SPO2 LOLITO T.
NACNAC, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 191913 I March 21, 2012 I VELASCO, JR., J
On February 20, 2003, in Dingras, Ilocos Norte, SPO2 Lolito I. Nacnac, a public officer, being then a
member of the Philippine National Police, assigned with the Dingras Police Station, Dingras, Ilocos
Norte, shoot SPO1 Doddie Espejo with a gun resulting into the latter’s death.
FACTS:
The accused/appellant was the most senior Non-commissioned officer on February 20, 2003,
and was the officer of the day.
That at about 10:00 in the evening the victim (SPO1 Espejo) together with SPO1 Basilio took
the police tricycle, but Nacnac stopped them.
That the victim was drunk and had a history of violent aggression and drunkenness.
The victim drew his issued Cal.45 and pointed it to Nacnac.
The accused/appellant fired his rifle and made warning shots.
When the victim pointed the gun at the appellant, the appellant quickly pointed his rifle to the
victim and shot him in the head, causing the instantaneous death of the victim.
The appellant/accused surrendered to the COP.
RTC ruling: Guilty for the crime of homicide.
CA ruling: affirmed the RTC’s ruling.
ISSUE:
1. [Whether the CA erroneously held that] the victim’s drawing of his handgun or pointing it at the
petitioner is not sufficient to constitute unlawful aggression based on existing jurisprudence.
2. [Whether the CA incorrectly appreciated the photo] showing the victim holding his handgun in a
peculiar manner despite the fact that no expert witness was presented to testify thereto x x x.
3. [Whether petitioner] has met the second and third requisites of self-defense x x x. 8
RULING/HELD:
WHEREFORE, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The CA Decision dated July
20, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 30907 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner SPO2 Lolito T.
Nacnac is ACQUITTED of homicide on reasonable doubt.
RATIO:
Reasonable Means Employed
To successfully invoke self-defense, another requisite is that the means employed by the accused
must be reasonably commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted. 18
Supporting petitioner’s claim of self-defense is the lone gunshot wound suffered by the
victim.1âwphi1 The nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly and
unremittingly considered as important indicia.19 In People v. Catbagan,20 We aptly held:
The means employed by the person invoking self-defense is reasonable if equivalent to the means of
attack used by the original aggressor. Whether or not the means of self-defense is reasonable
depends upon the nature or quality of the weapon, the physical condition, the character, the size and
other circumstances of the aggressor; as well as those of the person who invokes self-defense; and
also the place and the occasion of the assault.
In the instant case, the lone wound inflicted on the victim supports the argument that petitioner
feared for his life and only shot the victim to defend himself. The lone gunshot was a reasonable
means chosen by petitioner in defending himself in view of the proximity of the armed victim, his
drunken state, disobedience of an unlawful order, and failure to stand down despite a warning shot.
Lack of Sufficient Provocation
The last requisite for self-defense to be appreciated is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself or herself. As gleaned from the findings of the trial court, petitioner gave
the victim a lawful order and fired a warning shot before shooting the armed and drunk victim. Absent
from the shooting incident was any evidence on petitioner sufficiently provoking the victim prior to the
shooting.
All told, We are convinced that petitioner was only defending himself on the night he shot his fellow
police officer. The rule is that factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. 21
This rule is binding except where the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any
fact or circumstance of weight and substance.22 As earlier pointed out, the trial court did not consider
certain facts and circumstances that materially affect the outcome of the instant case. We must,
therefore, acquit the petitioner.
Given the peculiar circumstances of this case, we find that the prosecution was unable to establish
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner. Even the OSG shares this view in its Comment
appealing for his acquittal.
