DOI: 10.

2478/ejsta-2016-0001

‘Aquinas and Contemplation: A Neglected Topic’

Rik van Nieuwenhove

Jaarboek Thomas Instituut te Utrecht 35 (2016), p. 9-33

continued as
European Journal for the Study of Thomas Aquinas (2019 - ...)

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 AQUINAS ON CONTEMPLATION:
A NEGLECTED TOPIC1

Rik van Nieuwenhove

Introduction

While important scholarship has considered in detail Aquinas’s

views on the beatific vision and his indebtedness to Islamic and
early-Latin sources,2 the topic of contemplation remains rather
neglected.3 It is hard to account for this neglect. After all, Aquinas

1
Earlier versions of this paper were presented in Utrecht during the
Conference On the Virtuous Life organised by the Thomas Instituut in
December 2015, and at the invitation of the Irish Dominican Province,
on the occasion of the Aquinas Lecture (28 January, 2016) which
celebrated the 800th anniversary of the Dominican Order. I am grateful
to all present for their constructive comments, and especially to
Professor Harm Goris, Utrecht, for his detailed feedback.
2
For an outstanding recent contribution on Aquinas’s Latin sources,
with helpful references to literature, see Katja Krause, “Remodelling
Ultimate Human Happiness: Thomas Aquinas’ Commentary on the
Sentences and his Sources” Divus Thomas 118 (2015), 15-56.
3
Thomas Hibbs, “Interpretation of Aquinas’s Ethics Since Vatican II”
from Stephen Pope (ed.), The Ethics of Aquinas (Washington:
Georgetown University Press, 2002), 412: “Given Thomas’s emphasis
upon the crucial role of contemplation in the good life, it is surprising
how little attention has been devoted to the topic or to the role of
intellectual virtues. I might list the topic of contemplation and
intellectual virtue among those features of Aquinas’s moral thought
that remain neglected in the literature.” Only Josef Pieper [Happiness
and Contemplation (IN: St Augustine Press, 1996)], writing in the
1940s and ‘50s, considered it of sufficient importance to dedicate a
number of short books to it. There is a helpful contribution by Mary
Catherine Sommers “Contemplation and Action in Aristotle and
Aquinas” in G. Emery and M. Levering (eds.), Aristotle in Aquinas’s
Theology (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 167-85. Apart from a rather brief (and
somewhat abrasive) discussion of Aquinas’s notion of contemplation
10 RIK VAN NIEUWENHOVE

sees contemplation as the purpose and goal of our entire life (STh
II-II, q. 180, a. 4: contemplatio est finis totius humanae vitae) and
as an inchoative sharing in the beatific vision (STh II-II, q.180, a.
4: inchoatio beatitudinis), which, therefore, shapes almost every
aspect of his theological outlook, and his view on the human person
and her ultimate fulfilment in particular.

The following questions remain largely unexplored in recent

scholarship: What exactly is contemplation according to Aquinas?
To what extent does Aquinas transform the Aristotelian notion of
contemplation by importing elements from Christian and
Neoplatonic authors (e.g. Augustine, Gregory the Great, Boethius,
Ps-Dionysius, Richard of St Victor)? How do philosophical and
theological contemplation relate to each other? Does Aquinas treat
of “infused contemplation” (as some scholars such as Garrigou-
Lagrange and Torrell claim, see note 26), or is this a later category,
originating with the Carmelite mystics of the sixteenth century?
What is the role of the cognitive gifts of the Holy Spirit in relation
to contemplation, and how did Aquinas’s views on this matter
change from his Scriptum to (and throughout) the Summa
Theologiae? What is the role of charity in contemplation? How
does Aquinas conceive of the relation between the active and the
contemplative lives? Is he quietly abandoning the traditional notion

by Simon Tugwell in his book Albert and Thomas. Selected Writings.

Classics of Western Spirituality (NY: Paulist Press, 1988), 279-86, a
helpful discussion in Bernard McGinn’s The Harvest of Mysticism in
Medieval Germany. Vol. IV of The Presence of God. A History of
Western Christian Mysticism (NY: Herder & Herder, 2005), 27-38 and
a recent study by Edyta Imai (dealing with contemplation and
emotions), entitled Thomas Aquinas on Contemplation and the Human
Animal (Scholars’ Press, 2013) relatively little has been published in
the English-speaking world on the subject in the last forty years. In the
francophone world Jean-Pierre Torrell has engaged with the subject,
and there is a probing article by Adriano Oliva in Revue des Sciences
Philosophiques et Théologiques 96 (2012): 585-662, entitled “La
Contemplation des Philosophes selon Thomas d’Aquin.”
 AQUINAS ON CONTEMPLATION 11

that the contemplative life is superior to the active life, and is he, in
light of the Dominican charism, espousing a kind of mixed life?

In this contribution I will not be in a position to tackle all of these

questions, but I would like to consider the nature of contemplation.
I will argue that Aquinas operates with a broad and integrative
notion of contemplation, which includes philosophical
contemplation, theological contemplation, and the contemplation
of the ordinary Christian. This implies that I will take issue with
those scholars who put forward the view that Aquinas considers
philosophical contemplation to be radically different in kind from
“supernatural” theological contemplation (informed by charity).4

In part one of this contribution I will examine in some detail the

nature of contemplation, and uncover its intellective dimension. In
doing so, I will make a subsidiary claim, namely that a central
aspect of Aquinas’s notion of contemplation, namely the
characterisation of contemplation as intuitus simplex, is actually
Neoplatonic rather than Aristotelian in inspiration. This claim is
bound to strike some as provocative; after all, Aquinas’s
indebtedness to Aristotle’s views on contemplation are well-
documented.5 In a second part I will examine the relation between
philosophical and theological contemplation, while in part three I
will consider how the intuitive or simple nature of contemplation
can accommodate the contemplation of the ordinary faithful.

4
Some scholars (e.g. Jordan Aumann in the Blackfriars Edition, Vol.
46, Action and Contemplation, 105-106) include the theological
activity of the theologian with dead faith (as well as philosophical
contemplation) in ‘acquired contemplation’, which they contrast with
‘acquired supernatural contemplation’ (such as that of theologian who
enjoys charity) and ‘mystical contemplation.’
5
An illustration: a cursory glance at STh II-II, q. 182, a. 1 (where
Aquinas argues for the superiority of the contemplative over the active
life), for instance, reveals that all eight arguments are drawn from
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, on which Aquinas had written an
extensive commentary.
12 RIK VAN NIEUWENHOVE

1. The intellective nature of contemplation, and its Neoplatonic

roots

In order to explain the intellective nature of contemplation I need

to discuss first the distinction between intellectus and ratio.
Aquinas contrasts ratio and intellectus throughout his works. In STh
I, q. 59, a. 1 ad 1, for instance, we read: “the intellect knows by
simple intuition, while reason knows by a process of discursion
from one thing to another.” Of course, as he points out in STh I, q.
79, a. 8 intellectus and ratio are not different faculties. However,
the one faculty of human cognition has two distinct operations, a
rational-discursive and an intellective one:
Reason and intellect in humans cannot be distinct powers.
We shall understand this clearly if we consider their respective
actions. For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth:
and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another,
so as to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels, who
according to their nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible
truth, have no need to advance from one thing to another; but they
apprehend the truth simply and without mental discursion
(simpliciter et absque discursu veritatem rerum apprehendunt), as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. VII). But we arrive at the knowledge of
intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to another; and
therefore we are called rational. Reasoning, therefore, is compared
to understanding, as movement is to rest, or acquisition to
possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the
imperfect. 6

6
The quotation continues: “And since movement always proceeds
from something immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence it is
that human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery (secundum
viam inquisitionis vel inventionis), advances from certain things simply
understood – namely, the first principles; and, again, by way of
judgment (in via iudicii) returns by analysis (resolvendo) to first
principles, in the light of which it examines what it has found. Now it
is clear that rest and movement are not to be referred to different
powers, but to one and the same, even in natural things: since by the
same nature a thing is moved towards a certain place.” From first
 AQUINAS ON CONTEMPLATION 13

A number of points are worthy of note in this context: first, while

human cognition is mainly rational-discursive, it is also intellective:
discursive reasoning culminates in a moment of intellective
understanding or insight. As Aquinas suggests elsewhere, human
cognition is therefore dialectical (in the Hegelian, not in the
Aristotelian sense) or, to use Aquinas’s phrase: ‘circular’7, i.e., our
discursive reasoning processes cannot begin without assenting in
an intellective manner to a number of principles or truths which we
simply grasp without discursive reasoning (such as the principle of
non-contradiction), and our reasoning process culminates and
comes to rest in intellective understanding.8
Secondly, our rationality is a kind of shadow9 of the pure
intellectivity of angels, which it mirrors, and in which it

principles we arrive at new truths which we had not known earlier, and
this is called via inquisitionis or inventionis. It is also possible that an
‘analytic’ move occurs, when by way of resolution (via iudicii) we
return to first principles. (See: In De Div Nom no. 711). For our
purposes it is important to note that in both cases, whether by via
inquisitionis or via iudicii, we begin and end with an intellective
moment of understanding, or with something that is self-evident
(which can also be an experimental datum).
7
De Ver q. 10, a. 8 ad 10: “the circularity is observed in this, that reason
reaches conclusions from principles by way of discovery, and by way
of judgement examines the conclusions which have been found,
analysing them back to the principles.”
8
STh II-II, q. 8, a. 3 ad 2:“The discourse of reason always begins from
an understanding and ends at an understanding; because we reason by
proceeding from certain understood principles, and the discourse of
reason is perfected when we come to understand what previously did
not know.”
9
The metaphor of shadow, which Aquinas repeatedly uses, is derived
from Isaac Israeli: “Ratio oritur in umbra intelligentiae” (II Sent d. 3 q.
1, a. 6; see also: I Sent d. 3 q. 4, a. 1 ad 4; d. 25, q. 1, a. 1 ad 4; III Sent
d. 14 q. 1, a. 3 sol. 2 ad 3; Expos De Trin q. 1, a. 1 ad 4; De Ver q. 5, a.
8; q. 8, a. 3 ad 3; and q. 24, a. 3.
14 RIK VAN NIEUWENHOVE

participates,10 no matter how imperfectly. There are, of course,

important differences between human and angelic cognition:
Whereas angels have an immediate grasp of truth beyond temporal
succession (sine continuo et tempore)11 through the intermediary of
innate intelligible species, we know in a ratiocinative manner
through the intermediary of sensible species acquired through
abstraction. The natural manner of knowing for an angelic nature is
to know truth “without investigation or movement of reason”
whereas we know mostly through inquiry and by moving from one
thing to another.12 Nonetheless, we too share in intellectivity:
The human soul, according to what is highest in it, attains to
that which is proper to angelic nature, so that it knows some things
at once and without investigation (anima humana, quantum ad id
quod in ipsa supremum est, aliquid attingit de eo quod proprium
est angelicae naturae; scilicet ut aliquorum cognitionem habeat
subito et sine inquisitione) although it is lower than angels in this,
that it can know the truth in these things only by receiving
something from sense.13
Thirdly, the distinction between the rational and intellective
nature of cognition, as well as the notion of contemplation in terms
of simplex intuitus, appear more indebted to Neoplatonic sources

10
We are intellective per participationem (STh I, q. 108, a. 5). For the
notion of participation, see Rudi te Velde, Participation and
Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill, 1997).
11
III Sent d. 14 q. 1, a. 3 sol. 2.
12
De Ver q. 16, a. 1.
13
De Ver q. 16, a. 1; cf. also De Malo q. 16, a. 5; De Ver q. 8, a. 15.
Again, in De Ver q. 16, a. 1 Aquinas affirms that “human nature,
insofar as it comes in contact with the angelic nature, must both in
speculative and practical matters know truth without investigation.
And this knowledge must be the principle of all the knowledge which
follows, whether speculative or practical, since principles must be
more stable and certain.” Two aspects deserve attention: first, Aquinas
alludes to the Neoplatonic notion of participation in a hierarchy (“in
contact with…”); secondly, synderesis also involves a kind of intuition
or insight. This I will not develop in this contribution.
 AQUINAS ON CONTEMPLATION 15

than to Aristotle.14 While Aquinas’s philosophy of mind is

undoubtedly deeply Aristotelian, his views on contemplation
incorporate an important Neoplatonic element, and it is this
Neoplatonic element which, perhaps surprisingly, allows for an
inclusive and integrative notion of contemplation, which covers
both Christian and philosophical contemplation, as I hope to show.

It is revealing to survey the most important texts which emphasise

the distinction between ratio and intellectus, and the references
Aquinas quotes: I Sent d. 3 q. 4, a. 1 ad 4 (with a reference to Ps-
Dionysius); II Sent d. 9 q. 1, a. 8 ad 1 (Ps-Dionysius); De Ver q. 5,
a. 1 ad 5 (with a reference to Boethius); q. 8, a. 15 (Ps-Dionysius);
q. 15, a. 1 (Boethius and Ps-Dionysius); q. 24, a. 3 (no reference);
Expos De Trin q. 2, a. 2 (no reference) and q. 6, art. 1 (Boethius);
STh I, q. 58, a. 3 (no reference) and a. 4 (Ps.-Dionysius); I, q. 59,
a.1 ad 1 (no reference); I, q. 79, a. 8 (Ps-Dionysius); STh I, q. 79, a.
8 ad 2 (Boethius); II-II, q. 8, a. 1 obj. 2 (Ps-Dionysius); I, q. 83, a.
4 (no reference); II-II, q. 9, a.1 ad 1 (no reference); II-II, q. 180, a.
3 (Ps-Dionysius). In STh II-II. q. 8, a. 1 obj. 2 (a text I will discuss
below) the objection reveals the source from The Divine Names:
“the mode of human nature is to know the truth, not simply (which
is a sign of understanding) but discursively (which is a sign of

14
Aquinas, when distinguishing between discernere, cogitare and
intelligere, associates the notion of intelligere as simplex intuitus with
the writings of Augustine (cf. I Sent d. 3 q. 4, a.5) but scholars have
been unable to find its source in Augustine. Augustine discusses
cogitatio in De Trin XIV.7, quoted in STh II-II, q. 180, a.3 ad 1.
Perhaps a remote inspiration here was the Pseudo-Augustinian De
Spiritu et Anima, chs 1 and 23, which Aquinas quotes in De Ver q. 15,
a. 1: “the sight of the soul by which it looks at the true.” A more
immediate source is Boethius’s De Consol Phil Bk V (especially in
relation to the contrast between the ‘rest’ of intellect, and the
‘movement’ of reason), and, of course, Pseudo-Dionysius, who is
quoted (from In De Div Nom IV, 8) for instance, in De Ver q. 8, a. 15.
In STh II-II, q. 8, a. 1 obj. 2 he also refers to In De Div Nom VII for the
distinction between discursive and multiple reasoning and a knowledge
in a simple manner (simpliciter) through intellectus.
16 RIK VAN NIEUWENHOVE

reason), as Dionysius explains (Div. Nom. VII).” As this sample

suggests: whenever Aquinas is contrasting intellectus and ratio he
invariably appeals to Ps-Dionysius or Boethius, if he refers to his
sources at all, and never to Aristotle.

This distinction between intellectus and ratio is of immediate

significance in relation to contemplation. While in general terms
Aquinas describes contemplation as “the consideration of truth” he
characterises it in more specific terms as “a simple gaze upon the
truth” (STh II-II, q. 180, a.3 ad 1: contemplatio pertinet ad ipsum
simplicem intuitum veritatis) and, as I mentioned, Aquinas always
draws on Christian-Neoplatonic sources to describe this simple,
intellective or non-discursive grasp of things, not Aristotle.

This observation raises the question: why would Aquinas have

drawn on Ps-Dionysius and Boethius to develop the intellective
notion of contemplation rather than on Aristotle? Aristotle was,
after all, also familiar with the distinction between noein and
dianoeisthai (e.g., De An. 429a 23-24; 408b 18-31) and he
repeatedly acknowledges the non-discursive nature of nous, which
simply accepts certain principles without argument or deduction.
An in-depth answer to this question would require an exhaustive
comparison of Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s views on contemplation,
scientia, intellectus and sapientia – an enterprise I cannot undertake
within the confines of this paper. Still, we can hint at a possible
answer.

Aristotle uses nous both in a general sense to include all operations

of reason (e.g. 429a23), or to refer to a non-discursive apprehension
of first principles, in which instance it is clearly distinct from
dianoia (discursive reasoning). When he uses it in this more
restricted sense, such as in Posterior Analytics, nous (intellectus)
refers to grasping first principles, which are necessary to generate
the reasoning process in the first place, and avoid an infinite regress.
Specifically in the context of contemplation a characteristic (and
well-known) passage from Nicomachean Ethics Bk VI.6 (1140b31-
1141a8) may prove instructive in relation to the question we raised.
Here Aristotle discusses the intellectual virtues of nous
 AQUINAS ON CONTEMPLATION 17

(intellectus), episteme (scientia), and sophia (sapientia); the latter

is the most excellent and characteristic virtue of the contemplative
person. He explains that because episteme involves reason (meta
logou) the insight into first principles is not a matter of episteme but
of nous: “what is scientifically known is demonstrable” while first
principles are not. Thus, the end-result of demonstrative reasoning
is called episteme (scientia), and it always presupposes reasoning
(meta logou): scientia is from conclusions, intellectus relates to
principles. After having reiterated that “understanding and not
reasoning deals with first principles,” he adds: “nor is wisdom
[exclusively] about origins; for it is proper to the wise person to
have a demonstration of some things” (apodeixis).15 He then goes
on to describe wisdom as the combination of understanding and
episteme: “the wise person must not only know what is derived
from the origins of a science, but also grasp the truth about the
origins. Therefore wisdom is understanding plus scientific
knowledge.”

These passages indicate that not just episteme, but sophia as well
(as the combination of intellective apprehension of principles and
demonstrative reasoning) remains intrinsically linked with
apodeixis, and is therefore non-simple or composite. Aristotle
generally associates the outcome of the demonstrative reasoning
process with episteme, rather than with nous: nous is primarily
concerned with principles16 while episteme/science is the outcome
of demonstrative reasoning.17 In short, it seems doubtful that, for
Aristotle, episteme (which is essentially a grasp of demonstration,
cf. Post. An. I.2) can be simple. The same applies, I suspect, to
Aristotle’s sophia (as the combination of nous and episteme), which
remains apodeictic. Aquinas, at least in his own theological

15
Nicomachean Ethics, 1141a 1-3. I have made use of the translation
by Terence Irwin, Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics (IN: Indianapolis,
1985), 156-7.
16
Post An, 100b5.
17
In Aquinas’s words –when commenting on Aristotle’s De Anima
428a 16-18, III, lect. 5 (no. 648): “simple understanding bears upon
first principles, and science upon demonstrated conclusions.”
18 RIK VAN NIEUWENHOVE

syntheses (as distinct from the Commentaries on Aristotle)

explicitly allows for the possibility that the outcome of our
reasoning process can be simple or non-composite, and he draws
on Neoplatonic sources –especially the Pseudo-Dionysius– to make
this point. For Aquinas, there are instances in which both science
and wisdom can be simple or non-composite, as I will show. I will
suggest later that Aquinas had good reasons (albeit theological
ones) to identify contemplation with a simple understanding of
truth rather than with Aristotelian scientia or sapientia, which
remain composite: as I will try to show in part three, if
contemplation is effectively characterised as a simple, non-
discursive understanding of truth, Aquinas can incorporate the
contemplation of the ordinary faithful within his overall notion of
contemplation. With an apodeictic notion of contemplation, such as
Aristotle’s, this is not possible.

For now, let’s examine in some more detail contemplation as

simple intuition of truth and how it relates to other acts of human
cognition. As indicated earlier, in contemplation we have to
abandon discursive reasoning, and direct all the operations of the
soul toward the simple contemplation of the intelligible truth
(omnes operationes animae reductuntur ad simplicem
contemplationem veritatis intelligibilis).18 The gaze of the soul
must then be fixed in an intellective manner on the contemplation
of the one simple truth (cessante discursu, figatur eius intuitus in
contemplatione unius simplicis veritatis).19 STh II-II, q.180, a.3,
then, considers the relation of this act of contemplation with other
acts. More specifically, Aquinas asks “Whether there are various
actions pertaining to the contemplative life?” He basically argues
that there is only one basic act in contemplation, namely the
grasping of truth, in which contemplation comes to fruition,
although this one final act presupposes a number of other cognitive
acts, such as inductive inquiry and ‘analytic’ judgement (i.e., via
inventionis and via iudicii).20 In his Response he first refers, again,

18
ST II-II, q. 180, a. 6 ad 2; In De Div Nom no. 906.
19
ST II-II, q. 180, a. 6 ad 2.
20
See footnote 6 of this contribution.
 AQUINAS ON CONTEMPLATION 19

to angelic intelligence, pointing out that despite the differences

between angelic and human cognition, we too arrive at the one act
of beholding the truth:
According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. VII) between humans
and angel there is this difference, that an angel perceives the truth
by simple apprehension, whereas we arrive at the perception of a
simple truth by a process from multiplicity (ex multis pertingit ad
intuitum simplicis veritatis). Accordingly, then, the contemplative
life has one act wherein it is finally completed, namely the
contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives its unity.
We share in a hierarchy, midpoint between angels and the
rest of the animal kingdom. In the apex of our cognition, we share
to some degree in an intellective understanding which is connatural
to angels. Aquinas now argues for the unity of the contemplative
life on the basis of the one act of contemplating truth, which he
characterises in terms of intuitus simplicis veritatis, as he puts it in
the first Reply.21 In summary, for Aquinas, contemplation is the
terminus of human reasoning; it is the high-point of human
understanding; it is this which mirrors the intellective operation of
angels; and it is this climax of understanding that pertains especially
to contemplation, and bestows unity on the contemplative life.
The significance of what Aquinas is saying here in relation
to the unity of the contemplation should not be overlooked. For
instance, prayer, reading, study, meditation are traditionally
considered to be contemplative activities. Does this mean, then, that
the contemplative life loses its unity, as it covers rather divergent
activities? This does not appear to be Aquinas’s view. The Sed
contra puts it in a summary fashion: “Life signifies here the
operation on which a man is chiefly intent. Wherefore if there are
several operations of the contemplative life, there will be, not one
but several contemplative lives.” For Aquinas contemplation is that
which gives ultimate meaning to human existence; on earth it is a
foretaste of the vision of God. This ideal at the heart of his moral
theology cannot be splintered into many ideals. Thus, while there
are many acts that precede the crowning act of contemplation, “the

21
STh II-II, q. 180, a. 3 ad 1, with reference to a text from Richard of
Saint Victor.
20 RIK VAN NIEUWENHOVE

contemplative life has one act wherein it is finally completed,

namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives its
unity.” This final act is an intellective apprehension or vision of
truth.
This observation has implications for the topic I now hope to
discuss. For Aquinas, truth is one. There is not one truth for
philosophers, and another one for theologians. Hence, it makes no
sense to treat philosophical and theological contemplation as
specifically different. To do so, would undermine the very integrity
of theology as a science which integrates the findings of other
sciences, including philosophy. It is now time to substantiate this
claim.

2. Theological and philosophical contemplation

In STh II-II, q. 180, a. 4 Aquinas raises the question “Whether the

contemplative life consists in the mere contemplation of God, or
also in the consideration of any truth whatsoever?” The full
response runs as follows:

I answer that, as stated above (II-II, q. 180, a.2), a thing may

belong to the contemplative life in two ways: principally,
and secondarily, or dispositively. That which belongs
principally to the contemplative life is the contemplation of
the divine truth, because this contemplation is the end of the
whole human life. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. I, 8) that
"the contemplation of God is promised us as being the goal
of all our actions and the everlasting perfection of our joys."
This contemplation will be perfect in the life to come, when
we shall see God face to face, wherefore it will make us
perfectly happy: whereas now the contemplation of the
divine truth is competent to us imperfectly, namely "through
a glass" and "in a dark manner" (1 Cor. 13:12). Hence it
bestows on us a certain inchoate beatitude, which begins
now and will be continued in the life to come; wherefore the
Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7) places our ultimate happiness in the
contemplation of the supreme intelligible good.
 AQUINAS ON CONTEMPLATION 21

Since, however, God's effects show us the way to the

contemplation of God himself, according to Rm. 1:20, "The
invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood
by the things that are made," it follows that the
contemplation of the divine effects also belongs to the
contemplative life, inasmuch we are guided thereby to the
knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig
xxix) that "in the study of creatures we must not exercise an
empty and futile curiosity, but should make them the
stepping-stone to things unperishable and everlasting."
Accordingly it is clear from what has been said (II-II, q.
180, aa. 2-3) that four things pertain, in a certain order, to the
contemplative life; first, the moral virtues; secondly, other
acts exclusive of contemplation; thirdly, contemplation of
the divine effects; the fourth contemplative factor is the
contemplation of the divine truth itself.22

This response rewards close reading.23 Aquinas had already

explained how the moral life can assist us in obtaining serenity,
which is a prerequisite for contemplation (art. 2). He had also
already mentioned different cognitive acts which contemplation
crowns (art.3). In the first paragraph of article 4, then, Aquinas
refers to Christian contemplation, including the contemplation at
the heart of the endeavours of the Christian theologian. Christian
theology takes God as its immediate object of study (cf. ST I, q. 1,
a. 7), and it does so from the perspective of assent to key Christian
beliefs. The quotation from 1 Cor. 13:12 further confirms this. In
the second paragraph Aquinas has in mind philosophical
contemplation, as the reference to Romans 1:19-20 suggests.
Indeed, the passage from Romans 1:19-20 is a stock phrase which
Aquinas generally uses to argue for the legitimacy of philosophical
pursuits. In STh I, q. 7, a. 6, for instance, he had already written,
quoting the same passage from Romans: “sacred doctrine
essentially treats of God viewed as the highest cause – not only so

22
Following the Leonine edition, which has: quartum vero
contemplativum, instead of quartum vero et completivum.
23
Compare Oliva, “La Contemplation…”, 590-92.
22 RIK VAN NIEUWENHOVE

far as he can be known through creatures just as philosophers knew

him – That which is known of God is manifest in them (Rom 1:19)
– but also so far as he is known to himself and revealed in others.”
In both instances the reference to Rom 1:19-20 backs up the validity
of a philosophical consideration of creation as a manifestation of
God. The reference to Augustine’s De Vera Rel further reinforces
the point that such a philosophical consideration of creation,
although legitimate, should not lose this theocentric focus lest it
become mere curiosity.

In the final paragraph Aquinas summarises his broad notion of the

contemplative life, which he had been developing in previous
articles: while contemplation involves several acts which precede
the contemplation of divine truth, it is the intellective contemplation
of truth which bestows on the contemplative life its unity. Thus, it
comprises the moral virtues, as well as other acts, which include
inquiry and judgement. It further involves the (philosophical)
contemplation of the creation, but ultimately it comes to fruition in
contemplatio divinae veritatis. Thus, while Aquinas admits there is
a certain hierarchy or order (ordine quodam) to contemplation there
is no hint that he sharply differentiates philosophical from
theological contemplation, or considers them to be “specifically
different.” As Simon Tugwell rightly pointed out, in the STh
Aquinas is not interested in making a distinction between the
intellectual life of the philosopher and that of Christians: “on the
contrary, he is eager to show the continuity between the saint and
the philosopher (…). The contemplative life is much more simply
and straightforwardly the intellectual life, whoever is leading it. A
Christian intellectual life must, of course, be motivated by charity,
like any other Christian activity; but that does not mean that it
becomes something quite different from anyone else’s intellectual
life.”24

The way we conceive of contemplation will have repercussions for

how we interpret how Aquinas conceives of the relation between
theology and philosophy, and vice versa.

24
S. Tugwell, Albert and Thomas, 285.
 AQUINAS ON CONTEMPLATION 23

Anyone who subscribes to the view that Christian and

philosophical contemplation are different in kind, will find it
difficult to account for the harmonious way in which Aquinas
conceives of the relation between theology and philosophy. Or
again, those scholars (such as Eugene Rogers, John Milbank, and
others) who are of the view that Aquinas has no place for
philosophical considerations in his theological outlook, will
probably be wedded to the position that Christian and philosophical
contemplation are inherently different acts – a position that
Aquinas, in my reading, does not support. Aquinas’s general notion
of contemplation –“the consideration of truth”– covers both
Christian and philosophical contemplation, and nowhere in the
Summa does Aquinas state that these are ‘specifically’ different, as
some commentators have asserted.25 Nor does Aquinas use the
phrase “infused contemplation” anywhere in his writings, as some
twentieth century scholars (e.g., from Garrigou-Lagrange to Jean-
Pierre Torrell) appear to claim.26 At the heart of contemplation is
an intellective understanding that Aquinas considers to be the
culmination of our reasoning processes, and this intellective

25
For the claim of a “specific difference”, see for instance the
comments by the Editors of the Blackfriars Edition, Summa Theologiae
Volume 46 Action and contemplation (2a2ae 179 - 182) Latin Text,
English Translation, Introduction, notes appendices & glossary by
Jordan Aumann (NY: Blackfriars and McGraw-Hill, 1966), Appendix
3 “Contemplation”: “Acquired supernatural contemplation [which
includes theological contemplation under the impetus of charity] issues
from the infused virtues of faith and charity. (…) It is (…) specifically
different from purely natural acquired recollection [which includes
philosophical contemplation].” ( 106).
26
For attributing “infused contemplation” to Aquinas, see for instance
R. Garrigou-Lagrange, Christian Perfection and Contemplation
(Rockford, Ill.: Tan Books, 2003), 221-35 and Jean-Pierre Torrell,
Christ and Spirituality… 15, with a reference (unconvincing, in my
view) to In Ioannem I, lect. 11, no. 211.
24 RIK VAN NIEUWENHOVE

understanding extends to both philosophical and theological

contemplation.27

In a helpful contribution Rudi te Velde has reminded us that the

widespread view of the relationship between reason and revelation
as constituting two separate sources of knowledge about God is
really “a distortion belonging to later times. Revelation, as
distinguished from reason, pertains to the formality under which
God is known as object of faith.”28 Thus, Sacra Doctrina is not a
science about a different reality; it is about the same reality as
metaphysics but seen under a different formality, namely “the
aspect of the intelligibility which things have when seen in the light
of God’s revelation.”29
Te Velde’s views will resound with all those who have read
the first question of the STh. The very first article addresses the
question “Whether, besides philosophy, any further doctrine is
required?” The answer is a resounding “Yes”: given our limitations
(in terms of intelligence and time) it was necessary, for our

27
A stronger case –yet still unconvincing, in my opinion– could be
made that the speculative sciences, namely natural science,
mathematics, and divine science involve different kinds of cognition
(through their respective approaches: rationabiliter, disciplinabiliter,
and intellectualiter) rather than that philosophy (“theology pursued by
philosophers”) and theology (“theology taught in Sacred Doctrine”)
involve a different intellectus. Cf. Expos De Trin q. 5 art. 4 and q. 6.
All our philosophical pursuits can be described as an intellectual
glimpse (quasi intuitu) which prepares us for Christian theology (cf.
ScG IV 1.4). Metaphysics is especially intellective, while natural
philosophy relies primarily on ratio or discursive reasoning. (Expos De
Trin q. 6 a.1). This suggests that metaphysics, being especially
intellective, is particularly apt at preparing us for the Christian
contemplation of God.
28
See Rudi A. te Velde, “Understanding the Scientia of Faith” in
Fergus Kerr (ed.), Contemplating Aquinas. On the Varieties of
Interpretation (IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 55-74. For
this quotation, see 61
29
Ibidem, 68
 AQUINAS ON CONTEMPLATION 25

salvation, that we should be taught divine truths by revelation. But

this does not imply that theology considers an entirely different area
of study: “there is no reason why those things which may be learned
from philosophical science, so far as they can be known by natural
reason, may not also be taught us by another science so far as they
fall within revelation.” (STh I, q. 1, a. 1 ad 2) Theology considers
things “under the formality of being divinely revealed” (STh I, q. 1,
a. 3) and is based on principles revealed by God (STh I, q. 1, a. 2).
Metaphysics also treats of God as the highest cause but it does so
from another angle (to use a spatial metaphor). To refer to a text
quoted earlier: “Sacred doctrine essentially treats of God viewed as
the highest cause –not only so far as he can be known through
creatures just as philosophers know him –That which is known of
God is manifest in them (Rom 1:19)– but also so far as he is known
to himself alone and revealed to others.” (STh I, q. 1, a. 6) Note that
Aquinas writes “not only so far as he can be known through
creatures” –which implies that theological science also includes
knowledge of God through creatures. In STh I, q. 1, a. 3 ad 2 he
drives home the point:
Objects which are the subject-matter of different
philosophical sciences can yet be treated of by this one single sacred
science under one aspect precisely so far as they can be included in
revelation. So that in this way, sacred doctrine bears, as it were, the
stamp of divine science, which is one and simple, yet extends to
everything.
In short, theology is an all-encompassing or architectonic
discipline for Aquinas: it also includes knowledge which we
usually associate with philosophy. It is this inclusivity of theology
as the overarching science which sanctions the use of philosophical
rationality within the domain of theology.30 Of course, such a broad
and inclusive approach does not weaken the claim that God remains
the primary object of the science of theology (as is argued in STh I,
q. 1, a. 7). Peter Lombard, for instance, had stated that other things
(such as “things and signs”) are also included a topics of theology.
Aquinas does not disagree but he makes the point that God remains
the primary subject of theology, and things are only treated as

30
Ibidem, 68.
26 RIK VAN NIEUWENHOVE

subject of theology if “they have a reference to God” as their origin

or end (STh I, q. 1, a. 7). This focus on God is essential for theology
to remain a unified science.
While the philosophical and the theological paths are both
legitimate ways of pursuing truth, Aquinas is, of course, in no doubt
about the superiority of the latter, as the first article in the Summa
Theologiae makes clear. Still, for Aquinas, philosophy and
theology are not in competition with one another; nor is it necessary
somehow to insulate theology from the intrusions of philosophy.
His perspective is more serene than our modern one: for him, our
philosophical pursuits point the way and open up a theological
vista, just as nature craves grace. This is perhaps one of the reasons
why by the end of the Secunda Secundae Aquinas operates with an
integrative view of contemplation. In defining contemplation in
broad terms as “nothing else than the consideration of truth”31 he
can cover both theological and philosophical truth. If we fail to
acknowledge Aquinas’s inclusive and integrative understanding of
contemplation, the status of theology as the science which
integrates the findings of other disciplines, while respecting their
integrity, will become eroded.
There is little doubt that Aquinas considered philosophy and
theology specifically different disciplines, as STh I, q. 1, a. 1 ad 2
states (differt secundum genus). But from this it does not follow that
they imply specifically different acts of understanding. One may
raise the legitimate question: is our act of understanding while
reading the five ways (a preamble to faith) or when pondering
philosophical arguments for the immortality of the soul (in
Disputed Questions On the Soul) specifically different from the act
of understanding a theological argument, such as that there must be
two wills in Christ, and not one (cf. STh III, q. 18, a. 1)? Or is there
any merit in the suggestion that a theologian on whom the virtue of
charity and the gift of wisdom have been bestowed, understands the
data of faith in a specifically different manner from one who does
not enjoy these gifts? (This is not to deny that the theologian who
has a living faith may understand them better or have a more
intimate understanding than a theologian who has a dead faith; but

31
STh I-II, q. 35, a. 5 ad 3: “nihil aliud sit quam consideratio veri.”
 AQUINAS ON CONTEMPLATION 27

that is a different claim). I am not aware that Aquinas suggests this

to be the case, and I suspect he would resist such a claim, for it
would splinter the contemplative life into a multiple acts: “if there
are several operations of the contemplative life, there will be, not
one but several contemplative lives.” Given the unity of
contemplation as the goal of human life, this seems an unacceptable
suggestion. I will now argue that this integrative notion of
contemplation does not merely include theological and
philosophical contemplation, but also the contemplation of the
ordinary Christian.

3. Contemplation of the ordinary Christian

Earlier, I have attempted to show that Aquinas invariably refers to

Neoplatonic sources to argue for the intellective nature of human
cognition, which, as we have seen, is central to his notion of
contemplation. I also suggested why he could not appeal to
Aristotle, given the apodeictic character attached to Aristotelian
contemplation. This raises a further question: why exactly does
intuitus simplex occupy such a pivotal role in Aquinas’s
understanding of contemplation? I will conclude this contribution
by hinting at a number of possible (theological) reasons.
Emphasising the intellective, non-discursive nature of
human cognition has a number of advantages. First, as indicated
earlier, it makes clear that to the degree that we, too, are intellective,
we share in a hierarchy which puts us within touching distance of
angels, who are entirely intellective. This matters to Aquinas for
whom hierarchy adds to the beauty of the created world.32
More importantly, it further supports his view that there is
continuity between our ways of knowing on earth, and the beatific
vision. The intellective dimension of contemplation on earth
prefigures our non-discursive ways of knowing God in the after-
life. This kind of continuity mattered to Aquinas the theologian, for
whom grace perfects nature but does not abolish it. Thus, the
intellective nature of contemplation enables Aquinas to argue more

32
ScG III, 97.3.
28 RIK VAN NIEUWENHOVE

cogently that contemplation on earth is an inchoative sharing in

heavenly beatitude.33
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, there is the issue of
inclusivity of contemplation. For Aristotle, as mentioned earlier,
the final acme of our reasoning processes appears to remain linked
with demonstration and knowledge of causes. For Aquinas the
culmination of contemplation is clearly intuitive or non-
discursive.34 In my view it is here that the notions of simplicity and
intuitus simplex are of particular significance. Aquinas is willing to
defend notions of scientia, intellectus and sapientia that are utterly
non-composite and non-discursive, especially when he discusses
the theoretical gifts of the Holy Spirit.
Given the fact that an exhaustive discussion of the gifts of
the Holy Spirit is beyond the confines of this paper, I will focus for
present purposes exclusively on Aquinas’s treatment of the
intellectual gifts of the Holy Spirit in the latter parts of the Summa
Theologiae. As is well-known, Aquinas altered his views on the
gifts of the Holy Spirit throughout his career. It was only towards
the end of his career that he appended the gifts to their relevant
theological and cardinal virtues. The cognitive gifts of intellectus
(II-II, q. 8) and scientia (II-II, q. 9) are appended to the theological

33
See STh II-II, q. 180, a. 4: “inchoatio beatitudinis, quae hic incipit ut
in futuro terminetur.”
34
See also this early text: III Sent d. 35 q. 1, a. 2 qc. 2: “The
contemplative life consists in the activity that one assumes (acceptat)
above all others. (…) Now, the inquiry of reason (inquisitio rationis)
proceeds from a simple regard of the intellect (a simplici intuitu
intellectus progreditur) – for one proceeds by starting out from
principles which the intellect holds; so too the intellect attains certainty
when the conclusions it draws can revert back to the principles through
which the intellect attained certainty. This is why the contemplative
life consists primarily in the operation of the intellect (Et ideo vita
contemplativa principaliter in operatione intellectus consistit): the
very word ‘contemplation’ suggests this as it denotes ‘vision.’ The
contemplative person, however, uses rational inquiry (inquisitione
rationis) so as to attain the vision of contemplation, which is his main
goal.”
 AQUINAS ON CONTEMPLATION 29

virtue of faith, while sapientia (II-II, q. 45) is discussed in the

context of charity, and concilium (II-II, q. 52) is associated with
prudence.
Aquinas usually distinguishes between two key operations of the
intellect, namely grasping the indivisible and judgement.35 In order
to clarify the distinction between the gifts of understanding and
knowledge he refers to these two basic operations. The gift of
knowledge involves judgement; the gift of understanding is an
instance of the first operation (the apprehension of quiddity): it
involves a certain perception of the truth,36 “an excellence of
cognition that penetrates into the heart of things” (excellentia
cognitionis penetrantis ad intima).37
The first objection of STh II-II, q. 8, a.1 is particularly
relevant for our purposes: given the fact that humans know truth
mainly discursively (discursive), which we associate with ratio
rather than knowing simply (simpliciter), which we usually connect
with intellectus, we should speak of ‘the gift of reason’ (donum
rationis) rather than ‘the gift of understanding’ (intellectus). In his
reply, Aquinas reiterates that our reasoning proceeds from, and
ends in, understanding. We speak therefore of ‘the gift of
understanding’ (rather than of ‘the gift of reason’) because the gift
of understanding is in comparison with what we know
supernaturally, what the natural light is in regards to the things we
know intuitively and primordially. Thus, the gift of understanding
assists us in immediately perceiving the truth (perceptio veritatis),
and piercing with the mind (mente penetrare) into the principles of
faith.38

35
In Meta Bk VI lect. 4 (no. 1232): “The intellect has two operations.
One of these is called the understanding of indivisibles, and this is the
operation by which the intellect forms simple concepts of things by
understanding the whatness of each one of them. The other operation
is that by which the intellect combines and separates.” See also In Meta
IV (no. 605); In De An III, nos 760-62; De Ver q. 14, a. 1. I Sent d. 19,
q. 5, a. 1 ad 7; Expos De Trin q. 5, a. 3.
36
STh II-II, q. 8, a. 5 ad 3.
37
STh II-II, q. 8, a. 1 ad 3.
38
STh II-II, q. 8, a. 6 ad 2.
30 RIK VAN NIEUWENHOVE

It should not strike us as particularly surprising that the gift

of understanding is non-discursive. After all, the same can be said
about the intellectual virtue of understanding. More significant is
how Aquinas characterises the gifts of knowledge and wisdom. The
first objection in article 1 of question 9 of the Secunda Secundae –
the article raises the question whether scientia is a gift– cites An.
Post. I, 2 (71 b18), where Aristotle writes that demonstration is a
syllogism producing scientia. Whereas science is the result
(effectum) of our natural reasoning efforts, the gift of knowledge
surpasses our natural ability. In his reply, Aquinas, while
acknowledging that human science is acquired by means of
demonstration, argues that the gift of the Holy Spirit is a
participated likeness in the divine way of knowing, which is non-
discursive and simple:
In God there is a sure judgement of truth without any
discursive process, by simple intuition (absque omni discursu
per simplicem intuitum). Therefore, God’s knowledge is not
discursive, or ratiocinative, but absolute and simple (non est
discursiva vel ratiocinativa, sed absoluta et simplex), to which that
knowledge is likened which is a gift of the Holy Spirit, since it
is a participated likeness thereof (participata simulitudo ipsius).39
In short, the non-discursive or intuitive nature of the gift of
knowledge is one of the key features that distinguishes it from the
intellectual virtue of scientia.
Following Augustine, Aquinas distinguishes between the
gifts of knowledge and wisdom by linking the former with the
cognition of things created, and the latter of things divine.40
Whereas the gift of knowledge pertains to judgements of created
things, the gifts of understanding and wisdom, then, are particularly

39
STh II-II, q. 9, a. 1 ad 1.
40
Augustine, De Trinitate XIII,24. In De Trin XII, 21-25 Augustine
had also associated wisdom with contemplation and knowledge with
action, making an interesting distinction between intellective cognition
of eternal things (wisdom), and rational cognition of temporal things
(knowledge). For Aquinas’s comments, see for instance his In Col. 2:3,
no. 81.
 AQUINAS ON CONTEMPLATION 31

relevant for our contemplation of divine truth.41 I have already

outlined the non-discursive nature of the gift of intellectus. It is now
time to examine the gift of sapientia.
The virtue of wisdom and the gift of wisdom both involve
judgement according to divine norms. The gift of wisdom,
however, is characterised by an intuitive judgement, which
distinguishes it from the intellectual virtue of wisdom: “It belongs
to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to pronounce right
judgement about divine things after reason has made its inquiry, but
it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit to judge aright
about them on account of connaturality with them.”42 Aquinas
quotes Ps-Dionysius’s remark from The Divine Names ch.2 about
Hierotheus who “suffered divine things” through a connaturality or
sympathy, which results from the unity with God that charity
effects.43 By way of illustration, Aquinas draws a well-known
contrast with right judgement in matters of chastity after a
reasoning process, and an instinctive or intuitive awareness how to
judge when one has the habit of chastity. This theme of
connaturality has been frequently commented upon in
scholarship.44 For our purposes it suffices to state that the gift of
wisdom, as connatural, is intuitive and non-discursive.
Now, this non-discursive gift of wisdom is of central
importance in the contemplation of God. Through charity we are
intimately united with God. Through it and the gift of wisdom that
flows from charity, we are directed towards contemplation of God
(as well as proper action).45
Aquinas’s notion of contemplation incorporates central
insights from Aristotle. It is, however, overall far more inclusive
and less elitist. It can accommodate the contemplation of both the

41
STh II-II, q. 9, a. 4 ad 3.
42
STh II-II, q. 45, a. 2.
43
STh II-II, q. 45, a. 2.
44
See for instance Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas. Vol. 2.
Spiritual Master (Washington DC, The Catholic University of
America, 2003), 206-24.
45
STh II-II, q. 45, a. 3 ad 1 and ad 3 (ad sapientiam pertinet
contemplatio divinorum, quae est visio principii); II-II, q. 45, a. 5.
32 RIK VAN NIEUWENHOVE

philosopher who pursues knowledge and wisdom through

discursive reasoning, the theologian, and the illiterate vetula who
grasps and subscribes to central articles of the Christian faith –even
though she may not be able to reason about them, or refute
arguments against them; if she enjoys the gifts of the Holy Spirit
she just sees their truthfulness. In III Sent d. 36 q. 1, a. 3 ad 5 (no.
12831) Aquinas explicitly states that all Christians –most of whom
do not have the philosophical or theological skills to engage in
reasoning and demonstrative argumentation about what they
believe– are called to participate in contemplation: “Although all
those who are in the active life do not attain to a perfect state of
contemplation, every Christian who is in a state of salvation must
participate somehow in contemplation, for the commandment is
given to all: ‘Be still, and see that I am God.’” (Ps. 45:11). As the
quotation suggests, Aquinas interprets the third commandment
(keeping the Sabbath) in terms of a universal call to
contemplation.46 Similarly, in Summa contra Gentiles I.6 he
rejoices in the fact that “inspiration [is] given to human minds, so
that simple and untutored persons, filled with the gift of the Holy
Spirit, come to possess instantaneously the highest wisdom…” (ut
idiotae et simplices, dono spiritus sancti repleti, summam
sapientiam et facundiam in instanti consequerentur). It further
explains why Aquinas considered the Virgin Mary as excelling in
contemplation – a view that Aristotle undoubtedly would have
found rather puzzling.47
Contemplation is the goal of our entire life (finis totius vitae).
It is a foretaste of heavenly beatitude.48 All Christians are called to
contemplation but not all Christians have the intellectual skills to

46
III Sent, d. 36 q. 1, a. 3 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis ad
perfectum statum contemplationis non perveniat omnis qui in vita
activa est; tamen omnis Christianus qui in statu salutis est, oportet
quod aliquid de contemplatione participet, cum praeceptum sit
omnibus: vacate, et videte quoniam ego sum Deus, Psal. 45, 2; ad quod
etiam est tertium praeceptum legis.
47
Sermon Puer Iesus. See also STh III, q. 27, a. 5 ad 3.
48
See STh I-II, q. 3, a. 5 c. and STh II-II, q. 180, a. 4: “inchoatio
beatitudinis.”
 AQUINAS ON CONTEMPLATION 33

argue in a reasoned manner about their faith. Hence, Aquinas must

make allowances for a kind of contemplative act which is non-
discursive and which is available to all Christians through the gifts
of the Holy Spirit. This explains why the non-discursive notion of
intuitive understanding he encountered in the writings of his
Neoplatonic sources would have appealed to him. The broad
understanding of contemplation as intuitus simplex can incorporate
the acts of contemplation of the Greek sage or the academic
theologian, as well as those of the vetula who enjoys the benefit of
her Christian faith, enabling her to know truths which the
philosopher comes to know, if at all, with great difficulty and after
laborious reasoning processes.49

[Rik Van Nieuwenhove, Department of Theology, Mary Immaculate

College, Limerick, Ireland; Rik.VanNieuwenhove@mic.ul.ie]

49
See Sermo Attendite a falsis, pars 2: “Plus scit modo una vetula de
his quae ad fidem pertinent, quam quondam omnes philosophi.” See
also Sermo Beati qui habitant, where Aquinas contrasts the labours of
the philosopher with the short-cut offered by our Lord: “Veritatem
cognoscere nisi sunt per exercitium studii. Sed Deus breviorem viam
docet, scilicet per cordis mundiciam dicens: beati mundo corde et
cetera.”