2, 2025, the Supreme Court, En Banc, abandoned
the Desierto case and Corpus case. However, the Consibido case, which provides new rules on
interruption of prescription, will be applied prospectively.

SUMMARY:

The filing of a complaint for preliminary investigation involving a felony or offense punishable
under special laws will interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, whether Regular
Procedure or Summary Procedure covers it on the following grounds:

1. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the period of prescription shall be
interrupted by the filing of the “complaint” or information. The term “complaint” in Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code refers to a complaint filed with the prosecutor’s office for preliminary
investigation. It should be noted that Article 91 does not distinguish between complaints filed in
the Office of the Prosecutor for preliminary investigation and those filed in court for action on
the merits. (Francisco case)

2. Under Act No. 3326, the running of the prescription of offense punishable under special law
shall be interrupted when “judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment” are instituted
against the guilty person. The proceeding is described as “judicial” since when Act No. 3326 was
passed on December 4, 1926, preliminary investigations of criminal offenses were being
conducted by justices of the peace. Considering that preliminary investigation in criminal cases
for the purpose of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the
term “proceedings” should now be understood as either executive or judicial in character:
executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and
judgment stages. Hence, the institution of proceeding, whether executive or judicial, interrupts
the running of the prescriptive period. (Panaguiton case, Pangilinan case, and Perez case)

3. The Rules on Criminal Procedure, which adopted the Francisco doctrine, provide that the
institution of the criminal action (by filing a complaint for preliminary investigation or
examination) shall interrupt the running period of prescription of the offense charged.

4. Under the Expedited Rules of Procedure in the First Level Court, criminal cases governed by
the Rule on Summary Procedure shall be commenced by filing a “complaint” or “information”.
Hence, filing a complaint with the prosecutor's office for a preliminary examination in a case
covered by Summary Procedure will interrupt the running of the prescriptive period.