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Criminal Law Case Digest Day 1

People v. Roman [G.R. No. 198110. July 31, 2013.] FACTS: The accused-
appellant, Wilson Roman, was charged with murder. The incident happened in
the morning of June 22, 1995, at the wedding party when the accused-
appellant hacked Vicente Indaya, the victim, with his bolo. The victim was hit
on his head, nape, right shoulder, base of the nape and right elbow before he
fell on the ground and then died. There were several witnesses including
Elena Romero, Asterio Ebuenga, Martin Borlagdatan, Elisea Indaya, Ramil
Baylon, SPO1 Medardo Delos Santos and Dr. Teodora Pornillos. Each
testimonies were positive, clear and consistent in all material points. However,
there was a different version of the incident according to the accused-
appellant. He said that on that day, he went to the house of his parents-in-law
to bring the bamboos. On his way back, he met his close friend who invited
him to come to the wedding party. At the venue, he pacified his brother-in-law
and Indaya, the victim who were having a heated exchange of words and told
the victim to leave. After 20 minutes, the victim came back. He got mad
because he was pacified by the accused-appellant and threatened to kill him.
But he simply stood up and turned to leave the place. As he was leaving, he
heard a shout that he was about to be hacked. Then, he saw the victim,
aiming to hit him with a bolo, but he was able to get the bolo. He lost control of
himself, he hacked the victim instead. His testimony was supported by Delia
Tampoco. The Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals rendered a decision,
finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder.

ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not the accused-appellant may invoke self-defense.

2. Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery exists.

HELD: 1. No. Self-defense was used as an alibi, an inherently weak defense

for it is easy to fabricate. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, the
accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence the following elements:
(a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. It is a statutory and
doctrinal requirement that, for the justifying circumstance of self-defense,
unlawful aggression as a condition sine qua non must be present. There can
be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim commits an
unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. There is unlawful
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aggression when the peril to one’s life, limb or right is either actual or
imminent. There must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon.
Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of
unlawful aggression. Moreover, the severity, location and the number of
wounds suffered by the victim are indicative of a serious intent to inflict harm
not merely that he wanted to defend himself from an imminent peril to life.
Also, in the incident report executed by the police officers, only one bolo,
specifically that which was used in the hacking, was reported to have been
recovered from the crime scene. This belies the accused-appellant’s claim
that the victim was also armed at the time of the incident.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARCIAL MALICDEM

G.R. No. 184601; 12 November 2012

PONENTE: Leonardo-De Castro

On the night of August 11, 2002 in Brgy. Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan

Bernardo Casullar, Joel Concepcion and the victim, Wilson Molina were
seated near the artesian well when appellant arrived asking if they knew the
whereabouts of his godson Rogelio Molina. They answered in the negative.
They noticed that appellant was reeking of alcohol and as they stood to leave,
appellant suddenly embraced Wilson and lunged a six-inch knife to the left
part of his chest. A scuffle then ensued between the four men. Appellant then
ran away. Afterwards, Joel brought Wilson aboard a police patrol car to the
Region I Medical Center in Dagupan City where Wilson was declared dead on
arrival.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused can invoke self-defense which would warrant his
acquittal

HELD:

No, For the Court to consider self-defense as a justifying circumstance,

appellant has to prove the following essential elements: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
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provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. The Court has
repeatedly stated that a person who invokes self-defense has the burden to
prove all the aforesaid elements. The Court also considers unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim as the most important of these elements.
Thus, unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be
successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. The defense failed to
discharge its burden to prove unlawful aggression on the part of Wilson by
sufficient and satisfactory proof. The records were bereft of any indication that
the attack by Wilson was not a mere threat or just imaginary. Bernardo, Joel
and Wilson were just in the act of leaving when appellant suddenly plunged a
knife to Wilson’s chest.

Moreover, appellant’s act of suddenly stabbing Wilson as he was

about to leave constituted the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Treachery
is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.

People vs. Apolinar

Facts:

Midnight of December 22, 1936, the defendant and appellant Anastacio

Apolinar alias Atong was at that time the occupant of a parcel of land owned
by JoaquinGonzales in Papallasen, La Paz, Umingan, Pangasinan Armed with
a shotgun, Atong was looking over said land when he observed that there was
a man carrying a bundle on his shoulder Believing that he was a thief (of
palay), the defendant called his attention but he ignored him. The defendant
fired in the air and then at the person. The man, identified as Domingo Petras,
was able to get back to his house and consequently narrated to Angel
Natividad, the barrio chief, that he had been wounded in the back by a
shotgun. He then showed the two wounds one in each side of the spinal
column which were circular in form and a little bigger than a quarter of an inch,
according to the medical report of Dr. Mananquil Petras died of the wounds he
sustained. The defendant Surrendered to the authorities immediately after the
incident and gave a sworn statement (Exhibit F) before the Justice of Peace of
Umingan on December 23, 1936. Isoque
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WON the killing of Petras was justified by defense of property

Held: No: the right to property is not of such importance as right to life, and
defense of property can be invoked as a justifying circumstance only when it is
coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted with said property.

G.R. Nos. L-33466-67 April 20, 1983

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

MAMERTO NARVAEZ, defendant-appellant.

MAKASIAR, J.:

FACTS:

On the occasion of a fencing activity being conducted by deceased Davis

Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia together with some workers for the purpose of
securing a portion of land owned by Fleischer and Company of which Davis
Fleischer is the secretary-treasurer and Rubia is the Asst. Manager, the
defendant who was then taking his afternoon siesta, heard that the walls of his
house were being chiselled, and he arose and there he saw the fencing going
on. If the fencing would go on, defendant would be prevented from getting into
his house and the bodega of his ricemill. So he addressed the group, saying
Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it
over what is good, addressing the deceased Rubia, who is defendant's
compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however, answered: "No, gademit,
proceed, go ahead.' Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his
gun and shot Fleischer, hitting him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards
the jeep, and knowing there is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia,
likewise hitting him.

Defendant Narvaez was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of the crime of murder by the CFI. Defendant appealed stating that he
acted in defense of his person and in defense of his rights

ISSUE:
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WON defendant's claim of defense of one's person or rights can be treated as

a justifying circumstance and absolve him of criminal liability. (NO)

RULING:

Under Art. 11, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, defense of one's person or
rights is treated as a justifying circumstance if the following requisites are
present..

1. Unlawful aggression;

2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself

(Art. 11, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, as amended).

The Court finds that there was aggression on the part of the deceased when
they commenced with the fencing. There was aggression, not on the person of
appellant, but on his property rights. Citing Articles 536 and 539 of the Civil
Code,the Court finds that the deceased had no right to destroy or cause
damage to defendant's house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway
while he was pleading with them to stop and talk things over. The assault on
defendant's property amounts to unlawful aggression as contemplated by law.

The reasonableness of the resistance however, is not appreciated by the

Court. When the appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing the two
deceased, the Court finds his resistance disproportionate to the attack.

The third element of defense of property is found to be present. There was no

provocation on the part of defendant, since he was asleep at first and was
only awakened by the noise produced by the ongoing fencing. His plea for the
deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with him was not
considered to be a provocation from defendant's part.

Considering overall, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable,
since not all the elements for justifications are present. He should therefore be
held responsible for the death of his victims, but he could be credited with the
special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to paragraph
6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code and by two generic mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation.
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People vs PO3 Fallorina

G.R. No. 137347

March 4, 2004

Facts:

At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent Jorojoro, an eleven-year

old minor and the third child of Vicente and Felicisima Jorojoro, residing at
Sitio Militar, Brgy. Bahay Toro, Project 8, Quezon City, asked permission from
his mother Felicisima if he could play outside. She agreed. Together with his
playmate Whilcon. "Buddha" Rodriguez, Vincent played with his kite on top of
the roof of an abandoned carinderia beside the road.

Beside the carinderia was a basketball court, where a fourteen-year old

witness Ricardo Salvo and his three friends, were playing basketball. Ricardo
heard the familiar sound of a motorcycle coming from the main road across
the basketball court. Cognizant to Ricardo of the appellant, PO3 Ferdinand
Fallorina, a Philippine National Police (PNP) officer, detailed in the Traffic
Management Group (TMG), knew that he abhorred kids playing on the roof,
since one of his friends was previously been scolded by the appellant before.

Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from the roof. When
PO3 Fallorina saw them, the former stopped his motorcycle, he shouted and
badmouthed at them. After hearing the shouts of the appellant, Whilcon
rushed to jump off from the roof while Vincent was lying on his stomach on the
roof flying his kite. When he heard the appellant's shouts, Vincent stood up
and looked at the latter. As soon as Vincent turned his back, ready to get
down from the roof, suddenly, the appellant pointed the .45 caliber pistol
towards the direction of Vincent and fired a shot. Vincent fell from the roof,
lying prostrate near the canal beside the abandoned carinderia and the
basketball court.

The appellant approached Vincent and carried the latter's hapless body in a
waiting tricycle and brought him to the Quezon City General Hospital. Vincent
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was pronounced dead on arrival caused by a single gunshot wound in the

head.

Issues:

(a) Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability?

Held:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) cites that the basis for exemption
from a criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), is the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of
the accused. For the accused to be guilty for a felony, it must be committed
either with criminal intent or with fault or negligence.In the case at bar, the
Court a quo erred in inequitably appreciating exculpatory and inculpatory facts
and circumstances which should have been considered in favor of the
accused. The court also failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender in favor of the accused since it was only after three days
that the appellant gave himself up and surrendered his service firearm. And
lastly, the court considered the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage
of his position by the accused.

No. L-18660 December 22, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, VL FELIPE

DELIMA, defendant-appellant.

ROMUALDEZ, J.

FACTS

Lorenzo Napilon had escaped from the jail where he was serving sentence.

Some days afterwards the policeman Felipe Delima, who was looking for
Lorenzo, found him in the house of Jorge Alegria armed with a pointed piece
of bamboo in the shape of a

lance, and demanded his surrender

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The fugitive answered with a stroke of his lance The policeman dodged it, and
to impose his authority fired his

revolver, but the bullet did not hit him. The criminal ran away, without parting
with his weapon.

These peace officer went after him and fired again his revolver, this time
hitting and killing him

The policeman was tried and convicted for homicide and

sentenced to reclusion temporal and the accessory penalties. He

appeals from that judgment which must be reversed.

ISSUE

WON the act committed by policeman Felipe Delima was done in performance
of duty.

HELD/RULING

YES. That killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was
under the obligation to surrender, and had no right, after evading service of his
sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in the hand,
which compelled the policeman to resort to such an extreme means although
it proved to be fatal, was justified by the circumstances. Article 8, No. 11, of
the Penal Code being considered, Felipe Delima committed no crime. He is
hereby acquitted with the costs de oficio.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HERMOGENES FLORA AND EDWIN

FLORA G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000

FACTS

Three separate informations were filed against Hermogenes Flora and Edwin
Flora charging them of double murder and attempted murder.
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Days before the incident, appellant Hermogenes alias "Bodoy," had a violent
altercation with a certain Oscar Villanueva. Oscar's uncle, Ireneo Gallarte,
pacified the two.

On the evening of the incident, a dance party was held to celebrate a birthday.
Hermogenes, allegedly a suitor of the birthday celebrant, attended the party
with his brother and Edwin. Also in attendance were Rosalie Roma, then a
high school student; her mother, Emerita Roma, and her aunt, Flor Espinas.
Ireneo Gallarte, a neighbor of the Romas, was there too.

The dancing went on past midnight but at about 1:30, violence erupted. On
signal by Edwin, Hermogenes fired his 38 caliber revolver twice. The first shot
grazed the right shoulder of Flor Espinas, then hit Emerita Roma, below her
shoulder. The second shot hit Ireneo Gallarte who slumped onto the floor.
Rosalie, was shocked and could only utter, "si Bodoy, si Bodoy". referring to
Hermogenes. Edwin approached her and, poking a knife at her neck,
threatened to kill her before he and his brother, Hermogenes, fled the scene.

The victims of the gunfire were transported to the hospital, where Emerita and
Ireneo

died.

The RTC rendered judgment finding both accused guilty as charged.

ISSUES: Whether treachery may be appreciated in cases of aberration ictus

(NO)

RULING

In the present case, when Hermogenes Flora first fired his gun at Ireneo, but
missed, and hit Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas instead, he became liable for
Emerita's death and Flor's injuries. Hermogenes cannot escape culpability on
the basis of aberratio ictus principle. Criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony, although the wrongful act be different. from that which he
intended.

We find that the death of Emerita and of Ireneo were attended by treachery.
When Hermogenes Flora suddenly shot Emerita and Irenco, both were
helpless to defend themselves. Their deaths were murders, not simply
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homicides since the acts were qualified by treachery. Thus, we are compelled
to conclude that appellant Hermogenes Flora is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of double murder for the deaths of Emerita Roma and Ireneo Gallarte,
and guilty of attempted murder of Flor Espinas.

PEOPLE v. BERONILLA G.R. No. L-4445 February 28, 1955 REYES, J.B.L.,
J

Facts: Beronilla et al. were convicted of murder for the execution of Arsenio
Borjal in Abra pursuant to the memorandum issued to all Military Mayors in
Northern Luzon, authorizing them to try persons accused of treason,
espionage, or the aiding and abetting of the enemy.

ISSUE: W/N Beronilla et al’s actions are covered by justifying circumstances

for obedience to lawful order of superior

HELD/ RATIO: YES

Lt. Col. Arnold, failed to transmit the Volckmann message to Beronilla. And
this being so, the charge of criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal must be
rejected, because the accused had no need to conspire against a man who
was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death. The conduct of the
appellants does not dispose that these appellants were impelled by malice
(dolo). The arrest and trial of Borjal were made upon express orders of the
higher command; the appellants allowed Borjal to be defended by counsel
after finding that the late Arsenio Borjal had really committed treasonable acts,
(causing soldiers and civilians to be tortured, and hidden American officers to
be captured by the Japanese) expressly declared that "the Court is convinced
that it was not for political or personal reason that the accused decided to kill
Arsenio Borjal" Appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and
that the accused-appellants acted upon orders, of a superior officers that they,
as military subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good faith, without
being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on their part, we
cannot say that criminal intent has been established To constitute a crime, the
act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a
criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to
consequences, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus
non facit reum, nisi mens rea-a is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of being innocent.”
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G.R. No. 207397*. September 24, 2018 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CARPIO
MARZAN Y LUTAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS

To prove Marzan's guilt, the prosecution presented Bernardo, Erlinda Cabiltes

(Erlinda), Lolita Rombaoa (Lolita), and Dr. Valentin Theodore Lumibao (Dr.
Lumibao). Their testimonies can be summarized as follows:

On May 22, 2003, at around 1:30p.m., Erlinda saw Marzan enter the house of
her bedridden father,

Apolonio, while uttering "agda kalaban ko" (I have an enemy). Not long after,
Erlinda heard her father screaming. "apay Aping?" (why Aping?) and "uston
Aping!" (enough Aping) Thereafter, Erlinda saw Marzan emerge from her
father's house wearing a blood-stained shirt and holding a bladed instrument
dripping with blood. Erlinda ran to the barangay captain's house to ask for
help.

Lolita also saw Marzan come out from Apolonio's house holding a blood-
stained weapon. Out of fear, however, Lolita hid herself in the comfort room.

Bernardo tried to placate Marzan but the latter furiously said, "you are also
one of them and stabbed Bernardo in the stomach.

Marzan was charged in separate Informations with Murder and Frustrated

Murder. The defense claimed that Marzan was insane at the time of the
incident. To prove Marzan's insanity, the defense presented his wife Isabel
Marzan. Despite this, Marzan was convicted of murder and frustrated
homicide. CA affirmed.
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ISSUES:

WoN Marzan is exempt from criminal liability on the ground of insanity

Ruling: NO. In rejecting Marzan's argument that he should be declared

criminally exempt from the murder charge, considering that he was suffering
from psychosis when he stabbed his brother. The sudden attack on the victim
who was then at home, bedridden, recuperating from sickness, completely
unaware of any danger and unable to defend himself constituted treachery
because Marzan was thereby ensured that the victim would not be in any
position to ward off or evade his blows, or strike back at him. Evidently, the
attack was executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless
and unable to retaliate. There is thus no doubt that treachery

attended the killing. WON voluntary surrender may be considered a mitigating

circumstance in this case

NO. In the case at bar, there was no showing that Marzan unconditionally and
voluntarily. surrendered himself to the authorities either because he
acknowledged his guilt or because he wished to save them the trouble and
expense in looking for and capturing him. Marzan was just nonchalantly sitting
at the curb when the police force responded and handcuffed him.

G.R. No. 185285. October 5, 2009.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. PAUL ALIPIO, accused appellant.
Facts: AAA is a 41-year old mentally retarded woman whom Marilou Gipit
Alipio often hired to watch over her children whenever the latter is out of her
house. Sometime in June 2000, Marilou sent AAA to Sitio Liman, San
Francisco, Bulan, Sorsogon to borrow money from Marilou's father, Saul.
While about to head for home, AAA heard Paul, brother of Marilou, calling her
from his house, then he held her hand, pushed her inside and, while covering
AAA's mouth, brought her to his bedroom. From there, by means of force,
threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
have sexual intercourse with AAA. Paul threatened AAA with death should
she disclose to anybody what had just happened between them. However,
BBB, AAA’s mother noticed that she had missed her monthly period, then the
former told what Paul had done to her. AAA was then founded to be 7 months
pregnant, and afterwards gave birth to a girl. Psychiatric evaluation done by
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Dr. Escuadra revealed that AAA, although 42 years old at that time, had the
mental capacity and disposition of a nine or 10 year-old child, clearly
indicating a mental retardation case, but founded to be capable of being a
witness. On the defense, Dr. Chona C. Belmonte, a psychiatrist at the Bicol
Medical Center, conducted a psychiatric examination on Paul. Her diagnosis:
Paul was suffering from schizoaffective disorder, a temporary and reversible
psychiatric condition affecting basically an individual's thinking, perception,
and emotion. In Paul's case, this psychiatric disorder manifested itself after his
brother's death in 1987, and was aggravated when a sister committed suicide
in 1990.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant can avail of insanity as an

exempting circumstance for the crime of rape he committed.

Held: No. The moral and legal presumption is always in favor of soundness of
mind; that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a
person. It is improper to assume the contrary. This presumption, however,
may be overcome by evidence of insanity, which, under Art. 12 (1) of the
RPC, exempts a person from criminal liability.