FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 163868. June 4, 2009.]

ROMUALDO PAGSIBIGAN , petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and ELEAZAR CABASAL, respondents.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J : p

The Case
This is a petition 1 for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
petition challenges the 30 January 2004 Decision 2 and 26 May 2004
Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76291. The Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the 26 February 2002 Decision 4 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region 3, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal
Case No. 1149-M-2000.
The Facts
On 29 November 1982, Elizabeth Hinal (Hinal) and the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) entered into a deed 5 of conditional sale
over a piece of property located at 1399 Kadena de Amor Street, Alido
Heights Subdivision, Malolos, Bulacan. Under the deed, GSIS sold the
property to Hinal payable in 25 years.
Eleazar M. Cabasal (Cabasal) was a depositor, while Romualdo A.
Pagsibigan (Pagsibigan) was the manager, of the Rural Bank of Guiguinto,
Bulacan (Rural Bank). Aside from being the manager of the Rural Bank,
Pagsibigan acted as a real estate agent, usually to bank depositors. A certain
Liza Geronimo informed Cabasal that there was a property for sale which he
might like. Cabasal approached Pagsibigan and, in 1991, Pagsibigan offered
for sale Hinal's property to Cabasal for P215,000 plus assumption of the
outstanding obligation with GSIS. Cabasal agreed to buy the property. In a
receipt 6 dated 30 January 1992, Pagsibigan acknowledged receipt of
P215,000 from Cabasal. Cabasal occupied the property and spent P400,000
on renovation.
In 1992, Cabasal received from GSIS a notice directing Hinal to settle
her outstanding obligation of P535,000. Alarmed, Cabasal referred the
matter to Pagsibigan. Pagsibigan accompanied Cabasal to the house of Hinal
and asked Hinal to sign a deed of sale and transfer of rights over the
property in favor of Cabasal. Hinal refused to sign the deed because she did
not (1) sell the property, (2) authorize Pagsibigan to sell the property, and (3)
receive P215,000. Pagsibigan assured Cabasal that he would settle the
problem.
In 1999, Cabasal received another notice 7 from GSIS directing Hinal to
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 settle her outstanding obligation of P752,157.10, otherwise the deed of
conditional sale would be cancelled. Cabasal referred the matter to a certain
Atty. Reyes. Upon the advice of Atty. Reyes, Cabasal made an initial
payment of P50,000 to GSIS to forestall the cancellation of the deed of
conditional sale.
Atty. Reyes sent a demand letter to Pagsibigan asking him to return
Cabasal's P215,000. Because Pagsibigan failed to return the money, Atty.
Reyes initiated a criminal case against him. In an Information 8 dated 3 April
2000, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfredo L. Geronimo charged
Pagsibigan with estafa. Pagsibigan pleaded not guilty. cSHATC

The RTC's Ruling

In its 26 February 2002 Decision, the RTC did not find Pagsibigan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of estafa. However, the RTC ordered Pagsibigan to
pay Cabasal P215,000 civil liability, P20,000 attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation. The RTC held that:
In the prosecution for estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, it is indispensable that the element of deceit,
consisting in the false statement or fraudulent representation of the
accused, be made prior to, or, at least simultaneously with, the
delivery of the thing by complainant, it being essential that such false
statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or
the only motive which induces the complainant to part with the thing. If
there be no such prior or simultaneous false statement or fraudulent
representation, any subsequent act of the accused, cannot serve as a
basis for prosecution for that class of estafa. (People vs. Gines, et al.,
C.A. 61 O.G. 1365).

In this case it was complainant who approached accused

Pagsibigan with respect to the sale of the subject property and he had
known that accused was involved in realty sale, through a certain Liza
Geronimo. In fact Liza Geronimo had informed him that "there was a
house open for sale" which would meet his qualifications, and he was
told to see Mr. Pagsibigan. (TSN dated January 18, 2001, Cabasal on
Direct, p. 6).

As testified to by complainant, the lot was offered for sale by

accused Pagsibigan but there is no evidence that accused Pagsibigan
made false statement or fraudulent representation that he is the owner
of the property or that he had the power to transfer such property to
complainant, convincing enough to induce complainant to part with his
P215,000.00.

When accused had made a reputation with respect to realty sale,

it shows that he was good at it and that he could be relied upon,
otherwise Liza Geronimo would not have referred complainant Cabasal
to him. Evidence also shows that accused Pagsibigan tried to transfer
the property to complainant Cabasal. Moreover, had the accused from
the very beginning conceived an evil plan to deceive complainant he
would no longer inform complainant about the status of the subject
property with the GSIS.

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 "In the absence of proof that the representation of the
accused was actually false, criminal intent to deceive cannot be
inferred" (People vs. Urpiano, C.A., 60 O.G. 6009, citing the ruling
in the cases of People vs. Lagasca, G.R. No. 4230-R, June 5,
1960, and U.S. vs. Adriatico, 7 Phil. 187. [sic]

However, the evidence presented shows that accused

Pagsibigan received the amount of P215,000.00 from
complainant Cabasal and he failed to return or pay the same,
upon receipt of the demand letter. Hence, though the accused
is not criminally liable, he is under obligation to return the
same to complainant Cabasal, with legal interest from the time
of demand to pay the same.

"An acquittal based on reasonable doubt that the accused

committed the crime charged does not necessarily exempt him
from civil liability where a mere preponderance of evidence is
required." (Manahan, Jr., vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 202)

However, the other expenses incurred by complainant in

repairing the house same [sic] as well as the amount of P50,000.00 he
remitted to the GSIS same [sic] cannot be recovered from the accused,
since those are considered useful expenses for the convenience of the
complainant.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution evidence

having failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, his acquittal of the offense charged is hereby rendered.

However, the prosecution having proven with clear and

convincing evidence that accused received the amount of
P215,000.00 from complainant Cabasal and had not paid the
same, he is therefore adjudge [sic] civilly liable to pay such
amount to complainant with legal interest from the time of demand
up to full payment of the same to complainant.

Accused is also ordered to pay attorney's fees in the

amount of P20,000.00 to complainant and costs of this suit. 9
(Emphasis supplied)

Aggrieved, Pagsibigan appealed to the Court of Appeals. In his

memorandum 10 dated 1 August 2001, he claimed that the RTC erred in
finding him civilly liable for P215,000 and in ordering him to pay P20,000
attorney's fees. Pagsibigan claimed that he was not civilly liable because
Hinal transferred her rights over the property to Cabasal. acCETD

The Court of Appeals' Ruling

In its 30 January 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto
the 26 February 2002 Decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals held that
there was sufficient evidence to show that Pagsibigan was civilly liable and
that the transfer of rights over the property did not extinguish Pagsibigan's
civil liability. The Court of Appeals held that:
Contrary to the protestations of appellant, evidence adduced
by the prosecution is preponderant enough to sustain his civil
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 liability. As a matter of fact, on the strength of the affidavit of
Elizabeth Hinal alone, who is the registered owner of the
property in question, ample evidence is provided to prove the
civil liability of the appellant. In this affidavit, Hinal declared
the she never authorized appellant to sell her property nor did
she receive the amount of Php215,000.00 which is the alleged
consideration of the sale. From this declaration alone, it is
clear already that appellant received the amount of
Php215,000.00 from Cabasal on account of his
misrepresentation that he has the authority to sell the house
and lot of Hinal, when in fact there is no such authority. At the
very least, appellant's obligation to return the money to Cabasal is
sourced from Quasi-contract, particularly solutio indebiti, viz.:

Art. 2154. If something is received when there is no

right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake,
the obligation to return arises.
Art. 2159. Whoever in bad faith accepts an undue
payment shall pay legal interest if a sum of money is involved, or
shall be liable for fruits received or which should have been
received if the thing produces fruits.

xxx xxx xxx

Neither had the execution of the Deed of Transfer of
Rights between Hinal and Cabasal extinguished the civil
liability of appellant. It should be noted that Hinal declared in
open court that she did not receive any consideration for
executing the Deed of Transfer of Rights to Cabasal. Thus:
Q So you said the transfer to Cabasal was for a consideration?

A None, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q Are you aware that Mr. Pagsibigan sold your house and lot?
A No, sir.

Q You have not received any consideration for this sale?

A No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q This house and lot was transferred to Mr. Cabasal because

"naawa rin ako sa kanila dahil matagal na silang nakatira doon".

A Yes, sir.
Q And you are not claiming any consideration from Cabasal when
you executed the transfer of right?
A Yes, sir.
Thus, even if there had been a transfer of the right over the
property from Hinal to Cabasal, the amount of Php215,000.00 which
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 was given to appellant was never the consideration of the said transfer
but the sympathy of Hinal to Cabasal. In all probability, it is not far-
fetch [sic] that Hinal will later on demand from Cabasal the payment of
the consideration for the transfer of her right, perhaps, when the latter
had already collected from appellant. 11 (Emphasis supplied)

Pagsibigan filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 26 May 2004

Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, the instant petition. Pagsibigan claims that (1) he did not
receive P215,000 from Cabasal, and (2) the lower courts erred in ordering
him to pay P20,000 attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover
only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law
exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A
question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. 12
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being
resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The
issue to be resolved must be limited to determining what the law is on a
certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a review of the evidence, the
question posed is one of fact. 13 In Paterno v. Paterno, 14 the Court held that:
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be
accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious,
or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and
convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are
without doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs
presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary
evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear
and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one
side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as
to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not
inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to
justify refusing to give said proofs weight — all these are issues of fact.
Questions like these are not reviewable by this Court which, as a rule,
confines its review of cases decided by the Court of Appeals only to
questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth.

Whether Pagsibigan received P215,000 from Cabasal is a question of

fact. It can only be resolved after reviewing the probative value of the
evidence. Thus, it is not reviewable. aSTAHD

The factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding on the Court. The exceptions to this rule are (1)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded
on speculations; (3) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4)
when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension
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 of facts; (5) when the factual findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to
the admissions of the parties; (7) when the Court of Appeals overlooked
undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; (8) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (9) when the facts set forth by the petitioner are not
disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by
the evidence on record. 15 After a careful review of the records, the Court
finds that none of these circumstances is present.
The award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must have
factual and legal justification, which must be stated in the body of the
decision. Otherwise, the award is disallowed. In Consolidated Bank & Trust
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 16 the Court held that:
The award of attorney's fees lies within the discretion of the court
and depends upon the circumstances of each case. However, the
discretion of the court to award attorney's fees under Article
2208 of the Civil Code of the Philippines demands factual, legal and
equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion
without a premise and improperly left to speculation and conjecture. It
becomes a violation of the proscription against the imposition of a
penalty on the right to litigate (Universal Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 188 SCRA 170 [1990]). The reason for
the award must be stated in the text of the court's decision. If
it is stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the
same shall be disallowed. As to the award of attorney's fees
being an exception rather than the rule, it is necessary for the
court to make findings of fact and law that would bring the
case within the exception and justify the grant of the award
(Refractories Corporation of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 176 SCRA 539 [1989]).
In the instant case, the lower courts totally failed to justify the award of
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. There was no factual or legal
justification stated in the texts of the lower courts' decisions. The RTC
merely stated in the dispositive portion of its 26 February 2002 Decision
that, "Accused is also ordered to pay attorney's fees in the amount of
P20,000.00 to complainant and costs of suit". Thus, the award is disallowed.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT in part the petition. We AFFIRMwith
MODIFICATION the 30 January 2004 Decision and 26 May 2004 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76291. The award of P20,000
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Corona, Leonardo-de Castro and Bersamin, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

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 1. Rollo, pp. 14-54.
2. Id. at 55-61. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, with Associate
Justices Mariano C. del Castillo and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente, concurring.

3. Id. at 63.
4. Id. at 65-68. Penned by Judge Thelma R. Piñero-Cruz.
5. Id. at 76-77.
6. Records, p. 6.
7. Id. at 13-14.
8. Id. at 1-2.
9. Rollo, pp. 67-68.
10. CA rollo, pp. 33-66.
11. Rollo, pp. 59-61.
12. Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp, Inc., 481 Phil. 550, 561 (2004).
13. Id.
14. G.R. No. 63680, 23 March 1990, 183 SCRA 630, 636-637.
15. Ilagan-Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 171374, 8 April 2008, 550
SCRA 635, 647.
16. 316 Phil. 246, 260 (1995). cEAaIS

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