BADGE: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
CAPTION: G.R. No. 163868 June 4, 2009 ROMUALDO PAGSIBIGAN, Petitioner,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ELEAZAR CABASAL, Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
SYLLABI: A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain
set of facts, and a question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts.—A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court should cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable.
Pagsibigan vs. People, 588 SCRA 249, G.R. No. 163868 June 4, 2009 Attorney’s
Fees; The award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must have factual
and legal justification, which must be stated in the body of the decision,
otherwise, the award is disallowed.—The award of attorney’s fees and expenses
of litigation must have factual and legal justification, which must be stated in
the body of the decision. Pagsibigan vs. People, 588 SCRA 249, G.R. No. 163868
June 4, 2009
FACTS On 29 November 1982, Elizabeth Hinal (Hinal) and the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) entered into a deed of conditional sale
over a piece of property located at 1399 Kadena de Amor Street, Alido
Heights Subdivision, Malolos, Bulacan. Under the deed, GSIS sold the
property to Hinal payable in 25 years.
Eleazar M. Cabasal (Cabasal) was a depositor, while Romualdo
A. Pagsibigan (Pagsibigan) was the manager, of the Rural Bank of
Guiguinto, Bulacan (Rural Bank). Aside from being the manager of the
Rural Bank, Pagsibigan acted as a real estate agent, usually to bank
depositors. A certain Liza Geronimo informed Cabasal that there was a
property for sale which he might like. Cabasal approached Pagsibigan
and, in 1991, Pagsibigan offered for sale Hinal's property to Cabasal
for P215,000 plus assumption of the outstanding obligation with GSIS.
Cabasal agreed to buy the property. In a receipt6 dated 30 January
1992, Pagsibigan acknowledged receipt of P215,000 from Cabasal.
Cabasal occupied the property and spent P400,000 on renovation.
In 1992, Cabasal received from GSIS a notice directing Hinal to
settle her outstanding obligation of P535,000. Alarmed, Cabasal
referred the matter to Pagsibigan. Pagsibigan accompanied Cabasal to
the house of Hinal and asked Hinal to sign a deed of sale and transfer of
rights over the property in favor of Cabasal. Hinal refused to sign the
deed because she did not (1) sell the property, (2) authorize Pagsibigan
to sell the property, and (3) receive P215,000. Pagsibigan assured
Cabasal that he would settle the problem.
In 1999, Cabasal received another notice7 from GSIS directing
Hinal to settle her outstanding obligation of P752,157.10, otherwise
the deed of conditional sale would be cancelled. Cabasal referred the
matter to a certain Atty. Reyes. Upon the advice of Atty. Reyes, Cabasal
made an initial payment of P50,000 to GSIS to forestall the cancellation
of the deed of conditional sale.
Atty. Reyes sent a demand letter to Pagsibigan asking him to
return Cabasal's P215,000. Because Pagsibigan failed to return the
money, Atty. Reyes initiated a criminal case against him. In an
Information8 dated 3 April 2000, Second Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Alfredo L. Geronimo charged Pagsibigan with estafa.
Pagsibigan pleaded not guilty.
The RTC's Ruling
In 26 February 2002 Decision, the RTC did not find Pagsibigan
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa. However, the RTC ordered
Pagsibigan to pay Cabasal P215,000 civil liability, P20,000 attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation.
STAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315 (2)(a)
Commission of — Estafa under Art. 315 ( 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code
is committed by any person who defrauds another by using fictitious
name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means
of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of fraud. (People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 214500, June 28,
2017)
Elements — For the purpose of proving the existence of injury or
damage, it is unnecessary to inquire whether, as a matter of fact, the
unpaid debt could be or had been successfully collected; the commission
of the crime is entirely independent of the subsequent and casual event of
collecting the amount due and demandable, the result of which, whatever
it may be, can in no wise have any influence upon the legal effects of the
already consummated concealment of documents; the extent of a fraud,
when it consists of the concealment of a document, should be graded
according to the amount which the document represents, as it is evident
that the gravity of the damage resulting therefrom would not be the
same. (Capulong vs. People, G.R. No. 199907, Feb. 27, 2017)
— The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by
abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a
third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation; application. (People vs. Matheus, G.R. No. 198795, June 07,
2017)
"In the absence of proof that the representation of the accused was
actually false, criminal intent to deceive cannot be inferred" (People v.
Urpiano, C.A., 60 O.G. 6009, citing the ruling in the cases of People v.
Lagasca, G.R. No. 4230-R, June 5, 1960, and U.S. v. Adriatico, 7 Phil. 187.
[sic]
However, the evidence presented shows that accused Pagsibigan
received the amount of P215,000.00 from complainant Cabasal
and he failed to return or pay the same, upon receipt of the
demand letter. Hence, though the accused is not criminally liable,
he is under obligation to return the same to complainant Cabasal,
with legal interest from the time of demand to pay the same.
"An acquittal based on reasonable doubt that the accused committed
the crime charged does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability
where a mere preponderance of evidence is required." (Manahan, Jr., v.
Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 202
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
In its 30 January 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto the 26 February 2002 Decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals
held that there was sufficient evidence to show that Pagsibigan was
civilly liable and that the transfer of rights over the property did not
extinguish Pagsibigan's civil liability.
ISSUES: 1. WON the petitioner has a civil liability in the respondents?
2. WON Attorney’s fee will be waived?
RULINGS: 1. Yes, At the very least, appellant's obligation to return the money
to Cabasal is sourced from Quasi-contract, particularly solutio
indebiti, viz:
Art. 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demnd it,
and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return
arises.
Art. 2159. Whoever in bad faith accepts an undue payment shall pay
legal interest if a sum of money is involved, or shall be liable for fruits
received or which should have been received if the thing produces
fruits.
2. The award of attorney's fees lies within the discretion of the
court and depends upon the circumstances of each case.
However, the discretion of the court to award attorney's
fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines demands factual, legal and equitable
justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a
premise and improperly left to speculation and conjecture. It
becomes a violation of the proscription against the imposition of
a penalty on the right to litigate (Universal Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 188 SCRA 170 [1990]). The
reason for the award must be stated in the text of the
court's decision. If it is stated only in the dispositive portion
of the decision, the same shall be disallowed. As to the
award of attorney's fees being an exception rather than the
rule, it is necessary for the court to make findings of fact
and law that would bring the case within the exception and
justify the grant of the award (Refractories Corporation of the
Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 176 SCRA 539
[1989]).
In the instant case, the lower courts totally failed to justify the
award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. There was
no factual or legal justification stated in the texts of the lower
courts' decisions. The RTC merely stated in the dispositive
portion of its 26 February 2002 Decision that, "Accused is also
ordered to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00 to
complainant and costs of suit.
FALLO WHEREFORE, we GRANT in part the petition.
We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the 30 January 2004 Decision and 26 May
2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76291. The award
of P20,000 attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is DELETED.