1. PP v De Grano, G.R. No.

167710, Jume 5, 2009

FACTS:
➢ On November 8, 1991, an information for murder committed against Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the RTC of
Batangas against Joven de Grano (Joven), Armando de Grano (Armando), and Estanislao Lacaba (Estanislao), together
with their co-accused Leonides Landicho (Leonides), Domingo Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo Genil (Leonardo),
who were at-large.
➢ In arraignment, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded "not guilty" to the crime as charged; while their co-accused
Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large. Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for bail contending that the
prosecution’s evidence was not strong.
➢ Meanwhile, considering that one of the accused was the incumbent Mayor at the time when the crime was committed, the
Senior State Prosecutor Hernani moved the venue to be transferred from RTC Batangas to RTC Manila.
➢ Before transferring the case to RTC Manila, the trial court deferred the resolution of respondent’s motion for bail. When the
prosecution presented its evidence and failed to prove that the evidence for treachery and evident premeditation was
strong, the RTC Manila granted the motion for bail.
➢ The prosecution challenged this up to the Supreme Court, set aside the bail orders and ordered the accused's arrest.
Estanislao was re-arrested, but Joven and Armando were not. The Supreme Court later remanded the case to the RTC for
decision on the merits.
➢ The RTC rendered a decision finding Joven, Armando, Domingo, and Estanislao guilty of murder. Only Estanislao was
present at the promulgation. Joven, Armando, and Domingo were at-large.
➢ Respondents, also those who were at large, through counsel, filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration. The prosecution
opposed, arguing that those at-large lost their right to file the motion. The RTC issued an order modifying its decision
by acquitting Joven and Armando and downgrading the conviction of Domingo and Estanislao to homicide.
➢ The prosecution, assisted by private counsel, filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, arguing that the
respondents at-large lost their right to seek reconsideration because they were not present during the promulgation
and that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. They contended that a judgment of acquittal may be assailed via
certiorari for grave abuse of discretion, which prevents double jeopardy from attaching.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it entertained
the Join Motion for Reconsideration filed by the accused who were not present at the promulgation of judgement and were at large

HELD/RULING:
Yes, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the joint MR with respect to the respondents who were
at large

The Supreme Court based its ruling primarily on Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was
applicable at the time the Decision was promulgated. This rule provides that if the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the
accused to appear at the scheduled promulgation was without justifiable cause, "he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules
against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest.". The rule allows, however, that within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies, stating reasons for
their absence, and if justified, they are allowed to avail of said remedies within 15 days from notice.

In this case, when the RTC Decision of April 25, 2002, was promulgated, only Estanislao was present. Joven, Armando, and Domingo
were not without justifiable cause. Subsequently, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in filing a Joint Motion for
Reconsideration without first surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence.

The Court stated that in blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only failed to order the arrest of the respondents who were at large
but also took cognizance of their joint motion. By entertaining the motion with respect to the respondents who were at large, the
RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction. It should have treated the motion as filed solely by Estanislao.

The Supreme Court reiterated the principle that once an accused jumped bail or fleas, he loses his standing in court. Unless
he surrenders or submits to the court's jurisdiction, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.

Therefore, because Joven, Armando, and Domingo were at large and did not surrender before filing their motion for
reconsideration, they had lost their standing in court and their right to file such a motion. The RTC, in entertaining their motion,
acted without jurisdiction. Any ruling issued without jurisdiction is null and void and does not exist in legal contemplation.
Consequently, the RTC's order modifying the conviction for Joven, Armando, and Domingo (resulting in their acquittal or
reduced charge) was void.

Joven, Armando, and Domingo were not placed in double jeopardy because the lower tribunal acted without jurisdiction in
entertaining their motion and issuing the modifying order. A void ruling cannot be the source of an acquittal that triggers double
jeopardy.

The Court clarified that with respect to Estanislao, who was in custody and present at the promulgation, the RTC committed
no error in entertaining his motion for reconsideration, and the proscription against double jeopardy applied to him alone

CLASS NOTES:
 2. Reside v PP, G.R. No. 248682. July 28, 2020

FACTS:
➢ The petitioner (Janice Reside y Tan), while serving as Principal at Treasury of the Golden Word School, Inc. (TGWSI),
was charged with Estafa for misappropriating tuition fees from 2001 to 2005, amounting to ₱1,721,010.82.
➢ The RTC tried and convicted the petitioner for Estafa (through misappropriation).
➢ Upon appeal, the CA agreed with the RTC that the petitioner was guilty of Estafa. However, the CA found that, per the
documentary evidence presented, the total sum that petitioner failed to remit to the school amounts only to ₱134,462.90.
Hence, the CA modified the penalty imposed.
➢ Aggrieved, petitioner moved for the CA to reconsider its Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty for Estafa

HELD/RULING:
➢ The Court finds that the petitioner is guilty, not of Estafa, but of Qualified Theft.
➢ The first element of the crime charged (estafa) is absent because mere receipt of money, goods, or property is not
enough. The offender must acquire both material possession (physical control) and juridical possession (a legal right to
the property). Juridical possession grants the transferee rights over the property, enforceable even against the owner.
➢ Guzman v. Court of Appeals: As it now stands, a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an employer is
considered to be only in the material possession of the employee. Notably, such material possession of an employee is
adjunct, by reason of his employment, to a recognition of the juridical possession of the employer. As long as the juridical
possession of the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee, the offense committed is theft, qualified or otherwise.
➢ In this case, the petitioner, as principal and temporary custodian of TGWSI's funds, only held physical or material
possession of the tuition fees and was required to remit them to the school. She did not acquire juridical possession,
as she had no legal right to the funds. Therefore, she could not be convicted of estafa. Moreover, based on the
information and evidence, the crime charged aligns with qualified theft, as the petitioner misappropriated the funds
and failed to return them despite repeated demands, causing damage to TGWSI. Consequently, the petitioner was
found guilty of qualified theft.
➢ The elements of Qualified Theft are present in this case. First, the prosecution was able to establish that petitioner, as
part of her duty as principal of TGWSI, received tuition fees and other school payments from students and failed to remit the
same to the school. Second, the money taken by petitioner belongs to TGWSI. The Court, in Paramount Insurance Corp. v.
Spouses Remondeulaz,[39] clarified that there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property; if he was
entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the
same constitutes theft. Thus, the conversion of personal property in the case of an employee having material possession
of the said property constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical possession have
been transferred, misappropriation of the same property constitutes estafa. Third, the absence of TGWSI's consent was
shown in its attempts to account for the missing money through a review of its books and to recover it from petitioner. Fourth,
intent to gain on the part of the petitioner was likewise established. Intent to gain is an internal act that is presumed from the
unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. [40] Here, petitioner admitted to the taking of the funds
owing to TGWSI and even agreed to settle by signing a promissory note undertaking to pay De Dios. Fifth, no violence or
intimidation against persons nor of force upon things was employed by petitioner in obtaining the funds. Sixth, the taking was
clearly done with grave abuse of confidence. As principal of TGWSI, petitioner was authorized to collect school fees. Such
position or relation of trust and confidence was aptly established to have been gravely abused when she failed to remit the
entrusted amount of collection to TGWSI.

CLASS NOTES:
Elements of estafa through misappropriation under paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the RPC are:
1. That money, goods or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (THIS ELEMENT
IS ABSENT. THUS, PETITIONER WAS HELD LIABLE FOR QUALIFIED THEFT.)
2. That there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of the
receipt thereof;
3. That the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
4. That there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

Elements of qualified theft are as follows: (1) there was a taking of personal property; (2) the said property belongs to another; (3)
the taking was done without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking was done with intent to gain; (5) the taking was accomplished
without violence or intimidation against person, or force upon things; and (6) the taking was done under any of the circumstances
enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.
 3. PP v Malado, G.R. No. 243022. July 14, 2021

FACTS:
Accused Warton Fred y Layogan (Warton) and Paul Mark Malado y Balang (Paul) were charged with illegal possession of
approximately 17,599 grams of marijuana, a dangerous drug. The charge alleged that on April 7, 2010, in La Trinidad, Benguet,
they conspired and mutually aided each other in willfully and unlawfully possessing the said quantity of marijuana without
legal authority. Paul was a minor, aged sixteen years and eight months, at the time of the alleged crime, but was no longer a minor
during the judgment promulgation. Both accused pleaded not guilty.

According to the prosecution, based on a tip from a civilian informant (CI) received around 5:00 p.m. on April 7, 2010, PDEA agents
were informed that "Paul and Warton" would deliver marijuana bricks in Baguio that night. An anti-narcotics team was assembled
and positioned near the entrance of the Strawberry Farm at Km. 6, La Trinidad, where the CI claimed the individuals would emerge.
At around 9:00 p.m., two males emerged from a gate; the CI identified them as Paul and Warton. Paul was carrying a plastic bag,
and Warton was carrying a carton. As they walked towards the highway and Paul was about to flag down a taxi, Agents Yapes
and Asiong approached Paul, introduced themselves, and asked about the plastic bag.

When Paul did not respond, they instructed him to open the bag, found three brick-like objects, and smelled marijuana after
cutting one. Agent Yapes seized the bag, and Agent Asiong arrested Paul. The items were marked on-site. Meanwhile, Warton,
who was nearby, ran towards the Strawberry Farm upon seeing Paul apprehended, leaving his carton. Agents chased and
apprehended Warton. Agent Langwas asked Warton to open the carton, revealing seven bricks similar to those found with Paul.
Agent Yapes also marked these items on-site. Warton and Paul were brought to the PDEA-CAR Office, their identities confirmed, and
the seized items turned over to the evidence custodian. Documents were prepared, including an Inventory of Seized Items, which
was done around 1:00 a.m. on April 8, 2010, in the presence of a barangay official, media representative, and DOJ representative. The
seized items were subsequently brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory and tested positive for marijuana, with a total net weight of
17,599 grams.

The defense argued that the evidence was inadmissible due to an illegal warrantless search, that waiver of the right to contest
the validity of arrest before arraignment did not waive the right to question evidence admissibility, and that the PDEA agents
failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. 9165 regarding inventory and photographs.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found both Warton and Paul guilty. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision. It
agreed that the PDEA agents had reasonable suspicion based on the CI's information and Warton's behavior (running) which indicated
he was committing a crime, thus justifying the warrantless arrest and incidental search under Rule 113, Section 5(a). It also found
that the integrity of the seized items was preserved despite the lack of photographs. Paul did not appeal his conviction. Warton
appealed the CA decision to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Did the acquittal of accused-appellant Warton Fred y Layogan, based on the inadmissibility of evidence due to an illegal
warrantless search and arrest, benefit his co-accused, Paul Mark Malado y Balang, who did not appeal his conviction?

HELD/RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that the acquittal of Warton benefits his co-accused Paul, even though Paul did not appeal his
conviction.

The Court first determined the validity of Warton's warrantless arrest and the subsequent search. It explained that while Warton
waived his right to object to the validity of his arrest by entering a plea and participating in trial, he did not waive his right to question
the admissibility of the evidence seized. Jurisdiction over the person and the constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are separate
consequences.

The Court found Warton's warrantless arrest illegal. It did not fall under the in flagrante delicto exception (Rule 113, Section 5(a))
because there was no overt act indicating he was committing, had just committed, or was attempting to commit a crime in the
presence of the officers. The act of waiting for or flagging a taxi is not a suspicious activity. The Court specifically noted that the
PDEA agents themselves admitted they would not have accosted or arrested Warton and Paul had it not been for the informant's tip.
The Court also rejected the notion that Warton's act of running validated the arrest, stating that his running was merely a result of
Paul's illegal apprehension.

The arrest also did not qualify as a hot pursuit arrest (Rule 113, Section 5(b)), which requires the arresting officers to have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has just committed a crime. Here, the officers relied solely on the CI's
tip, not on personal knowledge. The situation was also not a valid stop and frisk because the officers lacked personal knowledge of
suspicious circumstances; they relied only on the tip and non-suspicious acts like flagging a taxi.

Since the warrantless arrest was illegal, the subsequent search of Warton's carton was also unlawful. Under Article III, Section
2 of the 1987 Constitution, any evidence obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure is inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. This is the doctrine of the "fruit of the poisonous tree". The marijuana bricks seized from Warton were thus
inadmissible in evidence. With no admissible evidence, Warton's conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs could not
stand, leading to his acquittal.

Applying Rule 122, Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states that "An appeal taken by one or more
of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable
and applicable to the latter", the Court extended Warton's acquittal to Paul. The Court found Warton's acquittal to be both favorable
(acquittal is always favorable) and applicable to Paul. The Court emphasized that they cannot disjoin the two because there is only
one transaction in this case. Paul's act of flagging down a taxi, which initiated the encounter, was also innocent. His warrantless
arrest and the subsequent search of his plastic bag were also illegal for the same reasons applicable to Warton (lack of overt act, lack
of personal knowledge, reliance on mere tip). Consequently, the marijuana seized from Paul was likewise inadmissible in evidence
as the fruit of an unlawful search. Therefore, there was also no admissible evidence to support Paul's conviction.

The Court concluded that because the grounds for Warton's acquittal – the illegality of the warrantless search and arrest
resulting in the inadmissibility of the crucial evidence – were equally applicable to Paul's situation within the same transaction,
Paul was also entitled to acquittal despite not having appealed.

CLASS NOTES:
➢ The General Rule on Appeals: An appeal taken by one of several accused does not benefit those who did not appeal.
The judgment of the lower court becomes final as to the non-appealing co-accused.
➢ The Exception: The Beneficial Appeal Rule (Rule 122, Section 11(a)): A judgment from the appellate court can benefit a
non-appealing co-accused if the judgment is favorable and applicable to them.
• Favorable: Means the outcome is better for the non-appealing accused, such as a reduction in penalty or, as in this
case, an acquittal.
• Applicable: Means the reasoning or grounds used by the appellate court to grant a favorable judgment to the
appealing accused equally applies to the factual and legal situation of the non-appealing co-accused.
• A non-appealing co-accused can benefit from a favorable judgment (like acquittal) if the core legal reason for that
judgment (like evidence being inadmissible due to an illegal search affecting both) is directly applicable to their
own situation, especially when the crime involved a single, intertwined transaction.
 4. Sio v PP, G.R. No. 224935

FACTS:
In 2010, Police Officer Paulino G. Raguindin of the PNP Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force (PNP-AIDSOTF) applied
for a Search Warrant (SW) before the Manila RTC. In the SW, he alleged that Sio, a businessperson, possessed an undetermined
quantity of shabu; a Toyota Camry with plate number ZYR 468 and a Honda Civic with plate number ZGS 763, both used in
illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs; and other vital documents. The basis of the said application was information from a
confidential informant, who claimed that Sio was selling and distributing shabu, and was using his Dalahican, Lucena City residence
to store the drugs prior to distribution.

Manila RTC subsequently issued the SW on October 22, 2010. Two days after (Oct 24), task force operatives implemented the search
warrant against Sio. The search yielded: an undetermined quantity of suspected shabu (which was later on confirmed by the PNP
Crime Lab), a .45 caliber Remington with 18 live ammunitions, and two magazines. Police also confiscated a CRV Honda vehicle
with plate number XPX 792 and a Toyota Camry with plate number ZRY 758.

Thereafter, two separate informations were filed against Sio for violating Sections 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 9165.

Before the trial court, petitioner filed an Entry of Appearance with Omnibus Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and/or to Recall Warrant of Arrest. In the omnibus motion, he pointed
to several infirmities in the SW application, including the non-existence of the Toyota Camry with plate number ZYR 468 and the
registration of the Honda Civic with plate number ZGS 763 to another person.

Sio also claimed that the SW was implemented in Barangay Purok 3-A, despite the address on the warrant being Ilaya Ibaba,
Purok 34, Barangay Dalahican, Lucena City. There were also no Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency operatives during the
implementation of the search warrant. Finally, according to Sio, police illegally seized two vehicles which were not subjects of
the SW and planted the illegal drugs in his residence.

RTC: denied the omnibus motion after finding probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant against Sio. His Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied.

Hence, Sio filed a petition for certiorari before the CA asserting that RTC gravely abused its discretion when it denied his Omnibus
Motion and issued the arrest warrant.

CA: dismissed Sio’s petition, and upheld that RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the omnibus motion. His
Motion for Reconsideration was also denied.

Thus, Sio filed a petition for certiorari before the SC, claiming that the SW was illegally implemented by the police and pointing to
the following infirmities:
➢ When the subject Search Warrant was implemented on October 24, 2010 at the subject residence of the Petitioner, the
members of the PNP-AIDSOTF were neither accompanied by PDEA cooperatives nor were authorized and/or consented
by the latter in implementing the same.
➢ When the subject Search Warrant was implemented and/or served on October 24, 2010 at the subject residence of the
Petitioner, the members of the PNP-AIDSOTF were not accompanied by media person or barangay official.
➢ The members of the PNP-AIDSOTF entered the house of the Petitioner around 7:00 o'clock in the morning on October
24, 2010 and that the media people and the barangay officials came in at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning which has
an interval period of three (3) hours from the time they entered the subject residence of the Petitioner and the time the
media people and the barangay officials came in to Petitioner's residence.
➢ When the subject search was conducted at the subject residence of Accused Antonio Sio, it was not made in the presence
of the lawful occupant of the subject house and/or any member of the family of Petitioner Antonio Sio and/or without
the presence of any representative from the barangay.

ISSUE: Whether the implementation of the search warrant was unreasonable, rendering the evidence seized inadmissible

HELD/RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court found that the pieces of evidence seized from the unreasonable search and seizure are inadmissible.
Without these, there is no probable cause for the filing of the Informations against petitioner Antonio U. Sio.

Rule 126, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides: “A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.”

Search warrants must describe particularly the places to be searched and the things to be seized. The purpose of this is to ensure
that law enforcement officers have no discretion as to where they search and what they seize. Only those places named in the
warrant should be searched, and those things listed should be seized.

The SW against Sio stated: “[a]n undetermined quantity of shabu/dangerous drugs, methamphetamine hydrochloride (SHABU);
assorted drug paraphernalias used in administering shabu; vehicle being used by the subject in his illegal drug trafficking activities
particularly a Toyota Camry with Plate No. ZYR-468 and Honda Civic with Plate No. ZGS-763; and other vital documents to illegal
drugs transaction.”

Yet, as noted by the Court of Appeals and pointed out by petitioner, the SW was implemented at Barangay Purok 3A, Barangay
Dalahican, Lucena City, not Ilaya Ibaba, Purok 34, Barangay Dalahican, Lucena City. The police officers also seized two vehicles
with plate numbers different from those stated in the search warrant. Instead of the declared Toyota Camry with plate number ZYR
468 and Honda Civic with plate number ZGS 763, a CRV Honda with plate number XPX 792 and Toyota Camry with plate number ZRY
758 were seized by the police.

The case does not involve an "obvious typographical error,” but concerns the search of a place different from that clearly identified
in the warrant. There was no ambiguity in the warrant itself; the ambiguity arose outside the instrument due to the absence of a
meeting of minds between the applicants and the Judge. Substituting the place written in the warrant with that intended by the officers
is neither fair nor licit. The Constitution requires that the place to be searched be particularly described by the Judge, not left to
the discretion of police officers. The irregularities in the search implementation and seizure of property not listed in the warrant
demonstrate unreasonable search and seizure.

Moreover, in drug cases, the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug itself. Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 requires that seized drugs be
inventoried and photographed immediately in the presence of the accused, a DOJ representative, a media representative, and
an elected official. Here, the required witnesses were absent at the time of search; they were summoned only after police entry,
with serious questions raised on possible tampering.

Because of the unreasonable search and noncompliance with Section 21, the seized evidence is inadmissible. Without the drugs,
no probable cause exists to support the arrest or the Informations.

CLASS NOTES:
 5. PP v Salanguit, GR No. 1333254-55

FACTS:
➢ Two criminal information were charged against Robert Salanguit for violating R.A. No. 6425.
○ possess and/or use 11.14 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu)
○ 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
➢ He pleaded not guilty when he was arraigned.
PROSECUTION'S VERSION:
➢ Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the Regional Trial Court to search the residence of accused-appellant Salanguit
on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a
poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant.
➢ The sale took place in accused-appellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a
cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and Presiding Judge Dolores L. Español later issued a search
warrant.
➢ Later that night, police operatives went to accused-appellant's residence to serve the warrant. They knocked but no one
opened, hearing sounds of panic inside, so they forced the door open and entered. After showing the search warrant, they
searched the house. The police found white crystalline substance and two bricks of dried leaves wrapped in newsprint.
The seized items included 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and 1,254 grams of marijuana. The
accused-appellant refused to sign the receipt for the seized items.
➢ Accused-appellant was taken to the police station along with the seized items. Laboratory examination confirmed the
substances were methamphetamine hydrochloride and marijuana. Charges were filed against him thereafter.
DEFENSE’ VERSION:
➢ The accused-appellant testified that a group of around 20 men in civilian clothing, armed with firearms, broke into his house
without a valid search warrant, preventing him from reading the warrant they briefly showed him. During the search,
the policemen forcibly opened cabinets and confiscated valuables, including money, a licensed firearm, and food items,
before detaining the accused-appellant. His mother-in-law corroborated his account, stating that the officers ransacked the
house and took their belongings.

RTC convicted him for illegal possession of shabu and marijuana (Sec. 16 and Sec. 8 of RA 6425).

Accused went to Supreme Court and assails the following:

➢ admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant
used in obtaining it was invalid.
➢ admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine
➢ the employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.

ISSUES:
1. Was the search warrant valid?
2. Was the place to be searched described with sufficient particularity?
3. Was the marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant admissible in evidence under the "plain view" doctrine?
4. Did the police use excessive and unnecessary force in executing the search warrant?

HELD/RULING:
1. Yes, the search warrant is valid with respect to the seizure of shabu but invalid with respect to the search for drug
paraphernalia.
a. Probable cause for drug paraphernalia
i. Although no evidence was presented during the search warrant application showing probable cause for
the existence of drug paraphernalia. However, Supreme Court (SC) held that this did not void the warrant
as a whole. Since no drug paraphernalia was actually seized based on this authorization, the warrant was
void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but valid as to the seizure of
(shabu) where probable cause was shown (sale transaction + search warrant). The Court cited Aday
v. Superior Court stating that invalid portions of a warrant can be severable from valid portions,
preventing wholesale invalidation when the warrant was issued on probable cause for some items
and described them particularly.
b. Issued for more than one offense (ANSWER TO Q1)
i. The accused-appellant argued the warrant was for more than one offense because possession/use of
shabu (§16) and possession of marijuana (§8) are different provisions; should be two search warrants. SC
rejected this, citing precedent (Olaes v. People, People v. Dichoso) which holds that R.A. No. 6425 is a
special law dealing with dangerous drugs, and offenses relating to prohibited and regulated drugs are
closely related or belong to the same class. Therefore, one search warrant may be validly issued for
such violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
ii. The Court noted that even if the specific section of the law isn't pinpointed in the warrant's caption,
the requirement is met if the text clearly recites the specific offense alleged as the basis for probable
cause. An analogy was also drawn to P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.), where violations
of different sections within that decree were also considered related enough to be covered by one warrant,
iii. "One specific offense" is interpreted broadly to include offenses related to dangerous drugs that are
closely connected or of the same nature, rather than strictly requiring a separate warrant for every
distinct provision of the law violated.
2. Yes, the place to be searched is particular (ANSWER TO Q2)
a. The accused-appellant contended the address "Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City" was not sufficiently
particular. SC disagreed, finding that while the warrant itself might seem general, other documents in the search
warrant case records provided sufficient detail (application mentioning location between specific house
numbers, deposition describing it as a house without a number, a sketch, and the fact that the police leader lived
nearby and knew the accused-appellant's house and confirmed his presence before the raid). The rule is that a
 description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched. In this case, the standard was met.
3. No, the marijuana is not admissible under plain view.
a. The search warrant did not authorize the seizure of marijuana. The prosecution attempted to justify its seizure under
the "plain view" doctrine. For this doctrine to apply, there must be prior justification for the intrusion,
inadvertent discovery of the evidence, and immediate apparent illegality of the evidence.
b. The Court found that while the valid search for shabu provided prior justification, the "plain view" doctrine cannot
be used to extend a search once the object of the warrant is found. The police failed to state when the marijuana
was found relative to the shabu or within the accused-appellant's immediate control (as in a search incident to
arrest). The discovery was presumably made during the search after the shabu was recovered, making its
recovery invalid under this context.
c. Crucially, the marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. The Court held that the contents wrapped in
newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Citing People v. Musa, the Court reiterated that the
incriminating nature of the object must be immediately apparent from plain view; a wrapped object does not meet
this standard. Therefore, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the seizure of marijuana complied with
the "plain view" doctrine, and thus, the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against the accused-appellant.
4. No, the police did not use excessive force
a. Accused-appellant claimed police climbed over the roof and broke doors. The SC found this claim unsupported by
reliable proof from disinterested persons. In contrast, the police testimony indicated they knocked but were
refused admittance and heard panicking inside, justifying their forced entry under the rules. SC accepted the
police account, finding the forced entry justified due to the refusal of admittance and suspicious behavior.

CLASS NOTES:
 6. Laud v PP, GR 199032, 11-19-14

FACTS:
On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National Police (PNP) sought a search warrant from the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), for
three caves within the Laud Compound in Davao City, believed to contain remains of “Davao Death Squad” victims. Ernesto
Avasola testified to witnessing the burial of six individuals in December 2005. On July 15, 2009, the search executed yielded human
remains.

Retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud challenged the search warrant (No. 09-14407) on the following grounds:
…
(c) the human remains sought to be seized are not a proper subject of a search warrant;

Petitions and motions filed evolved from Laud’s Urgent Motion to Quash, to the People’s Motion for Reconsideration denied by the
Manila-RTC, leading to the People’s successful petition for certiorari before the CA. Ultimately, this case ascended to the Supreme
Court upon Laud’s petition for review, focusing on issues around the search warrant’s issuance and execution.

ISSUE: Whether the Manila-RTC had jurisdiction and complied with requirements under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court for issuing the
search warrant.

HELD/RULING: YES
Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that a search warrant shall not be issued except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere
in the Philippines.
In this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant is evident from the first-hand account of
Avasola who, in his deposition, stated that he personally witnessed the commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in fact,
part of the group that buried the victims
The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement that there be a particular
description of "the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
"[A] description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify
the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that
points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement."
The Search Warrant evidently complies with the foregoing standard since it particularly describes the place to be searched,
namely, the three (3) caves located inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Maa, Davao City:
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time [of] the day of the premises above describe[d] particularly the
three (3) caves (as sketched) inside the said Laud Compound, Purok 3, Brgy. Ma-a, Davao Cityand forthwith seize and take
possession of the remains of six (6) victims who were killed and buried in the just said premises.
The things to be seized were also particularly described, namely, the remains of six (6) victims who were killed and buried in the
aforesaid premises. Laud’s posturing that human remains are not "personal property" and, hence, could not be the subject of a
search warrant deserves scant consideration. Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 3.Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. "Personal property" in the foregoing context actually refers
to the thing’s mobility, and not to its capacity to be owned or alienated by a particular person. Article416 of the Civil Code, which Laud
himself cites, states that in general, all things which can be transported from place to place are deemed to be personal property.
Considering that human remains can generally be transported from place to place, and considering further that they qualify
under the phrase "subject of the offense" given that they prove the crime’s corpus delicti, it follows that they may be valid
subjects of a search warrant under the above-cited criminal procedure provision. Neither does the Court agree with Laud’s
contention that the term "human remains" is too all-embracing so as to subvert the particular description requirement. As the
Court sees it, the description points to no other than the things that bear a direct relation to the offense committed, i.e., of Murder. It
is also perceived that the description is already specific as the circumstances would ordinarily allow given that the buried bodies
would have naturally decomposed over time. These observations on the description’s sufficient particularity square with the Court’s
pronouncement in Bache and Co., (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz, wherein it was held:
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow(People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384 [1932]); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact —
not of law — by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.); or when
the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued(Sec. 2, Rule
126, Revised Rules of Court) x x x If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant
must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and
seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence.

CLASS NOTES:
 7. RE: MOTU PROPRIO FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION ON THE ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT AND OTHER
PENDING INCIDENTS IN THE CASE OF DECEASED MAYOR ROLANDO ESPINOSA, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2494

FACTS:
Two criminal cases were filed against deceased Espinosa, Sr., and his son, Roland "Kerwin" Espinosa, for violation of Section 28
of R.A. No. 10591, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act, and against Espinosa Sr. alone
for violation of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

On 6 October 2016, Espinosa, Sr. filed a Notice of Entry of Appearance with concomitant Very Urgent Motion of Transfer
Detention seeking his transfer from the Sub-Provincial Jail of Baybay, Leyte to Albuera Police Station, Albuera, Leyte, for security
reasons. He alleged that:
1. He continuously fears [sic] for his life after receiving threats.
2. Every minute that he stays at the Leyte Sub-Provincial Jail, he becomes very vulnerable and poses as an easy target from
[sic] unknown elements which wanted him dead or other imminent danger that may likely occur.
3. Although the accused does not doubt the capacity of the personnel of the BJMP to keep him safe, it is also undeniable that
the accused is not the only one that these personnel will look out for.

Judge Arguelles heard the motion during the scheduled arraignment. The prosecution filed its opposition.

Subsequently, after ocular inspection, Judge Arguelles conducted another clarificatory hearing. During the hearing, the court was
confronted with differing opinions about the security of Espinosa Sr. in the detention facility. The sub-provincial warden expressed
doubts on their ability to keep him safe due to the insufficiency of guards and firearms. However, the prosecution filed an Ex-
Parte Counter-Manifestation to the Very Urgent Motion to Transfer of Detention pointing out that Albuera Police Station is not
a detention facility and that it is the Sub-Provincial Jail which has custodial responsibility over Espinosa Sr.

On 4 November 2016, pending resolution of both the Urgent Motion and its Ex-Parte Counter-Manifestation, elements of the CIDG
applied for two search warrants to search Cell Nos. 1 and 2 of the Sub-Provincial Jail of Baybay, Leyte, where Espinosa Sr. and
his co-accused, Raul Yap, were detained.

The Application for Search Warrant against Espinosa Sr. was for violation of R.A. No. 10591 wherein it was alleged that despite being
an inmate, Espinosa, Sr. "has in his possession an unlicensed firearm x x x kept and concealed particularly under his pillow in his
bedside inside Cell No. 1." As for Yap, the Application for Search warrant was for violation of R.A. No. 9165 and states that Yap has
in his possession "several grams of Illegal Drugs and paraphernalia kept and concealed particularly under his pillow in his bed inside
his cell at Cell No. 2." Search warrants were issued against Espinosa, Sr. and Yap.

While the search warrants were being served by the CIDG, it was reported that during the implementation of the search warrant
against Espinosa, Sr. at Cell No. 1, "respondent fired upon the raiding team that [sic] resulted to [sic] a firefight causing his
untimely death." At the crime scene, there were firearms and other paraphernalia seized.

In the course of the service of the two search warrants, the occupants of the cells, Espinosa Sr. and. Yap, were killed under
circumstances that are not yet clear.

On 8 November 2016, the Court motu proprio resolved to direct the Office of the Court Administrator to conduct an independent
investigation. The OCA found that there was no deliberate intent to delay the resolution of the Urgent Motion of Espinosa, Sr.
For the OCA, at most, Judge Arguelles should only be reminded to be more circumspect in resolving 'very urgent' motions. With regard
to the search warrants Judge Sabarre and Judge Cabalona respectively issued, the OCA considered that in cases involving a drug lord,
mere allegation that the accused has wide and vast connections from different agencies of the government, or has relatives,
henchmen, and friends who can influence and compromise the application and implementation of the search warrant, may be
considered a compelling reason to permit the application in any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
The OCA also opined that the issuance of search warrants to search jail facilities of the government can be considered as gross
ignorance of the law for which judges can be held liable. The police officers should have first exhausted all administrative
remedies by going to the superiors of the jail guards such as the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government
and the Secretary of Justice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of a search warrant against an inmate in a government-controlled detention facility was proper.

HELD/RULING:
The issuance of a search warrant against an inmate to be implemented in a government detention facility by law enforcers not in
charge of securing the facility is proper.

It must be stressed that the issuance of a search warrant is not absolutely prohibited provided that the stringent requirements
under the Rules and other issuances of the Court are observed.

In Senate Committee Report No. 46, it was stated that, when it comes to the right against unreasonable search, such prohibition
applies only when the person seeking to invoke its protection has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy that society is
willing to recognize as reasonable.
The search warrants involved in these cases are not the ordinary warrants issued by the court in relation to a criminal investigation as
these are issued against incarcerated individuals to be implemented in penal institutions and there are serious allegations of
connivance between jail guards and inmates. The discussion on the limited expectation of privacy is intrinsically-related with the
authority of judges to issue search warrants and lays the basis for the determination of the administrative liability of the judges. After
all, the State, through correctional officers assigned to maintain penal institutions, have custodial responsibility over inmates.

Thus, it is clear that there are marked differences between a search in relation to a criminal investigation and a search that is
meant as a protective measure in prison management. A comprehensive analysis of searches that may be conducted in a penal
institution by correctional officers and those that may be implemented by law enforcers other than correctional officers in charge of
the detention facility reveal their manifest differences in terms of purpose, frequency, and scope. In a search conducted by jail guards,
the search is routinary and is intended to preserve internal order and security in the entire detention facility. A search conducted as
a protective measure in prison management is non-criminal in nature and does not require a finding of probable cause.
Meanwhile, a search carried out as an incident to a criminal investigation and intended to uncover evidence of a crime may be
narrower in scope and may be limited only to a specific jail cell and articles specified in the warrant, as in the case.

CLASS NOTES:
 8. Manalili v CA and PP, G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997

FACTS:
On April 11, 1988, at about 2:10 PM, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Station were conducting
surveillance along A. Mabini street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery, based on information that drug addicts were
roaming the area. Police Officers Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas, along with a driver, were in a Tamaraw vehicle. Upon
reaching the cemetery, the policemen alighted. They encountered a male person who appeared high on drugs, exhibiting reddish
eyes and walking in a swaying manner. When this person tried to avoid the policemen, they approached him, introduced
themselves as police officers, and asked what he was holding in his hands. The male person, who turned out to be Alain
Manalili y Dizon, tried to resist. Pat. Espiritu asked if he could see what Manalili had in his hands, and Manalili showed his wallet
and allowed Espiritu to examine it. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet, examined it, and found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside.
He kept the wallet and its contents.

Manalili was brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Headquarters and turned over for investigation. Pat.
Espiritu turned over the confiscated wallet and suspected marijuana contents. The residue was originally wrapped in a smaller sheet
of folded paper. Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong received the residue, wrapped it in a white sheet of paper marked "Evidence "A" 4/11/88
Alain Manalili," and prepared a referral slip to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section requesting chemical analysis. Pat. Angel Lumabas
hand-carried the referral slip and specimen to the NBI, where it was received at 7:40 PM on April 11, 1988. NBI Forensic Chemist
Aida Pascual conducted microscopic, chemical, and chromatographic examinations, which gave positive results for marijuana. She
identified the specimen as "crushed marijuana leaves".

The defense presented a different version of events. According to Manalili, at about 2:00 PM on April 11, 1988, he was a passenger
in a tricycle near the cemetery on his way to his boarding house. Three policemen stopped the tricycle, stating the driver and
passenger were under the influence of marijuana. The policemen brought them inside a Ford Fiera and bodily searched them,
finding nothing. Manalili asked why he was being searched, and the police replied he was carrying marijuana. The tricycle driver was
allowed to leave, but Manalili was brought to the police headquarters for another search. At the headquarters, in the presence of a
neighbor and another companion, Manalili was asked to remove his pants, which were turned over a piece of bond paper, but nothing
was found except dirt and dust. Manalili's companion suggested releasing him, but he was led to a cell. Later, the policemen told him
they found marijuana inside his pants pockets. Manalili testified that he was later told by policemen, including Pat. Lumabas, Pat.
Espiritu, and Cpl. Tamondong, to call his parents to "settle" the case, which he did not do. At the inquest Fiscal's office, Manalili stated
no marijuana was found on him, but the Fiscal told him not to say anything.

The trial court convicted Manalili of illegal possession of marijuana residue, primarily relying on the testimony of the arresting
officers, whom it found to be "neutral and disinterested" witnesses. The court disbelieved the defense's claim of a "trumped up"
charge, noting Manalili did not take legal action against the police or move for reinvestigation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision, finding no proof it was based on speculations and ruling that alleged inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies were insubstantial. The appellate court also found Manalili's contention that he could not be convicted of illegal
possession of marijuana residue to be without merit, given the forensic chemist's report.

ISSUE:
(1) the admissibility of the evidence against him,
(2) the credibility of prosecution witnesses and the rejection of the defense of extortion, and
(3) the sufficiency of prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction.

Petitioner specifically protested the admission of the marijuana found, contending it was the product of an illegal search. –
NO.

HELD/RULING:
The Court found the petition had no merit.

Regarding the admissibility of evidence seized, the Court held that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. It
disagreed with the Solicitor General's argument that the issue of inadmissibility was waived, but nevertheless upheld the
search's legality. The Court also held that petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained by failing
to raise this issue or object during the trial. For a waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable search to be valid, the
right must exist, the person waiving it must have knowledge of it, and an actual intention to relinquish it. The Court stated that
while it usually indulges every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards, the petitioner was deemed to have
waived the right by failing to raise its violation before the trial court.

On the issue of the credibility of witnesses and the defense of extortion, the Court reiterated that the trial court's assessment
of witness credibility, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is given great weight and respect. It found the
inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses' testimonies were not substantial enough to impair the essential veracity of their
narration. The Court concurred with the appellate court that slight differences in detail do not reflect on the essential veracity of
statements as long as witnesses concur on material points. The Court found Pat. Espiritu's testimony credible, supported by the
Joint Affidavit of both arresting policemen, despite a contradiction from Pat. Lumabas about where the marijuana was found
(wallet vs. plastic bag). This contradiction was considered minor and did not destroy Espiritu's credibility, especially since petitioner
did not deny possession of the substance. The Court found insufficient grounds to believe the extortion defense, noting petitioner did
not file administrative or criminal cases against the officers or present evidence other than his claim, and his fear for his life argument
was unbelievable considering he was released on bail.

Regarding the sufficiency of evidence, the Court found that the elements of illegal possession of marijuana were proven: (a) the
substance found was identified as crushed marijuana leaves by the NBI Forensic Chemist; (b) possession was unauthorized by law;
and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. Manalili's awareness was undeniable, as he appeared high on drugs
and resisted when asked to show what he was holding, indicating he knew he possessed marijuana and it was prohibited.
The Court noted that the trial and appellate courts overlooked the Indeterminate Sentence Law (R.A. 4103, as amended). The
Dangerous Drugs Law (R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P. 179) imposes a penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to
twelve years and a fine of six thousand to twelve thousand pesos for illegal possession of Indian hemp (marijuana). The Indeterminate
Sentence Law applies to offenses punished by laws other than the Revised Penal Code, requiring an indeterminate sentence where
the maximum term does not exceed the maximum fixed by law and the minimum is not less than the minimum term prescribed by
the same law. The Court held that the proper penalty was an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment ranging from six years
and one day, as minimum, to twelve years, as maximum, and a fine of six thousand pesos.

The Court affirmed the assailed Decision and Resolution with this modification to the penalty.

CLASS NOTES:
 9. Sanchez v PP, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014

FACTS:
➢ Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili was convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite, for violating Section 11, Article
II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (illegal possession of 0.1017 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly
known as "shabu"). He was sentenced to imprisonment for twelve (12) to fifteen (15) years and ordered to pay a fine of
Php300,000.00.
➢ Sanchez was arrested on or about March 19, 2003, in Imus, Cavite.
➢ The prosecution's version of events states that police officers, acting on information that Jacinta Marciano was selling
drugs, were dispatched to Barangay Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite. They saw Sanchez leaving Marciano's house in a
tricycle, chased the tricycle, and requested Sanchez to alight. SPO1 Amposta noticed Sanchez holding a matchbox,
asked to see its contents, and Sanchez agreed. Inside, SPO1 Amposta found a small plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance, which later tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
➢ Sanchez pleaded not guilty and presented a different version, claiming he was transporting a passenger when four armed
men in a jeepney blocked them, frisked him without cause, and told him they had bought drugs from Alapan. He was
then brought to the police station, while his companion was released.
➢ The RTC found Sanchez guilty, believing he was caught in flagrante delicto and crediting the testimony of SPO1
Amposta.
➢ The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision, stating there was probable cause for the police to believe
Sanchez was committing a crime as he was seen leaving the residence of a known drug dealer. The CA also held that
non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not fatal to the prosecution's case.
➢ Sanchez filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, arguing that his warrantless arrest and search were invalid due to
the absence of probable cause for an in flagrante delicto arrest, and that non-compliance with Section 21 rendered the
seized item inadmissible.
➢ The Supreme Court treated the petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 [Be that as it
may, the Court, in several cases before, had treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review under Rule 45, in
accordance with the liberal spirit and in the interest of substantial justice, particularly (1) if the petition was filed within the
reglementary period for filing a petition for review; (2) errors of judgment are averred; and (3) there is sufficient reason to
justify the relaxation of the rules.]

ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the conviction of Sanchez, specifically addressing the validity
of the warrantless arrest and search, and the application of Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165? YES

HELD/RULING:
➢ The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition, REVERSED and SET ASIDE the decisions of the CA and the RTC, and ACQUITTED
Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili on reasonable doubt.
➢ The Court held that neither an in flagrante delicto arrest nor the stop-and-frisk principle was applicable to justify the
warrantless search and seizure made by the police operatives on Sanchez.
➢ The search preceded the arrest, making it unlawful as a search incident to a lawful arrest.
➢ Sanchez's acts of merely leaving the residence of a known drug peddler and boarding a tricycle were not overt criminal acts
that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. The police had no personal knowledge that Sanchez possessed illegal drugs
at that time.
➢ The Court also found that the stop-and-frisk principle did not apply because the totality of the circumstances did not
incite a reasonable suspicion that would justify such a search. Coming out of a drug pusher's house and boarding a
tricycle were innocuous movements and did not suggest Sanchez had shabu or was committing a crime.
➢ The plain view doctrine was also deemed inapplicable because there was no valid intrusion, the shabu in the matchbox was
not inadvertently discovered or plainly exposed, and SPO1 Amposta had to ask for and open the matchbox.
➢ Furthermore, the Court entertained doubts about the chain of custody of the seized shabu due to several lapses in the law
enforcers' handling of the item, creating uncertainty over its identity.
➢ Because the confiscated shabu, the very corpus delicti of the crime, was deemed inadmissible due to the unlawful search
and seizure and doubts in the chain of custody, Sanchez was acquitted.

QUESTION/s:
What is the allowable scope of stop and frisk?
A "stop-and-frisk" is defined as a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons. It involves a police officer stopping a
citizen on the street, interrogating them, and patting them down for weapons or contraband.
While probable cause is not required to conduct a 'stop-and-frisk', mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate it.
A genuine reason must exist, based on the police officer’s experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons (or contraband) concealed about them.
Before conducting a 'stop-and-frisk', the police officer should properly introduce themselves and make initial inquiries, and
approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct.
➢ The purpose of a 'stop-and-frisk' is two-fold:
➢ The general interest of effective crime prevention and detection.
The more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation of the police officer.
The search in a 'stop-and-frisk' is carefully limited to the outer clothing to discover weapons.
The case of Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People illustrated a justifiable 'stop-and-frisk' where the person appeared "high" on drugs
(reddish eyes, swaying), tried to avoid the police, and resisted when asked about what they were holding. The area was also known
as a drug haven.
Similarly, in People v. Solayao, a 'stop-and-frisk' was justified due to the accused's drunken behaviour, the flight of his companions
upon seeing the police, and the fact that the officers were on an intelligence mission regarding armed persons in the area.

CLASS NOTES: GIST OF THE CASE HAHA

In this case, the arrest of Sanchez followed a search, not the other way around. Under the Rules of Court, an arrest involves taking a
person into custody, either by actual restraint or voluntary submission. The arrest of Sanchez occurred only after police discovered
illegal drugs (shabu) inside a matchbox he was carrying. Prior to that, the police did not have enough cause to arrest him.

Even if Sanchez was arrested before the search, the arrest would still be unlawful because it did not meet the requirements for a valid
warrantless arrest. According to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a warrantless arrest is only lawful in certain situations, such as
when an officer witnesses a crime being committed, has probable cause based on personal knowledge that a crime has been
committed, or when a person has escaped from custody. None of these conditions were met in Sanchez's case. The police had no
direct knowledge that Sanchez was engaged in criminal activity or had committed a crime. They merely saw him leave the residence
of a known drug dealer and board a tricycle, which is not enough to justify an arrest.

Additionally, there was no valid "stop-and-frisk" search. A stop-and-frisk requires reasonable suspicion that a person is carrying
weapons or contraband, which was not present in Sanchez's case. The police did not observe any suspicious behavior that would
justify such a search. Just being near a known drug dealer or boarding a tricycle did not provide enough evidence to raise a reasonable
suspicion that Sanchez was engaged in criminal activity.

Hence, the court found that the arrest was unlawful, and since the search and seizure that followed were based on an illegal arrest,
any evidence obtained through them—such as the drugs—was inadmissible.