BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION

1. INTENTION OF LEGISLATURE
Introduction- A statute is an established rule, formal regulation or ordinance, enacted by the legislature.
A statute is an edict of the legislature. Interpretation of statutes is the exclusive privilege of the
constitutional courts. The function of court is to discover the true legislative intent. It is the obligation
of court to promote the intention of legislature. Principles of interpretation are not principles of law, it
merely a methodology for explaining the meaning in a text.
Principles of interpretation-
• the court must start with the presumption that the legislature did not make a mistake;
• the court must adopt a construction which will carryout the intention of the legislature;
• the court should not go beyond its aid to correct or make up the deficiency if there is a defect or
an omission in the words used by the legislature.
The above rules of interpretation are meant to assist the court in advancing the ends of justice. The
conventional way of interpreting or construing a statute is to know the intention of the maker of the
statute. According to Salmond, the duty of judicature is to discover and to act upon the true intention of
the legislature- the mens or sententia legis. The essence of law lies in its spirit, not in its letter. The
function of court is only to expound the law and not to legislate. Courts are therefore held as finishers,
refiners and polishers of legislation which comes to them in a state requiring varying degrees of further
processing.
Aspect- The intention of legislature can be said to have two aspects:
• Meaning- which tells what the words mean.
• Purpose and object- which means the purpose and object of enacting the statute.
The true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in
the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its
remedy to which the enactment is directed. The most fair method for interpreting a statute is by
exploring the intention of legislature through the most natural and probable signs which are either
words, the context, the subject-matter or the spirit and reason of the law.
In Reserve Bank of India vs Pearless General Finance and Investment Co., it has been said that “the
interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the basics of interpretation. That
interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best
interpreted when we know why it was enacted”.
While interpreting any pre-constitutional enactment, the court has to bear in mind the following:
 • what is the historical background leading to the legislation,
• how many amendments have been carried on therein; and
• the different aspects covered by it.
The rules of interpretation are not rules of law, they are not to be applied like the rules enacted by the
legislature in an interpretation act. In Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W Bengal vs
Corporation of Calcutta, the old rule that a statute does not bind the state unless it is expressly named or
brought in by necessary implication was rejected and a new rule was formulated that a general Act
applies to citizens as well as to state unless the Act expressly or by necessary implication excepts the
state from its operation. By rejecting outmoded rules and necessary substituting in their place new
rules, the Superior courts can help in the task of rationalization of the rules.
While applying the rules of interpretation it must be kept in mind that these rules are our servants and
not masters. They are aids to construction, presumptions or pointers. In each case we must look at all
relevant circumstances and decide what weight to attach to any particular rule. Lord Simon says that
there are primary and secondary canons of construction. The primary rule of construction is to consider
the plain meaning. If there is no plain meaning, mischief rule is the most important rule among the
secondary canons of construction.
It is open to courts to examine legislative history; it is not proper for courts to try and conclusively
ascertain legislative intent. Such an inquiry is impractical in view of the fact that courts do have access
to all materials which would have considered by the legislature.(Selvi vs State of Karnataka)

Conclusion: In determining the legislative intent the court is required to consider three factors, the
context and the object of the statute, the nature and precise scope of the relevant provisions and
whether the damage suffered is not of the kind which was to be guarded against. While applying the
rules of interpretation it must be kept in mind that these rules are our servants and not masters. They are
aids to construction, presumptions or pointers.

2. STATUTE MUST BE READ AS A WHOLE IN ITS CONTEXT

Ex visceribus actus which means “every part of the statute must be construed within the four corners
of the Act
Introduction- Interpretation of statute depends upon the text and context thereof and the object with
which it was made. It must be construed having regard to its scheme and ordinary state of affairs and
consequences flowing therefrom. Whenever the question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision
in a statute, it is proper and legitimate to read that provision in its context. This means that the statute
must be read as whole.
Questions to be considered-
• what was the previous state of law
• study of other statutes in pari materia that is on same matter
• general scope of the statutes
• what is the mischief
Jurist View-
• According to Lord Davey: “Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the
context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of
the whole statutes relating to the subject-matter”.
• Lord Greene MR said: “To ascertain the meaning of a clause in a statute the courts must look at
the whole statute, at what precedes and at what succeeds and not merely at the clause itself”.
It is the duty of a court to construe a statute justly. The maxim is lex injusta non est lex which means
that an unjust law is no law at all. Where two views are possible, the view which satisfies the
constitutional rights or requirements must be preferred. The conclusion that the language used by the
legislature is plain or ambiguous can only be truly arrived at by studying the statute as a whole. The
same word may mean one thing in one context and another in different context, therefore the same
word used in different sections of a statute may bear different meanings. That is why it is necessary to
read the statute as a whole in its context.
Case Laws:
1. OP Singh vs Union of India- Rule 7 of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules 1970 provided for
recruitment by promotion and by direct recruitment and proviso to the rule said “Provided that not
more than one-third of the substantive posts in the service shall be filled by direct recruits”. By itself
the language of the proviso it imposed a ceiling and did not provide for a quota. But in Rule 8 this view
was not accepted because it lays down that seniority of direct recruits namely promotees shall be
determined in order of rotation of vacancies based on the quotas of vacancies reserved for both
categories by Rule 7. It was held that having regard to Rule 8 the true intendment of the proviso to Rule
7 was that one-third of the substantive posts must be reserved for direct recruits.
2. Printers (Mysore) Ltd vs Astt CTO, Section 2 of the Central Sales Tax Act which defines certain
expressions occurring in the Act opens with the words; 'In this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires'. This shows that whenever the word 'goods' occur in the enactment, it is not mandatory that
one should mechanically attribute to the said expression the meaning assigned to it in clause(d).
Ordinarily, that is so. But where the context does not permit or where the context requires otherwise,
the meaning assigned to it in the said definition need not be applied.
3. In Jellings vs Kelly, it was held that the principle that the statute must be read as a whole is equally
applicable to different parts of the same section. The section must be construed as a whole whether or
not one of the parts is a saving clause or a proviso.
4. Attar Singh vs Inder Kumar- the Punjab Rent Restriction Act,1949 provided by S.13(a)(ii) that a
landlord could obtain possession in the case of rented land-
• he requires it for his own use
• he is not occupying in the urban area for the purpose of his business any other such rented land
• he has not vacated such rented land without sufficient cause after the commencement of the act
in the urban area concerned.
The HC of Punjab held that the words 'for his own use' in cl (a) permitted the landlord to claim eviction
for his own use. Whatever may be the nature of the use. But the SC reversed the HC's decision and held
that all the three clauses were to be read together and cl (a) was restricted to business use as were
clauses (b) and (c). It was printed out that if this restricted meaning were not given to the words 'for his
own use' in cl (a) the latter two clauses would become inapplicable.
3. UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT
Introduction- The maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat means that it may rather become operative
than null that is to uphold the constitutionality of statutes whenever it can rationally be done. On this
principle only a statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed so as to make it effective
and operative. It is an application of this principle that courts while pronouncing upon the
constitutionality of a statute start with a presumption in favour of constitutionality and prefer a
construction which keeps the statute within competence of the legislature. The courts tend to be
strongly against a constructions which reduces statute to be ineffective or useless.
Jurist's View-
• In the words of Farewell, J. “Unless the words were so absolutely senseless that I could do
nothing at all with them, I should be bound to find some meaning, and not to declare them void
for uncertainty. It could not be assumed that the legislature has used any word without
purpose”.
• Lord Dunedin observed that it is our duty to make what we can of statutes knowing that they are
meant to be operative, and not inept, and nothing short of impossibility should in my judgment
allow a judge to declare a statute unworkable.
• In the words of Viscount Simon, LC: If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower
of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation we should avoid a
 construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder
construction, based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing
about an effective result.
Application of this rule- It is a cardinal rule of construction that normally no word or provision should
be considered redundant or superfluous in interpreting the provisions of a statute. In the field of
interpretation of statutes, the courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part of it with a
purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. It may not be
correct to say that a words used in a statute are either unnecessary or without any purpose to serve,
unless there are compelling reasons. In order to make the statute workable, the court should take
recourse to such principles of interpretation of statutes as may be necessary, keeping in view the
doctrine of ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
A statute must be construed in such a manner so as to make it effective and operative on the principle
of ut res magis valeat quam pereat. When two meanings are possible, one making the statute absolutely
vague and the other leading to certainty and a meaningful interpretation, in such case the latter
interpretation should be followed. The courts will reject that construction which will defeat the plain
intention of the legislature even though there may be some inexactitude in the language used. Reducing
the legislation futility shall be avoided and in a case where the intention of the legislature cannot be
given effect to, the courts would accept the bolder construction for the purpose of bringing about an
effective result.
Case Laws:
1. In Corporation of Calcutta vs Liberty Cinema, the respondent was paying a sum of money as licence
fee to the appellant on the basis of yearly valuation. But change in the basis of valuation by the
appellant, the respondent challenged that change and the Supreme Court held that on the interpretation
of the statute on the basis of principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat it was clear that the expression
'fee' used in S.548 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act means a tax because fee means some
amount of money in lieu of services rendered by someone who is absent in the present case.
2. In Tinuskia Electric Supply Company Limited vs State of Assam, it was held that the courts strongly
lean against a construction which reduces the statute to a futility. A statute or any enacting provision
therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the
maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Here in this case, the Tinuskia and Dibrugarh Electric Supply
Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1973 were held to be not workable.
3. In Avtar Singh vs State of Punjab, the Supreme Court held that if the crime is committed against the
Act the requirements of the Act must be followed. In this case, the appellant was convicted for theft of
electricity under S.39 of the Electricity Act, 1910 but he contended that he could not be convicted
because the process against him was not started as per the direction of S.50 of the Act. But the
respondent contended that the punishment under IPC must be imposed. The SC applied the principle
and held that since the crime is against the Act and not against the Code, the requirement of S.50 must
be followed.
4. Delhi Cloth General Mills Co. Ltd vs State of Rajasthan, it was held that a validating act cannot be
held valid and effective if it simply deems a legal consequences without amending the law from which
the said legal consequence could follow. Therefore, the validating act which declares certain area to be
included in a municipality that was not validly included in that municipality would be ineffective
unless the law is amended retrospectively curing the defect in the inclusion of the area.
4. PLAIN OR ORDINARY MEANING
Introduction- When the language of a statute is plain, words are clear and unambiguous and give only
one meaning, then effect should be given to that plain meaning only and one should not go in for the
construction of the statute. It it not open to first create on ambiguity and then look for some principle of
interpretation. Courts should not overzealous in searching for ambiguities or obscurities in words which
are plain.
The courts have adhered to the principle that efforts should be made to give meaning to each and every
word used by the legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a
statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have a proper application in circumstances
conceivable within the contemplation of the statute.
Jurist's view-
• This rule was stated by Tindal, CJ in Sussex Peerage Case as: “If the words of the statute are in
themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those
words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best
declare the intent of the law giver.
• In the words of Gajendragadkar J: “If the words used are capable of one construction only then
it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground
that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act”.
Application of this rule- While interpreting a statute, plain or ordinary meaning should be ascribed
unless context requires otherwise. It has been held that where the language of the statute is
unambiguous, it is not necessary to examine the intent and object of the Act while interpreting its
provisions. When language used in the statute is unambiguous and on a plain and grammatical meaning
being given to the words in the statute, the end result is neither arbitrary nor irrational nor contrary to
the object of the statute, then it is the duty of the court to give effect to the words used in the statute
because the words declare the intention of the law-making authority best.
Case laws-
1. Nelson Motis vs Union of India- It was held that when the words of a statute are clear, plain or
unambiguous, that is, they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give
effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. It is said that the words themselves best declare the
intention of the law giver.
2. MV Joshi vs MV Shimpi- The Supreme Court gave effect to the plain meaning while construing the
word 'Butter' in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules 1955 and held that the word included butter
prepared from curd. Subbarao J rejected the contention based on the rule of strict interpretation and
said “But these rules do not in any way affect the fundamental principle of interpretation, namely, that
the primary test is- the language employed in the Act and when the words are plain and clear the court
is bound to accept the expressed intention of the Legislature”.
3. In D Stephan Joseph vs Union of India, it was held that when there is plain meaning of rule with
regard to past practice of applying the rule in a particular manner, preference is given to plain meaning.
Plain meaning is the accepted principle of interpretation while past practice is an exception which is to
be applied under special circumstances.
4. Oswal Agro Mills Ltd vs CCE, it was held that where the words of the statute are plain and clear,
there is no room for applying any of the principles of interpretation which are merely presumptions in
cases of ambiguity in the statute. The court would interpret them as they stand. The object and purpose
has to be gathered from such words themselves.
Appraisal of Plain Meaning- When it is said that the words of a statute have plain meaning, this means
that the words have already been construed because it is not possible to decide whether certain words
are plain or ambiguous unless they are studied in their context and construed. Therefore, in reality this
plain meaning rule means that after construing the words when the court comes to the conclusion that
they bear only one meaning it is the duty of the court to give effect to that meaning.
Judges' opinion as to the true meaning of words is often different from each other but this difference of
opinion does not always indicate that the words are ambiguous. Sometimes all the judges agree that the
meaning of the words is plain but they differ on the question as to what the meaning is. Example-
Article 105(2) of the Constitution provides that 'no member of Parliament shall be liable to any
proceedings in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament. The SC held in Tej
Kiran Jain vs N Sanjeeva Reddy that the article means what it says in language which could not be
plainer. But in PV Narasimha Rao vs State, it was held by a majority of judges that a member who
voted in Parliament after receipt of bribe cannot be prosecuted as his prosecution would be a
proceeding in respect of vote given by him and barred by Article 105(2).
In Girdharilal & Sons vs Balbir Nath Mathur, it is said that 'though a construction according to plain
language should be ordinarily accepted, such a construction should not be adopted where it leads to
anomalies, injustices and absurdities.' However, this is not an accurate statement of the rule and all that
it really means is that prima facie plain language may not be plain. Plain meaning rule applies only
when the words are construed in their context and the conclusion is reached that they are susceptible of
only one meaning, and the meaning so derived is to be given effect to irrespective of consequences for
no alternative construction is really open.