MSU College of Law
Statutory Construction – Week 5 Lecture Notes
Topic: Legislative Intent
I. Introduction to Legislative Intent
Legislative intent is the guiding principle in statutory interpretation. It refers to the
purpose or reason why a legislative body enacted a particular statute. Courts aim to
apply laws in a manner that gives effect to this purpose.
When the statutory language is clear, the courts apply it directly. But when ambiguity,
silence, or absurd consequences are present, the courts look beyond the words to
determine what the legislature truly meant.
II. The Role of Legislative Intent in Interpretation
Courts prioritize legislative intent to ensure that laws are interpreted fairly, sensibly, and
consistently with their objectives. This ensures that the application of the law serves
justice and does not defeat its purpose.
III. Core Doctrines in Determining Legislative Intent
1. Verba Legis – The plain meaning rule. If the words are clear and unambiguous, they
must be applied as written.
"When the law is clear, there is no room for interpretation."
2. Ratio Legis Est Anima – The spirit or reason of the law. When ambiguous, courts must
determine the purpose or objective of the statute.
3. Statute as a Whole – The law must be read in its entirety. A provision should not be
interpreted in isolation.
4. Casus Omissus Pro Omisso Habendus Est – That which is omitted must be considered
intentionally omitted. Courts cannot add to the law.
5. Stare Decisis – Courts adhere to precedent to preserve consistency unless there is a
compelling reason to deviate.
IV. Supporting Doctrines
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius – The express mention of one thing excludes
all others.
Ejusdem generis – General terms following specific ones are limited to the same
class.
Ut res magis valeat quam pereat – A law should be interpreted to be effective,
not useless.
V. Practical Approach to Interpreting Legislative Intent
1. Start with the language: Is it clear and unambiguous?
2. Consider context and purpose if ambiguity exists.
3. Read the statute holistically.
4. Avoid adding what the legislature omitted.
5. Consider prior judicial interpretations.
VI. Application from Case Law: Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. NLRC
G.R. No. 82511, March 3, 1992
Facts: Imelda Salazar was a cashier at Globe-Mackay. She encashed several company
checks for personal use without authority. She was dismissed for loss of trust and
confidence. The NLRC ruled in her favor. Globe-Mackay petitioned the Supreme Court.
Legal Provision: Article 282(c) of the Labor Code – Authorizes termination for fraud or
willful breach of the trust reposed by the employer.
Ruling: The Supreme Court reversed the NLRC. It ruled that Salazar's dismissal was valid.
Since she held a fiduciary position, loss of trust justified termination even without proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
“The rule is that loss of confidence as a ground for dismissal is premised on the fact that
the employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence.”
“It is sufficient that there is some basis for the loss of trust and confidence, or that the
employer has reasonable grounds to believe that the employee is responsible for the
misconduct.”
The Court applied ratio legis est anima, construing the law in light of its purpose – to
protect employers from dishonest conduct in fiduciary roles. It did not apply the
provision narrowly or restrictively but interpreted it to promote the underlying intent.
Lesson: This case exemplifies how courts apply legislative intent by prioritizing the
purpose of a law over literal application when necessary to achieve fair and just
outcomes.
VII. Conclusion
Legislative intent is central to statutory construction. Courts interpret statutes not just by
what they say, but by what they were meant to do. Through doctrines like verba legis and
ratio legis, courts ensure laws serve their rightful purpose in society.
MSU College of Law
Statutory Construction – Week 6 Lecture Notes
Topic: Principles of Construction
I. Introduction
Principles of construction are general guidelines or doctrines that courts use in
interpreting statutes when the text is not self-explanatory or when further clarity is
needed to apply the law fairly and effectively. These principles provide a logical
framework for resolving uncertainties, ambiguities, or conflicts within statutes. They are
grounded in both logic and experience, reflecting judicial efforts to give meaning to
legislative enactments.
Understanding and applying these principles help maintain legal coherence, prevent
absurdity, and ensure that laws are construed to promote their intended effects.
II. General Policies in Construction
1. Presumption of Legislative Intent to Enact Just and Reasonable Laws
It is a fundamental principle that the legislature is presumed to intend laws to produce
fair, just, and reasonable results. Courts avoid interpretations that lead to injustice,
oppression, or absurd consequences, preferring those that promote equity.
2. Presumption Against Useless Legislation
Every provision of a statute is presumed to have been inserted for a reason. Courts must
avoid interpretations that render any part of the law superfluous or meaningless.
3. Presumption of Consistent Meaning
A word or phrase used repeatedly in a statute is presumed to have the same meaning
throughout, unless the context clearly indicates a different intention. This prevents
internal inconsistency.
4. Presumption of Validity and Constitutionality
Statutes are presumed constitutional unless clearly proven otherwise. Courts adopt
interpretations that uphold the law’s validity. If two interpretations are possible, the one
that preserves the law's constitutionality will prevail.
5. Presumption Against Retroactivity
Laws are presumed to operate prospectively unless expressly stated to have retroactive
effect or where the nature of the law clearly implies it. This protects vested rights and
promotes stability in legal relations.
III. Specific Doctrines and Presumptions
1. Ejusdem Generis
When general words follow an enumeration of specific items, the general words are
interpreted to include only items of the same kind or class as those specifically listed. This
ensures that legislative language is not read too broadly.
Example: If a law refers to “cars, trucks, motorcycles, and other vehicles,” “other
vehicles” would be interpreted to mean similar motorized land vehicles—not boats or
airplanes.
2. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
The express mention of one or more things of a particular class implies the exclusion of
all others. This maxim prevents the court from reading into the law additional items that
the legislature may have intentionally omitted.
Example: If a law grants tax exemption to "educational and religious institutions," it does
not extend to charitable institutions unless explicitly included.
3. Noscitur a Sociis
A word is understood by the company it keeps. Ambiguous or general terms are
interpreted in the context of surrounding words to avoid distortion of meaning.
Example: If a statute penalizes “gambling, cheating, swindling, and other dishonest acts,”
the general term “other dishonest acts” is limited to offenses similar to those listed.
4. In Pari Materia
Statutes that relate to the same subject matter must be construed together to
harmonize their provisions. If two laws appear to be in conflict, they should be
interpreted so as to give effect to both if possible.
Example: Labor laws and social security statutes should be read together to promote
comprehensive worker protection.
5. Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat
A statute should be interpreted to be effective rather than ineffective. Courts must
adopt interpretations that give force and effect to the law, not ones that render it void,
redundant, or nugatory.
IV. Case Illustration: Philippine American Drug Co. v. CIR, G.R. No. L-13032, August 31, 1959
Facts: The case involved a taxpayer’s claim for exemption from a particular tax under a
general law. The issue was whether such exemption should be presumed or narrowly
interpreted.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that exemptions from taxation must be construed
strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. The Court
denied the exemption claim.
Principle Applied:
The doctrine of strictissimi juris applies to tax exemptions.
The presumption is against exemptions unless clearly granted by law.
This reinforces the policy that taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception.
V. Case Illustration: City of Naga v. Agna, 71 SCRA 285
Facts: A local ordinance appeared to conflict with a national law. The issue was whether
the ordinance should prevail and how to reconcile both statutes.
Ruling: The Supreme Court harmonized the local ordinance with the national statute,
holding that ordinances must conform to and operate within the bounds of enabling
laws.
Principle Applied:
In pari materia was used to reconcile the local and national provisions.
The presumption of validity was preserved by adopting an interpretation
consistent with the Local Government Code.
This reflects the judiciary’s preference to uphold, not invalidate, statutes or
ordinances.
VI. Summary and Key Takeaways
Principles of construction operate as default interpretive tools when the law’s
text is unclear, incomplete, or open to multiple meanings.
General presumptions include avoiding absurdity, preserving legislative purpose,
maintaining internal consistency, and favoring constitutionality.
Specific canons such as ejusdem generis, expressio unius, and in pari materia
provide refined strategies for interpreting statutory language.
Courts also interpret statutes based on doctrinal logic and the value of coherence
within the legal system.
VII. Suggested Readings and References
Philippine American Drug Co. v. CIR, G.R. No. L-13032, 31 August 1959
City of Naga v. Agna, 71 SCRA 285
Pilares, Ricardo III. "Statutory Construction: Concepts and Cases" (2023 Edition),
Chapter on Principles of Construction
End of Week 6 Notes