[ G.R. No.

172716, November 17, 2010 ]

JASON IVLER Y AGUILAR, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO- SAN PEDRO,
JUDGE OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 71, PASIG CITY, AND EVANGELINE
PONCE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
affirming sub-silencio a lower court's ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to
bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property. This, despite the accused's previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.

The Facts

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses:
(1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for
injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the
death of respondent Ponce's husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce's
vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and
was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to
quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803).
Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial
question. Without acting on petitioner's motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment
and, because of petitioner's absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later,
the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings and
postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of
the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.

Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal
of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner's loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the
motion.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its
ruling on petitioner's forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC's
order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No.
82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the
MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to
forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his
case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants
because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-
trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7

Petitioner laments the RTC's failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking
jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having
been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless
imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple
consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC's decision forfeiting
petitioner's standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce
calls the Court's attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical
injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less
grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the
homicide and damage to property.

In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General's motion not to
file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and
private respondent is represented by counsel.

The Issues

Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek
relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioner's
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366.

The Ruling of the Court

We hold that (1) petitioner's non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did
not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection
afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

Petitioner's Non-appearance at the Arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant's escape from custody or violation of the terms
of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to
Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the
Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if
the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country
during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a
suit to review judgments of convictions.

The RTC's dismissal of petitioner's special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment
ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC's reliance
on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a
proposition contrary to the RTC's ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an
accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped
bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the
mandatory review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8
of Rule 124.10

The mischief in the RTC's treatment of petitioner's non-appearance at his arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one
considers the Rules of Court's treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-
arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the defendant's absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to
cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the
defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and
could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce
the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the
accused's status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTC's observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend
the scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment,
petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC's proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light
of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC's refusal to defer
arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner's arrest),
petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this
petition.

Petitioner's Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367

Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused's negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense"13 protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same
offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner's conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the
question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same
offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the
same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not."15

We find for petitioner.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,

its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:

Imprudence and negligence. -- Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto
menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to
the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than
twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by
simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would
have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the
first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower
in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to
apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a
person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the
offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to
give.

Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the
penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2)
a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a
generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of
"reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses
penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of
care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish
the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them
apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As
early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field
by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless
imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x" 17 on three points of
analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the
legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them
under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures
for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is
not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of
criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their
structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious
mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi
offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of
classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. ...

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce
the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13,
specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed.
Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in
proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty
for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety.
But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence
at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute
a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from
prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal
negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class,
or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their
commission results in damage, either to person or property.19

Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for
"Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying
charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the element
of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.

Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and
since repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal
pronouncement in People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but]
simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en banc
promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in
1939. Quizon rejected Faller's conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes
under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing
crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal
confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes
and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as
will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed,
the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence
applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-
offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging
another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second
prosecution was based.

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of

Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and
not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-
offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts, undergirded this Court's unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to
property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless
driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been
dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court,
that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both
charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v.
Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated
in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the
Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per
Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per
Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L.,
acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per
Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per
Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally
impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the
Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage
to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused's prior acquittal of "slight
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the
Court explained:34

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x
(Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical
conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.

There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority.
Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-
war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for
multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon
which the second prosecution was based. Estipona's inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain
of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid
to rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals' conviction of an accused
for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and
less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon which
the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the
strength of Buan:38

Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of
People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22
SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that -

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

...

. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal)
Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from
the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation
places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.

It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance
in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Court's attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12,
1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner's
plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in
Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless
imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists
where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence
must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-
and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision
cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the
same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner's submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend
in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting
jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner's case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny.
There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate
Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with
Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the
accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court
initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accused's claim and dismissed
the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue
following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the
case, holding: --

[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy
enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged
in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through
reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them
(Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise
disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in
connection with the same collision one for damage to property through reckless imprudence
(Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and
another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by
the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose
Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case
No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending
that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just
been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted,
whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for
damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles
involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose
Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the
Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through
reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of
the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the
Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language:
.

The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the
chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and
damage to property through reckless imprudence.

In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was
charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a AAA34fast and reckless manner ...
thereby causing an accident.' After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed
in that court AAA34for failure of the Government to prosecute'. But some time thereafter the
city attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same
accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was
alleged to be P249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by
the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice
Montemayor --

The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the
Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage
to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the
tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113,
Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to
say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support
the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x

...
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting
attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have
been joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. The prosecution's contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged
to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before
pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney
is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless
imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court. 43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz)
"for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:

The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of
double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical
Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General,
admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon
which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however,
urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting
or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the
ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case,
will yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would
warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the
other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case
of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed,
stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible
substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing
quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code.
Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under
either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit
the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the
penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the
mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x
x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was
crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single
prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their
consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-
offense not falling under either models - that of a single criminal negligence resulting in
multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to
light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how
should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48's framework apply to "complex"
the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those
amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed
under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be
penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the
issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple
consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were
split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and
filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting
to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach
the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic
Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious
penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts
penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies
because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy
arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized
as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act
penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less
grave offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the
effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or
severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted
paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:

[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to
the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25
pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount
fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an
additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical
injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)

By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.

Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands
choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-
crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-
conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its
conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a
quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal
code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-
crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and
severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct
concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to
double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.

A becoming regard of this Court's place in our scheme of government denying it the power to
make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and
intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-
crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a
necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the
Solicitor General's argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense
could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the
complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by
this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:

[T]he prosecution's contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing
the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney
is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless
imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x
x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being
prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and
the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second
jeopardy for the same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under
Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of
constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce
state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will
do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and
proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are
thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but
any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution
for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious
consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by
extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe
penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as
grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-
offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes
occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2
May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in
Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio Morales, * Peralta, Abad, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.