PN-B10 For Maur
PN-B10 For Maur
GENERAL LIST NO
2024
2024
[Type text]
12TH JUSTICE P.N. BHAGWATI INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, 2024
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ISSUES RAISED................................................................................................................... IX
[1] WHETHER THE ICJ HAS THE JURISDICTION TO TRY AND DECIDE THE
CLAIM OF THE AGGRIEVED NATIONS? ....................................................................... 1
1.1 The existence of dispute satisfies the pre-requisites of the Courts jurisdiction ................ 1
1.2. Tacit consent through Kuwal’s conduct replaces the need for a clear and explicit
acceptance of ICJ’s Jurisdiction .............................................................................................. 3
2.1. The lack of explicit user consent and well trained AI algorithms on RHPL platforms
has violated the data protection and privacy rights which supplements the breach on
freedom of information. ............................................................................................................ 7
2.2. Kuwal failed to enact sufficient domestic laws and exercise due diligence to prevent
manipulative practices and unethical use of algorithms by RHPL platforms, amounting to
a breach of its obligations under international human rights law. ........................................ 9
3.1. Cyber operations Carried out by Kuwal through RPHL platforms to change political
landscape of Maur has violated the principle of non-intervention under customary
international law. .................................................................................................................... 10
3.2. Kuwal’s Engagement in Covert surveillance activities and Use of Sophisticated cyber
tools to infiltrate Maur’s Governmental communications systems is the act of Cyber
Espionage which in breach international law. ...................................................................... 13
4.1. Lawful and habitual presence of Maurian nationals entitles them to be protected. ..... 16
4.2 .Arrest, detention and punishment can only be resorted to when it is determined to be
necessary, reasonable in all the circumstances and proportionate to a legitimate purpose.17
4.3. Arrest and detention must comply with basic human rights standards. ........................ 18
4.4. Kuwal has not demonstrated credible evidence linking the detained individuals to
activities that pose a threat to Kuwal's security. .................................................................... 19
LIST OF ABBREVIATION
Art. Article
Para/¶ Paragraph
Int‘l International
UN United Nations
v. Versus
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
BOOKS
JOURNAL ARTICLES
LIST OF CASES
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Maur has unilaterally filed a case against the Republic of Kuwal pursuant
to Article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute. In response, the Republic of Kuwal has filed counter-
claims at the International Court of Justice against the Republic of Maur as per Article 36(1)
of the (‘ICJ’) Statute. Both Maur and Kuwal are members of the United Nations and as such
are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the ICJ under Article 93(1) of the UN Charter. The
representatives of Maur and Kuwal undertake to accept the judgement of this Court as final
and binding and shall execute it in good faith in its entirety.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
RHPL, a Kuwal conglomerate which owns major digital assets and employs advanced AI in
global platforms such as RNC, Facetok, Instasearch, Amazeshop, MyTube collecting user
data for advertising revenue is raising privacy concerns about privacy issues and threatened
to national security due to which Maur had banned the platforms yet again lifted the
restrictions with new sets of guidelines.
In 2022, Mr. Shil Ling of Maurian origin residing in Kuwal and a prominent advocate for
separatist movement was assassinated, leading to tensions between Maur and Kuwal.
Diplomatic Tensions
Maur filed the case against Kuwal on ICJ concerning the suppression of freedom of
expression, breach of personal data and information, cyber espionage and severe human right
violations.
ISSUES RAISED
The following broad issues are framed for the determination by ICJ in no particular
orders:
ISSUE 1
Whether ICJ has the jurisdiction to try and decide the claim of aggrieved nations?
ISSUE 2
Whether the activities of Kuwal (through RHPL’s platforms) are in breach of the
freedom of information and personal data protection rights as guaranteed under the
International Conventions?
ISSUE 3
ISSUE 4
The applicant has duly addressed all the aforementioned in the form of four substantive
arguments advanced summarized under.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
[1] WHETHER THE ICJ HAS THE JURISDICTION TO TRY AND DECIDE THE
CLAIM OF THE AGGRIEVED NATIONS?
It is humbly submitted before the hon‘ble International court of Justice that the dispute
between Mauritania and Kuwal over alleged breaches of international law is evident, with
both parties holding divergent views. Mauritania argues that Kuwal's conduct, including
filing counter-claims, signifies tacit consent to the ICJ's jurisdiction. The court's historical
practice emphasizes parties' actions as crucial in determining consent. Any objections to
jurisdiction should align with rules specifying when they should be raised, as seen in the
"Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia" case. Mauritania contends that Kuwal's actions
demonstrate a clear intention to submit to the ICJ's authority.
It is humbly submitted before the International Court of Justice that Kuwal's utilization of
RHPL platforms, marked by the deployment of AI algorithms without explicit user consent,
stands as a violation of international norms. This practice infringes upon Article 19(2) of the
ICCPR and GDPR Articles 5, 6, and 7, curtailing impartial access to information and
fostering echo chambers that compromise users' rights. Furthermore, Kuwal's failure to enact
laws preventing the unethical use of algorithms by RHPL platforms represents a breach of its
international human rights obligations under the ICCPR. This deficiency in regulatory
frameworks and oversight mechanisms reflects a lack of due diligence, further contributing to
a violation of international human rights law pursuant to Article 2(1) of the ICCPR.
It is humbly submitted before the hon'ble International court of justice that the Cyber
operations carried out through RHPL platforms and Engagement in Covert surveillance
activities and Use of Sophisticated cyber tools to infiltrate Maur‘s Governmental
communications systems is the act of Cyber Espionage. This act of Kuwal has manipulated
the political landscape of the Maur which is the violation of principle of non-intervention
under Customary international law, Violation of sovereignty under UN charter and an act of
aggression which leads towards the Responsibility of states for the international wrongful
acts.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble International Court of Justice that Kuwal's arrest,
detention and punishment of Maurian nationals violates international human rights law. As a
party to treaties like the ICCPR, Kuwal must uphold its commitments to protect human
rights. The lawful presence of Maurian nationals in Kuwal entitles them to rights under the
1951 Refugee Convention. For an arrest or detention to be justified, it must meet the
principles of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality. Kuwal has failed to provide
credible evidence that the detainees pose a serious threat to its security. Overall, the actions
taken contradict Kuwal's obligations under international agreements it has ratified. These
measures violate international standards on arbitrary detention and lack due process.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
[1] WHETHER THE ICJ HAS THE JURISDICTION TO TRY AND DECIDE THE
CLAIM OF THE AGGRIEVED NATIONS?
1. It is humbly submitted before the Hon‘ble Court that the jurisdiction of the Court in
this case is based upon Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court 1 and the
provisions of Customary International law, International treaties and conventions in
force to which the Maur and Kuwal are parties, each of which provides an
independent and sufficient basis for the Court's jurisdiction. Maur relies on this as a
basis of jurisdiction in the present case and submits that, under its provisions, the
Court is empowered to adjudicate the claims that Maur has advanced relating to the
Kuwal‘s actions violating international laws.
2. Maur and Kuwal are both members of the United Nations2, and thus ipso facto parties
to the Statute of the International Court of Justice (henceforth referred to as "the
Statute") which forms an integral part of the Charter of the United Nations (Art. 92,
93 [1]) of the Charter)3. In this capacity, both States are entitled to make use of the
machinery provided by the principal judicial organ of the United Nations (Art. 92 of
the Charter) without any further prerequisites ratione personae (Art. 35 [1] of the
Statute).
1.1 The existence of dispute satisfies the pre-requisites of the Courts jurisdiction
3. The fact that there is a dispute between the Parties in the present case as to the breach
of international law can hardly be challenged. The positions advanced by Maur and
1
Article 16 (1) of the Court's Statute provides that the jurisdiction or the Court encompasses "al1 matters
specially provided for . . . in treaties and conventions in force". Maur and Kuwal are, as Members of the United
Nations, parties to the Statute.
2
Compromis¶ 1.6, Line 2.
3
Article 92 of the United Nations Charter provides that the International Court of Justice shall be the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based
upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter
and Article 93(1) provides that all members are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.
the Kuwal show without any doubt that the Parties hold profoundly divergent views
as to the legality of the incidents on which Maur's claims are based.
4. Ever since the Maur government‘s ban on RHPL‘s platform in February 2020 citing
national security concerns4 following series of terrorist attacks, Maur has consistently
maintained that there was no justification for the Kuwal‘s actions along with its
influence on RHPL‘s platforms under international law. In contrast, the RHPL has
asserted its commitment to unbiased reporting and digital autonomy, an argument that
was repeated after the assassination of leader of the separatist movement.5
5. The Court has frequently been called on to decide whether a dispute exists as to the
interpretation and application of a treaty between parties to a given case. In this
connection, the classic definition of a dispute was given by the Permanent Court in
the Mavrommatis case, where it ruled that - "A dispute is a disagreement on a point
of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons6.‖ In the
case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, the Permanent
Court further clarified this definition when it affirmed that - "... a difference of
opinion does exist as soon as one of the Governments concerned points out that the
attitude adopted by the other conflicts with its own views7.‖ In the Interpretation of
Peace Treaties case, this Court stressed that the objective factual situation is central
in evaluating whether a dispute exists in a particular case. It observed: "Whether there
exists an international dispute is a matter for objective determination. The mere denial
of the existence of a dispute does not prove its non-existence... There has thus arisen a
situation in which the two sides hold clearly opposite views concerning the question
of the performance or non-performance of certain treaty obligations. Confronted with
such a situation… the Court must conclude that international disputes have arisen8.‖
6. In the present case, there can be no doubt that ever since the RHPL‘s close
relationship with Kuwal government was publicly exposed and Maur banned RHPL‘s
platforms9, the Kuwal has been well aware of Maur's allegation that the Kuwal
4
Annexure No. 3, p. 18.
5
Compromis ¶ 4.10, Line 1.
6
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgement No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J... Series A, No. 2, p. 11.
7
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Jurisdiction. Judgement No. 6, 1925, P.C.I.J., Series A, No.
6, p. 14.
8
lnterpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rornania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion. I.C.J.
Reports 1950, p. 74.
9
Annexure no.3, pg. 18.
breached international law. Maur's position was clearly stated in reports from Maurian
intelligence agencies. Mr. Shin Ling‘s assassination further escalated accusations via
public announcements between countries10 and RHPL also tried to make its position
clear in the course of numerous public announcements in response to allegations.
Maur also made its position clears in its numerous public announcements.
7. From these statements, it clearly emerges that a dispute arose between the Parties
from an early stage as to the violation of international laws and convention.
1.2. Tacit consent through Kuwal’s conduct replaces the need for a clear and explicit
acceptance of ICJ’s Jurisdiction
8. Subsequently, Maur brought a case against Kuwal in the International Court of Justice
when, as has been explained in Compromis11, Maur‘s attempt to resolve the issue
through international forums failed to bring about satisfactory response from Kuwal.
That made it seem useless to Maur to negotiate the issue or to agree to some other
pacific means of settlement.
9. ICJ‘s jurisdiction, like the consensual theory is based on the given consent of the
states. Wherein in a specific case, they may have jurisdiction over it if the parties or
the party states consented to the settlement of their dispute by the Court. And this
consent may be expressed through unilateral declarations or optional declaration
clause, treaties, special agreements or such consent may also be expressed after the
Court has been seized.
10. It may be helpful to the Court, for this Memorial to address certain arguments which
might conceivably be raised against the Court's jurisdiction under the various titles of
jurisdiction upon which Kuwal relies. The principal argument against jurisdiction
would probably be, in essence, that the Maur‘s Application lacks consent, that the
Court is without jurisdiction for that reason, and that the case should therefore be
dismissed. Such an objection firstly should have been raised by Kuwal in the
preliminary objection pursuant to Article 79 early in the proceedings, which does not
seem to be the situation as per the compromis. But even if had raised then that would
have to rest on an interpretation of court on question of jurisdiction in the Case
10
Compromis ¶5.1, Line 1.
11
Compromis ¶6.1, Line 4.
concerning the Factory at Chorzow12: " When considering whether it has jurisdiction
or not, the Court's aim is always to ascertain whether an intention on the part of the
parties exists to confer jurisdiction upon it. The question as to the existence of a doubt
nullifying its jurisdiction need not be considered when, as in the present case, this
intention can be demonstrated in a manner convincing to the Court."
11. In its specific application to the instant case the argument would be that, even though
the government of Kuwal have filed counter claim in response to Maur‘s
allegations13, prior to the preliminary hearing, on which it might be held that Kuwal
has tried to somehow challenge the jurisdiction of the court, however the counter
claim does not satisfy the general principle of clear and unequivocal consent14,
rather it shows the lack of Kuwal‘s intention to question the jurisdiction, further
establishing Kuwal‘s consent through conduct. Furthermore, relying on the
uncontested fact (a) that at no time prior to the extensive hearing or indeed to date has
Kuwal indicated a willingness to submit the preliminary objection, (b) that Kuwal has
in fact continually failed to assist Maur on its attempt to resolve the disputes through
international forums, (c) that, by the time this case was ready for hearing by the court
in accordance with the schedule set in court‘s order, the case have moved beyond the
initial stage, (d) that, by the time the oral pleadings on the merits are closed, it would
not satisfy the requirement of Article 79 of the rules of court of the International
Court of Justice15, it conceivably might be held that the court has the jurisdiction to
hear this case.
12. The Republic of Maur accordingly submits that:
(a) It had made several attempts to resolve the issues through international forums or
through the measures that the treaty in dispute suggested16 to which Kuwal
continually failed to bring about a satisfactory response leading Maur to submit an
application and Kuwal to file counter-claims, which fully and clearly indicated the
12
Case concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Jurisdiction), Judgment No. 8, Series A., No. 9, page 32.
13
Compromis ¶6.2, Line 1.
14
This principle is particularly relevant in international law, where silence or inaction can sometimes be
interpreted as form of consent, Quantum of Silence: Inaction and Jus ad Bellum, Dustin A. Lewis and et al ,
HLS PILAC, 2019, Part II — What We Mean By Silence — HLS PILAC (harvard.edu)[Accessed at Jan 24].
15
Rules of Court of International Court of Justice, Art. 79, (1978) provides that the preliminary objection to the
jurisdiction of the Court must be raised "not later than the close of the oral proceedings" on the merits.
16
Compromis ¶ 6.1, Line 4.
subject of dispute, and the parties, in accordance with Article 40 (1) of the Statute
of the Court.17
(b) The Republic of Kuwal, after delivery of Maur‘s Application, in its response filed
counter-claims at the ICJ, implying that it was prepared to appear before the Court
and to accept its jurisdiction in this case.
(c) The parties have clearly referred the present dispute by the above mentioned
documents (namely, the Maur‘s application, and Kuwal‘s counter-claims), which,
whether or not they constitute ―special agreement‖, at least constitute ―reference‖.
A special agreement is not necessary.18
(d) Even if (which is not admitted) there was any forma1 irregularity in the mode of
the commencement of the present proceedings, this irregularity has been cured,
because the Republic of Kuwal by its submission of counter-claims, has waived
any possible objection and has consented to the jurisdiction of the Court. An
irregularity in the manner in which a case is introduced may be cured by
subsequent events.19
(e) Having once consented to the jurisdiction, the Republic of Kuwal cannot
afterwards withdraw its consent.
(f) The President‘s order to hear the case in March 2024 clearly proceeded upon the
basis that the Kuwal‘s government had definitely accepted the jurisdiction, as was,
in fact, the case. It is not competent for the Kuwal‘s Government to reopen the
question of jurisdiction.
13. With reference to the submissions contained in the preceding paragraph, the Republic
of Maur invites the attention of the Court to the following cases decided by the
Permanent Court of International Justice:
(a) In Judgment No. 12, dated 26th April, 1928, and entitled Rights of Minorities in
Upper Silesia (~Minorities Schools), Series A., No.15, the Court observed as
follows: "The object of this article was to lay down when an objection to the
jurisdiction may validly be filed, but only in cases where the objection is
submitted as a preliminary question, that is to say-, when the Respondent asks for
17
Statute of International Court of Justice, Article 40(1), Statute of the Court Of Justice | INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE (icj-cij.org) [ Accessed at Jan 24].
18
Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (~Minorities Schools), Series A., No. 15, Judgment No. 12, dated 26th
April, 1928.
19
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case (Jurisdiction), Judgment No. 2, 30th August, 1924.
a decision upon the objection before any subsequent proceedings on the merits. It
is exclusively in this event that the article lays down what the procedure should be
and that this procedure should be different from that on the merits. But it does not
follow from this that an objection to the jurisdiction which is not filed as a
preliminary objection in the sense indicated above, can be taken at any stage of
the proceedings. The Court's jurisdiction depends on the will of the Parties. The
Court is always competent once the latter have accepted its jurisdiction, since
there is no dispute which States entitled to appear before the Court cannot refer to
it20."
(b) Later in its judgment the Court said: "....there is no rule laying down that consent
must take the form of an express declaration rather than that of acts conclusively
establishing it. If, in a special case, the Respondent has, by an express declaration,
indicated his desire to obtain a decision on the merits and his intention to abstain
from raising the question of jurisdiction, it seems clear that he cannot, later on in
the proceedings, go back upon that declaration."
14. In view of the circumstances above referred to, in the present case there is a clear and
express acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court on the part of the Respondent
Government. However, should there exist any doubt on the question it ought, in the
view of the Republic of Maur, to be fully dispelled by the preceding review of the
practice of the Court.
20
Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (~Minorities Schools), Series A., No. 15, Judgment No. 12, dated 26th
April, 1928
2.1. The lack of explicit user consent and well trained AI algorithms on RHPL platforms
has violated the data protection and privacy rights which supplements the breach on
freedom of information.
2. The activities of Kuwal through RHPL platforms to process the data without explicit
consent of user21 and the well trained AI Algorithms to personalize the content
delivery and subtly manipulate search results to prioritize or deprioritize or suppress
certain information influencing user‘s perception and understanding of key issues 22
which severely restricted impartial access to information in the breach of Article 19(2)
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)23 and violates the
personal data protection and privacy rights which is in breach of Article 5, Article 6
and Article 7 of General data protection Regulations (GDPR).24
3. RHPL has integrated sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI) technology across its
platforms like Facetok, Instasearch and MyTube which are capable of complex data
analysis, content curation and behavior prediction.25 The algorithms on these
platforms collect extensive user data and process it to personalize content delivery.
For instance, on Facetok and MyTube, well-trained AI algorithms personalize content
recommendations continuously presenting content that aligns with users' existing
viewpoints.26 Similarly, Instasearch AI Algorithms subtly manipulates search results
to prioritize or deprioritize certain information.27 Such algorithmic curation of data
and personalized content delivery severely restricts users' access to pluralistic
information and perspectives, creating an ‗echo chamber‘ effect. 28 Such Echo
chambers continuously presents the content that aligns with users‘ existing
viewpoints, preferences, beliefs and interest.
4. 2011 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion, algorithms
designed to filter information prevents users from accessing perspectives beyond their
own.29 By subtly downplaying critical news reports regarding the separatist movement
on the severity of terrorist attacks, de-indexing dissenting websites critical of the
21
Compromis 3.2
22
Compromis 3.3.2
23
ICCPR, Art 19
24
REGULATION (EU) 2016/679, General Data Protection Regulation
25
Compromis 3.2
26
Compromis 3.3.1
27
compromis 3.3.2
28
Compromis 3.3.1
29
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression, Frank La Rue
30
UDHR, Art 19
31
ICCPR, Art 19
32
EU GDPR, Art 5
33
EU GDPR, Art 7
34
CJEU - C-673/17 - Planet49
35
Budapest Convention, Art. 2
36
Budapest Convention, Article 16
37
Budapest Convention, Article 17
authorize expedited preservation and partial disclosure of traffic data associated with
specified communications up for investigation. However, no oversight mechanisms
existed to trace and preserve algorithmically filtered content to ensure platform
transparency and algorithm auditability. Hence, the lack of explicit user consent and
well trained AI algorithms on RHPL platforms has violated the data protection and
privacy rights as well as the breach on freedom of information.
2.2. Kuwal failed to enact sufficient domestic laws and exercise due diligence to prevent
manipulative practices and unethical use of algorithms by RHPL platforms, amounting to
a breach of its obligations under international human rights law.
7. It is humbly submitted before the International Court of Justice that under Article 2(1)
of the ICCPR, State Parties including Kuwal have an obligation to respect and ensure
the rights recognized by the Covenant, including the right to freedom of expression
under Article 1938. This requires States to take legislative and other necessary steps to
give effect to the rights and adopt laws or other measures as may be necessary to
prevent any violations. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
affirm that States must "protect against human rights abuse within their territory
and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises.‖ This requires
taking appropriate steps to "prevent, investigate, punish and redress such abuse
through effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication."
8. However, Kuwal failed to enact sufficient domestic laws and oversight mechanisms to
regulate and prevent the unethical use of algorithms, lack of transparency and
manipulative practices by RHPL platforms. No provisions existed to mandate
algorithm audits, ensure transparency in data collection/processing, or prevent
engineered amplification/suppression of particular information. Without such
regulating laws and policies, Kuwal failed to exercise due diligence in preventing the
violation of the right to freedom of expression and privacy by RHPL's platforms
through the use of non-transparent and potentially manipulative algorithms. As
affirmed by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression,
States have a positive obligation to promote algorithm transparency and prevent
public opinion manipulation. However, Kuwal took no steps in this regard. By failing
to enact and implement requisite laws and policies to regulate algorithm use and
38
Article 19, ICCPR.
prevent manipulative practices by RHPL platforms, Kuwal breached its duty of due
diligence under international human rights law. This amounts to a violation of Article
2(1) of the ICCPR read with Article 19.
9. The Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 34 has affirmed that
States parties must ensure that legislative and administrative frameworks for the
regulation of media fully comply with the strict requirements of Article 19(3) of the
Covenant. However, Kuwal failed to ensure the same. The Committee has further
elaborated that any restrictions on freedom of expression must be provided by law,
and the law must be formulated with sufficient precision. However, Kuwal did not
formulate any such regulating laws.
10. Therefore, in light of the above obligations elucidated by the ICCPR and the
interpretations of the Human Rights Committee, it is humbly submitted before this
Hon'ble Court that Kuwal is in breach of its obligations under international human
rights law by failing to exercise due diligence through domestic legislation and
prevent unethical practices by RHPL platforms.
3.1. Cyber operations Carried out by Kuwal through RPHL platforms to change political
landscape of Maur has violated the principle of non-intervention under customary
international law.
2. According to Tallin Manual 1.0 Cyber operation refers to the employment of cyber
capabilities with the primary purpose of achieving objectives in or by the use of
cyberspace.39 Offensive cyber operations involves activities in cyberspace that
39
Tallin Manual 1.0 (The Tallinn Manual has long been the flagship research initiative of the CCDCOE. Tallinn
Manual 1.0 (published in 2013 by Cambridge University Press) addressed the most severe cyber operations –
those that violate the prohibition of the use of force, entitle states to exercise their right of self-defense, or occur
3. The RHPL has been led to the widespread criticism on its ethical standards and
operational integrity after the whistleblower publicly exposed the close relationship
between RPHL platform and Kuwal government through their internal
44
communication indicating collusion between these two entities. Which shows that
Kuwal has been involving in offensive cyber operations to manipulate, disregard and
disruption of the information systems and shape the political belief of the citizen of
Maur through the RHPL platforms to influence Maurian citizens against their
government portraying it as oppressive and undermining minority rights which
ultimately affects the political landscape and the upcoming election in 2024.45
4. State must not conduct cyber operations that violate the sovereignty of another
State.46 Kuwal through RHPL platforms has conducted Cyber operations in such that
it has violated the sovereignty of Maur. A general rule has been laid out that cyber
operation must not violate the sovereignty of another state47 which prohibits the cyber
during armed conflict. The nature of the Tallinn Manual will remain unchanged; it will continue to be a non-
legally-binding scholarly work by distinguished international law academics and practitioners intended to
provide an objective restatement of international law as applied in the cyber context. It is policy- and politics-
neutral and will not represent the legal position or doctrine of any State or international organization, including
the CCDCOE.
40
HANSON, FERGUS, and TOM UREN. POLICY BRIEF: AUSTRALIA‘S OFFENSIVE CYBER
CAPABILITY. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2018. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep23053
Accessed 21 Jan. 2024.
41
compromis ¶ 3.5
42
compromis ¶ 2.11
43
compromis ¶ 3.3.2
44
compromis ¶ 3.4
45
Compromis ¶ 3.10
46
Tallin Rule 2.0, Rule 4
47
Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 14, ¶ 205.
operation to intervene into the internal and external affairs of the other States48;which
is well explained by 1970 Friendly Relation Declaration 49. RHPL platforms
influencing the government for the ongoing election coming in Maur is the
interference towards the domestic affairs of Maur. There is a growing agreement that
the principle of non-intervention applies to the cyber domain as well.50 Likewise , On
the question of opinio juris: Australia,51 the Netherlands52 United Kingdom53 and
United States54have all argued that cyber operations targeting elections are, or should
be, violations of the non-intervention rule. The dissemination of the misinformation
intended to influence the outcome of any political election is also categorized as a
―method of coercion‖55. The act of Kuwal to influence Maurian citizen against the
government to manipulate the political opinion breaches the independent electoral
process and outcome of political election. Hence, Cyber operations Carried out by
Kuwal through RPHL platforms to change political landscape of Maur has violated
the principle of non-intervention under customary international law.
48
Philip Kunig, Intervention, Prohibition of, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(updated Apr.2008)
49
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970)
50
Russell Buchan, Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Uses of Force or Prohibited Interventions? 17 J. CONFLICT &
SEC. L. 211, 221 (2012).
51
2019 International Law Supplement, AUSTL.‘S INT‘L CYBER ENGAGEMENT
STRATEGY,https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/international-relations/international-cyber-engagement-
strategy/ aices/chapters/2019_international_law_supplement.html (last visited June 19, 2020) (―[T]he use by a
hostile State of cyber operations to manipulate the electoral system to alter the results of an election in another
State . . . would constitute a violation of the principle of non- intervention.‖).
52
Letter from Stef Blok, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Neth., to the President of the House of Representatives on
the Int‘l Legal Order in Cyberspace: Appendix: International Law in Cyberspace (July5, 2019) (on file with the
government of the Netherlands) [hereinafter Letter on Int‘l Legal Order in Cyberspace] (―Attempts to influence
election outcomes via social media are [covered by] the non-intervention principle.‖).
53
Jeremy Wright, Attorney General QC MP, Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century (May 23, 2018)
(―[The] use by a hostile state of cyber operations to manipulate the electoral system to alter the results of an
election in another state . . . must surely be a breach of the prohibition on intervention in the domestic affairs of
states.‖).
54
In 2016, the U.S. State Department Legal Adviser, Brian Egan argued that ―cyber operation by a State that
interferes with another country‘s ability to hold an election or that manipulates another country‘s election results
would be a clear violation of the rule of non-intervention.‖ Brian J. Egan, International Law and Stability in
Cyberspace, 35 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 169, 175 (2017). In 2020, the United States reaffirmed this position,
with the Department of Defense General Counsel saying that ―cyber operation by a State that interferes with
another country‘s ability to hold an election‖ or that tampers with ―another country‘s election results would be a
clear violation of the rule of non-intervention.‖ Paul C. Ney, Jr., DOD General Counsel, Remarks at U.S. Cyber
Command Legal Conference (Jan 25, 2024).
55
Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J, ¶ 205.
3.2. Kuwal’s Engagement in Covert surveillance activities and Use of Sophisticated cyber
tools to infiltrate Maur’s Governmental communications systems is the act of Cyber
Espionage which in breach international law.
5. Tallinn Manual 2.0 defines cyber espionage as ‗the use of cyber capabilities to
surveil, monitor, capture or exfiltrate electronically transmitted or stored
communications, data, or other information‘.56 Kuwal‘s engagement in covert
surveillance activities and use of sophisticated cyber tools to infiltrate Maur‘s
governmental communication systems is the act of cyber espionage.
56
Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 13, Rule 32, p. 168 (The Tallinn Manual 2.0, published in 2017, built on that
work by considering the rules of international law governing cyber incidents that states encounter on a day-to-
day basis but which fall below the thresholds of the use of force or armed conflict.)
57
The legality of espionage in international law, Juan Pablo Hernándz, The Treaty Examiner, Issue 1 (April
2020) https://treatyexaminer.com/espionage-legality/ accessed at January 23, 2024
58
UN HRC, ‗Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right
to the Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue‘ UN Doc A/HRC/23/40 (17 April
2013), p.3.
59
UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), The
Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation, 8
April 1988, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/453883f922.html [accessed 23 January 2024]
60
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
61
Unpacking the International Law on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the Public and Private
Sectors, Scott J. Shackelford Scott Russell Andreas Kuehn, Vol. 17, No. 1
62
Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 RIAA 1905, 1965 (1941).
7. A Party may require that the offence be committed by infringing security measures,
with the intent of obtaining computer data or other dishonest intent, or in relation to a
computer system that is connected to another computer system.63 The illegal access of
Kuwal to infiltrate Maur‘s governmental communication systems invokes this article
of Budapest Convention. The interception of kuwal on sensitive government
communications or private data of Maur64 is reported by Maur‘s intelligence report
which has breached the Article 3 of the Budapest Convention.
9. The purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security68 and to take
effective and collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace69 and Art. 2(4) of the charter states that all members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purpose of
63
Budapest Convention, Article 2
64
compromise ¶ 5.5
65
Titan Rain Surhone, L.M. and Timpledon, M.T. and Marseken, S.F., 2010
https://books.google.com.np/books?id=DLA_YgEACAAJ
66
Thomas, Jason. (2019). A Case Study Analysis of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management Data Breech.
10.13140/RG.2.2.36670.23360.
67
Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (TimorLeste/Australia),
Memorial of Timor-Leste, ¶3.4 (2014); Quincy Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in
Internal Affairs in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Stranger ed. 1962), 12; JOHN
KISH, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ESPIONAGE 83-84 (Turns, ed. 1995); Manuel Garcia-Mora, Treason,
Sedition and Espionage as Political Offences Under the Law of Extradition, 26 U. PITT. L. REV. 65, 79-80
(1964).
68
Charter of the United Nations, United Nations, Article 1(1), (1945).
69
Ibid.
the United Nations. Sovereign States ―may not exercise…power in any form‖ in the
territory70which encompasses cyber-infrastructure71of another State.
10. Similarly, the purpose of UN72 is to take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of
aggression or other breaches of the peace. As was proven supra, Kuwal has violated
the principles of territorial integrity, non-intervention, as well as principle of
sovereignty. Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits any type of act against the territorial
integrity of States.73 This rule is considered as the ―crucial normative foundation‖ of
the Charter.74 Similarly, Article 2(7) of the Charter emphasizes the importance of the
non-intervention principle and article 2(1) of the charter emphasizes the importance of
the principle of sovereignty. Thus, If the Court accepts that Kuwal has violated the
above mentioned principles, then, Kuwal has violated the overall UN Charter which is
a direct violation of Maur‘s sovereignty and an act of aggression. Hence, In the
context of the law of State responsibility, the State bears responsibility for an act if
three criteria are fulfilled: firstly, the attribution of this conduct to the State; secondly,
the conduct constitutes an internationally wrongful act; and thirdly, the absence of
circumstances precluding wrongfulness.75 The act of Kuwal constitutes an
internationally wrongful act as it constitutes the breach of international obligation of
state.76
70
S.S. Lotus (Fr./Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser.A) No.10, 18. See also Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, U.N.Doc.A/Res/25/2625 (1970), Art.1.
71
Tallinn Manual, Rule 1.
72
Charter of the United Nations, United Nations, Article 1(1), (1945).
73
Article 2(4) UN Charter
74
Comment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality under Article 2(4) of the
Charter of the United Nations, 122 U. PA.L. Rev., 983, 986 (1974).
75
These three criteria are notably discussed by the ICJ in the Tehran Hostages case, dealing first with the
criteria of attribution and wrongfulness of conduct together (28–37, paras 56–79), and then with the last
criterion, the existence of circumstances precluding wrongfulness (37–41, paras 80–89); United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran) (Judgment) [1980] ICJ Reports 3.
76
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001, Art.2
4.1. Lawful and habitual presence of Maurian nationals entitles them to be protected.
1. In the case of The 1951 Refugee Convention, the Supreme court of United Kingdom
has adopted the view that there is the duty to give Refugee Convention a purposive
interpretation, bearing in mind its humanitarian objects and broad aims reflected in its
preamble.77 The first two operative paragraphs of preamble has established the human
rights purposes of the convention.78 All Members shall give the United Nations every
assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall
refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking
preventive or enforcement action.79 It also says that everyone has the right to seek and
to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.80 This shows the nexus between
refugee rights and human rights.
2. Refugees are granted expanding array of rights as their relationship with the asylum
state deepens.81 Here in the given case, Maurian nationals had found sense of
belongingness in Kuwal. A greater attachment is manifest when the refugees are
physically present within a state's territory. Attachment is also inherent when refugee
is deemed to be lawfully or habitually present within the territory. Thus a number of
rights are granted for refugees who can demonstrate durable residence in asylum
state.82 The Maurian Nationals who are residing in Kuwal are the exiled community
from Maur's northern region who found peace and a sense of belongingness in
Kuwal.83 A large-scale migration out of the northern area occurred as a result of the
conflict‘s peak and the crimes that followed. Numerous people fled to other nations,
especially Kuwal, which was a heaven because of its ‗refugee‘ laws and support of
human rights.84 From the authorities cited above, Maurian nationals have lawful
presence expanding array of rights and should not be a subject of human rights
violation.
77
Eritrea v Secretary of the state for Home department (2012) UKSC 12 (UK SC, March 21, 2012)
78
Refugee Convention at Preamble [1] [2] [3] [8]
79
UN Charter, Article 2 (5)
80
UDHR, Article 14
81
Eritrea v Secretary of the State for Home department (2012) UKSC 12 (UK SC, March 21, 2012)
82
James C. Hathway, The Rights of the Refugees under International Law, second edition, Cambridge
University Press
83
Compromis, 2.6. Page. 5
84
Compromis, 2.5. Page. 4
4.2 .Arrest, detention and punishment can only be resorted to when it is determined to be
necessary, reasonable in all the circumstances and proportionate to a legitimate purpose.
3. An arrest of detention is arbitrary if it is (a) on grounds or in accordance with
procedures other than those established by law, or (b) under the provisions of a law
the purpose of which is incompatible with respect for the right to liberty and security
of person.85 No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure
as are established by law.86 This is further corroborated by Article 9 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 3 of same, protecting against the arbitrary
restriction of the individual‘s freedom and person. Remand in custody pursuant to
lawful arrest must not only be lawful but reasonable in all the circumstances. 87
Therefore, Article 3 of the UDHR is summoned when Article 9 is breached. This
argument was supported by two cases where the rights of liberty and security are
deemed as intertwined with the individual‘s freedom from arbitrary arrest. 88 The
deprivation of liberty must be lawful, in that it must accord with procedures as
established by law. The arrest and detention must be specifically authorized and
sufficiently circumscribed by law.89 'Arbitrariness‘ is not to be equated with ‗against
the law‘, but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of
inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law. This means
that remand in custody pursuant to lawful arrest must not only be lawful but
reasonable in the circumstances.
4. Remand in custody must further be necessary in all the circumstances, for example, to
prevent flight, interference with evidence or the recurrence of crime. 90 The length of
detention can render an otherwise lawful decision to detain disproportionate and,
therefore, arbitrary. The general principle of proportionality requires that a balance be
struck between the importance of respecting the rights to liberty and security of
person and freedom of movement, and the public policy objectives of limiting or
85
United Nations, ―Study of the Right of Everyone to be Free from the Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile‖.
UN Publication Sales No 65.XIV.2 (1965), para. 7
86
ICCPR, Article 9 (1)
87
Van Alphen v The Netherlands, Communication No. 305/88, UN Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988
88
R. v Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 at 1008-1013.
89
Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
Cases, Materials, and Commentary (2000), p. 211
90
A. W. Mukong v. Cameroon (Views adopted on 21 July 1994)
denying these rights.91 In the given case however, some reports emerged from families
of the detained Maurian92 and international rights groups based in Maur about harsh
treatment in detention, including claims of keeping the prisoners in handcuffs and
solitary confinement, and claiming the detainees were subjected to intense
interrogations to extract confessions or information.93 The arrest and detention
without a legitimate cause infringing human rights obligations arising from human
rights instruments are not necessary and reasonable.
4.3. Arrest and detention must comply with basic human rights standards.
5. The decision of state must consider relevant factors case by case and not be based on
a mandatory rule for a broad category; must take into account less invasive means of
achieving the same ends, such as reporting obligations, sureties or other conditions to
prevent absconding; and must be subject to periodic re-evaluation and judicial review.
94
In the given case, the detained individuals have not been formally charged, nor have
they been presented before a court.95 Decisions regarding the detention of migrants
must also take into account the effect of the detention on their physical or mental
health.96 Any necessary detention should take place in appropriate, sanitary, non-
punitive facilities and should not take place in prisons. The inability of a State party to
carry out the expulsion of an individual because of statelessness or other obstacles
does not justify indefinite detention. 97 The place and conditions of detention must be
appropriate to people who have fled from their own country, often in fear of their
lives, so the specific vulnerable situation of the person must be taken into
consideration. Here, there have emerged multiple accounts of failure to provide such
basic level of care and sanitation to the detained Maurian nationals.
6. Principle of proportionality is applied to detention only to the extent that the detention
should not continue for an unreasonable length of time; thus, it held that ―any
deprivation of liberty will be justified only for as long as deportation proceedings are
91
Vasileva v. Denmark, (2003), ECtHR, App. No. 52792/99, para. 37; Lokpo and Touré v.
Hungary, above note 29.
92
Compromis, ANNEXURE NO. 8: Interview Report on Treatment of Detainees by Kuwal Government, Page
no. 26
93
Compromis, 5.7 page 13
94
7 Baban v. Australia, op. cit., para. 7.2; Bakhtiyari v. Australia, op. cit., paras. 9.2–9.3
95
Compromis, 5.9 page 13
96
Shafiq v. Australia, Communication No. 1324/2004, 13 November 2006,
97
F.K.A.G. v. Australia, Communication No. 2094/2011
in progress. If such proceedings are not prosecuted with due diligence, the detention
will cease to be permissible. 98 Here, the principle has not been applied by Kuwal. The
responsibility of the State to inform the detainee of the grounds for detention is not
discharged where the detainee has managed to infer from the circumstances or various
sources, the basis for the detention. Even in such circumstances, there remains an
obligation on the State to provide the information.99 However, Kuwal has failed to
communicate any of this matter to the concerned authorities, acting in contrary by
hiding the detained from even their family members.
7. The possibility to notify a family member, friend, or other person with a legitimate
interest in the information, of the fact and place of detention, and of any subsequent
transfer, is an essential safeguard against arbitrary detention, consistently protected by
international standards.100 The right to bring proceedings applies in principle from the
moment of arrest and any substantial waiting period before a detainee can bring a first
challenge to detention is impermissible. Thus, avoiding all these standards questions
the legality of detention and arrest done by Kuwal security forces.
4.4. Kuwal has not demonstrated credible evidence linking the detained individuals to
activities that pose a threat to Kuwal's security.
8. A ―bare indication of the legal basis‖ for the detention is not sufficient; in addition,
there must also be some indication of the factual basis for the detention.101 There is no
disagreement that the term ‗public security‘ (‗national security‘) covers both a
Member State‘s internal and external security.102 A threat to the functioning of the
institutions and essential public services and the survival of the population, as well as
the risk of a serious disturbance to foreign relations or to the peaceful coexistence of
nations, or a risk to military interests, may affect public security.103 It also presupposes
the existence of a threat to public security that is of a ‗particularly high degree of
98
Saadi v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 13229/03, Judgment of 29 January 20089
99
Shamayev and others v. Georgia and Russia, op. cit., para. 425.
100
Article 17.2(d) CPED; article 10.2, UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance; Principle 16, Body of Principles for the Protection of all persons deprived of their liberty;
WGAD, Annual Report 1998, para. 69, Guarantee 6)
101
28 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Applications Nos. 12244/86, 12245/86 and
12383/86, 30 August 1990, para. 41.
102
Judgment of 15 February 2016, J. N. v. Staatssecretaris voor Veiligheid en Justitie, C-601/15 PPU,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:84 (hereinafter‘J.N.‘).
103
Judgment of 11 September 2014, H. T. v. Land Baden-Württemberg, C-373/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:413,
paragraph 78 (hereinafter ‗H. T.).
seriousness.104 Here, Kuwal has failed to provide any evidence on how the detained
nationals are a serious threat to its national security.
9. The arrest and detention of Maurian nationals in Kuwal without formal charges or
presentation before a court raise concerns about violations of the right to liberty and
security, as enshrined in various international human rights instruments.105 The
conduct must represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting a
fundamental interest of society or the internal or external security of the Member State
concerned. It is checked whether the threat that the persons concerned represent to
national security or public order corresponds at least to the gravity of the interference
with the applicant‘s liberty (balancing exercise).106 Kuwal has not been able to
produce any evidence on how the Maurian nationals threaten the security of Kuwal
that justifies this leap of action taken by it.
10. As a party to international agreements, Kuwal is obligated to safeguard individuals
within its borders, with the lawful presence of Maurian nationals entitling them to
protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention. The key principles of necessity,
proportionality, and adherence to basic human rights standards are essential for
justifying arrests or detentions. Additionally, Kuwal has not provided credible
evidence linking the detainees to threats against its security, raising doubts about the
legitimacy of their arrest and detention. These actions prompt significant human rights
concerns and question Kuwal's commitment to its international obligation. Based on
the above arguments and cited authorities, the arrest, detention, and punishment of
Maurian nationals in Kuwal are in violation of International Human Rights Law.
104
ibid.
105
ICCPR Article 9(2)
106
EFFECTIVE REMEDIES IN NATIONAL SECURITYRELATED ASYLUM CASES, WITH A
PARTICULAR FOCUS ON ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, Joint Legal Note by the European
Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) and the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (HHC)
PRAYER
In light of the questions presented, arguments advanced and authorities cited the agent
for the aggrieved state must humbly and respectfully pray before this Hon’ble Court,
that it may be pleased to adjudge and declare that:
1. Hold that, ICJ has the jurisdiction to try and settle the claims of the nations.
2. Hold that, the activities of Kuwal are in breach of the freedom of information and
personal data protection rights as guaranteed under the International Conventions.
3. Hold that, the cyber espionage by Kuwal through RHPL is in breach of international law.
4. Hold that the arrest, detention and punishment of detained Maurian nationals residing in
Kuwal were in violation of International Human Rights Law.
The applicant state additionally prays that the court may make any such order as it
deem fit in terms of equity, justice and due conscience. And for this act of kindness the
Applicant shall as duty bound ever humbly pray.