TOPIC: FILIATION (FAMILY CODE ART.
164, 166)
CASE: James Cua Ko v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 210984, April 12, 2023
FACTS:
§ One Shalimar Abellera (Shalimar) filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with one
Kerwin Cruz Par (Kerwin). During trial, Shalimar testified that she and Kerwin had been separated since
1999.
§ While the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending in court, Shalimar gave birth to
a baby girl named "Jamie Shaye." In Jamie Shaye's certificate of live birth, Shalimar indicated "James
Cua Ko" as the name of Jamie Shaye's father. James executed an AUidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission to support the entry of his name in Jamie Shaye's certificate of live birth.
§ Shalimar's marriage to Kerwin was voided by the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque. On September 9,
2008, the OUice of the Civil Registrar of Muntinlupa City changed Jamie Shaye's surname in her
certificate of live birth from "Punzalan" to "Ko."
§ James subsequently filed a Petition for Judicial Approval of Voluntary Recognition of a Minor Natural
Child before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City "to secure the best interest of Jamie Shaye.”
§ However, the trial court denied the petition and James's motion for reconsideration.
§ The Court of Appeals aUirmed the trial court's Decision denying the petition for judicial approval of
voluntary recognition of a minor natural child. The Court of Appeals held that Jamie Shaye, having
been born during a valid marriage, is a legitimate child whose status as such is more favorable to
her.
§ To grant James's Petition for judicial approval of voluntary recognition was for the Court of Appeals to
impugn a favorable status to the detriment of Jamie Shaye.
ISSUE:
The sole issue for this Court’s resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioner James
Cua Ko’s Petition for Judicial Approval of Voluntary Recognition of a Minor Natural Child for being contrary
to the presumption of legitimacy and the best interest of the child rule.
RULING:
The Petition for Review on Certiorari for the Judicial Approval of Voluntary Recognition of a Minor Natural
Child is DENIED for being a collateral attack against the legitimacy of minor Jamie Shaye Ko. The
September 10, 2023 Decision and January 14, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
98417 are AFFIRMED.
Article 164 of the Family Code provides that "children conceived or born during the marriage are
legitimate." This means that legitimacy as a status attaches once when a person is born within wedlock.
There is no dispute that Jamie Shaye was born before the marriage between her mother, Shalimar, and
Kerwin was voided. Jamie Shaye is deemed born within wedlock, and, therefore, is considered a legitimate
child.
ARTICLE 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not
possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the
husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or
ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue
influence.
In this case, the petitioner has no standing to impugn Jamie Shaye's legitimacy. He also has no
standing to establish Jamie Shaye's filiation. Therefore, his Petition for voluntary recognition was
correctly denied.
TOPIC: Rule on DNA Evidence 9(c); A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC
CASE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. RUFINO UMANITO, APPELLANT, G.R. No. 172607,
October 26, 2007
SUMMARY:
In a Philippine Jurisprudence case, Rufino Umanito appeals his conviction for rape, claiming that the
credibility of the victim's allegations is questionable and that the case was filed against him belatedly; the
court orders DNA testing to determine if Umanito is the father of the victim's child, which may cast
reasonable doubt on his guilt.
FACTS:
§ It was around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, while on her way to her grandmother’s home, when private
complainant [AAA] was accosted by a young male.
§ It was only later when she learned the name of accused-appellant UMANITO.
§ She recounted that accused-appellant UMANITO waited for her by the creek, and then with a knife
pointed at [AAA]as left side of the [sic] abdomen, he forced her to give in to his kisses, to his holding
her breasts and stomach, and to his pulling her by the arm to be dragged to the Home Economics
Building inside the premises of the Daramuangan Elementary School where accused-appellant
UMANITO first undressed her [AAA] and himself with his right hand while he still clutched the knife
menacingly on his left hand.
§ Private complainant [AAA] recounted that she could not shout because she was afraid. She further
recounted that accused-appellant UMANITO laid her down on a bench, set the knife down, then
mounted her, inserting his penis into her [AAAas] vagina and shortly thereafter.
§ Accused-appellant UMANITO dressed up and threatened [AAA] while poking the knife at her neck,
not to report the incident to the police or else he said he would kill her. Accused-appellant UMANITO
then left, while the victim [AAA] went on to her grandmother’s house and she noticed that it was
already around 1:00 o’clock in the morning when she reached there.
§ 6 months after the incident, private complainant [AAAas] mother, noticed the prominence on
[AAA]’s stomach. It was only then when the victim, private complainant [AAA], divulged to her
mother the alleged rape and told her the details of what had happened.
§ After hearing private complainant [AAA]as story, her mother brought her to the police station.
Appellant’s version on the stand was diUerent. Denying the accusations of AAA, he claimed that on
15 July 1989, he was home the whole day, helping his family complete rush work on picture frames
ordered from Baguio. He did not step out of their house on the evening in question, he
added.[9] Concerning his relationship with AAA, appellant admitted that he had courted her but she
spurned him. He conjectured, though, that AAA had a crush on him since she frequently visited him
at his house.
Issue:
1. Did the lower courts err in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of the complaining witness,
AAA, despite alleged inconsistencies and the delay in filing the complaint?
2. Should DNA testing be ordered to determine if Umanito is the father of AAA's child, which may cast
reasonable doubt on his guilt?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the RTC for the reception of DNA evidence to determine if
Umanito is the father of AAA's child. The RTC was directed to report the results of the proceedings within
sixty (60) days from receipt of the resolution.
DNA Testing as Evidence
• The court recognizes the importance of DNA testing in determining the paternity of AAA's child.
• If Umanito is not the father, it may cast reasonable doubt and lead to his acquittal.
• The court orders Umanito, AAA, and AAA's child to submit themselves to DNA testing.
• DNA testing is recognized as a reliable means of linking a suspect to a crime or absolving an
accused.
• The court discusses the process and reliability of DNA testing.
• The court emphasizes the need for proper procedures and the assessment of probative value in
evaluating DNA evidence.
TOPIC: Rule on DNA Evidence 9(c); A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC
CASE: ANTONIO LEJANO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT, G.R. No.
176389, December 14, 2010
FACTS:
§ Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters, Carmela (19) and Jennifer (7), were brutally murdered in their
home in Parañaque City.
§ Following an intense investigation, the police arrested several suspects, but the trial court eventually
ordered their discharge, suspecting a frame-up.
§ In 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) presented Jessica Alfaro, who claimed to have
witnessed the crime.
§ Alfaro identified Hubert JeUrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael
A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as
the culprits, and Gerardo Biong as an accessory.
§ The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge Amelita G.
Tolentino, tried seven of the accused, as Ventura and Filart remained at large.
§ The prosecution relied heavily on Alfaro's testimony, which the trial court found credible despite
discrepancies. The trial court convicted all the accused, sentencing Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez to reclusion perpetua, and Biong to an indeterminate prison
term.
§ The Court of Appeals aUirmed the trial court's decision with modifications. The case was then brought
to the Supreme Court, which granted Webb's request for DNA analysis of the semen specimen
taken from Carmela's cadaver.
§ However, the NBI informed the Court that the specimen was no longer in its custody. Webb filed an
urgent motion to acquit, citing the loss of the semen specimen as a violation of his right to due process.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Alfaro's testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb, Lejano,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is entitled
to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented suUicient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro's testimony that
he led the others in committing the crime.
The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up the crime after its
commission.
RULING:
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of
his right to due process given the State's failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or
willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.
The Right to Acquittal
Due to Loss of DNA Evidence
The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with this, semen
specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony as Carmela's rapist and
killer but serious questions had been raised about her credibility. At the very least, there exists a
possibility that Alfaro had lied.
On the other hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached or
allured by a promise of reward or financial support. No two persons have the same DNA fingerprint, with
the exception of identical twins.[8] If, on examination, the DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to
Webb, then he did not rape Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine
that Alfaro committed perjury in saying that he did.
Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at
this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland[9] that he cites has long be overtaken by the
decision in Arizona v. Youngblood,[10] where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does not
require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the
latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a
medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the same
subjected to DNA test.
For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist,
the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent
had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the
specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up.
Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the
meantime.
The trial court denied Webb's application for DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding to move on when he
had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged
arbitrary actions taken against him and the other accused.[11] They raised the DNA issue before the Court
of Appeals but merely as an error committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None
of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of
their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such
test. Considering the accused's lack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put
on reasonable notice that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.
In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the
innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains
a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to
jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one's inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable between
teeth.
Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI asset
who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could
not produce?
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and
Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS
accused-appellants Hubert Jeirey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio
Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were
charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause.
TOPIC: Rule on DNA Evidence 9(c); A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC
CASE: HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, PETITIONER, VS. NBI DIRECTOR MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA,
FORMER NBI DIRECTOR CARLOS S. CAABAY, FORMER NBI DIRECTOR NESTOR M. MANTARING, DR.
RENATO C. BAUTISTA, DR. PROSPERO CABANAYAN, ATTY. FLORESTO P. ARIZALA, JR., ATTY. REYNALDO
O. ESMERALDA, ATTY. ARTURO FIGUERAS, ATTY. PEDRO RIVERA AND JOHN HERRA, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
§ The case stemmed from the infamous Vizconde Massacre, a horrific crime that shook the Philippines
in 1991. Carmela Vizconde, her mother, and her younger sister were brutally murdered in their home.
§ Hubert JeUrey Webb, along with several other individuals, was charged with the crime of rape with
homicide. The prosecution's case relied heavily on the testimony of Jessica Alfaro, who claimed to have
witnessed the crime. However, Alfaro's testimony was riddled with inconsistencies and doubts about
her credibility arose.
§ Webb maintained his innocence and sought to prove his alibi, claiming he was in the United States at
the time of the crime. He presented documentary evidence from the US and Philippine governments
supporting his claim.
§ In a critical development, Webb filed a Motion to Direct the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
Submit Semen Specimen to DNA Analysis. He argued that DNA testing would definitively prove his
innocence by showing that the semen found on Carmela Vizconde did not belong to him.
§ The trial court denied Webb's motion. However, in 2010, the Supreme Court, recognizing the potential
of DNA evidence to establish the truth, granted Webb's petition for certiorari and ordered the NBI to
facilitate the submission of the semen specimen for DNA analysis at the University of the Philippines
Natural Science Research Institute.
The NBI, in its Compliance and Manifestation, claimed that the semen specimen was no longer in their
custody. They alleged that the specimen had been submitted as evidence to the trial court during the
testimony of Dr. Cabanayan, the Medico-Legal Chief. However, the trial court denied this claim, stating
that only photographs of the slides containing the specimen were submitted as evidence.
Dr. Cabanayan's testimony about the specimen's submission to the trial court was inconsistent with his
previous statements and the available records. He initially claimed to have submitted the slides during his
testimony in 1996, but later admitted he had "forgotten all about it." This raised serious questions about
the credibility of his testimony and the NBI's handling of the evidence.
The NBI's failure to properly preserve the specimen, a crucial piece of evidence in a criminal case,
demonstrated a lack of care and concern for the integrity of the investigation. This negligence further
undermined the credibility of the NBI's claims and raised concerns about their commitment to ensuring a
fair trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents Magtanggol B. Gatdula, Carlos S. Caabay, Nestor M. Mantaring, Dr. Renato C.
Bautista, Dr. Prospero Cabanayan, Atty. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr., Atty. Reynaldo O. Esmeralda, Atty. Pedro
Rivera, and John Herra are guilty of indirect contempt; particularly: (1) disobedience or resistance to a
lawful order of the court; and (2) improper conduct tending to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice.
RULING:
The Supreme Court, in its resolution on the contempt petition, ruled that the NBI's actions constituted
willful disobedience of its order to facilitate the DNA analysis.
The Court found that the NBI oUicers, including Dr. Cabanayan and Dr. Bautista, were guilty of indirect
contempt for their negligence in handling the specimen and their contradictory statements about its
whereabouts.
The Court emphasized that good faith is not a defense in civil contempt proceedings, and that the NBI
oUicers had a duty to preserve the specimen and provide accurate information to the court.
The NBI's mishandling of the semen specimen, a critical piece of evidence, significantly impacted the
integrity of the investigation and potentially hampered the pursuit of justice. It underscores the
accountability of forensic experts and institutions for their actions, particularly when dealing with crucial
evidence in criminal cases. The NBI's negligence and contradictory statements demonstrated a lack of
professionalism and responsibility, raising serious concerns about their competency and commitment to
upholding the law.
Since the petitioner prays that respondents Atty. Rivera and Herra be held in contempt for coaching Alfaro
in executing her dubious aUidavit and in the coached identification of petitioner and alleges that these
acts amount to improper conduct tending to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.
The Court cannot cite a person for criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he or she
intended to commit it, thus Atty. Arizala and Agent Herra cannot be cited in contempt. A contempt case
on this ground is in the nature of a criminal contempt. Being a criminal contempt, it must be shown
that respondents acted willfully or for an illegitimate purpose. This implies willfulness, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to cause injustice. In criminal contempt, the contemnor is presumed innocent and the
burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the contemnor is guilty of contempt lies with the
petitioner. Here, respondents were not shown to have planned a deliberate scheme to inculpate petitioner.
Petitioner’s sole evidence against respondent Atty. Rivera is Atty. Artemio Sacaguing’s testimony stating
that Alfaro supposedly told him that Atty. Rivera asked her to execute a second aUidavit. There was no other
evidence presented supporting this. This does not satisfy the quantum of evidence required of petitioner.
The Court's power to cite persons in contempt, while used sparingly, serves as a crucial tool to ensure the
integrity of the judicial process and the proper administration of justice. This power serves as a deterrent
against negligence, misconduct, and deliberate obstruction of justice by forensic experts and institutions.
TOPIC: MARRIAGE (FAMILY CODE ART. 45, 46) Impotency
CASE: People of the Philippines vs. ZZZ G.R. No. 229209, February 12, 2020
FACTS:
This case is about the Supreme Court's decision regarding the conviction of ZZZ for the crime of rape
against his granddaughter, AAA.
Facts:
The case arose from a horrific incident of rape committed by ZZZ, the grandfather of the victim, AAA. The
crime occurred sometime in December 2010, before Christmas, in Sitio Anahaw, Barangay Otod,
Municipality of San Fernando, Romblon.
AAA, a minor at the time, lived with her grandfather while her mother and siblings resided separately. She
was unable to read or write and required assistance in executing her sworn statement with the police.
According to AAA, ZZZ took advantage of her vulnerability, forcing himself upon her, kissing her lips and
genitals, undressing her, and inserting his penis into her vagina.
After the assault, AAA fled to the forest and slept there. The following day, when she attempted to return
home, ZZZ allegedly attacked her with a bolo. She managed to parry his blows and escape, seeking help
from Barangay Captain Manuel Lotec.
AAA reported the incident to the barangay captain, who then brought her to the police station. AAA was
interviewed by a police oUicer and a local social worker, Rosa Ravalo, who assisted her in executing an
aUidavit. She also underwent a medical examination by Dr. Lolinie Celestial B. Montojo.
ISSUE:
The sole issue before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution successfully proved beyond a
reasonable doubt the guilt of ZZZ for the crime of rape.
RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals,
aUirming ZZZ's conviction for rape. The Court found that the prosecution had presented suUicient evidence
to establish ZZZ's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court ruled in the aUirmative. It held that
the crime of rape may be proven not only by direct evidence, but also by circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence are proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the
main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. In the absence of direct evidence,
resorting to circumstantial evidence is usually necessary in proving the commission rape because it is
generally unwitnessed and, very often, only the victim is left to testify for him or herself. It becomes even
more diUicult when the complex crime of rape with homicide is committed because the victim could no
longer testify.
1. Credibility of the Victim's Testimony: The Court emphasized that the trial court's determination of
witness credibility is generally respected on appeal, particularly when aUirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The Court found that AAA's testimony was credible, consistent, and corroborated by other evidence. The
Court also stressed that in assessing the credibility of a rape victim, courts should be wary of outdated
notions of a victim's behavior based on gender stereotypes.
2. Corroboration of Testimony: The Court acknowledged that while corroboration is not always necessary
for conviction, in this case, AAA's testimony was corroborated by the following:
Barangay Captain Lotec's testimony that he saw AAA pale and trembling when she reported the incident.
The medical certificate indicating lacerations to AAA's hymen.
ZZZ's own admission of the paternal relationship between him and the victim, which established his moral
ascendancy over her.
3. Impotency Defense: The Court rejected ZZZ's defense of impotency, finding that he failed to prove his
inability to have sexual intercourse with certainty. The Court reiterated the principle that impotency must
be proven with certainty to overcome the presumption of potency.
4. Outdated Gender Stereotypes: The Court took the opportunity to address outdated gender stereotypes
often used to assess the credibility of rape victims. The Court cited its previous ruling in People v. Amarela,
where it emphasized that courts should not rely on the "Maria Clara" stereotype of a demure and reserved
Filipino woman when evaluating the credibility of a rape victim. Instead, the Court emphasized that a
victim's testimony should be assessed based on its credibility, consistency, and corroboration, without
resorting to outdated gender biases.
While aUirming the conviction, the Supreme Court modified the monetary liability imposed on ZZZ. The
Court cited People v. Jugueta, which established that when the penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed
for rape, the appropriate amounts for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages are
P75,000.00 each.
The Supreme Court's decision in People of the Philippines v. ZZZ aUirmed the conviction of ZZZ for the
crime of rape. The Court emphasized the importance of carefully evaluating the credibility of rape victims
and avoiding outdated gender stereotypes. The Court also highlighted the need for forensic experts and
institutions to maintain a proper chain of custody for evidence and to be held accountable for their actions.
This case serves as a reminder that the pursuit of justice requires a commitment to accuracy, transparency,
and accountability from all parties involved.
TOPIC: MARRIAGE (FAMILY CODE ART. 45, 46) Pregnancy
CASE: Aquino v. Delizo G.R. No. L-15853, July 27, 1960
FACT:
This case focuses specifically the Supreme Court's ruling on the concealment of pregnancy as a ground
for annulment of marriage.
Facts:
Fernando Aquino (petitioner) filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage to Conchita Delizo
(respondent) on the grounds of fraud. He alleged that Delizo concealed her pregnancy by another man at
the time of their marriage on December 27, 1954. Delizo gave birth to a child in April 1955, approximately
four months after the marriage.
During the trial, Aquino presented evidence including the marriage contract and attempted to introduce
the child's birth certificate. However, the trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that the concealment
of pregnancy did not constitute fraud suUicient for annulment. The Court of Appeals aUirmed this decision,
finding that it was not impossible for the couple to have conceived a child during their engagement.
Aquino filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching aUidavits from Delizo and her brother-in-law, Cesar
Aquino, admitting that Delizo was pregnant by Cesar before the marriage and that they had concealed this
fact from Aquino. He also presented birth certificates of Delizo's three children with Cesar.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that it did not believe the
veracity/WEIGHT of the newly presented evidence.
ISSUE:
The main issue before the Supreme Court was whether the concealment of pregnancy by a woman at the
time of marriage constitutes fraud suUicient for annulment under the New Civil Code.
RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the case for a new trial.
The Court held that the concealment of pregnancy by a woman at the time of marriage, when the child was
conceived by another man, constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment under Article 85, paragraph (4)
in relation to Article 86, paragraph (3) of the New Civil Code.
The Supreme Court's decision relied on medical evidence and expert opinion to determine the
plausibility of the concealed pregnancy. The Court cited medical authorities, including Lull's Clinical
Obstetrics and the Cyclopedia of Medicine, Surgery, etc., to support its findings:
1. Concealment of Pregnancy: The Court acknowledged that a pregnancy in its early stages, particularly
within the first five months, may not be readily apparent, especially if the woman is "naturally plump." The
Court recognized that even medical professionals can only diagnose pregnancy with certainty in a limited
percentage of cases during the early stages.
2. Plausibility of Concealment: The Court found that Delizo's alleged pregnancy, being only four months
old at the time of the marriage, could have been concealed, particularly if she was naturally plump. The
Court also noted that Delizo's pregnancy was not apparent in a photograph taken in November 1954, just
before the marriage.
3. Medical Evidence: The Court emphasized the importance of medical evidence in determining the
plausibility of a concealed pregnancy. The Court cited medical authorities to support its conclusion that a
four-month pregnancy could be concealed, particularly in a woman who is "naturally plump."
Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of... her
marriage to plaintiU. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent,
especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiU.
According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a... woman's
abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the
abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower
part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of... pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's
abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general
and apparent.
If, as claimed by plaintiU, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be... expected to know, merely by
looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage, more so because she must have
attempted to conceal the true state of aUairs. Even physicians and surgeons, with the aid of the woman
herself who shows and gives her subjective... and objective symptoms, can only claim positive diagnosis
of pregnancy in 33% at five months and 50% at six months.
The Supreme Court's decision in Aquino v. Delizo established that the concealment of pregnancy by a
woman at the time of marriage, when the child was conceived by another man, constitutes fraud and is a
ground for annulment. The Court's reliance on medical evidence and expert opinion highlighted the
importance of considering medical factors in determining the plausibility of a concealed pregnancy. This
case also emphasized the