Risk

Analysis
for 2016
Risk Analysis for 2016

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FRONTEX  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

Frontex official publications fall into four main categories: risk analysis, training, operations and research,
each marked with a distinct graphic identifier. Risk analysis publications bear a triangular symbol formed
by an arrow drawing a triangle, with a dot at the centre. Meta­phorically, the arrow represents the cyclical
nature of risk analysis processes and its orienta­tion towards an appropriate operational response. The tri­
angle is a symbol of ideal proportions and knowledge, reflecting the pursuit of factual exactness, truth and
exhaustive analysis. The dot at the centre represents the intelligence factor and the focal point where informa­
tion from diverse sources converges to be processed, systematised and shared as analytical products. Thus,
Frontex risk analysis is meant to be at the centre and to form a reliable ba­sis for its operational activities.

European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation

at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union

Plac Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland

T +48 22 205 95 00
F +48 22 205 95 01
frontex@[Link]
[Link]

Warsaw, March 2016

Risk Analysis Unit
Frontex reference number: 2499 /2016

Print version: Online version:

OPOCE Catalogue number: TT-AC-16-001-EN-C TT-AC-16-001-EN-N
ISBN 978-92-95205-47-5 ISBN 978-92-95205-46-8
ISSN 1977-4451 ISSN 1977-446X
doi:10.2819/26690 doi:10.2819/416783

© Frontex, 2016
All rights reserved. Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

Cover photo © Frontex, 2015. All rights reserved.

DISCLAIMERS
This is a Frontex staff working document. This publication or its contents do not imply the expression of
any opinion whatsoever on the part of Frontex concerning the legal status of any country, territory or city
or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
All maps and charts included in this report are the sole property of Frontex and any unauthorised use is
prohibited. Frontex disclaims any liability with respect to the boundaries, names and designations used
on the maps.
The contents of open-source boxes are unverified and presented only to give context and media representa­
tion of irregular-migration phenomena.
Throughout the report, references to Kosovo* are marked with an asterisk to indicate that this designation
is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Ko­
sovo declaration of independence.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The Frontex Risk Analysis for 2016 has been prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. During the course of
developing this product, many colleagues at Frontex and outside con­tributed to it and their assistance is
hereby acknowledged with gratitude.

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Frontex  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

Table of contents

1. Preface  5

2. Summary  6

3. Introduction  9

4. Methodology  10

5. Situational picture in 2015  13

5.1. Main trends  14
5.2. Surveillance: Overview  16
5.3. Surveillance: Eastern Mediterranean  18
5.4. Surveillance: Western Balkans  19
5.5. Surveillance: Central Mediterranean  20
5.6. Surveillance: Other routes  21
5.7. Border checks: Regular flow   22
5.8. Border checks: Refusals  23
5.9. Border checks: Fraudulent documents  24
5.10. Border checks: Clandestine entry  26
5.11. Illegal stayers on exit  27
5.12. Cross-border crime  28
5.13. In the EU: Illegal stayers, Asylum, Facilitators  30
5.14. In the EU: Secondary movements  32
5.15. In the EU: Return  34

6. F
 eatured analyses  35
6.1. Key countries of origin and transit  36
6.2. Border authorities not equipped to deal with large flows  42
6.3. Managing violence at the borders  44
6.4. Preventing casualties at the border  46
6.5. Health risks  48
6.6. Overcoming the obstacles to effective returns  50

7. Looking ahead  53
Scenarios: Overview  56
Scenario assessment: Expected development paths  58

8. Conclusions  61

9. Statistical annex  62

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FRONTEX  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

© Frontex
1. Preface
The year 2015 was unprecedented for the Coast Guard – designed to meet the new
EU and its external borders, with 1.8 mil­ challenges and political realities faced by
lion detections of illegal entries asso­ the EU, with regard to both migration
ciated with an estimated one million and internal security. According to the
individuals. Unlike almost any other proposal, the European Border and Coast
year since World War II, the scenes of Guard should be composed of the Euro­
chaos and the tragic images of those who pean Border and Coast Guard Agency and
have lost their lives have sharpened the the national authorities and coastguards

© Frontex
focus on migration issues. responsible for border management.
Given the proximity of conflict areas I encourage all Member States to sup­
and the persistent economic disparity port the core elements of this proposal
between the EU and many countries of and swiftly conduct the work ahead for
origin, many would-be migrants will its implementation. This ambitious pro­
remain motivated to depart towards posal relates not only to the management by actionable intelligence. We need to
the EU. of the external borders, but furthermore invest in knowledge, information shar­
It can be a challenge to provide for the – and let’s make no mistake about it – ing and cooperation. We are advancing
continuous functioning of border-control to the preservation of free movement in that direction with the proposal to
activities in a situation where thousands within the Schengen area. set up in Frontex a risk analysis centre
of migrants of mixed backgrounds, cir­ At the onset of 2016, the Agency has with the capacity to carry out risk anal­
cumstances and nationalities arrive at received additional funding and staff. ysis covering all aspects of integrated
the border in a very short space of time. Risk analysis, like the one presented in border management. Moreover, facili­
Ensuring the rescue, safety, registration this report, is an essential tool for decid­ tating the exchange of information with
and identification of thousands of vul­ ing how these new resources should be Member States, the European Asylum
nerable individuals is an extremely on­ allocated. One of the most pressing chal­ Support Office, Europol or Eurojust will
erous task and one that implies a certain lenges for border guards is clear: how to be at the heart of Frontex processing of
level of inherent risk and vulnerability distinguish legitimate asylum seekers personal data.
at the external borders. who arrive at the external border with no Finally, irregular migration is a very
In response to the varying locations papers from individuals posing a security dynamic and complex phenomenon,
and the scale of the threats witnessed, threat and economic migrants attempt­ drivers of which can change rapidly and
the authorities at the borders must have ing to abuse the system by claiming a unexpectedly. Basing future analyses
a capability for risk mitigation at the false nationality? This difficulty is exacer­ merely on trend analysis or environmen­
time of emergency. Often the response bated in situations of intense migratory tal scans will no longer be effective or ad­
calls for intensified interagency cooper­ pressure. It is clear that in response to equate. The Risk Analysis for 2016 describes
ation. This is an important tool for re­ these challenges, greater emphasis must a series of alternative future scenarios
sponding when a particular border is be placed on increased screening, regis­ developed in collaboration with experts
under an extensive strain. tration and debriefing activities. Moreo­ from relevant organisations. I encourage
The already difficult problem of irreg­ ver, let me reiterate that Frontex urgently all stakeholders to make use of them as a
ular migration was rendered even more needs to be given access to SIS, VIS, Eu­ foresight instrument at a strategic level.
complex by the tragic attacks in Paris in rodac, Europol and Interpol databases
November 2015 and the growing threat which are relevant for border checks.
from foreign terrorist fighters. This was This report also shows that efforts
a dreadful reminder that border man­ should be pursued urgently in the area
agement also has an important secu­ of returns. Indeed, one of the incentives
rity component. It demonstrates that all for irregular migrants is the knowledge
Member States, be they of entry, transit that the EU’s return system – meant to
or destination, are bound by the links of return irregular migrants or those whose Fabrice Leggeri
shared responsibility. This responsibility asylum applications have been refused – Executive Director
calls for initiatives that unite. works imperfectly.
The European Commission is propos­ Operations against criminals involved
ing to establish a European Border and in migrant smuggling can be sharpened

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2. Summary
In 2015, Mem­ber States reported more assumption that all migrants first de­
than 1 820 000 detections of illegal bor­ tected irregularly crossing in Greece were
der-crossing along the external borders. then detected for a second time re-enter­
This never-before-seen figure was more ing the EU from the Western Balkans.
than six times the number of detections The largest number of detections was
reported in 2014, which was itself an un­ re­ported on the Eastern Mediterranean
precedented year, with record monthly route (885 386), mostly between Turkey
averages observed since April 2014. and the Greek islands in the Eastern Ae­
The year 2015 began with extremely gean Sea. However, few applied for asy­
high levels for the month of Jan­uary lum in Greece and instead crossed the
(over 20  000 detections, against the border to the former Yugoslav Republic
2009–2014 January average of 4 700 de­ of Macedonia and continued through the
tections), and each subsequent month Western Balkans, initially towards the
set a new monthly record. In July, a turn­ Hungar­ian border with Serbia, where
ing point was reached with more than they applied for asylum, and then to
100  000 detections, coinciding with a their final destinations in the EU. As
change in the law in the former Yugo­ of mid-September, the flow shifted to­
slav Republic of Macedonia allow­ing mi­ wards the Croatian bor­der with Serbia,
grants to legalise their stay for a 72-hour following the construction of a tempo­ to make a sea crossing to Spain, now in­
period after they express a wish to ap­ rary technical obstacle in Hungary and creasingly opt for departing from Libya.
ply for inter­national protection. It re­ the establishment of transit areas for On the Western African route, which
sulted in a further increase of the flow immediate processing of asylum appli­ con­nects Senegal, Mauritania and Mo­
and throughout the sum­mer months cants with the possibility of return to rocco with the Spanish Canary Islands af­
scenes of chaos from the border areas Serbia. ter a treacherous journey on the Atlantic
spoke of a situa­tion that appeared out In contrast, on the Central Medi- Ocean, the numbers remain negligible
of control. In Sep­tember, public bus and terranean route, the number of detec­ despite an increasing trend of departures
train services were requisitioned in West­ tions of illegal border-crossing was about from Morocco. This low number is attrib­
ern Balkan countries and in some Mem­ 154 000, a slight decrease compared to uted to the joint surveillance ac­tivities
ber States to transport migrants, but the the previous year, but this figure was still and effective return of those detected
flow continued to grow until October. As higher than total detections recorded for crossing the border illegally.
of No­vember, the situation eased a little, the entire EU in 2011, i.e. the year of the On the Eastern land bor­der, a new
but the EU’s total for December, at over Arab Spring (141 051). The decrease was route emerged in 2015 at the land bor­
220 000 detec­tions, was still way above due to a lower number of Syrians (about ders of Norway and Finland with the
the figure for the entire 2013. 40 000 in 2014, and 7 448 in 2015), who Russian Federation (the so-called Arctic
There is no EU system capable of trac­ seemed to have shifted to the Eastern route). The main tar­geted border cross­
ing people’s movements following an il­ Mediterranean route. ing point (BCP) was the Norwegian BCP
legal border-crossing. Therefore it is not On the Western Mediterranean of Storskog, which regis­tered an unu­
pos­sible to establish the precise number route, the cooperation between Spain sually high num­ber of applications for
of persons who have illegally crossed two and Mo­rocco is key in maintaining detec­ asylum in 2015 (over 5 200). The sit­uation
sections of the external borders of the tions on the land route between the two in Norway eased in December, when the
EU. Only an estimate of about 1 000 000 countries at a relatively low level. As a re­ Russian Federa­tion resumed its practice
persons can be provided, based on the sult, sub-Sa­haran migrants, who tended of preventing the exit of travel­lers with­

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Frontex  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

 © Frontex
out a travel document that would allow Af­ricans, who tend to apply for asylum take into account the risks to internal
them to enter the EU. However, at the in other Member States, West Af­ricans security.
onset of 2016, the situation remains a apply for asylum in Italy and in fact ac­ The Paris attacks in November 2015
concern in Finland, though with fewer count for the largest share of asylum ap­ clearly demonstrated that irregular mi­
cases than in Norway so far. plicants in this country. gratory flows could be used by terrorists
Those declaring to hail from Syria While Greece and Italy have been un­ to enter the EU. Two of the terrorists in­
(594 059) and Afghanistan (267 485) rep­ der particularly intense pressure as the volved in the attacks had previously ir­
resented the highest share of detections two main entry points reporting several regularly entered through Leros and had
of illegal border-crossing on entry to the thousand arrivals per day, the large-scale been registered by the Greek authori­
EU in 2015. While Syrians undeni­ably inflows of migrants have been a new ex­ ties. They presented fraudulent Syrian
constitute the largest proportion, their perience for several other Member States. documents to speed up their registra­
exact number is diffi­cult to establish due The main challenges include the widen­ tion process.
to the fact that many other mi­grants ing of the surveillance areas, the grow­ As the vast majority of migrants ar­
also claim to be from Syria in order to ing need for and the extension of search rive undocumented, screening activities
accelerate their travel. Establishing the and rescue operations, the lack of facil­ are essential to properly verify their dec­
identity of a large number of poorly doc­ ities to receive and accommodate thou­ laration of nationality. False declarations
umented migrants is one of the main sands of persons over a short time, the of nationality are rife among nationals
challenges border-control authorities lack of expertise to detect non-typical who are unlikely to obtain asylum in
are confronted with. travel documents, difficulties in address­ the EU, are liable to be returned to their
Since 2014, the number of detected ing fraudulent declarations of nation­ country of origin or transit, or just want
West Africans has been steadily increas­ ality or age, and non-systematic entry to speed up their journey. With a large
ing, to reach over 64 000 de­tections in of fingerprints to the Eurodac. Last but number of persons arriving with false
2015, of whom nearly 85% on the Central not least, the process of registration at or no identification documents or rais­
Mediterranean route. In contrast to East the borders should more thoroughly ing concerns over the validity of their

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claimed nationality – with no thorough of bodies recov­ered during Joint Opera­ the area of returns. Indeed, in its Eu­
check or penalties in place for those mak­ tions. In 2015, 470 dead bodies were re­ ropean Agenda on Migration, the Com­
ing such false declarations, there is a risk ported in the Mediter­ranean area, an mission states that ‘one of the incentives
that some persons representing a secu­ increase of 112% compared to 2014. Ac­ for irregular migrants is the knowledge
rity threat to the EU may be taking ad­ cording to IOM estimates, more than that the EU’s return system – meant to
vantage of this situation. 3  770 persons went missing or died in return irregular migrants or those whose
The unprecedented number of detec­ the Mediterranean area in 2015. asylum applications have been refused –
tions of illegal border-crossing has also In spite of the popular perception that works imperfectly.’
led to a surge in violent incidents along mass migration may pose a threat of Frontex has created scenarios to
the EU’s external borders. People smug­ the spread of infectious diseases, WHO form a basis for an annual monitor­
glers, motivated by profit, increasingly ‘Pub­lic Health Aspects of Migration in ing of changes in the environment in
put migrants’ lives at risk and even Europe’ (PHAME) indicates that there which the Agency operates. Very differ­
threaten border guards to re­cover boats is no evi­dence to suggest such connec­ ent stakeholders can make use of these
or escape apprehension. Also, situations tion. Refugees and migrants are mainly scenarios to develop their own internal
when a large number of people are cross­ exposed to the infec­tious diseases that strategies or monitor how these strate­
ing the border en masse have led to vio­ are common in Europe, independently gies fit into a changing environment.
lence requiring public order policing, of migration. The risk that exotic infec­ Seven scenarios are outlined in the pre­
a task for which border-control author­ tious agents will be brought to Europe sent report, spanning a large variety of
ities are neither adequately equipped is extremely low. possible futures.
nor trained. In a situation of continued pressure
It is dauntingly difficult to estimate on the EU’s external borders, it is pre­
fatal­ities among migrants irregularly sumed that these challenges will be best
crossing the border because it is not pos­ addressed in a co­ordinated manner, re­
sible to keep an accurate tally of missing quiring harmonised application of leg­
persons. Frontex does not record these islation and pooling of resources. In
data and can only report the number addition, efforts should be pursued in

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 © Frontex
3. Introduction
The Frontex Risk Analysis for 2016 has been gration at the external borders of the Network (FRAN) in Member States for
developed for decision-makers to make EU and Schengen Asso­ciated Countries. their efforts in provid­ing data and infor­
informed decisions on common and con­ Central to the concept of integrated bor­ mation, as well as Europol, the European
certed actions that are most likely to have der management (IBM), bor­der manage­ Asylum Support Office (EASO), the Fun­
sustainable effects on the management ment should also cover secu­rity threats damental Right Agency (FRA), the Com­
of the external borders and ul­timately on present at the external borders. mission, the European External Action
the internal security of the EU. This annual analysis is developed in Service (EEAS), EU Intelligence Analysis
Frontex operational activities aim the fol­lowing sequence: (1) description Centre (INTCEN), UNHCR, OECD Inter­
to strengthen border security by en­ of the sit­uation by utilising a range of national Migration Division, WHO and
suring the coordination of Member indicators on irregular migration as ex­ all Frontex colleagues involved in the
States’ actions in the implementation changed among Member States; (2) fea­ prepa­ration of this report.
of Community measures relating to the tured analyses representing the current
management of the external borders. The key risks identified at the external bor­
coordination of operational ac­tivities also ders; (3)  scenarios aimed at preparing
contributes to better allocation of Mem­ the management of the external bor­
ber States’ resources and protection of ders to face a range of situations in the
the area of freedom, security and justice. coming years.
The Risk Analysis for 2016 concentrates on The Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU)
the current scope of Frontex operational would like to express its gratitude to all
activities, which focus on irregular mi­ members of the Frontex Risk Analysis

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© Frontex

4. Methodology sionally vary from those officially pub­

lished by na­tional authorities.
Throughout 2015, some FRAN mem­
bers per­formed backdated updates of
A coherent and comprehensive analy­ turn decisions; effective returns; and their 2014 statis­tics. These updates have
sis of the risks affect­ing security at the passen­ger flow (when available). Data been accounted for in this document and
external borders requires, above all, the on asylum applications are still being so some data presented here may differ
adoption of common indica­tors. Consist­ collected within the FRAN, but increas­ from the data presented a year ago in
ent monitoring of these indica­tors will ingly Frontex relies on data collected by the 2015 Annual Risk Analysis.
allow effective measures to be taken on EASO that contributed to the dedicated Member States were not requested to
the ground. The analysis will need to section on asylum. an­swer specific questions in support of
identify the risks that arise at the exter­ The data were categorised by border this analysis. Rather, bi-monthly ana­
nal borders themselves and those that type (land, air, and sea) and those on lytical re­ports were important sources
arise in third countries. land borders were additionally catego­ of information, es­pecially as regards the
The backbone of the Risk Analysis for rised by border section with neighbour­ analysis of routes and modi operandi.
2016 is the monthly statistics exchanged ing third countries. The data exchanged Open-source information was also ef­
among Member States within the frame­ within the FRAN are compiled and an­ fectively exploited, especially in identi­
work of the FRAN. For the Risk Analysis for alysed on a quarterly ba­sis. Priority is fying the main push and pull factors for
2016, the key indi­cators collected through given to the use of the data for manage­ irregular migration to the EU. Among
the FRAN were: detec­tions of illegal bor­ ment purposes and to their fast sharing others, these sources included reports
der-crossing through the green border among Member State border-con­trol au­ issued by government agencies, interna­
or at BCPs; refusals of entry; de­tections thorities. Member States’ data that are tional and non-governmental organisa­
of illegal stay; detections of facilita­tors; processed by Frontex are not treated as tions, as well as mainstream news
detections of fraudulent documents; re­ official statistics, and thus may occa­ agencies and official EU reports, such

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as the European Commission’s reports Schengen Associated Countries and der-crossing and refusals of entry are
on third countries. Schen­gen Member States are consid­ both functions of the amount of effort
For the development of the scenarios, ered as internal borders. For the indica­ spent detecting migrants and the ac­
the services of an external company, Sce­ tors on detections of facilitators, illegal tual flow of ir­regular migrants to the
nario Management International (ScMI), stay and asylum, statistics are also re­ EU. For example, in­creased detections
were used. A computer-aided scenario ported for detections at the land bor­ of illegal border-crossing might be due
method has been designed by ScMI to ders between Schengen Member States to a real increase in the flow of irregu­
assist in the computation and selection and those Member States that have ei­ lar migrants, or may in fact be an out­
among millions of combinations, as ther not joined the Schengen area yet come of more resources made available
set of relevant possible futures. About (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Romania) or to detect migrants. In exceptional cases,
twenty experts participated in the devel­ have opted to stay out of it (the UK, Ire­ in­creased resources may produce a rise
opment of these scenarios, half of them land). Thus, a total for Member States in re­ported detections while effectively
from various Frontex units, and the oth­ and Schengen Associated Countries as masking the actual decrease in the flow
ers half experts delegated by Member a whole can be presented. It was not of migrants, resulting from a strong de­
States (Finland, Germany, Greece, the possible to make this distinction for air terrent effect.
Netherlands) Europol, EASO, FRA, the and sea borders because Member States
Commission, EEAS, EU INTCEN, UNHCR do not habitually differentiate between
and OECD migration division. extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea con­
External borders refer to the borders nections but tend to aggregate data for
be­tween Member States and third coun­ all arrivals per airport.
tries. The borders between the Schen­ Consistent with other law-enforce­
gen Associ­ated Countries (Norway, ment indi­cators, variation in admin­
Iceland, and Switzer­land) and third istrative data related to border control
countries are also considered as exter­ depends on several factors. In this case,
nal borders. The borders between the the number of detections of ille­gal bor­

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5. Situational picture in 2015
5.1. Main trends
The year 2015 was marked by an unprec­ ular migrants between BCPs (an area of­
edented number of detections of illegal ten referred to as the green border, from
border-crossing between BCPs, revealing where detections of illegal border-cross­ Latest situation 2015
a migration crisis without equivalent in ing are reported), rather than through Reported cases
Europe since World War II. There were BCPs, where passengers not meeting the (2014)
three choke-points: the maritime border requirements for entry will be refused. 2015 (3 052) Detections
between Turkey and Greece, the Central Overall, the ratio of refusals of entry
3 642 of illegal
Mediterranean border and, as a conse­ per 100 000 passengers is higher at the border-crossing
quence of the entry through Greece, the land than at the air border, revealing at BCPs
border with Western Balkan countries. the very different nature of the flows at
(9 421) Detections
The situation is described in detail in these border types. The large differences
8 373 of fraudulent
subsequent chapters. in refusal rates among Member States document users
Despite this crisis situation at the bor­ also suggest differences in flows of pas­
ders in Southern Europe, most of the sengers arriving through Member States.
workload of border-control authorities Among regular passengers, the num­ (10 234) Detections
at EU level continues to be directed to­ ber of persons detected using fraudulent
12 023 of facilitators
wards checking the regular flow of pas­ documents, mostly at airports remained
sengers. This regular flow is constantly at a very low level (fewer than 9 000 de­
increasing, mostly at the land borders, tections on entry from third countries) Refusals
(114 887)
due to the visa liberalisation policy and despite large movements across the bor­ of entry
118 495
local border traffic agreements and at air ders. The results and observations col­
borders, following a general increase in lected during an exercise carried out
the number of air passengers worldwide. under Frontex umbrella highlighted a
According to Eurostat, extra-EU air ar­ series of vulnerabilities in the travel doc­ (161 309) Returns
(effective)
rivals rose by 6% between 2013 and 2014.1 ument inspection process. This points to 175 220
The increase could partly be linked with the risk for detections of document fraud
the rising number of passengers transit­ to underestimate the actual number of
ing through the Middle East region, in persons entering the EU upon presen­
particular Dubai and Doha airports, be­ tation of fraudulent travel documents. (251 990) Returns
(decisions)
fore arriving in the EU. Within the EU, the number of asylum
The regular flow of passengers is com­ applications and the number of detec­ 286 725
posed of EU nationals, as well as third- tions of illegal stay rose to unprecedented
country nationals not requiring a visa levels, over 1.35 million. These increases
and those requiring one. By contrast to are directly connected with the arrivals
the first two flows, the number of short- at the external borders.
term Schengen visas issued decreased be­
tween 2013 and 2014, following a sharp
The number of return decisions (is­
sued by authorities other than border-
(424 967) Detections
of persons
staying illegally
fall in the number of visas issued in the
Russian Federation and Ukraine in the
control authorities) and the number
of effective returns (usually im­ 701 625
wake of the economic crisis. However, ex­ plemented by border-control
cluding these two countries, the number authorities) remained rel­
of visas issued increased by 11%, reflecting atively stable. There is a
growing mobility worldwide and the at­ striking difference be­
tractiveness of the EU for many travellers. tween the nation­
The number of refusals of entry at bor­ alities detected

(282 962)
der crossing points (BCPs), as defined in crossing the bor­
the Schengen Borders Code, remained der illegally or
Detections
relatively stable between 2014 and 2015 staying illegally
of illegal
(118 495 in 2015 and 114 887 in 2014). This in the EU, and border-crossing

1 822 337
is a very low level, considering the in­ the nationalities between BCPs
creasing migratory pressure, as well as effectively re­
the very large number of regular pas­ turned. Indeed,
sengers (several million per year), but it most people de­
reflects facilitators’ choice to direct irreg­ tected crossing
the border illegally
travelled within the EU
1 Latest year with complete statistics.
[Link]
and then applied for asy­
statistics-explained/[Link]/ lum and thus were not returned.
Air_transport_statistics

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Frontex  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

Three main types of irregular migration flow:

Nationalities very likely to obtain asylum in the EU:

Efforts at the border should be geared towards their fast
identification and prompt access to protection. Among
the same flow, however, a proportion of applicants is Asylum in EU
likely to make false declarations of nationality, and the
Syria
challenge for border guards is to identify those persons.
Afghanistan
If they do not need protection, measures should be un­
Iraq
dertaken to return them promptly to safe countries. positive
Eritrea
The EU law (the Asylum Procedures Directive) consid­ Somalia
ers a country safe when there is a democratic system, Asylum Asylum Iran
as well as, generally and consistently, no persecution, decision application

E
NC
no torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or pun­

LLA
ishment, no threat of violence and no armed conflict. negative

VEI
This flow corresponds mostly to detections of illegal Illegal

SUR
border-crossing between BCPs, where border-control border-crossing
authorities perform surveillance activities.
RETURN

Asylum applications in a Member State different Asylum

than the Member State of entry and unlikely to re-
in EU
ow
ceive a positive asylum decision: Here, the first chal­ ul ar fl
lenge is to detect those crossing illegally between BCPs positive Reg

CH
EC
and rapidly identify those likely to apply for asylum

KS
in other Member States. The second and most diffi­ Asylum Asylum
cult challenge is to identify among the large flow of decision
application

E
bona fide travellers those who will eventually apply

NC
LLA
for asylum. Finally, border-control authorities are also Illeg
negative

VEI
a
involved in implementing the return of those who re­ bor l
SUR
der
ceived a negative decision on their asylum application. -cro
s sing
The challenge here is to increase the ratio between re­ Albania
turn decisions and effective returns in line with the RETURN Kosovo*
Nigeria
EU return policy.
Bangladesh
Serbia

Persons who are likely to be found staying illegally

in the EU, mostly by overstaying a regular entry
or not being detected at the border: The main chal­ ow
ul ar fl
lenges here are to increase the detection of those en­
Reg
CH

tering clandestinely, for example hidden in vehicles,

EC

and to refuse entry to those who are likely to overstay

KS

Morocco
their legal period of stay. This can only be done by in­
Illegal Algeria
creased collaboration with police authorities inland stay India
and the joint analysis of the profile of vehicles and Turkey
persons crossing the border illegally. Prompt and har­ Tunisia
monised return policies among Member States are es­ China
sential to avoid migrants deciding to stay in Member
States where the likelihood of return is low. This flow
RETURN
mostly corresponds to flows at BCPs, where border-
control authorities perform checks.

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FRONTEX  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

 Eastern borders route
(1 275)
Detections of illegal border-
crossing at the EU’s external 1 920
borders, 2015
(282 962)
Western Balkan route
1 822 337 (43 357) Not specified 556 258
Syria 90 065 Black Sea route
Route
764 038 Afghanistan 53 237
(in 2014) Top three X XXX (433)
nationalities YYY
in 2015 in 2015 ZZZ 68

Circular route from

Albania to Greece
(8 841)

8 932
Western Mediterranean route
Eastern Mediterranean route
(7 272) Guinea 1 991
(50 834) Syria 496 340
Algeria 1 052
7 164 Morocco 828
885 386
Afghanistan 213 635
Iraq 92 721
Western
African route
Central Mediterranean route
(276)
(170 664) Eritrea 38 791
874 153 946
Nigeria
Somalia
21 914
12 430
5.2. Surveillance: Overview

Surveillance consists in the activities of In contrast, the Central Mediterra­ Search and rescue operations were
border-control authorities carried out be­ nean route saw the number of people crucial in saving the lives of an unprec­
tween BCPs. During these surveillance crossing to Italy decreasing by about 10% edented number of migrants. However,
activities, in 2015, more than 1 820 000 in 2015. This was in large part due to a it is on this route that the largest death
detections of illegal border-crossing decrease in the number of Syrians opting toll was reported among migrants cross­
along the EU external borders were re­ for this route, as the majority preferred ing the border illegally. IOM estimates
ported, i.e. six times more than in 2014. the shorter Eastern Mediterranean route, that around 3 770 persons went missing
Throughout 2015 and in particular dur­ bringing the figure down to 153 946 com­ or died at sea in 2015.
ing the summer, not only inflows surged pared with approximately 170 000 in the On the other traditional routes, the
but the routes used by asylum seekers same period of 2014. Mostly Africans, situation remained comparable to previ­
also changed. from Eritrea and West Africa, were re­ ous years, with 7 164 detections reported
On the Eastern Mediterranean route, ported on this route, and their detections from the Western Mediterranean route
most detections (872 938) corresponded to increased compared to 2014. (-1% compared to 2014), 8 932 on the cir­
the arrivals on the Greek islands of the
Aegean Sea. Syrians accounted for the
largest proportion of arrivals, although Figure 1.  Detections of illegal border-crossing, by main nationalities in 2015
towards the end of the year, the share of
Afghan nationals has risen significantly. 2 000 000

A total of 764 038 detections were re­ 6%

1% 1% 1%
corded on the Western Balkan route, 2% 1% 1%
1 600 000 6% 2%
mainly on Hungary’s and Croatia’s bor­
15%
ders with Serbia. Most of the migrants
had earlier arrived on one of the Greek
1 200 000 31%
islands and then left the EU to travel
through the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia and Serbia. After Hungary
800 000
constructed a temporary technical obsta­
33%
cle along its border with Serbia and tight­
Not specified

Afghanistan

ened border controls in September, the

400 000
Morocco
Pakistan

Kosovo*

migrants have begun crossing Croatia’s

OTHERS
Somalia
Nigeria
Eritrea
Syria

border with Serbia in record numbers.

Iran
Iraq

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Frontex  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

cular migration route between Albania Table 1. D
 etections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs
and Greece, and 68 in the Black Sea. Detections reported by routes and top three nationalities at the external borders
Detections associated with surveil­ Share of % change
lance activities on the eastern land bor­ parent row on previous
Routes 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 total year
der remained at relatively low levels
Eastern Mediterranean route 57 025 37 224 24 799 50 834 885 386 49 1 642
(1 920), but an unusual increase in un­
Sea 1 467 4 370 11 831 44 057 873 179 99 1 882
founded asylum applications at BCPs
Syria 76 906 5 361 27 025 489 011 56 1 709
was reported at the Norwegian and Finn­ Afghanistan 310 1 593 4 080 11 582 212 286 24 1 733
ish borders with the Russian Federation Iraq 76 47 57 382 90 130 10 23 494
(the Arctic route). On this route, start­ Other 1 005 1 824 2 333 5 068 81 752 9.4 1 513
ing from September 2015, an increasing Land 55 558 32 854 12 968 6 777 12 207 1.4 80
number of migrants, in particular from Syria 1 216 6 216 7 366 4 648 7 329 60 58

Afghanistan and Syria, were reported Iraq 1 054 987 372 483 2 591 21 436
Afghanistan 19 308 7 973 2 049 893 1 349 11 51
crossing the border without proper doc­
Other 33 980 17 678 3 181 753 938 7.7 25
uments and then applying for asylum.
Western Balkan route 4 658 6 391 19 951 43 357 764 038 42 1 662
Citizens from Syria and Afghanistan
Not specified 75 39 38 153 556 258 73 363 467
repre­sented the highest share of detec­ Syria 34 178 1 171 7 320 90 065 12 1 130
tions of illegal border-crossing in 2015. Afghanistan 983 1 665 2 174 8 342 53 237 7.0 538
The vast majority arrived from Turkey in Other 3 566 4 509 16 568 27 542 64 478 8.4 134
Greece, and only approximately 7 448 Syr­ Central Mediterranean route 64 261 15 151 45 298 170 664 153 946 8.4 -9.8

ians and 117 Afghans were reported on the Eritrea 659 1 889 10 398 33 559 38 791 25 16
Nigeria 6 078 449 2 824 8 233 21 914 14 166
Central Mediterranean route. The break­
Somalia 1 416 3 403 4 506 5 785 12 430 8.1 115
down by nationality, however, should be
Other 56 108 9 410 27 570 123 087 80 811 52 -34
considered with caution as thorough in­
Circular route from Albania to Greece 5 269 5 502 8 728 8 841 8 932 0.5 1
terviews of a proportion of migrants dur­ Albania 5 022 5 398 8 592 8 757 8 874 99 1
ing the screening procedure indicated a FYR Macedonia 23 36 21 31 16 0 -48
high degree of falsely claimed nationali­ Georgia 21 7 23 14 13 0.1 -7
ties. Indeed, many migrants claimed to be Other 203 61 92 39 29 0.3 -26
from Syria or Afghanistan, to avoid being Western Mediterranean route 8 448 6 397 6 838 7 272 7 164 0,4 -1

returned to Turkey or their country of ori­ Guinea 392 261 142 769 1 991 28 159
Algeria 1 772 2 015 1 436 734 1 052 15 43
gin, and so speed up their journey within
Morocco 775 508 282 476 828 12 74
the EU. Establishing the identity of a large
Other 5 509 3 613 4 978 5 293 3 293 46 -38
number of poorly documented migrants is
Eastern borders route 1 049 1 597 1 316 1 275 1 920 0.1 51
one of the main challenges border-control Afghanistan 105 200 149 209 491 26 135
authorities are confronted with. Vietnam 23 158 149 257 461 24 79
Eritreans ranked first in terms of the Syria 4 22 64 98 153 8.0 56
nationalities of migrants arriving on the Other 917 1 217 954 711 815 42 15
Central Mediterranean route, with 38 791 Western African route 340 174 283 276 874 0 217
Guinea 4 2 12 50 365 42 630
detections, or 25% of this route’s total.
Côte d'Ivoire 0 0 5 16 136 16 750
However, as regards regional totals, West
Gambia 2 39 3 22 85 10 286
Africans (54 828) represented the largest
Other 334 133 263 188 288 33 53
share of migrants arriving on this route.
Black Sea route 0 1 148 433 68 0 -84
The unprecedented number of detec­ Syria 0 0 80 14 42 62 200
tions of illegal border-crossing also meant Iraq 0 0 0 90 12 18 -87
that in several Member States, the author­ Iran 0 1 0 45 9 13 -80
ities were not able to register the nation­ Other 0 0 68 284 5 7.4 -98
ality of the persons arriving. Thus, the Other 1 0 4 10 9 0 -10

category ‘not specified’ for illegal border- Syria 0 0 0 0 5 56 n.a.

Russian Federation 0 0 0 4 2 22 -50
crossing represented 30% of the total. Most
China 0 0 0 0 1 11 n.a.
of the cases under this category were re­
Other 1 0 4 6 1 11 -83
ported after mid-September 2015, when the
Total 141 051 72 437 107 365 282 962 1 822 337 100.0 100.0
flow of migrants entered through Croatia.
Since 2014, the number of detections
of West Africans has been steadily in­ to be monitored. Compared to East Afri­
creasing, to reach 64  169 detections in cans who do not apply for asylum in Italy
2015, nearly 86% of which on the Central but rather in other Member States, West
Mediterranean route. While this number Africans do apply for asylum in Italy and
pales in comparison to the record annual in fact constitute the largest contingent
total, this is a growing trend that needs of asylum applicants in this country.

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FRONTEX  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

 Main nationalities
of illegal border-crossers, 2015

Western
Balkan
The breakdown by nationality should
Central
Mediterranean be considered with caution as thorough
Eastern
interviews of a proportion of the mi­
Mediterranean
Syria Afghanistan
grants during screening procedure re­
Iran vealed a high degree of falsely claimed
Iraq
Pakistan nationalities.
The vast majority of migrants do not
apply for asylum in Greece. Syrian mi­
Bangladesh grants receive special authorisation to
Mali stay in Greece for up to six months and
many use this authori­sation to travel
Eritrea
The Sudan through the country to the border with
Gambia the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo­
nia, and then continue through the West­
Nigeria
Somalia ern Balkans to other EU Member States.
Unspecified Eastern Mediterranean route
sub-Saharan Share of Land border
nationals % annual EU total
  2014 2015 increase in 2015
Total 50 834 885 386 1 642 49% At the land border, detections of il­
Syria  31 673 496 340 1 467  56% legal border-crossing increased by 80%
Afghanistan  12 475 213 635 1 613 24% between 2014 and 2105. Detections were
Iraq 865  92 721 10 619 10% twice as high at the Bulgarian land bor­
Other 5 821  82 690  1 321 10% der with Turkey as at the neighbouring
Greek land border. However, the gap nar­
rowed after September 2015, coinciding
5.3. Surveillance: Eastern Mediterranean with the transportation measures set up
from the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia border, rendering the journey
The largest number of detections was cluding that of a three-year-old boy near through the Greek Thrace region more at­
reported on the Eastern Mediterranean Bodrum, Turkey. tractive than the journey through Bul­
route (885 386), mostly between Turkey Most persons illegally crossing the garia and then Serbia.
and the Greek islands in the Eastern Ae­ border in the Aegean Sea were Syrians The composition of the flow was
gean Sea. However, few applied for asy­ and Afghans. Many travelled in family roughly similar to the flow of migrants
lum in Greece and instead left Greece units, which meant that many mi­grants crossing the Aegean Sea, with the top
across the border with the former Yu­ belonged to vulnerable groups requiring three nationalities being Syrian, Afghan
goslav Republic of Macedonia and con­ special attention. and Iraqi.
tinued through the Western Balkans.

Sea border

Most detections were reported from the

islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Leros
and Kos, though the number of islands
targeted by the smuggling groups is
growing. As resources at the border are
increasingly stretched in order to attend
to unprecedented numbers of arrivals,
it is also more likely that an unknown
number of mi­grants cross undetected.
With the rapid increase in the num­
ber of migrants seeking facilitation,
smugglers are becoming more and more
aggressive and ruthless to increase their
© Frontex

profit, forcing migrants to board already

overcrowded boats. Such behaviour led
to lives being lost in the Ae­gean Sea, in­ Figure 2.  Landing beaches on the shore of Greek islands near Turkey littered
with discarded life jackets

18 of 72

Frontex  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

 Main nationalities
of illegal border-crossers, 2015

Kosovo*
Western
Balkan
equipment), the authorities in the West­
Central ern Balkans, like their EU neighbours,
Mediterranean
could not contain the large number of
Eastern
Mediterranean
migrants arriving. In reaction to pub­
Syria Afghanistan lic secu­rity concerns, the authorities of
Iran
Iraq the former Yugoslav Republic of Mace­
Pakistan
donia and Serbia focused their efforts
on transporting migrants by trains and
Bangladesh buses towards the next border in order
to facilitate their exit. Only a fraction of
Mali
the migrants were screened and finger­
Eritrea printed as would normally be the case.
The Sudan
Kosovo*, being the only Western Bal­
Gambia
kan country that has not signed a visa
Nigeria liberalisation agreement, remains the
Somalia
Western Balkan route main regional source of migrants cross­
Unspecified Share of ing the border illegally. Their detections
sub-Saharan % annual EU total
nationals   2014 2015 increase in 2015 at the Hungarian-Serbian borders started
Total 43 357 764 038 1 662 42% to grow in August 2014, reached a peak in
Not specified 153 556 258 363 467 73% February 2015 and dropped afterwards,
Syria 7 320 90 065 1 130 12% following the introduction of concerted
Afghanistan 8 342 53 237 538 7% international countermeasures. Their
Other 27 542 64 478 134 8% numbers have remained very low since
then.
An increasing number of Albanians
5.4. Surveillance: Western Balkans travelled legally to EU Member States,
mostly Germany, where they applied for
asylum. The increase started in January
In 2015, 766 038 detections of illegal bor­ with Serbia, which was completed in 2015 and peaked in August 2015. Accord­
der-crossing were reported from the bor­ mid-September 2015. This resulted in a ing to EASO, the rejection rate for asylum
ders with Western Balkan countries. sharp decrease of detections, and con­ applications of Albanians between Janu­
Between January and February, most fined the flow of migrants at BCPs. Mi­ ary and July 2015 was 96% at EU level. Or­
of the detections concerned persons grants applying for asylum at Hungarian ganising the return of those not granted
from Kosovo*, i.e. a regional flow. As BCPs would be returned to Serbia, con­ asylum increases the burden on the au­
of March, detections were associated sidered as a safe country. The main flow thorities in charge of return activities.
with non-regional flow of migrants who of migrants thus quickly moved to the
had initially crossed illegally from Tur­ Croatian-Serbian land border, at a daily
key to Greece and on their way to West­ average of over 6 400 between mid-Sep­
ern Europe, mostly Germany. tember and the end of October. Once
Detections of non-regional migrants in Croatia, migrants were transported
dramatically increased in July as a result by trains towards the border with Hun­
of the increase in arrivals in Greece af­ gary. Hence, Hungary extended its con­
ter April 2015. This increase also coin­ struction to its land border with Croatia,
cided with the amendments made to thus moving the flow towards Slovenia
the Asylum Law of the former Yugoslav as of mid-October.
Republic of Macedonia that allowed for The main reported nationalities were
a 72-hour period of legal transit and ac­ Syrians and Afghans. However, the large
cess to public transportation, with the number of migrants made it impossi­
measures announced by the Hungarian ble for the authorities to identify all of
government aimed at curbing the irreg­ them, leading to a massive increase in
ular migratory flow entering from Ser­ the proportion of migrants whose coun­
bia, and with a declaration in Germany try of origin is reported as unknown.
that there was ‘no upper limit to the Although various prevention meas­
right for asylum’. ures were attempted (i.e. the former
As a consequence of the continued Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia tried
pressure, Hungary constructed a tempo­ to close the border with Greece, Ser­
rary technical obstacle along its border bia deployed additional personnel and

19 of 72

FRONTEX  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

 Main nationalities
of illegal border-crossers, 2015

Western
Balkan

Central
Mediterranean

Eastern
Mediterranean
Syria Afghanistan
Iran The decisions to apply for asylum
Iraq
Pakistan upon arrival is largely dependent on
nationality.
The majority of migrants from Nige­
Bangladesh ria, the Gambia, Senegal, Bangladesh,
Mali Mali, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire make an
asylum application upon arrival. How­
Eritrea
The Sudan ever, data on asylum decisions at first
Gambia instance between January and July 2015
at EU level (EASO) showed that the large
Nigeria
Somalia majority of these applications are re­
Unspecified Central Mediterranean route jected. However, very few will eventu­
sub-Saharan Share of ally be returned. As regards these seven
nationals % annual EU total
  2014 2015 increase in 2015 nationalities, together accounting for
Total 170 664 153 964 –9.8 8.4% over 54 000 detections of illegal border-
Eritrea 33 559 38 791 16 25% crossing at EU level, only fewer than
Nigeria 8 233 21 914 166 14% 8 000 were returned in 2015. The infor­
Somalia 5 785 12 430 115 8% mation of the low likelihood of being re­
Other 123 087 80 811 -34 53% turned and the ease of travelling within
the EU after arrival, is circulating among
migrants and encourages those at home
5.5. Surveillance: Central Mediterranean to attempt a perilous journey to the EU.
The remaining half (mostly from Er­
itrea, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Ethio­
In 2015, there were 153  946 detections a distress call. Smug­glers typically make pia) who do not often apply for asylum
of illegal border-crossing on the Cen­ use of frail, overcrowded boats, with a upon arrival will either stay illegally
tral Mediterranean route, represent­ limited fuel supply to maximise their in Italy, or continue towards other EU
ing a 10% decrease compared to 2014. profits, putting migrants’ lives at con­ Member States, where they will apply
The decrease is due to a fall in Syrians siderable risk. Search and rescue opera­ for asylum.
(about 40 000 in 2014, but fewer than tions were crucial in saving the lives of
7 500 in 2015) after a shift towards the an unprecedented number of migrants.
Eastern Mediterranean route. However, Nevertheless, they also contributed to
the number of East and West Afri- the enrichment of smugglers who could
cans steadily increased from below cut on travel costs and advertised to sus­
80 000 in 2014 to more than 108 000 ceptible migrants that rescue operations
in 2015 (+42%). This increase indicates make the journey safer, thus increas­
that this route also faces very strong ing the demand for crossings. IOM es­
pressures and migrants continue to ar­ timates that around 3 770 people died or
rive in Libya, where smugglers have es­ went missing at sea in 2015.
tablished a strong foothold. On several occasions, smugglers
Most migrants were Africans (89% of threatened border guards and rescue
the detections on this route), but due to teams to be able to recover the rubber or Migrant’s testimony
the large volume of arrivals preventing wooden boats. The share of rubber boats
their adequate identification, the nation­ has increased in 2015, an indication of Some of my friends went to Europe and
ality of a share of migrants remained un­ the limited availability of large wooden when they came back, they had money
known (6%). The nationality most often boats. This shortage may be a limit­ and bought cars for their family. One day
reported was Eritrean, but the regional ing factor in the number of crossings, I thought, ‘I am the same as these people,
composition of the flow indicated that whereas the demand remains high. I should do the same.’
the majority of the detected migrants Upon arrival, less than half of the mi­ Anonymous, Côte d’Ivoire, 25
came from West Africa. grants who were rescued subsequently
Source: Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting
The vast majority of migrants de­ claimed asylum. the Dots, IOM, June 2015
parted from Libya and were rescued by
border-control authorities after issuing

20 of 72

Frontex  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

5.6. Surveillance: Other routes
Increasing number of Syrian
asylum seekers in Ceuta
Western Mediterranean the Memorandum of Understanding be­ and Melilla
tween Spain, Senegal and Mauritania,
The cooperation between Spain and Mo­ that includes joint surveillance activ­ In March 2015, the International
rocco is key in maintaining low level of ities and effective return of those de­ Protection and Asylum Offices were
detections on the land route between the tected crossing the border illegally. The inaugurated at BCPs in Ceuta and
two countries, and the Moroccan author­ low number of departures resulted in Melilla (Spain). The decision came
ities regularly prevent attempts to climb relatively few casualties. Still, at least as response to the increase, since
over the fences to Melilla and Ceuta. Mo­ 12 people died in March 2015 in two sep­ November 2014, of Syrian families
roccan authorities have also dug a moat arate incidents involving boats that de­ applying for asylum. Most appli­
and built a high fence on its own terri­ parted from Morocco. cations were made in-land in Me­
tory in the most vulnerable areas of the lilla, suggesting that many entered
perimeter near the border with the Span­ Eastern land border fraudulently.
ish cities. These measures, combined
with the implementation of the read­ On the eastern land border, a new
mission agreement, reinforcement of route, called the Arctic route, emerged However, there has been a clear dis­
Moroccan Border Guard Units protect­ at the land border of Norway and Fin­ placement to the Finnish border.
ing the fence and dismantlement of mi­ land with the Russian Federation. The After crossing the border by bicycle
grants’ makeshift camps, have reduced main targeted BCP is the Norwegian BCP has been banned, migrants now acquire
the number of attempts to cross illegally. of Storskog, which registered an unu­ cars and drive to the border by them­
As a result, sub-Saharan migrants sually high number of applications for selves. Some of them have lived in the
are trying to take the sea route towards asylum, with more than 5 200 applica­ Russian Federation for a long period of
Spain. During debriefing many claimed tions in 2015. People seeking asylum in time. However, the share of those in
that they made several attempts to jump Norway have taken to using bicycles to transit through the Russian Federation
the fence in Melilla before taking the sea cross the border from the Russian Federa­ has been recently growing, indicating
route. Migrants are also more and more tion because pedestrian traffic is banned that the knowledge about the route in
encouraged to depart from Libya, as the and drivers of vehicles are fined if they the origin countries is spreading.
likelihood of return in the case of detec­ carry passengers across without proper
tion is much lower. documents.
Until mid-October 2015 the majority
Western African routes of asylum applicants were from Syria,
but then the number of nationalities
On the Western African route that con­ widened, and in November Afghans
nects Senegal, Mauritania and Morocco took over as the main nationality. In
with the Canary Islands in Spain the Norway, the situation eased of as De­
numbers remain negligible despite an cember, after the Russian authorities
increasing trend for departures from Mo­ stopped clearing transit travellers with­
rocco. This low number is attributed to out a Schengen visa.

21 of 72

FRONTEX  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

5.7. Border checks: Regular flow

While activities linked to surveillance, Figure 3.  Population in third countries under Annex II of the Visa Code,
i.e. activities between border crossing- listing countries not requiring a visa, in millions
points, received most media attention,
border checks are undoubtedly the core 1 250
Visa free Visa free with exemption of application
activities of border-control authorities, Peru and Colombia still with
1 200 exemption of application,
with millions of checks on entry and but expected to be visa free in 2016
exit carried out on a daily basis, at BCPs.
At the macro level, two factors con­ 1 150

tributed in the recent past to shape the Visa free for most
IN MILLIONS

Western Balkan countries

flow of passengers: the first is the visa 1 100

liberalisation policy and local border traf­

fic agreements that resulted in higher 1 050

passenger flows, mostly at the land bor­

ders with Western Balkan countries. The 1 000

second is the growing overall number of

passengers due to globalisation, in par­ 950
ticular at the air borders.
Based on Eurostat data1, the up­ 900
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
ward trend already observed in air pas­
Source: UN Population Division
senger transport for previous years has
been confirmed: the figures available for from Ukraine and the Russian Feder­ visa issued: 1.7 million) standing out at
2014 indicate a year-on-year rise of 4.4%. ation are also significant at the Polish about 20%.
Particularly remarkable is the growth and Finnish borders. In December 2015, the worldwide roll-
observed for Greece (+16%) and Luxem­ In 2014, 15.6 million short-term uni­ out of the Schengen Visa Information
bourg (+12%) as well as Portugal and Po­ form Schengen visas were issued, con­ System (VIS) was completed. The VIS da­
land (+10%). Athens registered the highest stituting a decrease of 3.1% compared tabase now contains all data related to
rise among the largest airports (+20%), fol­ to 2013 (16.1 million). The decrease was visa applications by third-country na­
lowed by Brussels (+14%) and Lisbon (+13%). mostly due to fewer visas being applied tionals who require a visa to enter the
In 2014, international intra-EU flights for and issued from the Russian Federa­ Schengen area, including biometric data
represented more than 44% of all passen­ tion, a trend attributed to the economic (fingerprints and a digital facial image).
gers carried at EU-28 level, followed by downturn. The overall visa rejection rate Each time a visa holder enters the Schen­
extra-EU flights (more than 38%) and na­ remained stable, at about 6.2%, with rate gen area, their fingerprints should be
tional flights (almost 18%). In 2014, pas­ for Africa (for a relatively low number of checked against the database.
sengers on arrival from extra-EU flights
totalled almost 169 million, compared to
164 million in 2013.2 Peru and Colombia granted visa-free regime
At the land border, some Member
States started to regularly report monthly Peru and Colombia signed short-stay visa-waiver agreements with the EU
data on regular passenger flow to Fron­ in 2015. As a result Peruvian and Colombian citizens will no longer be re­
tex. However, the information still con­ quired to request a visa for travel to the EU. Certain conditions will still
tains gaps and it is not currently possible apply, however; namely holding a return ticket, financial means for the
to report an EU total. Based on partial in­ visit and a biometric passport. Due to delays in the availability of biome­
formation from Member States, the larg­ tric passports in Peru, the agreement may not take practical effect until
est and increasing inwards passenger sometime in 2016. The risks arising from a visa waiver for Colombian and
traffic, was at the Croatian land border Peruvian citizens will likely remain modest and concern mostly drug traf­
with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Entries ficking and trafficking in human beings. As in other visa liberalisation
cases, passenger flow and refusals of entry are likely to increase.
1 [Link] Visa liberalisation dialogues are ongoing between the EU, Kosovo*, Geor­
statistics-explained/[Link]/ gia and Ukraine with the aim of taking gradual steps towards the long-
Air_transport_statistics
term goal of visa-free travel, provided that conditions for well-managed
2 Eurostat, Air passenger transport by
reporting country, avia_paoc, last update and secure mobility are in place.
of data 19.10.2015

22 of 72

Frontex  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

 Number per border type, 2015
(only values higher than 500 are stipulated)
Refusals of entry
Total: 66 503 (63 701) Total: 46 713 (46 292) Total: 5 279 (4 894)
Number in parenthesis is for 2014 Number in parenthesis is for 2014 Number in parenthesis is for 2014

Land Air Sea

United
Kingdom

Poland Lithuania

Germany
Hungary
France
Croatia
Italy Italy
Spain
Greece

Trend of the total

Land Air Sea
2014 63 701 46 292 4 894
2015 66 503 46 713 5 279

5.8. Border checks: Refusals

In 2015, among regular travellers, Mem­ travellers. Indeed, border-control author­ ing visa liberalisation in the Western Bal­
ber States reported a total of 118 495 refus­ ities face different challenges during bor­ kans, and the subsequent increased role
als of entry at the external borders of the der checks at air and land borders. of border-control authorities in check­
EU, a stable trend compared to the pre­ As in 2014, Ukrainians were the top ing entry requirements, which was pre­
vious year. Refusals of entry represented ranking nationality for refusals of entry viously the responsibility of consular
only a fraction of passenger flow, indi­ at EU level. Among Member States, Po­ authorities.
cating that the overwhelming number land reported the largest number of re­ At the air borders, as in 2014, Albani­
of passengers crossing the borders are fusals of entry in absolute terms, mostly ans continued to rank as the top nation­
bona fide travellers. to nationals of Ukraine at the land bor­ ality. Albanians ranked first for refusals
Most refusals of entry were reported ders. However, it is at the land border of entry at the air border in eight Mem­
at the land border (66 503, or 56% of the between Hungary and Serbia that the ber States and Schengen Associated
total). This is linked to the nature of the number of refusals of entry is the largest Countries. This predominance of Alba­
flow at the land border, which is mostly per passenger. This particular pressure is nians in the data on refusals of entry
composed of commuters and low budget due to the higher passenger flow follow­ coincides with the visa liberalisation
regime that entered into force in 2011
for Albanians.
As in previous years, the main reasons
for refusals of entry were the lack of valid
visa (25%) and the lack of appropriate
documentation justifying the purpose
of stay (28%). The number of persons re­
fused entry due to an alert in the SIS sys­
tem represented only about 8.2% of the
total, with 9 762 refusals issued in 2015.
© European Commission

Figure 4.  ABC devices used for checking passengers at Madrid Barajas airport

23 of 72

FRONTEX  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

Type Nationality of users

Type of fraudulent document Claimed nationality of persons detected

detected, by main countries with fraudulent documents, 2015 Number 400 100
of issuance, 2015
(only highest values are stipulated)
Number Note: values under 10
are not represented
300

50 Trend between 2014 and 2015:

rm ce

s
or t
its

ds
p es i d e n

higher than 25%

mp
car
ssp

as
Sta
Vis
Re

Pa

ID

between 25% and −25%

Ukraine
1 013
Poland Not specified lower than −25%
Spain
France
Italy
Morocco
Belgium
Germany
Greece
Syria
Morocco
Sweden
Nigeria
Israel
Turkey
Netherlands
Syria
Bulgaria
United Kingdom
Mali
Senegal
Romania
Lithuania

5.9. Border checks: Fraudulent documents

In 2015, Member States reported a total ments to Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen airport At land and sea borders, most
of 8 373 document fraudsters at BCPs on was, however, observed in the autumn detections of document fraud
entry from third countries to the EU. This of 2015 pointing to the increasing im­ from Morocco and Ukraine
represented a decrease (-11%) compared to portance of this smaller, budget airport.
the previous year. The most commonly From Nigeria to the EU, detections In 2015 most of the detections of fraud­
detected nationalities were Ukrainians steeply increased at the beginning of ulent documents at land and sea bor­
(1 186), Moroc­cans (867) and Syrians (745). 2015, mostly at Rome Fiumicino, but ders were reported between Morocco and
the trend reversed when Alitalia with­ Spain, mostly involving Moroccans de­
On air routes, most detections drew its Accra/Lagos/Rome service at the tected upon arrival from Tangier, Mo­
continue to be reported from end of March 2015. Hence most docu­ rocco, and in the Spanish exclaves of
Turkish airports ment fraud de­tections involving depar­ Ceuta and Melilla, often using fraudu­
ture places in Af­rica were recorded on the lent Spanish documents.
As in previous years, most detec­tions routes leading from Dakar (Senegal) and The most often reported land border
were reported on air routes. At 529 de­ Bamako (Mali) to­wards the EU. section for detection of document fraud
tections, the number of fraudulent Syrian nationals remained the most remained the Polish-Ukrainian border,
document users arriving from Istanbul prev­alent nationality detected with which is attributable to the Ukrainian
Atatürk decreased by 29% compared to the fraudulent docu­ments at the air borders, nationals abusing Polish fraud­ulently
previous year, yet it remained the top last mainly arriving from Turkish airports, obtained visas.
departure airport for detections of fraud­ although the num­ber of related detec­
ulent documents. The displacement of tions on flights from third countries was
the passengers using fraudulent docu­ only half as high as during 2014.

24 of 72

Frontex  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

 Security risks associated with continued recognition of Syrian passports

The massive migration inflow of 2015 raised many questions related to the identity of arriving people. Concerns re-
lated to the abuse of Syrian documents have been confirmed by the observations made during the regis­tration pro­
cess. The level of security of the Syrian supporting documents (in particu­lar ID cards, family books, military books,
etc.) is very low. Forgeries detected dur­ing the registration process are of different quality, although most of these doc­
uments could be detected during proper docu­ment checks.
The situation is much more complex in the case of the abuse of Syrian passports. Although the protection level
of these doc­uments is relatively low compared to EU passports, the big­gest problem lies in the security (and the over­
all reliability) of the issuing process. Criminal organisations have access to a large number of stolen blank Syrian pass­
ports and printers used for their per­sonalisation. This allows them to produce genuine-looking passports, which may
be difficult to identify even by experienced document experts.
The very unreliable and non-secure issu­ing process of Syrian passports together with the very low security pro-
tection of the Syrian breeder (supporting) docu­ments would normally lead to non-recog­nition of Syrian passports
for the purpose of travel. Recently issued ordinary Syr­ian passports are, however, recognised for travel and for affix­
ing a visa by all EU Member States. By contrast, similarly unreliable passports of Somalia are not recognised by most
EU Member States.

Intra-Schengen The current migration crisis is obvi­ The outcome of an exercise carried
ously also having an impact on the detec­ out by Frontex1, showed that the per­
By contrast, the number of document tions of fraudulent document users on formance of the technical equipment
fraud incidents on intra-EU Schengen the air routes between Greece and Ger­ shows a degree of variability, indecision
movements showed a marked in­crease. many, a 20% increase compared to 2014. and inconsistency, resulting in a num­
For the second year in a row, there were Most of these detections were attribut­ ber of false documents being incorrectly
more fraudulent documents detected on able to the Syrian nationals who decided accepted as genuine. On the other hand,
intra-EU/Schengen movements than dur­ to take the fast air route to reach their the performance of border-control offic­
ing bor­der checks on passengers arriving final destina­tion. ers is also variable and subjective. Al­
from third countries. This is partly due though some experts have very high
to the large num­ber of migrants under­ Vulnerabilities in detecting accuracy levels, short time available for
taking secondary move­ments within the fraudulent documents first-line check negatively affects the de­
EU, often with fraudulent documents ob­ tections of false documents.
tained in the country of en­try to the EU. There is no EU-wide system of docu­ A number of measures could mitigate
The number of persons aiming to get ment inspection performance in place these vulnerabilities, including for ex­
to the UK with fraud­ulent document sig­ and thus analyses focus on the threat ample routine testing of deployed op­
nificantly increased (+70%) com­pared to of document fraud as detected at the erational systems against performance
2014. This trend is mostly attributable to border, rather than on the vulnerabili­ requirements, establishing quality as­
the increasing number of Albanian na­ ties related to the means deployed (staff surance process, development of intra-
tionals often misusing Italian and Greek and equipment). However, the continu­ EU mobility programs for the exchange
ID cards followed by Ukrainian nation­ ous development and sophistication of of first-line border-control officers and
als abusing authentic Polish ID cards. the physical, optical and electronic se­ testing their skills and performance on
Other national­ities aiming to reach the curity features of travel documents cur­ a regular basis.
UK with fraudu­lent documents were Syr­ rently in circulation brings significant
ian, Iranian and Chinese nationals. challenges for border-control officers. 1 The document challenge II, Frontex, October
2014

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FRONTEX  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

 Detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs
(people hiding in vehicles)
Number, 2015

Total: 3 642 (3 052)

Number in parenthesis is for 2014

Hungary-
Serbia

Bulgaria-
Turkey

Spain-
Morocco

5.10. Border checks: Clandestine entry

In 2015, the number of detections of tan Andreevo and Lesovo. This pressure is ational risk analysis techniques, similar
clandestine entries at BCPs during bor­ a consequence of intensified surveillance to those used by customs or for check­
der checks (people hiding in vehicles to along the Bulgarian and Greek land bor­ ing lorries at the border between Schen­
avoid border control) remained much ders with Turkey. Although no data are gen Member States and the UK, could be
lower than the number of detections collected, it is also likely that the use of adapted to the specificities of the exter­
between BCPs during surveillance activ­ this modus operandi also increased at the nal borders. This is an area of work for
ities (detections of illegal border-cross­ Greek land border, as demonstrated by border-control authorities that would
ing). However, this indicator is not detections of migrants on the motorway greatly benefit from gathering and pool­
uniformly reported by Member States, soon after the border. ing intelligence at EU level. This would
and for example Greece reports clandes­ While checking all vehicles would in­ result in preventing clandestine entries
tine entries as part of detections of ille­ troduce undue waiting time for many and reduce the number of casualties.
gal border-crossing between BCPs, while bona fide travellers, targeted checks on
other Member States do not report any some vehicles meeting specific risk crite­
detections although police information ria would make it possible to determine
reveals such cases. with more precision the extent of the
The total number of detections phenomenon and better prevent it. Oper­
(3  642) thus underestimates the ac-
tual situation.
This is further confirmed by the large
number of detections of clandestine en­
try reported at the internal border (for
example between France and the UK),
as well as by police reports of in land de­
tections. The tragic discovery of 71 dead
bodies in a lorry that travelled from Hun­
gary to Austria in August 2015 illustrates
that this dangerous modus operandi is of-
ten used by smugglers, regardless of
its deadly consequences.
Most of detections were reported at
© European Commission

the land border between Bulgaria and

Turkey, through which a large share of Figure 5.  Hungarian police officer sets a sensor of a heart beat detector
the migratory flow transiting Turkey is and a flexible camera to search irregular migrants during control of a
channelled. The Bulgarian BCPs most af­ lorry at the border between Hungary and Serbia near Röszke
fected by clandestine entries were Kapi­

26 of 72

Frontex  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

People hiding in vehicles is a growing concern of the road transport industry

People hiding in vehicles is a growing opportunity for migrants to get in. The uration changes. Some Member States
concern for the road transport industry, border between France and the UK, near have developed a code of conduct, which
including threats to drivers, breaking Dover and Calais, is a vivid example of sets out how drivers should secure their
into trucks and damaging loads, with this phenomenon. vehicles, but improvements and a uni­
inevitable economic consequences. The Some private sector solutions are be­ form EU approach on this issue are still
problem is particularly acute at specific ing introduced, for example drivers buy needed.
locations near border areas, when slowly CO2 detectors which can send an SMS or
moving or stationary trucks provide an e-mail alert in case of the level of the sat­

5.11. Illegal stayers on exit

Border-control authorities also carry out

67 316 (56 128)

checks on exit. This offers an opportu­
Total:
nity to record the exit of potentially over­
Number in parenthesis is for 2014
staying third-country nationals, holders
of a Schengen visa or simply a biometric Number of detections, 2015
passport in the case of travellers benefit­ (only values higher than 2 000 are stipulated)
ing from visa liberalisation who may stay
2 000 250
up to three months within a six-month
Type of border section:
period. In 2015, border-control authori­
LAND
ties reported a total of 67 316 detections
of illegal stayers on exit. SEA

Most illegal stayers on exit were re­ AIR

ported by Germany at the air border, No data

Netherlands
mostly nationals from Kosovo* and Tur­
key returning home. At the EU level, Germany Poland
the largest number of detections was re­
lated to Ukrainians, mostly reported by
Poland. The comparatively low number
of illegal border-crossings of Ukrainians France
Switzerland Hungary
indicates that most of them had entered
the EU legally and then overstayed, or
had entered the EU abusing legal chan­
nels, such as fraudulently obtained work
or business visas.
In most cases, following a detec­
tion on exit, the person continues
to travel and is recorded in the SIS.
Greece

27 of 72

FRONTEX  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

CBC incidents reported through JORA
by border section in 2015

Smuggling of

Cannabis

Excise goods

Heroin

Stolen vehicles

Weapons

Number of incidents in 2015

> 300 incidents

> 100

> 50

5.12. Cross-border crime

Frontex promotes European border man­ arrested on a tip received from the Turk­ erlands, some countermeasures have
agement with a special focus on irregular ish police. proven successful, such as the establish­
migration flows. Applying the concept Regarding herbal cannabis, Turkey ment of joint customs and border guard
of Integrated Border Management, it has been seizing larger quantities of teams to identify couriers through pre-
additionally supports Member States in herbal cannabis than all EU countries flight checks and risk profiles. However,
combating organised crime at the exter­ combined. At the same time, Greece stricter controls on a set of high-risk air
nal borders, including the smuggling of has reported large increases, pointing routes tended to lead to the use of alter­
goods and trafficking in human beings. to an emerging route in the Eastern native routes.
Mediterranean.
Smuggling of illicit drugs Heroin from Afghanistan, Iran and
Cocaine from South America Pakistan
Cannabis from the Western Balkans
and North Africa According to EMCDDA’s calculations co­ According to the EMCDDA, more than
caine is the third most intensively smug­ five tonnes of heroin were seized in the
According to the EMCDDA European gled drug in Europe. However, seizures, EU in 2014 (the latest year for which data
Drug Report 20141, 80% of drug seizures increasing from the mid-nineties till are available), following a continuous
in Europe were of cannabis, Morocco 2007, have been declining since 2009. decrease in heroin use in Europe over
being the main provider although its Most of the cocaine is seized by Spain, the past decade. Most of the heroin con­
production is in decline. Spain reported but trafficking routes to Europe are diver­ sumed in the EU is produced in Afghan­
around two thirds of the total quantity sifying and seizures were recently made istan and transported along a variety of
of cannabis resin seized in Europe, but in ports of the Eastern Mediterranean, routes, including through Turkey and
routes are diversifying, and other EU Baltic and Black Sea. Cocaine is more­ Balkan countries, the Northern route,
countries are increasingly used as en­ over smuggled on pleasure boats and which heads through Central Asia and
try points. In June 2015, two vessels of through container shipments, where it the Russian Federation, and increasingly
the Italian Guardia di Finanza and Fron­ is often hidden under legitimate goods the Southern route via the Persian Gulf
tex assets intercepted a Turkish flagged and by air freight. by sea, sometimes including passages
cargo ship sailing from Morocco and At the air borders, organised crim­ through Africa.
seized 12 tonnes of cannabis resin worth inal networks often apply a ‘shotgun The latest annual statistics on seizures
more than EUR 40 million. Ten crew approach’, consisting in ‘flooding’ aero­ showed that more heroin was seized in
members, all Turkish nationals, were planes with dozens of couriers per flight Turkey than in all EU Member States
in the expectation that a sufficient num­ combined, and the gap in large seizures
1 EMCDDA (2014), European Drug Report: ber of them would slip through controls. within most countries of South-East­
Trends and Developments, p. 17. As shown by examples from the Neth­ ern Europe points to a substantial num­

28 of 72

Frontex  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

 ber of undetected shipments. On this
route, heroin is often smuggled into the Tackling cross-border crime requires uniform standard of
EU by individual travellers in small and collaboration between border guards and customs officers
medium amounts. Regular cooperation
between border guards and customs au­ Law-enforcement experience shows that in contrast to most locally commit­
thorities is of particular importance for ted crimes, cross-border crimes are highly complex, as their planning and
the detection of drugs smuggled by crim­ execution reaches into several countries. Thus local solutions are limited
inals posing as individual travellers. in their effectiveness, and law-enforcement and political cooperation with
third countries is indispensable for a substantial reduction of these offenses.
Smuggling of weapons In addition to the requirement to cooperate internationally, cooperation is
also needed between the different competent law-enforcement authorities.
The terrorist attacks in France in 2015 However, due to the legal and institutional national characteristics, border
have shown that the effective control guard authorities along the external borders of the EU have different types
of firearms is indispensable to fight ter­ and degrees of responsibilities in the fight against transnational crime. Re­
rorism. Few days before the November garding the prevention of smuggling of illicit goods, in certain Member States
attack, during a routine check German border-control authorities play only an assisting role, while in other Mem­
police officers discovered pistols, hand ber States they share their tasks with customs or are able to conduct inves­
grenades, Kalashnikov rifles with am­ tigations. Only with a more coherent approach to implementing Integrated
munition and an explosive agent. The Border Management including closer cooperation between the different au­
weapons were transported from Monte­ thorities operating at the external borders, can cross-border criminality be
negro to France in a car of a man proba­ more effectively prevented.
bly linked to suspects behind the Paris
attacks.
Police investigations have generally ties will be crucial in the effective fight nal borders. Detections at the borders
shown a wide availability of military- against trafficking of firearms. reported to Frontex showed an decrease
grade arms including AK-47s, rocket-pro­ from over 430 in 2014 to almost 350 in
pelled grenade launchers on European Exit of stolen motor vehicles 2015, including cars, lorries, trailers,
illicit markets, especially in the dark boats, excavators, agricultural machines
net, which is a network that is not ac­ According to Eurostat, the total number and motorbikes.
cessible through conventional search of vehicles including cars, motorcycles,
engines. Many of these weapons are il­ buses, lorries, construction and agri­ Smuggling of excise goods
legally traded from former conflict re­ cultural vehicles stolen in the EU was
gions such as the Western Balkans, steadily falling between 1998 and 2013. Most excise goods smuggled across
where around 800 000 weapons are es­ Among the reasons for the decline were the EU’s external borders are tobacco
timated to be in illegal civilian posses­ the advanced technical protection tech­ products. According to estimates of the
sion in Bosnia and Hercegovina alone. A nologies developed by the producers and European Commission, the illicit trade
closer cooperation and information ex­ intensified international law-enforce­ in tobacco products costs the EU and its
change between European law-enforce­ ment cooperation. Member States EUR 10 billion a year in
ment authorities both inland and at the Only a small share of the vehicles sto­ lost tax revenues. Not only individual
external borders and customs authori­ len in the EU are detected at its exter­ consumers and small scale smugglers
from economically weak border regions
try to take advantage of existing price
differences. Large-scale criminal busi­
nesses illicitly import cigarettes from
as far away as Asia, especially to West­
ern European markets.
In 2015, the largest share of illicit cig­
arettes reported to Frontex was smuggled
across the EU borders from Turkey: More
than 228.7 million pieces of cigarettes
were seized by the authorities in over
300 cases. In turn, more than 11.8 mil­
lion cigarettes were seized at the eastern
borders, about 0.8 million on the West­
ern Balkan route and half a million at
© Frontex

the Spanish border.

Figure 6.  The Western Balkans region remains the focus of EU efforts on
tackling illicit firearms trafficking through the external borders

29 of 72

FRONTEX  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

Illegal stayers
Number of detected cases
of illegal staying, 2015
(only highest values are stipulated)

25 000 2 000
Germany

Facilitators
Number of facilitators, 2015
Spain Austria
France
France
Italy
Greece

Spain

815
713
263
218
5.13. In the EU: Illegal stayers, Asylum, Facilitators

Illegal stayers Facilitators There is also a heightened risk of hu­

man trafficking (in the form of forced la­
In 2015, Member States reported 701 625 The facilitation of illegal immigra­ bour, prostitution, crime) in connection
detections of illegal stay, which repre­ tion remains a significant threat to the with payments demanded from the mi­
sented a generally increasing trend com­ EU. Detections of facilitators rose from grants by their facilitators.
pared to the previous year. However, it 10 234 in 2014 to 12 023 in 2015. The rise
should be borne in mind that the Neth­ was mostly due to in­creases reported in Asylum
erlands, since 2012, due to technical rea­ Spain, France and Italy.
sons, only reported detections on exit and Facilitation services related to the il­ According to EASO, over 1.35 million ap­
not those inland. legal im­migration to the EU and second­ plications for asylum were registered in
In terms of nationalities, the large ary move­ments between Member States 2015 – double the number in 2014. This
numbers of Syrians, Afghans, Iraqi and are in high demand and generate sig­ number marked the highest level re­
Eritrean are artificially inflated by de­ nificant profits for facilitators involved. ceived in the EU since EU-level data col­
tections of people not meeting require­ The facilitation of illegal immigration is lection began in 2008 and exceeds the
ments for legal stay before they apply a growing market prompting existing numbers of refugees received by the then
for asylum. criminal groups to adapt their business EU-15 in the 1990s during the Balkan
Looking at detections over the past models and shift to the facilitation of il­ wars. According to EASO, 95% of this to­
few years, Moroccans stand out as one of legal immigration. tal was comprised of persons applying for
the main nationalities detected staying An increase in the number of irreg­ the first time in the EU. The main nation­
illegally (above 20 000 annual detections ular mi­grants reaching the EU as part alities of applicants were Syrians (over
between 2009 and 2015), although their of mixed mi­gration flows will sustain 334 000), Afghans (over 168 000) and Ira­
detections at the external borders remain and increase the demand not only for qis (over 114 000), together accounting for
much lower. This indicates that Moroc­ facilitation services re­lated to entry into 50% of all applications. Applicants from
cans tend to cross the external borders le­ the EU, but also those associated with Western Balkan countries comprised 16%
gally, but then exceed their legal period attempts to legalise the stay of irregu­ of the total (over 192 000), despite an ex­
of stay within the EU. The same applies lar migrants (such as the use of forged tremely low recognition rate, thus ham­
to Algerians, although their number is identity or supporting documents, mar­ pering Member States’ ability to provide
lower (about 10  000 annual detections riages of convenience to obtain residence protection to those clearly in need.
since 2009). permits and the abuse of asylum pro­ EASO data include figures on implicit
visions in order to tem­porarily obtain withdrawals of asylum applications,
leave to remain). where a person applies for asylum in one

30 of 72

Frontex  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

 Difficulties in implementing
the Dublin asylum system

Member State and then absconds. Many to assist Greece and Italy by moving In its 2011 decision in M.S.S. v.
of those implicitly withdrawing subse­ persons in clear need of international Belgium and Greece, the European
quently apply for international protection protection to other Member States to Court of Human Rights found that
in another Member State and may even­ process their asylum claims. The reloca­ the living conditions for asylum
tually be returned in accordance with tion mechanism was aimed at nation­ seekers in Greece amounted to in­
the stipulations of the Dublin III Reg­ als of countries who have an average human and degrading treatment,
ulation. In 2015, implicit withdrawals EU-wide asylum recognition rate equal and that shortcomings in the asy­
were particularly high in Hungary (56% to or higher than 75%, which thresh­ lum procedure placed refugees at
of all withdrawals) and Bulgaria. Im­ old in 2014 was passed for Syrians, Er­ risk of being returned to a coun­
plicit withdrawals might indicate po­ itreans and Iraqis. Frontex and EASO try where they could be persecuted
tential misuse of the asylum procedure worked together in hotspots to identify (known as ‘refoulement’ and ille­
whereby an individual makes an appli­ the nationalities and ensure that they gal under international law). The
cation for international protection at the were informed of the possibility to be decision was the first time Dub­
border in order to circumvent the normal relocated and assisted with the regis­ lin transfers from across the Eu­
requirements. tration of the asylum application. How­ ropean Union had effectively been
A number of Member States faced diffi­ ever, due to the practical challenges of suspended to a particular Member
culty, in the context of the migration cri­ implementing this entirely new system State. Returns to Greece have not
sis, in transposing and implementing the by the end of 2015, only 272 applicants resumed nearly five years after the
new requirements on Member States un­ had been relocated from Italy and Greece decision.
der the asylum acquis that came into force to other Member States. In 2014, in its decision on the
on 20 July 2015. The situation in main In October 2015, Frontex and EASO Tarakhek case, the Court held
countries of arrival (Italy and Greece) in­ both instituted emergency data collec­ that there would be a violation
deed demonstrated that large numbers of tions in order to keep track of the massive of Article 3 (prohibition of inhu­
potential applicants for asylum arriving flows of migrants via the Eastern Med­ man or degrading treatment) of
in an irregular manner by sea can lead iterranean and Western Balkan routes. the European Convention on Hu­
to severe difficulties in the registration This showed that while the numbers man Rights if the Swiss author­
foreseen by the new legislation. Even full of illegal border-crossers to the Greek ities were to send the applicants
implementation of existing legislation, islands corresponded to the eventual back to Italy under the Dublin Reg­
in particular the requirement to upload numbers of formally lodged asylum ap­ ulation without having first ob­
into the Eurodac system the fingerprint plications, they were made almost exclu­ tained individual guarantees from
records of all illegal border-crossers and sively in countries of destination rather the Italian authorities that the ap­
asylum applicants, has shown to be ex­ than those of transit: while the initial plicants would be taken charge of
tremely difficult in areas where author­ route had been through Hungary, after in a manner adapted to the age of
ities were faced with huge numbers of the closure of the green border in Sep­ the children and that the family
daily arrivals, often in remote locations. tember 2015, asylum seekers did not ef­ would be kept together. The effects
In September 2015, an emergency re­ fectively need to apply for asylum until of the Tarakhel case could already
location mechanism was triggered via they reached Austria and countries fur­ be seen in early 2015. In the Neth­
the passing of two Council Decisions ther north and west. erlands, authorities have already
implemented new procedures for
transfers to Italy requiring indi­
vidual guarantees that reception
standards will be met, and allow­
ing for claims to be processed in the
Netherlands if obtaining a guaran­
tee takes an unreasonable amount
of time. German authorities im­
plemented a similar procedure for
families to be transferred to Italy;
and the decision has also been used
© European Commission

successfully to challenge transfers

in national courts in Switzerland,
Germany, and Belgium.
Sources: ECHR, Factsheet – ‘Dublin’ cases, July 2015
The Migration Policy Institute Europe, EU Dublin Asylum
System Faces Uncertain Future after Ruling in Afghan Family’s Case,
Figure 7.  A member of the Belgian Immigration Office speaks with April 2015
a Palestinian woman

31 of 72

FRONTEX  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

5.14. In the EU: Secondary movements

In 2015, subsequent to the massive ar­ troduced temporary internal border con­
rivals of persons crossing the border il­ trols. Additional internal border controls Public-private cooperation
legally, secondary movements of people were reinstated after the terrorist attack at EU internal borders
within the EU reached unprecedented in Paris in November 2015. In most cases,
levels. Indeed, the vast majority of the the reintroduction of internal controls Some Member States have intro­
people who entered illegally through means the presence of police patrols with duced measures to involve trans­
Greece, and a large proportion of those the authority to perform border checks. port companies in the prevention
entering through Italy, undertook sec­ Their intensity and frequency are, how­ of undocumented migrants from
ondary movements to their final des­ ever, not comparable to the controls at entering their territories. Nor­
tinations, mostly Germany, resulting the external borders. way requires ferry providers to ask
in about a million persons travelling The main effect of the reintroduc­ passengers for a valid travel docu­
through the EU without proper travel tion of controls at internal borders has ment, both when passengers buy
documents. The unprecedented volume been the restraining of the chaos at the the ticket and before they board
of these secondary movements created borders. However, between September the ferry to Norway, for example
new challenges for Member States, in­ and December 2015, internal controls on Danish or German soil. Den­
cluding the registration and transport have not reduced the general migratory mark’s parliament has approved
of large flows of persons, as well as in­ flow, neither at the external nor inter­ a bill, which could, under cer­
ternal security issues linked to the chal­ nal borders. tain circumstances, oblige bus,
lenges in determining the identity and train, and ferry operators to re­
motivation of the migrants. fuse transportation across Danish
Following chaotic scenes at the ex­ borders to passengers who cannot
ternal borders in September 2015, when present a valid travel document. In
migrants forced their way through the a law, which entered into force in
border and onboard trains and buses, December 2015, Sweden required
several Schengen Member States rein­ cross-border transport providers to
have all passengers controlled on
© [Link]

foreign soil before they enter Swe­

den. While Sweden’s state-owned
train operator SJ has stopped ser­
vices across the Öresund bridge
from Denmark because it did not
see itself in the position to carry
out the demanded identity checks
in time, Öresundståg, another
train operator which runs a Den­
mark-Sweden commuter service
introduced an around 30-minute-
long stop at Kastrup station to al­
low for document checks.

Figure 8.  Syrian refugees at the

Slovenian border with Croatia

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Frontex  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

Reintroduction of control at internal borders between Schengen Member States after September 2015

In November, Sweden reintroduced con- Austria reintroduced temporary controls In mid-October, Hungary reintroduced
trols on its ferry connections from the at its border with Slovenia, Italy, Hungary controls at its border with Slovenia for ten
south and on the bridge to Denmark. Those and Slovakia, from where the largest flow days. The step was taken after Hungary had
migrants who enter the country on entry of persons without legal travel documents extended its temporary technical obstacle
routes that are covered by the controls is arriving. Checks are carried out in a flex- with Serbia also to Croatia, which effec-
and who apply for asylum are systemat- ible manner, adapting to the situation on tively stopped migration through Hungary
ically registered and fingerprinted. Under the basis of intelligence. and diverted the transit of migrants to Slo-
a new Swedish law, which entered into venia and further to Austria.
force on 4 January 2016, transport com-
panies are obliged to ensure that passen-
gers on the way to Sweden have a valid The Slovenian authorities reintroduced
Austria 17 Oct '15
travel document. controls on their side of the border with
Hungary. Their purpose was to protect this Spielfeld 26 Oct '15
border section when the main migratory Hungary
flow still transited through Hungary. These 17 Sep '15
Austria
Norway, also facing an increased migra-
controls ended by the end of October. 16 Oct '15
tory flow, reintroduced border controls in
Razkrizje
November to identify among the migrants
those who want to apply for asylum. Slovenia Hungary
The Czech Republic has not officially re-
introduced their border controls, but have
Denmark reintroduced border controls intensified police presence and checks of
Croatia
with particular focus on the sea and land travellers.
Slovenia
Brezice
borders with Germany on 4 January 2016. Croatia

On 13 September 2015, Germany reintro- 26 Nov '15 Finland

duced temporary border controls at in- 14 Feb '16
ternal borders, with a special focus on the
land border with Austria. The controls en- Norway
Sweden
able systematic monitoring, registration 12 Nov '15
and dispatching of these persons to Ger- Russia
8 Feb '16
many. In November, following the terrorist Latvia
attack in France, the Federal Police rein-
forced its controls of the border, covering
also smaller routes. 4 Jan '16 Denmark Lithuania

3 Feb '16
Belarus

Belgium has stepped up police controls on

the main roads from France on the basis
of risk analysis. The Belgian police has de- Poland
Netherlands
tected irregular migrants during random Germany
police checks on routes from neighbour-
ing Member States, mostly on trains, lorries Belgium Ukraine

and on intra-EU/Schengen flights. Czech

Republic
13 Sep '15 Moldova
France Slovakia
13 Feb '16
After the terrorist attack in Paris in No- 13 Nov '15 Austria Hungary

vember, and coinciding with the meas- 26 Feb '16

Switzerland 16 Sep '15 Romania
ures planned for the COP21 conference in
Paris in December, France has reinstated
15 Feb '16 Slovenia
Croatia
controls at its borders with Belgium, Lux-
embourg, Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Bosnia &
Italy
Spain. Mobile controls were set up, while Herzegovina Serbia Bulgaria
fixed controls were only re-established for
a few days before the opening of the COP21.

Start Dates of introducing and lifting temporary

Malta reinstated temporary internal bor- End controls at intra-Schengen borders Greece
der controls during November until end Main control points
December 2015 due to the Valletta Con-
Temporary and local reintroduction
ference on Migration and the Common- of border controls
wealth Heads of Government Meeting. Reinforced surveillance/fence
The reintroduced controls led to a num-
Land routes
ber of detections of persons travelling with
Special trains/buses transporting migrants
fraudulent documents on intra-Schengen
Sea routes Malta 9 Nov '15
movements.
31 Dec '15

FRONTEX  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

 27 937
Syria 4 522 Others
123 312
78 468

26 453
Albania 30 468

Iraq 16 093
4 831 Nigeria
7 059
4 314

6 083
Kosovo* 10 136
22 360 17 709
Morocco 8 158 Ukraine 15 010

Return decisions in 2015: 286 725

Effective returns in 2015: 175 220

Afghanistan
18 655
1 805 India
8 287
9 419 Pakistan 12 777
8 089
Return decisions
Effective returns
xxx
xxx

Please note that the number of effective returns may sometimes be larger than return decisions, as a return decision issued in a given month may be effectively enforced at a later date. Also, return decisions may be issued
without prejudice to the person’s right to apply for asylum. Returns between Member States are not included (for example between France and Italy). Effective returns do not necessarily mean returns to the country of origin
and, for example in the case of Syrians, they include returns of persons to third countries considered to be safe (for example from Hungary to Serbia).

5.15. In the EU: Return depends on available resources, in par­

ticular on the number of officers and the
detention capacities prior to the return.
In 2015, Member States reported 286 725 return decisions have been issued to the In terms of nationalities, there is
return decisions issued to third-country same individuals. Although it is not pos­ a  striking difference between the na­
nationals as a result of an administra­ sible to quantify the phenomenon, as tionalities detected crossing the bor­
tive or judicial decision, which was a 14% data at EU level are anonymised, it illus­ der illegally or staying illegally in the
increase compared to 2014. The absolute trates the difficulty to effectively imple­ EU, and those effectively returned. In­
total number of migrants subject to re­ ment a return decision. deed, many detections of illegal border-
turn decisions is still underestimated by Finally, return decisions may also crossing or even detections of illegal
this indicator, as data on decisions were concern voluntary returns that are not stay concern migrants who will apply
unavailable from, inter alia, France, the registered. In fact, for voluntary return, for asylum and thus are not returned.
Netherlands and Sweden, which only only few Member States, such as the In 2015, more than half of the effective
reported effective returns but presuma­ Netherlands, apply a policy of controlled returns concern nationals whose nation­
bly issued a high number of decisions. departure, monitoring if migrants in­ alities were not easily granted asylum
As in previous years, the number of deed complied with the return decision. at first instance.
return decisions was much larger than In these circumstances it is difficult to The Commission noted in its com­
the total number of effective returns to ascertain that a return decision has ef­ munication on return policy that data
third countries (175 220). The main rea­ fectively been implemented. on basic parameters such as the aver­
sons for non-return relate to practical Within the number of effective re­ age length of detention, grounds for de­
problems in the identification of return­ turns to third countries, 47% were re­ tention, number of failed returns, and
ees and in obtaining the necessary docu­ ported to be on a voluntary basis and 41% use of entry bans proved to be available
mentation from non-EU authorities.1 In were forced returns, while for 12%, the in only a limited number of Member
addition, many decisions to return vol­ type of return was not specified. States. Moreover, common definitions
untarily do not materialise as the persons On an annual basis, the number of and approaches concerning data collec­
decide to stay illegally. Some Member effective returns has remained relatively tion are frequently absent, impacting
States reported that, over time, several stable over the years, despite large fluc­ on the comparability of such data across
tuations in the number of detections of the EU.
illegal border-crossing and detections of
1 Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament on Return illegal stay. This stability illustrates that
Policy, COM(2014) 199 final the number of effective returns largely

34 of 72

FRONTEX  ·  for 2016 (draft version) Risk Analysis

6. Featured analyses

© Frontex
6.1. Key countries of origin and transit

Transit country index For risk analysis the four-tier access proposed to gauge the relative importance
model indicates the different areas in of a set of third countries, with a focus on
The index is designed to capture the which the analysts will seek informa­ the risk of detection of migrants crossing
current transit status of selected third tion. The first tier represents third coun­ illegally the land or maritime external
countries related to the risk of illegal tries, analysed from the point of view of borders. This risk is indeed currently the
border-crossing at the external bor­ irregular migration in countries of ori­ most pressing to address.
ders. It is calculated using FRAN data gin and transit towards the EU. The third countries assessed as origin
for illegal border-crossings. As there This analysis therefore briefly looks into or transit countries include Syria, Iraq,
are large differences among countries, the key third countries from where most Afghanistan, Pakistan, Western Balkan
a logarithmic scale has been used for of people are likely to continue to come countries, Libya, Turkey, Morocco, and
the detections of illegal border-cross­ or which most will have to transit before the countries of the Horn of Africa and
ing of transiting migrants. The transit irregularly entering the EU. For the first West Africa. Together, they represent
nature of a country is also captured by time, indicators on transit countries and more than 90% of all detections of ille­
the number of nationalities detected. countries of origin based on FRAN data are gal border-crossing in 2015.
The outcome stretches from 0 to 5,
where a score near 5 shows the coun­
tries with the highest importance for
transit of migrants then detected for
illegal border-crossing along the ex­ Serbia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
ternal borders. Montenegro
This score provides for a guide of Kosovo*
FYR Macedonia
where efforts related to transit coun­ Albania
tries, for example the development of
a cooperation assistance package or
the posting of a Liaison Officer, are
likely to make the largest immedi­
ate impact. This index focuses on the
risk of illegal border-crossing. It does
not consider other risks, for example Morocco
risks typically associated with the air
border, where third-country airports
may play a significant role.
Libya

Transit Country Index in 2015

TURKEY

WESTERN BALKANS
Mali Niger
Senegal
Sudan
Burkina
LIBYA Faso
Guinea Benin
Guinea- Nigeria
Cote Sou
MOROCCO Bissau d’Ivoire Ghana
Sierra Sud
0 5 Leone Liberia
Togo
Origin Country Index in 2015
36 of 72 SYRIA/IRAQ

Frontex  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN
 The deployment of the Frontex Liaison Officer in Turkey, planned for the Origin country index
spring of 2016, aims at improving the exchange of information and the op­
erational cooperation between Member States and Turkey, essential also for The index is designed to capture the
developing better risk analysis to fight irregular migration and address pos­ status of selected third countries of or­
sible security threats posed by criminal activities related to smuggling of igin. It is calculated using FRAN data
migrants, as well as for facilitating Joint Operations coordinated by Fron­ for illegal border-crossings. As there
tex. The same objectives are also fostered under the EU-Turkey Visa Liberali­ are large differences among coun­
sation Dialogue carried out since December 2013 and its Roadmap, which is tries, a logarithmic scale has been
currently being implemented. used to compare detections of ille­
gal border-crossing per country or re­
gion of origin.
The outcome stretches from 0 to 5,
where a score near 5 shows the coun­
tries with the highest importance as
origin countries of migrants then de­
tectedCountry
Transit for illegal border-crossing
Index in 2015 along
the external borders. This score pro­
TURKEY
vides for a guide of where efforts re­
Turkey lated to origin countries, for example
the development of a cooperation as­
WESTERN BALKANS
sistance package or the posting of a
Syria Liaison Officer, are likely to make the

Iraq Afghanistan largest immediate impact.

LIBYA
This index focuses on the risk of il­
legal border-crossing at the external
border. It does not consider the im­
Pakistan MOROCCO
pact of these detections, for example
the subsequent asylum applications
0 the possibility of effective return.5
or

Origin Country Index in 2015

SYRIA/IRAQ

Eritrea AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN

n
HORN OF AFRICA

Ethiopia Somalia
uth Key countries/region of origin WESTERN AFRICA
dan Key transit countries
0 5

37 of 72

FRONTEX  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

 Transit countries

Serbia
Turkey Bosnia and Herzegovina
Montenegro
Kosovo*
FYR Macedonia
Syria Albania

Iraq Afghanistan

TURKEY WESTERN BALKANS Pakistan

ya Morocco
Transit Country Index (TCI) 3 Transit Country Index (TCI) 3
Number of claimed nationalities in transit 77 Number of claimed nationalities in transit 86
Number of people detected at the external borders 884 038 Numbers of people detected at the external borders 764 038
after transiting this country/region after transiting this country/region
Own nationals detected for illegal border-crossing NEGLIGIBLE Libya
MODERATE
Own nationals detected for illegal border-crossing

Visa policy comparable to the EU NO Visa policy comparable to the EU YES

Eritrea
Readmission agreement with the EU YES Readmission agreement with the EU YES
Within the framework of the external relations policy of the EU YES Within the framework of the external relations policy of the EU YES
Sudan
Member of existing regional risk analysis networks of Frontex YES Member of existing regional risk analysis networks of Frontex YES
Cooperation on return of TCNs YES Cooperation on return of TCNs YES

Mali Niger
Ethiopia
Turkey is the most important transit country for a large number of
Somalia
The Western Balkans region is a very important transit area, impacted
South Senegal
people who are routing through it on their way towards the EU. This Keyofcountries/region
by a large number of origin
people routing through it after first transiting Tur-
Sudan
Sudan
is facilitated by geographical position of the country and its visa pol-
icy for countries which constitute the main source of irregular mi-
key on their way towards the EU. Throughout 2015 the Western Bal-
Burkina
kans Key transit countries
Fasoregion was transited by an unprecedented number of migrants,
Guinea
grants to the EU. Turkey is also aiming at becoming a major tourist which overstretched
Benin the capacities of the affected countries, triggering

Guinea-
destination, entering the list of the top five countries receiving the Nigeria
various reactions by the authorities (from border closures to providing
Cote
highest number of tourists by 2023. In 2014, more than 200 differ- organised transportation). The Western Balkans were also a source re-
South
Bissau d’Ivoire
ent nationalities entered Turkey through official BCPs. gion for migration, especially at the end of 2014 and the first quarter of
Ghana
Sierra
Well-developed facilitation and smuggling industry is able to procure
2015, which was marked by high outflows of Kosovo* nationals sub- Sudan
sided since. Towards the end of 2015 this flow remained at low levels.
Leone Liberia
boats, safe houses, vehicles and fraudulent travel documents. Turkey
is also hosting a large number of Syrian refugees and is increasingly
expanding its national air carrier’s network of routes in Africa, the Togo
Middle East and South-east Asia. This, in turn allows a large num-
bers of potential irregular migrants to gain easy access to the exter-
nal borders of the EU.

EU-Turkey agreement of 29 November 2015 offers great incentives Concerted measures aimed at reducing the massive flow transiting
for Turkey when it comes to slowing down and stopping irregular the region towards the EU by increased prevention at successive bor-
movements across the common borders. Furthermore, EU-Turkey der sections; enhanced screening and registering capabilities to reduce
readmission agreement offers many opportunities to engage in sup- security threats; supporting Western Balkan countries to return third-
porting Turkey’s return of third-country nationals to their countries country nationals to their countries of origin, which would reduce the
of origin (e.g. Pakistan), which in turn should reduce Turkey’s appeal region’s appeal as a transit area.
as a transit country.

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Frontex  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

 Serbia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Montenegro
Kosovo*
FYR Macedonia
Albania

Turkey Serbia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Montenegro
Kosovo*
FYR Macedonia
Syria Albania

o Iraq Afghan

Pa
Libya
Morocco

Mali Niger
LIBYA MOROCCO Eritrea
Transit Country Index (TCI) 2 Sudan Transit Country Index (TCI) 1
Burkina
Faso Number of claimed nationalities in transit 55 Number of claimed nationalities in transit 52
Benin
Nigeria
Numbers of people detected at the external borders 136 872 Mali
Somalia
Numbers of people detected at the external borders 7 164
Niger
after transiting this country/region
Ethiopia after transiting this country/region
Own nationals detected for illegal border-crossing NEGLIGIBLESouth Senegal
Own nationals detected for illegal border-crossing INCREASINGKey countries/reg
Ghana Visa policy comparable to the EU NO Sudan Visa policy comparable to the EU
Burkina
NO
Key transit count
Readmission agreement with the EU NO Readmission agreement withFaso
the EU NO
Guinea Benin
Nigeria
Within the framework of the external relations policy of the EU N.A. Within the framework of the external relations policy of the EU YES
Togo Member of existing regional risk analysis networks of Frontex NO Guinea- Cote
Member of existing regional risk analysis networks of Frontex YES

While Libya’s appeal as a destination country has diminished, the coun-

Bissau
Flow of irregular migrants via the d’Ivoire
land borderGhana to Morocco remains rela-
try is still attracting thousands of transiting migrants from African and tively modestSierra
but important as the main entry points from Algeria saw
Southeast Asian countries who aim to reach Europe via irregular mar-
itime routes. The Central Mediterranean route might have registered
Leone Liberia
a decreased migration flow following border management changes in
Algeria (closed BCPs with Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Libya and border ar-
a slight decrease in 2015 when compared to 2014 but these figures eas turned into military zones) in response to terrorism Togo
threat. At the
are still as high compared with the overall number of illegal border- same time, following increased surveillance measures on both side of
crossings in the EU in previous years. the borders in 2014, irregular migration through Ceuta and Melilla re-
mains at a low level. Similarly, the route to the Canary Islands remains
Libya’s inability to have a post-conflict political transition resulted
practically closed, notably thanks to effective cooperation agreements
in two opposing power blocs. All state institutions are fragmented
between Spain and Morocco. With regards to air routes, Casablanca
and weak, including Libya’s security establishment and the judiciary.
re­mains the most popular air hub for sub-Saharan migrants (frequently
Therefore, the country’s vast land and sea borders remain largely un-
detected in possession of false documents).
controlled.
As for entry to Morocco, the growing risk of the abuse of passports of
All these uncertainties have been exploited by the facilitation networks,
ECOWAS countries falling under the visa-free regime with Morocco
whose ruthlessness has resulted in a number of maritime tragedies.
cannot be excluded.
Libya is also very important theatre of jihad, which is also the clos-
est to the EU’s external borders. Moreover, Libya has been attract-
ing battle-hardened jihadists from Syria, which has resulted in the
same atrocious modi operandi being utilised elsewhere besides Syria.

The UN-brokered peace talks, also facilitated by other regional actors, Establishing an EU-Morocco readmission agreement. Implementation
have brought about a rapprochement between the House of Repre- of stricter exit controls from Morocco to Ceuta and Melilla. Working on
sentatives and the General National Congress. The deal signed on 17 better effectiveness of the Spanish-Moroccan repatriation agreement
December in Morocco to form a unity government offers hope but not (signed in 1992) with regards to other than Moroccan nationalities.
a guarantee for a smooth political transition. The challenge is to iden-
tify the right interlocutors within the Libyan establishment who could
over time make Libya less attractive for transiting irregular migrants.

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FRONTEX  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

 Origin countries

Turkey
Turkey
Syria
Syria Iraq Afghanistan
Iraq Afghanistan
Pakistan
a
Pakistan

SYRIA and IRAQ AFGHANISTAN and PAKISTAN

Origin Country Index 4 Origin Country Index 4

Population
Eritrea
18 / 19 million Population 13 / 130 million
Detections of illegal border-crossing 594 059 / 101 285 Detections of illegal border-crossing 267 485 / 43 314

Sudan
Readmission agreement with the EU Eritrea
NO Readmission agreement with the EU NO / YES

Sudan
In Syria, while the talks held in Vienna and New York in late 2015 are
expected to launch the peace process, the humanitarian situation re-
Afghans represent the second most detected nationality at the EU ex-
ternal borders. The security situation in Afghanistan represents an im-

to areasSouth
Ethiopia Somalia
mains dramatic: civilian populations are left with few options: relocate
under the control of the al-Assad’s regime; relocate to areas
portant push factor for migration. In addition, Iran is estimated to host
around 3 million Afghans of various status and Pakistan hosts mini-

Ethiopia Somalia
Key countries/region of origin
under the control of the Syrian armed-opposition; exit the country mum 2.5 million Afghans. These two countries are becoming increas-
South Sudan
and remain in the immediate region; and/or flee Syria and the region Key transit
ingly unwilling to host countries
the Afghan communities, and this can be an
altogether. The latter option accelerated in 2015 when the Syrian hu-
Key countries/region of origin
important push factor for migration.
Sudan
manitarian crisis led to a migratory crisis in the EU. Key
The transit
main countries
factors pushing Pakistanis to migrate are of economic na-
The staggering number of EU citizens who joined the conflict as ji- ture as 80% of persons interviewed in a study on Determinants of In-
hadists has resulted in a number of returnees opting to use irregular ternational Migration in Pakistan1 consider low paid jobs as reasons to
means of travelling. Islamist extremists will exploit irregular migra- migrate and 70% see salaries as pull factors. The security situation
tion flows whenever such movements’ fit their plans. (assessed to have improved following increased government actions)
plays a lesser role in migration.
In Iraq the volatile security situation has brought about the inter-
nal displacement of at least 4 million people. IS/Da’ish has been able The main destination for the Pakistani economic migrants is the Gulf re-
to take control over vast areas and thus also contributed to move- gion, hosting roughly 3.5 million Pakistanis. If oil prices remain low, that
ments of people both within the country and the immediate region, will neg­atively impact Pakistani employees in the Gulf region and make
and also to Europe. other destinations like the EU more attractive. The EU is also host to a
large Pakistani diaspora, which can play a role in attracting migration.

The EU-Turkey Action Plan should further assist fleeing Syrians in the Establishing an EU-Afghanistan readmission agreement; supporting
immediate region. However, in the absence of a resolution to the the authorities to reintegrate returned Afghan migrants.
conflict, it is assessed that Syrians will continue to leave the country.
A better implementation of the EU-Pa­kistan readmission agreement
There are more and more international players supporting the Iraqi and increasing the share of persons effectively returned could help re-
authorities. The success of these initiatives depends on political sta- duce the share of economic migrants among Pakistanis detected cross-
bility and security, without which there will be more outflows of ing the border illegally.
Iraqi citizens.

1
[Link]

40 of 72

Frontex  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

 Montenegro
Albania Kosovo*
FYR Macedonia
Turkey Albania

Syria
Iraq Afghanistan
Morocco
Pakistan
Libya
Libya

Niger Eritrea
Mali Niger
Sudan
Senegal
Sud
Burkina
igeria Ethiopia Somalia Faso
South Guinea Benin
Guinea- Nigeria
Sudan Cote
Bissau d’Ivoire Ghana
Sierra
Leone Liberia
Togo

HORN OF AFRICA WEST AFRICA

Origin Country Index 3 Origin Country Index 3

Population 115 million Population 278 million
Detections of illegal border-crossing 70 442 Detections of illegal border-crossing 54 085
Readmission agreement with the EU NO Readmission agreement with the EU YES

Migration flow from the Horn of Africa consists of young men from Er- Most West Africans who cannot obtain an EU visa and still wish to
itrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and more recently also from Sudan. It is driven reach the EU illegally now opt to first travel by land to Agadez in Ni-
by regional security issues, slow economic development, and lack of ger. From there, smuggling services can be easily found. Up to 6 000
long-term livelihood options for refugees in the region. While the se- weekly arrivals in Agadez were registered in 2015, according to me-
curity situation is improving in Somalia, many Somalis were forced to dia reports, and from there migrants cross the Sahara desert to reach
return from Yemen given the civil war there. In turn, this may increase Europe via the Central Mediterranean route, making a maritime cross-
the number of persons going to Europe. ing departing from Libya. Routing through Niger is currently the pre-
ferred option despite the turmoil in Libya and a high risk of loss of life
Nationality swapping is very likely, as people living in different coun-
when crossing the Mediterranean. Part of the challenge for the Ni-
tries often speak the same or very similar language (e.g. Ethiopians
gerien authorities is the fact that the smuggling service industry is
claiming Eritrean nationality or Sudanese claiming Somali origin). Se-
fragmented rather than controlled by one group. Authorities in Niger
curity concerns associated with arrival of persons active in terrorist
also face transiting migrants who are determined to reach Libya and
groups, such as Al Shabab, are assessed as negligible given the local
Italy, and have entered the territory of Niger legally (under ECOWAS
agenda of these groups. Migratory movements from the Horn of Af-
free-movement protocol) and for the most part are able to finance
rica are often financed by members of diaspora, which in turn creates
their onward journey. Evidence from debriefing suggest that many
a self-sustaining dynamics. The more migrants are able to settle in Eu-
have started their journey after receiving information or encourage-
rope, the more people are likely to attempt the dangerous journey.
ment from friends or relatives already in the EU. The suggestion was
that it is now fairly easy to reach the EU regardless of the height-
ened risk of dying in the desert or at sea. The motivation for migra-
tion may vary among individuals, but most are believed to be pushed
by economic motivations.

Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan are part of the Khartoum Process, The EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (COM(2015) 285 fi-
which, with EU funding, aims at assisting countries in setting up and nal) acknowledges that a lack of effective return of persons arriving
managing reception centres and developing a regional framework to from West Africa and not eligible for protection is encouraging others
facilitate the return of migrants, mostly from Europe. In 2015, Ethi- to try their chances, leading to unnecessary human suffering as mi-
opia and the EU signed a joint declaration which will enable them to grants face harassment, exploitation, violence and even death while
better address the issue of migration and mobility. trying to cross the desert or the Mediterranean Sea. The Emergency
Trust Fund for Africa (launched at Valletta summit at the end of 2015)
will benefit a wide range of countries across West Africa. The Fund
will be addressing root causes of irregular migration.

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FRONTEX  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

 6.2. Border authorities not equipped to deal with large flows

Border authorities have been under in­ borders, as stipulated by the Schengen lack of equipment for electronic checks
tense pressure for years, but the large Border Code. It was not possible to de­ and also the fact that most of the docu­
and growing annual number of detec­ tect many migrants during their cross­ ments are not proper travel documents
tions of illegal border-crossing along the ing, and many migrants got in contact but rather simple identity documents.
EU external border has exposed the dif­ with authorities once on the islands. Under strenuous circumstances, as it
ficulties they face to adequately perform In these circumstances, it is likely that was the case in Greece starting from Au­
border control. Although Greece and It­ gust 2015 when more than 100 000 ar­
an unknown proportion
aly have been under particularly intense rivals were observed each month, there
actually crossed and continued
pressure as the two main entry points is risk that some migrants may be reg­
their journey without being
reporting up to 6  000 arrivals per day, istered on the basis of forged documents
detected
for several other Member States, large- or using some else’s genuine documents
scale inflows of migrants was a new ex­ by any law-enforcement authorities. as impostors. Border-control authorities
perience, revealing the complexity of At the same time, border-control au­ need time to mobilise extra resources.
the challenge to manage sudden large thorities are increasingly expected to be In the Aegean Sea, the situation had
flows. In an environment of continued engaged in search and rescue operations improved by the end of 2015, with the
pressure on the EU’s external borders, covering vast areas, as well as being the deployment of document experts and a
these challenges will be best addressed first interlocutors for a growing number decrease in the number of arrivals. How­
in a coordinated manner, requiring har­ of persons presenting themselves at the ever, a resurgence of flow comparable to
monised applications of legislations and EU borders in search of international asy­ the autumn of 2015 would require the
pooling of resources. lum. Most of the resources are thus al­ mobilisation of yet additional resources.
In the Aegean Sea, although the main located to search and rescue operations, In Greece, for most of 2015, the sheer
landing areas continued to be Lesbos, as well as local reception facilities to reg­ number of migrants did not permit ef­
Chios and Samos, smugglers have spread ister migrants. The challenge is com­ ficient practical measures to be set up
their activities to a larger number of is­ plicated due to the fact that many are to address simultaneously the rescue at
lands, from south to north, thus stretch­ undocumented and therefore their reg­ sea, registration, screening and identi­
ing the surveillance capacities. In these istration has to be based on their decla­ fication of new arrivals taking into ac­
conditions it is difficult for Member ration. In these circumstances, count security issues, the provision of
States to ensure an efficient, high and assistance to those in need of assistance,
fraudulent declarations of
uniform level of control at their external the prevention of secondary movements
nationality are rife.
within the EU, and the prevention of il­
Figure 9.  Having arrived on Greek Even when migrants hold some sort of legal border-crossing for persons not in
islands, a large number of migrants identity document, it is not always pos­ need of protection.
were ferried to Greek mainland sible to conduct a thorough check due to An integrated approach is required to
time pressure to register migrants, the tackle these challenges simultaneously,
© Frontex

Frontex  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

 in 2015 due to a lack of resources and non-
cooperation with some third countries’.3
The situation was addressed in the au­
tumn, with the establishment of dedi­
cated registration teams including two
screeners, two interpreters, two Greek
Police officers for registration, two EASO
officers, and four officers doing Eurodac
registration, photographing migrants
and producing release papers for them.
The procedure is also being optimised,
and the objective is to reduce the aver­
age processing time.
© Frontex

As of December 2015, Frontex started

the deployment of Advanced Level Doc­
Figure 10.  It is not always possible to conduct thorough check due to time ument Officers (ALDO) in the hotspot
pressure to register migrants areas in Greece and Italy. Additional ex­
perts are expected to join.
including strengthened collaboration data must be transmitted to the Eurodac A particularly striking and worrying
with asylum authorities to guarantee central system within 72 hours. characteristic of the current refugee cri­
the most effective treatment of arriv­ The reality is that sis is the large number of unaccompa­
ing migrants (even when they do not ap­ nied minors (UAMs) among the asylum
fingerprinting of all persons
ply for asylum on arrival) and enhanced seekers. Regardless of whether unac­
detected crossing illegally
collaboration with law-enforcement au­ companied minors are considered as
the border is not possible or
thorities to thwart the development of legitimate asylum seekers or not, re­
of poor quality, and in any
the criminal networks involved in forg­ sponsibility for them falls on the state –
case, is often not transmitted
ing identity and travel documents. It and often the municipality – where they
promptly to the Eurodac
also calls for strengthened measures in are identified. Even when minors come
central database.
providing civil protection assistance to from countries from which asylum ap­
face sudden and large flow of arrivals. Apart from the fact that this tool may not plications are rarely successful, they of­
In the Central Mediterranean area, be used for analysis or to support the re­ ten go into the asylum process.4
the large number of simultaneous de­ location mechanism, the biometric data
The rising number of
partures does not enable the same rapid of many migrants are missing2, which
unaccompanied minors is one
intervention on all distress calls. Some prevents law-enforcement authorities in
of the challenges requiring
have to be given priority, putting the the EU from effectively using the Eurodac
greater coordination between
lives of others at risk. This is particularly (the EU fingerprint database for asylum
border-control and asylum
dangerous when facilitators actually in­ seekers and irregular border-crossers) for
authorities.
tegrate the presence of vessels used for the purposes of preventing, detecting or
search and rescue operations into their investigating serious criminal offices or In the case of minors travelling undocu­
planning, and therefore minimise fuel even terrorist offenses. mented or with forged documents, the
and food provisions onboard. The UNHCR has established that ‘some issue is complicated by the lack of for­
In addition to these operational con­ of the procedures in place before June 2015 mal proof of the age of the person. In­
siderations aiming at detecting, res­ are no longer functioning (in particular deed, with no unambiguous scientific
cuing and accommodating migrants, full registration with all aspects of iden­ methods to determine with sufficient
a large number of simultaneous arriv­ tification and fingerprinting for Syrian accuracy and precision the age of a per­
als also creates challenges for Member arrivals) due to a lack of capacity on the son, some migrants may falsely declare
States to apply the EU regulation con­ islands caused, to a large extent, by the their age. The large proportion of unac­
cerning the collection and sharing of austerity measures af­fecting the Greek companied migrants applying for asy­
migrants’ fingerprinting. Indeed, the public sector. Along the same lines, re­ lum in Sweden has led the authorities
Dublin III regulation1 requires Member movals for persons not in need of interna­ to strengthen the measures to deter­
States to promptly take the fingerprints tional protection have decreased by 60% mine their age.
of every third-country national or state­
less person of at least 14 years of age who
is apprehended by the competent border
authorities. In addition, these biometric
3 Highlights from the UNHCR High Level
Mission to Greece on 27 July–1 August
1 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the 2 Chapter VI of Regulation (EU) 603/2013 2015
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the establishment of 4 OECD, Migration Policy Debates,
of 26 June 2013 ‘Eurodac’ September 2015

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 6.3. Managing violence at the borders
On 14 December 2015, a Swedish
asset involved in a Frontex JO near
The unprecedented number of detections Violence of the smugglers Lesbos attempted to intercept a
of illegal border-crossing has led to a rise against migrants boat with about 12 migrants on
in violent incidents along the EU exter­ board. After the repeated use of
nal borders. The most life-threatening In the Central Mediterranean route, light and sound signals by border
incidents are related to violence of the smuggling networks have entered a guards, the driver of the boat fired
smugglers against the migrants. Moti­ more ruthless phase as regards the sea­ two shots in unknown direction.
vated by profits, smugglers increasingly worthiness of the ves­sels utilised and A crew member of the Swedish as­
put migrants’ lives at risk. Smugglers their lack of regard in the face of bad set, following the rules of engage­
may also use violence directly threat­ sea conditions. In some cases armed ment in such situation, fired two
ening border guards to recover boats or smugglers threatened mi­grants to board warning shots in the water (safe
escape apprehension. Finally, the large flimsy inflatable craft in rough weather sector). The boat continued its
number of people crossing the border en conditions. course and its driver fired again
masse has led to violence requiring pub­ The smugglers’ quickening of migrant twice in the air. Another round
lic order policing, an area for which de­partures in an attempt to dispatch as of warning shots were fired by
border-control authorities are not ad­ many migrants as possible into a tight the Swedish asset to the water.
equately equipped or trained. Violence window of opportunity is also assessed The driver of the boat fired again
between groups of migrants have also to be the reason for frequent simultane­ two shots and escaped by entering
been reported. ous de­partures from the Libyan shore­ Turkish territorial waters.
line. The proximity of search and rescue
operations to Libya and the multitude of
concurrent incidents makes it increas­ have to pay for several crossing attempts.
Figure 11.  On 7 September 2015, ingly difficult for responding au­thorities This strategy put migrants’ lives at enor­
during a demonstration on the to coordinate their activities. mous risk.
island of Lesbos, migrants set fire to On the Eastern Mediterranean route,
a Frontex registration container in there were reports from migrants that fa­ Violence against border-control
Kara Tepe, delaying the transfer of cilitators on the Turkish coast purposely authorities
additional facilities to the site sank their boats, so that migrants would
In the Central Mediterranean route, the
reuse of vessels by smuggling net­works,
a phenomenon identified already in
2014, suggests that there is an apparent
lack of seaworthy vessels that can be used
for irregular migration purposes. This
resulted in more aggressive behaviour
of smugglers to recover these assets, as
demonstrated in two serious incidents,
one in February and another in April
2015, during which border guards were
held at gunpoint.
Near the Greek islands, some smug­
glers are using powerful boats to sail from
Turkey to Greece, or in some cases to Italy.
These assets are costly and thus smug­
glers are ready to take risks and resort to
violence to hold on to them.
© Frontex
© Frontex

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Frontex  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

Violence of crowds ber States, in particular near Sentilj, at proportional to the number of people
the border between Slovenia and Austria. but rather exponential. One of the first
The rapid and massive increase in detec­ Incidents involving migrants ig­ responses is to prevent the formation
tions of illegal border-crossing resulted noring the orders of border officials or of large crowds, a condition difficult to
in large crowds forming near reception even, when they are in large groups, meet on islands or near border areas were
centres along the external borders, and showing aggressive behaviour towards crossing is usually confined.
later on, as they approached other bor­ of­fi cers is becoming commonplace. Inci­ In many instances, the unrest was ex­
der areas. dents at the border between Greece and acerbated by migrant’s frustration. Many
Many migrants from the Turkish the former Yugoslav Republic of Mace­ expected to be welcomed in the EU, as of­
coast arrived in dispersed order on the donia and between Serbia and Hungary ten reported in the media, but instead
Greek islands, often camping out in the have shown that many migrants do not had to face registration and long waiting
main town’s parks and squares. The exi­ stop when re­quested to do so by border times in overcrowded conditions, lead­
guity and relative isolation of the Greek guards, they do not obey orders of bor­ ing to their infuriation.
islands resulted in rapid overcrowding. der authorities and are not afraid to en­ The reactions of border-control au­
The area of the island of Leros is less than gage in physical contact while crossing thorities, whether in the EU or in transit
75 square kilometres and yet is registered the border. countries, have been diverse but eventu­
around 32 000 migrants in the first nine A common characteristic of these in­ ally resulted in organising the transport
months of 2015. That’s roughly quadru­ cidents was that they involved crowds of migrants to their final destinations.
ple the island’s total population. of more than 1  000 persons who were The priority of ensuring smooth trans­
Attempts to relocate them to nearby temporarily stopped in their movement. port resulted in fewer scenes of chaos
registration centres or large public They gathered people from very different scenes at the border, but also less scru­
spaces, such as a stadium, involves form­ backgrounds and nationalities, render­ tiny in the registration process. This is
ing large crowds of people. Managing ing the communication of orders and evidenced by the growing difficulty to
the movement of large groups of peo­ the circulation of basic information dif­ report on basic facts like the national­
ple is difficult, and often results in un­ ficult. The crowds also mixed young ity of the migrants.
rest, as several incidents demonstrated, single men with more vulnerable fam­ These types of violent incidents were
for example, in August in several Greek ilies, including women and children, not confined to the external borders but
islands, where thousands of new arriv­ sometimes purposely put in front of the were also reported along the main routes
als were registered daily. groups to facilitate their progression. to the final destinations of the migrants.
Similar unrest was also reported near This makes them different from other The number of incidents has increased
border areas on the route used by mi­ types of crowds typically managed by near Calais, France, at the ferry and Chan­
grants during their journey within the law-enforcement authorities, for exam­ nel Tunnel terminals to the UK, and, this
EU. After Greece, incidents were reported ple during sport events, demonstrations year, incidents also developed at the bor­
in the former Yugoslav Republic of Mac­ or political riots, and drastically limits ders between Slovenia and Austria. These
edonia, Serbia, Hungary (until Septem­ the type of responses that can be used. unusual events within the EU, widely re­
ber) and then in Croatia. Incidents were Constant arrival of new migrants also ported in the media, required the inter­
also reported at borders between Mem­ requires a complex response, as the diffi­ vention of police authorities to restore
culty in managing crowds is not directly and maintain order.

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6.4. Preventing casualties at the border includes fatalities reported during the
often short sea crossing between the
Turkish coast and the Greek islands, and
Estimating fatalities among migrants to all distress calls impossible. Due to during crossing of the Evros River.
crossing the border illegally is daunt­ a limited number of assets, some have Fatalities when crossing the Evros
ingly difficult. Frontex does not record to be given priority, putting the lives of River are also regularly reported. The
these data and only has at its disposal others at risk. The increasing death toll most dangerous areas are in the delta,
the number of bodies recovered during during 2015 seems to confirm the as­ where shallow waters spread over kilo­
Joint Operations. In 2015, 470 dead bodies sumption that the increased number of metres. The lower course of the river is
were reported in the Mediterranean area, ves­sels engaged in rescue operations is also very vulnerable to flooding.
an increase of 112% compared to 2014. not nec­essarily a guarantee for a reduc­ The winter months also represent
Official statistics from Member States tion in the number of fatalities as many highest risks for migrants’ lives, and
are not comprehensively archived and of­ unseaworthy boats depart from the coast health hazards in general. When mi­
ten follow investigation procedures that and count on a quick rescue. Even with grants undertake a long journey, which
remain classified. In addition, even if many more vessels now engaged in res­ may take several days, through the for­
available, these data would only concern cue oper­ations it is simply impossible to ests and rural areas and are forced to sleep
the number of bodies found. However, effectively rescue everyone, as there are outdoors or in cold shelters at temperature
during maritime accidents, the number often multiple simultaneous rescue op­ below 16°C, they are prone to hypother­
of missing persons may be larger than erations over a large sea area, requiring mia, frostbites and other health condi­
the number of recovered bodies, and in a high level of coordination. tions. Their risk increases if they lack
the absence of passenger list, this num­ Migrants are aware of the more dan­ proper clothing, food and medical care.
ber often remains unknown. gerous sea crossing conditions during On the Western Mediterranean
In 2013, IOM launched the ‘Missing the winter months, with stronger winds route, the sea crossing between Morocco
migrants project’ that endeavours to re­ and colder water, and try to plan their and Spain is relatively short, but fatali­
cord the number of deaths and missing crossing between April and September. ties are often reported, in particular due
persons when attempting to cross bor­ In the past two years, the deadliest ac­ to the fact that small vessels are used. Ac­
ders. This project relies on official statis­ cidents took place either at the onset cidents resulting in casualties have also
tics complemented with media reports. of the season, in April, or at its end, in been reported during group attempts to
This methodology is prone to underesti­ September, when migrants wrongly as­ cross the fence. Poor health conditions
mation when accidents are not reported sumed that fair weather conditions were have also been reported among migrants
by the media (for example when other prevailing. These periods are assosiated in the makeshift camps near the bor­
news prevail), or overestimation (for ex­ with the highest risk of large accidents. der. However, the size of the population
ample when missing migrants are first In addition to be the most dangerous in the camp has been reported decreas­
reported and later the number of found sea-crossing, the Central Mediterra- ing due to efforts by Moroccan authori­
bodies), but is the most comprehensive nean route also implies for most of the ties to return migrants to their country
and systematic attempt to gather infor­ migrants the very risky crossing of the of origin.
mation on missing migrants. Sahara desert. Indeed, most migrants Few fatalities were reported in 2015
originally come from sub-Saharan coun­ on the Western African route leading
According to IOM estimates,
tries and travel overland to the Libyan to the Canary Islands. However, between
about 3 770 persons went
coast. This means routing through Aga­ 2003 and 2006, it used to be the route
missing or died while
dez, Niger, where an industry of smug­ with the highest death toll, with an­
crossing the border in the
gling services is constantly growing. nual estimates by some NGO reporting
Mediterranean area in 2015.
Evidence from debriefing of migrants over one thousand dead or missing per­
While this estimate should be treated on the Central Mediterranean route sug­ sons.1 Migrants departing from Mauri­
with caution, it confirms that the Cen- gests that many of them started their tania or Senegal had to sail for several
tral Mediterranean is the most danger­ journey after receiving information or days in cayucos, small wooden boats not
ous migration route. Smugglers on this encouragement from friends and rela­ designed for such a long sea voyage, re­
route typically make use of frail, over­ tives already in the EU. The suggestion sulting in a large death toll.
crowded boats, with limited fuel avail­ was that it was fairly easy to reach the Since irregular migration was effec­
able to maximise their profits, putting EU, regardless of the risk of dying in the tively closed on this route, following a
migrants’ lives at considerable risk. desert or at sea in the Mediterranean.
The large number of simultaneous The Eastern Mediterranean route 1 Fatal Journeys: Tracking lives lost during
departures makes rapid interventions is the second most dangerous route. It migration, IOM, 2014

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Frontex  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

 © Frontex
set of measures including cooperation strengthened surveillance to cooperation Figure 13.  SAR by the Belgian vessel
with country of departure and effective with third countries and effective imple­ Godetia, Operation Triton
implementation of a return agreement, mentation of return agreements in the
case of migrants not entitled to interna­
several thousand lives have
tional protection.
been saved.
On the other hand, for many refugees
Crossing the border illegally between who cannot return home because of a
BCPs is the modus operandi representing the continued conflict, war or persecution,
highest risk for migrants’ lives, in par­ resettlement programme may offer an al­
ticular during a long sea crossing. How­ ternative to seeking the services of peo­
ever, fatalities are also reported when ple smugglers. According to UNHCR, 28
migrants hide in vehicles. Few fatal­ countries resettled refugees, and in 2015
ities have been reported at the border Italy became a new country of resettle­
itself, but in 2015, several dramatic inci­ ment. However, out of the 14.4 million
dents took place within the EU. The most refugees of concern to UNHCR around
tragic was discovered in Austria when the world, fewer than 1% are subject to
71  bodies were found dead in a truck. resettlement.
This incident highlighted the high risk
of suffocation for migrants hiding in ve­
hicles, and this calls for strengthened
measures at the border itself and more
thorough checks of vehicles.
This short overview of the most dra­
matic aspect of illegal border-crossing
shows that sea-crossing is by far the risk­
iest modus operandi for migrants’ lives.
Preventing departures, as demon­
strated on the Western African route
includes a set of measures ranging form

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FRONTEX  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

6.5. Health risks the unfamil­iar and changing health
profiles and needs. Due to the common
lack of proper prepara­tion and informa­
The main focus of Frontex is on stren­g­ gration process. However, the impact tion, the health risks posed by migrants
th­en­ing border-control cooperation to of the journey varies depending on the are often overestimated by the receiving
facilitate bona fide migration manage­ category of the migrant, undocumented communities.
ment, combat cross-border crime and migrants being among the most vulner­
prevent threats to the Member States. able given the often harsh con­ditions Migrants
This includes the pre­vention of threats of the journey and the limited access
to public health, as defined by the Inter­ to health services. The following analy­ Pre-departure
national Health Regulations of the World sis, therefore, focuses on undocumented
Health Organization. The Risk Analysis migra­tion. The risk of acquiring vaccine-preventa­
for 2016 presents the WHO Regional Of­ The public health aspects of migra­ ble dis­eases depends on the presence of
fice for Europe’s re­view of the potential tion affect both healthcare and non- susceptible individuals in the popula­
public health risks as­sociated with the healthcare workers involved in the tion and their epide­miological profile.
migration phenomena and ways to ad­ various stages of the migration pro­ In many countries of ori­gin and transit
equately address them, prepared under cess, as well as resident com­munities. the healthcare systems are weakened by
the project ‘Public Health Aspects of Mi­ In the countries of destination, mi­ civil unrest, wars, economic crisis and
gration in Europe’ (PHAME). gration often stretches the capacity of natural disasters. The provision of pub­
Migrants are exposed to a number healthcare systems to adapt to the addi­ lic health services including vaccination
of different health risks during the mi­ tional de­mand for health services, and to the population is often interrupted or

48 of 72

Frontex  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

 Travel and transit refugees and migrants soon after their
arrival. Proper diagnosis and treatment
Health risks at this phase vary depend­ must follow, and the necessary health­
ing on the conditions and duration of care must be ensured for specific popula­
the travel. The conditions to which mi­ tion groups (children, pregnant women,
grants are ex­posed to during the journey elderly). 
as well as in the countries of destination Each and every person on the move
put them at risk of sexual victimisation, must have full access to a hospitable en­
violence and sexual ill health. vironment, to prevention (e.g. vaccina­
Refugees, asylum seekers and undoc­ tion) and, when needed, to high-quality
umented migrants, especially women, healthcare, without discrimination on
infants and children, were identified as the basis of gender, age, religion, na­
the most vulnerable ones. Other health tionality or race. This is the safest way
risks arising throughout the journey to ensure that the resident population is
and specially during rescue operations not unnecessarily exposed to imported
include traumatism, burns, hypother­ infectious agents.
mia, dehydration, drowning, heat­
stroke, foodborne diseases, respiratory Host community
and skin infections.
At reception centres, overcrowding and
Upon arrival inad­equate hygiene and sanitary con­
ditions cou­pled with limited access to
WHO does not recommend obligatory healthcare are well known risk factors
screening of refugee and migrant pop­ for acquiring a va­riety of communicable
ulations for diseases, because there is diseases. The risk of measles, diphthe­
no clear evidence of benefits (or cost-ef­ ria and whooping cough is enhanced in
fectiveness); furthermore, it can trigger the presence of susceptible in­dividuals.
anxiety in individual refugees and the Furthermore, scarce hygiene and sani­
© Frontex

wider community.  tary conditions increase the risk of gas­

WHO strongly recommends, how­ tro-intestinal and skin infections.
ever, offering and providing health
checks to ensure access to healthcare Workforce at the border and in
even withheld, resulting in a dramatic for all refugees and migrants in need of the reception centres
reduction of the immunisation cover­ health protection. Health checks should
age. For instance, in the Syrian Arab be done for both communicable and non- Health risks for healthcare and non-
Republic, the immunisa­tion coverage communicable diseases, with respect for healthcare work­force vary depending on
has fallen from 91% registered in 2011 to migrants' human rights and dignity. the resistance and vulnerability of each
68% in 2012. Although efforts have been In spite of the common perception individual, the working conditions as
made to improve immunisation cover­ that there is a link between migration well as the potential exposure to biolog­
age, there are still deep concerns on the and the importation of infectious dis­ ical agents. Rescuers may be exposed to
im­munisation status of Syrians, includ­ eases, there is no systematic associa­ trauma, injuries, hypothermia, drown­
ing those asking for asylum in European tion. Refugees and migrants are exposed ing and heatstroke during rescue oper­
countries. mainly to the infectious diseases that ations. Due to their difficult working
In countries with high tuberculosis are common in Europe, independently conditions, psycho­logical support to the
(TB) inci­dence and prevalence, large por­ of migration. The risk that exotic infec­ workers both at the border and in the
tions of the population have a status of tious agents, such as Ebola virus, will be migration centres is also relevant. Ade­
latent TB infec­tion that can be developed imported into Europe is extremely low, quate screening procedures fo­cused on
to TB disease, of­ten contagious, in case and when it occurs, experience shows communicable, non-communicable dis­
of decreased immune response. Such sit­ that it affects regular travellers, tour­ eases as well as mental health should be
uation may be created by the hard con­ ists or healthcare workers rather than performed when required and with full
ditions of a journey which may start refugees or migrants. re­spect to human rights.
before crossing the border of the coun­ Triage is recommended at points of
try of destination. entry to identify health problems in

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FRONTEX  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

 increase in the level of irregular migra­
tion into the EU, the number of return
decisions for these nationals is only
6.6. Overcoming the obstacles slowly growing, and the number of ef­

to effective returns fective returns remains rather stable,

never exceeding 3  000 per month (see
Fig. 15). This first comparison indicates
that effective return are not responsive,
In its Eu­ropean Agenda on migration, The measures that prevented depar­ or even disconnected, to sharp increases
the European Commission states that tures from West Africa to Spain, and that in irregular migration flows. This may be
‘one of the incentives for irregular mi­ contributed to saving thousands of lives, due to national procedures to process asy­
grants is the knowledge that the EU’s re­ cannot be applied straightforwardly to lum applications and return decisions,
turn system – meant to return irregular today’s challenges, with a large propor­ and frequent difficulties in obtaining
migrants or those whose asylum appli­ tion of refugees arriving from Syria and the collaboration of the countries of or­
cations are re­fused – works imperfectly.’ the lack of counterparts in Libya. Yet, igin in the identification process. The
The Commission proposes several key ac­ this analysis examines how to best sup­ fast track procedure introduced in sev­
tions in this regard, including to rein­ port the EU policy of safe countries of eral Member States for third countries
force and amend the Frontex legal basis origin. with low positive rate of asylum deci­
to strengthen its role on return, as well sion is a step to remedy the situation. To
as the development of the concept of safe Few effective returns but many be effective, however, it requires a rapid
country of origin. difficulties to return implementation of the returns, so that
Implemented alone, return policies the persons bound to return do not ab­
may not be sufficient to curb the flows, Comparing the total number of return scond. The pooling of resources among
but when implemented as part of a com­ decisions or the total number of effective ­Member States can contribute to the ef­
prehensive strategy developed with third numbers of return against detections of fective implementation of Member States
countries, returns are pivotal in effec­ illegal border-crossing does not take into return decisions.
tively reducing the pressure at the ex­ account the fact that many detections of In addition, it is often the case that
ternal borders. This is clearly illustrated illegal border-crossing will be followed for nationals coming from countries
by the case of the Western African route, by positive asylum applications. For this with a low first-instance asylum recog­
that used to be the main point of entry reason, it is preferable to focus on those nition rate, they do not spontaneously
towards the EU around the year 2005, nationalities who are unlikely to obtain apply for asylum, but their return proce­
but that has been effectively closed due asylum, as they represent the national­ dure is often the outcome of detections
to the implementation of a set of meas­ ities most likely to be subject to return. of illegal stay (most often overstayers),
ures including increased surveillance, Considering only some of those na­ and they frequently apply for asylum
strengthen collaboration with countries tionalities that showed a first-instance during the return procedure. This often
of origin to prevent departures and effec­ asylum recognition rate1 of less than 30% results in longer detention time, and
tive returns guaranteeing that those who (Algerian, Bangladeshi, Ghanaian, Ma­ thus limiting the number of available
do not need asylum are quickly returned. lian, Moroccan, Nigerian, Pakistani and detention places.
Sri Lankan nationals), the anal­ The analysis of the situation of people
Figure 14.  Detections of illegal border- ysis shows that despite a strong from Kosovo* also reveals some difficul­
crossing, return decisions and effective ties in rapidly implementing returns. In­
returns for selected nationalities having deed, considering the period 2014–2015,
1 According to data provided by
a first-instance asylum recognition and thus lessening possible time-lag due
EASO
rate of less than 30% at EU level in 2015
(Algerian, Bangladeshi, Ghanaian, Malian,
Moroccan, Nigerian, Pakistani and Sri Figure 15.  Detections of illegal border-crossing, illegal stay, return
Lankan nationals). decisions and effective returns for Kosovo*, 2014–2015

25 000 25 000
■ Illegal border-crossing —— Asylum applications
20 000 ■ Return decisions 20 000 —— Illegal border-crossing
■ Effective returns —— Return decisions
15 000 15 000 —— Effective returns
10 000 10 000
5 000 5 000
0 0
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec

Source: Frontex data 2014 2015

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Frontex  ·  Risk Analysis for 2016

to the length of the procedure, it is ob­ under different identities than in their with problems in obtaining the neces­
vious that the peak in detections of il­ home countries. It is thus sometimes sary documentation from third coun­
legal border-crossing observed between difficult for the home countries to issue tries’ consular authorities) and lack of
September 2014 and February 2015 did the travel document. cooperation from the individual con­
not correspond to an increase in effec­ cerned (s/he absconds).
tive returns. Between January and April EU safe countries of origin Statistics also revealed stable annual
2015, more than 80 000 Kosovo* citizens trends in decisions and effective returns,
applied for international protection in The Commission is proposing a list of and this stability is in stark contrast to
the EU/Schengen area. In contrast, the safe countries of origin2 to facilitate the the high variability of other indicators
number of return decisions made by EU use by all Member States of the proce­ like detections of illegal border-cross­
Member States increased only temporar­ dures to increase the overall efficiency of ing. This stability is likely to be an indi­
ily and to a limited extent, and peaked their asylum system as concerns applica­ cation of the limited resources Member
at around 1 400 in March 2015. Likewise, tions for international protection which States have at their disposal to conduct
the average monthly number of effective are likely to be unfounded. The initial EU returns. Indeed, given the requirement
returns doubled from a very low level in list designating as ‘safe’, includes Alba­ in terms of trained police-officers and
2014 to only around 840 in 2015, which nia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the for­ detentions, the number of effective re­
after all means that only around 15 per­ mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, turns are strongly constrained. These
cent of all Kosovo* citizens with nega­ Kosovo*, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey. constrains do not enable to have a flex­
tive asylum decisions were effectively Among this list of safe countries, the ible response to sudden and large num­
returned to their home country. main impact on the border and on asy­ ber of return decisions.
Delays in return also often encourage lum come from nationals from Kosovo*
additional arrivals, because for those un­ and Albania who, in 2015, were detected
satisfied with the local economic condi­ at the border for illegal border-crossing
tions even a temporary provision of food in large numbers, and who formed the
and shelter combined with a small allow­ largest contingent of asylum applicants.
ance is an incentives to travel to the EU. The concept of safe countries of origin
This creates further back logs in the sys­ is distinct from the notion of safe third
tems, while for the migrants the most country, which can be broadly defined
likely consequence will be to stay ille­ as a country of transit of an applicant
gally in the EU. which is considered as capable of offering
The challenges to return are indeed him or her adequate protection against
numerous, starting with the difficul­ persecution or serious harm. However,
ties to actually take into account in the this concept is not applied uniformly by
spontaneous return, out of any official all EU Member States, some using it,
record, of a certain number of migrants some referring to it but not applying it in
for whom a return decision has been is­ practice. In 2015, Hungary published an
sued. However, data from detections of official list of safe countries of origin and
illegal stay on exit do not show signif­ safe third countries that includes Serbia.
icant volume of detections. For exam­ It is on this basis that the returns of Syr­
ple, in the case of Kosovo*, 2  645 were ians were organised to Serbia.
detected staying illegally while leaving
the EU in 2015. Effective returns
Another challenge arising from
the data is that the number of return With regard to the return of those with­
­decisions largely depends on the leg­ out the right to stay in the EU, statistics
islative framework and regulation of a demonstrate that there is a consider­
Member States. For example, the more able gap between the persons issued
possibilities a person has to lodge appeal with a return decision (286 725 in 2015)
procedure, the more likely the same per­ and those who, as a consequence, have
son can be notified several times a return been subject to an effective return (ap­
decision after one of the appeal proce­ proximately 158  345). There are multi­
dures has been rejected. ple reasons for this gap, including in
There are also numerous practical particular lack of cooperation from third
challenges, in particular the difficul­ countries of origin or transit (e.g. linked
ties to obtain adequate travel document
from the Embassies of the origin coun­
2 [Link]
tries. There are many constrains to this,
what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
and among them is the fact that many migration/background-information/docs/
migrants have been registered in the EU 2_eu_safe_countries_of_origin_en.pdf

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© Frontex
7. Looking ahead
Why develop scenarios?

Scenarios are created to form a basis for omy, society and geopolitics. Some of the ▪▪ Foresight of alternative projections
an annual monitoring of changes in the aspects of the scenarios cannot directly (Phase 2). In the next step, possible
environment. Very different stakehold­ be influenced by border-control author­ developments for all key factors have
ers can make use of these scenarios to ities, including Frontex, but rather by been identified. These so-called ‘fu­
develop their own internal strategies or politics or society. For this reason, they ture projections’ represent the three
monitor how their internal strategies fit describe possible side-conditions for the to five alternative futures within the
a changing environment. Scenarios aim development of Frontex work and these next 5–10 years regarding each and
at supporting strategic decision mak­ scenarios should therefore be interpreted every single key factor. This time ref­
ers whose decisions will have middle- as ‘external scenarios’ in which Frontex erence helped the participants to im­
to-long-term impacts so that they can will develop its activities. agine the future beyond the current
come up with realistic strategies which events.
are not focused on fixed expectations or How have the scenarios been ▪▪ Calculation and formulation of sce-
ideals about the future. developed? narios (Phase 3). Based on an assess­
Indeed, in a dynamic and very com­ ment of the consistencies between
plex environment like irregular migra­ These scenarios came up as the result all future projections, all possible
tion, it is difficult to develop reliable of an interactive team process, involving combinations have been checked by
forecasts based on past data. Similarly, experts from Frontex, Member States, a software. This led to seven possible
in the face of changes in the environ­ and the European Commission and from futures which have been analysed
ment of border management, it is not other EU Agencies like Europol, EASO, and described. These scenarios rep­
adequate to rely on trend analysis. Sce­ the Fundamental Rights Agency, the Eu­ resent the whole ‘window of possi­
narios are thus a tool that can be used as ropean External Action Service (EEAS), as bilities’ and are visualised in a ‘Map
a foresight instrument at strategic level. well as from the OECD and the UN Ref­ of the future’.
ugee Agency (UNHCR). ▪▪ Scenario assessment and conse-
What kind of scenarios is The scenario team used the scenario- quences (Phase 4). Finally the scenar­
necessary? management approach, which is based ios have been assessed by the scenario
on four steps: team so that the current status as well
One of the key objectives of the scenario ▪▪ Detection of key factors (Phase 1). as expected futures are examined. In
process is to foresee strategic changes as The building blocks of the scenarios addition consequences of each sce­
early as possible, so that decision makers were gathered from the four-tier of nario for border management in gen­
at EU and Member State levels can pre­ the border control access model and eral and Frontex have been identified.
pare, react or proactively decide. There­ resulted in the description of influ­
fore, it is necessary to include in the ence factors. Based on a systemic in­
development of scenarios not only issues terconnection analysis the dominant
related to border management, but also drivers and those representing nods
to take into account its environment: in­ have been worked out. The scenario
ternational migration and cross-border team selected 25 key factors for fur­
crime, European actors and policies as ther consideration.
well as general developments from econ­

SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT

Scenario field analysis Scenario prognostics Scenario creation Scenario assessment

What are the driving How could these key What are the possible What are the expected
forces in the scenario factors develop in scenarios – and how does scenarios – and what
field? the future? the landscape look like? does that mean for us?
(Key factors) (Future projections) (External scenarios) (Expected scenarios)

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What drives future Less migration and
Strong migration & open societies
developments? restrictive policies

The seven scenarios represent the most

Stronger European
significant possible environments for

integration
border management in Europe. An Scenario 7 Scenario 6
analysis of the core differences of these Open Doors More Europe
scenarios showed the following main
drivers:
Scenario 5
▪▪ European integration: Scenarios 1 to
Multi-speed Europe
4 include a stagnating or decreasing
political integration process in the
EU, while Scenarios 5 to 7 describe a Scenario 1

Constant or reduced European integration

Scenario 3
more harmonised development on a Attrition of
Managed Diversity
European Union
political and societal level as well as
for border management.
▪▪ Global pressure: Scenarios 1, 2 and 7
refer mostly to situation of continu­
ous development of side-conditions,
Less migration and

Scenario 2
restrictive policies

Scenarios 3 to 6 describe a signifi­ Scenario 4

cantly higher global pressure – and Passive
Restrictive policies
due to that a more proactive Euro­ European Union
pean foreign policy and a stronger fo­
cus on border management.
▪▪ Level of migration: Scenarios 1,
Constant side
3, 6 and 7 represent scenarios with Changing side conditions
conditions
permissive migration policies and
a higher degree of migration while
Scenarios 2, 4 and 5 contain more re­ Figure 16.  Map of the future
strictive policies and a lower degree
of migration.
Additional important drivers applying
to selected scenarios are the openness of Scenarios…
societies combined with a successful in­
tegration (Scenarios 3, 5, 6 and 7), a low ▪▪ describe alternative, possible futures (and not a single future);
security orientation (Scenarios 1 and 7) ▪▪ are based on the interconnection of the most important, long-term drivers
and stricter implementation of internal (and not on a few, currently dominating factors);
border controls within the EU (Scenar­ ▪▪ describe side-conditions for border management activities in the future
ios 1 and 2). (and not, what Frontex will, could or should do in the future);
▪▪ are a thinking tool for the next years (and a basis for a continuous assess­
ment within planning processes).

The scenarios describe external side-conditions for the management of the EU

external border within the next years. This means a set of possible scenarios
for the environment in which border management will act in the future. These
scenarios should cover all imaginable developments within the next 5–10 years
– but part of some scenarios may develop earlier. This wider focus of the scenar­
ios is set to support a continuous scenario assessment process within the next
years, monitoring which scenarios are actually prevailing.

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Scenarios:
Overview

© [Link]
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3

Attrition of the European Union A Passive European Union Managed Diversity

Extensive migration and failed Fear and passivity leads to Controlled migration into
integration leads to conflicts mistrust, security focus and diverse and safeguarded
and nationalism walling-off societies

Global threats do not reach a tip- The politically and economically Due to international cooperation,
ping point, so countries and ex- fragmented world faces an increas- numerous regional conflicts can
isting alliances prefer to work on ing number of conflicts. The EU be solved. The European Union
their individual challenges. While stopped enlargement and turned withdraws from further political
most countries focus on their eco- into a loose and economically ori- integration but remains open to
nomic interest, a common European ented alliance of Member States new Member States. Most socie-
identity loses relevance. Policies are with a low level of political and soci- ties have a positive perception of
mainly oriented on political correct- etal integration. Member States act migration and welcome new cit-
ness and short-term public opinion. completely differently on migration izens even with different cultural
Former agreements, like Schengen and asylum policies. This leads to backgrounds. Migration pressure
and Dublin, failed and became dras- more internal border controls even stays manageable, but organised
tically less important or completely within the Schengen area. Migra- crime groups and terrorist activi-
void. The high numbers of economic tion pressure on EU borders is highly ties remain a threat for EU borders.
migrants – mostly with low educa- related to the volatile global con- The Dublin process is implemented
tional qualification and with a dif- flicts: Numbers of refugees, coun- to control migration flow and free
ferent cultural background – are not tries of origin, routes and affected movement within the enlarged
truly integrated into European so- borders sections change perma- Schengen area is preserved. Pro-
cieties. This causes social conflicts nently. Despite differing migration active foreign policies keep stabil-
and critical perception of migration policies, the control of EU external ity and migration manageable on a
– but without important security is- borders is a common interest with long-term view. Actions regarding
sues. Border management is Mem- high priority on security. In reality border control are the responsibil-
ber States’ affair, there are very few foreign policies remain passive and ity of rather independent Mem-
common activities, and EU institu- there are only few concerted ac- ber States, but communication and
tions are only barely involved. tions in border management. collaboration is on a very high level.

Global environment Constant global side-conditions Growing global conflicts and strong Globalisation, ecological
with economic migration pressure economic migration pressure and security problems –
but less global conflicts

Cross-border crime (CBC) / Limited development of CBC; OCG focus on specific fields; Wide range of OCG activities;
organised crime groups (OCG) constant threat of terrorism constant threat of terrorism growing threat of terrorism

European integration Erosion of EU and possible exit Closed EU without EU with significant
of selected Member States stronger integration growth perspective, but
no further integration

European foreign policy Passive policy based on short- Passive policy based on Realpolitik Proactive policy based on Realpolitik
term expectations of the public

Migration and integration Strong migration but split societies, Closed societies – less migration Strong migration into open societies
less acceptance and conflicts and no willingness for integration with high level of integration

European asylum policies Restrictive access to process – but In general, restrictive policy – but Generally permissive policies –
problems in Dublin implementation less harmonised implementation relying on Dublin implementation

Security and internal mobility Low security orientation and High security orientation and Free movement and high
increase of internal border controls internal border controls security orientation

Border management (BM) BM by individual Member States BM by individual Member States BM as bilateral / joint cooperation
– few but inefficient common – few but inefficient common – efficient registration &
procedures and fewer returns procedures and fewer returns information, fewer returns

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 © [Link]
Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7

Restrictive Policies Multi-speed Europe More Europe Open Doors

Restrictive and uncoordinated Limited migration and Integrated EU profits External borders lose relevance
migration policies but common successful integration from migration and copes in a peaceful world
long-term security strategy in an adaptable EU with global challenges

Growing global conflicts and eco- The world has speeded up, with fur- The world has to face significant The world is able to breathe again as
nomic disparities between EU and ther globalisation, intensification of political and environmental chal- conflicts can be solved and environ-
third countries are substantial push international conflicts and terrorist lenges, and for this reason, coun- mental degradation can be slowed
factors for migration. The EU has activities. Within the EU, there are tries all over the world close ranks down. In this peaceful world, Mem-
turned away from the idea of a different views on the integration and cooperate. EU Member States ber States close ranks and crime or
stronger integrated federation. Tra- process. This has led to a ‘multi- understand that they have to act terrorist activities play no signifi-
ditional values dominate, and in many speed Europe’ where some Mem- consistently in times of external cant role. They understand Europe
challenges. The integration within
Member States there are critical views ber States create more integrated as political, economic and social un-
a number of Member States in-
on foreigners for different reasons, systems, and others stick to their ion with one common mindset. For-
tensifies. Society lives the ‘Euro-
which leads to restrictive migration national values and interests. Eu- eign policy is proactive as Europe
pean idea’ and understands itself
and asylum policies. Even the integra- rope has withdrawn from a value- believes in its values and wants to
as open union. Migrants from dif-
tion of few migrants is difficult. Nev- driven foreign policy, and opted for manifest human rights all over the
ferent cultures are seen as enrich-
ertheless the variety of global conflicts a Realpolitik line, including restrictive world. Due to this social conviction,
ment and integrate eagerly. Legal
and terrorist threats strengthened the migration policies. This comprises Europe opens its arms and wel-
migration and asylum processes are
wish for a common security policy. legal migration for a small number comes large numbers of migrants,
set up consistently within all Mem-
Foreign policies focus on containment, of highly educated migrants who ber States. Nevertheless the pres- especially by a permissive legal mi-
and the Dublin process is strictly im- can easily be integrated. The Schen- sure on the external border remains gration policy. Migration is not seen
plemented to control migrants directly gen area includes border controls, high, so that security is still a main as a security problem, and Member
at the external border. Member States but some aspects of free move- topic. Europe tries to react consid- States closely coordinate their ac-
act individually, the EU mandate for ment remain. In border manage- erately by a long-term proactive tions. In case of crisis, EU intervenes
border management is often symbolic. ment, Member States cooperate, foreign policy and a common bor- self-contained; but overall: Com-
Member States cooperate mostly bi- and major tasks are done by a Euro- der management addressed to the mon border management is not a
laterally, which in many cases results pean border and coast guard corps. uniform European border and coast significant topic.
in efficient actions. guard corps.

Fast changing side-conditions: global Fast changing side-conditions: global Growing global conflicts and Conflicts can be solved and
conflicts and strong economic and conflicts and strong economic and special migration pressure environmental degradation
ecological migration pressure ecological migration pressure (ecology, health risks) can be slowed down

Wide range of OCG activities; Wide range of OCG activities; Wide range of OCG activities; Limited development of CBC;
growing threat of terrorism growing threat of terrorism growing threat of terrorism constant threat of terrorism

EU with significant Multi-speed Europe based on Stronger integration of Stronger integration of

growth perspective, but current Member States current Member States current Member States
no further integration

Proactive policy based on Realpolitik Proactive policy based on Realpolitik Proactive policy based on Realpolitik Proactive policy based on
values and human rights

Closed societies – less Limited migration but high Strong migration into open societies Strong migration into open societies
migration and no need (and no acceptance and good integration with high level of integration with high level of integration
willingness) for integration of well-educated migrants

More easy access to process – and More easy access to process – Generally permissive policies Open external borders
implementation of Dublin process and implementation of restrictive and implementation of a (no further access) and focus
process for distribution of applicants distribution of applicants on distribution of applicants

Free movement and high Free movement and high Free movement and high Free movement and low
security orientation security orientation security orientation security orientation

BM as bilateral / joint cooperation BM as bilateral / joint cooperation European border and coast Common BM is not a significant
– efficient registration & – efficient registration & guard corps – efficient procedure topic; Reinforced EU intervention
information, fewer returns information, many returns including decisions, fewer returns in crisis situations

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Scenario assessment: Expected development paths

The seven scenarios are initially ‘think­ to the current status. In addition, sce­ In general the scenario assessment
ing tools’, without any assigned prob­ nario 4 (‘Restrictive policies’) included showed that the scenario team expected
abilities. In this way, they are to be a lot of topical elements. Scenario 7 a continuous development with restric­
considered to stimulate thinking and (‘Open doors’) has the greatest dis­ tive policies and limitations of migration
a toll to identify little-used thinking tance to the current situation. – but within a stronger changing global
paths. For their use into specific strat­ ▪▪ Expectation for 2025: Three scenar­ environment which forces the need for a
egy and planning processes, it is nec­ ios have been assessed as the most proactive European foreign policy and a
essary to evaluate them in more detail. expected ones: Scenario 2 (‘Passive common European border management.
The scenario team assessed the different European Union’), Scenario 4 (‘Re­
scenarios in two ways: strictive policies’) and Scenario 5
▪▪ Nearness to the current situation: (‘Multi-speed Europe’). Scenario 7
Scenario 2 (‘Passive European Union’) (‘Open doors’) has the greatest dis­
was seen as the future image closest tance to the expected future, too.

Less migration and

Strong migration & open societies
restrictive policies

Scenario assessment:

Stronger European
Current

integration
Scenario 7 Scenario 6
situation Open doors More Europe

Scenario 5
Multi-speed Europe

Scenario 1
Constant or reduced European integration

Scenario 3
Attrition of
Managed diversity
European Union

TODAY
Less migration and

Scenario 2
restrictive policies

Scenario 4
Passive
Restrictive policies
European Union

Constant side-
Changing side-conditions
conditions

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How to use the scenarios ten ignored dangers of superficially ▪▪ Strategic early warning: Scenarios
‘good’ scenarios. are like ‘maps of the future’ – there­
These scenarios form a basis for an an­ ▪▪ Robustness check: Scenarios are like fore, they should not be discarded af­
nual monitoring of changes in the en­ ‘long-term weather reports’ for a vi­ ter first use, but continue to be used.
vironment and to support strategic sion, a strategy or an action plan. This process of regular observation is
decision makers whose decisions will Therefore, existing concepts can be called scenario monitoring and this is
have middle to long-term impacts so that reviewed in light of their potential particular aspect will be followed-up
they come to realistic strategies, which under different future possibilities. in future annual analysis, thus cre­
are not focused on fixed expectations or In this manner, the risks of current ating a reference platform of knowl­
ideals about the future. The scenarios strategies become clearer. At the same edge for strategic decision makers in
could be used not just by Frontex, but time, it becomes possible to detect the field of border management.
also by decision makers at the EU and whether and how far existing con­ ▪▪ Scenarios in change processes: Sce­
Member State levels. Therefore they may cepts are robust against changes in narios have also turned out to be an
be used for different objectives: the environment. important instrument in systematic
▪▪ Consequence analysis: Scenarios ▪▪ Scenario-supported decision-mak- change processes. They clarify oppor­
could be used to analysing the ef­ ing: How an organisation handle un­ tunities and needs for change as well
fects of different possible futures on certainty depends on how many and as one’s own options for action – and
an organisation. In this process, all which external scenarios are consid­ they contribute to the openness of
scenarios should be kept ‘in play’ for ered for strategic decisions. Options managers and organisations towards
as long as possible to also identify range from focused strategies (fit to the future.
the opportunities hidden in scenar­ one or a few scenarios) to robust strat­
ios perceived as negative and the of­ egies (fit to many or all scenarios).

Less migration and

Strong migration & open societies
restrictive policies

Scenario assessment:
Stronger European

Expected
integration

Scenario 7 Scenario 6
Open doors More Europe
future

Scenario 5
Multi-speed Europe

Scenario 1
Constant or reduced European integration

Scenario 3
Attrition of
Managed diversity
European Union

EXPECTED
FUTURE
TODAY
Less migration and

Scenario 2
restrictive policies

Scenario 4
Passive
Restrictive policies
European Union

Constant side-
Changing side-conditions
conditions

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© Frontex
8. Conclusions
The EU external borders are confronted information which can be further used
with three major challenges: an unprec­ for intelligence and risk analysis pur­
edented rise in migratory pressure, an poses. Improving intelligence and an­
increasing terrorist threat and a steady alytical capacities is thus also of great
rise in the number of regular travellers. importance. The development of risk
The challenge for border-con­trol authori­ profiles of arrivals and training for bor­
ties is thus to become more effective and der guards in­volved in these fields would
efficient whilst maintaining the neces­ also help to en­sure greater identification.
sary quality standards. One improvement which has been
Given the threats visible at the exter­ evident in the preceding years is the
nal bor­ders of the EU, it is evident that increas­ing pool of sources of informa­
border man­agement has an important tion and data from the external border.
security component. What useful func­ Information is key to situational moni­
tion can be played by the border author­ toring and for analytical purposes and
ities in the area of counter-ter­rorism? so the improved availability of infor­
The threat of terrorist activi­ties and the mation is of critical importance. How­
methods of entry into the EU have been ever, with greater information comes
much discussed during the past year a greater challenge in utilising it effec­
due to several incidents which occurred tively. This is especially the case in emer­
within the EU in 2014 and 2015. Delin­ gency sit­uations when large amounts
eating the tasks and potential tools of of information are available but time
those working at the borders to help com­ is scarce. It is in this context that data
bat this threat is an important discussion and situational informa­tion are some­
which should be undertaken. times not enough, but authori­ties will
The corollary of the unprecedented require the analysis and intelligence de­
number of arrivals was the strain placed rived from them to make the fully in­
on border-control authorities, which left formed decisions. The management
them with fewer resources available for of this knowl­edge process is critical.
identifying those attempting to enter the Regular passenger flows across the
EU. This then resulted in high numbers external border will also increase signif­
of entrants were not even attributed a icantly in the com­ing years, in particu­
national­ity, let alone their identity thor­ lar at the air border due to rising global
oughly checked. The importance of this mobility. Visa liberalisation processes
issue is twofold; firstly, granting inter­ and local border traf­fi c agreements are
national protection to those in need is a also placing increasing re­sponsibility
legal obligation. Hence, there is a strong on border-control authorities. Increas­
need to ensure the cor­rect and full iden­ ingly, while movements across the ex­
tification of those arriving at the bor­ ternal air borders are managed through
ders so as to provide the full nec­essary a layered approach, where the border is
protection, where required. Secondly, divided into four tiers, the physical bor­
the identification issue concerns the po­ der is increasingly becoming a second­
tential threat to internal security. With ary layer for risk assessment, meaning
large num­bers of arrivals remaining es­ that checking and screening start well
sentially unclas­sified for a variety of rea­ before passengers cross border-control
sons, there is clearly a risk that persons posts at airports. Border management
representing a se­curity threat maybe en­ will increasingly be risk-based, to en­
tering the EU. sure that interventions are focused on
Second-line checks on arrivals are a high-risk movements of people, while
crucial step in the identification process. low-risk movements are facilitated
They also provide an important source of smoothly.

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9. Statistical annex

LEGEND

Symbols and abbreviations: n.a. not applicable

: data not available
Source: FRAN and EDF-RAN data as of 22 January 2016, unless otherwise indicated
Note: ‘Member States’ in the tables refer to FRAN Member States, including
both 28 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries

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Annex Table 1. Illegal border-crossing between BCPs
Detections by border type and top ten nationalities at the external borders
Share of % change
2012 2013 2014 2015 total on prev. year

All Borders
Syria 7 903 25 546 78 764 594 059 33 654
Not specified 2 113 3 571 386 556 432 31 144 053
Afghanistan 13 169 9 494 22 132 267 485 15 1 109
Iraq 1 219 537 2 110 101 285 5.6 4 700
Pakistan 4 877 5 047 4 059 43 314 2.4 967
Eritrea 2 604 11 298 34 586 40 348 2.2 17
Iran 611 404 468 24 673 1.4 5 172
Kosovo* 990 6 357 22 069 23 793 1.3 7.8
Nigeria 826 3 386 8 715 23 609 1.3 171
Somalia 5 038 5 624 7 676 17 694 1 131
Others 33 087 36 101 101 997 129 645 7.1 27
Total all borders 72 437 107 365 282 962 1 822 337 100 544

Land Border
Not specified 1 817 3 469 189 556 285 70 294 231
Syria 6 416 8 601 12 066 97 551 12 708
Afghanistan 9 838 4 392 9 445 55 077 7 483
Kosovo* 990 6 350 22 069 23 792 3 7.8
Pakistan 3 344 3 211 555 17 448 2.2 3 044
Iraq 1 027 413 939 10 145 1.3 980
Albania 5 460 8 833 9 268 9 450 1.2 2
Bangladesh 4 751 687 311 4 413 0.6 1 319
Iran 457 214 262 1 550 0.2 492
Congo 502 175 138 1 124 0.1 714
Others 14 581 10 847 7 526 12 409 1.6 65
Total land borders 49 183 47 192 62 768 789 244 100 1 157

Sea Border
Syria 1 487 16 945 66 698 496 508 48 644
Afghanistan 3 331 5 102 12 687 212 408 21 1 574
Iraq 192 124 1 171 91 140 8.8 7 683
Eritrea 1 942 10 953 34 323 39 773 3.8 16
Pakistan 1 533 1 836 3 504 25 866 2.5 638
Iran 154 190 206 23 123 2.2 11 125
Nigeria 575 2 870 8 490 22 668 2.2 167
Somalia 3 480 5 054 7 440 16 927 1.6 128
Morocco 700 672 3 042 12 704 1.2 318
Sudan 61 302 3 432 9 349 0.9 172
Others 9 799 16 125 79 201 82 627 8 4.3
Total sea borders 23 254 60 173 220 194 1 033 093 100 369
* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

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Annex Table 2. Clandestine entries at BCPs
Detections reported by border type and top ten nationalities at the external borders
Share of % change
2012 2013 2014 2015 total on prev. year

Border Type
Land 476 558 2 972 3 627 100 22
Sea 115 41 80 15 0.4 -81

Top Ten Nationalities

Syria 36 181 1 091 1 868 51 71
Afghanistan 190 128 1 022 966 27 -5.5
Iraq 14 12 85 305 8.4 259
Algeria 61 48 120 144 4 20
Pakistan 24 30 63 90 2.5 43
Guinea 8 4 66 62 1.7 -6.1
Morocco 24 33 16 52 1.4 225
Palestine 24 5 7 34 0.9 386
Iran 5 3 33 18 0.5 -45
Myanmar 0 2 83 15 0.4 -82
Others 205 153 466 88 2.4 -81

Total 591 599 3 052 3 642 100 19

Annex Table 3. Facilitators

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities
Share of % change
2012 2013 2014 2015 total on prev. year

Place of Detection
Land 903 695 1 214 4 711 39 288
Inland 5 076 5 057 6 828 4 669 39 -32
Sea 471 394 585 1 137 9.5 94
Land intra-EU 494 566 811 872 7.3 7.5
Not specified 320 267 457 357 3 -22
Air 358 273 339 277 2.3 -18

Top Ten Nationalities

Morocco 455 366 959 1 138 9.5 19
Not specified 514 693 681 703 5.8 3.2
Spain 498 241 510 613 5.1 20
Albania 241 279 413 611 5.1 48
Syria 79 172 398 533 4.4 34
France 351 271 417 469 3.9 12
Bulgaria 157 211 322 426 3.5 32
Romania 362 225 275 413 3.4 50
Turkey 232 185 396 411 3.4 3.8
Italy 513 675 487 370 3.1 -24
Others 4 260 3 934 5 376 6 336 53 18

Total 7 662 7 252 10 234 12 023 100 17

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Annex Table 4. Illegal stay
Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities
Share of % change
2012 2013 2014 2015 total on prev. year

Place of Detection
Inland 242 270 253 103 366 467 632 286 90 73
Air 35 410 31 009 33 793 39 559 5.6 17
Land 19 883 17 677 15 345 18 704 2.7 22
Land intra-EU 5 832 3 216 3 929 5 763 0.8 47
Between BCPs 724 574 2 160 2 609 0.4 21
Not specified 56 38 2 372 2 023 0.3 -15
Sea 4 585 1 396 901 681 0.1 -24

Top Ten Nationalities

Syria 6 907 16 402 53 618 140 261 20 162
Afghanistan 19 980 14 220 22 358 95 765 14 328
Iraq 6 812 4 452 5 800 61 177 8.7 955
Eritrea 3 243 5 975 32 477 39 330 5.6 21
Morocco 20 959 25 706 28 416 32 549 4.6 15
Albania 12 031 15 510 21 177 28 485 4.1 35
Pakistan 18 092 14 034 12 803 23 199 3.3 81
Ukraine 12 965 12 345 15 771 22 615 3.2 43
Kosovo* 3 949 5 192 9 548 16 018 2.3 68
Algeria 15 420 14 116 14 769 15 587 2.2 5.5
Others 188 402 179 061 208 230 226 639 32 8.8

Total 308 760 307 013 424 967 701 625 100 65

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

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Annex Table 5. Refusals of entry
Refusals reported by border type and top ten nationalities at the external borders
Share of % change
2012 2013 2014 2015 total on prev. year

All Borders
Ukraine 18 108 16 380 16 814 25 283 21 50
Albania 12 932 11 564 13 001 15 025 13 16
Russian Federation 10 113 22 698 10 772 10 671 9 -0.9
Serbia 5 652 8 181 8 657 6 883 5.8 -20
Belarus 5 035 4 572 5 171 4 715 4 -8.8
Morocco 4 256 5 372 4 439 4 085 3.4 -8
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 693 3 523 4 010 3 784 3.2 -5.6
Turkey 3 086 2 999 3 048 3 250 2.7 6.6
Brazil 3 042 2 524 2 313 2 634 2.2 14
Algeria 1 407 2 075 2 730 2 435 2.1 -11
Others 52 072 49 347 43 932 39 730 34 -9.6
Total all borders 117 396 129 235 114 887 118 495 100 3.1

Land Border
Ukraine 17 007 15 375 15 573 23 857 36 53
Russian Federation 7 306 20 236 9 013 9 299 14 3.2
Albania 8 250 6 504 7 005 7 893 12 13
Serbia 4 810 7 405 7 868 6 016 9 -24
Belarus 4 912 4 430 5 009 4 588 6.9 -8.4
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 532 3 363 3 843 3 578 5.4 -6.9
Morocco 2 738 3 938 2 975 2 370 3.6 -20
Turkey 1 479 1 514 1 634 1 946 2.9 19
FYR Macedonia 1 781 1 758 1 707 1 523 2.3 -11
Moldova 992 736 754 1 038 1.6 38
Others 15 170 13 347 8 320 4 395 6.6 -47
Total land borders 65 977 78 606 63 701 66 503 100 4.4

Air Border
Albania 2 689 3 159 3 762 4 601 9.8 22
Brazil 2 980 2 481 2 275 2 598 5.6 14
Algeria 1 330 2 001 2 642 2 335 5 -12
United States 1 966 2 305 2 307 1 737 3.7 -25
China 1 195 1 186 1 422 1 550 3.3 9
Not specified 1 948 1 910 1 668 1 535 3.3 -8
Nigeria 1 709 1 647 1 653 1 388 3 -16
Ukraine 965 921 1 124 1 318 2.8 17
Russian Federation 1 650 1 812 1 584 1 293 2.8 -18
Morocco 997 963 893 1 124 2.4 26
Others 26 634 26 400 26 962 27 234 58 1
Total air borders 44 063 44 785 46 292 46 713 100 0.9

Sea Border
Albania 1 993 1 901 2 234 2 531 48 13
Morocco 521 471 571 591 11 3.5
Turkey 185 228 188 273 5.2 45
Tunisia 128 139 136 190 3.6 40
Afghanistan 40 52 56 165 3.1 195
Syria 129 125 133 115 2.2 -14
India 258 151 83 109 2.1 31
Ukraine 136 84 117 108 2 -7.7
Iraq 111 58 70 105 2 50
Algeria 45 46 72 93 1.8 29
Others 3 810 2 589 1 234 999 19 -19
Total sea borders 7 356 5 844 4 894 5 279 100 7.9

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Annex Table 6. Reasons for refusals of entry
Reasons for refusals of entry reported by top ten nationalities at the external borders

Reasons for refusals of entry (see description below) Total

Total Refusals
Reasons
A B C D E F G H I n.a.

Top Ten Nationalities

Ukraine 25 283 106 186 6 582 23 12 367 1 265 1 698 844 148 2 153 25 372
Albania 15 025 147 173 324 10 5 038 582 3 310 4 005 161 1 334 15 084
Russian Federation 10 671 101 12 7 325 16 945 306 452 173 859 699 10 888
Serbia 6 883 227 53 312 3 1 204 2 112 1 219 1 566 56 163 6 915
Belarus 4 715 117 2 2 114 5 386 265 637 156 434 669 4 785
Morocco 4 085 927 76 924 64 506 30 250 699 335 266 4 077
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 784 852 3 144 4 1 311 66 1 169 118 68 51 3 786
Turkey 3 250 289 16 1 961 24 339 253 91 108 23 149 3 253
Brazil 2 634 13 19 144 1 558 111 118 189 8 1 479 2 640
Algeria 2 435 42 20 225 13 1 298 25 639 32 13 130 2 437
Others 39 730 2 179 1 046 9 591 613 9 438 1 342 2 209 1 872 471 11 184 39 945

Total 118 495 5 000 1 606 29 646 776 33 390 6 357 11 792 9 762 2 576 18 307 119 212

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:

A has no valid travel document(s);
B has a  false / counterfeit / forged travel document;
C has no valid visa or residence permit;
D has a false / counterfeit / forged visa or residence permit;
E has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;
F has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the European Union;
G does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;
H is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;
I is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the European Union;

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Annex Table 7. Reasons for refusals of entry
Reasons for refusals of entry at the external borders reported by border type
Share of % change
2012 2013 2014 2015 total on prev. year Highest share

All Borders Member State

E) No justification 25 261 26 511 24 567 33 390 28 36 Ukraine (37%)
C) No valid visa 35 941 50 030 34 841 29 646 25 -15 Russian Federation (25%)
Reason not available 11 127 12 449 14 772 18 307 15 24 Ukraine (12%)
G) No subsistence 10 885 11 128 10 870 11 792 9.9 8.5 Albania (28%)
H) Alert issued 15 423 10 787 12 682 9 762 8.2 -23 Albania (41%)
F) Over 3 month stay 5 346 5 045 7 219 6 357 5.3 -12 Serbia (33%)
A) No valid document 7 845 8 997 6 333 5 000 4.2 -21 Morocco (19%)
I) Threat 3 262 3 077 2 753 2 576 2.2 -6.4 Russian Federation (33%)
B) False document 3 712 2 571 2 052 1 606 1.3 -22 Not specified (13%)
D) False visa 1 842 1 552 1 139 776 0.7 -32 Morocco (8.2%)
Total all borders 120 644 132 147 117 228 119 212 100 1.7

Land Border Member State

C) No valid visa 25 033 40 163 25 195 21 054 32 -16 Russian Federation (32%)
E) No justification 11 802 12 724 10 688 18 972 28 78 Ukraine (62%)
G) No subsistence 7 342 7 517 6 594 7 278 11 10 Albania (29%)
H) Alert issued 10 980 7 289 9 094 6 564 9.8 -28 Albania (37%)
F) Over 3 month stay 4 497 4 018 5 566 4 920 7.4 -12 Serbia (41%)
Reason not available 0 595 1 427 3 048 4.6 114 Ukraine (60%)
A) No valid document 3 478 5 071 3 275 2 579 3.9 -21 Morocco (33%)
I) Threat 2 064 1 803 1 615 1 856 2.8 15 Russian Federation (44%)
B) False document 1 352 498 393 372 0.6 -5.3 Ukraine (47%)
D) False visa 640 434 176 135 0.2 -23 Morocco (16%)
Total land borders 67 188 80 112 64 023 66 778 100 4.3

Air Border Member State

Reason not available 10 713 11 372 12 641 14 302 30 13 Brazil (10%)
E) No justification 12 806 12 930 12 885 13 395 28 4 Albania (13%)
C) No valid visa 8 647 8 372 9 029 7 918 17 -12 China (7.6%)
G) No subsistence 3 297 3 332 3 649 3 644 7.7 -0.1 Algeria (17%)
H) Alert issued 2 686 2 335 2 556 2 153 4.6 -16 Albania (36%)
A) No valid document 2 611 2 647 2 443 1 973 4.2 -19 Not specified (29%)
F) Over 3 month stay 834 949 1 565 1 388 2.9 -11 Albania (11%)
B) False document 2 239 2 009 1 600 1 172 2.5 -27 Not specified (17%)
I) Threat 1 121 1 149 1 014 609 1.3 -40 Suriname (23%)
D) False visa 1 126 1 043 854 596 1.3 -30 India (5.5%)
Total air borders 46 080 46 138 48 236 47 150 100 -2.3

Sea Border Member State

H) Alert issued 1 757 1 162 982 1 045 20 6.4 Albania (77%)
E) No justification 653 857 987 1 023 19 3.6 Albania (66%)
Reason not available 414 482 704 957 18 36 Morocco (20%)
G) No subsistence 246 279 626 870 16 39 Albania (96%)
C) No valid visa 2 261 1 492 610 674 13 10 Tunisia (15%)
A) No valid document 1 756 1 279 615 448 8.5 -27 Turkey (27%)
I) Threat 77 125 124 111 2.1 -10 Albania (58%)
B) False document 121 64 55 62 1.2 13 Syria (29%)
F) Over 3 month stay 15 78 88 49 0.9 -44 Turkey (41%)
D) False visa 76 75 106 45 0.9 -58 Morocco (42%)
Total sea borders 7 376 5 893 4 897 5 284 100 7.9

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Annex Table 8. Document fraudsters – external borders
Persons detected using fraudulent documents at BCPs on entry to EU or Schengen area by border type and top ten nationalities claimed

Share of % change
2013 2014 2015 total on prev. year

Border Type
Air 7 058 6 511 5 331 64 -18
Land 2 141 2 484 2 671 32 7.5
Sea 605 425 367 4.4 -14
Not specified 0 1 4 0 300

Top Ten Nationalities Claimed

Ukraine 536 519 1 186 14 129
Not specified 1 197 742 1 013 12 37
Morocco 666 767 867 10 13
Syria 1 209 1 447 745 8.9 -49
Albania 1 008 573 425 5.1 -26
Iran 321 263 340 4.1 29
Nigeria 481 516 291 3.5 -44
Iraq 149 338 245 2.9 -28
Sri Lanka 126 315 207 2.5 -34
Congo (D.R.) 169 142 148 1.8 4.2
Others 3 942 3 799 2 906 35 -24

Total 9 804 9 421 8 373 100 -11

Annex Table 9. Fraudulent documents – external borders

Detections of fraudulent documents on entry from third countries to EU or Schengen area by country of issuance and type of document
Share of % change
2013 2014 2015 total on prev. year Highest share

Country of Issuance Type of Document

Poland 597 492 1 011 10 105 Visas (84%)
Spain 761 1 020 973 10 -4.6 Residence permits (30%)
Italy 1 048 1 154 931 9.6 -19 ID cards (33%)
France 1 335 1 165 906 9.4 -22 Passports (39%)
Belgium 465 383 477 4.9 25 Residence permits (35%)
Germany 560 396 476 4.9 20 Residence permits (38%)
Greece 1 390 917 473 4.9 -48 Passports (28%)
Morocco 116 515 341 3.5 -34 Passports (96%)
Sweden 374 298 162 1.7 -46 Passports (61%)
Nigeria 131 165 159 1.6 -3.6 Passports (96%)
Others 4 571 4 266 3 779 39 -11 Passports (68%)

Type of Document Type of Fraud

Passports 5 046 4 953 4 068 42 -18 Forged (39%)
Visas 1 816 1 617 1 934 20 20 Authentic (53%)
Residence permits 1 763 1 507 1 384 14 -8.2 Counterfeit (39%)
ID cards 1 112 1 414 1 207 12 -15 Counterfeit (42%)
Stamps 1 411 1 047 903 9.3 -14 Counterfeit (77%)
Other 200 233 192 2 -18 Counterfeit (68%)

Total 11 348 10 771 9 688 100 -10

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Annex Table 10. Return decisions issued
Decisions issued by top ten nationalities
Share of % change
2012 2013 2014 2015 total on prev. year

Top Ten Nationalities

Syria 8 129 12 599 26 489 27 937 9.7 5.5
Albania 15 356 17 983 21 287 26 453 9.2 24
Morocco 15 436 12 486 19 789 22 360 7.8 13
Afghanistan 23 147 9 301 11 861 18 655 6.5 57
Ukraine 9 255 9 242 11 026 17 709 6.2 61
Iraq 5 629 3 517 3 292 16 093 5.6 389
Pakistan 24 707 16 567 13 717 12 777 4.5 -6.9
India 10 628 10 193 8 860 8 287 2.9 -6.5
Nigeria 9 345 8 549 7 135 7 059 2.5 -1.1
Algeria 13 771 8 732 7 790 6 832 2.4 -12
Others 134 546 115 136 120 744 122 563 43 1.5

Total 269 949 224 305 251 990 286 725 100 14

Annex Table 11. Effective returns

People effectively returned to third countries by top ten nationalities
Share of % change
2012 2013 2014 2015 total on prev. year

Top Ten Nationalities

Albania 13 149 20 544 26 442 30 468 17 15
Ukraine 7 645 7 763 9 582 15 010 8.6 57
Kosovo* 3 666 4 537 4 744 10 136 5.8 114
India 8 946 8 958 7 609 9 419 5.4 24
Morocco 7 667 6 758 8 595 8 158 4.7 -5.1
Pakistan 10 488 12 127 9 609 8 089 4.6 -16
Serbia 7 520 6 512 6 243 7 482 4.3 20
Iraq 3 125 2 584 1 932 4 831 2.8 150
Russian Federation 6 894 8 216 6 652 4 595 2.6 -31
Syria 795 938 2 495 4 522 2.6 81
Others 89 060 81 481 77 406 72 510 41 -6.3

Total 158 955 160 418 161 309 175 220 100 8.6

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

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Annex Table 12. Effective returns by type of return
People effectively returned to third countries by type of return and top ten nationalities

2012 2013 2014 2015 Share of total % change on prev. year

TYPE OF RETURN
Forced 82 061 87 465 69 400 72 473 41 4.4
Enforced by Member State 71 568 76 062 50 418 54 195 75 7.5
Not specified 8 759 9 832 17 014 15 724 22 -7.6
Enforced by Joint Operation 1 734 1 571 1 968 2 554 3.5 30
Voluntary 65 596 64 588 63 896 81 681 47 28
Others 36 433 34 615 37 488 54 466 67 45
IOM-assisted 15 417 16 035 11 325 14 391 18 27
Not specified 13 746 13 938 15 083 12 824 16 -15
Not specified 11 298 8 365 28 013 21 066 12 -25

Total 158 955 160 418 161 309 175 220 100 8.6

TOP TEN NATIONALITIES

Forced
Albania 11 944 19 296 6 306 10 249 14 63
Morocco 3 275 2 943 7 158 6 802 9.4 -5
Kosovo* 2 063 2 266 2 708 4 742 6.5 75
Serbia 2 943 3 353 3 164 4 049 5.6 28
Syria 593 789 1 504 3 695 5.1 146
Nigeria 2 714 2 707 2 488 2 311 3.2 -7.1
Tunisia 5 137 3 123 3 048 2 268 3.1 -26
Algeria 2 521 2 617 2 811 2 232 3.1 -21
Pakistan 7 178 8 369 2 942 2 067 2.9 -30
India 3 427 2 898 2 314 1 932 2.7 -17
Others 40 266 39 104 34 957 32 126 44 -8.1
4.4

Total Forced Returns 82 061 87 465 69 400 72 473 41 4.4

Voluntary
Ukraine 6 079 6 248 8 122 13 017 16 60
India 5 462 6 032 5 111 7 399 9.1 45
Kosovo* 1 603 2 271 2 035 5 363 6.6 164
Albania 1 100 1 171 2 013 4 626 5.7 130
Pakistan 3 076 3 663 3 507 4 479 5.5 28
Iraq 2 071 1 493 1 094 3 643 4.5 233
Russian Federation 5 532 6 715 5 018 3 469 4.2 -31
Serbia 4 552 3 126 3 020 3 374 4.1 12
Bangladesh 1 427 1 872 1 402 2 198 2.7 57
China 2 702 2 796 2 391 2 122 2.6 -11
Others 31 992 29 201 30 183 31 991 39 6

Total Voluntary Returns 65 596 64 588 63 896 81 681 47 28

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

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Annex Table 13. Passenger flow on entry
Data reported (on a voluntary basis) by border type and top ten nationalities

Air Land Sea Total % change

Share of on prev.
2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 total year

Top Ten Nationalities

Not specified 90 333 109 98 460 249 35 059 165 26 648 082 15 779 407 13 810 322 141 171 681 138 918 653 62 -1.6
EU MS/SAC 9 036 096 12 988 627 24 067 501 33 359 678 503 579 1 514 408 33 607 176 47 862 713 21 42
Ukraine 193 219 285 457 10 285 108 12 175 572 50 207 51 130 10 528 534 12 512 159 5.6 19
Russian Federation 579 054 1 370 134 9 554 369 7 702 667 303 693 254 801 10 437 116 9 327 602 4.2 -11
Belarus 45 696 147 116 4 925 467 4 450 792 2 030 2 682 4 973 193 4 600 590 2.1 -7.5
Serbia 11 528 33 893 2 456 862 2 646 078 3 372 3 770 2 471 762 2 683 741 1.2 8.6
Moldova 9 148 16 408 1 028 245 1 363 351 418 5 962 1 037 811 1 385 721 0.6 34
Turkey 147 642 249 865 157 063 991 935 11 211 18 788 315 916 1 260 588 0.6 299
Israel 321 532 670 099 22 305 27 662 6 443 6 311 350 280 704 072 0.3 101
FYR Macedonia 2 290 9 686 149 691 559 422 913 660 152 894 569 768 0.3 273

Total 101 863 139 116 207 439 88 074 244 90 518 230 17 183 825 16 205 725 207 121 208 222 931 394 100 7.6

Notes on FRAN data sources and methods

The term Member States refers to FRAN In addition, data on detections of il­ For the data concerning detections
Member States, which includes the 28 legal border-crossing at land, air and of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data
Member States and the three Schengen sea BCPs (1B) are not available for Ice­ on detections on exit are not available
Associated Countries (Iceland, Norway land, Ireland and Spain, and in Greece for Denmark, Ireland, Italy and the UK.
and Switzerland). For the data concern­ these detections are included in the Data on detections of illegal stay inland
ing detections at the external borders of data for indicator 1A. Data for Norway have not been available from the Neth­
the EU, some of the border types are not only include detections of illegal bor­ erlands since 2012. Data from Sweden
applicable to all FRAN Member States. der-crossing at land and sea BCPs (1B), for Illegal stay have been revised start­
This pertains to data on all FRAN in­ not between BCPs (1A). ing with 2010.
dicators since the data are provided Data on detections of illegal border- Data on refusals of entry (FRAN In­
disaggregated by border type. The def­ crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not dicator 4) at the external EU borders are
initions of detections at land borders available for Ireland. For 2013, data from not disaggregated by reason of refusal
are therefore not applicable (excluding Slovenia include detections at the EU ex­ for Ireland and the UK.
borders with non- Schengen principal­ ternal borders only until June 2013. Data The data on passenger flow (shared
ities) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, from Spain at the land border with Mo­ on voluntary basis) are not available
Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, rocco have been revised by reporting only for Austria, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, It­
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the detections of persons crossing the bor­ aly, Malta, Sweden and the UK. Data
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Swit­ der irregularly by climbing the fence. on passenger flow at the air border are
zerland and the UK. For Cyprus, the Data on apprehension (FRAN Indi­ not available according to the definition
land border refers to the Green Line cator 2) of facilitators are not available for Spain. Data at the sea border are not
demarcation with the area where the for Ireland and UK. For Italy, the data available for Spain, the Netherlands, Ro­
Government of the Republic of Cyprus are not disaggregated by border type, mania and Denmark.
does not exercise effective control. For but are reported as total apprehensions For all indicators, data from Croatia
sea borders, the definitions are not ap­ (not specified). Data for Italy and Nor­ are available only starting with July 2013.
plicable for land-locked Member States way also include the facilitation of ille­
including Austria, the Czech Republic, gal stay and work. For Romania, the data
Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and include land Intra-EU detections on exit
Switzerland. at the border with Hungary.

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European Agency for the Management For Public Release
of Operational Cooperation
at the External Borders of the Member Risk Analysis Unit
States of the European Union
Reference number: 2499 / 2016
Plac Europejski 6
00-844 Warsaw, Poland Print version:
TT-AC-16-001-EN-C
T +48 22 205 95 00 ISBN 978-92-95205-47-5
F +48 22 205 95 01 ISSN 1977-4451
doi:10.2819/26690
frontex@[Link]
[Link] Online version:
TT-AC-16-001-EN-N
ISBN 978-92-95205-46-8
ISSN 1977-446X
doi:10.2819/416783

Warsaw, March 2016