Risk

Analysis
for 2020
Risk Analysis for 2020
Plac Europejski 6,
00-844 Warsaw, Poland
T +48 22 205 95 00
F +48 22 205 95 01
frontex@[Link]
[Link]

Warsaw, March 2020

Risk Analysis Unit
Frontex reference number: 1218 / 2020

© European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), 2020

Cover photo: Border guards on patrol - Joint Operation in Albania © Frontex, 2019
All rights reserved.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2020

Paper version: PDF version:

TT-AC-20-001-EN-C TT-AC-20-001-EN-N
ISBN 978-92-9471-618-7 ISBN 978-92-9471-619-4
ISSN 1977-4451 ISSN 1977-446X
doi: 10.2819/46797 doi: 10.2819/450005

FPI 20.5032

DISCLAIMERS
This is a Frontex staff working document. This publication or its contents do not imply the expression of
any opinion whatsoever on the part of Frontex concerning the legal status of any country, territory or city
or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
All maps and charts included in this report are the sole property of Frontex and any unauthorised use is
prohibited. Frontex disclaims any liability with respect to the boundaries, names and designations used
on the maps.
Throughout the report, references to Kosovo* are marked with an asterisk to indicate that this designation is
without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo
declaration of independence.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The Frontex Risk Analysis for 2020 has been prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. During the course of
developing this product, many colleagues at Frontex and outside con­tributed to it and their assistance is
hereby acknowledged with gratitude.

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Table of contents

1. Foreword 6

2. Summary 8

3. Introduction 11

4. Methodology 12

5. Migratory Flow 15
5.1. Situational Overview 22
5.2. Fraudulent Documents 28
5.3. A
 n integrated asylum-migration picture by EASO, Europol and Frontex 30
5.4. R eturns 32

6. Other Border Management Challenges 35

6.1. P
 assenger Flow and Border Guards’ Workload 36
6.2. Pandemics and border control 38
6.3. Cross-border crime: Firearms 39
6.4. Cross-border crime: Drug Trafficking 40
6.5. Cross-border crime: Stolen Vehicles and Parts 42
6.6. Managing and Interdicting Terrorist Mobility 44

7. F
 eatured analyses 47
7.1. The EBCG Regulation and Returns 48
7.2. Changes in Smuggling Services on the Central and Western Mediterranean Routes 50
7.3. S
 ecurity risks of blacklisted flag vessels (BLVs) under the Paris MoU on port state control 52
7.4. In Focus: Secondary Movements by Sea Throughout 2019 54

8. Outlook and conclusions 56

9. Statistical annex 58

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List of acronyms used

API advanced passenger information

BCP border-crossing point
BLV blacklisted flag vessels
EASO European Asylum Support Office
EBCG European Border and Coast Guard
EC European Commission
EDF European Union Document-Fraud
EDF-RAN European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
EMN European Migration Network
EMPACT European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats
EU European Union
EU+ 28 EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland
Europol European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
Eurostat Statistical Office of the European Union
EUROSUR European Border Surveillance System
FRAN Frontex Risk Analysis Network
Frontex European Border and Coast Guard Agency
FTF foreign terrorist fighter
IBC illegal border-crossing
ICJ International Court of Justice
ID identification document
IOM International Organization for Migration
INTCEN European Union Intelligence and Situation Centre
JAD Joint Action Day
JO Joint Operation
MS EU Member State
NGO non-governmental organisation
OCG organised crime group
PNR passenger name record
SAC Schengen-Associated Country
SAR search and rescue
UK The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSCR United Nations Security Council resolution

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 EU Commission Vice President Margaritis Schinas, Commissioner Ylva Johansson
and Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri © Frontex, 2020

1. Foreword
Comprehensive situational awareness the EU illegally, is also to be consid- While the first part of Risk Analysis for
for the European Border and Coast Guard ered (the last tier of the ‘four-tier ac- 2020 focuses on migratory issues, the re-
means that we must consider various cess control model’). The Frontex Risk port also discusses other challenges for
developments, starting with those far Analysis should pro­vide reliable infor- border management and Frontex – pan-
beyond our external borders. Some meas- mation covering all of the aspects rele- demics, terrorism and various types of
ures, such as these under the common vant to the European integrated border cross-border crime. These include ille-
visa policy, have immediate and straight- management. Only with this situa- gal firearms, drug trafficking and sto-
forward impact. Much else in terms of tional awareness we may safeguard the len vehicles.
developments that impact EU border European Area of Freedom, Security Risk Analysis for 2020 also features special
management is beyond our control – nat- and Justice. analyses that touch upon other core func-
ural disasters, conflict and level of eco- With this in mind, I would like to tions of Frontex. They include the effect
nomic development. present the Frontex Risk Analysis for 2020, of Frontex’s new mandate in the area of
Closer to our borders, in the direct which provides a comprehensive picture returns or changes in the way criminal
EU neighbourhood, the impact of meas- of the European Union’s migratory sit- smuggling networks have been operat-
ures taken by the respective authorities uation. This, as always, is anchored by ing and tracking the movement of ter-
makes the difference between uncon- a series of indicators from the previous rorists. Other interesting topics analysed
trolled large-scale migratory move- year. These show that while the detec- by our experts are security risks of black-
ments and manageable conditions. At tion of illegal border-crossings between listed flag vessels and secondary move-
the external borders is where we col- border-crossing points has gone down ments by sea.
lectively secure the Schengen area. Fi- to the lowest level since 2013, other in- We also present an integrated asy-
nally, within the area of free movement, dicators, such as refusal of entry and de- lum-migration picture Frontex prepared
our collective response, such as the re- tections of persons staying illegally, rose together with the European Asylum Sup-
turn of people who are residing within from the previous year. port Office (EASO) and Europol, which

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 © Frontex
highlights our cooperation with other EU effective border management to protect The responsibility for the external bor-
agencies to support their stakeholders. health while preserving the integrity of ders of the European Union and Schengen
Finally, Risk Analysis for 2020 reviews the EU/Schengen area. Area is in the hands of Member States and
the possible evolution of the situation The recent events at the Greek bor- Frontex. Together our aim is to ensure ef-
along the external borders of the EU in ders highlight the fact that we must fective borders addressing the challenges
the coming years. Among the challenges remain vigilant and maintain compre- of irregular migration, cross-border crime
foreseen by Frontex are the effects of pan- hensive situational awareness. Fron- or terrorism. This way we want to contrib-
demics and migrants organising them- tex and Member States must continue ute to a well-functioning European area
selves or being used to challenge border to cooperate to uphold a clear picture of Freedom, Security and Justice.
regimes. Other potential challenges in- of the trends in migration, cross-bor-
clude the possibility of a trend reversal der crime and other phenomena at the
in the number of irregular arrivals and external borders.
a possible change of the upward trend These combined risks make even more
of passenger flows. urgent the establishment of the European
In a timely study, our experts ana- Border and Coast Guard standing corps,
lyse and provide actionable information with staff and equipment able to rein-
about the effect of pandemics on border force Member States and to strengthen
control and the role of Frontex in sup- EU responsiveness capacities.
porting Member States. The health crisis This will be a game changer for Eu-
has brought to the forefront the need for ropean border management that will be
a common situational picture provided a crucial part of future responses to desta-
by the Agency. It also spotlights the es- bilisation linked to challenges such as hy-
sential role of an integrated approach to brid threats and pandemics.

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2. Summary
The total number of reported detections arrivals on the Eastern Mediterranean sea on the Algerian corridor to the EU sea-
of illegal border-crossing along the EU’s route were the highest since the signing sonally ticked up in the autumn, as in
external borders fell in 2019 to the low- of the EU-Turkey Statement. Migrant previous years.
est level since 2013. The observed irreg- smugglers managed to provide for the On the Central Mediterranean route,
ular migration patterns did not deviate increased demand, in particular from the Libyan corridor saw relatively little
greatly from previous years, so grouping Afghan and Syrian migrants coordinat- activity throughout 2019. Of the main
illegal border-crossings into chiefly the ing simultaneous departures. Push fac- nationalities departing from Libya, Er-
Western, Central and Eastern Mediterra- tors throughout many key countries of itreans saw the largest relative and ab-
nean routes continues to be instructive. origin and long-term host countries in- solute decrease. Detections on the other
On the EU’s eastern borders as well as tensified as the year progressed. The pres- corridors that make up this migratory
on the circular route from Albania south- sure on Turkey’s land border with the EU route also decreased compared with 2018.
wards into the EU, the lowest numbers subsided slightly in 2019. Cyprus experi- On the Eastern Land Border in 2019,
were reported since the Frontex Risk enced a significant increase of migrants illegal border-crossings from each of
Analysis Network started collecting data. crossing the green line and, in the lat- the EU’s eastern neighbours decreased.
However, the relative decrease in 2019 ter half of the year, sporadically arriv- However, refusals of entry on the east-
compared with previous years was mostly ing by sea. ern green border on the other hand con-
due to a drop in migrants intercepted and Irregular migration towards the EU tinued to rise. On the circular route from
rescued in the Central and Western Med- along the two main migratory corridors Albania southwards into the EU, detec-
iterranean. In contrast, detections on the through the Western Balkans – the Greek- tions decreased significantly. No signif-
Eastern Mediterranean, Western Balkan Albanian corridor and the Serbian-cen- icant migratory incidents took place in
and Western African routes recorded sig- tred corridor – continued throughout the Black Sea.
nificantly higher numbers of detections 2019. The western corridor into Albania The overall demographics of migrants
compared with 2018. reported mounting detections after the in 2019 show an increase in the share
The reversal in the long-term trend of start of the Frontex joint operation in of vulnerable groups, including a slight
growing migratory pressure on the West- May. In the second half of the year the growth in the share of women and chil-
ern Mediterranean route, which occurred pressure from the region northwards dren. Europol has received particularly
in the spring of 2019, was perhaps the focused on the EU borders with Serbia. worrying reports about the kidnapping
least expected and arguably most con- Detections on this route grew by 158% of vulnerable irregular migrants, includ-
sequential factor as regards the EU’s ex- compared to 2018. ing unaccompanied minors, once they
ternal border overall. After January 2019 departures from arrive in the EU.
The spotlight once again returned to Morocco on the Western Mediterranean Member States reported an increase
the Eastern Aegean in 2019, where mi- route decreased significantly (by 57% in the detection of clandestine entries
gratory pressure rose in the spring and compared with 2018 as regards the sea on both land and sea routes, the latter
peaked in September, after which arriv- route). Meanwhile departures from Mo- showing a stronger relative growth. As
als started falling chiefly due to weather rocco on the Western African route in- regards land borders, most clandestine
conditions. In the second half of the year, creased again slightly. Migration pressure entry attempts in 2019 were again in

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 Latest situation (2018)
2019 Reported cases 2019

(2 258) Detections of illegal

2 550 border-crossing at BCPs

Detections
(6 546) of fraudulent
5 697 document users
the Western Balkans region. According As in previous years, the number of ef-
to the demograph­ics of the migrants in- fective returns in 2019 fell short of the re- Detections
(10 642)
volved, those who are detected attempt- turn decisions issued by Member States. of facilitators
10 989
ing to enter clandestinely (a risky modus Around 139 000 migrants who were not
operandi) are 97% male. Organised crime granted refugee status or subsidiary pro-
groups continue to focus on specific na- tection were returned to their countries
tionalities, as evidenced by the fact that of origin, less than half (approximately (147 815) Returns
65% of all detected cases of clandestine 47%) the total number of return deci-
entry attempts concern a single nation- sions issued in the same period. While
138 860 (effective)

ality (Afghan). the number of return decisions increased

Secondary movements remained siz- by around 5%, effective returns dropped
able in 2019 judging by, for instance, the 6% (both compared to 2018) to the low-
rising number of detections of illegal stay est level since data has been collected
Detections
and by the fact that applications for inter- on this indicator. This finding of course (149 117) of illegal
national protection collected by EASO also does not take into account the fact that border-crossing
increased. Further evidence of the rise in many Third Country nationals receive 141 846 between BCPs
secondary movements in 2019 is that the multiple return decisions, and in many
number of discoveries of such movements cases voluntary returns are not properly
inside the EU/Schengen area increased in documented or reported. Southern Asian
2019 for the third year in a row. The re- and Western Balkan citizens saw signif-
ported figures grew by almost 38% com- icant decreases (both in relative and ab-
pared with 2018 and reached the highest solute terms) in the number of effective
(190 658) Refusals
of entry
level since Frontex started collecting data returns, whereas there were considerably 212 097
on this indicator. In addition, high num- more returns to South America.
bers of people smugglers continue to be
detected inland. Secondary movements
by sea also grew in 2019.
Beyond migration, the results of Fron-

(283 880)
tex joint operations and EU joint action
days as well as Member States’ data for Returns
2019 shed some light on the sizable ex- (decisions)
tent of cross-border crime. Smuggling
of firearms, drugs, stolen vehicles and
298 190
other illicit goods, as well as people smug-
gling and trafficking in human beings
is happening every day on the EU’s ex-
ternal border. The complex character of
cross-border crime threats necessitates

(367 266)
a comprehensive operational response Detections
at the borders. of persons
staying
402 913 illegally

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 3. Introduction
The Frontex Risk Analysis for 2020 re- ▪ Cooperation with third countries;
ports on all aspects relevant for Euro- ▪ Border control measures within the
pean Integrated Border Management. For Schengen area;
this reason, developments and threats to ▪ Return of third-country nationals;
the security of the EU’s external border ▪ Use of state-of-the-art technology;
and the Schengen area are analyzed. The ▪ Quality control mechanisms;
aim is to limit the challenges and threats ▪ Solidarity mechanisms.
for border management by risk analy-
sis and to ensure the functioning of the These components, together with the
Schengen area. three horizontal components – funda-
Frontex’s operational activities aim at mental rights, education and training, re-
strengthening border security by support- search and innovation – collectively form
ing Member States in their implementa- also the basis for of the technical and
tion of EU measures for the management operational strategy for European Inte-
of external borders. grated Border Management. The strategic
The coordination of operational activ- and horizontal components are conse-
ities contributes to a more efficient al- quently applied onto the four-tier-access
location of Member States’ resources as control model, which comprises meas-
well as the better protection of freedom, ures in third countries, such as under
security and justice. In this context, this the common visa policy, measures with
Risk Analysis concentrates on the scope neighbouring third countries, border con-
of Frontex’s operational activities and, in trol measures at the external borders, risk
particular, on irregular migration at the analysis and measures within the Schen-
external borders of the EU and Schengen gen area and return.
Associated Countries. In order to cover all aspects of Inte-
Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 significantly grated Border Management, this annual
enhanced Frontex’s mandate to ensure the report has been structured as follows:
efficient implementation of European In- (1) the situational picture for the Euro-
tegrated Border Management as a shared pean Border and Coast Guard as regards
responsibility of the Union, the Agency irregular migration in accordance with
and national authorities of the Member the concept of Integrated Border Man-
States. More recently, Regulation (EU) agement; followed by (2) a description
2019/1896 further reinforced the Agency’s of other border management challenges
mandate and increased its competences. impacting the workload of border guards
European Integrated Border Man- caused by passenger flows, pandemics,
agement consists of 12 strategic compo- terrorism and various forms of cross-bor-
nents defined in Article 3 of the Agency’s der crime, (3) featured analyses on key
Regulation: risks affecting the security of the exter-
▪ Border control, including measures to nal borders and/or internal security; and
detect and prevent cross-border crime finally (4) outlook for the year.
at the external borders; The Agency and in particular its Risk
▪ Search and rescue operations; Analysis Unit would like to express its
▪ Analysis of risks for internal security; gratitude to all members of FRAN in
▪ Information exchange and coopera- Member States and third country part-
tion with and between Member States; ners for their efforts in providing data
▪ Inter-agency cooperation; and information, as well as EASO and
▪ Cooperation among relevant Union in- Europol, and all colleagues involved in
stitutions, bodies, offices and agencies; the preparation of this report.

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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2020
4. Methodology
A coherent and comprehensive analy- ▪ detections of fraudulent documents; and to rapidly sharing data among Mem-
sis of the risks affecting security at the ▪ return decisions; ber State border-control authorities.
external borders requires, above all, the ▪ effective returns and passenger flow Member States’ data processed by
adoption of common indicators. Consist- data (when available). Frontex are not treated as official statis-
ent monitoring of these indicators al- tics and thus may occasionally vary from
lows effective measures to be taken on Concerning applications for interna- those officially published by national au-
the ground. The analysis needs to iden- tional protection, in order to avoid dou- thorities. Throughout 2019, some FRAN
tify the risks that arise at the external ble reporting, Frontex stopped collecting members made backdated changes to
borders themselves and those that arise asylum data from MSs in July 2019 and their 2018 statistics. These changes have
in third countries. since then only works with data collected been incorporated into this document,
This Risk Analysis for 2020 is based upon by EASO. hence some data presented here may dif-
the monthly statistics exchanged among The data were categorised by border fer from those presented a year ago in the
Member States within the framework of type (land, air or sea), and those on land Risk Analysis for 2019.
the FRAN. For this, the key indicators col- borders were additionally grouped by Member States were not requested
lected through the FRAN were: border section with neighbouring third to answer specific questions in support
▪ detections of illegal border-crossings countries. The data exchanged within of this analysis. Rather, bimonthly ana-
at green and blue borders and at BCPs; the FRAN are compiled and analysed on lytical reports and incident reports from
▪ refusals of entry; a quarterly basis. Priority is given to the Member States routinely collected within
▪ detections of illegal stay; use of the data for management purposes the FRAN, as well as other Member States’
▪ detections of facilitators; contributions submitted in 2019, were

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 © Frontex, 2019

used, especially as regards the analysis of borders between the Schengen Associated seaport. Consistent with other law-en-
routes and modi operandi. Intelligence de- Countries and Schengen Member States forcement indicators, variations in ad-
rived from debriefing activities carried are considered as internal borders. Sta- ministrative data related to border control
out within Joint Operations was also es- tistics on detections of facilitators and depend on several factors. In this case, the
sential analytical material. illegal stay and asylum are also reported number of detections of illegal border-
Open-source information was also ex- at the land borders between Schengen crossings and refusals of entry are both
ploited, especially in identifying the main Member States and Member States that functions of the amount of effort spent,
‘push and pull factors’ for irregular mi- have either not yet joined the Schengen respectively, on detecting migrants and
gration to the EU. These sources included area in full (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the actual flow of irregular migrants to
reports issued by government agencies, Romania) or have opted to stay out of it the EU. For example, increased detec-
international and non-governmental or- (the UK – a MS throughout 2019 – and tions of illegal border-crossing might be
ganisations, as well as mainstream news Ireland). Thus, total figures for Member due to a real increase in the flow of ir-
agencies and EU bodies. States and Schengen Associated Coun- regular migrants, or may be due to more
External borders, a term often used in tries as a whole can be presented. resources made available to detect them.
this report, refer to the borders between It was not possible to make the dis- In exceptional cases, increased resources
Member States and third countries. The tinction for air and sea borders because may lead to a rise in reported detections
borders between the Schengen Associated Member States do not habitually differ- while effectively masking an actual de-
Countries (Norway, Iceland, and Switzer- entiate between extra-EU and intra-EU crease in the migratory flow, resulting
land) and third countries are also consid- air and sea connections, but tend to ag- from the deterrent effect of those in-
ered as external borders. By contrast, the gregate data for all arrivals per airport/ creased resources.

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5. Migratory Flow

Joint Operation in Albania

© Frontex, 2019

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 Canada

France

Spain
U nited States

Algeria

Mexico

Mali N ig

N iger
Venezuela

f$ rP
T
'[up M
.S
ita
c n
g
_
e O
R
lo W
m
G
w
C
U
N
Y
A
E
F
+
L
d
b
x
"/]s

Peru B razil

B olivia

Argentina

Argentina
Destination EU – While there have been information in both the country of origin and po-
a globalised migration context campaigns to dissuade economic mi- tentially in transit countries comes into
grants, they are limited in scope. How- play, shaping the concrete opportunities
Beyond the EU’s external borders it is gen- ever, potential migrants are continuously to migrate and crucially the costs with
erally not state actors that organise mi- exposed to media which show them how their efforts to control migration (inevi-
gration, but individual migrants acting desirable a future in Europe may be. State tably leaving loopholes), counter irregu-
within parameters setting living condi- actors also set the parameters of migra- lar migratory movements or fight people
tions and a framework of security, sta- tion by influencing conditions in the smuggling networks. The capacity of bor-
bility and freedom. As the individuals’ countries of origin – among them eco­ der management is of importance for the
decisions to migrate are often rational nomic opportunities, individual liberties migration process, impacting the means
choices made with incomplete infor- and religious freedoms. of irregular movements.
mation (for those who do in fact have The legal framework for migration is Judging from the number of mi-
a choice), the perception of costs and ben- another important factor migrants have grants who made asylum applications,
efits are weighed. How these perceptions to consider when intending to leave a attempted illegal border-crossings, stayed
are formed is an intricate process, and the country of origin and to enter an EU in the EU illegally or were refused en-
information gained from, for example, Member State or Schengen-Associated try in 2019, the European Union con-
personal networks and select media dif- Country. Once the decision to migrate has tinues to be a desirable destination for
fers widely between individuals. been taken, however, border management migrants. More than 180 nationalities

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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2020

 Russia

U kraine
Kazakhstan
Mongolia

Tu rkey
China
I raq I ran

Libya Egypt

Sau di Arabia I ndia

ger
Chad Su dan Yemen

ria
Ethiopia

Kenya
Congo,
D RC Number of Name of indicator
detections of cases
per nationality of origin Australia

Angola As yl u m ap p l i c ati o n s
100
Zambia 1 000 D e te c ti o n s o f i l l e g al b o r d e r -
c r o s s i n g s at B C P s
10 000
D e te c ti o n s o f i l l e g al b o r d e r -
c r o s s i n g s b e twe e n B C P s

70 334 D e te c ti o n s o f i l l e g al s tay Australia

Sou th R e fu s al s o f e n tr y
Africa

were recorded under the above indicators Secondly, migration based on family destination Member States. This is true for
in 2019, clearly indicating the global ex- reunification continues to be important. both regular and irregular immigration.
tent of migratory pressure towards the EU According to an EMN Focused Study from Thirdly, the existence of a smuggling
(see the above map). On the other hand 2016, family reunification was the rea- infrastructure in key transit regions (e.g.
a glance at the map also highlights the son behind more than 30% of new arriv- transport, lodging, fraudulent documents
importance of partnerships with key non- als in 21 Member States, even exceeding etc.) and access to irregular legalisation
EU countries. 50% in some Member States (BEL, GRC, options once in the EU (e.g. misuse of asy-
Migratory movements towards the ESP, HRV, LUX and SVN). lum provisions, identity fraud) contribute
EU regularly occur, far removed from the Moreover, several studies1 and Frontex to the appeal of migration towards the EU.
well-publicised rubber dinghies in the empirical data (based on debriefing in- Lastly, the EU is located relatively close
Mediterranean. Firstly, more than 700 terviews) clearly suggest that one of the to several crisis areas in the Middle East
million legal travellers enter and leave biggest drivers of migration towards the and North Africa, where large pools of po-
the EU every year. Demand for short- EU is the presence of a diaspora in the tential / would-be migrants are located (e.g.
term visas remains very strong; for ex- Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan). Like-
ample, just over 16 million applications wise, the lack of economic opportunities
1 For example “International Migration
for short-stay visas were lodged at the in the countries of origin (Africa, Asia and
Drivers. A quantitative assessment of the
consulates of Schengen States in 2018. structural factors shaping migration” Latin America), and demographic pres-
JRC, 2018 sures drive movements towards the EU.

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 Greenland

I celand
Sweden Finland
N orway
Russia

B elarus
Poland
Germany

U kraine
France H ungary
Romania

I taly
B ulgaria

Spain
Turkey T

Syria

I raq
Morocco

Algeria
Libya
Egypt

Sau di Arabia

Mauritania
Mali
N iger
Sudan
Chad Yemen
Senegal

B urkina Faso
Ethiopia
N igeria
Guinea B enin
Ghana Somalia

Key neighbouring and transit cooperation agreements such as the one pressure on select border sections with
regions between Spain and Morocco, the EU-Tur- almost immediate effect.
key Statement and – as happened during Frontex data suggest that there
In the context of the external dimen- the 2015/16 migration crisis – agreements are roughly a dozen non-EU countries
sion of European integrated border man- between several EU Member States and through which the vast majority of ir-
agement (EIBM), cooperating with the Western Balkan countries. While some regular migrants pass before being de-
key transit countries is a very effective agreements may be regarded as more sus- tected at the external borders of the EU.
tool. In the past and currently, migration tainable than others, their results support Working closely with these countries is
flows were addressed in multi- or bilat- the conclusion that multi- or bilateral therefore a key element of the European
eral agreements, including prominent agreements can alleviate migratory integrated border management strategy.

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 Key Neighboring Transit Countries

Senegal

Montenegro
a
North
Macedonia

Moldova

Algeria
Mongolia
Kazakhstan
Tunisia

Bosnia and
U zbekistan
Herzegovina
Kyrgyzstan

Tu rkmenistan China Libya

Taji kistan

Russia

Afghanistan

I ran Albania

Pakistan Marocco
N epal

Serbia

Belarus
Sum of detections of cases of India
illegal border-crossings and refusals
of entry per last country of departure Ukraine
(excluding below threshold)
879 - 5 000 Turkey
5 001 - 14 000
1 4 001 - 35 000 0 10 000 20 000 30 000 40 000 50 000 60 000 70 000 80 000 90 000
35 001 - 85 078
Detections of illegal border-crossings at BCPs
a Detections of illegal border-crossings between BCPs
Refusals of entry

The Agency’s assessment also suggests of migrants in neighbouring third coun- beyond just the symptoms, and involves
that any perceived or actual deficiency tries, as few migrants are initially dis- also fighting the organised crime net-
of border and migration management suaded from their goal of reaching the works that enable migrant flows, build-
systems and their components in these EU. In the longer run, however, if these ing border management capacity and
transit regions can result in much higher efforts are sustained, migrant numbers facilitating information exchange. Be-
pressure towards the EU. may dwindle as migrants make use of re- yond the realm of border guarding, also
On the other hand, effective collab- turn schemes and fewer people leave their cooperating in the development of coun-
oration that merely prevents migrants countries of origin as the word gets round tries of origin is necessary to tackle the
from entering the EU may well in the of reduced chances of success. Truly sus- root causes of migration.
short term mean a rise in the numbers tainable collaboration, however, goes far

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The Western Balkans and Turkey ▪ the situation in Syria; subsequent transfers to the mainland3
▪ instability in Afghanistan; with knock-on effects in the Western
Turkey will remain the key country ▪ the economic situation in the Middle Balkans.
along the Eastern Mediterranean route. East and South Asia; Migrants already in the region, to-
As of 2019, Turkey’s Ministry of Interior ▪ changes in migrant workers’ access gether with those expected to arrive from
estimated around 4.9 million migrants to Saudi Arabia or changes in mi- the south, will continue to exert pressure
to be present in Turkey. Over 3.6 million grants’ perceptions related to the ac- on the borders of Croatia, Hungary and
of them are Syrians. Between 1 January cessibility of the Western Balkans. Romania. It is likely that they will apply
and 30 November 2019, Turkey report- the “mass movement” modus operandi
edly prevented roughly 84 000 seaborne, Migration in the Western Balkan re- to force their way across regional borders.
and over 41 000 land-borne departures of gion will continue to be influenced, to Finally, the availability of and con-
migrants towards the EU. A rising trend a large extent, by the size of the flows ditions in reception centres, the prom-
was observed, especially from July on- along the Eastern Mediterranean route.1 ise of more favourable living conditions
wards. Border surveillance in the Aegean If readmissions under the EU-Turkey elsewhere, and access to smuggling ser-
from both the Greek and Turkish side is statement remain low, this will lead to a vices will determine most intra-regional
crucial to detect vessels in distress and further overcrowding of the reception fa- movements as well as pressure on the re-
to avoid non-intercepted arrivals on the cilities on the Aegean islands2, prompting gion’s northern borders.4
Greek islands. The size, composition and
location of migration flows across Turkey 1 Over 50 000 migrants reached Greece by
and on the Eastern Mediterranean are de- sea, and 8 000 by land (cut-off date: 30
November), while Turkey prevented over
termined by multiple factors, including:
100 000 departures in the same period. 3 Over 32 000 up to 30 November 2019.
▪ border and migration enforcement
2 Over 39 000 migrants on the islands 4 Migrants use reception facilities for
measures taken by Turkish Security as of 3 December 2019, surpassing the shelter, they abscond, try to cross borders,
Services within Turkey; reception capacity by a factor of three. and if they fail they return.

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 Frontex Situation Centre
© Frontex, 2019

North Africa, the Maghreb and Member States in these regions. In fact, The smuggling of illicit drugs (mainly
West Africa they all have already demonstrated their hashish from the EU and heroin to the
willingness to jointly tackle the issue of EU)5 on the EU’s eastern external bor-
The stability of Libya and the Libyan irregular migratory flows that mostly af- ders is likely to continue increasing in
Coast Guard’s operations in its assigned fect Spain (the Canary Islands, Ceuta and the foreseeable future as smugglers de-
SAR area will continue to be key deter- Melilla and the Strait of Gibraltar). velop more sophisticated modi operandi.
miners of flows across the Central Medi- Morocco detected more than 27 000 Ukraine is likely to be increasingly
terranean. Likewise, the presence of naval irregular migrants and dismantled more attractive as a transit country for na-
assets, including NGO vessels, in the prox- than 60 smuggling networks in 2019. The tionalities that enjoy visa-free travel to
imity of Libya’s territorial waters and General Directorate for National Secu- Ukraine (e.g. Turkish nationals). Further-
their access to EU ports will also play rity (DGSN) also reported the discovery of more, the visa-free policy for Turkish citi-
a vital role. roughly 3 000 fraudulent travel or iden- zens in Ukraine is likely to generate more
North Africa is also likely to gener- tity documents. demand for fraudulent Turkish docu-
ate a new stock of migrants that will be ments from the various migrant com-
willing to travel to the EU using all avail- The Eastern European munities in Turkey or its neighbourhood
able means. This will be largely driven neighbouring region (e.g. Iranians).
by the poor economic prospects for the
entire region. Several countries in the Smuggling of excise goods and illicit
region need to re-examine their devel- drugs as well as trafficking in leased/
5 Heroin going from Central Asia to
opment model and speed up necessary rental vehicles will remain the most sig-
Germany via Russia, Belarus, Latvia,
structural reforms. nificant threats to border security on the
Lithuania, and Poland. The information
Morocco, Senegal and Mauritania will EU’s eastern land borders. was shared by Belarus during a meeting
remain key partners for the EU and its in December 2019.

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 Eastern
Mediterranean

Central
Western Mediterranean Turkey
Mediterranean
Unspecified
sub-Saharan Syria
nationals Iran
Algeria Afghanistan
Morocco Iraq
Palestine^
Libya Pakistan

Egypt
Bangladesh
Mauritania Mali

Senegal
Eritrea Yemen
Gambia
Burkina Faso Sudan
Guinea
Sierra Leone Nigeria
Ghana
Côte d'Ivoire Cameroon
Somalia

Congo
(Brazzaville) Congo
(Kinshasa)
^ This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and
is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.

5.1. Situational Overview

Data reported by Member States indi- mounting migratory pressure on the East- growth in the share of women and child
cate a total of 141 846 detections of illegal ern Mediterranean route and the corre- migrants compared with 2018.
border-crossing along the EU’s external sponding pressure in the Western Balkans. In 2019, in line with the intense migra-
borders in 2019, which represents a 4.9% Irregular migration to Europe in 2019 tory pressure on the Eastern Mediterra-
decrease compared with the number of did not deviate from well-known patterns nean route and related to the heightened
detections recorded in 2018 (and a 92% along the established routes. More than pressure on the Western Balkan route, mi-
decrease compared with the 1.8 million two-thirds of all illegal border-crossing grants from the Middle East and South-
detections at the height of the migra- detections at the EU’s external borders in ern Asia represented a larger share of all
tion crisis in 2015). Looking a little fur- 2019 were again made at sea in the Medi- detected illegal border-crossings. In fact,
ther into historical data, the number of terranean, along familiar migration corri- these two regions accounted for over half
illegal border-crossings in 2019 fell to its dors. The three main routes - crossing the (around 87 500 arrivals or 62%) of all regis-
lowest level since 2013. A decrease in mi- Western, Central and Eastern Mediterra- tered irregular arrivals in the EU in 2019.
grant numbers of less than 5% compared nean - are indicated above, along with Of this subset, the respective main coun-
with 2018 signifies that the rate of the de- the relative flows from the main coun- tries of origin, Afghanistan and Syria, ac-
crease slowed down significantly in 2019. tries of origin. According to the collective counted for roughly 41% of the registered
Even though arrival figures decreased findings from EU and MS law enforce- illegal border-crossings.
in 2019 for the fourth year in a row, it is ment authorities involved, migrants on The largest decrease in absolute num-
instructive to go back further in the data the Mediterranean routes are primarily bers of irregular arrivals (a decrease of
collection: for instance, the number of smuggled on rubber boats, toy boats, or almost 31 000 compared with 2018) was
detections in 2019 is roughly compara- small fishing boats, with very basic life- from Africa, specifically from western
ble to the figure for 2011, when strong saving and rescue equipment. and northern Africa, although in the for-
migratory pressure was exerted on the It has become more common for boats mer case the exact magnitude is unclear
EU’s south-eastern land borders and also to reach the EU without the presence of due to the categorisation of many mi-
in the Central Mediterranean. a smuggler. The vast majority of migrant grants from West Africa as ‘unspecified
The 2019 decrease occurred primarily smugglers run their illegal business from sub-Saharan nationals’. The total number
due to fewer detections on the Western the last country of departure to the EU, of African migrants who used the East-
and Central Mediterranean routes, a re- with connections in source, transit and ern Mediterranean route increased how-
sult primarily of determined prevention destination countries. ever, in contrast to the steep decreases on
efforts by Northern African countries. On The number of detections of illegal both the Western and Central Mediter-
the other hand 2019 saw continuously border-crossing in 2019 indicates a slight ranean routes.

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 Operation Poseidon
© Frontex, 2019

The Eastern Mediterranean route saw countries of origin and long-term host Afghan families arriving in Greece had
the highest total in detected illegal bor- countries throughout Southern Asia and departed from Afghanistan or Iran. But
der-crossings since 2016. Compared with the Middle East intensified as the year apart from Asia, some African countries
2018, almost 27 000 more migrants on progressed and materialised in migra- also had significantly more migrants ar-
this route were reported by Greece, Cy- tory pressure on the Eastern Mediterra- rive on the Eastern Mediterranean route,
prus and Bulgaria. Geographically, the nean route. Around half of all migrants in particular from Congo (Kinshasa), So-
migratory pressure in 2019 focused on on this route were rescued in search and malia, Cameroon and Congo (Brazzaville).
the Eastern Aegean Sea and on Cyprus. rescue operations. From all of these countries significantly
The pressure on the Greek and Bulgar- Cyprus in 2019 experienced a further more women arrived (from Cameroon
ian land borders with Turkey markedly increase in migrant arrivals, in fact since only slightly). Over 2 600 unaccompa-
eased in 2019. In fact, reported detections 2013 reported detections by Cyprus have nied minors were reported to Frontex on
there fell by almost half compared with been continuously increasing, although this route in 2019.
2018. Turkish migrants in 2019 made exponentially since 2016. Compared to
up an even larger share of these arrivals 2017, the number almost tripled in 2019.
than in 2018. More pertinently, EASO reports that Cy-
In the Eastern Aegean on the other prus was by far the leading country in
hand, migratory pressure rose in the terms of asylum applications relative to
spring and peaked in September, when population size (150 applications per 10
arrivals started falling chiefly due to 000 inhabitants). It ranked second in
weather conditions. In the second half terms of applications relative to the coun-
of the year, arrivals were the highest try’s geographic size.
since the implementation of the EU- On the Eastern Mediterranean route
Turkey Statement despite the Turkish in 2019 the increase in Afghans stood
Coast Guard’s continued resolve to pre- out, with their numbers increasing by
vent irregular migrant departures. Mi- 167% (in absolute numbers an increase of
grant smugglers satisfied the increased roughly 18 000 migrants). Of this demo-
demand, in particular from Afghan and graphic, the share of women increased,
Syrian migrants, by adapting their modi with their numbers almost tripling:
operandi and using simultaneous depar- Over 11 000 Afghan women arrived, of-
tures. Push factors throughout many key ten with their families. Many of these

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 Eastern Borders route
Turkey 77
Detections of illegal border- 722 Vietnam 62
(1 084) Ukraine 57
crossing at the EU’s external
borders, 2019

141 846
(149 117 in 2018)
Black Sea route
Route Western Balkan route

in 2019 Top three nationalities Afghanistan 5 338 2 Ukraine 1

Afghanistan 34 154 15 152 Syria 4 643 ()
Russia 1
(in 2018) Syria 24 390 (5 869) Iraq 1 498
Morocco 8 020

Circular route from

Albania to Greece

1 944 Albania 1 867

China 18
Eastern Mediterranean route
(4 550) Afghanistan 28 693
India 16
83 333 Syria 19 604
(56 561) Turkey 7 169
Western Mediterranean route
Unknown 12 637
23 969 Morocco 6 336
(56 245) Algeria 4 014
Western
African route
Central Mediterranean route
Unknown 1 709
2 718 Morocco 949 Tunisia 2 690
(1 323) Mali 48 14 003 Sudan 1 764 Please note that selection of these border sections does not
adequately capture developments at other, internal, sections of the route.
(23 485) Côte d'Ivoire 1 304

The Western Balkan migration route also of the corridors, along the Bosnian and smuggling networks rather than a de-
saw increased migratory activity in 2019 Herzegovinian–Croatian–Slovenian cor- crease in smuggling activities. For those
compared with 2018, in particular due to ridor and on Serbia’s border with Hun- migrants who cannot afford the smug-
the increased number of illegal border- gary, Croatia and Romania. Slovenia felt glers the sharing and use of offline maps
crossings towards the end of the year, much of the pressure emanating from with detailed information on the routes
many of them purportedly repeated at- the region throughout 2019. is a commonly used modus operandi. Those
tempts by the same migrants. In fact, al- According to Europol, most migrant who reach their final destinations share
most half of all detections on this route smuggling cases in 2019 concerned the maps of their journey with other mi-
were recorded in the last quarter of the Western Balkan region. The most com- grants. These maps show the safest places
year. In the latter part of the year pres- mon modus operandi here was clandestine to cross the border as well as good hid-
sure focused on the EU’s borders with entry using often life-threatening means ing places. In 2019 tunnels were found
Serbia. Throughout the year, the land of concealment in various types of ve- at the southern EU border to the region.
borders to this region recorded slightly hicles. Migrant smugglers often used The top nationalities detected trans-
fewer refusals of entry. different kinds of vehicles to transport iting the region were largely similar to
The Western Balkan route continues to irregular migrants in the region, in par- those reported on the Eastern Mediterra-
be mostly transited by irregular migrants ticular cars, (mini-) vans, and trucks. Con- nean route. A third of all migrant detec-
trying to reach Western Europe from Tur- cealment methods ranged from simply tions concerned Afghan citizens, closely
key. This continues to be a testing route hiding irregular migrants in the cargo followed by Syrians. Iraqis, Iranians. Turk-
avoided by families, as the large share of space of a van or boot of a car to con- ish nationals complete the list of the five
young male migrants suggests. 94% of all structing furniture around irregular mi- most common nationalities using this
migrants detected at the EU’s borders on grants and sophisticated custom-built route.
entry from the region in 2019 were male. compartments. Frontex data indeed show On the circular route from Albania
Both corridors through the region saw that the majority of reported clandes- southwards, detections decreased signifi­
activity throughout the year, the cen- tine entries at the EU’s external borders cantly, by 57% compared with 2018 to their
tral route via Serbia and the route from took place in this region, almost exclu- lowest level since FRAN data collection
the Greek-Albanian border. The western sively by male migrants aged 18 to 34. The commenced in 2009. It is believed that
corridor into Albania reported mount- number of migrant smugglers detected these cross-border movements continue
ing detections after the start of Frontex’s at the borders to this region reported to reflect seasonal labour migration. 96%
joint operation in May. Migratory pres- to Frontex fell, most likely suggesting of all cases are attributed to Albanians,
sure was projected northward from each the increased sophistication of people supporting this assessment.

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 © Frontex, 2018

The Central Mediterranean in 2019 re- numerous than Eritreans on this corri- either directly or via Greece. The aver-
corded its lowest yearly number of ir- dor in 2019. Almost 1 500 unaccompa- age number of migrants per vessel in
regular migrants since before the Arab nied minors were registered amongst 2019 was 55 from Turkey to Italy, while
Spring. A 40% decrease in migrants com- those who had departed from Libya, al- via Greece the average was 24 migrants
pared with 2018 denotes the third year most four times as many as those who per vessel. Frontex estimates that second-
in a row of reduced arrivals in this re- were accompanied by family members. ary movements by sea from Greece to It-
gion. Irregular migratory activity was All other migratory corridors in the aly generate particularly high profits per
very low at the beginning of 2019, but Central Mediterranean (i.e. departures smuggled migrant for people smuggling
it then picked up in the summer and in from Algeria, Tunisia and Turkey) also groups. Pakistani, Iraqi and Iranian mi-
particular in the autumn. reported decreased activities compared grants made up the vast majority of all
As regards departures from Libya, to 2018. Tunisia was the main country of migrants who used this relatively expen-
which in 2019 was the country of last departure for migrants detected on the sive option (there are instances where
departure for well over half of the mi- Central Mediterranean route in February, migrants have purportedly paid up to
grants who reached the EU on this route, April and September. Almost 600 unac- EUR 10 000 for the journey) to reach
prevention activities by the Libyan Coast companied minors were reported on this the EU from Turkey. In 2019, 300 unac-
Guard kept departures down through- corridor, which represents the majority companied minors were reported aboard
out the year, and thus also arrivals in of all registered minors (around 750). As leisure boats arriving in Italy from Tur-
the EU. The conflict in Libya, which in- the year progressed, the share of non-Tu- key, which represents an increase com-
tensified as the year progressed, did not nisian migrants departing from Tunisia pared to 2018.
appear to affect the coast guard’s activ- increased. In 2018 a mere 9% were non-
ities. Including arrivals and prevented Tunisian, whereas in 2019 their share
departures as well as those rescued by increased to 28%, led by Ivorians. In fact,
the Libyan Coast Guard, an estimated Ivorians accounted for more than half of
17 000 migrants attempted to reach the all the non-Tunisian nationals on this
EU by sea in 2019. Of the main nation- route. Departures from the east of Algeria
alities departing from Libya, Eritreans – on the other hand continued to be made
in 2018 the most common nationality up almost entirely of Algerian nationals.
on this route – saw the largest relative A modus operandi that continued
and absolute decrease. Sudanese, Bang- throughout 2019 was the use of sailing
ladeshi and Ivorian migrants were more boats travelling from Turkey to Italy,

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© Frontex, 2018

On the Western Mediterranean route, At the land borders significantly fewer irregular migration in semitrailers, which
a 57% decrease in arrivals compared to (-71%) incidents were reported in 2019, al- are loaded onto ferries connecting Tang-
the peak year of 2018 was reported. While most exclusively involving sub-Saharan ier (Morocco) with Barcelona (Spain) and
in 2018 an increase in migrants from migrants. Clandestine entry attempts at Savona (Italy).
different Asian countries, mostly from border-crossings points also fell to less The Western African route in 2019 re-
Bangladesh, was recorded, 2019 saw their than half the number in 2018. Refusals corded roughly twice the number of de-
share drop (from 1.3% in 2018 to 0.8% in of entry at the land borders fell as well. tections compared with 2018 making it
2019). While the number of Moroccans Migration pressure on the Algerian – with approximately 2 700 migrants –
decreased in line with the overall flow in corridor pertaining to the Western Med- the busiest year for this route in a decade.
comparison with 2018, Algerian migrants iterranean route rose in the autumn, as While departures from Senegal only in-
increased their share as their number in previous years. Overall the number of creased slightly, departures from Morocco
only fell slightly, a decrease solely due detections remained similar to the pre- more than doubled. This increase was
to slightly fewer departures from Mo- vious two years. made up of sub-Saharan migrants, while
rocco (the number that departed from According to Europol, in this region the number of Moroccan migrants en
their country of origin remained virtu- it has become more common for boats route to the Canary Islands only slightly
ally unchanged). to reach the EU without the presence of increased.
After January 2019, departures from a smuggler on board. In some cases, peo-
Morocco on the Western Mediterra- ple smugglers escort the boat loaded with
nean sea route decreased significantly irregular migrants only for the first part
(by 57% for the entire year compared of the sea crossing, leaving irregular mi-
with 2018). After very quiet months in grants on their own to sail towards the
the spring, in the summer and autumn EU. OCGs active on the Western Medi-
the numbers recovered somewhat. Ac- terranean route are particularly known
cording to Europol, in 2019 there was for their poly-criminality, often being in-
an increase in cases involving jet skis volved in other criminal activities, such
and speedboats, traditionally used for as trafficking in human beings and drug
drug trafficking, for people smuggling trafficking. A newly discovered modus
on this corridor. operandi in 2019 was the facilitation of

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Refusals of entry
per border type, 2019
(only values higher than 1 000 are stipulated)

145 494 (131 641) 62 498 (54 952) 4 100 (4 037)

Number in parenthesis is for 2018 Number in parenthesis is for 2018 Number in parenthesis is for 2018

Land Air Sea

United
Kingdom

Poland Germany
Romania
France
Hungary
Croatia Italy Italy
Spain Spain
Greece

Trend of the total

Land Air Sea
2018 131 641 54 952 4 037
2019 145 494 62 498 4 100

On the Eastern borders route, the num- Most likely the resulting trend to transit being responsible for an additional ma-
ber of illegal border-crossings decreased via the two countries in question would jor share of the overall increase. With ap-
with figures falling to their lowest level have been more accentuated, but there proximately 7 500 refusals, Belarusians
since the inception of FRAN data col- was also a significant rise in the num- were the third-most common refused
lection. The 722 reported illegal border- ber of refusals of entry issued to Turk- nationality at the Eastern land borders.
crossings signify a drop by approximately ish nationals by these two countries. This For Russians and Belarusians the most
one-third compared with 2018. Vietnam- shows that many more were barred from reported reason for refusal was that the
ese migrants, the foremost migrant group transiting there. concerned individual was not in posses-
detected over the past few years at the In general, refusals of entry at the sion of a valid visa.
Eastern borders, dropped to a mere 62 Eastern borders increased even further Detections of illegal stay on exit also
migrant arrivals in 2019, a drop of 83% in 2019: Almost 114 000 refusals were is- increased slightly at the Eastern borders
compared with 2018. Successes in dis- sued at the Eastern land borders, 21% (or in to approximately 28 500 cases. Ukraini-
mantling organised crime groups – often absolute terms almost 20 000) more than ans, who stayed beyond the permitted
specialising in smuggling select nation- in 2018. Of the main reasons associated period, were responsible for the vast ma-
alities – are likely behind the drop in de- with the significant number of refusals jority of cases.
tections. Clandestine entry attempts at issued, the only reason that saw a de-
border-crossing points were once again crease was no sufficient means of subsist-
not a major occurrence, with a mere 13 ence in relation to the period and form of
cases for the entire year. stay or the means to return to the coun-
Due to the decrease in Vietnamese try of origin or transit. More than half of
arrivals at the Eastern borders, Turkish these refusals (and 45% of all refusals at
migrants became the most common na- all land borders) were issued to Ukraini-
tionality detected for illegal border-cross- ans, mostly because they were not able to
ing. Two neighbouring countries have provide justification for their stay. With
over the last two years adopted visa-free over 11 000 additional cases, Ukraini-
agreements with Turkey. Some Turkish ans were behind much of the aforemen-
nationals have used this new opportu- tioned increase. Russians received almost
nity of visa-free traveling and abused it. 9 000 additional refusals vis-à-vis 2018,

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Joint Operation Flexible Operational Activities - Western Balkans 2019 in Albania
© Frontex, 2019

5.2. Fraudulent Documents

External borders corded the most marked intensification The Italian airports were the most af-
compared with 2018. As in 2018, the po- fected by this increase in detections in-
In 2019, over 7 000 fraudulent document litical situation in Turkey continues to be bound from Casablanca. A large majority
users were detected at the EU’s exter- the main ‘push factor’ for the increasing of detected fraudulent document users
nal borders (entry/exit/transit), 5% fewer number of Turkish citizens successfully identified in Italy arriving from Casa-
than in 2018. reaching EU countries. blanca are from sub-Saharan countries,
Of this total number, some 5 700 de- At EU level, of the 133 nationalities de- e.g. Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, the Democratic
tections were made on entry to the EU/ tected using fraudulent documents to il- Republic of Congo, Senegal and Guinea.
Schengen area from third countries, legally enter the EU/SACs from a third The second most reported last depar-
which is a 13% decrease in comparison country, the most commonly recognised ture airport in 2019 was the new inter-
with 2018. The most significant decrease were unchanged compared with 2018. national “Yeni Havalimani” airport in
was reported by Poland and Hungary and Nonetheless, the number of detected Istanbul.
the 40% decrease reported by Spain at the Ukrainian, Iraqi and Russian fraudulent An increase in detection of fraud-
external EU borders. The latter related to document users decreased dramatically ulent documents was also noticed on
migrants from Morocco, while the former in 2019. flights arriving from Brazil, Tunisia and
related mostly to Ukrainian nationals ar- As in previous years, most detec- the Emirates.
riving on fraudulent travel documents tions of fraudulent documents were re- Many cases related to migrants trans-
from Ukraine. ported on air routes. Indeed, seven out iting the EU from one third country to
The most significant increase involves of ten detections affect this border type. another were reported from European
Turks, Albanians, and nationals of Kos- The number of document fraud cases Union and Schengen Associated Coun-
ovo1. Of these nationalities, Kosovars re- from Morocco’s Casablanca airport in- tries airports, where especially African
creased by 114% in 2019 compared with nationals in transit were pretending to
2018. Consequently, Casablanca airport travel to different destinations outside
1 This designation is without prejudice to
became the top departure airport for de- Europe. Instead they applied for asylum
positions on status, and is in line with
UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the tections of fraudulent documents from at the transit airport.
Kosovo declaration of independence. third countries.

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 Nationality of users of fraudulent documents detected
by MS - absolute number in 2019 and relative to 2018.

R u ssi a

Serb i a
B el aru s
Kosovo* U krai n e

M ol d ova
Al b an i a Kosovo*
Serb i a

Al b an i a

Tu rkey

Afg h an i stan Ch i n a
Tu n i si a Syri a
M orocco I raq
I ran
P aki stan
Al g eri a
E g yp t
B an g l ad esh
I n dia
M al i
D om i n i can R ep u b l i c
Sen eg al
N i g eri a
G u i n ea
Cam eroon
Sri L an ka
Cote d ' I voi re
G h an a
Con g o
N ati on al i ty of u sers
Con g o, D R C
≤ 1 00
P ercen tag e ch an g e
≤ 1 50 Tre n d b e twe e n 2 01 8 an d 2 01 9
≤ 300
B ol i vi a ≤ 76 9
Decrease (from 1% to 50 %) Increase (from 1% to 120 %)

Fron tex 201 9 * The designation for Kosovo is withou t preju dice to positions on statu s, and is in line with U N SCR 1 244 and the I CJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

As in 2018, in 2019 the border between of detections increased in 2019 for the In the context of the general develop-
Hungary and Serbia bore the brunt of doc- third year in a row. The reported figures ment, Italian documents continue to be
ument fraud cases, mainly involving na- increased by almost 33% compared with the favourites used by fraudulent docu-
tionals from the Western Balkan region. 2018 and reached their highest level ever. ment users on secondary movements. Al-
The number of Kosovar fraudulent doc- The unceasing increase in demand banians, who registered another dramatic
ument users doubled compared to the from within the EU for fraudulent doc- increase in the number of detections, pre-
previous year. uments has prompted established coun- fer to use these documents when trav-
At the land borders, the most evi- terfeiters to find new supply channels. elling illegally to Ireland or the United
dent increase was in the use of fraud- There is now the opportunity to buy coun- Kingdom.
ulent Turkish, Serbian and Romanian terfeit or stolen travel and other identi- At sea borders, the most noticeable
documents. fication documents on the web and the increase in fraudulent document detec-
There was a dramatic decrease in the dark web. The documents offered on the tion was on the main routes from Greece
number of reported detections at var- internet are frequently stolen by organ- with a registered increase in the num-
ious Eastern land borders with Russia ised gangs. ber of Turkish, Syrian and Afghan na-
and Belarus. A dramatic increase in the number of tionals detected.
At the external sea borders, no signif- attempts to reach Ireland using fraudu-
icant change was observed in compari- lent documents was registered in 2019.
son with previous years regarding entries The number of detections on journeys
from third countries. to Ireland has more than doubled, mak-
ing it the most popular route for irregu-
Intra EU/Schengen movements lar migrants using fraudulent documents.
Several Greek airports saw a noticea-
In contrast with the fall in detections ble increase in the number of attempts to
of fraudulent documents on entry from travel within the EU/Schengen area us-
third countries, on secondary movements ing fraudulent documents. Many Italian
inside the EU/Schengen area, the number airports also described similar increases.

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5.3. An integrated asylum-migration picture by EASO, Europol
and Frontex

The Schengen area is one of the most international protection (13% more than in the EU/SAC area towards their country of
important achievements of the Euro- 2018) were lodged by third-country nation- destination. Migrants and asylum seek-
pean Union. The abolition of internal bor- als in the EU/SAC area. This means that ers travelling through irregular migra-
ders allows EU citizens and many non-EU there were five times as many applica- tion routes sometimes attempt to evade
nationals, tourists and professionals to tions for asylum as there were detections registration on arrival as the countries of
move freely among 26 countries with- at the external border, a complex discrep- entry represent transit points. This situa-
out being subject to passport or border ancy with many underpinning factors. tion is well illustrated in cases of migrant
controls. Yet, while providing countless An important aspect is related to smuggling reported to Europol. According
benefits to genuine travellers, freedom third-country nationals who apply for to Europol, last year most of these cases
of movement also facilitates less legit- asylum more than once within the same concerned the Western Balkans region,
imate movements and the activities of EU/SAC after having received a negative where migrant smugglers and organised
ill-intentioned people who are able to en- decision on a previous application. Spe- crime groups (OCGs) used various types of
ter the Schengen Area. This means that cifically, in 2019, 9% of all asylum applica- vehicles such as (mini-)vans and trucks
strengthening the EU’s external borders tions at EU/SAC level were repeated. These to transport irregular migrants across
and the effective implementation of the proportions were the highest among na- the region. Concealment methods were
Common European Asylum System are tionals of Serbia (34% of all Serbian appli- a common modus operandi and ranged from
essential elements in delivering internal cations), Russia (22%), Moldova (20%), as hiding people in the cargo area of a van or
security to European citizens and ensur- well as from Sri Lanka, Nigeria and Sen- the trunk of a car to more sophisticated
ing that those within the free-movement egal (more than 15% each). On the other custom-built compartments.
area can fully enjoy its benefits. hand, countries in Central and South The activities of the European Bor-
2015 and 2016 were exceptional for America such as Venezuela, Colombia, der and Coast Guard Agency at the ex-
the European Union and the Schengen El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and ternal borders have been very important
Associated Countries (EU/SACs). During Peru had the lowest share of repeated ap- in reducing opportunities for undetected
this period an unprecedented number plications, which implies that they may crossings of the external borders. Offic-
of third-country nationals crossed the have been new arrivals in the EU. ers deployed to the Agency’s operations
EU’s external (land and sea) borders ei- Equally relevant is the fact that many help to register, screen and fingerprint
ther in need of protection or searching third-country nationals, who apply for incoming migrants and asylum seekers,
for better opportunities within the EU/ asylum, previously crossed the external as well as identify and refer, in coopera-
SAC area. The number of arrivals have border in a regular fashion. Currently, tion with EASO, those in need of interna-
since decreased, but the situation at the 62 states and territories worldwide en- tional protection, while simultaneously
external borders and within the Schen- joy a visa-free regime to the EU/SAC area, supporting EU/SACs to detect and prevent
gen area remains dynamic. many of which represent important migrant smuggling, human trafficking
While illegal-border crossings (IBCs) places of origin for applicants of interna- and other forms of cross-border crime,
of the external land and sea borders tional protection. Last year, slightly more sharing relevant intelligence with na-
have declined over the past years, grad- than a quarter of all asylum applications tional authorities and Europol. The man-
ually reaching pre-migration crisis levels were submitted by nationals from visa- agement of mixed migration flows and
- the approximately 142 000 IBCs regis- exempt countries. Applications lodged the fight against cross-border crime have
tered in 2019 were the lowest in five years by Venezuelans and Salvadorans doubled been further enhanced by the implemen-
and 5% fewer than in 2018 - the number from 2018, those by Colombians tripled, tation of a Joint Operation in Albania (at
of those detected staying illegally on the and the trend was similar for other Latin- the land border with Greece) – the first
territory of EU/SACs has remained high. American countries. Despite on a smaller ever Frontex operation in a Third Country.
For example, in 2019, there were more scale, applications by Georgians also in- While illegal border-crossings include
than 400 000 detections of illegal stay- creased, continuing an upward trend for only arrivals by land and sea, some third-
ers (10% more than in 2018) largely due to a fourth successive year. Although most country nationals also travel to the EU/
increased detections of nationals of Mo- visa-free nationals enter legally, some SAC area by air. In order to enhance the
rocco (by 49%), Moldova (47%), Eritrea (38%), overstay their permission to stay and then chances to reach their preferred destina-
Algeria (31%) and Afghanistan (11%). While become irregular, a phenomenon that ap- tions, some use fraudulent documents
detections were widely distributed across peared to be particularly common among (e.g. counterfeit visas, passports, and resi-
all countries, they largely took place in nationals from Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, dence permits, authentic but fraudulently
Central and Western European countries. Serbia and North Macedonia. obtained visas, authentic documents used
In contrast to fewer detections of IBCs, Asylum applications are also lodged by as impostors). Last year, reported cases of
applications for international protec- applicants who may have crossed the ex- arrivals by air with the use of fraudulent
tion actually increased compared to a year ternal land and sea borders undetected documents involved a number of nation-
ago. In 2019, some 715 000 applications for and then continue their journey inside als of Morocco, Turkey, Iran, Ukraine and

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 Applications for international protection were much higher than illegal border-crossings throughout 2019, however
a significant share concerned repeated applications and first-time applications from nationals of visa-exempt countries.

80 000
Total IBCs at external land and sea borders
Repeated applications from all nationalities and first-time applications from visa-exempt nationalities
70 000 Other first-time asylum applications

60 000

50 000

40 000

30 000

20 000

10 000

0
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Albania. Some of them might have applied asylum authorities (with varying timings 21 500 Algerians and 33 000 Moroccans
for asylum sometime after arrival, but the across EU/SACs and countries of origin) - far outweighed requests for interna-
number of applications lodged at air bor- who are responsible for issuing a decision tional protection. Some of them could
der-crossing points in EU/SACs has re- at first instance. In 2019, only one third be failed asylum applicants as the high
mained low, at about 2% of all applications of first-instance decisions culminated ratio of implicitly withdrawn to lodged
in 2019. In line with intelligence available with the granting of refugee status applications suggests. The situation was
at Europol, last summer there was a re- and subsidiary protection. Unsuccess- similar for Tunisians, whose more than
emergence of smuggling of third-coun- ful applicants – or those unhappy with 4 000 applications for international pro-
try nationals by plane from airports in the outcome (e.g. because they were only tection were far below the 8 259 illegal
the first countries of arrival towards air- granted subsidiary protection) have the stay detections.
ports in northern EU/SACs facilitated by possibility to submit an appeal – a step On the other hand, others are brought
the use of forged or look-alike documents. that prolongs the asylum process to a fi- to EU/SACs and transported across the
Even though a large number of third- nal decision. Once a negative decision free movement area for purposes other
country nationals apply for asylum upon becomes final, the next step in the pro- than irregular migration. In 2019 Eu-
arrival, not all of them remain present cess is a return decision, following which ropol supported an operation targeting
for long enough to complete the proce- the failed asylum seekers are returned to a poly-criminal network involved in mi-
dure. Sometimes asylum applications their country of origin. Last year, approx- grant smuggling, trafficking in human
are withdrawn implicitly, potentially imately 11 000 third-country nationals beings and drug trafficking. The OCG tar-
because of absconding in order to reapply were returned by EU/SACs after receiv- geted minors in protection centres in one
in a different EU/SAC at a later stage. In ing return decisions. EU/SAC and transported them to another
2019 one application was implicitly with- However, not all third-country nation- EU/SAC by buses used to smuggle hash-
drawn for every fifteen that were lodged. als who arrive in the EU/SACs irregularly ish, tobacco and hunting species.
This phenomenon was particularly rel- have the intention to apply for interna- The past year remained challenging
evant for nationals of Morocco and Al- tional protection or travel for the pur- for national asylum, reception, border
geria, for whom the ratio of lodged to poses of seeking asylum. Some decide guard and law enforcement authorities
implicitly withdrawn applications was to remain illegally (e.g. because they in the EU/SACs. In this context, EASO,
five to one. Among the citizens applying may not have legal grounds for protec- Europol and Frontex continued to invest
in high numbers in 2019, the ratios were tion). This is particularly true for nation- efforts in supporting their stakeholders
also relatively high for nationals of Tur- als from North African countries such according to needs. Furthermore, despite
key, Pakistan and Afghanistan. as Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. For ex- differences in their mandates, EASO, Eu-
For those seeking international protec- ample, last year Algerian and Moroccan ropol and Frontex remain committed to
tion on the territory of the EU/SACs, the nationals each submitted over 10 000 cooperation in different aspects of their
lodging of an asylum application is only asylum applications, but the number of work, including analysis that contributes
the beginning. After submission, appli- those detected staying illegally within to a better understanding of the asylum
cations must be examined by national the territory of EU/SACs – approximately and migration picture in the EU/SACs.

Disclaimer: The statistics presented in the text above are based on data collected by the European Border and Coast
Guard Agency (Frontex) and the European Asylum Office (EASO) under different indicators; direct comparisons between
these data are thus not possible. EASO data on EU/SACs covers EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland.

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 Return decisions (2019 total: 298 190) Effective returns (2019 total: 138 860)

35 000 35 000

30 000 30 000

2018 2018
25 000 2019 25 000 2019

20 000 20 000

15 000 15 000

10 000 10 000

5 000 5 000

0 0
ey
aine

nia

Iraq

ria

zil

aine

nia

rgia

ria

isia

Iraq
zi
Syri

si

dov
occ

occ
ista

ista

Bra

Bra
Turk
Alge

Alge

Rus
Alba

Alba

Tun
Geo
Ukr

Ukr
Mor

Mor

Mol
han

Pak
Afg

5.4. Returns

Member States reported just under when taking into account the aforemen- documents from the authorities of third
300 000 return decisions issued to third tioned caveats, no direct comparison or countries, as well as many migrants who
country nationals in 2019 (298 190). The link between the indicators of return de- abscond from the return process. Frontex
figure was around 5% higher than what cisions and effective returns should be has developed many tools to assist Mem-
was reported in 2018 and was the second established. ber States in returns (see 7.1).
highest reported number for this indica- In line with available data from pre- Bearing in mind the many challenges
tor since 2011, when the FRAN data col- vious years, the number of return deci- that arise from both the return process
lection on this indicator began. However, sions issued in 2019 was far larger than and its reporting, available data for 2019
the absolute number of return decisions the number of effective returns report- show that the main recipients of return
actually issued might vary. For instance, edly carried out in the same year. Member decisions were, in line with 2018, na-
data for this indicator in 2019 was una- States registered around 138 860 effective tionals of Ukraine, Morocco and Afghan-
vailable for three Member States. Varia- returns to third countries in 2019, a fig- istan. While the share of Ukrainians who
tions in numbers are also largely reliant ure that is around 6% lower than in 2018. were issued a return decision decreased
on what data Member States exactly re- Also, it is the lowest reported total for this slightly between 2018 and 2019, the num-
port, which mainly depends on the prac- indicator since 2011. The decrease in the ber of return decisions to Moroccans in-
tices in place in each Member State when number of effective returns can be linked creased by 23%. When looking at the ten
issuing return decisions. For example, in to many factors, stemming from lower ir- most reported nationalities for return de-
some federal EU countries, several dif- regular migratory pressure towards the cisions in 2019, nationals of Albania, Pa-
ferent authorities are in charge of issu- EU in 2019, to the fact that many return- kistan, Syria, Algeria, Brazil and Turkey
ing return decisions, but not all of them ees leave the EU voluntarily without there also witnessed an increase for this indi-
might be reporting this data to FRAN. In being evidence that they have actually left cator, while the number of Iraqis showed
addition, according to the national legis- the territory of the EU Member State/SAC, a decrease in comparison with the pre-
lation in some Member States, an irreg- hence no reporting of these occur. Some of vious year. The vast majority of return
ular migrant might also receive several the obstacles that Member States may face decisions were reportedly issued by EU
return decisions that are reported, accu- during the return process include prac- countries of arrival. The three countries
mulating to a sizable share of this indi- tical problems such as the identification issuing the most return decisions were,
cator. It can therefore be asserted that, of migrants and obtaining the necessary respectively, Greece, Spain and Poland.

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 Ukraine 33 296
26 594 Others
105 757
50 890

22 938 13 463
Morocco 9 647 Syria 405

18 269 13 086 Turkey 7 464

Afghanistan 1 643 Iraq 3 421 2 886

Georgia 7 049
7 343

17 063 12 402 6 197

Albania 15 120 Algeria 5 190 Bangladesh 1 029

5 544
Iran 1 176
Return decisions in 2019: 298 190
Effective returns in 2019: 138 860
Pakistan 17 044
2 984 Brazil 7 933
3 425
Russia 5 407
4 820
Return decisions

Nigeria 5 278 Effective returns

2 287

That the number of effective returns may sometimes be higher than return decisions, as a return decision issued in a given month may be effectively enforced at a later date. Also, return decisions may be issued without
prejudice to the person’s right to apply for asylum. Readmissions between Member States are not included (for example between France and Italy). Effective returns do not necessarily mean returns to the country of origin and,
for example in the case of Syrians, they include returns of persons to third countries considered to be safe (for example from Hungary to Serbia).

In line with previous years, Ukraini- arrivals started to increase in the second towards the EU as well as relatively low
ans, Albanians and Moroccans were the half of the year, which means in the vast asylum recognition rates.
most reported nationalities for effective majority of cases the asylum procedure Overall in 2019, around 71 100 returns
returns in 2019. All three showed a de- is still ongoing. Effective returns of Syr- were reportedly carried out with the sup-
crease when comparing data with the ians and Afghans are expected to remain port of Member States and/or Frontex,
year before, despite actually presenting at low levels, because of high asylum rec- and these mainly involved nationals of
an upward trend for detections of illegal ognition rates and the limited possibility Albania, Morocco and Algeria. Voluntary
stay between 2018 and 2019. On the other to return. In fact, according to Eurostat departures3 reported in 2019 amounted to
hand, the share of Georgian returnees in- data1, the asylum recognition rates calcu- around 67 600, 36% of which were Ukrain-
creased in 2019 in comparison with the lated between 2016 and 2019 for nation- ians, followed by around 3 800 Georgians
previous year, while the number of Al- als of Syria is 95%, while for Afghans it is and just over 3 000 Albanians opting for
gerian and Russian returnees remained 50%, thus the vast majority of returns of this method of return. Furthermore, in-
relatively stable. The number of Geor- these nationalities do not materialise2, creasingly higher numbers of returnees
gians being returned witnessed a stark in line with inter alia the principle of benefited from administrative and finan-
increase of 46% when comparing 2019 non-refoulement. cial support. In fact, assisted voluntary re-
with 2018, with an increasingly higher Since 2016, Member States have turns provide tailored support, including
trend since 2017, when the visa obligation started to report gradually increasing reintegration, to those individuals who
was waived. The data is also in line with numbers of effective returns of South would like to travel back to their coun-
a general increase in the migratory pres- American citizens. Comparing data of try of origin in a dignified manner. Lastly,
sure of this nationality towards the EU, 2019 with 2018, the increases are espe- the number of returns that happened in
with more and more detections of illegal cially visible for Peruvian and Colombian the framework of bilateral readmission
stay being reported by Member States. returnees, 80% and 41% respectively. The agreements rose from around 4 800 in
Conversely, effective returns of Syrians upward trend is in line with the gen- 2018 to more than 6 300 in 2019.
and Afghans decreased by 38% and 36% re- eral increase in the migratory pressure
spectively in 2019 compared with 2018,
despite the number of detections of ille-
1 Data for 2019 is partial.
gal border-crossings of these nationali- 2 According to MS national legislations,
ties having risen last year. One possible return decisions can be issued before the
reason for these varying trends is that asylum procedure starts. 3 With a return decision.

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6. Other Border Management Challenges

Operation Minerva
© Frontex, 2014

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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2020

 Passenger Flow on Entry to Subset of EU/SAC Illegal Stay on Exit for EU/SAC

350 000 000 100 000

300 000 000

80 000

250 000 000

60 000
200 000 000

150 000 000

40 000

100 000 000

20 00
50 000 000

0 0
2018 2019 2018 2019

Air Border Land Border Sea Border Air Border Land Border Sea Border

* excludes France, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain

6.1. Passenger Flow and Border Guards’ Workload

Passenger flow data is an important in- a comprehensive picture and offer further by air having gained entry by deception
dicator of border guards’ workload. 2019 opportunities for risk analysis. or overstaying and not leaving as obliged.
was another demanding year for border The second line at border-crossing At the EU/SAC air borders there was
guards in Member States. They were faced points was also kept busy in Member a year-on-year increase in passenger
with a further rise in passenger flows and States by, for instance, an increase in re- flows. It is estimated that the increase
the corresponding increase in entry and fusals of entry along external borders, as is about 5% per annum across Europe.
exit checks at border-crossing points. In well as an increase in document fraud de- There were significant increases in the
2017 systematic checks were expanded tections. Detections of illegal stay on exit number of Brazilians, Albanians, Peruvi-
to cover passengers enjoying the right of at air, land and sea borders remained at ans and Georgians refused entry in 2019.
free movement under EU law. This has at a very high level, increasing slightly com- The most affected airports were: Ma-
times led to delays for passengers at cer- pared with 2018, albeit a decrease in de- drid (MAD) (5 172) with mainly nationals
tain border-crossing points and continues tections at the air borders vis-à-vis 2018 of Latin American countries, Paris (CDG)
to put a greater burden on border guards. was compensated by an increase at the varied, and Lisbon (LIS) mainly Brazilians.
As in previous years, in 2019 the re- land borders, in particular at the East- Following Schengen visa liberalisa-
corded passenger flow peaked in August. ern land borders. tion for Georgia, there have been large
While passenger flow data are difficult to increases in the refusal of entry of this
compare from year to year, some Mem- Air Borders nationality at air borders. Budget airlines
ber State data suggest that passenger particularly have responded to the new
flow at air, land and sea borders slightly In 2019 across all main indicators there travel opportunities provided by visa lib-
increased compared with 2018. In fu- was an increase in irregular migration at eralisation by increasing flights from/to
ture years, the forthcoming Entry-Exit the external EU air borders. Georgia, linking to larger and smaller re-
System (EES) and its automatically gen- It is believed that many migrants who gional EU/SAC airports.
erated passenger flow data will provide are currently in the EU irregularly arrived

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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2020

 Automated Border Control Systems as seen here at Warsaw
Chopin Airport may alleviate the workload of border guards.
© Frontex, 2019

There has also been both an increase Nationals of some countries requiring migratory threat is dealing with pas-
in the level of asylum applications and a Schengen visa have been identified as sengers with such documents seeking
refusals of entry of migrants from South abusing the transit visa waiver at larger to travel to the UK or Ireland. In 2019
and Latin American countries. In respect airports associated with hubs operated some 3 000 such migrants arrived in the
of Venezuelans, over 5 000 claimed asy- by global airlines, e.g. Amsterdam, (AMS), UK and an almost equal number were
lum at air borders, however over 40 000 Frankfurt (FRA), Paris (CDG) and Madrid stopped seeking to board flights to the
claimed asylum in-country after entry. (MAD). They arrived from a non-EU/SAC UK. A further 1 390 were detected seeking
Frontex operations at third country and whilst claiming to be in direct air- to travel to Ireland. Intelligence suggests
airports located quite close to EU exter- side transit to another non-EU country that human smugglers were proposing to
nal borders indicated that migrants are they claimed asylum. migrants that they should seek to enter
also seeking to use local visa waivers and This has shown to be an increasingly the UK and Ireland prior to Brexit.
then to enter the EU by obtaining fraud- popular way to gain entry to the EU/SAC
ulent travel documents and crossing land which invariably does not require the ser-
borders. In this respect there has been an vices of a human smuggler or the use of
increase in refusals of Indian and Chinese forged, counterfeit or inappositely ob-
nationals arriving at Belgrade (BEG) who tained documentation.
are visa free in Serbia1. In respect of document abuse, 70% of
Iranian and Turkish nationals have all document abuse detected at the air
been identified seeking to transit the EU/ borders is on intra EU/Schengen flights
SAC via Tbilisi (TBS) and Baku (GYD) – as opposed to those arriving at the ex-
mainly Iranians – and Kiev (KBP) – mainly ternal borders.
Turkish – using fraudulent documenta- The year 2019 also saw a large increase
tion often of high quality. in migrants seeking to exit EU/SAC air-
ports to travel to the UK and Ireland us-
1 [Link] ing fraudulent documentation. Indeed
consular-affairs/entry-serbia/visa-regime for most EU/SAC airports their biggest

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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2020

 Indicative number of FTFs per country and number of returnees

© iStock, 2019

6.2. Pandemics and border control

The reoccurrence of infectious diseases, What has ensued within the European reducing the burden of entry and exit
epidemics or pandemics have always pre- Union goes well beyond the reintroduc- checks, these checks may have to expand
sented border guard authorities with tion of border controls within the Schen- in scope (i.e. including health aspects).
many challenges. SARS, Ebola and bird gen area. Rather it constitutes a closing Also, the closing of internal borders is
flu (avian flu) have in the 2000s already down of the borders to whole groups of binding border guard personnel, which
been some of the health scares, but none travellers, in some cases even Union citi- some border authorities have long stopped
has had more impact than the emergence zens. Still, travel restrictions may delay the planning for. And finally, the spread of the
of the ‘coronavirus disease’ (COVID-19), dissemination of the coronavirus but they infection to staff and quarantine measures
which by mid-March 2020 had report- cannot prevent it once it has already been may further stretch the capacity of bor-
edly surpassed 180 000 confirmed cases introduced into the population. Yet such der guard authorities to deploy personnel.
and 7 000 deaths globally1. a delay is reasoned to be in line with the The role of Frontex in supporting Mem-
Border guard authorities, alongside strategy of ‘flattening the epidemic curve’ ber States is manifold. First of all, the
other competent authorities, have, of (i.e. slowing down the spread of the disease health crisis elevates the need for a com-
course, already collected some experience to avoid a peak of the pandemic). The sci- mon situational picture. On a daily basis,
from the aforementioned diseases, for entific consensus is that the suppression Frontex is providing up-to-date mon-
instance from the response to the 2002- strategy is the best approach for saving itoring of the crisis to Member States
2004 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome lives – the uppermost goal - regardless of and the Agency looks to contribute to
(SARS), also a coronavirus. There is how- the great economic costs and social disrup- an integrated approach to effective bor-
ever a crucial difference, which makes the tion. Otherwise, healthcare systems and der management to protect health while
current COVID-19 pandemic an unprec- intensive care units might collapse as in- preserving the integrity of the internal
edented challenge: SARS patients were fections soar and mortality rates rise sig- market. Amongst many other actions,
only infectious after the onset of symp- nificantly. Once strict control measures the Agency also contributed to the guide-
toms. This appears to be different in the are relaxed, however, the transmission of lines on the handling of border control ac-
case of the novel coronavirus. Patients coronavirus disease might once again re- tivities in the time of heightened health
suffering from COVID-19 are infectious bound.3 Particular care and a cautious ap- risks. And finally, committed to the duty
before the onset of symptoms. Asymp- proach is therefore of utmost importance. of care for all its staff and deployed per-
tomatic travellers are therefore not eas- Given the special characteristics of sonnel, the Agency is taking all steps to
ily identified at points of entry and may the COVID-19 pandemic – in particular outfit its joint operations and Headquarter
spread the disease2. This means that pro- its comparatively long incubation period staff with the necessary protective gear.
cedures such as checking temperature combined with the infectiousness of carri-
are only in part effective in stopping the ers before showing symptoms – the chal- 1 [Link]
spread. Consequently, following this logic, lenges to border guards across Europe are, 2 [Link]
NEJMc2001899
measures such as quarantining all trav- of course, widely different from previous
3 [Link]
ellers and/or altogether closing the bor- responses to diseases. While on the one imperial-college/medicine/sph/ide/gida-
ders have been introduced. hand global travel is plummeting and fellowships/Imperial-College-COVID19-
[Link]

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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2020

6.3. Cross-border crime: Firearms

It is estimated that 60 percent of the 640 The majority of these seizures were not employed. In general, targeted searches of
million firearms currently in circulation the result of large-scale weapons traffick- vehicles increase incidental seizures (by-
worldwide are in civilian hands1. Flows of ing. Numerous actors were involved, from catch). This implies that the amount of
illicit firearms fuel armed conflicts and individuals smuggling for their own use firearms smuggling is significant.
violent criminal organisations. Illegal to organised criminal groups distribut- Due to the growing presence of il-
firearms may be used for coercion and ing firearms in large quantities. licit firearms in the EU, it is important
intimidation in other crime areas. The Various sources suggest that crisis to underline the significance of coopera-
recent terrorist attacks in the EU and ac- regions and former crisis regions, like tion with all EU and international bodies
companying seizures of firearms during Ukraine or the former Yugoslavia, are as well as with Border Guard and Cus-
cross-border and inland operations dem- a huge source of illegal weapons. However, toms authorities to achieve an appropri-
onstrate the multidimensional nature of this has not been confirmed by detections ate, comprehensive and tailored response
illicit firearms trafficking. Once in circu- at the borders. Incidents of smuggling of to detecting transportations at the bor-
lation, illegal firearms can pose a risk for ammunition and gas pistols or converted ders through detailed checks of travel-
decades. Given all these issues, illicit traf- firearms towards these regions have also lers based on profiling.
ficking of firearms is constantly consid- been reported, which might indicate that Seizures 2019
ered a high threat.2 weapons with a lower penalty in case of
Expl osives
Around 80% of the illicit firearms detection are in demand.
2%
transported within the EU are destined Information exchange with countries
to stay in the EU3. A significant amount of neighbouring the EU in the Western Bal-
the firearms used in the EU are imported. kans and Eastern Europe indicate that Fi rearms
Also easily convertible weapons manufac- the border control authorities in those Air 27%
Sea
tured in the EU tend to be modified and regions continue to detect weapons, am- 3% 13%
used for lethal purposes. These are also munition and explosives, but with a de-
very often transported outside the EU. The creasing long-term trend.
routes used depend on the current situa- According to the findings from Joint La nd
84%
tion, legal requirements and firearms leg- Action Days (for instance Joint Action
islation in particular countries. Two main Day Mobile 2 across Europe), detections Ammunition
corridors have been identified, one from of firearms and ammunition are more (×1000pcs )
71%
the Western Balkans to Northern Europe likely when intense search measures are
and the other from the Eastern land bor-
ders towards the United Kingdom.
The European Border and Coast Guard
Agency is tasked with addressing seri-
ous crimes that adversely affect the se-
curity of the EU’s external borders, for
instance smuggling of drugs and fire-
arms. In 2019 border authorities seized
numerous weapons, mostly during bor-
der checks at the external border. Most
of these were cold arms, prohibited pep-
Blank firing weapon detected during intensified vehicle searches performed
per sprays and electric shockers, but fire-
during Joint Action Day Mobile 2.
arms and ammunition were also found.

1 IANSA presentation to the UN Small

Arms Review Conference 2006 https://
[Link]/events/smallarms2006/pdf/
[Link]
2 SOCTA 2017 is a comprehensive study
of serious and organised crime in the
EU released by EUROPOL. It is the
outcome of a detailed analysis of the
threat of serious and organised crime
facing the EU providing information for
practitioners, decision-makers and the During Joint Action Day Mobile 2, sniffer dogs located hiding places in a
wider public. controlled car. Nine packages containing firearm parts were found hidden in the
3 Estimations made by the European Crime left rear doorsill and the left part of the boot.
Prevention Network.

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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2020

 N O R W AY

Sm u ggl in g of d ru gs seized d u rin g Join t Op eration s

E STO N I A

SWE D E N
I n i c i d e n ts fro m 01 Jan - 31 D e c 2 01 9
L AT V I A

D E N M AR K

L I TH U AN I A

RU SSI A

B E L AR U S

I R E L AN D
U N I TE D
KI N GDOM
N E TH E R L AN D S P O L AN D

G E R M AN Y
H ash i sh BELGI UM
H U N G AR Y
CZECH
M ari ju an a REPUBLI C
U K R AI N E R O M AN I A
H e ro i n S e i zu re am o u n t (c ase s)
S L O VA K I A

Opiu m 39 C R O AT I A
AU S T R I A

C o c ai n e 13 H U N G AR Y M O L D O VA
F R AN C E S W I TZ E R L AN D
O th e r d ru g s 1
S L O VE N I A
R O M AN I A
C R O AT I A SE RB I A
B O S N I A AN D
H E R Z E G O VI N A
B O S N I A AN D
H E R Z E G O VI N A S E R B I A B U L G AR I A

I TALY
GEORGI A
M O N TE N E G R O B U L G AR I A

K O S O VO * M O N TE N E G R O

K O S O VO *
AL B AN I A
S P AI N
P O R TU G AL
GREE CE
TU R K E Y

AL B AN I A

I TALY GREE CE
M ALTA The designation for Kosovo is withou t preju dice to positions on status,
I R AQ
AL G E R I A TU N I SI A S Y declaration
and is in line with U N SCR 1 244 and the I CJ Opinion on the Kosovo RI A of independence.

C YP R U S
M OROCCO
L E B AN O N F ro n te x 2 02 0

6.4. Cross-border crime: Drug Trafficking

Drug trafficking is a highly lucrative EU’s external borders.5 While large seizures effort to reduce and deflect the attention
criminal activity which generates large were again related to maritime borders, of law-enforcement authorities.
profits for organised criminal structures a variety of drugs was also seized on land Generally, the top smuggled drug at
worldwide. With the great majority of routes and at EU airports. The trafficking the EU’s external borders is cannabis
drugs used in Europe passing through the of drugs by air presents serious challenges both in number of cases (68%) and quan-
EU’s external borders, the European Bor- to authorities with constantly increas- tity (97%).6 Easy production, high availabil-
der and Coast Guard Agency has a major ing passenger flows at the international ity and accessibility, cultural and regional
role to play in tackling drug smuggling. airports. Passengers arriving from South characteristics, as well as lower penalty
In 2019 there were 658 cases and 130.6 American countries, as well as from Af- risk in some countries contribute to the
tonnes of various drugs detected during rica, smuggling drugs by body-packing, in popularity of herbal cannabis and hash-
Frontex-coordinated operational activities, clothes or in hold baggage are the typical ish. Cannabis is the most widely con-
an increase of 50% in the number of detec- types of cases at airports. Similar smug- sumed illicit drug in Europe with a large
tions but a slight reduction in the quan- gling methods have become popular on sea proportion of the herbal cannabis grown
tity of seizures.4 The majority of seizures and land routes as well, usually on ferry closer to the place of consumption. Out-
occurred in the maritime domain with connections between ports in the West- door cultivation sites and numerous in-
52% of the cases and 98% of the quantities. ern Mediterranean and Adriatic. Notably, land seizures reported in EUROSUR by
Being equally important, detections in postal packages for receiving or redistrib- Member States during border surveillance
the Balkans and on the Eastern land bor- uting drugs in Europe have been increas- activities confirm the Western Balkans
ders were typically related to the traffick- ingly used over the past few years. and Albania in particular as a source of
ing of small quantities of various narcotic Trafficking through interchanging herbal cannabis trafficked to neighbour-
substances and pharmaceuticals through routes and using various means of trans- ing countries via land routes or exported
BCPs. These small quantities were usually port have become a common modus operandi to Western and Central Europe via the
found in passenger cars, buses and lorries. for concealing the cargo’s place of origin. Adriatic Sea, using speedboats or ferries.
Furthermore, cooperation with Mem- Traffickers employ this modus operandi in an The proximity of Morocco, which has
ber State authorities resulted in the seizure been considered the leading producer
of an even larger quantity, 356 tonnes, of of cannabis resin for years facilitates
drugs during surveillance activities at the 5 EUROSUR, Detections reported during
the trafficking of hashish mostly in the
surveillance activities at EU external
4 JORA, Results of Frontex Joint Operations borders 6 EUROSUR and JORA, consolidated data

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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2020

 Number of Drug Cases
Numberduring
of Drug
Frontex
CasesJoint
during
Operations
Frontex Joint Operations Drug Cases and Drug
Quantities
Casesper
andRegion
Quantities
2019per Regi

2019 2019

2018 2018

2017 2017

0 100 0 200 100 300 200 400 300 500 400 600 500 700 600 700

cocaine hashish cocaine

heroin hashish
marihuanaheroin opium
marihuana
other opium other
ESP Sea ESPBalkans
Sea Land Balkans Land
Western Mediterranean, but also on most used for importing cocaine either via di-
sea routes in southern Europe, predom- rect transatlantic routes from Latin Amer- Med Sea (excl. ESP) Eastern
Med LandESP)
Sea (excl. Eastern Land
inantly by speedboats. Hashish traffick- ica to Western Europe or via transhipment
PRT Sea PRTAirports
Sea Airports
ing is accompanied by other criminal hubs in West Africa and the Caribbean.
activities, including facilitated irregular In the recent years, North Africa has also
other other Drug Cases and Quantities
Drug Cases2019
and Quantities 2019
migration and property crime, as crimi- emerged as a significant transit area for co-
nals generally use existing criminal in- caine destined for Europe. Morocco and to
opium opium
frastructure for distribution of hashish to a lesser extent Algeria and Libya are consid-
Western and Northern European markets ered entry hubs recently reporting large co-
arihuana marihuana
and to countries in Asia and North Africa. caine hauls.9 Seizures of smaller quantities
Cocaine accounts for almost one third of cocaine on the southern Spanish coast
heroin heroin
of the EU retail drug market, which makes and at Spanish ports (e.g. Algeciras, Valen-
hashish it hashish
the second most commonly consumed cia, Barcelona, etc.) suggest an increase in
illicit drug in the EU after cannabis. This is the supply of cocaine in the region.
cocaine reflected
cocaine in the second highest rate of sei- The smuggling of heroin into Europe
zures in Europe after the Americas. The re- is usually characterised by fewer detec-
0 100
cord number 200
0 of100
300
seizures 200
400 the 300
over 500 two 400
last 600tions on
500
700specific
600
800 700
drug routes. 800 is due
This
years at European ports in the North Atlan- to the concentration of production in Af-
2017 2018 2019
2017 2018 2019
tic, the North Sea and the West Mediterra- ghanistan, which to a certain extent lim-
cocaine cocaine
marihuana marihuana
nean point to the Western European coast its supply and distribution markets. In
as the main entry gate of cocaine to Europe.7 2019 approximately 472 kg of heroin were hashish opium hashish opium
The enormous supply from Latin Amer- reported. The largest quantities were de- heroin other heroin other
ica and the drop in wholesale prices world- tected during numerous seizures at French,
wide in the last couple of years have made Italian and Spanish airports, but also dur- could be convenient distribution hubs for
cocaine more affordable than ever before, ing several big hauls at French and Italian both the EU and Russian markets.
and this has resulted in frequent bulk ship- seaports. These seizures tend to show that Synthetic drugs and precursors con-
ments on various maritime routes, but along with typical land routes, maritime tinue to be a threat to the EU’s external
also in smaller quantities at land borders and air transports are also used to smuggle borders, appearing in small quantities on
and airports. In 2019 seizures of almost 12 heroin to destination countries in Europe.10 air routes, but recently more often in large
tonnes of cocaine were reported, mostly Sporadic large hauls of heroin and to consignments from China on sea routes.
by Portugal and Spain, the most affected a lesser extent cocaine in some Member Notably, there has been an increase in the
locations being the Azores, Lisbon, Setu- States and third countries suggest that detection of captagon arriving in ports in
bal, Valencia port, Barcelona port, Algeciras typical routes are highly diversified fol- the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as sei-
port, and the Canary Islands. Portuguese, lowing not only the most used Balkan zures of ecstasy on yachts in the Aegean
Spanish and Italian airports also registered route, but also passing through different Sea. A large container seizure of ecstasy
a large share of detections on incoming or regions in Central Asia. The Caucasus her- precursor in 2018 supports the findings
transiting flights from Latin America and oin route and partly the Northern route for increased precursor trafficking in the
South and West Africa.8 Maritime shipping are also used, where third countries at the Aegean and Mediterranean ports.
containers as well as other types of mar- Eastern and South-eastern land borders The precursor market is also influenced
itime transportation will be increasingly by shifting a part of the heroin production
to drug laboratories in Europe, which leads
7 EMCDDA, EU Drugs Market Report 2019; to demand for illicit sourcing of acetic anhy-
UNODC statistics of global seizures 9 UNODC, World Drug Report 2019; dride. Similar developments have been ob-
2007-2017 EMCDDA, EU Drugs Market Report 2019
served in the cocaine production process.11
8 EUROSUR, Detections reported during 10 EUROSUR, Detections reported during
surveillance activities at EU external surveillance activities at the EU’s external
borders borders 11 EMCDDA, EU Drugs Market Report 2019

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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2020

Vehicle Check - Operation Minerva
© Frontex, 2017

6.5. Cross-border crime: Stolen Vehicles and Parts

Despite the decreasing trend in Europe second-hand vehicle and parts market. control activities. Criminals use various
over the last several years, car thefts con- Of those detections supported by Frontex, methods in order to go unnoticed such
tinue to have a serious financial impact 78% involved passenger cars (in different as using the cover of the regular flow of
on society, with an average of 697 000 price categories), followed by a signifi- travellers and goods via the commonly
car thefts per year in the EU.12 Moreover, cantly lower share of lorries and trail- used border-crossing points.
around 3.5 million alerts for searched ve- ers (9%), and vans. Nevertheless, special The main reasons for detection were
hicles are registered in the SIS II database attention should be given to incidents alerts in SIS or Interpol databases (57%),
each year, and around 15 500 hits are gen- involving stolen lorries and heavy ma- alterations of the vehicle’s identifica-
erated.13 Persons engaged in motor vehi- chinery, considering the difficulties in tion number (36%), false or exchanged
cle crime are motivated by the prospects identifying and recovering those types licence plates (4%) or registration docu-
of fast profit. These people perceive the of vehicles, as well as the higher finan- ments (3%). Some of the cases included
risk of detection and prosecution as low. cial impact of those crimes. insurance fraud or vehicles stolen from
In 2019 there were 384 vehicles Furthermore, taking an active role rental or leasing companies. It is worth
searched and 578 vehicle parts stopped in European Multidisciplinary Platform mentioning the increasingly close rela-
at border-crossing points during Fron- Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) op- tionship between vehicle theft and doc-
tex-coordinated operational activities, erational activities, the Agency supported ument fraud, identified as a result of the
which shows similar detection rates com- the efforts of the Member States in pre- European joint action days (JADs). In ad-
pared to previous years.14 The majority venting the traffic of 475 stolen vehicles dition, different characteristics of the car
of the targeted vehicles were common and 394 parts.15 The increased effective- market in neighbouring third countries
car makes and models, with crimi- ness of short-term tailored actions reveals also influences the market for falsifying
nals trading in large quantities on the the potential risk at the EU’s external bor- car registration documents and manip-
ders and the challenges in detecting and ulating the vehicle identification num-
12 Eurostat, crime statistics 2015-2017
searching vehicles during regular border ber (VIN).
13 EU-LISA, SIS II 2018 Statistics
14 JORA, Results of Frontex Joint Operations 15 EMPACT, results of EU joint action days

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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2020

Ca ses of Stolen Vehicles Fr ontex Joint Operations 2019 Reasons for Detection of Vehicles Frontex Joint Operations 2019

1%

3% 3%
4%

17%

40%
39% 57%

36%

Eastern Land Borders Western Med False documents Vehicle Identification

Balkans Other Number manipulation
False licence plate
Interpol hit SIS hit

The vehicles were usually driven by The Eastern land borders represented years in the framework of border surveil-
one driver via land BCPs, being driven as 57% of all detections, with vehicles cross- lance activities, referring to similar mo-
a means of transport and not as a com- ing the borders with Ukraine having the dus operandi of exporting luxury SUVs to
modity. Drivers of various nationalities highest share (36%). Serbia’s borders in the Mauritania via Dakar and Senegal. Fer-
were involved in transporting stolen vehi- Western Balkans scored second highest ries in Italy, Greece and Spain connect-
cles across the borders. Their nationality with 25% of cases. A number of cases at ing land routes in Europe and between
usually matched the country they were the borders with Belarus and the Rus- Europe and North Africa were also used
attempting to cross into. In some cases sian Federation in the northeast, as well for transporting stolen vehicles.17
cars were transported inside trailers, or as with Turkey indicate the continuous It is expected that criminals will con-
dismantled in parts inside cargo vans. use of routes for the export of stolen ve- tinue using BCPs on the main transport
The illicit market of stolen or substand- hicles through Eastern Europe to Cen- corridors for moving different types of
ard spare parts is a lucrative source of in- tral Asia and through the Balkans to the vehicles, depending on demand. Pre-
come for criminal organisations, which, Near and Middle East. venting vehicle crime at the borders re-
besides the financial impact, puts driv- In addition, maritime transport is quires strong cooperation between border
ers in general at serious risk. also considered by criminals for mov- guards and other law enforcement au-
The common modus operandi involved ing stolen vehicles to countries in other thorities for better pre-warning and tar-
the immediate transportation of the sto- continents. Export routes identified by geted intelligence-led actions.
len vehicle outside of the EU towards end- Member State law-enforcement author-
destinations in the Middle East and Asia ities are via the ports of Rotterdam and
or dismantling it into parts. Yet almost Hamburg towards countries in Africa.16
one-third of the vehicles were detected There were several reports in the last two
on entry, which is a strong indication
that Europe is also a big market for sto- 16 Interpol, Motor Vehicle Crime in Global 17 EUROSUR, Detections reported during
len vehicles. Perspective 2014; Bundeskriminalamt, surveillance activities at EU external
KFZ-Kriminalität, Bundeslagebild 2012 borders

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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2020

© iStock, 2010

6.6. Managing and Interdicting Terrorist Mobility

A global and omnipresent threat in Da’esh related incidents in Syria. This the [Da’esh] core in the conflict zone and
trend continued throughout the year, affiliates abroad will be maintained.”
Terrorism is not exclusive to Islamist extending to Iraq as well. No other predominant conflict zone
extremists. This said, when it comes According to a January 2020, United has emerged after the loss of territory
to counter-terrorism efforts within the Nations (UN) report submitted pursuant in Syria and Iraq. Many fighters have
border dimension, it is assessed that to resolution 2368 (2017), the reduction melted back into the local population
the main threat emanates from Islam- of US forces raised concerns regarding and have stayed there, while others are
ist extremism. the ability of local security forces cur- lying low in certain neighbouring coun-
Da’esh is still active, especially its rently active in north-eastern Syria to tries. Others are in less intensive conflict
ideology, which is still appealing de- maintain adequate control over a restive zones like Libya and the Sahel.
spite its organisational setbacks and ter- population of detained Da’esh fighters, Depending on developments, some
ritorial losses. The threat is even more as well as family members, numbering may seek to move elsewhere or be di-
pronounced when taking into consid- more than 100 000. Many dependants rected to do so. Irrespective of whether
eration other Islamist extremist groups remain equally ideologically committed such travelling is sanctioned by the rel-
ranging from core al-Qaeda and many and their fate is a major concern for the evant terrorist groups’ structures, the
other regional affiliates such as Hay’at international community. Some 2 000 use of regular or irregular movements –
Tahrir al-Sham, a group which suppos- foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) remain or both – is assessed to depend on a va-
edly has thousands of fighters operat- in detention in the area. riety of chances and constraints.
ing in Syria. The same UN report adds, Da’esh
The United States (US) troop with- is “mounting increasingly bold insur- External borders and internal
drawal and the launch in October 2019 of gent attacks, calling and planning for security
the Turkish military operation in north- the breakout of [Da’esh] fighters in de-
eastern Syria, meant that the Syrian tention facilities and exploiting weak- Pre-border checks and border checks re-
Democratic Forces redeployed its forces nesses in the security environment of main one of the main safeguards of the
and refocused their operations. Da’esh both countries. The current assessment Schengen area and significantly contrib-
elements immediately tried to capitalise is that the strategic direction of [Da’esh] ute to guaranteeing the long-term secu-
on the ensuing vacuum. The US-led op- with regard to administration, propa- rity of the Union and its citizens. Such
eration Inherent Resolve had already re- ganda and recruitment is unchanged, checks are carried out in the interest
ported a resurgence, starting in Q2 2019, and that command and control between of all Member States and the Schengen

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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2020

area. One of the purposes of these checks Enforcing existing legislation Importantly, the EBCG Regulation of-
is to prevent any threat to the internal fers a tangible way to support Member
security and public policy of the Member The EBCG Regulation contextualises States, especially in times of large and
States, irrespective of the origin of such Frontex’s supporting role in countering sudden or continuous migration flows.
threat – including where such a threat terrorism. It states that due to its activ- Article 82§10 (previously 40§8) states that
derives from Union citizens. ities at the external borders, the Agency “the host Member State shall authorise
Borders provide challenges but also should contribute to the prevention and members of the teams to consult Union
opportunities in countering-terrorism as detection of serious crimes with a cross- databases, the consultation of which is
they offer a geographical spread where border dimension, including terrorism, necessary for fulfilling operational aims
Member States can take executive ac- where it is appropriate for it to act and specified in the operational plan on bor-
tions and pursue prosecutorial or judi- where it has obtained relevant informa- der checks…”.
cial actions. To this end Member States tion through its activities. This is fur- The Council conclusions recommend-
and Schengen Associated Countries, ther reinforced in Article 3, which lists ing security checks in the case of irregu-
with the support of JHA Agencies, have the various European integrated border lar migration (10152/17) list the databases
to make the best use of the legislative management components. that border authorities should systemati-
frameworks that aim to deter, disrupt In regards to before border checks, cally consult to identify known terrorists
and detect terrorist-related movements Frontex supports Member States with and ‘subjects of interest’. Implemented
and detain those involved in terrorist- knowledge and guidelines for them to correctly, border activities can sup-
related activities. make best use of advance information port Member States’ counter-terrorism
The amendments to the Schengen systems, such as API and PNR data. efforts.
Borders Code (SBC) and the Schengen In- At the borders, Frontex complements Counter-terrorism efforts require that
formation System (SIS) provision to allow Member States’ counter-terrorism efforts the international community at large
Team Members’ access to SIS, plus the through the Agency’s operations and co- collectively makes the best use of all the
forthcoming introduction of the Entry- ordinated activities. Screening, registra- systems, security databases and sharing
Exit System (EES), the Electronic Travel tion, document checks and debriefing platforms that are currently in place.
Information and Authorisation (ETIAS), activities are part of such efforts. All these
the interoperability between EU informa- activities converge on the main goal of
tion systems and the European Search supporting Member States to identify po-
Portal (ESP) are all aimed at improving tential travelling terrorists or ‘subjects of
such database checks. interest’ through detailed security checks.

Informing and reporting

in various EU languages

e threat, facilitati
to th ng
ting ac
ce
p s
da
s
A

Asylum

CCWP
Ou

Supporting
In f

Border
trea
o rm

Guards
counter-terrorism
ching, spreading
ing, influencin

COSI efforts Customs

within the border Specialised

dimension and beyond Services
gE

COTER
now

Law
U
po

Enforcement
le

cy
d

ge
li

Eng ng Visa / Consular

ag i n g , s u p p o r ti
TWP authorities

INTERPOL CEPOL EUROPOL

EU CTC INTCEN

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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2020

7. Featured analyses

Land Borders Officers Training 2018

© Frontex, 2018
Frontex Return Operation
© Frontex, 2019

7.1. The EBCG Regulation and Returns

The new European Border and Coast to gradually reach 10 000 actively func- the acquisition of travel documents from
Guard Agency Regulation (EU) 2019/1896, tioning and trained staff by 2027. This third countries.
which came into force in December 2019, standing corps will include representa-
introduced important changes to Fron- tives of Frontex as well as Member States, Wider scope of support for
tex’s mandate, aiming at more effectively who will be deployed either long term or return-related activities
implementing its Integrated Border Man- for shorter secondments with the aim
agement strategy. The The EBCG Regula- of providing assistance and support to More significantly, the Agency’s re-
tion has, among others, a particular focus Member States in matters related to mi- mit was widened so that it can now
on the topic of returns, particularly in Ar- gration management, cooperation with offer Member States support also in
ticles 48 to 53. third countries, and returns. Deployed post-arrival and post-return activities.
The following analysis provides a gen- staff will be fully empowered and will Hence, all areas of return are now covered,
eral overview of what Frontex’s new man- have received specific and targeted train- including pre-return activities, assistance
date entails for the field of returns and ing to perform border control as well as with voluntary returns and assistance
outlines some of the challenges and re- tasks associated with return. for Member States to identify non-EU
sponsibilities that the Agency will face Articles 52(1) and 53 (2)(3) of the new nationals as well as acquire travel docu-
in the future. EBCG Regulation allow for the arrange- ments by means of consular cooperation
ment of return teams, which can be de- with third countries.
The first European uniformed ployed at the Agency’s own initiative or As set out in Article 48 (2), the support
service upon request or in agreement with host and assistance Frontex can now provide
Member States. Frontex will provide tech- to Member States is multi-fold, rang-
In line with the The EBCG Regula- nical and operational support for return ing from interpreting services to provid-
tion, the Agency will strengthen its op- interventions and rapid return interven- ing equipment, resources and expertise
erational and technical capacities. The tions. Experts in the field of return will for identifying potential returnees and
most challenging task is the creation of be in charge of specific tasks such as, implementing return decisions. Addi-
the first European uniformed service, set for example, assisting Member States in tional support is provided in the form of

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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2020

 © Frontex, 2020

producing tailored analysis and recom- of children and vulnerable persons. Un- The ultimate goal of improved data
mendations on third countries of return. der the general provisions on respect for collection on returns is to provide tai-
fundamental rights, as laid down in Ar- lored support to Member States by deliv-
Enhanced focus on fundamental ticle 80 of the new EBCG Regulation, the ering specific strategic and operational
rights legislators once again specified that, in products. The quality of such products is
line with the principle of non-refoulement, a consequence of the quality of the data
Together with the expanded mandate no person shall be returned to a country collection and how much this reflects re-
comes increased accountability. The im- where he or she will be subjected to any ality in the Member States. For this rea-
portance of monitoring return opera- kind of inhumane or degrading treat- son, it is fundamental to maintain high
tions is further reinforced in Articles 51 ment. While there is no new information standards as regards an integrated re-
and 110 (2a) by the introduction of funda- in this regard, it is important to remem- turn management platform.
mental rights monitors that can also act ber that Frontex must always remain in
as return monitors. Fundamental rights compliance with the requirements set Our efforts
monitors are now mandatory for all Fron- out by basic international and European
tex operations. They are to be selected human rights law. A lot of work is still to be done and sev-
by the fundamental rights officer and eral challenges are waiting ahead, but in
should constantly ensure that funda- Improved data collection cooperation with Member States as well
mental rights are fully respected in joint as with other EU agencies, Frontex will
operations. Return monitors are experts In accordance with Article 48 (1d), the continue to make its best efforts to deliver
who will have received training in fun- Agency is finally tasked with the devel- tailored support and assistance based on
damental rights as well as in other appli- opment of an integrated return manage- the individual needs of the EU countries,
cable areas in accordance with relevant ment platform that will link the return with a view to ensuring the proper func-
research outcomes and best practices, management systems of the Member tioning of the European Area of Freedom,
as outlined in Article 62 (1). In particu- States for the purpose of exchanging data Security and Justice.
lar cases, return experts will be provided and information for analytical as well as
with specific training on the protection operational purposes.

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 The development of routes over time and the flow from countries of origin (to the right)
to departure countries to the EU (to the left of the Sankey)
S p ai n Tu rke y
Syri a
Tu rke y I ran
S p ai n I raq
Density of Routes Syri a
I ran
reported by I raq
Density S p ai n Al g e ri a
African of Routes E g yp tTu rke y
L i b ya
migrants
reported SyriS au
a d i Arab i a
in 2019by Al g e ri a L i b ya E g yp t I raq
I ran
African of
Density migrants
Routes M au ri tan i a S au d i Arab i a
M al i
in 2019
reportedLowby
Al g e ri a
N iger
S u d an Ye m e n
LCi bhya
ad E g yp t
African migrants M au ri tan i a
M al i N iger S au d i Arab ia
Low S u d an
in 2019 N i g e ri a C h ad
S o u th E th i o p i a
Ye m e n
Medium
M au ri tan i a S u d an
M al i
Low N i gNei griear S u d an E th i o p i a Ye m e n
Medium C hDade m o c ratiSc o u th
S u d an K e n ya
High Repu bl ic of

Medium
N i g e ri a Dthe emCooc rati
n g oc
S o uTan
th zan E th i o p i a
K ei na ya
F ro n te x 2 01 9

High R e p u b l i c oSfu d anTu rke y

S p ai n
th e C o n g o
Density of Routes D e m o c rati c Tan zan Syri ia a F ro n te x 2 01 9

Tu rke I ran
High
S p ai n Repu bl ic of K eyn ya I raq
reported by th e C o n g o Syri a
Density
African of Routes
migrants Tan zan i a I raq
I ran
F ro n te x 2 01 9

reported S p ai n Al g e ri a
in 2018by E g yp tTu rke y
L i b ya

African of
Density migrants
Routes Al g e ri a
SyriS au
a d i Arab i a
I ran
L i b ya E g yp t I raq
in 2018by
reported M au ri tan i a S au d i Arab i a
Low M al i N iger
African migrants Al g e ri a S u d an Ye m e n
LCi bhya
ad E g yp t
in 2018
Low
M au ri tan i a
M al i N iger S au d i Arab ia
S u d an Ye m e n
Medium N i g e ri a C h ad
S o u th E th i o p i a
M au ri tan i a S u d an
Low M al i
Medium N i gNei griear S u d an E th i o p i a Ye m e n
C hDade m o c ratiSc o u th
High S u d an K e n ya
Repu bl ic of
Medium N i g e ri a Dthe emCooc rati
n g oc
S o uTan
th zan E th i o p i a
High K ei na ya
F ro n te x 2 01 9

S p ai n R e p u b l i c oSfu d an
Tu rke y
Density of Routes th e C o n g o
reported D e m o c rati c Tan zanSyri ia a
Highby
F ro n te x 2 01 9

S p ai n I ran
Density R e p u b l i c o f Tu rkeK ye n ya I raq
African of Routes
migrants th e C o n g o Syri a
reported
in 2017by Al g e ri a Tan zan i a I raq IF roran
n te x 2 01 9

African of
Density migrants
Routes S p ai n L i b ya E g yp Tu
t rke y
S au
a d i Arab i a
in 2017by
reported Al g e ri a
L i b ya
Syri
I ran
Low E g yp t I raq
African migrants M au ri tan i a M al i S au d i Arab i a
N iger
in 2017
Low Al g e ri a
LCi bhya
ad
S u d an Ye m e n
M au ri tan i a M al i E g yp t
Medium N iger S u d an S au d i Arab i a
N i g e ri a C h ad Ye m e n
Low E th i o p i a
Medium M au ri tan i a M al i
High N i gNei gri ear S u d an E th i o p i a Ye m e n
ChD
ade m o c rati c
Medium Repu bl ic of K e n ya
High
N i g e ri a Dthe emCooc rati
n g oc
KEe th iopia
n ya
F ro n te x 2 02 0
Repu bl ic of
th e C o n g o
High F ro n te x 2 02 0
D e m o c rati c
Repu bl ic of K e n ya
th e C o n g o
F ro n te x 2 02 0

7.2. Changes in Smuggling Services on the Central and Western

Mediterranean Routes

From 2012 to 2017, Libya was the main their countries of origin to Agadez in Ni- the areas of Tripoli, Sabratah or Sabha and
nexus point where most sub-Saharan ger and, subsequently, were smuggled to subsequently smuggled by boat to Italy.
migrants gathered in order to be smug- Libya. The majority of East African mi- In mid-2018, after the Libyan Coast
gled across the Mediterranean Sea to Italy grants were smuggled first to Khartoum Guard had increased its patrolling ac-
and further to their countries of destina- in Sudan and then to Libya across the Sa- tivities in the Mediterranean Sea and
tion in Europe. hara desert, either directly or via Chad the Italian authorities had changed its
In addition, most West African mi- or Egypt. In Libya, migrants were trans- policy regarding SARs, the sea crossings
grants travelled by public transport from ported to safe houses located mainly in from Libya to Italy became increasingly

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difficult and expensive for migrants. Con- in 2019) had a limited effect on the mil- threat on the Western Mediterranean
sequently, sub-Saharan migrants started itary capabilities and power of the Lib- route. In the future, these criminal net-
searching for alternative routes to reach yan armed groups involved in these works might use their increased capa-
Europe. West African migrants started illegal activities. This may be an indica- bilities to expand their illegal activities
travelling to Algeria and Morocco, via tor that these armed groups have alter- to other crimes such as money launder-
Mali and Mauritania, and then to Spain native sources of financing that can easily ing, corruption and smuggling of goods.
by boat. cover such a significant loss. Nevertheless, as the smuggling fees
The reduction in the number of mi- Conversely, the shift in the flow of continue to rise on the Western Med-
grants smuggled across Libya has appar- West African migrants from Libya to- iterranean route, an increasing num-
ently reduced the revenue of the people wards Morocco and Algeria, has sig- ber of migrants might find this route
smuggling networks that operate in Libya nificantly increased the revenue of the unaffordable and search for alternative
and along the routes leading to it. criminal groups involved in the smug- routes. Should any relevant factor be al-
Information collected during debrief- gling of migrants from these two coun- tered, the Central Mediterranean route
ing interviews indicates that in 2017, mi- tries to Europe. could become attractive again for sub-
grants paid Libyan networks on average More specifically, during 2017 and the Saharan migrants.
USD 1 500 per person to be smuggled first half of 2018, migrants paid between
from Libya to Italy by boat. Based on this EUR 500 and EUR 1 000 to be smuggled
figure and the number of migrants who from Algeria to Spain and between EUR
departed from Libya and were appre- 1 000 and EUR 2 000 from Morocco to
hended by the Italian authorities, it can Spain. Since mid-2018, smuggling fees
be estimated that the criminal networks have grown on the Western Mediterra-
smuggling migrants to Italy by boat gen- nean route and by Q4 of 2019 the fee had
erated nearly USD 150 million in 2017. In reached EUR 3 000 per person. Based on
mid-2018, the smuggling fees increased these data and the number of migrants
to EUR 1 800 per person, while the over- detected on the Western Mediterranean
all revenue of the smuggling networks route it can be estimated1 that in 2017
decreased to just over EUR 24 million in the people smuggling networks operat-
2018, and to over EUR 12 million in 2019. ing in Morocco gained nearly EUR 35 mil-
The people smuggling networks oper- lion, and their revenue grew to roughly
ating on Libyan territory were led by Lib- EUR 105 million in 2018, and EUR 19 mil-
yan nationals who were assisted by other lion in 2019.
smugglers who, in most cases, originated Another effect of the growing demand
from the same country as the migrants. for smuggling services in Morocco and Al-
In many cases, the Sudanese and Malian geria was that these services have become
associates of the Libyan smugglers took increasingly diverse and sophisticated.
on the role of enforcer, whereas associ- Also, the number of smugglers involved
ates from other sub-Saharan countries in these activities has increased, espe-
took on the role of intermediary between cially those originating from the same
the migrants and the criminal groups. countries as migrants.
Information collected during debrief­ Practically, the criminal networks
ing interviews, corroborated with infor- operating in Morocco and Algeria have
mation from other sources, indicates that constantly scaled up their capabilities
many of the armed groups fighting in to smuggle an increasing number of mi-
Libya, especially those controlling the grants, thus increasing the migratory
Zuwarah region, were deeply involved
in the smuggling of migrants to Italy by 1 It is more difficult to estimate the
financial gains of the criminal groups
boat. These groups either directly or in-
operating in Morocco and Algeria because
directly charged part of the smuggling
the smuggling fees paid by migrants can
fees obtained by the criminal networks. vary depending on many factors, such as:
Apparently, the significant decrease the services included in the agreement
in estimated revenue resulting from mi- (e.g. safe house, food, flight ticket, life
vest), the means of transport used and
grant smuggling (i.e. from USD 150 mil-
their seaworthiness (e.g. toy boat vs. jet
lion in 2017 to less than USD 3 million
ski vs. Zodiac), and the departure location.

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7.3. Security risks of blacklisted flag vessels (BLVs) under the
Paris MoU on port state control

The European Union has an exten- do not meet the required international compliance with international laws may
sive maritime area that stretches along safety and security standards) through be less strictly observed. This is a legal -
44 000 km of external sea borders. Its a uniform approach to port state control. albeit controversial - practice, particularly
shipping lanes (some of the busiest in In 2018, the following 13 states world- as some countries’ registries are operated
the world) and more than 300 seaports wide were blacklisted by the Paris MoU by private companies that provide a fast
are vital for the bloc’s economic growth on PSC: Belize, Cambodia, Comoros, Cook and easy process with few or no restric-
and prosperity – EU ports handle 400 Islands, Democratic Republic of Congo, tions to registration. Unsurprisingly, the
million passengers per year, 74% of goods Moldova, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, practice may also result in the registra-
traded by the EU enter or exit via the sea Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Vanuatu tion of substandard vessels used for il-
and 40% of its internal trade takes place and Ukraine. In 2019, two new states – licit activities at sea.
via maritime flows. Albania and Mongolia – were added to According to data on the BLV fleet
The EU’s maritime environment there- the black list, while Vanuatu was moved available to Frontex for 2018, a total of
fore offers valuable opportunities, but to the grey list. 3 128 vessels (3% of the total global fleet)
it also poses significant risks. Some of Notably, for 95% of BLVs, the 13 black- were registered in the 13 blacklisted flag
the major threats to the EU’s security listed countries represented flags of con- states. The present analysis provides
(cross-border crime, terrorism and ille- venience – a business practice whereby a closer look at this vessel population
gal migration) have an important mar- ship owners register their ships in the and considers the risks they pose to the
itime dimension, which consequently registries of other countries where EU’s security.
calls for a strong and effective maritime
security strategy to properly address and Vanuatu
manage such threats. (11%) Belize
One risk to the EU’s security concerns (16%)
the presence of so-called blacklisted flag
vessels (BLVs) in EU ports. BLVs are ships
registered in countries that have been
Ukraine Cambodia
blacklisted by the Paris Memorandum
(10%) (1%)
of Understanding on Port State Control
(Paris MoU on PSC) on the basis of port
Comoros
state control inspections.
(7%)
The Paris MoU on PSC was created
in 1982 following a large-scale disaster
at sea, namely, the sinking of the crude Cook Islands
carrier Amoco Cadiz in 1978. Although, Togo (7%)
prior to the signing of the Paris MoU on (11%)
PSC, rules were in place to regulate the
working conditions for crews and to en- D.R. Congo
(<1%)
sure compliance with the demands of the
International Labour Organisation, the
Tanzania Moldova
Amoco Cadiz catastrophe highlighted the (4%)
(8%)
need for more extensive regulations on
safety and pollution. Today, the Paris MoU Palau
on PSC comprises the maritime admin- St Kitts & Nevis (9%)
istrations of 26 European countries and (5%) Sierra Leone
Canada with the aim of controlling the (11%)
use of substandard ships (e.g. those that
Breakdown of BLVs by country of registration, 2018

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Profile of blacklisted flag vessels tend to be more attractive to criminals. record, out of which 77% are registered in
BLVs are therefore potentially more likely a blacklisted flag-state. This finding also
Vessels registered in the 13 blacklisted to be involved in illicit activities than reg- suggests the potential risk of BLVs for the
flag states displayed a uniform profile: ular ships (e.g. at the beginning of 2018, security of the Paris MoU region.
smaller and older vessels compared with the Greek Coast Guard seized a Tanza- In 2018, close to 1 000 vessels flying
the world’s fleet representing three main nia-registered general cargo off the is- different blacklisted flags made more
types (i.e. general cargo, service vessels land of Crete, carrying explosives destined than 15 000 calls to EU ports. While
and tankers). Specifically, cargo ves- to Libya1; towards the end of the year, their presence in EU waters per se does
sels made up the largest group of BLVs, Spanish Police officers apprehended 1 not indicate their involvement in an il-
accounting for half of the entire BLV 400 kilos of cocaine from a tugboat reg- legal activity (many BLVs are involved in
population. This class included a high pro- istered in Moldova, navigating in the At- legitimate business and present no secu-
portion of general cargo vessels, as well lantic Ocean, off the southwestern coast rity and safety risk), it is important that
as an important share of bulk and live- of Spain2). EU countries are able to detect and in-
stock carriers. As the second main class, tercept those vessels whose voyages to
service vessels represented close to one- Mitigating the risk of BLVs to the EU do not have a legitimate purpose.
fifth of all BLVs, and comprised mostly the EU’s maritime security As the European Border and Coast
tugs, supply vessels and anchor handling Guard Agency, Frontex will continue to
vessels. Tankers represented one in seven The involvement of BLVs in illicit activ- deal with the security risks posed by BLVs
BLVs and included a large number of oil ities has been well-documented, forc- in the framework of its Multipurpose
tankers (almost half). Together, the three ing certain countries to take measures Maritime Operations and the EUROSUR
classes – cargo ships, service vessels and to protect their registries. In 2016, for Fusion Services for Border Surveillance,
tankers – made up 88% of the entire BLV example, the government of Cambodia supporting the competent authorities of
population in 2018. closed its flag of convenience scheme af- the Member States accordingly.
BLVs were generally small in size – ter foreign ships registered in the coun-
more than three-fifths were below 7k try were found to be involved in drug and
tonnage and rarely exceeded 10k ton- arms smuggling and human trafficking.
nage, whereas, in comparison, less than Earlier in 2013, the European Commis-
half of the global merchant fleet was this sion banned seafood imports into the
small. Similarly, while three-fifths of BLVs EU from Cambodia and Belize in view of
measured up to 100 metres in length, illegal fishing by ships registered in the
only two-fifths of the global vessel popu- two countries, further proving the mis-
lation were this size. Furthermore, more use of the two countries’ registries by
than 63% of BLVs were over 20 years old, foreign ships.
and 76% were more than 10 years old. As According to the Paris MoU’s current
regards the global fleet, 56% of vessels list of banned ships, as of mid-Febru-
were less than 20 years old. ary 2020, 110 ships are banned from the
BLVs were thus usually smaller and Paris MoU region due to their poor safety
older than most ships in the global fleet.
This is an important finding because the 1 [Link]
age, size and type of BLVs are determin- article/ekathimerini/news/greek-
ing factors for their involvement in illicit authorities-intercept-ship-stacked-with-
arms-for-libya
activities. Since smaller ships are easier
2 [Link]
to operate and older ships have a lower
world/spain-police-raid-boat-in-
market value and more difficulty in stay- atlantic-seize-1-5-tons-of-cocaine-
ing economically competitive at sea, they arrest-10/50000262-3789687#

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7.4. In Focus: Secondary Movements by Sea Throughout 2019

EU migration in recent years has become most common method remained hiding attempts to cross in small boats, a trend
closely associated with arrivals of third- third-country nationals in the backs of that began towards the end of 2018 and
country nationals, often in overcrowded lorries bound for the United Kingdom. rose sharply in 2019, likely as a result of
and unseaworthy boats. While crossings While highly popular among migrants reinforced security measures and more
of external sea borders are an important and facilitators, this modus operandi often stringent border checks which made at-
part of EU migration, there are also other comes at a great cost to human life due tempts to stow away in lorries more diffi-
relevant aspects. For many migrants and to the dangerous concealment methods cult. Many of the third-country nationals
asylum seekers, the initial sea voyage to used (i.e. refrigerated lorries and sealed that attempted the illegal boat crossings
Europe is just the beginning. After ar- containers). The tragic consequences came from Iran and Afghanistan. This mo-
rival, many try to continue their journey that can ensue from clandestine entry dus operandi poses substantial risks to mi-
to their desired destination, travelling in attempts were illustrated by the death grants’ and asylum seekers’ lives – not
an irregular manner between countries of 39 Vietnamese nationals whose bod- only is the English Channel one of the
in the EU and Schengen area (secondary ies were found at an industrial park in busiest shipping lanes in the world, but
movements). Essex inside a refrigerated lorry that had the boats used are small and unfit for pur-
For irregular migrants and asylum departed from the port of Zeebrugge in pose, lacking the necessary equipment to
seekers who do not wish to stay in the Belgium. guarantee a safe crossing. For those who
first country of arrival and for whom trav- Last year, the vast majority of those make it, the risk of exploitation and hu-
elling by land or air may not be viable, detected attempting to cross the North man trafficking remains a possibility if
travelling by sea may be the only way to Sea and English Channel clandestinely opportunities for legal work in the UK
get to their intended destination. Despite were adult males from Eritrea, Albania are not available.
the inherent risks, many third-country and Sudan, followed by North African
nationals are eager to attempt sea cross- and Middle Eastern nationalities such Mediterranean Sea
ings. In 2019 secondary movements by as Algerians, Iraqis, Afghans and Liby-
sea continued to be reported across the ans. Though in much fewer numbers, Although the Mediterranean is largely
EU; they were mostly concentrated in attempts by females were also reported, known as an entry route for migrants
the North Sea, Baltic and Mediterranean. in particular from Eritrea, and to a lesser and asylum seekers wanting to reach Eu-
extent from Vietnam, India, Iraq and Af- rope, it is also extensively used by a num-
North Sea/English Channel ghanistan. Nearly one in every five per- ber of third-country nationals who aim
sons detected travelling clandestinely to reach a country different from that of
In 2019 the North Sea and English Chan- were children (mostly boys). Here again, arrival. In particular, the sea route from
nel remained a key area for secondary Eritreans made up the largest group and Greece to Western European countries has
movements by sea. The movements were were followed by children from Sudan, gained increasing importance as an alter-
largely towards the United Kingdom, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Albania and Iraq. native for irregular migrants and asylum
which has long been an attractive desti- Three-fifths of reported children travelled seekers looking to circumvent the over-
nation for third-country nationals. While unaccompanied, with the majority orig- land Western Balkan route since its clo-
such movements to the UK are not a re- inating from Eritrea. sure in 2016.
cent phenomenon, they gained prom- A further modus operandi that continued Last year, the Mediterranean contin-
inence in the past few years and saw to be widely employed for sea crossings in ued to experience intense intra-Schengen
a diversification of modi operandi and na- the North Sea and English Channel con- movements from Greece. The modi operandi
tionalities. The increased volume of sec- cerned the use of fraudulent documents used were largely comparable to those
ondary movements across these seaways by third-country nationals travelling by observed in the North Sea and English
may have been in part attributed to the ferry. However, given the cost of procur- Channel. Many third-country nationals
UK’s departure from the EU, which stoked ing fraudulent documents, not everyone attempted to travel clandestinely by hid-
fears among migrants and asylum seek- could afford this method – one-third of ing in trucks, cars, vans, buses and fer-
ers that reaching the United Kingdom all users were from Albania, followed by ries. This method was most commonly
would become increasingly difficult af- Iraqis and Iranians, and to a large ex- used by males from Afghanistan, Iraq
ter Brexit, and heightened the sense of tent they used false ID cards as well as and Iran, and to a lesser extent from Al-
urgency to reach the country. false passports. bania and Turkey. Overall, few children
Despite the various modi operandi em- In 2019 the English Channel be- were detected travelling clandestinely;
ployed for the sea crossings, in 2019 the came especially notorious for migrants’

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 Border Guard checking lorry,
© Frontex 2007

almost all cases reported concerned Iraqi a valid visa or residence permit. The fact movements between EU and Schengen
and Afghan children. that the vast majority of irregular trav- Associated Countries and reduced oppor-
As regards third-country nationals ellers in this region were male, coupled tunities for clandestine attempts, there
who boarded ferries in a bid to reach with increases over the summer, implies is an increased risk of facilitated second-
Western Europe, many were in posses- that such movements were associated ary movements.
sion of fraudulent documents, such as with seasonal migrant labour. In order to more effectively tackle risky
false passports, false ID cards and (less Other relevant movements by sea from movements of irregular migrants and
so) residence permits. These included to Central Europe to Scandinavia included asylum seekers and ensure their safety,
a large extent Syrians, Turks, Afghans and those by Syrians, Iraqis, Afghans, Eri- cooperation at national and EU level is
Iraqis. There were also cases of ferry pas- treans and Somalis. Movements in the pivotal. In this regard, Frontex will con-
sengers travelling without documents. opposite direction were rarely reported. tinue to actively support Member States,
not only in ensuring well-functioning ex-
Baltic Sea Facilitation of secondary ternal borders, but also in providing oper-
movements ational support where it is most needed
Although the Baltic Sea was the least af- and collaborating with other Agencies
fected of the three regions by secondary The high number of irregular migrants and Bodies of the European Union to en-
movements by sea, last year it experi- and asylum seekers present in EU terri- sure that the EU’s internal security and
enced a surge in movements from Cen- tory and the strengthening of law en- the area of freedom, security and justice
tral European countries and, to a lesser forcement and border management are guaranteed. Last but not least, anal-
extent, Baltic States, towards Scandina- measures has led to the establishment ysis will remain an important aspect of
via. Secondary movements by sea across of organised crime groups dedicated Frontex’s work in the area of secondary
this region concerned mostly Ukraini- to the facilitation of secondary move- movements in years to come. The use of
ans, but also some nationals of Central ments across all types of border. Their EUROSUR as the main framework for
Asian countries (Uzbekistan and Kyr- business model is largely founded on the information exchange and cooperation
gyzstan) and other European countries exploitation of migrants’ aspirations for between the Agency and Member States
(Georgia, Belarus and Russia). While the a brighter future in a new country, and (as envisaged under the new EBCG Reg-
main mode of travelling was ferry, detec- often conducted without any regard for ulation) will thus be crucial in fulfilling
tions suggest that many travelled with- the lives of those they are meant to be this role, helping Frontex to maintain an
out the necessary documentation, as well assisting. With the stepping up of meas- up-to-date and accurate European situa-
as with fraudulent documents or without ures to dissuade dangerous irregular tional picture on the phenomenon.

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 Frontex Headquarters in Warsaw
© Frontex 2018

8. Outlook and conclusions

Looking at the possible evolution of the were displaced from Idlib, most of them has already witnessed several instances,
situation at the EU external border, some women and children. Not all that far which were closely monitored by Frontex.
developments are likely whereas oth- away, at the EU external border, a tense The ease with which these kinds of ral-
ers are possible. Past experience dem- situation developed from the end of Feb- lies can be organised on social media sug-
onstrates that there are a large number ruary 2020 onward. Other key regions of gests that these occurrences may increase
of unforeseeable events and factors that origin are currently experiencing major in the future, potentially with the goal
can have a profound and unpredictable upheavals as well, for instance the locust of overwhelming border authorities or
impact on the situation at the border. plague in East Africa is threatening the even forcing their way onto EU territory.
livelihood of millions. Considering these
The likely factors, and in view of the slowing rate Cross-border crime
of decrease of migrant arrivals in recent
2019 was the year irregular arrivals years, 2019 may well stand out as the year Cross-border crime remains by all esti-
bottomed out when the number of illegal border-cross- mates a profitable venture and as such
ings bottomed out. will continue to occur at the EU’s ex-
2019 was characterised by destabilising ternal borders. Heterogeneous weapon
trends in key countries of origin – in Migrants organise to challenge border laws in the EU will continue to attract
particular in countries bordering Tur- regimes the smuggling of weapons and ammu-
key and thus in direct proximity to the nition both within the EU and across its
Eastern Mediterranean route. While the 2019 saw multiple instances of attempts external borders. New aspects like the
migratory movement from most of these by migrants to organise themselves to availability of illicit goods on the dark-
countries is gradual, the risk of sudden, successfully cross the EU’s external bor- net and deliveries in small parcels will
large-scale outflows from Syria remains. ders. These attempts were organised affect these crime fields. Closer cooper-
The Idlib region of Syria has seen hun- through social media messaging services ation between customs services, border
dreds of thousands of refugees amass- and are often described as ‘caravans’ in guards, law enforcement authorities and
ing on the Turkish border. According to reference to the Central American phe- (profile-based) targeted checks could ad-
the UN, from 1 December 2019 to mid- nomenon in 2017/18 and in particular dress these developments going forward.
February an estimated 900 000 people observed in the Western Balkans. 2020

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 Generally speaking, given the complex could well suffer, too, if consumers start of their potential impact on European
nature of cross-border crime, comprehen- changing their behaviour. border management. As even the most
sive operational responses are required. developed countries with sophisticated
Therefore, risk mitigation measures by Brexit creates new challenges for EU healthcare systems are struggling to deal
Member States and Frontex at the EU’s border management with the pandemic and are often passing
external borders need to be based on the unparalleled measures that rely to some
findings of risk analysis and identified The UK has traditionally been and is likely extent on societal/public trust, the effects
criminal threats. Besides risk analysis to remain a prime destination country for on whole regions of the globe without
support, the Agency may provide techni- migrants. Uncertainty about Brexit has proper governance, adequate healthcare
cal and operational assistance to Mem- in fact increased the resolve of migrants systems or an appropriate economic ar-
ber States to reinforce their capacity to to get to the UK recently, resulting in an senal to deploy against the pandemic are
fulfil their obligations with regard to the increase in migrant boats in the English entirely unclear.
control of the external borders and to Channel, clandestine entry attempts on Some regimes may be unable to main-
face challenges resulting from cross-bor- lorries and even attempts to enter the tain order and the outbreak of internal
der crime. UK aboard cruise ships. As the future re- and inter-state conflict could occur, po-
lationship between the UK and the EU is tentially creating new displaced popula-
The possible negotiated during the transition period, tions or irregular migration, possibly also
the level of formalised cross-border coop- moving towards Europe.
Reversal of upward trend of passenger eration will be a key determinant of the Many other scenarios are conceivable.
flows future challenges to EU integrated border For instance, infected people from devel-
management. Bilaterally good examples oping countries might seek medical care
Rising legal passenger flows across the of cooperation already exist in the North in Europe – regardless of the risk of in-
EU’s external borders year-on-year seem Sea region. The UK is not only a destina- fecting others in the chosen country of
to have been almost a given in recent tion country for migrants, it also plays destination.
years. With global mobility on the rise, a significant role as a market for drugs Finally, until such a time that a via-
the growing demand is being met by an and illegal firearms. Hence Brexit – with ble, scalable vaccine is available, the vi-
expanding supply of cheap travel options. different border and customs controls – rus will continue to encircle the globe,
However, there are a number of factors will influence the development of cross- making it necessary to thoroughly re-
that suggest a reversal of this trend (al- border crime, too. orientate border management towards
beit probably temporary) is at hand, on health screening.
both the demand and supply side. The unknown
Firstly, the outbreak of the Coronavi- Migration within the geopolitical
rus disease (COVID-19) has already put The coronavirus and border controls context
a dent in global mobility. At the time of
writing, countless people have been put The coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak has Increased geopolitical competition in the
under quarantine globally, with airlines had far-reaching consequences beyond Mediterranean is clearly visible from the
suspending numerous connections. Major the impact on passenger flows (as dis- ferocity with which foreign powers have
international events have been cancelled. cussed above). Given the increasing prev- been moving into Libya to side with ei-
Travellers are growing more careful in alence of the disease, proper contingency ther faction in the ongoing conflict. Com-
light of the pandemic as the WHO clas- planning and precautionary measures are petition for natural resources like offshore
sified it. Others may be falling victim to essential in order to mitigate the worst gas is just one of many interests at stake.
what has been termed the ‘infodemic’. effects of the disease. Beyond the mul- Given the actors involved, the geopolitics
Secondly, there is a real possibility tifaceted effects on the European Border of the Central Mediterranean may well
that climate change concerns may soon and Coast Guard described in 6.2, the result in the use or threat of the use of
translate into hefty CO2 emission prices spread of COVID-19 has also set in mo- migration as a bargaining chip.
which may considerably raise the prices tion dynamics that are, for the time be-
of transportation. In addition, demand ing, still difficult to evaluate in terms

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9. Statistical annex

LEGEND

Symbols and abbreviations: n.a. not applicable

: data not available
Source: FRAN and EDF-RAN data as of 31 January 2020, unless otherwise indicated
Note: ‘Member States’ in the tables refer to FRAN Member States as of 2019,
including both 28 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated
Countries.

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Annex Table 1. I llegal border-crossing between BCPs, on entry
Detections at the external borders by Member State, border type, gender and age group
Share of % change
2016 2017 2018 2019 total on prev. year Highest share
Border Type Nationality
Sea 365 295 176 211 113 643 106 246 75 -6.5 Afghanistan (27%)
Land 145 851 28 539 35 474 35 600 25 0.4 Syria (21%)

Sex Nationality
Female : : 28 547 32 987 23 16 Afghanistan (35%)
Male : : 113 770 106 690 75 -6.2 Afghanistan (21%)
Not available 511 146 204 750 6 800 2 169 1.5 -68 Tunisia (29%)

Age Group* Nationality

Adult 107 974 146 736 114 183 96 947 68 -15 Afghanistan (17%)
Minor 20 332 32 443 30 948 32 554 23 5.2 Afghanistan (40%)
Not available : : 765 23 542 17 n.a. Afghanistan (49%)
Unaccompanied 20 332 32 443 26 430 4 009 2.8 -85 Morocco (34%)
Accompanied : : 3 753 5 003 3.5 33 Afghanistan (28%)
Not available 382 840 25 571 3 986 12 345 8.7 210 Afghanistan (40%)

Total 511 146 204 750 149 117 141 846 100 -4.9

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Annex Table 2. Illegal border-crossing between BCPs, on entry
Detections reported by border type and top ten nationalities at the external borders

Share of % change
2016 2017 2018 2019 total on prev. year

All Borders
Afghanistan 54 366 7 576 12 666 34 154 24 170
Syria 88 551 19 452 14 378 24 339 17 69
Unspecified sub-Saharan
3 0 69 14 346 10 n.a.
nationals
Morocco 6 836 11 279 13 498 8 020 5.7 -41
Turkey 1 060 2 957 8 412 7 880 5.6 -6.3
Iraq 32 068 10 177 10 114 6 433 4.5 -36
Algeria 5 140 7 443 6 101 5 314 3.7 -13
Pakistan 17 973 10 015 4 988 3 799 2.7 -24
Palestine^ 2 549 1 199 2 095 3 620 2.6 73
Iran 6 605 1 662 2 127 3 478 2.5 64
All Other 295 995 132 990 74 669 30 463 21 -59

Total all borders 511 146 204 750 149 117 141 846 100 -4.9

Land Border
Syria 5 777 3 122 6 083 7 546 21 24
Turkey 921 2 648 7 954 7 322 21 -7.9
Afghanistan 12 171 3 684 2 863 5 812 16 103
Iraq 4 041 1 778 3 348 2 256 6.3 -33
Pakistan 6 519 5 281 2 883 2 109 5.9 -27
Albania 5 316 6 502 4 576 2 055 5.8 -55
Bangladesh 493 260 855 1 386 3.9 62
Iran 997 395 1 353 1 318 3.7 -2.6
Cameroon 364 494 503 1 127 3.2 124
Palestine^ 268 104 480 379 1.1 -21
All Other 108 984 4 271 4 576 4 290 12 -6.3

Total land borders 145 851 28 539 35 474 35 600 100 0.4

Sea Border
Afghanistan 42 195 3 892 9 803 28 342 27 189
Syria 82 774 16 330 8 295 16 793 16 102
Unspecified sub-Saharan
3 0 69 14 191 13 n.a.
nationals
Morocco 6 012 11 190 13 386 7 823 7.4 -42
Algeria 4 575 7 194 5 943 5 089 4.8 -14
Iraq 28 027 8 399 6 766 4 177 3.9 -38
Palestine^ 2 281 1 095 1 615 3 241 3.1 101
Somalia 7 718 3 106 1 194 3 049 2.9 155
Congo (Kinshasa) 456 312 1 812 3 029 2.9 67
Tunisia 1 306 6 489 5 204 2 699 2.5 -48
All Other 189 948 118 204 59 556 17 813 17 -70

Total sea borders 365 295 176 211 113 643 106 246 100 -6.5

^ This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.

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Annex Table 3. I llegal border-crossing between BCPs, on entry
Detections reported by routes and top three nationalities at the external borders

Share of % change
Routes 2016 2017 2018 2019 total on prev. year
Eastern Mediterranean Route 182 277 42 319 56 561 83 333 59 47
Sea 174 605 34 732 34 014 65 963 79 94
Afghanistan 41 775 3 713 9 597 28 273 43 195
Syria 81 570 13 957 8 173 16 707 25 104
Iraq 26 573 6 417 6 029 3 741 5.7 -38
All Other 24 687 10 645 10 215 17 242 26 69
Land 7 672 7 587 22 547 17 370 21 -23
Turkey 190 2 220 7 468 6 619 38 -11
Syria 3 015 2 438 5 733 2 897 17 -49
Pakistan 893 901 1 823 1 556 9 -15
All Other 3 574 2 028 7 523 6 298 36 -16
Western Mediterranean Route 9 990 23 063 56 245 23 969 17 -57
Sea 8 641 21 552 54 820 23 557 98 -57
Unspecified sub-Saharan nationals 0 0 69 12 482 53 n.a.
Morocco 722 4 704 11 881 6 336 27 -47
Algeria 1 693 4 287 4 339 4 007 17 -8
All Other 6 226 12 561 38 531 732 3.1 -98
Land 1 349 1 511 1 425 412 1.7 -71
Unspecified sub-Saharan nationals 0 0 0 155 38 n.a.
Mali 33 6 216 102 25 -53
Guinea 604 636 779 76 18 -90
All Other 712 869 430 79 19 -82
Western Balkan Route 130 325 12 179 5 869 15 152 11 158
Afghanistan 10 620 3 388 1 669 5 338 35 220
Syria 2 705 634 323 4 643 31 n.a.
Iraq 2 607 960 300 1 498 9.9 399
All Other 114 393 7 197 3 577 3 673 24 2.7
Central Mediterranean Route 181 376 118 962 23 485 14 003 9.9 -40
Tunisia 1 207 6 415 5 182 2 690 19 -48
Sudan 9 406 6 221 2 037 1 764 13 -13
Côte d'Ivoire 12 399 9 509 1 191 1 304 9.3 9.5
All Other 158 364 96 817 15 075 8 245 59 -45
Western African Route 671 421 1 323 2 718 1.9 105
Unspecified sub-Saharan nationals 0 0 0 1 709 63 n.a.
Morocco 94 106 902 949 35 5.2
Mali 0 1 11 48 1.8 336
All Other 577 314 410 12 0.4 -97
Circular Route from Albania to Greece 5 121 6 396 4 550 1 944 1.4 -57
Albania 4 996 6 220 4 319 1 867 96 -57
China 0 0 39 18 0.9 -54
India 0 0 4 16 0.8 300
All Other 125 176 188 43 2.2 -77
Eastern Borders Route 1 384 872 1 084 722 0.5 -33
Turkey 49 47 76 77 11 1
Vietnam 399 261 370 62 8.6 -83
Ukraine 138 105 75 57 7.9 -24
All Other 798 459 563 526 73 -6.6
Black Sea Route 1 537 0 2 0 n.a.
Ukraine 0 0 0 1 50 n.a.
Russia 0 0 0 1 50 n.a.
Iraq 0 495 0 0 0 n.a.
All Other 1 42 0 0 0 n.a.
Other 1 1 0 3 0 n.a.

Total 511 146 204 750 149 117 141 846 100 -4.9

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Annex Table 4. Clandestine entries at land and sea BCPs
Detections reported by Member State, border type, age group, gender and top ten nationalities

Share of % change
2016 2017 2018 2019 total on prev. year Highest share
Border Type Nationality
Land 1 896 1 207 1 998 2 119 83 6.1 Afghanistan (78%)
Sea 323 415 260 431 17 66 Tunisia (60%)

Age Group Nationality

Adult 467 604 1 709 2 436 96 43 Afghanistan (67%)
Minor 200 53 391 113 4.4 -71 Tunisia (58%)
Not available 1 552 965 158 1 0 -99 Pakistan (100%)

Sex Nationality
Female : : 145 84 3.3 -42 Tunisia (31%)
Male : : 2 101 2 464 97 17 Afghanistan (67%)
Not available 2 219 1 622 12 2 0.1 -83 Ethiopia (50%)

Top Ten Nationalities

Afghanistan 233 490 1 041 1 646 65 58
Tunisia 63 47 59 263 10 346
Algeria 127 90 121 90 3.5 -26
Pakistan 55 47 245 69 2.7 -72
Iraq 221 171 120 52 2 -57
Syria 667 115 64 51 2 -20
Turkey 35 49 65 49 1.9 -25
Morocco 148 48 43 45 1.8 4.7
Iran 22 32 118 42 1.6 -64
Guinea 360 246 114 37 1.5 -68
All Other 288 287 268 206 8.1 -23

Total 2 219 1 622 2 258 2 550 100 13

Annex Table 5. Facilitators

Detections reported by Member State, by place of detection and top ten nationalities

Share of % change
2016 2017 2018 2019 total on prev. year Highest share
Place of Detection Nationality
Inland 5 199 4 397 4 958 4 912 45 -0.9 Italy (9%)
Not available 3 382 327 3 033 3 765 34 24 Morocco (23%)
Land 2 833 4 197 2 139 1 804 16 -16 Turkey (10%)
Sea 962 1 032 402 404 3.7 0.5 Turkey (14%)
Air 245 293 110 104 0.9 -5.5 Syria (16%)

Top Ten Nationalities

Morocco 1 233 804 696 1 039 9.5 49
Albania 687 650 609 758 6.9 24
France 490 435 655 595 5.4 -9.2
Spain 638 475 477 507 4.6 6.3
Italy 504 477 439 494 4.5 13
Unknown 1 948 781 614 488 4.4 -21
Syria 318 369 522 460 4.2 -12
Iran 213 149 284 431 3.9 52
Pakistan 367 370 503 411 3.7 -18
Iraq 210 259 295 409 3.7 39
All Other 6 013 5 477 5 548 5 397 49 -2.7

Total 12 621 10 246 10 642 10 989 100 3.3

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Annex Table 6. Illegal stay
Detections reported by Member State, place of detection, age group, gender and top ten nationalities

Share of % change
2016 2017 2018 2019 total on prev. year Highest share
Place of Detection Nationality
Inland 409 869 352 750 273 807 307 246 76 12 Morocco (10%)
onExit 82 029 82 329 91 929 92 248 23 0.3 Ukraine (27%)
Not available 20 5 1 530 3 419 0.8 123 Turkey (22%)

Age Group Nationality

Adult : : 236 900 359 249 89 52 Ukraine (11%)
Minor : : 21 052 22 321 5.5 6 Afghanistan (14%)
Not available 491 918 435 084 109 314 21 343 5.3 -80 Brazil (17%)

Sex Nationality
Female : : 38 957 61 833 15 59 Ukraine (19%)
Male : : 154 294 247 853 62 61 Ukraine (11%)
Not available 491 918 435 084 174 015 93 227 23 -46 Eritrea (12%)

Top Ten Nationalities

Ukraine 28 996 32 608 36 299 39 612 9.8 9.1
Morocco 30 042 29 859 21 891 32 653 8.1 49
Albania 24 127 24 801 21 639 24 833 6.2 15
Algeria 17 274 19 892 16 383 21 469 5.3 31
Iraq 31 883 21 574 21 850 20 011 5 -8.4
Pakistan 19 573 19 624 15 605 19 206 4.8 23
Afghanistan 50 746 21 177 14 104 15 699 3.9 11
Eritrea 24 655 12 995 10 626 14 641 3.6 38
Moldova 6 524 8 340 9 536 13 987 3.5 47
Nigeria 14 838 14 997 11 545 10 041 2.5 -13
All Other 243 260 229 217 187 788 190 761 47 1.6

Total 491 918 435 084 367 266 402 913 100 10

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Annex Table 7. Refusals of entry
Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by Member State, border type, age group, gender and top ten nationalities

Share of % change
2015 2016 2017 2018 total on prev. year Highest share
Border Type Nationality
Land 162 162 126 456 131 641 145 494 69 11 Ukraine (45%)
Air 45 565 48 924 54 952 62 498 29 14 Brazil (11%)
Sea 5 861 7 192 4 037 4 100 1.9 1.6 Albania (38%)
Not available 0 0 28 5 0 -82 United States (20%)

Age Group Nationality

Adult : : 141 049 175 099 83 24 Ukraine (39%)
Minor : : 14 757 19 288 9.1 31 Russia (74%)
Not available 213 588 182 572 34 852 17 710 8.3 -49 Brazil (31%)

Sex Nationality
Female : : 42 185 53 103 25 26 Ukraine (36%)
Male : : 105 198 132 772 63 26 Ukraine (38%)
Not available 213 588 182 572 43 275 26 222 12 -39 Brazil (22%)

Top Ten nationalities

Ukraine 27 761 37 071 57 576 70 334 33 22
Russia 80 190 36 335 25 951 34 529 16 33
Albania 19 148 31 861 24 386 21 604 10 -11
Belarus 5 970 7 660 7 955 7 696 3.6 -3.3
Serbia 6 824 7 727 7 658 7 203 3.4 -5.9
Brazil 3 490 3 079 4 973 7 082 3.3 42
Moldova 3 790 5 930 6 378 6 176 2.9 -3.2
Georgia 1 787 2 601 4 094 5 140 2.4 26
Turkey 3 201 4 662 4 836 4 644 2.2 -4
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4 081 3 774 4 142 3 318 1.6 -20
All Other 57 346 41 872 42 709 44 371 21 3.9

Total 213 588 182 572 190 658 212 097 100 11

Annex Table 8. Reasons for refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by reasons for refusal, Member State and top ten nationalities

Refusal persons Reasons for refusals of entry (see description below) Reasons
Total Total
A B C D E F G H I n.a.

Top Ten nationalities

Ukraine 70 334 152 72 4 509 51 37 048 7 100 14 740 6 037 279 1 514 71 502
Russia 34 529 108 43 30 732 56 1 322 294 731 189 1 350 126 34 951
Albania 21 604 130 89 284 22 8 302 1 991 4 582 6 379 183 525 22 487
Belarus 7 696 42 3 2 502 4 1 217 427 832 191 1 316 1 256 7 790
Brazil 7 082 22 31 2 619 2 2 531 147 383 242 32 1 549 7 558
Serbia 7 203 370 68 271 19 1 000 2 645 766 2 103 19 33 7 294
Moldova 6 176 48 12 366 9 2 341 726 1 136 1 599 19 97 6 353
Georgia 5 140 29 12 113 7 2 410 218 923 1 263 71 539 5 585
Colombia 3 247 18 11 267 0 2 216 82 580 172 78 1 350 4 774
Turkey 4 644 486 143 1 954 74 927 617 264 206 23 64 4 758
All Other 44 442 4 953 1 357 9 224 682 14 683 2 164 3 893 3 100 542 9 826 50 424

Total 212 097 6 358 1 841 52 841 926 73 997 16 411 28 830 21 481 3 912 16 879 223 476

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:

A has no valid travel document(s);
B has a false / counterfeit / forged travel document;
C has no valid visa or residence permit;
D has a false / counterfeit / forged visa or residence permit;
E has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;
F has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the European Union;
G does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;
H is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;
I is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the European Union;

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Annex Table 9. Persons using fraudulent documents
Detections on entry at the external borders, by Member State, border type and top ten nationalities

Share of % change
2016 2017 2018 2019 total on prev. year Highest share
Border Type Nationality Reported
Air 4 372 4 137 4 344 3 901 68 -10 Iran (10%)
Land 2 272 1 870 1 324 1 089 19 -18 Ukraine (19%)
Sea 417 705 878 707 12 -19 Morocco (91%)
.

Top Ten Nationalities Country of issuance

Morocco 800 919 975 769 13 -21 Spain (89%)
Turkey 211 270 383 431 7.6 13 Croatia (18%)
Iran 383 419 443 428 7.5 -3.4 Germany (37%)
Unknown 714 534 611 324 5.7 -47 Portugal (33%)
Ukraine 1 201 790 395 251 4.4 -36 Poland (62%)
Albania 380 244 162 205 3.6 27 Ireland (26%)
Ghana 76 93 127 176 3.1 39 Italy (60%)
Kosovo* 43 103 99 153 2.7 55 Hungary (54%)
Syria 235 212 182 136 2.4 -25 Netherlands (26%)
Iraq 270 155 211 136 2.4 -36 Germany (28%)
All Other 2 748 2 973 2 958 2 688 47 -9.1 Italy (16%)

Total 8 361 6 998 6 670 6 667 100 0

Annex Table 10. Fraudulent documents used

Detectections on entry at the external borders, by country of issuance of the document and type of document

Share of % change
2016 2017 2018 2019 total on prev. year Highest share
Country of issuance Type of Document
Spain 862 989 1 107 895 12 -19 ID Cards (37%)
France 783 1 030 944 817 11 -13 Passports (34%)
Italy 875 860 711 649 8.6 -8.7 Visas (29%)
Germany 469 504 412 443 5.9 7.5 Residence Permits (37%)
Turkey 69 117 276 315 4.2 14 Passports (95%)
Poland 886 740 404 272 3.6 -33 Visas (79%)
Greece 272 296 283 251 3.3 -11 ID Cards (34%)
Belgium 293 253 239 203 2.7 -15 Residence Permits (32%)
Senegal 78 91 75 192 2.5 156 Passports (98%)
Ghana 43 57 88 181 2.4 106 Passports (97%)
All Other 3 659 3 289 3 439 3 318 44 -3.5 Passports (68%)

Type of Document Type of Fraud

Passports 2 764 2 885 3 130 3 582 48 14 AUTH-IMPOSTOR (27%)
Visa 2 124 1 856 1 454 1 179 16 -19 FALSE-COUNTERFEIT (47%)
ID Cards 1 166 1 309 1 461 1 163 15 -20 FALSE-COUNTERFEIT (45%)
Residence Permits 1 193 1 227 1 138 956 13 -16 FALSE-COUNTERFEIT (43%)
Stamps 832 710 602 496 6.6 -18 FALSE-COUNTERFEIT (85%)
Other 210 239 193 160 2.1 -17 FALSE-COUNTERFEIT (61%)

Total 8 289 8 226 7 978 7 536 100 -5.5

^ This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.

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Annex Table 11. Return decisions issued
Decisions issued by Member State, age group, gender and top ten nationalities

Share of % change
2016 2017 2018 2019 total on prev. year Highest share
Age Group Nationality
Adult : : 149 334 151 176 51 1.2 Ukraine (20%)
Minor : : 9 287 9 627 3.2 3.7 Iraq (11%)
Not available 305 463 282 075 125 259 137 387 46 9.7 Albania (10%)

Sex
Female : : 44 267 48 930 16 11 Ukraine (18%)
Male : : 187 080 201 811 68 8 Ukraine (11%)
Not available 305 463 282 075 52 533 47 449 16 -9.7 Brazil (13%)

Top Ten Nationalities

Ukraine 24 651 29 303 33 651 33 296 11 -1.1
Morocco 22 437 22 028 18 572 22 938 7.7 24
Afghanistan 34 440 18 686 18 160 18 269 6.1 0.6
Albania 18 195 18 015 16 495 17 063 5.7 3.4
Pakistan 16 091 14 281 14 198 17 044 5.7 20
Syria 9 830 8 963 6 979 13 463 4.5 93
Iraq 28 454 19 316 15 489 13 086 4.4 -16
Algeria 9 490 9 691 9 199 12 402 4.2 35
Brazil 5 025 5 788 5 794 7 933 2.7 37
Turkey 3 461 4 508 5 855 7 464 2.5 27
All Other 133 389 131 496 139 488 135 232 45 -3.1

Total 305 463 282 075 283 880 298 190 100 5

* Data for Belgium are not available for May-December 2018 and November-December 2019.

Annex Table 12. Effective returns

People effectively returned to third countries by Member State, age group, gender and top ten nationalities

Share of % change
2016 2017 2018 2019 total on prev. year Highest share
Age Group Nationality
Adult : : 76 380 96 044 69 26 Ukraine (26%)
Minor : : 2 963 5 411 3.9 83 Albania (11%)
Not available 174 810 155 945 68 472 37 405 27 -45 Albania (10%)

Sex
Female : : 16 259 21 374 15 31 Ukraine (34%)
Male : : 56 958 75 202 54 32 Ukraine (24%)
Not available 174 810 155 945 74 598 42 284 30 -43 Albania (14%)

Top Ten Nationalities

Ukraine 20 990 24 614 27 264 26 594 19 -2.5
Albania 27 221 25 790 19 243 15 120 11 -21
Morocco 8 672 10 047 10 858 9 647 6.9 -11
Georgia 2 500 3 446 5 021 7 343 5.3 46
Algeria 3 414 4 888 5 052 5 190 3.7 2.7
Russia 3 683 4 573 4 628 4 820 3.5 4.1
Moldova 2 028 3 415 3 531 4 027 2.9 14
Tunisia 2 982 3 653 3 854 3 563 2.6 -7.6
Brazil 2 786 2 934 3 065 3 425 2.5 12
Iraq 11 840 5 482 4 869 3 421 2.5 -30
All Other 88 694 67 103 60 430 55 710 40 -7.8

Total 174 810 155 945 147 815 138 860 100 -6

* Data for Austria are not available since October 2015.

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Annex Table 13. Effective returns by type of return
People effectively returned to third countries by type of return and top ten nationalities

Share of % change
2016 2017 2018 2019 total on prev. year Highest share
Type of Return Nationality
Forced return 78 574 79 606 75 030 71 163 51 -5.2 Albania (17%)
Enforced by Member State 57 985 59 684 54 015 50 105 70 -7.2 Albania (21%)
Not available 15 297 16 565 18 741 17 218 24 -8.1 Morocco (35%)
Enforced by Joint Operation 5 292 3 357 2 274 3 840 5.4 69 Albania (20%)
Voluntary return 91 703 76 013 72 773 67 656 49 -7 Ukraine (36%)
Without assistance : : 33 335 34 342 51 3 Ukraine (64%)
Not available 9 365 3 996 27 556 22 223 33 -19 Albania (11%)
Others** 61 178 53 980 8 442 4 758 7 -44 India (19%)
AVRR : : 237 4 179 6.2 n.a. Iraq (30%)
AVR : : 1 665 2 132 3.2 28 Ukraine (14%)
IOM Assisted** 21 160 18 037 1 538 22 0 -99 Pakistan (36%)
Not available 4 533 326 12 41 0 242 Albania (71%)

Total 174 810 155 945 147 815 138 860 100 -6.1

Top Ten Nationalities

Forced
Albania 19 508 21 738 16 341 11 996 17 -27
Morocco 6 901 8 936 9 977 9 074 13 -9.1
Algeria 2 428 3 410 4 044 4 579 6.4 13
Georgia 1 173 1 524 2 290 3 514 4.9 53
Tunisia 2 719 3 403 3 545 3 347 4.7 -5.6
Ukraine 2 069 2 249 2 635 2 542 3.6 -3.5
Brazil 1 539 1 612 1 912 2 307 3.2 21
Serbia 4 311 3 155 2 594 2 126 3 -18
Moldova 725 1 280 1 092 1 848 2.6 69
Russia 961 1 512 1 681 1 780 2.5 5.9
All Other 36 240 30 787 28 919 28 050 39 -3

Total Forced Returns 78 574 79 606 75 030 71 163 100 -5.2

Voluntary
Ukraine 18 899 22 362 24 629 24 052 36 -2.3
Georgia 1 187 1 904 2 731 3 824 5.7 40
Albania 5 520 3 984 2 901 3 095 4.6 6.7
Russia 2 717 3 057 2 946 3 040 4.5 3.2
Iraq 10 586 4 635 3 945 2 667 3.9 -32
Belarus 1 114 1 422 2 388 2 275 3.4 -4.7
Moldova 1 299 2 135 2 439 2 179 3.2 -11
Pakistan 4 262 4 543 2 871 1 816 2.7 -37
India 6 888 3 339 2 478 1 622 2.4 -35
Turkey 880 854 972 1 544 2.3 59
All Other 38 351 27 778 24 473 21 542 32 -12

Total Voluntary Returns 91 703 76 013 72 773 67 656 100 -7

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo* declaration of independence.

** Since January 2018, the breakdown for effective voluntary returns was changed from “IOM and Others” into “AVR, AVVR and Without assistance”.
Because at the beggining of the year the old template was still used by some Member States, the breakdowns “IOM and Others” are still reported in 2018.

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Annex Table 14. Passenger flow on entry
Data reported (on voluntary basis) by Member State, border type and top ten nationalities

Share of % change
2016 2017 2018 2019 total on prev. year Highest share
Border Type Nationality
Air 164 867 817 167 638 054 172 286 781 179 526 259 61 4.2 Unknown (75%)
Land 107 709 052 111 447 809 101 249 852 104 491 073 36 3.2 Ukraine (13%)
Sea 9 533 816 8 247 005 8 283 407 8 902 698 3.0 7.5 Unknown (66%)

Groups of nationalities
EU MS/SAC 56 370 512 61 050 240 81 093 247 86 170 620 29 6.3
Third-country 41 727 234 55 239 577 58 696 490 61 681 536 21 5.1
Not specified 184 012 939 171 043 051 142 030 303 145 067 874 50 2.1

Total 282 110 685 287 332 868 281 820 040 292 920 030 100 3.9

As the data reported by France, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain for the 2016-2019 are not fully compliant with the definitions, the respective figures have been excluded from this table. Member States and Frontex
are working closely to resolve these issues and the figures will be reported as soon as possible in the next publications.

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Notes on FRAN data sources and methods

The term ‘Member States’ refers to FRAN land-locked Member States including For the data concerning detections
Member States, which includes the 28 Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data
Member States and three Schengen As- Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland. on detections on exit are not available
sociated Countries (Iceland, Norway and In addition, data on detections of il- for France, Ireland Portugal, and Spain.
Switzerland) as of 2019. For the data con- legal border-crossing at land, air and sea Data on detections of illegal stay inland
cerning detections at the external bor- BCPs (1B) are not available for Iceland have not been available from the Neth-
ders of the EU, some of the border types and Ireland. erlands since 2012.
are not applicable to all FRAN Member Data on detections of illegal border- Data on refusals of entry (FRAN In-
States. This pertains to data on all FRAN crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not dicator 4) at the external EU borders are
indicators since the data are provided available for Ireland and Sweden. For not disaggregated by reason of refusal for
disaggregated by border type. The defi- 2013, data from Slovenia include detec- Ireland and the UK.
nitions of detections at land borders are tions at the EU external borders only un- The data on passenger flow (shared on
therefore not applicable (excluding bor- til June 2013. voluntary basis) are not available for Aus-
ders with non-Schengen principalities) Data on apprehension (FRAN Indica- tria, Ireland, Sweden and the UK. Data on
for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Den- tor 2) of facilitators are not available for passenger flow at the air border are not
mark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Ireland and UK. For Italy Norway, Spain available according to the definition for
Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Nether- and Sweden,, the data are not disaggre- Spain. Data at the sea border are not avail-
lands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland gated by border type, but are reported able for Denmark, Estonia, France, Latvia,
and the UK. For Cyprus, the land bor- as total apprehensions (not specified). the Netherlands and Norway.
der refers to the Green Line demarcation Data for Italy and Norway also include For all indicators, data from Croatia
with the area where the Government the facilitation of illegal stay and work. are available only starting with July 2013.
of the Republic of Cyprus does not ex- For Romania, the data include land In-
ercise effective control. For sea borders, tra-EU detections on exit at the border
the definitions are not applicable for with Hungary.

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Plac Europejski 6 Risk Analysis Unit
00-844 Warsaw, Poland
Reference number: 1218/2020
T +48 22 205 95 00
F +48 22 205 95 01 Paper version:
TT-AC-20-001-EN-C
frontex@[Link] ISBN 978-92-9471-618-7
[Link] ISSN 1977-4451
doi: 10.2819/46797

PDF version:
TT-AC-20-001-EN-N
ISBN 978-92-9471-619-4
ISSN 1977-446X
doi: 10.2819/450005

FPI 20.5032