DEMOCRACY

1. Classical Democracy (Ancient Athens)

The model of classical democracy, rooted in the political system of 5th century BCE Athens,
represents the earliest and most direct form of democratic governance. According to David
Held, this system was characterized by direct political participation, where free male citizens
deliberated and voted on laws and policies in popular assemblies. Political power was
exercised without the mediation of elected representatives, and governance was seen as the
responsibility of each citizen, who was expected to participate actively in legislative, judicial,
and executive roles.
Bhargava and Acharya expand this view by emphasizing the civic ethos of Athenian
democracy. Citizenship was not merely a legal status but a duty that entailed engagement in
all spheres of governance — from enacting laws in the Assembly (Ekklesia) to adjudicating
cases in courts. Participation was seen as a means of personal development, where
individuals realized their rational and moral capacities by engaging in collective deliberation.
This model assumes a unified conception of the common good, with the idea that individual
interests must be subordinated to the general will for society to flourish.
However, both Bhargava and Held underscore the limitations of this model. It was highly
exclusionary, with women, slaves, and resident aliens denied political rights. Its functioning
was sustained by the labor of these excluded groups, which allowed elite male citizens the
leisure to participate in politics. Heywood echoes these concerns, noting that while classical
democracy is idealized for its emphasis on participation and civic virtue, it is impractical in
large, modern states and undermined by inherent inequalities.
Thus, classical democracy serves as a foundational model that celebrates direct rule by
citizens but is also a reminder of the challenges of scale, inclusion, and equality in
democratic systems.
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2. Republican Democracy
Republican democracy, as outlined by David Held, evolves from the classical model and
stresses the notion of the political community as a collective endeavor oriented toward the
common good. It is distinguished by two primary variants: protective republicanism and
developmental republicanism. In both cases, the focus remains on active citizenship, but
with different emphases.
Protective republicanism, influenced by thinkers like Niccolò Machiavelli and Montesquieu,
is designed to safeguard individual liberty against the corruption of concentrated power. It
champions a mixed government structure, incorporating checks and balances to prevent
tyranny and protect civic freedoms. Machiavelli, for instance, viewed civic participation and
public vigilance as essential for sustaining liberty. Montesquieu’s concept of separation of
powers later became foundational in many constitutional democracies.
Developmental republicanism, on the other hand, sees political participation not just as a
means of protecting liberty but as a vital avenue for human development. Drawing on the
ideals of ancient Rome and thinkers like Rousseau, it posits that individuals become fully
human through their engagement in civic life. Bhargava and Acharya emphasize how this
strand of republican thought, especially in Rousseau’s formulation, regards freedom as
obedience to the “general will.” The act of legislating and deliberating collectively is an
exercise in freedom itself.
Andrew Heywood further notes that republican democracy values public virtue and a sense
of civic responsibility. The individual is not merely a bearer of rights but a moral agent
embedded in a community. The model assumes that the public interest is discoverable
through dialogue and consensus, and not merely an aggregate of private interests.
Despite its strengths, Held and other scholars critique this model for its idealism. It
presumes a relatively homogenous society with shared values and may downplay the
significance of pluralism and individual autonomy. Moreover, it remains susceptible to
elitism if civic virtue is not equally cultivated among all citizens.
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3. Liberal Democracy
Liberal democracy, emerging during the 17th and 18th centuries, synthesizes liberal ideals
with democratic procedures. According to David Held, it developed in response to the rise of
capitalism and the need to restrain state power. The model is rooted in the thought of
Enlightenment philosophers such as John Locke, Montesquieu, and later, John Stuart Mill. It
values the protection of individual rights, private property, and limited government through
constitutional and representative institutions.
Held breaks this model into two strands: protective democracy and developmental
democracy. In protective democracy, the state is seen as a neutral umpire safeguarding the
individual’s liberty. This model, as Bhargava and Acharya point out, was deeply influenced by
early liberal thinkers like Locke and James Mill, who believed that individuals are rational,
self-interested actors needing minimal state interference. Hence, governance should be
conducted by representatives accountable through regular, competitive elections.
Institutions such as the rule of law, separation of powers, and an independent judiciary are
critical features to prevent tyranny.
Developmental democracy, inspired by Rousseau and John Stuart Mill, gives more weight to
the ethical and educational role of participation. Mill, in particular, argued that democracy
could help cultivate the moral and intellectual capacities of citizens. Bhargava and Acharya
explain that this variant views political participation not only as a means to protect liberty
but as a way to promote individual growth and civic virtue.
Andrew Heywood emphasizes that liberal democracy is also procedural — focusing more on
how decisions are made than what decisions are made. It tolerates a diversity of views and
relies on institutions like parliaments, political parties, and free media. However, critics,
including neo-Marxists, point out that such democracies often mask deep structural
inequalities. Participation may be formal, but actual influence is skewed toward elites and
corporations.
Thus, liberal democracy represents a balance between freedom and order, rights and
governance — but also leaves open the question of how deeply democratic a system can be
if it permits significant socio-economic disparities.
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4. Marxist Conception of Direct Democracy
The Marxist conception of democracy departs fundamentally from liberal models by
challenging the underlying socio-economic structures that liberal democracies tend to
preserve. David Held describes this model as emphasizing direct participation of citizens in
decision-making, aiming to dismantle elite control over political and economic institutions.
Instead of periodic elections of representatives, Marxist direct democracy envisions
mechanisms like referenda, citizen assemblies, and workers' councils (soviets) where power
is decentralized and rooted in the daily lives of the people.
This model is influenced by Karl Marx’s belief that true democracy cannot exist under
capitalism, which inherently fosters inequality. According to Marx, the state under capitalism
serves the interests of the bourgeoisie, even in so-called democratic systems. Therefore,
democracy must involve the abolition of class-based society, and political equality must be
grounded in economic equality. Held notes that this ideal can be traced through historical
experiments such as the Paris Commune of 1871 or soviet democracy in early revolutionary
Russia, which attempted to implement systems of collective, direct governance.
Bhargava and Acharya highlight that Marxist democracy is not merely about procedural
participation but about transforming power relations. The workplace, factory, and
community are all seen as arenas of democratic governance, moving beyond the limited
scope of electoral politics. Marxists argue that unless the means of production are socially
controlled, political rights are hollow for the working class.
Andrew Heywood adds that while Marxist democracies aim for participatory equality, they
are often criticized for suppressing pluralism and dissent in practice. Historical regimes that
claimed Marxist inspiration, such as the Soviet Union, frequently centralized power and
curtailed individual liberties, deviating from Marx’s original vision.
Despite the risks of authoritarianism in practice, the Marxist model remains significant for its
insistence that political democracy must be underpinned by economic justice. It critiques
liberal democracies for maintaining formal equality while ignoring real power imbalances,
and challenges theorists to rethink what true participation and equality should mean in a
democratic society.
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5. Competitive Elitist Democracy
The Competitive Elitist Democracy model, most notably articulated by Joseph Schumpeter,
redefines democracy in minimalist terms. According to David Held, this model regards
democracy as a method for selecting leaders through competitive elections rather than as a
system for empowering citizens. The core idea is that while people may not be equipped or
interested enough to govern directly, they can choose among elites who then exercise power
on their behalf. This model is pragmatic, aiming for political stability and administrative
efficiency.
Bhargava and Acharya note that this view emerged as a response to the impracticalities of
direct democracy and the limitations of idealistic participatory models. Elitist theorists like
Schumpeter and later Anthony Downs argue that democracy should not be about mass
participation in governance, but about ensuring competition among elites so that citizens
can remove ineffective rulers. In this view, democracy functions well if it offers a peaceful
mechanism for leadership change. Participation is reduced to periodic voting; deliberation,
activism, or policy-making are left to professionals.
Andrew Heywood explains that competitive elitism accepts and even celebrates political
inequality. It assumes that a small group of well-informed, capable elites is better suited to
make complex policy decisions. Masses are seen as generally apathetic and ill-equipped to
participate beyond voting. While this protects governance from populist volatility, it also
significantly reduces citizen influence.
Critics, as both Held and Heywood argue, point out that this model risks alienating the public
and reinforcing status quo power structures. It downplays political education, engagement,
and equality. Moreover, Bhargava and Acharya warn that this version of democracy may
foster apathy, cynicism, and limited accountability if citizens are only involved once every
few years.
Despite these limitations, competitive elitist democracy remains influential in many
contemporary liberal-democratic systems, especially those emphasizing technocratic
governance and electoral legitimacy over participatory depth.
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6. Participatory Democracy
Participatory democracy is a response to the perceived shortcomings of representative and
elitist models of democracy. David Held emphasizes that this model draws inspiration from
Rousseau’s ideas, aiming to deepen democratic engagement beyond voting. It calls for direct
citizen involvement in political, economic, and social decision-making processes. The central
belief is that democracy must empower citizens to take part in shaping policies and
institutions that affect their lives, thereby fostering a more informed, engaged, and
responsible citizenry.
Bhargava and Acharya trace participatory ideals to classical Athens and Rousseau’s theory of
the general will, where citizens collectively deliberate on matters of public concern. They
highlight that, in this model, participation is valued not only for its outcomes but also for its
role in individual self-development. Citizens grow intellectually and morally through
continuous political engagement. The model thus seeks to bridge the gap between state and
society, encouraging the development of institutions like gram sabhas, workers’ collectives,
neighborhood councils, and cooperative housing bodies that enable grassroots involvement.
Andrew Heywood notes that participatory democracy is associated with the New Left and
various social movements that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, advocating for
decentralization, transparency, and empowerment of marginalized groups. It challenges the
bureaucratic and distant nature of representative institutions and argues that democracy
must be practiced daily, not just during elections.
However, this model faces practical challenges. As Held and Heywood point out,
participatory democracy is often criticized for being difficult to implement in large, complex,
and diverse societies. High levels of participation demand time, resources, and political
education that not all citizens can access. Moreover, without adequate safeguards,
participatory processes may be dominated by vocal majorities, suppressing minority voices.
Despite these hurdles, participatory democracy remains an influential normative model. It
urges democracies to go beyond formal procedures and cultivate a more active, equal, and
deliberative political culture — one where citizens are not just governed but are themselves
the agents of governance.
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7. Pluralist Democracy
Pluralist democracy emphasizes diversity, competition, and group-based participation in the
democratic process. As David Held outlines, this model views democracy as a system where
multiple groups — including political parties, interest groups, trade unions, business
associations, and civil society organizations — compete and collaborate to influence policy.
The central idea is that power is not concentrated in a single institution or class but
dispersed among many centers, allowing for a dynamic and responsive political process.
Held links this model to 20th-century thinkers like Robert Dahl, who argued that no single
elite can dominate in a functioning democracy because countervailing forces exist. The ideal
is polyarchy, where multiple competing groups prevent the monopolization of power.
Citizens are not expected to participate as individuals directly in every decision; instead, they
are assumed to associate with organized groups that express their interests in policy-making
arenas.
Bhargava and Acharya elaborate that in a pluralist democracy, the state is viewed as a
neutral referee among competing interests. Political decisions emerge from negotiation and
compromise between these diverse groups, mirroring a kind of “marketplace of ideas.” This
model accepts inequality in resources and influence but assumes that the system remains
balanced as long as all groups can organize and advocate.
Andrew Heywood supports the strengths of pluralist democracy — it allows for peaceful
conflict resolution, protects minority interests, and ensures a degree of responsiveness.
However, he also raises critical concerns. In reality, some groups — particularly those with
economic power (e.g., corporations, industrial lobbies) — exercise disproportionate
influence. Held, too, warns that pluralism can mask the dominance of well-organized elites
and lead to systemic bias, undermining the notion of equal representation.
Thus, while pluralist democracy offers a more realistic view of how politics functions in
liberal states, it also reveals the tension between formal equality and actual influence. It
invites democracies to reflect on how power operates within interest-based systems and
whether all voices truly have a fair opportunity to be heard.
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8. Legal Democracy
Legal democracy, as described by David Held, is grounded in the idea that the authority of
democratic governance must be exercised through a well-defined legal and constitutional
framework. This model prioritizes the rule of law, the separation of powers, and institutional
checks and balances to protect individual rights and uphold fairness. It is heavily influenced
by thinkers like Montesquieu, who advocated for institutional mechanisms to limit state
power, and Hans Kelsen, who stressed the importance of a normative legal order in
democratic systems.
In this model, democracy is not merely the rule of the majority, but a system constrained
and guided by legal principles. These include the supremacy of the constitution, judicial
independence, and the protection of fundamental rights. Held emphasizes that legal
democracy builds safeguards against the arbitrary use of power and maintains political
stability through predictability and transparency in governance.
Bhargava and Acharya support this conception indirectly through their discussion of liberal
constitutionalism. They explain that modern democratic societies require strong legal
institutions to ensure that rights are protected equally and that those in power are held
accountable. The idea is that without a robust legal structure, democracy risks degenerating
into majoritarianism or populist authoritarianism.
Andrew Heywood discusses legal–rational authority in Weberian terms, where legitimacy
stems not from tradition or charisma but from adherence to codified rules. He highlights
how modern democratic states are structured around constitutional law and bureaucratic
procedures that enhance accountability and efficiency. However, Heywood and Held both
point out potential drawbacks: over-legalization can lead to judicial overreach, where
unelected judges make decisions that affect policy. Additionally, powerful interests can
manipulate the legal system to entrench their dominance, undermining the egalitarian ideals
of democracy.
In sum, legal democracy offers an essential framework for safeguarding rights, promoting
accountability, and maintaining order. But its success depends on how impartial and
accessible legal institutions are — and whether legalism serves the people or merely
protects entrenched power.
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9. Deliberative Democracy
Deliberative democracy emphasizes the importance of public reasoning and dialogue in
democratic decision-making. As David Held notes, this model was developed as a critique of
both the aggregative logic of liberal democracy and the narrowness of elitist models.
Drawing on thinkers like Jürgen Habermas and John Dryzek, deliberative democracy places
communication, persuasion, and mutual understanding at the heart of political legitimacy.
Rather than merely counting votes, it seeks to foster decisions based on reasoned
agreement after open and inclusive discussion.
Held explains that deliberative democracy envisions political forums — from citizen juries to
public assemblies — where individuals can exchange arguments, justify their positions, and
revise opinions in light of others' perspectives. It assumes that through dialogue, better
policies emerge and social divisions can be bridged.
Bhargava and Acharya resonate with this view when they discuss Rousseau’s idea of the
“general will.” Although they critique Rousseau’s totalizing tendencies, they appreciate the
ideal that true freedom and collective good are achieved not through aggregation of
preferences but through deliberation. They also link deliberative practices to modern
democratic innovations like gram sabhas, participatory budgeting, and citizens' councils that
aim to empower people with real voices in shaping policies.
Andrew Heywood points out that deliberative democracy contributes to a deeper form of
legitimacy by encouraging reason-based participation and respect for diverse opinions. It
values civic virtues like tolerance, listening, and informed debate, and promotes a more
inclusive, dialogic public sphere. However, he also highlights limitations: deliberation can be
slow and inefficient, especially during emergencies, and may unintentionally exclude
marginalized voices if participants lack the education, time, or resources to engage
effectively.
Moreover, as Held observes, deliberative forums can be co-opted or dominated by articulate
elites, and structural inequalities may influence who gets to speak and be heard. Despite
these concerns, deliberative democracy remains a powerful vision of a society in which
decision-making is shaped by rational discourse and moral persuasion, rather than raw
power or strategic bargaining.
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