2024年11月14日 | 6:00PM GMT

全球市场分析

2025年市场展望：交易尾部风险和利好因素 (摘
要)
我们最近发表了报告2025年宏观展望：利好因素（大概率）胜过特朗普潜在关税政策 Kamakshya Trivedi
+44(20)7051-4005 |
影响。我们在本文中详述了全球市场展望，并如往常一样重点介绍了推动我们诸多市 kamakshya.trivedi@gs.com
高盛国际
场观点的10个核心投资主题。我们将陆续发布对各类资产的更详细展望。
多米尼克·威尔逊
+1(212)902-5924 |
1. 软着陆后各种可能性的分布更广泛：在基本情景下，经济增长稳健、股票上涨、美 dominic.wilson@gs.com
高盛集团
元走强，但市场已向此方向行动，尾部风险加大。
Vickie Chang
+1(212)902-6915 |
2. 权衡关税的尾部风险：对中国的关税在很大程度上在预料之内，并且风险可控； vickie.chang@gs.com
高盛集团
“全面”关税将推高通胀，更利好美元并进一步“规避风险”。
Victor Engel
+44(20)7051-3862 |
3. 在全球财政风险中寻找最终利率：美国大选后的财政扩张（与日本、英国和一些新 victor.engel@gs.com
兴市场一道）增加了最终利率上升的风险。 高盛国际

4. 增长重新分化加强美元走势：美国经济增长强于其他发达市场，也强于市场预期；
真正的美元上涨空间在于更广泛的关税政策。

5. 中国处于关注焦点，但也有一定的应对空间： 最终，中国资产状况的挑战和机遇仍
主要取决于国内政策的实施。

6. 欧洲市场和新兴市场——前景更具挑战性： 欧洲经济增长和新兴市场面临着特朗普
政策部署带来的阻力，令资本流入门槛提高。

7. 能源市场——供应充足，关注尾部风险：油价走势呈区间震荡：短期内受地缘政治
影响而上行，随着年内时间的推移，闲置产能将导致油价下行。

8. 通胀风险略有上升，但增长冲击仍是关注焦点： 股票-收益率的相关性可能会上
升；投资组合中的国债/通胀保值债券（TIPS）的价值，尤其是德国国债和金边债券。

9. 估值挑战日益加剧：美国股票估值凸显了长期挑战；估值损失通常出现在周期更替
时，这加剧了下行风险。

10. 多元化、尾部风险和对冲：有保护的良好（美国）基本情景。波动性重置后股票
投资的机会；做多美元，并通过买入石油和黄金来抵御尾部风险；2017年的类似情况
表明，如果风险消退，非美国资产可能会受益。

投资者不应视本报告为作出投资决策的唯一因素。 有关分析师的申明和其他重要信息，见信息披露附录，或参阅
www.gs.com/research/hedge.html。
Goldman Sachs 全球市场分析

Markets Outlook 2025: Trading Tails and Tailwinds

1. A wider distribution after the soft landing

n Solid US growth, low inflation still the right base case

n Trump policy agenda reinforces divergence but markets have moved
n Wider distribution of policy shifts and market outcomes, especially risk of broader
trade war
n Higher equities, higher rates, stronger Dollar in central scenario but hedge the tails

Our baseline forecast remains essentially benign for the US: solid growth, cooling
inflation and further non-recessionary rate cuts, alongside a range of policies that could
be friendly to corporate earnings. And while the US is a clear outperformer, non-US
economies still see stable growth, falling inflation and monetary easing in our central
scenario. This backdrop would naturally push towards a friendly risk asset backdrop,
alongside US outperformance. Although our forecasts for 2025 have that flavour, two
issues complicate those judgments. The first issue is that markets have already moved a
long way towards pricing this kind of outlook. Both ahead of and since the election,
markets have upgraded US growth, pushing US equities and the USD higher, and
building in a larger divergence between US and European rate markets. We think our
baseline forecasts justify higher equity prices and further USD outperformance, but that
judgment is more finely balanced than it was. As US equity markets take more credit for
potential favourable policies, the risks of disappointment as the policy agenda ultimately
becomes reality will rise.

The second issue is that the tails around our base case look quite fat and the US
election outcome—the broad mandate it has given to President-elect Trump—widens
the distribution of possible policy shifts. We generally worry less about a sustained
increase in fiscal risk premia in bond markets, though ongoing fiscal support could push
views on the neutral rate higher. But while the market has focused on risks to the most
likely tariff recipients, the risks of a broader trade war look underpriced. If the market
comes to place more weight on that outcome, we think that would reinforce USD upside,
but add to pressures on non-US, and ultimately US, equities. Unusually high US equity
valuations may amplify the reaction to any economic weakness and dampen long-term
expected returns. Positive tailwinds are also possible if tariffs are narrowly targeted, if oil
prices fall more sharply on enhanced supply, or if inflation or fiscal fears prove overdone.
We think this backdrop justifies investors maintaining upside exposure to US equities,
while diversifying or using options to limit the major tail risks.

2024年11月14日 2
Goldman Sachs 全球市场分析

图表 1: Market Pricing Has Already Shifted Towards Our More Positive US Growth View

Percent Change in Market Pricing Since: Basis points

20 100

September FOMC 81bp

15 75
US Election 68bp
11.9%

10 50

6.2%
4.8% 25bp
5 4.4% 25
3.5% 18bp
2.1% 11bp

0 0
-3bp

-2.5% -2.7% Left axis Right axis

-5 -25
US Cyclicals vs S&P 500 Eurostoxx 50 USD TWI US 2y yield US 10y yield Germany 10y
Defensives yield

资料来源：彭博, 高盛全球投资研究部

2. Weighing the tariff tail

n China tariff in base case is largely expected and manageable; real tail risks beyond
(Mexico/Autos/elsewhere)
n Across-the-board tariffs would be more inflationary and more ‘risk off’
n Broader trade war would have much larger impacts on FX and likely on equities
n Rates impact ambiguous but increases risks of flattening, lower term yields

Tariffs pose a direct threat to our benign central economic forecast of solid growth and
lower inflation. Unlike many market participants, our expectation is that tariffs against
China taking the effective rate up to 20% could be implemented relatively early in the
administration. But we suspect that this would be less disruptive this time around—both
to the US economic picture and to China’s trade and markets—given the experience
since the first round of tariffs in 2018-19 and China’s reduced trade exposure to the
US. The larger impacts are likely to come if other countries are targeted or if tariffs are
applied ‘across the board’, neither of which is part of our baseline expectations. Even
as US imports have rotated away from China, they have increased from other countries,
such as Mexico, Korea and India. In the case of Mexico, tariff threats have been
articulated a number of times, and reflected in the pressure on the Mexican Peso.
Looking ahead, the USMCA review process may prove the point of maximum risk,
although ultimately we think it is in the interest of both countries to have a constructive
relationship on the border and trade.

A tariff on Europe or an across-the-board tariff would be more disruptive to global trading

arrangements, have a larger impact on US inflation (upwards of 1 percentage point on
core PCE on our US team’s estimates) and, as a consequence, drive more financial
conditions tightening with higher front-end rates, a flatter curve and lower equities. The

2024年11月14日 3

WU0VsRpRrNpQzQwOtQsOzR6MbP8OtRpPpNsOfQqRsQjMrRnM9PnMoNMYnPtRMYsRmN
Goldman Sachs 全球市场分析

impact on the rest of the world would also be substantial, with significant further broad
Dollar upside beyond what has already been priced since the elections. We would not
be surprised if at some point in the coming months and years the threat of an
across-the-board tariff becomes a serious market focus. Ultimately, the disruptive macro
and market impacts in that case, which could spill back into the US, are part of the
reason we don’t have across-the-board tariffs in our baseline scenario. But we do see
a 40% chance of them being enacted, making them an underpriced tail risk.

图表 2: Markets Have Not Yet Priced a High Risk of Broader Tariffs

Percent GS Estimates of Implied Post-Election Change in USD TWI, by Percent

Trade Policy Assumption
8 8

7 7

6 6

5 5

4 4

3 3

2 2

1 1

0 0
Actual since November 5 GS Baseline (China-focused) GS Baseline + 40% Chance 10% Across-the-Board Tariff
of Across-the-Board

We use the market reaction to tariff announcements in the 2018-2019 China trade war to estimate the USD move associated
with shifts in tariff expectations

资料来源：彭博, 高盛全球投资研究部

3. Finding terminal rates in a world of fiscal risks

n Republican sweep raises risks of fiscal expansion, inflation and higher terminal rates
n Higher term premium already from macro performance, but accentuated by new
policy agenda
n Japan likely to stay on path towards higher terminal rates
n Post-election fiscal loosening across UK, Japan, EMs likely to push terminal rates
higher globally
n UK at the cutting edge of DM fiscal worry, but may be overpriced

Apart from tariffs, the Republican sweep also raises the prospect of more expansionary
fiscal policies. Any incremental expansion is likely to be much more modest than after
the 2016 or 2020 election: we expect that congressional Republicans would support a
scaled-down version of additional tax cuts to accommodate some of Trump’s
campaign proposals, primarily focused on individuals and domestic manufacturers,
representing a few tenths of a percent of GDP. We also expect federal spending to rise
somewhat, particularly on defence, though a clearer majority in both houses may
increase the support for spending cuts. Alongside lower immigration and higher tariffs,
even a modest further fiscal loosening risks putting upward pressure on inflation and the

2024年11月14日 4
Goldman Sachs 全球市场分析

Fed stopping the easing process earlier. It is not just the terminal rate that is biased
upwards by the new policy agenda, but changes in long-term yields have also been
consistently responsive to changes in the fiscal picture.

In reality, the potential for higher terminal rates than in the last cycle and higher term
premia is a broader global phenomenon with a number of reinforcing impulses. In Japan,
fiscal policy is also likely to be loosened after a disappointing election outcome for the
ruling LDP, and we are increasingly confident in a domestic wage-price spiral and the
ability of the BoJ to take policy rates to a higher terminal rate than the consensus among
many market participants. The new UK government has also just recently proposed a
substantial front-loaded fiscal expansion and while there is some justifiable scepticism
that more restraint can be delivered in subsequent years, we do think that concerns
around a ‘Truss-style’ fiscal risk premium are overdone. That said, the additional
spending will keep the BoE on only a gradual easing path with higher terminal rates
again possible. Similar concerns are more pressing in EM, where Brazil has already
been forced to dial back some of its rate cuts in the face of fiscal concerns. So the
picture is more mixed across EM: more focus on fiscal consolidation post-elections in
South Africa, but scope for looser fiscal policy, for example in Indonesia, and higher
terminal rates in this cycle.

图表 3: Yield Levels Have Become Less Responsive to Deficit Levels, Changes in Fiscal Outlook
Still Matters
Regression coefficients of 5y5y Treasury yields on the level of, and changes in, CBO’s 5-year-ahead
projected deficit-to-GDP ratio, controlling for 5y-ahead CBO projected GDP growth, inflation
expectations, and the equity risk premium following Laubach (2009)

Percentage points Percentage points

0.5 0.5

1976-1999
0.4 0.4
2000-2024

0.3 0.3

0.2 0.2

0.1 0.1

0.0 0

-0.1 -0.1

-0.2 -0.2
Overall Deficit Primary Deficit Overall Deficit Primary Deficit
Levels Changes

资料来源：高盛全球投资研究部

4. Renewed divergence reinforces Dollar strength

n US growth stronger than DM peers, and stronger than consensus

n Trade uncertainty to weigh heavily on Europe, actual tariffs on China
n Hard to see capital moving to rest of the world, and mix should strengthen Dollar

2024年11月14日 5
Goldman Sachs 全球市场分析

n But watch for fiscal responses and ‘deals’; broader tariff agenda is where the real
Dollar upside remains

Going into the US elections, our economic outlook envisaged a global picture where US
growth was stronger than DM peers and stronger than consensus expectations. That
picture has been reinforced by the Republican sweep at the polls. Tariffs are likely to
feature prominently in the new Trump Administration, coupled with modest additional tax
cuts, more federal spending, and a light touch on regulation. That combination, meant to
boost domestic business and weigh on foreign activity levels, should continue to keep
capital flows tilted towards the US versus the rest of the world and support the Dollar on
a broad basis. So a Dollar that is stronger for longer is the correct modal view under the
economic and policy outlook we expect.

As with many parts of the Trump agenda, a number of conflicting dynamics mean that
there is a wide distribution of risks around that view. So even with tariffs on the agenda,
Dollar strength is far from guaranteed. While a ‘currency pact’ that weakens the
Dollar is unlikely to be sustainable without a shift in underlying macro factors, it is
possible that a strong fiscal policy response abroad could mitigate or even dominate the
effect of tariff threats. Already China’s ongoing fiscal stimulus package has helped
offset some of the potential impact, and Germany’s evolving fiscal debate bears
watching. The more subtle issue revolves around market pricing. In many cases, the
Dollar has already reset higher in response to the election results, and has been highly
valued for some time in recognition of sustained strong US economic and market
performance. So the scope for sharper Dollar strength—that sends the EUR towards
parity and beyond—is only likely if the tariff agenda broadens and deepens beyond our
base case, or if bolder fiscal ambitions and a steeper rates curve don’t weigh on US
equity markets.

图表 4: US Growth Still Above Consensus and Above DM Peers

Percent Percent

5 5
2025 Annual Average Real GDP Growth
Forecast:
GS
4 Consensus 4

3 3

2 2

1 1

0 0
US Euro area UK Japan China EM ex. China*

*Bloomberg consensus data not readily available for EM ex. China GDP growth.

资料来源：彭博, 高盛全球投资研究部

2024年11月14日 6
Goldman Sachs 全球市场分析

5. China in the cross-hairs but some scope to respond

n China may not be hit as hard by tariffs given lower US exports than in 2016
n FX/fiscal/monetary response should offset hit—more weight on fiscal versus
currency compared with 2018/19
n Ultimately, challenges and prospects for China asset picture still mainly domestic
n Underwhelming response so far, but policymakers may wait to show their hand

We expect the US to impose additional tariffs averaging 20% on Chinese goods, with
much or all of this imposed in the first half of 2025. A fresh hit to external demand and
investor sentiment would come on top of what is already a tough cyclical picture for the
Chinese economy. But it is also possible that tariffs will have a smaller impact than in
2018-19. First, tariffs on China are widely expected at this point, so it should constitute
less of a surprise. Second, China’s export exposure to the US has declined as a
consequence of the tariffs in the first Trump term. And third, it is not likely to change the
broader policy efforts to foster a rotation of Chinese growth towards domestic demand in
2025. To the extent that China responds to any tariffs with a mix of retaliatory measures,
currency depreciation, and monetary and fiscal policy, the emphasis on the latter may be
greater relative to the 2018-19 episode.

Ultimately we still think that the bigger challenges and prospects for the China macro
and market picture are domestic rather than international. While renewed trade
disruptions may impede any rebound in international capital flows to China, the reality is
that international investors have already shed a large proportion of China risk on
perceived disappointments on stimulus delivery. So the key to China and China-linked
assets is whether policymakers succeed in putting a floor under local activity and
equities in line with their objectives. Recent data have been stabilising, and while the
recently concluded NPC meeting offered only limited detail beyond measures on local
government debt resolution, our China team still expects the official fiscal deficit target to
be raised to 3.6% of GDP in 2025 from 3.0% in 2024, and an increase in government
bond issuance quotas. While the overall urgency seems less than investors would like, it
is also possible that policymakers are waiting to see measures from the new Trump
administration to respond.

2024年11月14日 7
Goldman Sachs 全球市场分析

图表 5: A Shift in Trade Patterns Following The First Round of Trump Tariffs

Fraction of US goods imports exported from the displayed country or region. ‘ROW’ stands for Rest
of World.

Percent Percent
22 22
China now accounts for a smaller Nov 2016
20 share of total US imports than 20
when Trump took office in 2016... Jul 2024
18 18

16 16

14 14

12 12

10 10

8 ...while others 8
now account for a larger share
6 6

4 4

2 2

0 0
ROW

JPY
MXN

TWD

MYR

ILS

CLP
THB

COP

SEK
INR

BRL

IDR

AUD

TRY

ZAR
CNY

EUR

CAD

KRW

CEE

PHP
GBP

SGD
CHF
资料来源：Haver Analytics, 高盛全球投资研究部

6. Europe and EM—a more challenging picture

n Renewed risks to European growth from Trump agenda, while policy space is
constrained (by defence spending)
n Deeper ECB cuts, European rates should outperform US, though market has moved
to reflect this
n EM headwinds from higher rates, stronger USD
n Focus on markets that can withstand shocks, provide support (India/China stocks,
CEE rates)

Our European economists have downgraded their GDP forecasts across the region in
anticipation of higher trade uncertainty, the ongoing pressures from China competition in
key industries, and other spillovers. Moreover, the policy space to respond to these
headwinds is already limited given fiscal concerns in core economies such as France,
alongside the typical worries in the periphery. That space is likely to be further
constrained by pressure to increase spending on Ukraine and the broader security
architecture of Europe. That leaves the ECB again as the primary and perhaps only
institution that will need to respond, and a deeper rate cut path is the most likely
outcome. That should sustain the outperformance of European rates relative to the US,
although the market has moved a long way to reflect this. Better market opportunities
may therefore lie in outright longs in Bunds, or a renewed compression of rate spreads
between core Europe and Central and Eastern Europe, where the lower growth and rate
outlook should spill over eventually. Given the otherwise soggy growth outlook in
Europe, the UK’s relative outperformance is likely to stand out and benefit a procyclical
currency like the Pound and other UK assets on a relative basis.

2024年11月14日 8
Goldman Sachs 全球市场分析

Tariffs, higher US rates, and a stronger Dollar also provide a negative backdrop for EM.
As with Europe, many EMs are open economies that are vulnerable in a global trade
war, further delaying the prospect for portfolio capital flows. So the EM complex will
need to rely on its own macro and asset market fundamentals. That should favour EM
jurisdictions where vulnerabilities to external risks are lower (higher reserve buffers and
smaller overall current account deficits, although bilateral surpluses with the US may
also pose a risk); internal imbalances are smaller (fiscal/inflation constraints less
binding), and ultimately where policymakers can find room to support domestic growth
and asset markets. Given subdued valuations and a pro-cyclical backdrop, EM equities
are likely to outperform fixed income, with greater room for policy support in China (and
to a lesser extent India). EM equities will likely struggle to generate higher returns
relative to US equities, however, especially in vol-adjusted terms. And while EM hard
currency fixed income should prove more defensive than local currency in a strong
Dollar environment, tight hard currency spreads mean that local currency assets have
more scope to outperform if the tails are avoided, especially in procylical markets,
including Brazil and Mexico, which already embed decent premium in FX and rates.

图表 6: European Rates Heading Back Lower

Percent Percent

5.0 3.2

UK 10y yield
4.8
3
Germany 10y yield (RHS) Forwards
4.6

4.4 2.8

4.2 GS forecast
2.6

4.0

2.4
3.8
Forwards

3.6 2.2

3.4
2
3.2
GS forecast
3.0 1.8
Jan-23 May-23 Sep-23 Jan-24 May-24 Sep-24 Jan-25 May-25 Sep-25

资料来源：Goldman Sachs FICC and Equities, 高盛全球投资研究部

7. Energy markets—ample supply, watch the tails

n Oil market still range-bound in the central case

n But US election reinforces tails on both sides
n Upside tail from geopolitical risk, Iran supply in short term
n Downside risks from spare capacity, trade escalation, as the year goes on

In our baseline forecast, we continue to see oil prices as range-bound, with Brent likely
to stay in a $70-$85/bbl range. Including the roll return, this means that energy and our
broader commodity indices should offer modest positive returns in the central case. But

2024年11月14日 9
Goldman Sachs 全球市场分析

we think the risks of breaking outside those ranges are growing and the US election
outcome reinforces that. In the short term, we think the new Administration raises the
risks to Iranian supply, where disruption risks have already been elevated due to the
Israel-Iran conflict. That upside tail risk adds to the value of commodity longs in a
portfolio context.

But we think the medium-term risks skew to the downside of our forecast range. In part,
that is because ample supply is still being kept off the market, which could begin to find
its way back into the system in 2025. But it is also because a clear shift towards a
broad-based tariff agenda from the Trump Administration could hurt global demand. In
those scenarios, oil prices might again become a tailwind for disinflation trends. If supply
increases, rather than demand shortfalls, that would push prices lower and would
constitute a positive global supply shock at a time when other recent favourable supply
dynamics (higher immigration, for instance) are fading.

图表 7: Oil: Upside Risks From Disruptions, Downside Risks from Supply and Trade War

$/bbl $/bbl
Estimated Brent Spot Price Forecast
100 100

90 90

80 80

70 70

Iran Supply Persistently Falls 1mb/d

Iran Supply Falls 2mb/d for 6 Months
60 60
US Imposes 10% Tariff
OPEC+ Raises Production for 12 Months
Baseline
50 50
Nov-24 Feb-25 May-25 Aug-25 Nov-25 Feb-26 May-26 Aug-26 Nov-26

资料来源：高盛全球投资研究部

8. A bit more inflation risk but growth shocks still in focus

n Inflation declines allowing central banks to focus more on growth downside

n Trade/fiscal agenda could put a sting in the tail-end of inflation normalisation
n Recession fears have faded fast but could return; equity-yield correlation should drift
higher
n Value in Treasuries/TIPS, and especially Bunds and Gilts, in portfolios

The ongoing decline in inflation across a range of economies in 2024 has allowed
central banks, including the Fed, to focus more on the risks to growth and begin to lower
policy rates from restrictive levels. With markets also worrying more about potential risks
to growth, the period of a strong negative correlation between equities and Treasury
yields has given way to a more mixed picture (over the past six months, the correlation

2024年11月14日 10
Goldman Sachs 全球市场分析

between US equities and Treasury yields has been close to zero). In our baseline
forecast, the process of inflation normalisation is on course to continue. We estimate
that an across-the-board US tariff would raise US core inflation to 3%, however. And
although we expect any US fiscal impulse to be modest even with a new Administration,
there is clearly some risk that a mix of higher term premium or higher neutral rate
assumptions lead to upward pressure on the bond yield path too. On the other side of
the ledger, a more positive oil supply backdrop could provide a tailwind to inflation
declines, particularly in EM.

Set against that, we think downside growth risks are likely to remain in focus, particularly
outside the US. A broader trade war would clearly increase global growth risks, as would
some potential geopolitical shocks. Markets priced real recession fear as recently as
early August. We have seen a sharp cyclical upgrade since then, both before and after
the US election, but this means that markets are more vulnerable if we revisit those
fears. We see risks from both growth and inflation/policy shocks, particularly in the next
few months as the Trump policy agenda takes shape. But although the market may still
oscillate between these two kinds of risks, we think the correlation of bond yields and
equities is more likely to drift higher than lower over the medium term. This means that
Treasuries and TIPS, and even more so Bunds and Gilts, can still play an important
diversifying role in portfolios.

图表 8: Easing Inflation Has Helped Push Correlation Between US Equities and Yields Higher

Index Correlation coefficient

20 Growth focus vs. policy focus* 0.8
Higher means:
S&P 500/US10y yield 6-month rolling correlation (right axis) "Growth focus" dominates "policy focus" 0.7
15
More positive correlation (equities up, 0.6
yields up) as in a typical growth shock
10 0.5

0.4
5
0.3
0
0.2

0.1
-5
0
-10
-0.1
Lower means:
-15 "Policy focus" dominates "growth focus" -0.2

More negative correlation (equities up, yields -0.3

-20 down) as in a typical policy shock
-0.4

-25 -0.5
Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17 Jan-18 Jan-19 Jan-20 Jan-21 Jan-22 Jan-23 Jan-24
*Contribution of growth exposures to full-model R^2 ("growth focus") less contribution of policy exposures to full-model R^2 ("policy focus")

资料来源：彭博, 高盛全球投资研究部

9. The growing valuation challenge

n US equities and credit spreads highlight growing valuation challenge

n But valuation penalty normally paid the most when cycle turns
n Credit premium compressed but protected by high all-in yield
n Watch for a different ‘valuation challenge’ when macro themes are fully priced

2024年11月14日 11
Goldman Sachs 全球市场分析

US equity valuations continue to climb and are now at levels that have not been
exceeded in the post-war era except in the late 1990s. Some of the recent uplift is
coming on expectations that upcoming policies will boost after-tax earnings. But even
after adjusting for the macro backdrop, which makes that comparison a little more
favourable, US equity valuations look historically high. Credit spreads too are at the 6th
percentile of the last 15 years, and even those segments of the market that were pricing
more elevated risk premium have now compressed. As our Portfolio Strategy team
recently showed, long-term expected returns from equities now look low as a result (they
estimate 3% annualized returns over the next decade when accounting for the risks from
unusually high market concentration). The prospective returns on government bonds on
that longer horizon now look relatively better, as do the returns on credit (though largely
from the risk-free yield).

High valuations are not an obstacle to further gains if the cyclical tailwinds are powerful,
as we have seen already in 2024—although we can expect more of the back-and-forth
where upside growth surprises make rate cuts less likely. High all-in yields are also
supporting demand for credit even with compressed spreads. We have shown that in
equities, the price for higher valuations is often paid disproportionately when the cycle
deteriorates. Our baseline forecast means that challenge will most likely be avoided in
2025. But it means that if growth risks do rise more sharply than we anticipate, equity
downside could be faster and deeper than normal. The sharp drops in risk assets, and
spikes in volatility, that we saw in early August may be a harbinger of that kind of
sensitivity. That fatter downside tail also highlights the importance of keeping an eye on
another kind of ‘valuation challenge’—the point at which our more optimistic macro
forecasts seem fully reflected in assets. That has been the story in 2024 too—to push
harder when the market is clearly in doubt about elements of our macro picture and to
take more care to protect against downside tails when those views seem more clearly
reflected (as they are starting to now).

2024年11月14日 12
Goldman Sachs 全球市场分析

图表 9: Equity Valuations High Relative to Bonds, Dampening Long-Run Expected Returns

Percentile rank, 1999-present

Percentile Percentile
100 100

90 November 2023 November 2024 90

81
80 76 80
72
70 68 70
62
60 55 60

50 50
42 42
40 40
29
30 24 30
20
20 17 17 20
14
9
10 10
2
0 0
S&P 500 Real A/BBB 5y TIPS yield 10y TIPS yield 60/40/portfolio Credit spread Equity risk Equity-credit
CAEY* credit yield premium premium
(15+ yrs)

*S&P 500 cyclically-adjusted earnings yield

资料来源：高盛全球投资研究部

10. Diversification, tails and hedges

n Friendly (US) base case with protection still the key; optionality in equities more
appealing post-election vol reset
n Positive returns in core assets but benefits from diversification
n A wider distribution of outcomes with tariffs, rate upside among key risks
n Long USD (vs EUR) attractive in portfolios, alongside tails in oil and gold
n 2017 parallel suggests non-US assets could benefit if policy risks recede

Despite the heightened tension between our baseline macro forecasts, high valuations
and markets that have moved to reflect the better US growth picture, we still forecast
modest positive returns across the key asset classes. US growth resilience is reflected
in outperformance of US equities and underperformance of US bonds, alongside some
further expected upside to the US Dollar. The challenge is that tail risks are greater than
before, and the new Administration’s policy agenda creates a wider distribution of
potential outcomes. The prospect of a broader trade war is the clearest example and a
risk that looks under-priced, and upward pressure on US yields is still clearly possible,
particularly in the near term. Diversification can help address some of these challenges.
Bonds, particularly non-US bonds, should provide some protection against growth risks
including those from a deeper trade war. Although US inflation risks are quite well-priced
at the front end of the curve, expectations are more moderate further along the curve, so
TIPS may offer a good portfolio hedge too. And broadening US equity exposure towards
mid-cap equities or a more equal-weighted allocation may mitigate concentration and
valuation risks. Long USD positions should also provide protection against both US rate
upside and broadening tariff risks, reinforcing the case for US investors to keep hedging
their overseas bonds (and equity) exposures.

2024年11月14日 13
Goldman Sachs 全球市场分析

As in 2024, we think there are strong arguments for using options to provide protection
against macro tails. Equity volatility has fallen post-election, making it easier to gain
upside exposure to US assets through calls again. Deeper downside exposure
(including in European equities, which are vulnerable to some key risks) also looks more
attractively priced. Long USD optionality also remains appealing (especially against
EUR, CAD, SGD and KRW), while upside in gold and oil can also protect against some
key tails. With the market already pricing the impact of some potential US policy shifts, it
is also possible that some assets could benefit if those policy risks fail to materialise.
2017, the first year of the first Trump Administration, was ultimately a year of strong
outperformance for EM stocks and currencies. A more restrained US fiscal impulse, or a
more narrowly focused trade agenda, could now provide relief, particularly in parts of the
EM universe where those risks have been most clearly reflected. So while the outlook
for non-US equities looks more challenging than before, some exposure to that kind of
upside tail may be useful too. The wider range of potential market outcomes means that
any declines in volatility across assets in 2025 are likely to be opportunities to add
hedges.

图表 10: Modest Positive Returns Across Assets In Our Base Case

Percent Percent
2025 Returns: GS Forecasts
12 12
Local currency In USD

10 10

8 8

6 6

4 4

2 2

0 0
Global Equities Commodities DM 10-Year Government Global Credit Cash
(S&P GSCI) Bonds

资料来源：彭博, Bloomberg-Barclays, Datastream, iBoxx, ICE-BAML, 高盛全球投资研究部

2024年11月14日 14
Goldman Sachs 全球市场分析

信息披露附录
申明
我们，Kamakshya Trivedi、 多米尼克·威尔逊、 Vickie Chang、 Victor Engel，在此申明，本报告所表述的所有观点准确反映了我们的个人看法，没有
受到公司业务或客户关系因素的影响。
本报告首页所列作者为高盛全球投资研究部分析师，除非另有说明。

信息披露
法定披露
美国法定披露
任何本报告中研究企业所需的特定公司法定披露见上文：包括即将进行交易的承销商或副承销商，1%或其他股权，特定服务的补偿，客户关系种类，之
前担任承销商或副承销商的公开发行，担任董事，担任股票做市及／或专家的角色。高盛担任或可能担任本报告中所涉及发行方的债券（或相关衍生品）
的交易对手。
以下为额外要求的披露：股权及重大利益冲突: 高盛的政策为禁止其分析师、分析师属下专业人员及其家庭成员持有分析师负责研究的任何公司的证券。
分析师薪酬: 分析师薪酬部分取决于高盛的盈利，其中包括投资银行的收入。 分析师担任高级职员或董事: 高盛的政策通常禁止其分析师、分析师属下人
员及其家庭成员担任分析师负责研究的任何公司的高级职员、董事或顾问。 非美国分析师: 非美国分析师可能与高盛无关联，因此可以不受FINRA 2241
条FINRA 2242条对于与所研究公司的交流、公开露面及持有交易证券的限制。

美国以外司法管辖区规定的额外披露
以下为除了根据美国法律法规规定作出的上述信息披露之外其他司法管辖区法律所要求的披露。 澳大利亚: Goldman Sachs Australia Pty Ltd及其相关机
构不是澳大利亚经授权的存款机构（1959年《银行法》所定义），因此不在澳大利亚境内提供银行服务，也不经营银行业务。本研究报告或本报告的其
他形式内容只可分发予根据澳大利亚公司法定义的”批发客户”，在事先获得高盛许可的情况下可以有例外。在撰写研究报告期间，Goldman Sachs
Australia全球投资研究部的职员可能参与本研究报告中所讨论证券的发行公司或其他实体组织的现场调研或会议。在某些情况下，如果视具体情形
Goldman Sachs Australia认为恰当或合理，此类调研或会议的成本可能部分或全部由该证券发行人承担。如本报告内容包含任何金融产品建议，则该建
议仅为一般建议，且高盛提出该建议时并未考虑客户的目标、财务状况或需求。客户在就此类建议采取行动之前，应结合其自身目标、财务状况和需求来
考虑该建议的适当性。 高盛澳大利亚和新西兰的利益披露，以及高盛澳大利亚卖方研究独立性制度声明请参见
https://www.goldmansachs.com/disclosures/australia-new-zealand/index.html。 巴西: 与CVM Resolution n. 20相关的信息披露请参阅
https://www.gs.com/worldwide/brazil/area/gir/index.html。根据CVM Resolution n. 20第20条，在适用的情况下，对本研究报告内容负主要责任的巴西注
册分析师为本报告开头部分标明的第一作者，除非报告末另有说明。 加拿大: 这些信息仅供您参考，在任何情况下都不应被理解为Goldman Sachs & Co.
LLC对加拿大证券购买者进行有关任何加拿大证券交易的广告、要约或征求行为。Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC 未在适用的加拿大证券法规下注册为任何
加拿大司法管辖区内的交易商，通常不被允许交易加拿大证券，并且可能被禁止在加拿大某些司法管辖区内销售某些证券和产品。若您想在加拿大交易任
何加拿大证券或其他产品，请联系 Goldman Sachs Canada Inc. (高盛集团的关联机构) 或其他已注册的加拿大交易商。 香港: 可从高盛（亚洲）有限责
任公司获取有关本报告中所研究公司的证券的额外资料。 印度: 可从高盛（印度）证券私人有限公司 （分析师 – 印度证券交易委员会(SEBI) 编号
INH000001493，地址951-A, Rational House, Appasaheb Marathe Marg, Prabhadevi, Mumbai 400 025, India, 公司编号 U74140MH2006FTC160634,
电话 +91 22 6616 9000, 传真 +91 22 6616 9001） 获取有关本报告中研究对象或所提及公司的额外资料。高盛可能持有本报告中研究对象或所提及公司
的证券（1956年印度《证券合同(管理)法》条款2(h)之定义）的1%或更高比例。 证券市场投资会受到市场风险的影响。请在投资之前仔细阅读所有相关
文件。在SEBI注册并获得NISM认证并非对该中间机构表现的担保，亦不能对投资者回报做出保障。高盛（印度）证券私人有限公司投资者支持部门电
邮：india-client-support@gs.com。合规负责人：Anil Rajput |电话：+ 91 22 6616 9000 | 电邮： anil.m.rajput@gs.com。 日本: 见下文。 韩国: 除非高盛
另行同意，本报告无论以何种方式取得，仅供《金融服务与资本市场法》定义的“专业投资者”使用。可从高盛（亚洲）有限责任公司首尔分公司获取有
关本报告所研究公司的额外资料。 新西兰: Goldman Sachs New Zealand Limited及其关联机构并非1989年新西兰储备银行法定义的“注册银行”或“存
款机构”。本研究报告以及本报告的其他形式内容只可分发给2008年财务顾问法案定义的 “批发客户”，在事先获得高盛许可的情况下可以有例外。 高
盛澳大利亚和新西兰的利益披露请参见 https://www.goldmansachs.com/disclosures/australia-new-zealand/index.html。 俄罗斯: 在俄罗斯联邦分发的研
究报告并非俄罗斯法律所定义的广告，而是不以产品推广为主要目的的信息和分析，也不属于俄罗斯法律所界定的评估行为。 研究报告不构成俄罗斯法
律法规定义的个性化投资建议，并非针对某个具体客户，在报告准备阶段也未分析客户的财务状况、投资特征或风险特征。高盛不对某个客户或任何其他
人基于本报告可能做出的任何投资决策承担责任。 新加坡: 高盛（新加坡）私人公司（公司编号：198602165W）（受新加坡金融管理局监管）为本研究
报告承担法律责任，若有由本研究报告所引发或与本研究报告相关的任何事宜，请联系高盛（新加坡）私人公司。 台湾: 本信息仅供参考，未经允许不得
翻印。投资者应当谨慎考虑他们自身的投资风险，投资结果由投资者自行负责。 英国: 在英国根据金融市场行为监管局的定义可被分类为私人客户的人士
参阅本报告的同时应当参阅高盛以往对本报告研究企业的研究报告，并应当参考高盛国际已经发给这些客户的风险警告资料。该风险警告资料复本，以及
本报告中采用部分金融辞汇的解释可向高盛国际索取。
欧盟和英国: 与欧盟委员会实施条例 (EU) (2016/958)（欧盟议会和欧盟理事会条例(EU) No 596/2014的补充条款,规定了有关投资建议或其他投资策略的
推荐或建议之信息的客观陈述,以及对特定利益或利益冲突进行披露的技术安排应达到的监管技术标准；英国脱离欧盟和欧洲经济区之后该实施条例被纳
入英国国内法律法规）第6(2)条相关的披露信息可在https://www.gs.com/disclosures/europeanpolicy.html上获取，该网址介绍在处理和投资研究有关的利
益冲突时应参照的欧洲政策。
日本: 高盛证券株式会社是在关东财务局注册（注册号：No. 69）的金融工具交易商，同时也是日本证券业协会日本金融期货业协会、第二类金融工具公
司协会、日本投资信托协会以及日本投资顾问协会的成员。股票买卖需要缴纳与客户事先约定的佣金及消费税。关于日本证券交易所、日本证券交易商协
会或日本证券金融公司所要求的适用的信息披露，请参见与公司有关的法定披露部分。

全球产品；分发机构
高盛全球投资研究部在全球范围内为高盛的客户制作并分发研究产品。高盛分布在其全球各办事处的分析师提供行业和公司的研究，以及宏观经济、货
币、商品及投资组合策略的研究。本研究报告在澳大利亚由Goldman Sachs Australia Pty Ltd（ABN 21 006 797 897）分发；在巴西由Goldman Sachs
do Brasil Corretora de Títulos e Valores Mobiliários S.A.分发；Public Communication Channel Goldman Sachs Brazil：0800 727 5764和/或
contatogoldmanbrasil@gs.com。工作日（假期除外）上午9点至下午6点。Canal de Comunicação com o Público Goldman Sachs Brasil: 0800 727
5764 e/ou contatogoldmanbrasil@gs.com. Horário de funcionamento: segunda-feira à sexta-feira (exceto feriados), das 9h às 18h；在加拿大由
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC 分发；在香港由高盛（亚洲）有限责任公司分发；在印度由高盛（印度）证券私人有限公司分发；在日本由高盛证券株式会
社分发；在韩国由高盛（亚洲）有限责任公司首尔分公司分发；在新西兰由Goldman Sachs New Zealand Limited 分发；在俄罗斯由高盛OOO 分发；在
新加坡由高盛（新加坡）私人公司（公司号：198602165W）分发；在美国由高盛集团分发。高盛国际已批准本研究报告在英国分发。
高盛国际（由审慎监管局授权并接受金融市场行为监管局和审慎监管局的监管）已批准本研究报告在英国分发。
欧洲经济区: 由高盛国际（由审慎监管局授权并接受金融市场行为监管局和审慎监管局的监管）向欧洲经济区内的以下司法管辖区分发研究报告：卢森堡
大公国、意大利、比利时王国、丹麦王国、挪威王国、芬兰共和国和爱尔兰共和国；由GSI - Succursale de Paris （巴黎分公司；由法国审慎监管管理局
授权并接受审慎监管管理局和金融市场管理局的监管）在法国分发研究报告；由GSI - Sucursal en España （马德里分公司；在西班牙由国家证券市场委

2024年11月14日 15
Goldman Sachs 全球市场分析

员会授权）在西班牙王国分发研究报告；由GSI - Sweden Bankfilial（斯德哥尔摩分公司；由瑞典金融监管局按照瑞典证券市场法 (Sw. lag (2007:528)

om värdepappersmarknaden) 第4章第4节作为“第三国分公司”授权）在瑞典王国分发研究报告；Goldman Sachs Bank Europe SE是一家在德国注册
成立的信贷机构，在单一监管机制下接受欧洲央行的直接审慎监督，在其他方面接受德国联邦金融监管局(Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin)和德国联邦银行的监督，由该机构向德意志联邦共和国和欧洲经济区内高盛国际未获授权分发研究报告的司法管辖
区分发研究报告，此外，由GSBE哥本哈根分公司filial af GSBE, Tyskland（接受丹麦金融监管局的监督）在丹麦王国分发研究报告；由GSBE - Sucursal
en España（马德里分公司；在有限范围内接受西班牙银行的地方监督）在西班牙王国分发研究报告；由GSBE - Succursale Italia（米兰分公司；在相关
适用范围内，接受意大利银行(Banca d’Italia)和意大利金融市场监管局(Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa “Consob”)的地方监督）
在意大利分发研究报告；由GSBE - Succursale de Paris（巴黎分公司；接受金融市场管理局和审慎监管管理局的监督）在法国分发研究报告；由GSBE -
Sweden Bankfilial（斯德哥尔摩分公司；在一定范围内接受瑞典金融监管局(Finansinpektionen)的地方监督）在瑞典王国分发研究报告。

一般性披露
本研究报告仅供我们的客户使用。除了与高盛相关的披露，本研究报告是基于我们认为可靠的目前已公开的信息，但我们不保证该信息的准确性和完整
性，客户也不应该依赖该信息是准确和完整的。报告中的信息、观点、估算和预测均截至报告的发表日，且可能在不事先通知的情况下进行调整。我们会
适时地更新我们的研究，但各种规定可能会阻止我们这样做。除了一些定期出版的行业报告之外，绝大多数报告是在分析师认为适当的时候不定期地出
版。
高盛是一家集投资银行、投资管理和证券经纪业务于一身的全球性综合服务公司。全球投资研究部所研究的大部分公司与我们保持着投资银行业务和其它
业务关系。美国证券经纪交易商高盛是SIPC(https://www.sipc.org)的成员。
我们的销售人员、交易员和其它专业人员可能会向我们的客户及自营交易部提供与本研究报告中的观点截然相反的口头或书面市场评论或交易策略。我们
的资产管理部门、自营交易部和投资业务部可能会做出与本报告的建议或表达的意见不一致的投资决策。
我公司及其关联机构、高级职员、董事和雇员，除法规及高盛的制度所禁止的情况外，将不时地对本研究报告所涉及的证券或衍生工具持有多头或空头头
寸，担任上述证券或衍生工具的交易对手，或买卖上述证券或衍生工具。
在高盛组织的会议上的第三方演讲嘉宾（包括高盛其它部门人员）的观点不一定反映全球投资研究部的观点，也并非高盛的正式观点。
在此提到的任何第三方，包括销售人员、交易员和其它专业人士或其家庭成员，可能持有本报告提及的且与本报告分析师所表达的观点不一致的产品头
寸。
本报告重点关注整体市场、行业以及板块的投资主题，而无意区分任何我们所描述的行业或板块中具体公司的前景或表现、或对此进行分析。
本报告中与行业或板块内一只或多只股票或信贷证券相关的交易建议是对所讨论投资主题的反映，而并非对该证券的孤立的交易建议。
在任何要约出售股票或征求购买股票要约的行为为非法的司法管辖区内，本报告不构成该等出售要约或征求购买要约。本报告不构成个人投资建议，也没
有考虑到个别客户特殊的投资目标、财务状况或需求。客户应考虑本报告中的任何意见或建议是否符合其特定状况，以及(若有必要)寻求专家的意见，包
括税务意见。本报告中提及的投资价格和价值以及这些投资带来的收入可能会波动。过去的表现并不代表未来的表现，未来的回报也无法保证，投资者可
能会损失本金。外汇汇率波动有可能对某些投资的价值或价格或来自这一投资的收入产生不良影响。
某些交易，包括牵涉期货、期权和其它衍生工具的交易，有很大的风险，因此并不适合所有投资者。投资者可以向高盛销售代表取得或通过
https://www.theocc.com/about/publications/character-risks.jsp和
https://www.fiadocumentation.org/fia/regulatory-disclosures_1/fia-uniform-futures-and-options-on-futures-risk-disclosures-booklet-pdf-version-2018取得
当前期权和期货的披露文件。对于包含多重期权买卖的期权策略结构产品，例如，期权差价结构产品，其交易成本可能较高。与交易相关的文件将根据要
求提供。
全球投资研究部提供的不同服务层级：根据您对接收沟通信息的频率和方式的个人偏好、您的风险承受能力、投资重心和视角（例如整体市场、具体行
业、长线、短线）、您与高盛的整体客户关系的规模和范围、以及法律法规限制等各种因素，高盛全球投资研究部向您提供的服务层级和类型可能与高盛
提供给内部和其他外部客户的服务层级和类型有所不同。例如，某些客户可能要求在关于某个证券的研究报告发表之时收到通知，某些客户可能要求我们
将内部客户网上提供的分析师基本面分析背后的某些具体数据通过数据流或其它途径以电子方式发送给他们。分析师基本面研究观点（如股票评级、目标
价格或盈利预测大幅调整）的改变，在被纳入研究报告、并通过电子形式发表在内部客户网上或通过其它必要方式向有权接收此类研究报告的所有客户大
范围发布之前，不得向任何客户透露。
所有研究报告均以电子出版物的形式刊登在我们的内部客户网上并向所有客户同步提供。并非所有研究内容都转发给我们的客户或者向第三方整合者提
供，高盛也并不对由第三方整合者转发的我们研究报告承担任何责任。如需了解可向您提供的有关一个或多个证券、市场或资产类别的研究报告、模型或
其它数据（包括相关服务），请联络您的高盛销售代表或登陆https://research.gs.com。
披露信息可以查阅https://www.gs.com/research/hedge.html或向研究合规部索取，地址是200 West Street，New York，NY 10282。
高盛版权所有 © 2024年
对于通过这些服务获取的信息，您仅可出于自行使用的目的进行保存、展示、分析、修改、重新排版和打印。未经高盛明确书面同意，您不得将这些信息
转售或进行逆向处理从而用于计算或开发任何用于披露和/或营销的指数、或生成任何其他衍生产品或商业产品、数据或其他产品或服务。未经高盛明确
书面同意，您不得以任何形式将这些信息的整体或部分向任何第三方发布、传输或复制。上述限制性要求的适用范围包括但不限于：使用、提取、下载或
获取这些信息的整体或部分从而用于对机器学习或人工智能系统的训练或微调、或将这些信息的整体或部分提供或复制给任何此类系统作为提示词或输入
信息。

2024年11月14日 16