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social sciences
Article
The Gender Gap in Income and the COVID-19 Pandemic
in Ireland
Karina Doorley 1,2, * , Cathal O’Donoghue 3 and Denisa M. Sologon 4

1 Tax, Welfare and Pensions Team, Economic and Social Research Institute, Whitaker Square,
D02 K138 Dublin, Ireland
2 IZA Institute of Labor Economics, 53113 Bonn, Germany
3 Geography, Archaeology & Irish Studies, The National University of Ireland, H91 TK33 Galway, Ireland;
cathal.odonoghue@nuigalway.ie
4 Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER), 4366 Luxembourg, Luxembourg;
denisa.sologon@liser.lu
* Correspondence: karina.doorley@esri.ie

Abstract: The gender income gap is large and well documented in many countries. Recent research
shows that it is mainly driven by differences in working patterns between men and women but
also by wage differences. The tax–benefit system cushions the gender income gap by redistributing
it between men and women. The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in unprecedented levels of
unemployment in 2020 in many countries, with some suggestions that men and women have been
differently affected. This research investigated the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the gender
gap in income in Ireland. By using nowcasting techniques and microsimulation, we modeled the
effect of pandemic-induced employment and wage changes on the market and disposable income.
We showed how the pandemic and the associated tax–benefit support could be expected to change
the income gap between men and women. Policy conclusions were drawn about future redistribution
between men and women.

Keywords: gender inequality; Ireland; tax–benefit system; COVID-19

Citation: Doorley, Karina, Cathal
O’Donoghue, and Denisa M. Sologon.
2022. The Gender Gap in Income and
the COVID-19 Pandemic in Ireland. 1. Introduction
Social Sciences 11: 311. https://
Given the rapid spread of the COVID-19 virus and the associated lockdown measures,
doi.org/10.3390/socsci11070311
governments have had to respond rapidly and quite severely to slow the spread of the
Academic Editor: Nigel Parton virus and flatten the curve of new infections, hospitalisations and deaths. This has had
Received: 3 June 2022
significant and wide-reaching implications on many aspects of life—health, economic and
Accepted: 7 July 2022
social—and has been affecting different social groups in highly asymmetric ways.
Published: 17 July 2022
Previous research for Ireland and elsewhere has shown how the employment losses
engendered by the pandemic and the mitigation measures enacted by the government have
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral
affected household disposable income. Analysis from Christl et al. (2021) shows that, in
with regard to jurisdictional claims in
EU countries, national tax–benefit systems were able to absorb a significant share of the
published maps and institutional affil-
drop in earnings (73.3% at the EU level) and that monetary compensation schemes played
iations.
a major role in this cushioning effect (35.2% at the EU level). In Ireland, Doorley et al.
(2020) showed that discretionary policies enacted to cushion the effect of the pandemic on
household incomes halved the income losses suffered at the household level, on average,
Copyright: © 2022 by the authors.
with larger cushioning effects experienced by low-income households.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This research focuses on gender income inequality and its likely trajectory during
This article is an open access article and in the immediate aftermath of the pandemic. Ireland is a country with a significant
distributed under the terms and and recent history of progress in gender equality but one that still retains a sizable gender
conditions of the Creative Commons wage and gender work gap (Russell et al. 2017)—these combined lead to a significant
Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// gender income gap. Ireland experienced substantial employment and income loss during
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ the pandemic. More than half of the workforce in Ireland was in receipt of state income
4.0/). support at the height of the crisis in April 2020.

Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci11070311 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci

Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 2 of 23

This gender gap in market, or pre-tax and transfer income, is certain to be affected
by the economic effects of the pandemic. Women are disproportionately in low-paying
and insecure jobs. They are traditionally more likely to shoulder the burden of childcare
and elder care, which is particularly relevant during a period of school closure and elderly
cocooning. However, women also tend to be over-represented in both locked-down sectors
(such as hospitality) and essential sectors (such as healthcare) cocooning (Alon et al. 2020).
Research to date presents a somewhat mixed view of the gender division of job and income
losses during the pandemic.
Most of the research suggests that women were more likely to suffer job and income
losses as a result of the pandemic than men (Adams-Prassl et al. 2020; Andrew et al. 2020;
Alon et al. 2021; Fabrizio et al. 2021). However, some research indicates important cross-
country differences. In a study of six countries, Dang and Nguyen (2021) show that women
were more likely to permanently lose their jobs than men in China, Italy and the US but
were less likely to permanently lose their jobs in Japan, South Korea and the UK. They
also showed that women were more likely to temporarily lose their jobs in China and
the UK but were less likely to temporarily lose their jobs in Japan, South Korea, Italy and
the US. Alon et al. (2021) showed that women’s labour supply fell relative to men’s in 18
of 28 countries studied when measured by employment and in 19 of 28 countries when
measured by hours worked. However, Ireland was one of the few countries that saw a
slight increase in women’s labour supply relative to men’s under both measures.1
Even within a country, there is not always consensus on the immediate impact of
the crisis by gender. By using data from the COVID-19 supplement of Understanding
Society, Hupkau and Petrongolo (2020) found that labour market outcomes of men and
women were roughly equally affected at the extensive margin but that women suffered
smaller losses at the intensive margin. This is in contrast to other research for the UK,
which relies on independent surveys and finds that women’s employment decreased by
more than men’s employment (Oreffice and Quintana-Domeque 2020; Sevilla and Smith
2020). Administrative information on job losses in Ireland to date indicates that their scale
has been reasonably similar for men and women.
In addition to the gender gap in market income, the gender gap in disposable, or post-
tax and transfer income, is also likely to be affected by the pandemic and not only through
its effect on market income. Tax–benefit changes enacted so far due to the pandemic have
increased the generosity of welfare payments in many countries, including Ireland, without
increasing income taxes. While tax–benefit systems do not differentiate based on gender,
traditional gender divisions of work and caring roles mean that men are disproportionately
affected by income tax changes while women are disproportionately affected by changes
to welfare payments (Stotsky 2016). The extent of gender differences in wages and work
intensity and the design of the tax–benefit system determines how men and women are
affected by policy changes. The question of how pandemic-related employment and wage
changes and discretionary tax–benefit policy have affected men and women is, therefore,
an empirical one.
The purpose of this research was to move away from the household perspective of
the effect of the pandemic and related mitigation measures on income inequality, which
has been covered in previous work. Instead, we estimated, at the individual level, the
gender income gap in Ireland before the pandemic and at three points during the pandemic,
corresponding to the three waves of the virus. This focus serves a number of purposes.
First, progress has been made in recent years in closing the gender wage and the
gender work gaps in Europe and elsewhere. There is a risk that the pandemic may have
stalled or reversed some of this progress. We showed how employment changes during the
pandemic affected men and women separately in Ireland. There is reason to believe that
these effects are not symmetrical. Like old vs. young workers, male and female workers
have different wage, tenure and occupation profiles. We expect this analysis to shed light
on whether policy intervention may be needed to restore employment levels of men and
women to their pre-pandemic state.
Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 3 of 23

Second, we showed how the gender income gap is cushioned by the pre-pandemic tax
and transfer system as well as by the pandemic-related income supports. Previous research
for Ireland showed that, during the financial crisis, changes to the tax and welfare system
reduced the income of women relative to the income of men. This discrepancy was not
reversed in post-crisis policy reforms (Doorley et al. 2018). Our current analysis indicates
whether or not this pattern has been repeated in the context of the current crisis and has
implications for policy makers who engage in gender-responsive budgeting.
Quantifying the effect of the pandemic on the incomes of men and women is com-
plicated by the fact that most representative surveys that contain information on family
income, taxes, benefits and demographics are released with a delay of two or more years.
In order to overcome this, we employed a nowcasting technique based on microsimulation
(O’Donoghue and Loughrey 2014) using the most recent data on employment and wage
levels to calibrate a simulation model of household incomes, taxes and benefits. This
approach produces a real-time picture of the population and the distribution of income
from different sources and allows us to identify those most affected by the pandemic. We
merged this framework with a gender decomposition technique developed by Doorley
and Keane (2020). The authors develop a method to measure the cushioning effect of
the tax–benefit system on gender income inequality and, using data and policies from
2017, estimate that the gender income gap is reduced tax–benefit policy by 10–40% in a
cross-section of European countries.
We used the resulting method to “nowcast” the 2020 income distribution in Ireland,
accounting for pandemic-related employment and income. We then quantified (i) the
composition of the gender gap in income in Ireland, (ii) how the gender gap in income was
cushioned by the tax–benefit system immediately prior to the pandemic and (ii) the relative
roles of the market and the tax–benefit system in changing the gender income gap during
the three waves of the pandemic. Conclusions were drawn regarding the likely trajectory
of gender income inequality in Ireland and elsewhere in the future. Our results suggest the
growing importance of gender and equality budgeting.

2. Gender Equality in Ireland

The structure of the Irish labour force has been strongly influenced by the historical
role of women in Irish society.2 In the 1937 Constitution of the Republic of Ireland, there was
a legal basis for excluding women from the labour market and confining them to the home.
The marriage bar of 1932 prevented married women from working in the civil service and
existed until 1973. Similar marriage bars existed elsewhere but were lifted earlier. For
example, the British marriage bar was lifted in 1944, reflecting the increased prevalence
of women in male-dominated industries during the Second World War. A system of fully
joint taxation for married couples existed in Ireland until the early 2000s, and indeed, prior
to the 1980 Supreme Court ruling, a wife’s income was regarded as part of their husband’s
for tax purposes (O’Donoghue and Sutherland 1999). This provided a disincentive for the
secondary earner in a couple, who was usually female, to work. Reforms to this system
were strongly opposed, and the current system is now a hybrid, partially individualised
one, which retains some of the same disincentives (Doorley 2017).
The activity and employment rates of Irish women have been rising over the last
couple of decades and are currently around the EU average. Eurostat figures compiled
from the Labour Force Survey for 20–64-year-olds show that 70% of Irish women and 80%
of Irish men were employed in 2021. Comparable figures for the EU-27 were 68% (women)
and 79% (men). The average weekly hours worked by Irish women—at 33—is lower than
that of women in the EU as a whole (35).
The raw Irish gender pay gap, measured as the percentage difference between average
male and female hourly wages, is low by European standards, at around 14% in 2018.
Comparable figures for the UK and EU are 20% and 15%, respectively. An adjusted
measure of the gender wage gap, which accounts for different labour market characteristics
Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 4 of 23

of men and women, puts the Irish gender wage gap closer to 11%, similar to the adjusted
UK gender wage gap at around 12% (Redmond and McGuinness 2019).
The gender gap in market income—defined as earnings plus private pensions plus
investment income—is relatively high, at close to 50%, in Ireland. However, the Irish
tax–benefit system is also relatively effective at redistributing between men and women.
Doorley and Keane (2020) estimate that, in 2017, the gender gap in income was reduced by
one-fifth due to the tax benefit system. Roughly half of this redistribution was performed
by the benefit system, while another half was attributable to taxation. This was at the upper
end of the redistribution between men and women estimated for the countries studied.
As elaborated upon in the next section, however, heterogeneity in how the COVID-19
pandemic has affected the labour market could significantly change this estimate, with
implications for policy makers who are engaged in gender budgeting.

3. The COVID-19 Pandemic in Ireland

3.1. Policy Response
The first case of COVID-19 in Ireland was confirmed on 29 February 2020. The first
“lockdown” of Ireland began on 12 March 2020 with the closing of schools, childcare facili-
ties, universities and other public buildings. Mass gatherings were also cancelled. On 15th
March, pubs and bars were instructed to close. The result was a huge loss of employment in
the hospitality sector. The Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP) was announced on the
same day at a rate of EUR 203 per week, which was the same as the maximum personal rate
for the main existing unemployment supports. However, the PUP required no contribution
history (unlike the contributory unemployment benefit—Jobseeker’s Benefit) and was not
subject to a means test (like the non-contributory unemployment benefit—Jobseeker’s As-
sistance). The rate of the PUP increased to EUR 350 per week following an announcement
on 24 March. A number of changes to the rate were processed in the following months
amidst claims that many recipients were receiving more in PUP than their prior earnings.
At the time of writing, the PUP is a four-tier benefit, with claimants entitled to EUR 203,
EUR 250, EUR 300 or EUR 350 per week, depending on their prior earnings. The PUP is
intended to be a temporary payment and is set to be withdrawn in 2021, subject to labour
market recovery. Beirne et al. (2020) and Doorley et al. (2020) showed that the PUP was
extremely effective in cushioning the incomes of low-income households who suffered
employment losses, although there were certain marginal groups of workers—such as
seasonal workers—who were not eligible for it as they were not employed immediately
before its introduction.
On 19 March 2020, the Employer Refund Scheme was introduced, which allowed
employees to remain on company payrolls while receiving a support payment that was
reimbursed to businesses by the State. This scheme was replaced by the Temporary Wage
Subsidy Scheme (TWSS) on 26 March, which allowed employers to claim subsidies of up to
EUR 410 per week for eligible employees that were kept on the payroll. On September 1,
the TWSS was replaced by the Employment Wage Subsidy Scheme (EWSS), which provides
a flat-rate subsidy per employee to employers who have suffered at least a 30% loss in
turnover. Unlike the furlough scheme in the UK, workers receiving the Irish wage subsidy
were permitted to continue working. A number of tiered payments were added to this
scheme in October 2020, in line with changes to the PUP. The subsidy ranges between EUR
203 and EUR 350 per week, depending on the gross income of the employee. This scheme
was also intended to be temporary in nature and was set to be withdrawn in 2021.
A third major measure introduced in response to the pandemic was Enhanced Illness
Benefit for COVID-19. The traditional waiting period for Illness Benefit of 6 days3 was
abolished for those who contract the virus and/or are required to self-isolate, and the rate
of the benefit increased from EUR 203 to match the highest rate of the PUP, of EUR 350
per week.
A cautious re-opening of the economy during the summer of 2020 was followed by a
second wave of the virus and the second lockdown in October 2020. The second lockdown
 abolished for those who contract the virus and/or are required to self-isolate, and the rate
of the benefit increased from EUR 203 to match the highest rate of the PUP, of EUR 350
per week.
Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 A cautious re-opening of the economy during the summer of 2020 was followed 5 of by
23
a second wave of the virus and the second lockdown in October 2020. The second lock-
down was different in nature from the first in that schools, childcare facilities and the
construction
was sector
different in natureremained
from theopen. Inthat
first in early December,
schools, restrictions
childcare were
facilities andeased once more,
the construction
sector remained open. In early December, restrictions were eased once more, only to beThe
only to be re-introduced in January as a third wave of the virus gripped the country. re-
third lockdown
introduced extended
in January to schools,
as a third wave childcare forgripped
of the virus non-essential workers
the country. Theand thelockdown
third construc-
tion sector
extended toand began
schools, to be eased
childcare in April 2021.workers
for non-essential Each lockdown resulted in an
and the construction uptick
sector and in
PUP and
began wage
to be subsidy
eased claimants.
in April 2021. Each lockdown resulted in an uptick in PUP and wage
subsidy claimants.
3.2. Heterogeneity in Employment Effects
3.2. Heterogeneity in Employment
The unemployment rate inEffects
Ireland (including those on the PUP), displayed in Figure
The unemployment
1, peaked at around 30%rate in Ireland
in April 2020 (including those on
and was slightly the PUP),
higher displayed
for men than forinwomen
Figure 1,
at
peaked at around 30% in April 2020 and was slightly higher for men than for
this point (32% compared to 29%). It fell gradually over the summer months before in-women at this
point (32%again
creasing compared to 29%).
in October andItinfell gradually
January 2021,over the summer
coinciding with months before
the second andincreasing
third eco-
again
nomic lockdowns. In March 2021, it stood at around 24% and was similar foreconomic
in October and in January 2021, coinciding with the second and third men and
lockdowns.
women. In March 2021, it stood at around 24% and was similar for men and women.

Unemployment rate
35
30
25
Percentage

20
15
10
5
0

Men Women

Figure1.1.The
Figure Theunemployment
unemploymentrate rateof
ofthose
thoseaged
aged15–74
15–74in
inIreland
Irelandbetween
betweenJanuary
January2020
2020and
andMarch
March
2021.Source:
2021. Source:Central
CentralStatistics
StatisticsOffice.
Office.

The youth
The youth unemployment
unemployment rate rate peaked
peaked at at aa much
much higher
higher rate
rate of
of 64%
64% in
in May
May 2020
2020
(Figure2).
(Figure 2). This
Thiswas
wasslightly
slightlyhigher
higherfor
forwomen
womenthan thanmen,
men,and
andthe
thediscrepancy
discrepancywidened
widened
during the
during the rest
restof
ofthe
theyear.
year. In
In March
March 2021,
2021, the
theyouth
youthunemployment
unemployment rate rate was
was 65%
65% for
for
womenand
women and54%
54%for
formen.
men.
Soc.
Soc. Sci. 2022, 11,
Sci. 2022, 11, 311
311 66 of
of 23
24
Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 6 of 24

Youth
Youth unemployment
unemployment rate
rate 2020
2020
80
80
70
70
60
60

Percentage
50
Percentage
50
40
40
30
30
20
20
10
10
00

Men
Men Women
Women

Figure
Figure 2. The
2.The
Figure2. unemployment
Theunemployment
unemploymentrate rate of
rateof those
ofthose aged
thoseaged 15–24
aged15–24 in
15–24in Ireland
inIreland between
Irelandbetween January
betweenJanuary 2020
January2020 and
2020and March
andMarch
March
2021.
2021. Source:
2021.Source: Central
Source: Central Statistics
CentralStatistics Office.
StatisticsOffice.
Office.

Figure
Figure 333 shows
Figure shows
shows thethe gender
the gender breakdown
gender breakdown
breakdown of of wage
of wage subsidy
wage subsidy recipients
subsidy recipients at
recipients at one
at one point
one point in
point in
in
time,
time, August 2020.
2020. This
This is the
is latest
the available
latest wage
available wagesubsidy
subsidydata, which
data, are
which
time, August 2020. This is the latest available wage subsidy data, which are available dis- available
are dis-
available
aggregated
aggregated by
disaggregatedby gender.
by Women
gender.
gender. WomenWomenare
are slightly more
are slightly
slightly likely
moremore to
to be
be in
likelylikely toreceipt
in of
of the
the wage
be in receipt
receipt subsidy
of the
wage wage
subsidy
than men,
subsidy particularly
than men, the youngest
particularly the and oldest
youngest andcohorts.
oldest Although
cohorts. wage subsidy
Although
than men, particularly the youngest and oldest cohorts. Although wage subsidy recipients wage recipients
subsidy
are
are not
not included
recipients in
in the
the unemployment
are not included
included figures
figures above,
in the unemployment
unemployment figureswhen
above, the
above,
when wage
thewhen
wagethesubsidy expires,
wage subsidy
subsidy expires,
these individuals
expires, these may
individuals be at
may serious
be at risk of
serious unemployment.
risk
these individuals may be at serious risk of unemployment. of unemployment.

TWSS
TWSS recipients
recipients August
August 2020
2020
25%
25%

20%
20%

15%
15%
Female
Female
10% Male
Male
10%

5%
5%

0%
0%
<25
<25 25
25 to
to 34
34 35
35 to
to 44
44 45
45 to
to 54
54 55
55 to
to 59
59 60+
60+

Figure
Figure 3.
3. The proportion of
of each age cohort in receipt
receiptinof the
the Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme in
Figure 3. TheThe
proportion
proportion each
of age cohort
each age in
cohort of receipt
Temporary
of the Wage SubsidyWage
Temporary Scheme in
Sub-
August
August 2020.
2020. Source:
Source: Revenue
Revenue Commissioners,
Commissioners, Available
Available online:
online: https://revenue.ie/en/corporate/in-
https://revenue.ie/en/corporate/in-
sidy Scheme in August 2020. Source: Revenue Commissioners, Available online: https:
formation-about-revenue/statistics/number-of-taxpayers-and-returns/covid-19-wage-subsidy-
formation-about-revenue/statistics/number-of-taxpayers-and-returns/covid-19-wage-subsidy-
//revenue.ie/en/corporate/information-about-revenue/statistics/number-of-taxpayers-and-
scheme-statistics.aspx
scheme-statistics.aspx (accessed
(accessed on
on 11 October
October 2020).
2020).
returns/covid-19-wage-subsidy-scheme-statistics.aspx (accessed on 1 October 2020).
4.
4. Methodology
Methodology
In
In order
order to
to understand
understand how
how policy,
policy, economic
economic and
and social
social changes
changes such
such as
as those
those de-
de-
scribed in Section 2 affect income inequality and gender income inequality, household
scribed in Section 2 affect income inequality and gender income inequality, household
Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 7 of 23

4. Methodology
In order to understand how policy, economic and social changes such as those de-
scribed in Section 2 affect income inequality and gender income inequality, household
survey data are typically used. There is, however, a substantial time lag (2 years or more)
between the collection and the release of survey data for research. In Europe, the main
survey with data on the income situation of households in European countries is the Survey
of Income and Living Conditions (SILC). Its latest release at the time of analysis occurred
in 2018, with an income reference period of 2017. A two-year time lag prevents survey
data from being fully representative of the current period, even in normal times. When
sudden changes in economic conditions occur, the time lag hinders a timely analysis of
these shocks.
Other more recent datasets are available such as the Labour Force Survey, which is
available every quarter at a 6-week lag, or up-to-date register data that are available every
month at a short lag. Earnings indexation is available on a quarterly time period. Their
main limitation, however, is the lack of micro-information on incomes. Without good
information on household incomes, these datasets cannot be used to design policies that
mitigate the impacts of a crisis at least cost.
Therefore, the key methodological challenge in identifying and addressing changing
income inequalities due to the pandemic is the lack of up-to-date data. We overcame this by
using a “nowcasting” methodology based on microsimulation (O’Donoghue and Loughrey
2014) using the most recent data on employment and wage levels to calibrate a simulation
model of household incomes, taxes and benefits. This approach produces a near real-time
picture of the population and the distribution of income from different sources and allows
us to identify those most affected by the pandemic.
There are a number of different “nowcasting” methods. Some more simple methods
apply wage indexation factors and proportionally change the employment rate in specific
industries (Navicke et al. 2014). We utilised a more nuanced approach that allows us to
model the heterogeneity of changes in the population, following the latest developments by
O’Donoghue et al. (2020, 2021); Sologon et al. (2022) and O’Donoghue et al. (2022). Figure 4
provides a graphical description of the method. This method relies on two core components:
• An income generation model (IGM) to characterise and simulate the distribution of
household income and its subcomponents;
• A nowcasting component that calibrates the simulations of the IGM to the external
labour market, wage and price statistics in order to reflect the most recent develop-
ments in the distribution of income.
We extended this infrastructure by integrating a third component, a gender decom-
position of income, following the method developed by Doorley and Keane (2020). This
allows us to understand how gender income gaps are likely to change in the short term as
a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Soc.
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11,311
311 88of
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23

Figure 4. Model Structure.

Figure 4. Model Structure.
4.1. Household Income Generation Model
4.1. Household Income income
The household Generation Model model (IGM) follows the framework developed
generation
by Sologon et al. (2021),
The household incomewhich relies on
generation a system
model (IGM) of follows
hierarchically structured,
the framework multiple
developed
equation
by Sologonmodels
et al.for the components
(2021), which reliesofon household
a systemincome that describe
of hierarchically parametrically
structured, how
multiple
the receipt
equation and the
models forlevel of income sources
the components vary with
of household personal
income thatcharacteristics. Residuals
describe parametrically
link the model
how receiptpredictions
and the level to of
observed
income income
sourcessources.
vary with A personal
similar IGM was used forResid-
characteristics. cross-
uals link the model predictions to observed income sources. A similar IGM was usedetfor
country analysis (Sologon et al. 2021), for historical analysis in Lithuania ( Černiauskas al.
2022) and in Australia (Li et al. 2021). The IGM describes the distribution
cross-country analysis (Sologon et al. 2021), for historical analysis in Lithuania of household
disposable income
(Černiauskas in a particular
et al. 2022) period and
and in Australia then
(Li et al. allows the simulation
2021). The IGM describes of counterfactual
the distribu-
distributions
tion under
of household alternative
disposable labour
income inmarket, policy,
a particular returns
period andor demographic
then scenarios.
allows the simulation
We presented
of counterfactual first the five
distributions mainalternative
under household income
labour components
market, modelled
policy, returns in our
or demo-
approach:
graphic scenarios.
• WeyhL =presented
gross labour
firstincome
the five(for
mainemployees and
household the self-employed);
income components modelled in our ap-
• yK
proach:
h = capital income (investment and property (rental) income);
O
• 𝑦yh ==gross
otherlabour
market incomes
income (for(including
employeesprivate
and the pensions, private transfers and other
self-employed);
• 𝑦 B = capital income (investment and property (rental) income);
incomes);
• y = public benefits;
• 𝑦 hT = other market incomes (including private pensions, private transfers and
• yh = personal direct taxes and social insurance contributions.
other incomes);
• 𝑦 = public benefits; yh = yhL + yKh + yOh + yhB − yhT
n o n o

• 𝑦 = personal direct taxes and |social insurance

{z } contributions.
| {z }
{ Market} { Non−market}
Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 9 of 23

Each income component was parametrically linked with the observed individual and
household characteristics (typically education and demographic characteristics for labour
market models and, in addition, labour market characteristics such as industry, occupation,
sector and hours for employment income).4 For each income source, we applied a two-step
procedure:
1. First, we estimated the incidence of the income source S for individual i in household
S :
h, Ihi

S 1, i f the individual receives the income source
Ihi =
0, otherwise
where S ∈ {employment, self-employment, investment, property, other}.
2. Second, we estimated the level of the income source S, yShi for those that receive it
S = 1).
(Ihi
For annual labour income, we first estimated an in-work binary indicator equal to 1
if the individual receives any income from work and 0 otherwise. For those in work, we
estimated a model for being employed versus self-employed, their occupation, industry
and sector. A similar binary strategy was applied for the remaining market income (sub-
)components: capital and other incomes. The modelling of the prevalence of the income
sources and the labour market structure (employment status, occupation, industry, sector
and hours) is part of the labour market module in Figure 4 and involves estimating logistic
and multinomial logistic models.
After modelling the labour market structure, we proceeded to modelling the income
sources, conditional on the variables modelled in the preceding step. This is part of the
income module in Figure 4. It involves estimating log-linear models for monthly wages,
self-employment income, investment, property and other market income sources.
We estimated each equation of the model independently and stored the vector of
parameter estimates and the vector of residuals for each model. All of the labour market
models in our IGM were estimated separately by gender.
Formally, this is represented by:
nh  
∑ lab emp emp semp semp
yhL = Ihi Ihi yhi + Ihi yhi
i =1

nh  
∑
prop prop
yK
h =
inv inv
Ihi yhi + Ihi yhi
i =1
nh
yO
h = ∑ IhiO yOhi
i =1

where nh is the number of individuals in the household.

These parametric relationships are reduced-form projections that describe the empir-
ical associations between the household and individual characteristics and the various
income sources. We used these projections to simulate counterfactual distributions of
market incomes under alternative scenarios: a different labour market structure, a different
structure of economic returns or a different demographic composition. Specifically, for
this analysis, we used our projections to (i) nowcast the latest available data to reflect
the situation before and during the crisis and (ii) simulate counterfactual distributions of
market incomes for women if they were paid according to the male wage structure and if
their labour market participation and hours and occupation/industry choice followed the
male distributions.
Benefits, taxes and social security contributions for projections and counterfactuals
were simulated using the NUI Galway microsimulation model developed for studying
the impacts of an economic crisis (O’Donoghue et al. 2018). Household benefits (yhB ) are
defined as the sum of household pension income, means-tested benefits and non-means-
tested benefits:
Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 10 of 23

pens
yhB = yh + ymtb nmtb
h + yh

Direct taxes combine income taxes and social security contributions:

yhT = ytax ssc

h + yh

These not only transform the distributions of market income into disposable income
but also allow us to simulate further counterfactual distributions of disposable income
under alternative tax–benefit rules, such as those introduced in response to the pandemic.

4.2. Simulating Counterfactual Distributions and Nowcasting

The IGM estimated in the previous step was used to nowcast the micro-survey data
from the most recent collected data, s (2017), to period t (pre-COVID, corresponding to
December 2019) and periods t + k during the COVID-19 crisis corresponding to successive
waves of the virus k = 1, 2, 3. Wave 1 corresponds to May 2020, wave 2 to November 2020
and wave 3 to January 2021. Calibration totals utilise administrative data for employment
and industry, while wage levels draw upon a quarterly earnings survey. For period s
(estimation data), we formalised the IGM as follows:
{l,r,tb}
Ys = f ( X, Y; ls (ξ ); rs (ξ ); tbs (ξ ))

where:
# Y is household disposable income, a function f of:
# X is a vector of exogenous individual and household characteristics;
# ξ is the vector of parameter values describing the labour market structure (l), the
structure of returns (r) and the tax–benefit rules (tb);
# Y is a vector of unobserved heterogeneity terms.5
The income-generating process is a statistical representation of the structure of the
prevalence and the level of market incomes and their sub-components, combined with the
tax–benefit rules converting market incomes into disposable counterparts.
This setup allows us to understand how the distribution F of a random variable Y
(such as disposable income) as well as any function of interest θ ( F ) (such as inequality
indices, quantiles) changed due to the impact of the COVID-19 crisis.

4.3. Nowcasting the Distribution to t (Pre-COVID) and t + 1 (Wave 1, 2 and 3)

The nowcasting component calibrates the simulations resulting from the IGM to
external statistics in order to update the data from the most recent available survey data
(period s) to the targeted periods t (pre-COVID) and waves t + k, k = 1, 2, 3 during the crisis.
We followed the nowcasting method applied by O’Donoghue et al. (2020) and explained
in detail in O’Donoghue et al. (2020, 2022). The age range to which the simulations and
calibrations apply is the population above the age of 16.
Calibration for logit models was based upon the rank of the XB + ε estimated by the
model compared with the target number of, for example, those in work generated from near-
real-time calibration totals. This calibration method is known as alignment and is described
in Li and O’Donoghue (2013). For multinomial logit models of, for example, industry or
occupation, XBi + ε i is ranked for each category i, with the highest ranks selected until the
weighted number of categories is selected. This method has the advantage that it captures
more observed heterogeneity than purely random selection, reflecting the fact that certain
groups are more likely to be in work. The incorporation of stochastic terms means that we
capture unobserved heterogeneity so that, for example, some higher educated are out of
work and some lone-parents work. Ranking by XB alone could result in only those with
a high chance of being selected. It is thus akin to Monte Carlo simulation but allows for
external totals to be hit rather than merely replicating the observed relationships in the
estimation dataset.
We implemented three transformations:
Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 11 of 23

3. Labour market transformation: The labour market transformation consists of mod-

elling the labour market structure in period s and using the parameter estimates,
in conjunction with external labour market statistics, to re-calibrate so that the new
simulated labour market structure reflects the targeted period (t or t + k, k = 1, 2, 3)
with respect to the age and gender composition of the probability of being in work, the
employment rate, occupation and industry structure, and unemployment. The labour
market status and characteristics of all individuals of working age are simulated
and captured by a new vector for each time period e l (ξ ) reflecting the aligned labour
market characteristics with the target period: t or t + k, k = 1, 2, 3;
 
lt (ξ ) : f X, Y; let (ξ ); rs (ξ ); tbs (ξ ) .
e

4. Returns transformation: The returns transformation involves: (i) first, re-simulating all
incomes based on the updated labour market structure using the parameter estimates
of the income models for period s; (ii) updating monetary values using income growth
indices for earnings differentiated by industry and occupation and CPI indices for the
adjustment of remaining incomes.6 The income of all individuals is updated in this
way and captured by a new vector e r (ξ ) reflecting the aligned incomes with the target
period: t or t + k, k = 1, 2, 3;
 
ret (ξ ) : f X, Y; e lt (ξ ); ret (ξ ); tbs (ξ ) .

5. Tax–benefit transformation: The tax–benefit transformation consists of updating the

tax–benefit rules and the parameters of the system to reflect the target period and
applying them to the distribution of market incomes obtained in step 2 in order to
obtain the nowcasted distribution of disposable incomes at time t and t + k, k = 1, 2, 3:

{el,er,tb
e}  
Yet = f X, Y; elt (ξ ); ret (ξ ); tb
e t (ξ )

 
et+k {el,er,tb
Y
e}
= f X, Y; elt+k (ξ ); ert+k (ξ ); tb
e t+k (ξ )

et+k {l,er,tb} −
By comparing the two distributions, we obtained the nowcasted change (Y
e e

{l,er,tb}
e e
Yet ) in the distribution of disposable income due to the COVID crisis, taking into
account the change in the labour market structure, incomes and tax–benefit rules. We
could also evaluate the counterfactual effect of changing just one of these components (i.e.,
increased unemployment with no targeted tax–benefit changes) or of changing the returns
structure of women so that their income distribution follows the male pattern.

4.4. Gender Income Inequality

In the final stage of the analysis, we compared the distribution of male and female
income and the drivers of the gender gap in income before and after accounting for the
impact of the pandemic. Therefore, we incorporate a gender decomposition developed by
Doorley and Keane (2020) into our simulation. This allowed us to show how the pandemic-
induced income and employment shock and the tax–benefit response alter gender income
inequality in both market and disposable income.

4.4.1. Income Sharing

Estimating gender income inequality using a population of single individuals is
relatively straightforward. However, taking the complexity of married couple households
into account requires some assumptions about how married couples split their income.
Most income distribution analyses, such as the measurement of inequality using the Gini
Index, are carried out at the household level. The implicit assumption is that household
income is pooled so that all household members enjoy the same standard of living. There is
Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 12 of 23

empirical evidence that households do pool a significant proportion of income, supporting

this unitary model of household behaviour (Watson et al. 2013).
Some empirical and theoretical basis was also found for non-unitary models of family
behaviour, which challenge this approach (Lundberg et al. 1997; Cantillon and Nolan 2001;
Browning et al. 2010). For example, it was found that the recipient of income in a household
can strongly influence the distribution of its consumption (Browning et al. 1994; Lundberg
et al. 1997). This has implications for the economic independence of individual members of
a household as well as for bargaining power within the household.
In this work, we considered each member of a couple as an individual in terms of their
market income, tax liability and benefit entitlement. We assume that family benefits and
household level benefits are shared equally among members of a couple.7 One exception
is Child Benefit, which we assigned to the mother as this is the default payment rule for
this benefit. We considered this individual approach as representing an upper bound
of the gender gap in income. An assumption of full income-sharing may be closer to
reality as empirical studies suggest that most couples share most of their income (Watson
et al. 2013). The assumption of no income sharing, however, allows us to estimate the
redistribution performed by the State through the tax–benefit system, separately from the
private redistribution performed at the household level between members of a couple.
The former measure was of interest for this analysis as it is the margin of change readily
available to policy-makers. It is also a useful measure in that it represents potential income
(consumption, bargaining, etc.) inequality.

4.4.2. Decompositions
At the core of our analysis lies the gender gap in the average market income gap
(Gap M ) and the gender gap in average disposable income ( Gap D ), defined as:

Gap M = Mm − M f

Gap D = D m − D f

where M gender=m, f and D gender=m, f stand for nowcasted average market and disposable
income of men and women and are formalised as follows:
{el,er }
 
M m = E (Yfm ) = E(m X, Y; lem (ξ ); rf
m (ξ ) )

ff {l,er} ) = E(m X, Y; e
e  
M f = E (Y l f (ξ ); ref (ξ ) )

{el,er,tb
e}  
D m = E (Y
fm ) = E(m X, Y; lem (ξ ); rf
m ( ξ ); tb ( ξ ) )
e

{el,er,tb
e}  
D f = E (Y
ff ) = E(m X, Y; el f (ξ ); ref (ξ ); tb
e (ξ ) )

Decomposition of the Gender Gap in Market Incomes

First, we estimated how the structure of the gender gap in market incomes, Gap M =
Mm − M f , changed during the course of the pandemic, between t and t + k, k = 1, 2, 3.
To this end, we decomposed the difference between the nowcasted distributions
of market incomes for men and women to identify the contribution of differences in
labour market characteristics between men and women (participation, hours and wages,
occupational structure, etc.) and how these have changed during the pandemic.
The decomposition of the difference in average market incomes between men and
women can be formalised as:
∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
 
Mm − M f = ( M f − M f ) + M f − M f ∗ + ( Mm − M f ) (1)
| {z } | {z } | {z }
work and wages occupation/industry other
Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 13 of 23

∗
where M f is the counterfactual average market income of women if women had the labour
∗∗
market participation, hours and wage structure of men, and M f is the counterfactual
market income of women if women also had the occupational and industry structure
∗
of men. M f is obtained by applying the coefficients of the labour market participation,
wage and earnings model for men to women while retaining the residuals for women and
∗∗
predicting a counterfactual market income for women. M f is obtained by importing in
also the coefficients from the occupation and industry models for men and simulating the
resulting market incomes for women.
By following this logic, the gender gap in market income was decomposed into (1) the
contribution of gender differences in wages and labour supply, (2) gender differences in
occupation and industry structures and (3) the contribution of all other differences in char-
acteristics/returns between men and women. These other characteristics include gender
differences in income due to demographics, non-labour income and self-employment status.
The decomposition is performed for each period: t (pre-COVID) and t + k (post-COVID
wave k = 1, 2, 3).

Decomposition of the Cushioning Effect of the Tax–Benefit System

By comparing the gap in average market income between men and women (Gap M )
and the gap in average disposable income between men and women ( Gap D ), we obtained
the “cushioning” effect of the tax–benefit system on the gender gap in market income in
each period:
C = Gap M − Gap D .
Defining gross income, D b , as market income plus benefits, the gender gap in gross
income is:
b
Gap Db = Dm − D bf .

Defining net income, D t , as market income net of tax, the gender gap in net income is:
t
Gap Dt = Dm − D tf .

C can then be further decomposed into the “cushioning” effect of benefits and the
“cushioning” effect of taxes.

C = ( Gap M − Gap Db ) + ( Gap M − Gap Dt ) (2)

| {z } | {z }
bene f its taxes

5. Data
Our analysis required two data sources: (i) microdata for estimating the income gener-
ation model and for simulating the distributions of disposable income and (ii) calibration
data to align the simulations with the timely changes in labour market and income growth.
Our microdata is the 2017 version of the Irish component of the European Union
Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). EU-SILC is a representative survey
with information on household incomes, labour market characteristics, demographics and
living conditions, typically used for building poverty and inequality indicators for the EU
countries. The Irish component relies both on survey and register data. Income information
for 80% of the respondents comes primarily from administrative sources linked to the
individual’s tax number (PPSN) (Callan et al. 2010).
Our analysis used a set of calibration control totals capturing the evolution of the
macro-economic climate in Ireland between 2017 and the COVID-19 crisis. The calibration
control totals were drawn from the Labour Force Survey, Live-Register data and official
statistics provided by the Irish Central Statistics Office.
We described below the adjustments made to the SILC data in order to simulate the
pre-COVID period—December 2019—and the three waves of the COVID-19 pandemic:
May 2020, November 2020 and January 2021.
Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 14 of 23

5.1. Employment Rate and Sectoral Impact

Individuals who have lost their job because of COVID-19 were eligible for a COVID-19
Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP), a flat rate non-means tested benefit paid to
those aged 18–66. Unlike traditional jobseekers’ supports, there are no additional payments
for dependents. The changes in the instrument structure over the crisis were captured in
our simulations.
We used the income generation model to simulate the numbers and the type of
individuals affected by the crisis and eligible for the PUP. The overall employment rate,
determined by the number of people in work relative to the population of a particular age
group, was first used to calibrate the simulations from the income generation model. The
overall and age-specific employment rates are drawn from the Labour Force Survey (LFS).
However, as a quarterly survey, there is still a 2–3 month lag between data collection and
publication. In order to model in “real-time” a period of economic volatility such as the
COVID-19 crisis, we needed even more timely data.
Given the asymmetric employment shock, with some industries remaining at work
and others closing almost fully during the pandemic, we were confronted with limited
“real time” data to capture the sectoral impact of the crisis. We fine-tune the simulations by
relying in addition on age-specific administrative data from the Live-Register on a monthly
basis, together with weekly updates of their aggregates. Given that the Live-Register data
does not reflect the level of unemployment equivalent to the ILO definition, people could
be working part-time while receiving benefits, and conversely, someone could be out of
work and seeking work but not eligible for unemployment benefits. However, in the short
term, the changes observed in the Live-Register are a proxy for changes in the numbers
out of work (or non-employment rate). We used the LFS to nowcast to December 2019,
and then we used administrative data to nowcast to May 2020 (wave 1), November 2020
(wave 2) and January 2021 (wave 3).

5.2. COVID-19 Infections

Individuals who had to stop working due to a COVID-19 infection or due to having
been a close contact qualified for the COVID enhanced Illness Benefit (CEIB), which was
paid at the maximum PUP rate. In our simulations, both workers and non-workers were
infected with COVID-19. The cases were randomly allocated across in-work and out-of-
work based on the national age distribution of the COVID-19 cases. The recipient rate of
the COVID-19-related illness benefit is obtained by dividing by the proportion of workers
in each age group.

5.3. Pandemic Wage Subsidy

The Wage Subsidy itself has a limited distributional impact, but it shifts the burden
of payments from the private sector to the public sector. In modelling the subsidy, we
assumed that the sum of the subsidy component and the employer component remains
constant. The subsidy is simulated parametrically and has changed 5 times over the year, re-
flecting different objectives and teething problems (O’Donoghue et al. 2021). The employer
component is therefore modelled as the residual of the original wage less the subsidy.

6. Results
We started by looking at the core employment and income statistics by gender and
how they evolved during the course of the crisis (Table 1). As expected, we found lower
employment levels both for men and women during the three waves of the pandemic
than before the crisis, with the largest employment shock recorded during the first wave.
Women have lower employment levels than men in all time periods. At the same time, they
also lose less employment, especially during the first wave of the crisis. During the first
wave, the drop in employment was 27 pp for men versus 20pp for women, narrowing the
absolute gender gap in employment. The gender gap in hours of work followed a similar
Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 15 of 23

pattern, narrowing slightly during the first wave. However, the gender gap in hourly
wages, which was very small in the pre-COVID scenario, widened during the pandemic.

Table 1. Employment, wages and income pre-COVID and during the three waves of the pandemic
by gender.

Men Women
Pre-COVID Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Pre-COVID Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
Employment rate 0.79 0.52 0.62 0.61 0.67 0.47 0.54 0.53
Weekly employee hours (predicted) 31.3 20.5 24.7 24.6 21.2 15.3 17.3 17.2
Employee hourly wage (predicted) 19.20 18.18 17.14 17.94 19.01 16.36 16.82 16.66
Market Income 43,047 29,188 32,944 33,224 25,806 17,322 19,865 19,634
Gender gap in Market Income 40% 41% 40% 41%
Benefits 5845 12,166 10,792 10,770 7100 12,530 11,287 11,305
Tax + Social security 13,076 10,281 11,399 11,356 9456 7831 8401 8372
Disposable income 35,816 31,073 32,336 32,638 23,450 22,022 22,751 22,566
Gender gap in Disposable income 35% 29% 30% 31%
Source: Own calculations using the NUI Galway microsimulation model linked to 2017 SILC data nowcasted to
December 2019 (pre-COVID), May 2020 (wave 1), October 2020 (wave 2) and January 2021 (wave 3). All monetary
values are annual unless otherwise specified. Employment and wage statistics relate to 18–65-year-olds. Income
relates to those ≥ 18.

In the pre-COVID scenario, male employees earned an average of EUR 19.20 per hour.
This fell to EUR 18.18 in wave one and EUR 17.14 in wave two before slightly recovering
to EUR 17.94 in wave three. The average wage rate for women fell from EUR 19.01 in the
pre-COVID scenario to EUR 16.36 in wave one of the pandemic. Female hourly wages
registered a slight recovery after wave one, increasing to EUR 16.82 and EUR 16.66 in waves
two and three. However, in all three waves of the pandemic, the raw gender wage gap for
employees is larger than in the pre-COVID scenario. This is likely to reflect the non-random
nature of job losses, which are concentrated in particular sectors of the economy such as
hospitality, construction and childcare, as well as asymmetric wage reductions by gender.
The result of changes to employment and wages is that market incomes dropped for men
and women, but the relative gender gap in market incomes was maintained at around
40%–41%.
The system of taxes and benefits, however, works well to reduce the gender income
gap during the pandemic. After taxes and benefits, the gender gap in disposable income is
35% in the pre-COVID scenario. This gap was reduced to 29% in the first wave and 30–31%
in the following waves. Men caught up with women in terms of benefits during the first
wave, profiting from larger relative increases compared to women. This is consistent with
the larger drops in employment experienced by men in the first wave. In contrast, gender
differences in taxes paid seem to have been affected little during the pandemic, with both
groups paying less in tax.
Table 2 shows how the components of disposable income change for men and women
in the baseline (pre-COVID) and in the three subsequent waves of the pandemic. Pre-
COVID annual market income, which includes earnings, investment income and private
pensions, is EUR 43,047 for men and EUR 25,806 for women. This gives a gender gap in
market income of 40%. Gross income, which sums up market income and benefits, is higher
than market income at EUR 48,892 for men and EUR 39,906 for women. The absolute
difference between male and female gross income is less than the difference between male
and female market income, indicating that benefits provide some redistribution between
men and women. Market income net of tax (which excludes benefits) is EUR 29,971 for
men and EUR 16,350 for women. Finally, disposable income for men, at EUR 35,816, is
35% higher than the disposable income of women of EUR 23,450. The tax benefit system
cushions the gender income gap by five percentage points in the pre-COVID baseline.
Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 16 of 23

Table 2. Wages, hours of work in income in pre- and post-COVID scenarios and in counterfactual
scenarios for women.

Employee Weekly Annual Annual Annual Market Annual

Gender Gender
Hourly Hours Market Gross Income Net of Disposable
Gap Gap
Wages of Work Income Income Tax Income
Pre-COVID Men 19.20 31.3 43,047 48,892 29,971 35,816
Women Predicted 19.01 21.2 25,806 40% 32,906 16,350 23,450 35%
Adjusted * 19.72 32.3 40,800 5% 47,262 26,901 33,363 7%
Adjusted ** 18.98 32.3 42,172 2% 48,610 27,831 34,269 4%
Post-COVID
Men 18.18 18.2 29,188 41,354 18,907 31,073
wave 1
Women Predicted 16.36 15.3 17,322 41% 29,852 9491 22,022 29%
Adjusted * 18.66 25.9 32,179 −10% 42,659 20,222 30,702 1%
Adjusted ** 17.76 23.1 30,199 −3% 41,911 18,359 30,071 3%
Post-COVID
Men 17.14 24.7 32,944 43,736 21,544 32,336
wave 2
Women Predicted 16.82 17.3 19,865 40% 31,151 11,464 22,751 30%
Adjusted * 18.79 27.3 34,132 −4% 44,293 21,699 31,859 1%
Adjusted ** 16.95 26.7 33,086 0% 43,668 20,745 31,327 3%
Post-COVID
Men 17.94 24.6 33,224 43,994 21,868 32,638
wave 3
Women Predicted 16.66 17.2 19,634 41% 30,938 11,262 22,566 31%
Adjusted * 18.95 27.4 34,323 −3% 44,393 21,937 32,007 2%
Adjusted ** 17.44 26.7 34,014 −2% 44,612 21,401 31,998 2%
Source: Own calculations using the NUI Galway microsimulation model linked to 2017 SILC data nowcasted to
December 2019 (pre-COVID), May 2020 (wave 1), October 2020 (wave 2) and January 2021 (wave 3). Employment
and wage statistics relate to 18–65-year-olds. Income relates to those ≥18. Notes: The adjusted * scenario adjusts
female labour market participation and hours to represent the male structure and adjusts female wages so that
they are paid according to the male wage structure. The adjusted ** scenario additionally adjusts the occupation
and industry structure of women so that it follows that of men. Gross income = market income + benefits. Market
income net of tax = market income–tax–social security.

Looking at the adjusted* and adjusted** scenarios for women indicates how this
picture would change if women (i) supplied labour at the same rate as men and were
rewarded for their labour market characteristics in the same way as men and (ii) if women
additionally worked according to the occupation and industry structure of men. In the
adjusted* scenario, the gender gap in market income falls from 40% to 5%, and the gender
gap in disposable income falls from 35% to 7%. In the adjusted** scenario, the gender gap
in market income falls further to 2%, and the gender gap in disposable income falls to
4%. In each case, the inclusion of benefits decreases the absolute gender gap in income.
In the baseline, the inclusion of tax also decreases the gender gap in income, while in the
adjusted* and adjusted** scenarios, the inclusion of tax increases the gender income gap
slightly. This results in a relative gender gap in disposable income that is slightly higher
than the gender gap in market income for the two adjusted scenarios.
Post-COVID, the gender gap in market income is similar in relative terms (40–41%
depending on the wave in question) to the baseline, although market income for men and
women has decreased significantly. This reflects the fact that, while average labour supply
decreased relatively more for men (particularly in the first wave), average hourly wages
decreased relatively more for women. However, the gender gap in disposable income is
significantly lower in each wave of the pandemic (at 29–31%) than in the baseline. Benefits
reduce the gender gap in income slightly in each wave, but taxation provides much stronger
redistribution, reducing the absolute size of the gender gap in income substantially in each
wave. Men, who see relatively larger decreases in their labour supply, benefit relatively
more from the welfare system, while women, who see relatively larger decreases in their
average wage, pay relatively less in tax. The overall effect is in favour of women as the
cushioning effect of the tax–benefit system on the gender gap in income doubles in the
pandemic scenarios to 10–12 percentage points, depending on the wave.
These results can be visualised more clearly in Figures 5 and 68 . First, we explored
how the structure of the gender gap in market incomes evolved during the course of
the COVID-19 crisis. Figure 5 decomposes the gender gap in market income into the
 Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 18 of 24

Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 17 of 23

These results can be visualised more clearly in Figures 5 and 68. First, we explored
how the structure of the gender gap in market incomes evolved during the course of the
COVID-19 crisis. Figure 5 decomposes the gender gap in market income into the contri-
contribution bution
of gender differences
of gender in wages
differences and and
in wages labour market
labour marketparticipation and
participation andhours,
hours, gender
gender differences in occupation and industry structures and the contribution of
differences in occupation and industry structures and the contribution of allall
other
other differ-
differences inences
characteristics/returns between men men
and women 9.
in characteristics/returns between and women 9.

Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 19 of 24

may be due to different patterns of occupational sorting in Ireland compared to other

countries or national lockdowns of different severities. A cross-country study using de-
composition methods linked to microsimulation models could determine the precise ex-
planation.
Figure 5. The Figure 5. The components
components
Next, we of explored
the gender of the
thegap
gender gap in
in market
cushioning
market Source:
income.
effect
income. Source: Own calculations using the
Own calculations
of the tax–benefit system on using
the gender in-
the NUI Galway NUI Galway microsimulation
microsimulation model model linked
linked tobetweento 2017
2017 SILC SILC
data data nowcasted
nowcasted to December
to December 2019 2019 (pre-
come gap by taking the difference the gender gap in market
COVID), May 2020 (wave 1), October 2020 (wave 2) and January 2021 (wave 3). Sample income and the
is ≥gen-
18.
(pre-COVID), Mayder 2020in(wave
gap 1), October
disposable 2020similar
income, (wave 2)to and January
Doorley and 2021 (wave
Keane 3). Sample
(2020). Figure is
6 ≥18.
illustrates the
Notes: The gender work/wage gap, occupational segregation gap and other gap correspond to the
Notes: The gender work/wage
cushioning
three terms ineffect gap, occupational
of the
equation 1 intax–benefitsegregation gap and
system during
Section 4.4.2. other
the gap of
course correspond to the isolating
the pandemic,
three terms in equation 1 in Section
the contribution 4.4.2. policy from the contribution of tax policy.
of benefit
During the COVID-19 crisis, the absolute gender gap in market incomes dropped
compared to the pre-COVID period. The largest drop in the absolute gap was recorded
during the first wave, followed by a slight increase in wave 2/3. In relative terms, the gen-
der market income gap was stable at around 40–41% (men = reference). The structure of
the gap, however, changed. We found an increase in the relative contribution of the gen-
der differences in labour market participation, hours and wage structure, counterbalanced
by a negative contribution of gender differences in the occupation and industry structure.
In other words, labour market participation, hours and wage differences between men
and women contributed more to gender income gaps during the crisis: women would
have lost less during the crisis had they had the labour market participation, hours and
returns of men. On the other hand, gender differences in the structure of occupation and
industry benefitted women: had their occupations been distributed similarly to men’s,
women would have recorded higher losses in market incomes. This finding is consistent
with conclusions made by Alon et al. (2021) that occupation and industry structure played
a major role in determining unequal impacts of the crisis by gender. In the case of Ireland,
the gender division of occupation and industry actually benefitted women. Their repre-
sentation in essential roles outweighed their representation in locked-down roles. This
finding differs somewhat from speculation by Dang and Nguyen (2021) that, because
women are over-represented in the services sector, they were more likely to lose their job
during the pandemic in the six countries in their study. This cross-country discrepancy

Figure 6.
Figure 6. Cushioning Cushioning
effect of taxeseffect of taxes and
and benefits. benefits.
Source: OwnSource: Own calculations
calculations using
using the NUI the NUI Galway
Galway
microsimulation model linked to 2017 SILC data nowcasted to December 2019
microsimulation model linked to 2017 SILC data nowcasted to December 2019 (pre-COVID), May 2020 (pre-COVID), May
2020 (wave 1), October 2020 (wave 2) and January 2021 (wave 3). Sample is ≥ 18. Notes: The cush-
(wave 1), October 2020 (wave 2) and January 2021 (wave 3). Sample is ≥18. Notes: The cushioning
ioning effect of the tax and benefit systems correspond to the terms in equation 2 in Section 4.4.2.
effect of the tax and benefit systems correspond to the terms in Equation (2) in Section 4.4.2.
Before the COVID-19 crisis, both taxes and benefits were contributing to cushioning
the gender gap in income, although taxes were playing a larger role. However, during the
pandemic, most of the cushioning role was taken over by tax policy. As Table 1 shows
benefit receipt by men and women is roughly similar in the three waves of the pandemic
Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 18 of 23

During the COVID-19 crisis, the absolute gender gap in market incomes dropped
compared to the pre-COVID period. The largest drop in the absolute gap was recorded
during the first wave, followed by a slight increase in wave 2/3. In relative terms, the
gender market income gap was stable at around 40–41% (men = reference). The structure of
the gap, however, changed. We found an increase in the relative contribution of the gender
differences in labour market participation, hours and wage structure, counterbalanced by
a negative contribution of gender differences in the occupation and industry structure.
In other words, labour market participation, hours and wage differences between men
and women contributed more to gender income gaps during the crisis: women would
have lost less during the crisis had they had the labour market participation, hours and
returns of men. On the other hand, gender differences in the structure of occupation and
industry benefitted women: had their occupations been distributed similarly to men’s,
women would have recorded higher losses in market incomes. This finding is consistent
with conclusions made by Alon et al. (2021) that occupation and industry structure played a
major role in determining unequal impacts of the crisis by gender. In the case of Ireland, the
gender division of occupation and industry actually benefitted women. Their representation
in essential roles outweighed their representation in locked-down roles. This finding
differs somewhat from speculation by Dang and Nguyen (2021) that, because women are
over-represented in the services sector, they were more likely to lose their job during the
pandemic in the six countries in their study. This cross-country discrepancy may be due to
different patterns of occupational sorting in Ireland compared to other countries or national
lockdowns of different severities. A cross-country study using decomposition methods
linked to microsimulation models could determine the precise explanation.
Next, we explored the cushioning effect of the tax–benefit system on the gender income
gap by taking the difference between the gender gap in market income and the gender
gap in disposable income, similar to Doorley and Keane (2020). Figure 6 illustrates the
cushioning effect of the tax–benefit system during the course of the pandemic, isolating the
contribution of benefit policy from the contribution of tax policy.
Before the COVID-19 crisis, both taxes and benefits were contributing to cushioning
the gender gap in income, although taxes were playing a larger role. However, during the
pandemic, most of the cushioning role was taken over by tax policy. As Table 1 shows,
benefit receipt by men and women is roughly similar in the three waves of the pandemic,
although it was relatively higher for women in the pre-COVID scenario. While women were
disproportionately benefiting from the welfare system prior to the crisis, the scale of job
loss and the introduction of flat-rate, non-means-tested benefits for the newly unemployed
means that men are benefitting from the welfare system at the same rate as women during
the pandemic.
The effect of benefits on the gender income gap is lower, the stronger the shock (e.g.,
wave 1). There are two consequences of this: firstly, although the tax–benefit system
provides less cushioning in absolute terms than before the crisis, the relative effect is larger.
Women’s disposable income is actually higher than their market income, on average, during
the crisis, reflecting the generous nature of the new pandemic income supports. Men’s
disposable income is lower than market income, on average, although not by as much as
it was in the pre-COVID scenario. Second, the taxation system is performing most of the
heavy lifting in terms of redistribution between men and women during the pandemic.
Men’s market income remains higher than women’s, although they suffer a slightly higher
loss of employment, so men continue to pay systematically more tax than women.

7. Discussion
This paper investigated the effect of three waves of the COVID-19 pandemic on gender
income inequality in Ireland. By using a nowcasting technique linked to a decomposition
framework, we showed the drivers of gender income inequality in Ireland just prior to the
COVID-19 pandemic and how these have changed over the course of the pandemic.
Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 19 of 23

Job losses were more concentrated among men during the first wave of the pandemic.
As in the case of the financial crisis, employment in white-collar, professional employment
proved to be more resilient than for men, while blue-collar, more manual work was less
robust. However, when the construction sector was allowed to remain open in later waves
of the pandemic, this differential disappeared.
Average hourly wages of men and women were very similar prior to the pandemic,
but these decreased more among women than men during the first wave of the pandemic.
This may reflect selection among those who remained in employment during the crisis but
might also reflect higher scarring of female wages than of male wages by the labour market
shock induced by the pandemic.10 Wage effects were more similar by gender in subsequent
waves of the pandemic.
The overall effect of employment and wage changes was that market income decreased
by similar relative amounts for men and women, and the gender gap in market incomes
remained stable at 40%. However, the composition of the market income gap shifted
during the pandemic. While the main source of this gap, labour supply and wage gaps,
remained stable, there was a shift in the contribution of occupational segregation. Prior
to the pandemic, occupational segregation contributed positively to the gender income
gap as men were disproportionately working in high-income occupations and industries.
This reflects traditional gender stereotypes in specific industries and professions that limit
opportunities for women. The structure of job and earnings loss during the pandemic has
reversed this, with women’s occupation and industry structure currently providing them
with an earnings advantage. This finding warrants monitoring as the economy recovers.
Prior to the pandemic, the tax–benefit system was reducing the gender income gap
from 40% to 35%. However, its cushioning effect doubled during the pandemic. Men
benefitted relatively more than women from welfare due to their higher employment losses
and the flat and non-means-tested nature of new supports. However, taxation policy
continued to automatically redistribute between men and women with the result that the
cushioning effect of the tax–benefit system on the gender income gap increased. Tax as
an automatic stabiliser provided very important redistribution between men and women
during the pandemic.
These results highlight the impact of a number of long-term trends in the Irish labour
market that impact underlying gender differences in market and disposable incomes. Firstly,
the gender gap in income is driven to a greater extent by hours worked and labour force
participation than by wage differences. High childcare costs are particularly relevant to this
issue. Successive OECD reports estimated that out-of-pocket childcare costs for full-time
care in Ireland are one of the highest in the OECD. Doorley et al. (2021) showed that most
households with children use considerably less formal childcare than this and this is likely
to be linked to affordability. Although the labour force participation rates and hours of
work for men and women have somewhat converged since the 1980s, there remains a larger
gap after childbearing. Further reducing the gender gap in income will require improved
policies both to enable work–life balance to support child-rearing, education policies that
reduce the growing gap in educational outcomes between men and women and challenges
to gender stereotypes. Continued monitoring of the evolution of the gender income gap as
the Irish economy recovers will indicate if the pandemic has harmed or bolstered progress
made to date.
These results also highlight international differences in labour markets and in the
effect of economic lockdowns. Ireland was one of the few countries studied to date in which
men lost more employment than women did during the pandemic. Our decomposition
analysis shows that this gender difference in employment loss is due to occupational sorting.
Women were over-represented in essential sectors in Ireland during the pandemic, so their
employment levels fell by less than men’s. The severity of the Irish lockdowns compared to
those experienced internationally may explain this finding. Alternatively, decomposition
analysis such as that carried out in this paper could be used for other countries to highlight
the explanatory difference in occupational sorting by gender.
Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 20 of 23

Author Contributions: Conceptualization, K.D., D.M.S. and C.O.; methodology, K.D., D.M.S. and
C.O.; formal analysis, K.D., D.M.S. and C.O.; writing—original draft preparation, K.D., D.M.S. and
C.O.; writing—review and editing, K.D., D.M.S. and C.O.; funding acquisition, K.D., D.M.S. and C.O.
All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This work was carried out with funding from the ESRI’s Tax, Welfare and Pensions Research
Programme (supported by the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, the Department of
Employment Affairs and Social Protection, the Department of Health, the Department of Children,
Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth and the Department of Finance). Funding from the Health
Research Board (HRB COVID-19 Rapid Response Award) is also gratefully acknowledged.
Data Availability Statement: Data can be obtained from EUROSTAT based on a formal request.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Appendix A

Table A1. Definition of income components and summary modelling information.

Variable Definition Level Treatment Transformation Model

total household
yh household aggregate –
disposable income
yhL gross labour income household aggregate –
emp
Ihi ,
emp employee income (wage*hours) individual modelled LM struct/Returns logit, log-linear
yhi
se ,
Ihi self-employment income
individual modelled LM struct/Returns logit, log-linear
yse
hi (receipt, amount)
IhK , capital income
individual modelled LM struct/Returns logit, log-linear
yinv
h
(receipt, amount)
pripen
Ih , private pensions
pripen individual modelled LM struct/Returns logit, log-linear
yh (receipt, amount)
other non-benefit incomes
yOh
individual aggregate, modelled LM struct/Returns logit, log-linear
(receipt, amount)
Notes: The Non-wage regressions use the following explanatory variables: university, upper secondary education,
number of children 0–3, number of children 4–11, number of children 12–15 married, age, age squared, rural,
suburban. The Wage regression uses the following explanatory variables: age, age squared, marital status, years
of education, occupation, industry.
Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 21 of 23

Table A2. Demographic and labour market variables.

Variable Definition Level Treatment Factor Model

nh household size household observed Demo –
household-level demographic characteristics (number of
children aged 0–3, 4–11 and 12–15) and individual
xh household observed Demo –
characteristics of the household head (marital status,
gender, age and age squared, education, urban–rural)
individual-level characteristics: gender, age and age
squared, university education, marital status, number of
xhi individual observed Demo –
children in the household (aged 0–3, 4–11 and 12–15),
citizenship, age × university, age squared × university
multinomial
occhi Occupation (1-digit ISCO); for working individuals only individual modelled LM Struct
logit
multinomial
indhi Industry (8 categories); for working individuals only individual modelled LM Struct
logit
pubhi Public or private sector job; for employees only individual modelled LM Struct logit
shi Number of hours worked individual modelled LM Struct Earnings/Wage
whi Average hourly wage rate; for employees only individual modelled Returns Log-linear
Notes: The Labour Market logit and multinomial logit model use the following explanatory variables: university,
upper secondary education, number of children 0–3, number of children 4–11, number of children 12–15 married,
age, age squared, rural, suburban; The Hours model uses the following explanatory variables: age, age squared,
marital status, years of education, occupation, industry.

Appendix B

Table A3. The composition of market income (annual EUR) and the cushioning effect of the tax–
benefit system.

Pre-COVID Post-COVID Wave 1 Post-COVID Wave 2 Post-COVID Wave 3

Market income gap 17,241 11,866 13,079 13,591
Gender work gap and unexplained gender
14,994 14,856 14,267 14,690
wage gap
Occupational segregation 1373 −1980 −1046 −309
Other 874 −1010 −142 −790
Cushioning of gender gap in income
Market income gap 17,241 11,866 13,079 13,591
Reduced by: Benefits −1255 −364 −495 −535
Tax −3620 −2450 −2999 −2984
Disposable income gap 12,366 9052 9586 10,072
Source: Own calculations using the NUI Galway microsimulation model linked to 2017 SILC data nowcasted to
December 2019 (pre-COVID); May 2020 (wave 1); October 2020 (wave 2) and January 2021 (wave 3). Sample is
≥18. Notes: The gender work/wage gap, occupational segregation gap and other gap correspond to the three
terms in Equation (1) in Section 4.4.2. The cushioning effect of the tax and benefit systems corresponds to the
terms in Equation (2) in Section 4.4.2.

Notes
1 Other countries that saw increases in female labour supply relative to male labour supply via hours and participation were
Austria, Norway and the UK.
2 Russell et al. (2017) describe the evolution of gender equality in the Irish labour market over the last 50 years.
3 This waiting period was reduced to 3 days in March 2021.
4 Detailed information about these characteristics, as well as those used in other parts of the framework is available in Appendix A.
5 Details of the variables used can be found in Appendix A.
6 The model is linked to the 2017 SILC, with an income reference period of 2016, so monetary values are uprated from 2016 levels
to 2020 levels.
7 These include Fuel Allowance, Rent Supplement, Residual Family Allowances, Supplementary Welfare Allowance, Minor Social
Assistance Benefits.
8 See also Table A3 in Appendix B.
 Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 311 22 of 23

9 These include gender gaps in self-employment probability and income; gender differences in non-labour income and demographic
differences unrelated to labour supply; occupation or industry.
10 Recent evidence from Boissay et al. (2021) suggests that while wages may have grown more slowly since the COVID-19 pandemic,
concerns about widespread wage scarring have somewhat receded.

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