ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

THE CITY OF MAKATI V. THE MUNICIPALITY OF BAKUN

G. R. No. 225226, July 7, 2020, J. Reyes Jr., J

FACTS  The case sprang from a special civil action for interpleader under Rule
62. Luzon Hydro Corporation (LHC) sought to compel the City of
Makati (Makati), the Municipality of Alilem (Alilem), and the
Municipality of Bakun (Bakun) to litigate among themselves their
conflicting claims on LHC's liability for local business tax under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160.
 LHC operates a hydroelectric power plant harnessing the Bakun River
that runs through the Provinces of Ilocos Sur and Benguet.
 Until 2003, LHC enjoyed a six-year tax holiday as an entity engaged in
a pioneer area of investment registered with the Board of
Investments.
 For three years since 2004, the 70% portion of the local business tax
was equally apportioned among Alilem, Bakun, and Makati, such that
each local government unit (LGU) received 23.33% -Alilem and Bakun
as power plant sites and Makati as a "project office" site. It is the
sharing in the 70% portion that became the bone of contention
among the three LGUs.
 Bakun questioned the sharing scheme and claimed the entire 70%
portion of the local business tax. The matter was submitted to the
Bureau of Local Government and Finance (BLGF) for determination.
 The BLGF opined that only Bakun and Alilem should share in the 70%
portion of LHC's local business tax because LHC's Makati office was a
mere "administrative office" and not among the sites enumerated in
Sec. 150 of R.A. No. 7160. According to the BLGF, Makati can only
collect the mayor's permit fee and other regulatory fees under its
existing local tax ordinances.
 LHC’s Makati office filed a petition relative to the resolution of the
CTA.
ISSUES  Whether or not LHC’s Makati office was a project office or a mere
administrative office
 Whether or not LHC’s Makati office had a right to participate in the
70% portion of LHC's business tax.
 Whether or not the BLGF’s decision carries a binding effect
RULING  The CTA took into account where LHC's sales, transactions and
operations were undertaken. Having noted that these did not take
place at the Makati office, the tax court concluded that it was a mere
administrative office.
 The BLGF is not an administrative agency whose findings on questions
of fact are given weight and deference in the courts. The authorities
cited by petitioner pertain to the Court of Tax Appeals, a highly
specialized court which performs judicial functions as it was created
for the review of tax cases. In contrast, the BLGF was created merely
to provide consultative services and technical assistance to local
governments and the general public on local taxation, real property
assessment, and other related matters, among others.
 CTA found no reversible error and denied the petition.
DOCTRINE/KEY  The rules on tax allocation in relation to tax situs under Sec. 150 of
TAKEAWAY R.A. No. 716030 come into play when a business subject to it does not
operate a branch or sales office outside of its principal office where all
sales are recorded, but has a factory, project office, plant, or

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plantation situated in different localities, whether or not sales are
made in these localities. Thus, even if no sales were recorded or
undertaken at LHC's Makati office, Makati would have been entitled to
share with LHC's power plant sites in the 70% portion of the business
tax if it could be shown that the Makati office was a project office of
LHC akin to a factory. The enumeration itself - factory, project office,
plant, or plantation — reveals the character of the office
contemplated by the provision. These are offices directly involved in
production or operations; hence, the inescapable conclusion that
LHC's Makati office was a mere administrative office.
 The mere label of a project office does not convert a mere
administrative office into one, if the term is used in such a
way that carries tax implications.

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IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF INMATES RAYMUNDO
REYES AND VINCENT B. EVANGELISTA
GR. No. 251954, June 10, 2020, J. Zalameda

FACTS  This case involves the petition for the Issuance of Writ of Habeas
Corpus praying for: 1) the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
directing respondent Gerald Bantag, as Director General of the
Bureau of Corrections, to make a return thereon, showing legal
authority to detain Raymundo Reyes (Reyes) and Vincent B.
Evangelista (Evangelista), persons deprived of liberty (PDLs), and to
present them personally before the Court; and 2) for the release of
Reyes and Evangelista from incarceration at the New Bilibid Prison in
Muntinlupa City.
 Petitioner alleges that Reyes and Evangelista were convicted for
violation of Section 15, Article III, Republic Act No. (RA) 6425,2 as
amended, for the illegal sale of 974.12 grams of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, or shabu, acting in conspiracy with one another, and
were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
the amount of Php 500,000.00 each.
 Petitioner now claims that with the abolition of the death penalty, 5
and the repeal of the death penalty in RA 7659 as a consequence, the
penalty for illegal sale of drugs should be reverted to that originally
imposed in RA 6425, or from reclusion perpetua in RA 7659 to six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years in RA 6425.
 Further, petitioner insists that both Reyes and Evangelista have
already served 19 years and 2 months, or more than 18 years if the
benefit of Good Conduct Time Allowance (GCTA) under RA 105927
was to be considered. And, with the benefit of the GCTA, which may
be applied retroactively, 8 both Reyes and Evangelista have already
served more than the required sentence imposed by law.
ISSUES  Whether or not petitioner discarded the hierarchy of courts
 Whether or not issues raised by the petitioner is a question of law
 Whether or not writ of habeas corpus filed by the petitioner is
meritorious
 Whether or not Reyes and Evangelista are eligible for GCTA
RULING  The Court ruled that the Petitioner discarded the hierarchy of courts.
 The Rules of Court provide that "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly
provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto.
 An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a
petition filed before this Court or any of its members, the Court of
Appeals (CA) or any of its members in instances authorized by law, or
the RTC or any of its presiding judges.10 In the absence of all the RTC
judges in a province or city, any metropolitan trial judge, municipal
trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge may hear and decide
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in the province or city where the

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absent RTC judges sit.
 At first blush, petitioner seeks to raise a question of law - whether or
not the abolition of the death penalty in RA 9346 reverted the penalty
for illegal sale of shabu from RA 7659 to RA 6425 prior to its
amendment, thus placing the question within the jurisdiction of this
Court. The real question, however, is the release of Reyes and
Evangelista from detention based on the alleged service of their
sentences pursuant to RA 10592, which requires a determination of
facts, i.e., if said PDLs are entitled to the benefit of GCTA. On this
ground alone, the petition must be dismissed.
 A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is
restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal. Any restraint that will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient. The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge, or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record,
the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.
 Nonetheless, the petitioner invokes the third circumstance where writ
of habeas corpus may also be availed of as a post-conviction remedy.
In this matter, the Court ruled that there is no dispute that death
penalty has been abolished. This does not mean, however, that the
penalties imposed under RA 7956, apart from death, have likewise
been repealed.
 The Court ruled that pursuant to Section 1 of RA 10592, amending
Article 29 of the RPC that PDLs convicted of heinous crimes shall not
be entitled to GCTA.
DOCTRINE/KEY  This Court has concurrent jurisdiction, along with the CA and the trial
TAKEAWAY courts, to issue a writ of habeas corpus. However, mere concurrency
of jurisdiction does not afford parties absolute freedom to choose the
court with which the petition shall be filed.12 Petitioners should be
directed by the hierarchy of courts. After all, the hierarchy of courts
"serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs."
 While this Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC
and the CA in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus (extraordinary writs),
direct recourse to this Court is proper only to seek resolution of
questions of law.
 Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Section 4.
When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of
judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge
had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make
the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears
after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason
of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of
a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
 The writ of habeas corpus may also be availed of as a post-conviction

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remedy when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the
following exceptional circumstances is attendant: 1) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
person; 2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or 3)
the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence
as to such excess.
 Rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to
interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, such as
the 2019 IRR issued by the DOJ and the DILG, have the force
of law, and are entitled to great respect. Administrative
issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in their
favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore
administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its
validity was not put in issue. Unless an administrative order is
declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply the same.

PINAG-ISANG LAKAS NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA LRT (PIGLAS), ET AL. V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA),
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY (LRTA) AND METRO TRANSIT ORGANIZATION, INC. (MTOI)
G. R. No. 263060. July 23, 2024, J. Hernando

FACTS  Metro and LRTA entered into a management contract denominated as

"Agreement for the Management and Operation of the Light Rail
Transit System" (O & M Agreement) in consideration of a PHP 5 Million
annual fee to be paid by LRTA to Metro. LRTA undertook to defray and
reimburse all the operating expenses of Metro. LRTA's Board of
Directors also approved the wage increases and grant of benefits to
the employees of Metro as provided in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) between Metro and its employees.
 Manila Electric Company sold its 499,990 Metro shares of stocks to
LRTA. Consequently, Metro became a wholly owned subsidiary of
LRTA.
 the Union staged a strike over a bargaining deadlock which paralyzed
the operations of the LRT Line 1 System. To put a halt to the strike,
the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued a Return to
Work Order (RTWO), directing all striking employees to return to work
immediately upon receipt thereof, and for Metro to accept said
employees under the same terms and conditions of employment prior
to the strike.
 LRTA no longer renewed the O & M Agreement with Metro when it
expired on July 31, 2000, refused to admit back Malunes et al. who
were willing to return to work, and hired replacement workers to
perform their tasks.
 Malunes et al. claimed that they were not notified of the non-renewal
of the agreement, and that their dismissal was without just cause and

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due process of law. The closure of Metro was not just a clear defiance
of the RTWO issued by the DOLE Secretary, but an act of unfair labor
practice.
ISSUES  Whether or not NLRC has jurisdiction over the case
 Whether or not Motion to Quash/Lift Updated Writs of Execution and
Notices of Garnishment on the grounds of res judicata and the labor
arbiter's lack of jurisdiction to issue the said writ filed by LRTA and
Metro is meritorious
 Whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the money claims of
Malunes et al. against LRTA
RULING  The Second Division reiterated the doctrine laid down in Venus that
employment in LRTA is governed by the Civil Service Rules and
Regulations, and not the Labor Code, since LRTA is a GOCC with an
original charter, hence, beyond the ambit of the DOLE.
 Metro, on the other hand, is covered by the Labor Code despite
LRTA's subsequent acquisition thereof, as it was originally organized
under the Corporation Code. It became a government corporation
only after LRTA's acquisition but even then, Metro maintained its
distinct and separate personality from that of LRTA, and remained to
be without an original charter. Thus, employees of Metro are not and
cannot be considered employees of LRTA. Having distinct
personalities, the Second Division concluded that LRTA cannot be held
liable for employmentrelated obligations of Metro to its employees
 Further, it found that the final and executory judgment in G.R. No.
175460 does not operate as res judicata in G.R. No. 182928 given
that there is no identity of parties in the two cases. Metro litigated for
its own interests, not for LRTA's, As the labor arbiter had no
jurisdiction over LRTA when they heard the illegal dismissal case, the
NLRC also had no jurisdiction over LRTA at the appellate level. The
NLRC's exercise of jurisdiction over LRTA therefore cannot produce
legal effects because they are patently null and void. Thus, the LRTA
was exempted from the traditional requirement of filing a motion for
reconsideration in order that recourse to a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari may be made validly in light of the patent nullity of the
NLRC's action. in CA-G.R. SP. No. 95665, and could not have spoken in
representation of LRTA. For lack of the requisite identity of parties,
there can be no application of the principle of res judicata in the
present case.
 The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC do not have jurisdiction over
respondent LRTA. And thus, the decisions and resolutions of the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC, holding respondent LRTA liable for petitioners'
monetary award, are null and void and can never become final
[insofar] as respondent LRTA is concerned.
 The COA did not reverse nor nullify the final and executory ruling in
G.R. No. 175460. It merely echoed the Second Division's
pronouncement in G.R. No. 182928 that LRTA cannot be held liable for
the illegal dismissal claims of Malunes et al. simply because the labor
arbiter had no jurisdiction over LRTA when it heard the illegal
dismissal case (a defense the LRTA duly invoked before the labor
arbiter). As a matter of course, the NLRC also had no jurisdiction over
LRTA at the appellate level. Consequently, the labor arbiter's Decision
and all of NLRC's subsequent actions on the case were a nullity for

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want of jurisdiction, and as such, they never attained finality insofar
as LRTA is concerned.
 The Court ruled that the COA did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the Petition for Money Claims. The Third
Division's ruling in G.R. No. 175460 cannot be used as basis to
enforce the labor tribunals' judgment award against LRTA which arose
out of the NLRC's improper exercise of jurisdiction over Malunes et
al.s' illegal dismissal case against LRTA. Considering that the NLRC
incorrectly took cognizance of the illegal dismissal case against LRTA,
LRTA cannot be held solidarily liable for the backwages and
separation pay awarded on the basis thereof.
DOCTRINE/KEY  It is a hornbook doctrine that "[a] void judgment or order has no legal
TAKEAWAY and binding effect for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is
nonexistent and may be resisted in any action or proceeding
whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to
vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may simply be
ignored. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating
from it have no legal effect. In this sense, a void order can never
attain finality."
 Grave abuse of discretion speaks of an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in
contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on
law and evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism.
 The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) lacks
jurisdiction in this case because the Light Rail Transit
Authority (LRTA) is a government-owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC) with an original charter. As such, it is
governed by the Civil Service Law rather than the Labor Code.
This distinction places the LRTA under the jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) instead of the NLRC.

HICAP V. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION ET AL

GR. No. 210334, August 1, 2023, En Banc

FACTS  Petitioner applied for registration of its trademark "CHAMPAGNE

ROOM" with the IPO. Petitioner then received a Notice of Opposition10
from respondent CIVC, a public service body established by the
French Parliament engaged in the protection and development of the
champagne market in general.
 PO Adjudication Officer Atty. Adoracion U. Zare (Adjudication Officer)

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rendered a Decision dismissing the opposition of respondent CIVC.
The Adjudication Officer held that petitioner's adoption of the mark
"CHAMPAGNE ROOM" does not suggest a connection to respondent
CIVC or its appellation of origin.
 CIVC received a copy of the Decision on February 2, 2018 and filed a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal to the IPO-BLA Director
praying for an extension of 10 days from February 12, 2018 or until
February 22, 2018 within which to file an appeal.
ISSUES  Whether the CA erred in affirming the Orders of the IPO-BLA Director
granting respondent CIVC's Motion for Extension to File Appeal from
the Decision of the Adjudication Officer
RULING  The Court denies the Petition and sustains the assailed Resolutions
issued by the CA.
 It is true that the right to appeal, being merely a statutory privilege,
should be exercised in the manner prescribed by law. But "it is
equally true that in proceedings before administrative bodies the
general rule has always been liberality." "Administrative rules of
procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their
object to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their respective claims and defenses."
 The IPO is composed of several Bureaus, including the BLA which is
headed by the BLA Director. One of the functions of the BLA is to hear
and decide opposition to the following: application for registration of
marks; cancellation of trademarks; cancellation of patents, utility
models, and industrial designs; and petitions for compulsory licensing
of patents.
 In the present case, the grant of CIVC's Motion for Extension of Time
to File Appeal by the respondent IPO-BLA Director was a valid exercise
of his discretion considering that the IPO-BLA Director is not strictly
bound by the technical rules of procedure. Because moving for an
extension of time to file an appeal is not expressly and explicitly
proscribed under the Revised Inter Partes Rules, the IPO-BLA Director
acted within his authority when he allowed respondent CIVC an
extension of time considering that respondent CIVC was able to file
the Appeal Memorandum within the period allowed.
DOCTRINE/KEY  Republic Act No. (RA) 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual
TAKEAWAY Property Code of the Philippines, is a law enacted pursuant to the
State policy "to streamline administrative procedures of registering
patents, trademarks and copyright, to liberalize the registration on
the transfer of technology, and to enhance the enforcement of
intellectual property rights in the Philippines."
 Palao v. Florentino III International, Inc. - Administrative
bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of law and
procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law.
Administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are
unfettered by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements,
subject to the observance of fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented
before them. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and
administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense.
 Birkenstock Orthopaedie GmbH and Co. KG v. Phil. Shoe Expo

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Marketing Corp. - It is well-settled that "the rules of
procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment
of justice, rather than its frustration.1a⍵⍴h!1 A strict and
rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when
it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to
enhance fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should
never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other
party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities." x x x This is
especially true with quasi-judicial and administrative bodies,
such as the IPO, which are not bound by technical rules of
procedure.

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