Session 1

1.​ What is Comparative Politics?

Comparative politics is a subfield of political science (CGG). Political science is divided by

international relations, political theory (normative: how things should be) and comparative
politics, whose main goal is empirical: describe, explain and predict similarities and
differences across political systems (Caramani).

Three definitions of comparative politics:

1.​ The study of political phenomena in every country except the one in which the
student resides. Doesn’t make sense, problematic when you move residence
2.​ The study of political phenomena through the comparative method. Not specific
3.​ The study of political phenomena that are predominantly within country​
(region) relationships.

CP is oriented to studying a problem and finding a solution, it is strategic and scientific,

and uses methodological rigor. It doesn’t ignore external influences or internal structure,
but its ultimate concern is power configurations within sovereign systems. It defends a
positive position (vs. normative), theoretical pluralism, eclecticism and multidisciplinary. Uses
quantitative methods and it is an aggregate and individual-level evidence.

* Important to distinguish between international relations (between nations) and comparative

politics (within nations). Conflict is for both (civil or interstate wars).

Politics is the human activity of making public and authoritative decisions, the activity of
acquiring, maintaining and exercising the power of making such decisions and the
competition of power and its use. First, they are ​public because they concern the whole
society. Second, they are authoritative because the government that makes such decisions
is invested with the authority (and legitimacy) to make them binding and compulsory,
meaning that they are supported by the possibility to sanction individuals that don’t comply
with them.

Comparative politics uses the scientific method, which involves bold conjectures and
rigorous attempts at refutation: risky guesses, propositions, hypotheses and empirically
falsifiable and testable through observational or experimental data. The method must allow a
valid inference to be drawn, regardless of who does the work.

We should not talk about:

 -​ Tautology: a statement that cannot be refuted (in instance the definition of
something as by definition it is true)
-​ Non-observable statement: God exists.

The elements that are compared can be:

-​ Supra-national units: (international organizations, trade agreements)

-​ National political systems (the political system in UK)
-​ Sub-national regional political systems (US federal states, Spanish regions)
-​ Single elements or components of the political system (electoral laws, structure of
parliaments, wage-bargaining institutions)
-​ National actors (parties, media)

The evolution of CP:

Before WWII, traditional CP consisted mainly of an analysis of states and their formal
institutions. Between the late 1920s and the 1960s, the behavioral revolution took place.
This was due to three main causes:

-​ Stable democracies were not based on the Anglo-Saxon type (Netherlands,

Switzerland,...)
-​ It surged a new focus beyond the West world, with new categories and concepts.
-​ Many democracies gave way to other kinds of regimes (communism, fascist
dictatorship, …)

The consequences were:

-​ An increase in the variety of political systems

-​ The incorporation of the observance of non-formal institutions like parties and social
movements.
-​ The introduction of a new methodology based on more empirical data
-​ A “new language” imported from systemic functionalism.

There have however been some changes in CP over the last 30 years:

-​ A shift of substantial focus: state and institutions

-​ Less ambitious theories and narrowing of the geographical scope
-​ A change of methodology: rise of case-oriented analysis (small-N)
-​ A theoretical turn with Rational Choice Theory: each country wants to maximize its
economics interest.

Session 2 & 3
 1.​ Research and scientific methods

Comparative Politics is not about comparing, it is about testing hypotheses across

contexts (countries, historical periods, etc.). Hence comparative research is testing general
hypotheses under different conditions. The scientific method involves bold conjectures
and rigorous attempts at refutation: risky guesses, propositions, hypotheses & empirically
falsifiable and testable through observational or experimental data. Two previous decisions
are the type of units (regions, countries, supra-national) and the number of units (one/few
cases, large-N) being used. Furthermore, in order to conduct research, we must pay
attention to two questions: how many countries/units of study we are considering (sampling)
and which ones.

Theory comes before method and is expressed in its simplest form as the relationship
between dependent (Y) and independent (X) variables. Therefore the research method
follows the research question in order to find the research answer.

The research answers are (tentative) hypotheses that are interpreted by means of
descriptive inference on the basis of comparative evidence, possibly allowing for causal
interpretation.

The aim of social sciences is to find the causal connections between the variables that
account for the phenomena we observe.
A variable is any property of an entity that can take at least two different values. It can be
dependent or independent. A dependent variable is affected by some factors that can make
it change. An independent variable may vary without considering other factors but is
accountable for the variation of the dependent variable.

Internal vs External validity:

-​ Internal validity: degree to which descriptive or causal inferences from a given set of
cases are indeed correct for most, if not all, the cases under inspection. (Cómo de
fiables y apropiados son los métodos/preguntas usad@s, por ejemplo, en los
“survey” y las entrevistas)
-​ External validity: extent to which the results of the comparative research are also
relevant for other cases that are not included in the research

●​ Cases: It denotes the units of observation to be compared, such as countries. To

clarify, case is any type of system included in the analysis.

Case selection according to Caramani’s Chapter 3:

-​ Intensive strategies: many variables and few cases
-​ Extensive strategies: few variables and many cases

- The single case study: It is at best comparative and its external validity is low or
absent
- Closed universe: Concerns the few cases for comparison at different points of time,
taking into account change by defining periodical intervals based on external events. For
example the interwar period in Europe in which democracies in some countries turned into
dictatorships while others resisted.
- Cross-section: Several cases are compared simultaneously. It bases itself in a
selection of those cases that resemble each other more and they differ from each other and
thereby reduce variance caused by other variables. It implies that the circumstances of the
cases under review are assumed to be constant whereas the included variables do vary.
- Pooled analysis: Is mainly used in sophisticated quantitative approaches and it
requires skills in statistical methods at a more advanced level. The main point of this section
is that case selection isn't only important for how many cases can or should be included in
the analysis, but also that the choice is neither free nor determined. The choice of the
cases depends on the theoretical relationship that defines which type of political
system can be selected.

Experimental variance can exist:

- Error variance: The occurrence of random effects of unmeasured variables. These
effects are almost impossible to avoid in social science. Yet, error variance should be
minimized for instance, increasing the number of cases.
- Extraneous variance: Controlling for extraneous variance. There's no best remedy to
prevent extraneous variance exercising an influence other than by having formulated a fully
specified theory or statistical significance tests and control variables. The best way is to
apply the principles of the Methods of Agreement and Difference.

CASE STUDY:
It is “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of
similar units”. Their goals are exploratory (theory-building, the idea that a case study can
help us create a theory) or confirmatory (conduct the research and at the end of it, focus on
one particular case and try to see if what happens at a larger view happens at a smaller
one).

Their potential advantages are:

​ - Quantitative approaches, through maximizing generalizability, lose contextual

knowledge, rely upon statistical techniques sometimes unsuited to political
science/data research questions (errors at operationalizing) and underestimate
statistical uncertainty and error.
​ - Case studies are valuable because of within-case causal chains, process tracing
and path-dependent relationships for generating theories, hypotheses and concepts.
​ - They present a distinct approach not reduced to statistical methods. They may not​
be quantitative, but qualitative.

Their limitations are also many:

​ - Bias in selection and omitted variables. For example, to select a country that does
not represent the sample of countries you want to study in-depth.
​ - Bias in selecting the dependent variable: if we were only focusing on one case, we
would miss info.
​ - Too few cases reduce scientific testing; lack of capacity to make scientific
inferences and estimate error; lack of degrees of freedom (over-determination: “Too
 few cases/too many variables” problem, the number of variables is greater than the
number of cases).

ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
Generate further theoretical hypotheses for Limited generalizability and theory testing
research

Depth, especially good to understand Selection bias

longitudinal processes

Post-hoc validation Over-determination

Analyze deviant cases/outliers (cases that don’t Demand extensive fieldwork (high cost and physical
follow the general pattern) security), language skills and immersion (knowledge
about the culture, norms and values of the country)

Small-N Comparisons / Few Nations Comparison:

They have a medium number of cases. For example, Europe, South America, etc. They
usually combine the best of the case studies and large-N comparisons.

ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES

Combine both depth of knowledge of one case Limited theoretical generalizations

study and the breadth generalizations of outside of cases/area/region. Cannot be
large-N comparisons applicable to all the nations

Build middle-level theories, so they are Can still generate too many independent
applicable to a few nations but not the whole variables and too few cases (intensive
world strategy)

Identify variations within the same regional Higher demand for fieldwork and
area language skills (Language constraint)

How are the countries chosen/selected?

Large-N Comparison / Many Nations Comparison:

The large-N studies take into account multiple countries worldwide for global perspective.
There are two main types: cross-sectional (across units at one single point in time, f.e: at
one point in time, say 2020) or cross-sectional time-series (pooled time-series: different
countries across time, f.e: Country A & B at times “1” & “2”). Data can be observational and
experimental.
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
 Comprehensive generalizations/high external Lack of insights into ‘black-box’ political
validity​ processes
External validity: the results of an exercise can
be extrapolated to other settings. The sample
taken is representative.

Build and test general theories Too abstract and far removed from
context and processes

Develop scientific inference valid and accurate Concept stretching: the distortion that
occurs when a concept does not fit the
several cases. Making concepts lighter
because we want to apply them to a
bigger universe of cases

Identify outliers/deviant cases Valid cross-cultural measures?

Expansion in availability of statistical datasets Limited availability of data

(technological development)

Problem of conceptualization, meaning

that there is no agreement about terms
such as democracy

●​ Causes:
A cause is a necessary and/or sufficient condition. Saying that X is a necessary and
sufficient condition for Y implies that X is not substitutable. If X is true, Y is inevitably true,
and vice versa.

Necessary Condition: Circumstance in whose absence the event is question cannot occur:
-​ Y (effect) never happens unless X (cause) happens
-​ If Y exists, then X exists; if X does not exist, then Y does not exist.
-​ So, one can infer X (cause) from the presence of Y (effect)
-​ X may not always be enough for Y to occur. We can have X and not Y.
Sufficient Condition: Circumstance in whose presence the event in question must occur.
-​ Y (effect) always happens if X (cause) happens
-​ If X exists, then Y exists, and vice versa
-​ Cause (X) must always and invariably lead to effect Y, but the presence of Y does not
mean that X exists. Therefore, when Y is true, X is not necessarily, even if highly
probable, true.

Comparative Method - Mill

The systematic search for necessary, sufficient, and necessary and sufficient conditions has
come to be known as Mill’s methods, or the comparative method.
Mill proposed two main methods:
-​ Method of Agreement: when the cases agree on the phenomenon to be explained.
We have cases with identical values in the dependent variable and we look for an
independent variable that is common to all cases. There can be any interference in
this method.
-​ Method of Difference: when the cases differ on the phenomenon to be explained. We
have cases with different values in the dependent variable and we look for an
independent variable which matches this variation. It requires that the phenomenon
to be explained is present in one case, but not the other.
-​ To determine a sufficient condition we need to apply the Method of Difference.
-​ To determine a necessary condition we need to apply the Method of Agreement.
Mill’s comparative analysis are based on 4 assumptions:
1.​ Causal factors are independent of each other
2.​ Causal factors are deterministic, while most social researches are probabilistic​​
3.​ There is only one true causal path
4.​ All the relevant causes are examined. However, we are never sure whether we have
considered all the relevant causes. Apart from that, we normally have more
hypotheses (explanatory factors) than cases, so the explanation is over-determined.
What is a MSSD?
The Most Similar System Design (previously named as method of difference by Mill) wants
to find a sufficient condition.
“Systems as similar as possible with respect to as many features as possible constitute the
optimal samples for comparative inquiry”
Intersystemic similarities (control variables) and intersystemic differences (explanatory
variables) are the focus. The number of common characteristics sought is maximal and the
number of not shared characteristics sought is minimal. Then, for different outcomes, the
explanatory variable that is different is likely to be the cause.

Applications: Comparisons over time, comparisons across nations, comparisons across

areas, counterfactuals…

Weaknesses of MSSD:
-​ Heroic assumptions of the risk of over-determination = more inferences (variables)
than observations
-​ We generally treat the independent variables as something simple (yes/no, for
instance). The more complicated the operationalization is, the harder this method
becomes.
-​ Multiple causal factors and ​causal complexity​are hard or impossible to determine
-​ Deterministic causality = we come up with the idea that this variable is having an
automatic impact on the phenomenon. If you have the factor, you're going to have the
phenomenon. You don't accept errors in the sense of having cases that don't
perfectly fit your inference.
-​ Theories of ​limited applicability​? Problem of low external validity
-​ The problem of ​absence of random assignmen​t we can't never be sure that this
factor in consequence of something that has happened in a country

What is MDSD?
The Most Different System Design (previously named as method of agreement by Mill) has
to search for a common variable in cases with different characteristics.

●​ We have cases that are very different except for two things: the outcome to be
explained and the values of one independent variable.
●​ One variable that is the same in all of them. The key to this type of design is to
understand why very different cases have the same outcome (Y variable). The
search is then for a key explanatory variable in common to the cases that all appear
very different from each other.
●​ Starting point: variation of the observed behavior at a lower level than that of
systems.
●​ Initial assumption: systematic factors don't play any role in explaining the observed
behavior.
●​ It seeks to establish causality between two variables. The main independent and
dependent variables.
●​ We have to identify those independent variables, observed within systems, that are
equal across systems -> GOOD CANDIDATES FOR EXPLANATORY FACTORS.
●​ Systemic differences need to be taken into consideration if:
 ○​ The subgroups of the population from which they are drawn don't differ with
regard to the DV.
○​ The relationship between an independent and the dependent variable is the
same within the subgroups of the population.

Weaknesses of MDSD:

-​ As with the most similar system designs, we cannot use complicated variable
co-signs, multiplied causal factors are hard or impossible to determine, and external
validity is low.
-​ Deterministic causality
-​ Case selection on the dependent variable - without variation on the dependent
variable determining causality is extremely difficult.
-​ This method is more useful for ruling out “necessary” causes than for determining
causality.

2. Counterfactuals and Experiments:

The classical experimental design: “double blind” control group research design

​ - A large subject population is split randomly into two halves

​ - One half is given the “treatment”, the other half a placebo
​ - Nobody except the designers knows which is which
​ - Treatment and control groups are, ideally, identical in every respect except the​
treatment, though we never know this for sure, given unobservable variation​
between subjects.
​ - Following treatment, we observe if treated subjects are different in the predicted​
way from those in the control group
​ - If the difference is statistically significant, we draw the statistical and, from this,​
logical inference that the treatment “causes” this difference (only thing that differs
between groups).
Types of experimental methods:

Laboratory experiments:

Randomly split a group of subjects into 3 and run a voting game. Give everyone a red/blue
card representing their preference; there is a narrow majority for one color in each group.
Players win $20 if their candidate is elected, nothing otherwise, regardless of whether or not
they voted. There is a series of elections, in which voting costs 5$.​
Group A is told nothing, Group B is told the race is marginal, Group C is told there is a solid
majority for 1 color. Prediction: Group B has the highest turnout, Group C the lowest. The
issue concerns (external) validity, given the artificial nature of the laboratory setting.

Field experiments:

Aim to investigate whether “clientelistic” appeals (this is what I will do for you) by electoral
candidates are more effective than “public goods” appeals (this is what I will do for your
country). Non-marginal electoral districts were randomly assigned to two groups, those
where candidates would make clientelistic appeals and those where they would make public
good appeals. The results showed that candidates making clientelistic appeals did better,
especially incumbents.

“Natural”/”Quasi” experiments:

Very difficult to do pure experiments on politics.​

The best we can hope for are quasi-experiments: division of a region into two parts;
introduction of a new law (nothing else changes), with effects assessed before and after.
However, the law changes for a reason (hidden cause). Problem: endogeneity. These
experiments are rare, un-designed and product of pure happenstance.

To infer a causal relationship in experiment, we also use the MSSD, MDSD, methods of
agreement/difference…

Theories and causal inference:

How do we decide which things to hold equal, and which things might have an impact on
what we are trying to explain? We just can keep thinking about things as they occur to us
when we get out of bed in the morning… we need a well-specified theory of how electoral
systems operate. This theory involves a logical model of the world identifying key factors
that are expected to affect the working of, for example, electoral systems – that is the job of
a theory.

A good theory tells:

-​ What affects what — thus what to measure and why

-​ What factors are assumed to have no effect
-​ What to look for when we analyze the information we collect... “holding a, b and c​
constant, we expect increases in x to be associated with increases in y”.
 -​ Good statistical techniques then allow us to estimate how sharply y varies with a​
vary in x, holding a, b and c constant.

The theory also has assumptions restricting the set of countries to which it applies. Most
theoretical predictions are made ceteris paribus, but all things are never equal in the real
world. We can never completely reassure/assure ourselves we have not missed a crucial
causal factor.

Mixed Methods:
Logic of inferences is the same for qualitative and quantitative approaches, but styles of
analysis are different.
-​ Qualitative research uses thick description of a small number of cases, particular
events, decisions, institutions, location, regime, nation.
-​ Quantitative research uses numerical measurement, abstracting from particular to
testable generalizations, systematic patterns, emphasizes replicability and
regularities in classes/categories
-​ Yet, both use same logic – designed to make descriptive or explanatory inferences
about unobserved phenomenon on the basis of empirical information about the world

Session 4
Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy and Dictatorship

Historical and Normative approaches

We live in a world that generally agrees on the importance and desirability of democracy. But
it has not always been like that. ​The ancient Greeks were some of the first to start thinking
about the merits of different forms of regime.
Demokratia ​is the Greek word meaning ‘rule by the demos’- Although the Greek word
demos often gets translated as ‘the people’, it refers more specifically to the ​‘common
people’ - those people with little or no economic independence who are politically
uneducated. Many believed that the demos would pursue their own interests at the expense
of the commonweal.

Plato and Aristoteles were perhaps the ones who started thinking about different forms that
regimes could take. In The Republic, Plato says that political decision making should be
based on expertise, that only trained statesmen should guide the ship of state. He believed
that if it were ruled by a poor and uneducated mass who would be open to demagoguery it
would end up with democracy and people would quickly surrender to a tyrant.

Aristoteles disagreed with Plato. He stated that the government “must be in the hands of
one, or of a few or of the many”. He believed that regimes could come in good or bad forms.
Good if the rulers govern for the good of all, bad if the rulers govern only for the good of
themselves. Each of the good forms of regime could be corrupted. Democracy would be the
most dangerous form of regime because it is characterized by class rule, in which poor and
uneducated citizens govern for themselves rather than the commonweal, it could result in
class warfare. Democracy was not associated with elections.

Until the 18th century​, democracy was seen as a regime in which offices were distributed by
lot, while aristocratic regimes were chosen by elections. Democracy was viewed as ​obsolete
as it meant direct legislation, not representative government. ​Monarchy ​was consistently
preferred to democracy by political thinkers. This type of democracy was only possible in
city-states.

Things began to change in the Age of Revolution (1775-1848). People in the french and
american revolution had started to talk about representative government, not democracy.
Democracy became synonymous for representative government. But ‘democracy’ and
‘aristocracy’ came to designate the main lines of cleavage in the Age of Revolution.

The classical 3-way Aristotelic distinction between the one, the few, and the may was
gradually replaced by the 2-way distinction between ​democracy (many) and
autocracy/dictatorship (one or few). Nowadays, ​having constituted fewer than one in four of
world regimes in the 1950s and 1960s, democracies now count for almost 3 in 4.

Defining Democracy
The central notion underlying our contemporary concept of democracy is that the people
rather than some subset of the people should rule. We need secondly that these people
govern the country.
-​ State: it is an entity that used coercion and the threat of force to rule in a given
territory
 -​ Government: it is the set of people who run the state or have the authority to act on
behalf of the state at a particular point of time. Governments are the means through
which state power is exercised
-​ Regime: it is the set of rules, norms or institutions that determine how the
government is constituted, how it is organized and how major decisions are made. It
can be either democratic or dictatorial.
-​ Concept: Theories about the world are based on abstract concepts. A concept is a
mental category or construct that captures the meaning of objects, events, or ideas.
-​ Measure / Indicator: It is a quantification of the thing we are interested in, in this case
the concept of democracy. The process by which we translate a concept into a
measure is called operationalization. For instance, an indicator could be something
recognized by the constitution. The celebration of elections is not a good indicator of
democracy since we cannot be sure whether they are fair or not.

Substantial vs Prodecural

1.​ Substantive definitions of democracy deal with the ​goals and effectiveness
(outcomes​) of the regime. A democracy is a system that meets particular goals and
produces specific outcomes (justice, equality, truth, consensus and self-governance).
According to some people, a democracy would be a system that guarantees the
happiness of the population. (Happiness, economic growth, equality, trust in political
institutions...)
2.​ Procedural definitions of democracy focus on how the regime is organized and its
processes/institutions. A democracy is a system that uses some particular
rules/means. It focuses on the organization of the regime, without getting into what
these institutions produce in the terms of outcomes. We can difference between:
a.​ Maximalist Definition: Dahl was researching real world cases of democracy
but he found out that none of them produced the right outcome, so he argues
that there are no real democracies in the world. That is why we talk about
polyarchy, where there has to be a high level of inclusion and contestation.
For Dahl, modern democratic states can be understood in practice as
‘polyarchies’. Elections are not enough. His model
has two main factors.
i.​ Contestation: captures the extent to which
citizens are free to organize themselves into
competing blocs in order to press for the
policies and outcomes they desire.
ii.​ Inclusion: has to do with who gets to
participate in the democratic process.
iii.​ Examples: The Soviet Union had high levels
of inclusion and low levels of contestation, as
everyone could vote and participate but there was just one political
power. China has low levels of both as there is only one political party
and there are no elections above the municipal level. South Africa
under the apartheid and United States prior 1830 had multiparty
elections but low levels of inclusion as there was a segment of the
population who could not vote.
 b.​ Minimalist Definition: democracy is a system where there are free and fair
elections and competitive ones (alternatives) so the voters determine
government, that is the only thing we need (Schumpeter). Due to this there
may be an exclusion of other aspects (freedoms, rights...) and still be
considered a democracy. It is also called thin / populistic / popular /
participatory. As Schumpeter said on Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy,
for whom democracy was a mere method/procedure: “The democracy
method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive
struggle for the people’s vote”. So, there should only be (i) competitive, free
and fair elections and (ii) voters determine the government. So, he excludes
outcomes, rights, freedom, etc. and the term “competitive elections” is
confusing.
The procedural definitions are more common than the substantive ones, because it is easier
to reach a consensus about the democracy definition than about the outcomes of it.

Liberal vs Illiberal Democracy

-​ Since 1989, there has been an emergence of
illiberal democracy = popular democracy and
government “by” the people + limits and
restrictions on individual rights and freedoms.
-​ Also known as electoral democracies (or
delegation democracies)
-​ It is attached to an increase of populism
-​ This is the case of the transformation of a
former polyarchy into illiberal democracies. Ex;
Hungary, Poland, Boris Johnson and
Parliament Prorogation.
-​ Most countries tend to be liberal and democratic (a full democracy), or not liberal and
not democratic (a pure autocracy); the other combinations are relatively rare.

Competitive Authoritarianism Regime: Hybrid Regime (grey zone)

Competitive authoritarianism is a political system in which formal democratic institutions are
widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority.
Incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent that the regime fails to meet
conventional minimum standards for democracy. Competition is real but unfair. It is not a full
autocracy because they have elections.

For example, Mexico pre-2000, current Russia, Turkey... They are neither fully democratic
and nor fully authoritarian: they are a diminished form of authoritarianism.
Comparing Democracies

Democracy has developed in waves, with the “third wave” coming in 1974 and reaching
explosive proportions after 1989. Huntington’s 3 waves of democracy:
1.​ 1828-1922: from “Jacksonian Democracy” in the US to Benito Mussolini in Italy
2.​ 1943-1962: Italy, West Germany, Japan, Austria...
3.​ 1974: Greece, Spain, Portugal, Latin America, Africa, Asia..
“A wave of democratization is a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic
regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber
transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time”

Why do we have to compare democracies? What had once been a small and homogeneous
group of democratic regimes has become large and heterogeneous. It is important to study:
-​ Neo-institutionalism: views institutions as determinants of political outcomes.
-​ Institutional engineering (associated with the third wave): specially interested in
why some systems appear to perform better than others.
-​ Scholarly research focused on the quality rather than the quantity of democracy.
Criteria to classify democracies:
-​ Head of State -> Republic or Monarchy
-​ Horizontal division of powers -> Presidential (if republic), Parliamentary and semi
Presidential
-​ Vertical division of power -> Unitary or Federal
-​ Electoral systems -> proportional, representational or majoritarian systems.

Seminar Measures for Democracy

Democracy and Dictatorship Measure (DD)
It provides an annual measure of democracy and dictatorship for 199 countries from January
1, 1946 to December 31,2008. According to the DD measure, democracies are “regimes in
which governmental offices (Chief executive and legislature) are filled as a consequence of
contested elections.” It takes into account:
-​ Contestation from Dahl. Contestation occurs when there is an opposition that has
some chance of winning office as a consequence of election. Does not really focus
on inclusion as most countries already have universal suffrage so it would mean no
variation.
 -​ Competition from Schumpeter: policy programs are not pursuing common good but
leaders and parties’ interest. Individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a
competitive struggle for the people’s vote.
-​ It is based on a purely procedural, or minimalist view of democracy and dictatorship
(because the classification rules make no mention of the substantive outcomes
produced by different political regimes).
-​ It is dichotomous and not continuum. Meaning that it focuses on whether a country is
democratic or not, not on the degree of democracy.

A country is classified as a democracy only if all of the following conditions apply. If not, it is
measured as an autocracy/dictatorship.
1.​ The chief executive is elected
2.​ The legislature is elected
3.​ There is more than one party competing in the elections
4.​ An alternation in power under identical electoral rules has taken place
-​ Ex ante uncertainty: outcome of election is not known before it takes place
-​ Ex post irreversibility: the winner of the electoral context actually takes office
-​ Repeatability: elections occur at regular and known intervals

Polity IV
It is an annual measure of democracy and autocracy for 190 countries from 1800 to the
present. The democracy and autocracy scores for each both range from 0-10. The total
polity score is the democracy score - the autocracy score. So, it ranges from -10 (“ideal”
autocracy) to +10 (ideal democracy).​
In practice, three categories depending on the Polity score. Democracies range from +10 to
+6; anocracies or mixed/hybrid regimes from +5 to -5; and autocracies from -6 to -10

Polity IV follows Dahl in conceptualizing and measuring democracy along a continuum. Five
dimensions in which Polity Score is based:
1.​ Competitiveness of executive recruitment
2.​ Openness of executive recruitment
3.​ Executive constraints.
4.​ Regulation of political participation
5.​ Competitiveness of political participation

These dimensions capture Dahl’s contestation and inclusion dimensions. The new aspect is
the limited governments with the constraint of the executive. This is very Dahlian in several
aspects:
-​ Unlike DD, it measures democracy along a continuum
-​ Like DD, it provides a largely procedural measure
-​ Unlike DD, it captures both contestation and inclusion
-​ In fact, it actually adds one more dimension: limited government

Freedom House
It is an independent, nongovernmental organization that has provided an annual measure of
“global freedom” for countries around the world since 1972. The 2011 Freedom in the World
Survey covers 194 countries. Potential problem: This is not technically a measure of
democracy.

It is measured through two dimensions:

-​ Political Rights -> measured from 1 to 7 being 1 the highest level of freedom. It
covers 3 primary categories:
1.​ The electoral process
2.​ The political pluralism and participation
3.​ The functioning of the government
-​ Civil Rights -> measured also from 1 to 7. It covers 4 primary categories:
1.​ Freedom of expression and beliefs
2.​ Associational and organizational rights
3.​ Rule of law
4.​ Personal autonomy and individual rights
In practice:
-​ Free (democratic): 1-2.5
-​ Partly free (mixed): 3-5
-​ Not free (dictatorship): 5.5-7

Freedom House believes that although particular institutions are necessary for democracy,
they are not sufficient. As a result, it considers the substantive outcomes produced by
different political regimes. It is like Dahl’s model in the way that both take into account
contestation and inclusion and also because they use a continuum measure. However
Dahl's model does not take the substantive view/definition into account.

Comparing DD, Polity IV, and FH

The three different measures of democracy and dictatorship are highly correlated. This high
degree of correlation across the 3 measures is largely driven by uncontroversial cases.
Unfortunately, there is considerable disagreement among the measures when it comes to
classifying the mixed regimes. We can evaluate measures in different ways:
conceptualization, validity, reliability, replicability.

Conceptualization
It is the process of creating mental categories that capture the meaning of objects, events or
ideas.
-​ Minimalist view: democracy depends exclusively on the presence of certain​
institutions, with no reference to the kinds of outcomes that are generated (DD and​
Polity IV)
-​ Substantive view​: institutions are seen as necessary, but not sufficient, to​
characterize regimes. Representation, accountability, economic equality, rationality,
and so on (freedom house)
-​ The importance of the Research Question:
-​ Its appropriateness will depend on the researcher’s question. For example,
FH and democracy and economic inequality is a redundant reasoning: FH
already takes into account inequality.
 -​ Identifying causes:
-​ It is easier to identify causes with minimalist measures (FH, for example,
takes too many things into account). By being minimal, measures like DD are
better able to isolate the precise cause of phenomena.

Validity
It refers to the extent to which our measures correspond to the concepts that they are
intended to reflect. Several things are important for validity:
-​ Attributes: Scholars should try to avoid using too many attributes because this
reduces the usefulness of the measure.
-​ Aggregation issues/rules: Consider FH and Polity IV, is it appropriate to weight each
of the attributes equally?
-​ Measurement level:
-​ Nominal Measure: classifies observations into discrete categories. A country
is a democracy or dictatorship (DD)
-​ Ordinal Measure: allows us to rank order cases. A country is more or less
democratic than another country
-​ Interval Measure: allows us to say how much more or less democratic one
country is than another (Polity IV and Freedom House)

Reliability
It refers to the extent to which the measurement process repeatedly and consistently
produces the same score for a given case
-​ The DD measure e is highly reliable because it is based on “observable” variables
(not subjective judgements). Polity IV and FH’s surveys are sent to experts whose
opinion could differ.

Replicability
It refers to the ability of third-party scholars to reproduce the process through which a
measure is created (coding rules and disaggregated data).
-​ DD and Polity IV provide much more detailed and clear coding rules for constructing
their measures of regime type than FH does.

Session 5
Economic determinants of democracy and dictatorship
How does economic development influence the democratization process?
-​ Democratization is a transition from authoritarianism to democracy.
-​ This transition can be gradually
-​ There are many theories about democratization
-​ Democracy and dictatorship are the dependent variable
-​ Economic determinants are the independent variable

Classic Modernization Theory

According to Seymour M. Lipset, most economic explanations for
democracy can be linked to a paradigm called modernization
theory. Modernization theory argues that all societies pass through
the same historical stages of economic development. Although this
theory was originally developed by economists, it was later taken up
by political scientists.

Classic modernization theory predicts that as countries develop

economically, they are more likely to become and remain
democratic. A central implication is that we should see a strong
positive relationship between economic development and democracy.
“As (countries) develop, social structure becomes complex, labor
processes begin to require active cooperation of employees, and new
groups emerge and organize. As a result, the system can no longer
be effectively run by command: the society is too complex, technological change endows the
direct producers with some autonomy and private information, civil society emerges, and
dictatorial forms of control lose their effectiveness.” (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997)
The previous table is consistent with modernization theory: the more the GDP per capita, the
more democracies. But it does not explain what came first: wealth or democracy. The data is
consistent with two different stories linking income and democracy:
1.​ Classic Modernization Theory predicts that democracy is
more likely to emerge AND survive as countries develop and
become richer.
2.​ The survival story predicts that democracy is more likely to
survive as countries develop and become richer, but it is not
more likely to emerge.

Survival Story
-​ Suppose you are a rich person living in a democracy: Autocracy is a big gamble.
-​ Suppose you are a poor person living in a democracy: Autocracy is less of a gamble.

Survival Story vs Classic Modernization Theory

The survival story, as proposed by Przeworski, argues that higher income levels help
democracies survive but do not necessarily lead to their emergence. In a wealthy
democracy, autocracy is seen as a risky gamble because the stability of one's wealth
depends on being close to the dictator. In contrast, for poorer individuals, autocracy is less
risky as they have little to lose and may see it as a chance for economic improvement.
According to the survival story, income increases the likelihood of democratic survival but
does not affect the probability of a transition to democracy. Modernization theory, on the
other hand, suggests that both the emergence and stability of democracies are positively
correlated with income. While higher income stabilizes democracies, it does not have the
same effect on dictatorships.

How does foreign aid influence the democratization

process?​
According to the modernization theory, we should fund
democracies and dictatorships that are poor. If you help poor
democracies to become richer, the probability of becoming
dictatorships decreases. We also want poor dictatorships to
become richer, so that the probability of becoming democracies
increases.
According to the survival story, we should fund poor democracies. We increase the income
and decrease the probability of democracy to become a dictatorship.

Similarities
1.​ Democracies are more common in rich countries than in poor countries.
2.​ Transitions to dictatorship become less likely as income increases

Differences
-​ Modernization theory
-​ Transition to democracy becomes more likely as income increases
-​ Regime transitions may or may not become less likely as countries become
richer
-​ Survival theory
-​ Transitions to democracy are unaffected by increases in income
-​ Regime transitions become less likely as countries become richer

Implications
As predicted by both stories, democracies are more common in rich
countries than in poor countries. Income has relatively little effect on
the probability of a regime transition.

Examining the effect of increased income on

transitions to democracy and transitions to dictatorship separately, it is
found that the kind of transition a country experiences is a function of
income.

Additional income appears to increase both the emergence and

survival of democracy, as predicted by classic modernization theory.
Even though the former (emergence) to a lesser extent that the latter
(survival).
How do natural resources influence the democratization process?
A huge exception to the previous explanation are countries in the MENA
region that have great natural resources (oil) and, thus, great GDP per
capita but are dictatorships. So, how do natural resources influence the
democratization process? Why does oil hinder democracy?

According to the natural resources curse, countries that depend on revenue from natural
resources, such as oil, diamonds and minerals, will find it difficult to democratize. They are
also more prone to corruption, poor governance and civil war. The Natural Resources curse
is about the emergence, not the survival, of democracy.
Aid optimists​think that foreign aid can spur democratization efforts
-​ Foreign aid helps democratization efforts only if: (i) the recipient country is
dependent on foreign aid, (ii) the aid donor wants to promote democratic reforms and
(iii) the aid donor can credibly threaten to withdraw the aid if its demands for reform
are not met.
Aid pessimists​think that foreign aid has a negative effect on democratization reforms
-​ Foreign aid can hurt democratization efforts. By freeing governments from the
need to raise taxes and providing them with access to “slack resources” that can be
strategically used to reward supporters and co-opt opposition groups, foreign aid
increases the autonomy of recipient governments from the demands of their citizens.

There are two types of explanations: demand-side and supply-side.

1.​ Demand side explanations

They emphasize how resource revenues reduce both the citizens’ demand for democratic
reform and government responsiveness to that demand.

Resource revenues mean that taxes are low and governments are autonomous from citizen
demands. People are less likely to demand democracy since dictators offer more ambitious
social services, low taxes... These make the population happier and they want to remain in a
dictatorship.

2.​ Supply side explanation

They focus on how resource revenues enable dictators to resist pressure to democratize and
help them to consolidate their hold on power.
Resource revenues can be distributed as patronage to preempt or coopt opposition groups
(paying them, offering them positions...), or used to repress them.
Two variants of Modernization Theory
1.​ The importance of credible exit threats
It was first enunciated by Barrington Moore (1966): “No bourgeoisie, no democracy”.
Representative government is more likely to emerge and survive when the rulers of a
country depend on a segment of society consisting of a relatively large number of people
holding liquid or mobile assets. The key to this story is that the state must depend on a
group of people with credible exit threats.

Democracy comes when rising economic groups (middle class) compete for sharing political
power with entrenched elites. This variant of modernization theory states that it is not income
per se that encourages democratization, but rather the changes in the socioeconomic
structure that accompany wealth in the modernization process.

The English monarchy in early modern Europe accepted limits on its predatory behavior
because it depended on elites with credible exit threats (mobile assets). The French
monarchy in early modern Europe did not accept limits on its predatory behavior because it
depended on elites who did not have credible exit threats (fixed assets).

According to modernization theory, all societies move through a series of stages.

Specifically, we see a shift from a focus on agriculture to a focus on manufacturing and
services. Some scholars have argued that these changes in early modern Europe played a
crucial role in the creation of representative government in England.

Why?
Structural changes in the economy produced a shift in economic power away from traditional
agricultural elites who controlled easily observable assets to a rising class of wool producers,
merchants, and financial intermediaries who controlled assets that were more difficult to
observe.

The key point is that the state can tax or predate on only those assets that they can
observe (or count).
The increased ability of the gentry to hide their assets from state predation changed the
balance of power between modernizing social groups and the traditional seats of power such
as the Crown. The Crown now had to negotiate with the new economic elites in order to
extract revenue. In return for paying their taxes, the economic elites demanded limits to state
predation. This resulted in the supremacy of Parliament over the Crown.
This is the explanation proposed by many scholars to explain the institutional reforms that
led to the establishment of modern parliamentary democracy in Britain during the Glorious
Revolution of 1688.

A credible commitment problem, or time-inconsistency problem, occurs when (a) an actor

who makes a promise today may have an incentive to renege on that promise in the future
and (b) power is in the hands of the actor who makes the promise and not in the hands of
those expected to benefit from the promise.
The establishment of a strong parliament is designed to solve the credible commitment
problem by keeping power in the hands of the recipient of the promise.
The Role of Economic Inequality (Carles Boix)
It's commonly argued that economic inequality undermines democracy. The possibility that
the poor would expropriate the rich through the ballot box makes democracy appear quite
costly to elites. The basic argument is that the emergence of democracy in unequal societies
is likely to produce political cleavages based on divisions of wealth and income (class) and
lead to significant pressures for economic redistribution from the rich to the poor. ​As a result,
they often step in to block attempts at democratization with right-wing coups.

Theoretical background: median voter theorem. Imagine a case in which there is a

democracy with only 2 parties, 10 people voting and in which the economic situation of
voters is the main element to explain their voting behavior. The bold party is the party of the
rich and is against redistribution; the italics party of the poor and is in favor of redistribution.

Democracy A is highly unequal, while democracy B is equal. In both, half of the population is
rich, so it's going to vote for the bold party, while half of the population is poor, so it's going to
vote for the italics party. So, the median voter will decide the result. In democracy A (high
Unequal), the medium voter is likely to be poor, so they are in favor of redistribution.
Therefore, elites will fear their wealth will be expropriated and will block any attempt to
democratize. In Democracy B, we don’t know whether the median voter will be rich or poor.
Probably the medium voter will be in the middle and will not care about redistribution.
Therefore, we won’t be able to predict what they will vote, and elites will be less fearsome of
redistribution.

Empirical evidence may be found in Center/South-America. But the empirical support for this
line of reasoning is not always very strong. Alternatively, economic elites do not need to
worry that the poor will expropriate them if they have credible exit threats. So, economic
inequality should only be bad for democratization in those countries where the economic
elites do not have credible exit threats. Recent evidence shows that land inequality is bad for
democracy, but that income inequality is not.

Worst situation for a democracy: combination of lack of exit assets and a high inequality.

Conclusion
There is considerable evidence to support the claim made by classic modernization theory
that ​countries are more likely to become democratic and remain democratic as their
economies become more “modern​.” Higher levels of income encourage both the emergence
and the survival of democracy. Changes in economic structure that accompany changes in
income also matter. We have shown that limited government in early modern Europe was
more likely to arise in polities in which the Crown was dependent on elites with mobile
assets. As we stated earlier, this argument can be generalized to account for the emergence
and survival of democracy in more contemporary periods. States that are more reliant on
fixed assets that generate quasi-rents support this claim. Statistical analyses, income and
economic growth continue to be important contributors to the emergence and survival of
democracy even after taking account of oil production.

Session 6

Cultural Determinants of democracy and dictatorship

Theories
Are certain cultures incompatible with democracy? Yes. Cultural theories support it.

Cultural arguments generally fall into two categories:

1.​ Primordialist arguments treat culture as something that's objective and inherited.
Something that has been fixed since primordial times. They consider culture cannot
be changed. Some countries will be condemned not to have a democracy forever,
since you cannot improve... (Muslim countries)
2.​ Constructivist arguments treat culture as something that's constructed or invented
rather than inherited. (Stuart Mill highlighted the role of education)
Public Policy Implications
The notion that political regimes such as democracy and dictatorship are more suited to
some cultures than others is not new (Montesquieu, Stuart Mill, etc.). But Mill also thought
that culture was malleable, this is, neither completely fixed nor completely changing.

Preliminary Concepts
There is considerable debate about the exact causal relationship between culture, economic
development and democracy. While the values story (Cultural Modernization Theory)
affirms economic development produces cultural change that leads to democratization; the
institutional story states economic development leads to democratization, which, in turn,
leads to cultural change.

Cultural Modernization Theory argues that socioeconomic development doesn't directly

cause democracy; instead, economic development produces certain cultural changes, such
as the emergence of a civic culture, and it is these cultural changes that ultimately produce
democratic reform.
According to the theory, if a country becomes more modern, people are going to change
their thoughts about democracy that are going to ultimately lead to democracy.

Problems:
-​ Does democracy require civic culture ?
-​ What's a civic culture? (Cultural transformations for a democracy)
-​ What exactly is it about culture that matters (what's the causal relationship between
cultural, economic and political factors)?
Before that we have to define political culture.

Political Culture
Political culture refers to all human activities that relate to a group’s or society’s prevailing
political beliefs, norms and values:
-​ Beliefs are understood here as what people think is factually right or wrong
-​ Norms are behavioral guidelines that are socially sanctioned
-​ Values mean what people think is morally good or bad

The psychological orientations of political culture are cognitive, affective and evolutional;
thinking and feeling. Political culture is “particular distribution of patterns of orientation
toward political objects among the members of a nation”

Political objects are elements of political culture (affected by / react to political culture)

1.​ Specific roles of structures(institutions and roles:PM, number of cabinets seats)

2.​ Incumbents of roles(Trump, Obama, Rajoy...).
3.​ Particular public policies, decisions or enforcement of decisions (redistributions,
barriers to immigration...).

Political/input process vs administrative/output process. This means, political culture shapes

decisions and institutions.

How to study political culture?

A scientific approach to studying political culture requires the reliance on systematic
evidence based on representative data. Main source of this: surveys (The World Values
Surveys, most valuable source to study political culture across countries). Comparative
politics researchers often confront problems when conducting surveys: Public Opinion
Courses.
​
Example of problems on survey: democratic legitimacy. “Democracy may have problems, but
it’s better than any form of government. Could you please tell me if you strongly agree,
agree, disagree or strongly disagree?”

To sum up, political culture is determined by how individuals think and feel about the
political system:
-​ Do individuals think they can influence political decisions?
 -​ Do individuals feel positive towards the political system?
-​ Do individuals believe other citizens are trustworthy?
-​ Do individuals prefer gradual or revolutionary social change?

The Civic Culture

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba wrote The Civic Culture in 1963. Their goal was to
identify the psychological attributes of a culture that sustains democracy.
​
Research design: comparison of two old democracies (UK and US), two then-young
democracies (Italy and Germany) and a developing nation (Mexico) using data from surveys.
Their theory was based on two concepts: civic competence (countries are going to differ in
how much people in the country know about politics, basically refers to cognition) and civic
allegiance.

1.​ Civic Competence

Citizens must be capable of evaluating what the governing parties have done and what the
opposition parties are proposing as alternatives to make reasonable choices in an election.

The description of modern mass publics as insufficiently competent has been frequent.
Invoking the information shortcuts*, scholars argue that the demands for voter
competence are more modest than critics of “insufficient voter sophistication” suggest.

What is important for people to make reasonable choices is to have ready access to reliable
heuristic cues* concerning, for example, whose group interests support a given proposal.
So, people vote based on preferred ideology.

* Shortcut criticism:​ we can take political decisions without having political knowledge
because we can research political summaries made by someone else for instance, a party
leader.

* “A heuristic cue is anything we encounter in our environment that leads us to use a

mental shortcut or “rule of thumb” when making a judgment or decision. These cues tend to
be based on experience or common sense and their use is meant to save time and reduce
demands for thinking, but they can lead to bias and stereotyping”

Another phenomenon that weakens the criticism of incompetent citizens in post-industrial

societies is what came to be know as “cognitive mobilization”, which happens when
sometimes you don't know the answer of a question about politics, but you have the skills in
order to take a decision: you don't have civic competence but cognitive mobilization.

People’s factual political knowledge might not have significantly increased in post-industrial
societies, but their skills in acquiring information and processing has certainly grown through
cognitive mobilization. This does not refer to the means by which we acquire information
but our capabilities to process it.
Civic Allegiance
As much as Almond and Verba emphasized civic competence, they also emphasized the
importance of civic allegiance.
In contrast to competence, allegiance is an affective mode of orientation. They introduce
”congruence”, arguing that in order to be stable, political institutions must be in accordance
with people’s legitimacy beliefs.
Democratic legitimacy: a democracy is going to last in a country if people in this country
feel well having democracy. Higher levels when people think it's the best system they could
have.

The emphasis on allegiance was strongly inspired by Easton’s concept of political support.
Democracy can cope with low levels of “specific” support for concrete policies of
particular actors, but it cannot cope with the absence of “diffuse” support for its basic
norms, principles and institutions.
Ex: Why did the Spanish democracy not collapse during the recent Economic Crisis?
Because the dissatisfaction was placed on specific political actors, not on the democracy
itself.

Anderson and Tverdova’s concept of “losers' consent” highlights a key factor in democratic
stability: how well election losers (those whose candidates or parties lost) accept the
outcomes of democratic processes. A stable democracy requires not only high overall
support, but also a small gap between the support levels of election winners and losers. If
this gap is too large, losers might lose faith in the system, which can lead to instability or
even challenges to the legitimacy of the democratic process.

Losers’ consent refers to how people who lose in elections continue to support the
democratic system, even when their preferred candidate or party doesn’t win.

In a democracy, both winners and losers tend to prefer different

political systems based on whether they expect to win or lose in
elections:

●​ Losers often prefer consensus or parliamentary systems

because these systems offer power-sharing, giving them
more influence even if they lose.
●​ Winners prefer majoritarian or presidential systems,
where the winner takes more control.

However, when the difference between winning and losing is

smaller (i.e., close elections), both winners and losers may prefer more balanced systems,
as they are less certain about future victories.

The ideal democratic citizen is usually seen as a person who takes part in elections and
other forms of elite-mandating participation that are necessary to make representation work.
The problem is that turnout rates have fallen over time, but not every hope has been lost.
Participation in demonstrations is increasing but remains low. Before, high civic competence
and civic allegiance meant high turnout, but not anymore.

Types of Political Culture

1.​ Parochial - traditional system of African tribes
2.​ Subject - centralized authoritarian systems
3.​ Participant (Civic?) - democracy (high levels of competence and allegiance). A
political culture that is predominantly participant, and in which you have some
reminiscences of parochial and subject.
Civic Culture
A civic culture is conceptualized as a shared cluster of attitudes that includes things like high
levels of interpersonal trust, a preference for gradual societal change, a high level of support
for the existing political system and high levels of life satisfaction (sometimes related by
some authors with high social capital).

A civic culture is thought to be conducive to the emergence and survival of democracy.

Economic & Cultural determinants together

There has been considerable debate about the exact causal relationship between culture,
economic development and democracy. Values Story vs. Institutional Story.

According to Robert Putnam, the existence of some particular cultural traits, is going to
explain why in society countries we have better and worse government performances. It's
not outcomes that explain cultures. Years later, Ronald Inglehart wrote The Silent Revolution
and Cultural Backlash (along with Poppa Norris). He emphasized 4 types of values, opposite
to each other 2 vs 2:

1.​ Traditional Values

a.​ Religion, traditional family roles, and deference to authority
b.​ National pride and rejection of divorce, euthanasia, suicide and abortion.
2.​ Secular-rational values
a.​ Less emphasis on religion, traditional family roles, and deference to authority
b.​ Cosmopolitan and more support for divorce, euthanasia, suicide and abortion
3.​ Survival values
a.​ Emphasis on physical and economic security
b.​ Ethnocentric worldview and low levels of interpersonal trust and tolerance
4.​ Self-expression values
a.​ Emphasis on gender, racial, and sexual equality; environmental protection;
tolerance of diversity, civic activism; and life satisfaction.
b.​ High levels of interpersonal trust and desire for a greater say in how political
and economic decisions are made.
Economic development produces predictable cultural changes that help the
democratization process. The industrialization phase sees countries moving away from
traditional values to secular-rational values. The post-industrialization phase sees
countries moving away from survival values to self-expression values.

Conclusions
Both the political-economy and the political-culture approach argue that modernization
works in favor of democracy, but their claims contradict each other.

1.​ The political-economy approach (TOP-DOWN) argues that modernization favors

democracy because it makes democracy more acceptable in the eyes of the elites.

2.​ The political-culture approach (BOTTOM-UP) argues that modernization favors

democracy because it confronts elites with more capable and ambitious mass
publics.

Democracy and Religion

Recent arguments linking culture and democracy have increasingly focused on religion.
Huntington (1993) The Clash of Civilizations.

Conflicts in the world will be cultural rather than ideological or economic. The fault lines
between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.

Civilizations: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin

American, African.

“Western values (individualism, liberalism, HR, equality) often have little resonance in
Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures”. The Western belief in
the universality of the West values and its insistence on imposing those values through
democratization efforts will only antagonize other civilizations and lead to conflict.

“Certain religions are incompatible with democracy: Islam and Confucianism countries
cannot sustain democracy; Catholic countries will find it hard to sustain democracy and
violent conflict will be particularly prevalent between Muslims and non-Muslims”.

However, nearly all religions have doctrinal elements that make them seem both compatible
and incompatible with democracy. THus, it becomes an empirical question as to whether
certain religions pose difficulties for the emergence and survival of democracy.

Considerable evidence that the stance of religions towards political institutions often
depends less on religious doctrine and more on the interests of religious leaders at the
time. The empirical reality is that all religions have historically been compatible with a
wide range of political institutions.

Emergence of democracy. Increased income makes democratic transitions more likely.

Increased economic growth makes democratic transitions less likely. Catholic countries are
more likely to become democratic. Having a Protestant/Muslim majority has no effect on
democratic transitions, neither have ethnic, religious and cultural diversity.

The Cultural Backlash Thesis

 1.​ Long-term rise of progressive and post-materialist values during the 1960s and
1970s in Western societies – the Silent Revolution (Inglehart)
2.​ Values shift: diverse forms of sexuality and fluid gender identities, LGBT rights,
same sex marriage, secularization, cosmopolitanism, openmindedness towards
diversity of lifestyles and peoples, support for international cooperation but skeptical
towards political institutions
3.​ Catalyzes a cultural backlash (retroceso) and authoritarian reflex among social
conservatives under threat
4.​ If so, authoritarian populist values and votes should be predicted by generation,
college education, urbanization, religiosity, race/ethnicity, and sex – as well as by
material values, socially-conservative attitudes and authoritarianism

Concept: what are authoritarian values?

-​ Security​: the importance of tribal protection against perceived risks of instability and
disorder
-​ Conventionalism​: hostility to outsiders threats to group norms -- racial/ethnic​
minorities, Islamophobia, misogyny, homophobia & anti-semitism
-​ Loyalty​: towards leaders protecting the tribe

Session 7
Types of democratic transitions
1.​ A bottom-up transition is one in which the people rise up to overthrow and
autocratic regime in a popular revolution
2.​ A top-down transition is one in which the dictatorial ruling elite introduces
liberalizing reforms that ultimately lead to a democratic transition

Bottom-up Transitions
A revolution should carry/follow these steps. (a) The appearance of contenders, or
coalitions of them, advancing exclusive alternative claims to the control over the
government currently exerted by the members of the polity.
(b) Commitment to those claims by a significant segment of the subject population
(specially when they are not simply acknowledged in principle, but activated in the face of
prohibitions or contrary directives from the government)
(c) Incapacity or unwillingness of the agents of the government to suppress the
alternative coalition and/or the commitment to its claims.
Examples: most post-communist transitions in Central and Eastern Europe, People Power
Revolution in the Philippines (1986), June Resistance in South Korea (1987), Orange
Revolution in Ukraine (2006), Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia (2011), Carnation Revolution in
Portugal (1974), Tiananmen Square in Beijing in (1989).
Questions to address are:
1.​ How can we explain these bottom-up transitions (A/B)?
2.​ Why are revolutions so rare (A) and hard to predict (B)?
3.​ Why do dictatorships seem so fragile after the revolution but so stable beforehand
(B)?

The answers are: A. Collective Action Theory and B. Tipping model.

Collective Action Theory

Collective action refers to the pursuit of some objective by groups of individuals. Typically,
the objective is some form of a public good. Theory developed by Olson (1965).

A public good is non-excludable and non-rivalrous (lighthouse, park, democracy)

-​ Non-excludability means that you cannot exclude people from enjoying the good
-​ Non-rivalry means that your consumption of the good does not hinder another
person’s consumption, this is, there is just as much public good for people to enjoy​
no matter how many people consume it.

So, public goods are quite desirable. You might expect that groups of individuals with
common interests would act collectively to achieve those interests. However, this is not the
case because of the free-rider problem.​
The collective action problem or free-rider problem refers to the fact that individual
members of a group often have little incentive to contribute to the provision of a public good
that will benefit all members of the group because there are no impediments for them to
enjoy it even if they do not contribute.

Example I
Imagine a group of N individuals. If K people participate, then the public good is provided.
The benefit/value of the public good to each individual is B. The cost of contribution or
participation is C. It is assumed that B > C. An individual is wondering if they should go to
the pro-democracy demonstration . The return will be B-C. 3 scenarios and 2 options.

The individual's decision to participate in the pro-democracy protest, or contribute to the

public good, is unlikely to be the decisive factor in determining the success of either. What
difference could one person make in a mass protest? This logic, however, applies to
everyone, suggesting two possible equilibria: either no one participates, or exactly K
individuals do. Therefore, “no participation” is an equilibrium, and “exactly K participants” is
also an equilibrium. Successful collective action depends on (a) the costs of
participation and (b) the size of the benefit at stake.

Collective actions, like protests or strikes, are less likely to succeed when K is significantly
smaller than the number of people who benefit from the success. The size of the group
matters because it influences how critical each individual feels to the action. If too few
participate, the protest is unlikely to succeed; if many do, individual contributions seem
negligible. Larger groups also face difficulties in monitoring and punishing free riders, making
smaller groups more effective at overcoming these problems.

An example illustrates this: suppose in a dictatorship, the protest's success depends on

exactly 100 participants. In this case, if 99 people are already mobilized, your participation
would be crucial in toppling the dictatorship. This scenario provides the only clear reason for
one to participate, as your action directly leads to success.

In contrast, if you receive a benefit B of $10 by not participating, but participation results in
10 - C (with C representing the cost of involvement), it's clear that not participating is more
rational, as the payoff without participation is higher. This incentivizes free-riding, especially
when K is smaller than N (the total group size), creating a significant difference between
those contributing and those benefitting. The larger the difference between K and N, the
greater the free-rider problem, making collective action harder to achieve.

For collective action to succeed, exactly K people must feel that they, and only they, are
essential to its success. Two crucial factors influence the outcome:

1.​ The difference between K and N: when K = N, free-riding incentives vanish; when K
< N, free-riding becomes tempting, especially if the difference is large.

2.​ The size of N: larger groups are harder to monitor, making it difficult to punish
non-participants, leading to the counterintuitive result that smaller groups can be
more powerful than larger ones. In very large groups, the likelihood of punishment for
non-participation is low, further reducing incentives to contribute.

This dynamic explains the stability of communism in Eastern Europe, where collective action
problems hindered opposition movements, even though many shared an interest in
overthrowing the regime. The public goods nature of democracy in East Germany, for
instance, led to widespread free-riding, as the costs of participation were prohibitive and the
collective action problem made opposition difficult to organize. Thus, while many desired
change, the incentives for collective action were not strong enough to overcome the
free-rider problem.

Tipping Models
Tipping (threshold) models provide an explanation for the mass protests that occurred in
Eastern Europe in 1989. There is a “long” intellectual history on this topic, but it was applied
to democratic transitions in EE by Tim Kuran (1991). Example of FaceBook parties.​
An individual must choose whether to publicly support or oppose the dictatorship. She has a
private and public preference regarding the dictatorship. However, in dictatorships,
preference falsification is quite often: since it is dangerous to reveal your opposition to
dictatorship, individuals who oppose the regime often falsify their preferences in public.​
There is often a protest size at which individuals are willing to publicly reveal their true
preferences. As protests become larger, it becomes harder for dictatorships to monitor and
punish each individual. A revolutionary threshold in the size of protest at which each
individual is willing to participate.​
Individuals naturally have different thresholds:
- People with low thresholds oppose the government irrespectively of others’ actions
- People with higher thresholds will protest only if lots of others do
- People with very high thresholds actually support the regime to some extent and​
are extremely unwilling to protest

The distribution of revolutionary thresholds is crucial in determining if a revolution occurs:

A revolutionary cascade happens when one person’s participation triggers the participation
of another, and so on. Similar distributions of revolutionary thresholds may lead to a
revolution in one setting but to a small, abortive and ultimately unsuccessful protest in
another.

The tipping model of revolutions highlights how structural factors like economic recessions or
repressive policies can shift private preferences and revolutionary thresholds against a
regime, even without directly producing a revolution. In many societies, the revolutionary
threshold of individuals is low, meaning that only a small push is needed to trigger a
revolutionary cascade. This phenomenon was evident during the Arab Spring in Morocco,
where "first movers" were often those with personal or familial experiences of repression.
Once these individuals mobilized, they were able to generate momentum, pushing others to
join and bringing the movement closer to a tipping point. However, due to preference
falsification, where individuals hide their true preferences for fear of reprisal, the exact
distribution of revolutionary thresholds remains unknown to both citizens and outsiders. This
means that a society can approach the brink of revolution without anyone realizing it.

Structural changes, such as those in Eastern Europe in the 1980s, can dramatically lower
revolutionary thresholds, triggering widespread cascades of participation. Key events, like
Gorbachev's reforms and the Soviet Union's declaration of non-intervention in Eastern
European affairs, combined with economic decline, lowered the cost of participation in
anti-communist movements. These shifts led to a revolutionary cascade that spread not just
within countries but across borders, resulting in the collapse of communist regimes. In
hindsight, the fall of communism seems inevitable due to the pent-up opposition to the
regime, but this overlooks the unpredictable nature of revolutionary dynamics. As Timur
Kuran notes, this creates a "predictability of unpredictability"—societies may be on the brink
of revolution without anyone realizing it.

Revolutions, therefore, are neither irrational nor entirely random. Instead, they often occur
when structural factors lower revolutionary thresholds to the point where collective action
becomes possible. The unpredictability of revolutions lies in the hidden nature of preference
falsification, where even regime supporters may falsify their allegiance under pressure, just
as pro-democracy supporters hide their true preferences under dictatorships. Once a
revolutionary cascade begins, it can create a snowball effect, where former regime
supporters join the pro-democracy movement, for example while Poland's transition took a
decade, it happened in just 10 weeks in East Germany and 10 days in Czechoslovakia. As
seen in Eastern Europe, these dynamics can make the eventual collapse of a regime appear
inevitable in hindsight, even if the timing and path of the revolution were unpredictable.

Top-down Transitions
A top-down transition is one in which the dictatorial ruling elite introduces liberalizing reforms
that ultimately lead to a democratic transition. A policy of liberalization entails a controlled
opening of the political space and might include the formation of political parties, holding
elections, writing a constitution, establishing a judiciary, opening a legislature, and so on.
Examples: Brazil and Chile in the 1980s, Poland in 1989, Spain…

The period of liberalization often results from a split in the supporters for the autocratic
regime between hard-liners and soft-liners. This split is often caused by declining
economic conditions or social unrest.

The liberalization process in authoritarian regimes is inherently unstable, as it often leads to

a dilemma for both the ruling elites and the democratic opposition. When soft-liners within
the regime initiate reforms, the opposition faces a choice: either accept the concessions and
integrate into a broadened dictatorship or use the new freedoms to further mobilize against
the regime. This creates a dangerous situation for soft-liners, who risk unleashing forces
they cannot control if the opposition opts for continued mobilization. In such cases, the
regime is left with two options: repression to restore order or acquiescing to democratic
demands, potentially leading to a full democratic transition. This tension was evident in
Poland in 1989, where economic crises and public unrest forced the regime to open up
politically, eventually leading to the unexpected victory of the opposition group Solidarity in
elections.

USSR Collapse in 1991. Mikhail Gorbachev 1985 implemented the Perestroika (economic
restructuring), a reforms policy aimed at liberalizing and regenerating the Soviet economy
and Glasnost, a reform policy aimed at increasing political openness.

Autocratic Transitions (Democratic deconsolidation / backsliding)

US democracy is in danger because (i) politicians treat rivals as enemies, (ii) rulers
intimidate the press, (iii) weakening of institutional buffers and (iv) states become
authoritarian.
Democracies die (i) with violent coups (Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Guatemala, Nigeria,
Turkey) or (ii) slowly at the hands of elected officials (Hitler, Chávez, …).

Democratic backsliding, particularly in established democracies like the United States, can
follow a similar trajectory. Lessons from other countries suggest that while constitutions
provide some protection, they are not enough to contain would-be autocrats. The real
safeguards lie in political parties, organized citizens, and unwritten democratic norms.
Warning signs of democratic erosion include the rejection of democratic rules, denial of the
legitimacy of political opponents, tolerance of violence, and curtailing civil liberties. The rise
of Donald Trump, who exhibits all four of these behaviors, underscores the fragility of
democratic institutions when gatekeeping mechanisms fail. Political parties, which once
filtered out extremists, have weakened their ability to do so through mechanisms like binding
primaries, allowing populist or authoritarian figures to rise within democratic systems.

To prevent democratic backsliding, successful democracies rely on widely respected norms

of mutual toleration and institutional forbearance. When these norms break down, as they
have in many democracies, institutions themselves can be weaponized by autocratic
leaders. The future of U.S. democracy, for example, remains uncertain. While a swift
democratic recovery seems unlikely, ongoing polarization could lead to a prolonged period of
instability. The experience of countries like Peru under Fujimori or historical cases such as
Hitler's Germany show that the combination of an authoritarian leader and a major crisis,
such as the COVID-19 pandemic, can quickly push even stable democracies toward
autocratic rule.

Session 8

The Economics Consequences of Type of Regime

Does regime type make a difference to material well-being?

Because of endogeneity concerns, the topic is important because it casts doubts on

political economy accounts of democratization.

Hypothesized causal path between democracy and economic growth

Democracy → rule of law → stable property rights → investment → growth

Why do democracies not produce higher economic growth?

​ - Property rights story (private investment by owners)
​ - Consumption vs. investment story (private investment by workers)
​ - Dictatorial autonomy story (public investment)

Property Rights Story

Democracy produces rule of law, and the consequence is that we have stable property
rights, and foreign and domestic investors are going to be more likely to invest in a
country. As a consequence, economic growth is increased.
-​ The empirical support for property rights is weak: although rule of law is linked with
economic growth, democracy is not associated with rule of law.
-​ Robert Barro writes that "the electoral rights index (democracy) has no predictive
content for the rule of law index" and, therefore, that encouraging democracy on the
grounds that it will lead to economic growth "sounds pleasant, but is simply false.“

Why might democracies fail to protect property rights?

Answer - Meltzer-Richard Model
The Meltzer-Richard model explains how tax policies and redistribution of wealth differ
between rich and poor in democratic and non-democratic societies. In this model,
everyone pays a portion of their income as a tax, tt, with wealthier individuals (those with
above-average incomes) contributing more in absolute terms than poorer individuals (net
contributors). The government then redistributes the total tax revenue equally among all
members of society.

Individuals with above-average incomes prefer low taxes, as they are net contributors, while
those with below-average incomes, who benefit from redistribution, prefer higher taxes. The
"median voter," representing the person whose income is in the middle of the distribution
(median income), has more interest in redistribution than someone whose income
reflects the average (mean income), as societies often have an income gap where the
richest hold a disproportionate amount of wealth (mean > median).

Democracies tend to represent a broader portion of society than dictatorships. In

dictatorships, tax policies often favor the wealthy, while in democracies, policies are
more likely to favor the poor. Therefore, a transition to democracy is expected to result in
higher taxes and greater redistribution from the rich to the poor. However, higher taxes in
democracies may reduce incentives for the rich to invest, potentially slowing economic
growth.

Two potential criticism of the Melzter-Richard Model

1.​ Poor people are less likely to vote, and so the tax rate in a democracy may not be
that much higher than it would be in a dictatorship
2.​ The structural dependence of the state on capital suggests that capitalists have a
veto over state policies in that their failure to invest at adequate levels can create
major problems for state managers. (high redistribution - political parties will lose the
support of the capitalists, the ones with the means to invest).

Consumption vs Investment Story

The poor cannot afford to direct their assets away from immediate consumption – they
need to eat and pay their rent today. Since workers get to vote in democracies, they
encourage government policy to redistribute assets away from investment towards
consumption.​
If dictators are future-oriented, they can force people to save, thereby launching economic
growth.

Three potential criticisms of this story

1.​ Do the poor really have a higher propensity to consume than the rich?
2.​ Is economic growth primarily driven by capital investment?
3.​ Why would dictators care about the future more than democratic leaders?

Dictatorial Autonomy Story

Dictators are not subject to as many pressures from special interests as democratic leaders.
Because the dictator is autonomous, he doesn’t need to spend money inefficiently to satisfy
different constituencies.

Two potential criticisms of this story

1.​ Why would a dictator promote economic growth? (benevolent dictator)
2.​ Since the dictator is autonomous, he will act in a predatory way and elites will not​
invest (extractive institutions)

Empirical Evidence
In sum and in theory, dictatorships produce higher economic growth. However the theoretical
arguments are not entirely convincing. What does the empirical evidence say?

1.​ Przeworski
a.​ 8 results show that dictatorships grow faster
b.​ 8 results show that democracies grow faster
c.​ 5 results show that regime type has no effect on economic growth
2.​ Data indicates that:
a.​ Democracies generally perform quite well
b.​ Some dictatorships perform as well as democracies, but some perform
much worse
c.​ Democracy seems to be sufficient, but not necessary, for success
3.​ Conclusions
a.​ There is no trade-off between democracy and development, not even in
poor countries

Session 9

Types / Varieties of Autocracies

Autocracies: Historical Review

Until the 19th century, most of the world’s states were ruled by autocratic regimes which
were mostly hereditary monarchies.

During the 19th century, an important new sort of autocratic regime emerged, namely
dictatorship by an organization or its leader, but only in the form of rule by a military
organization or military leader.

In the first half of the 20th century, the emergence of communist and fascist regimes
meant that there was now a political-party form of this dictatorship (military), with rule by
a party or organization or a party leader.

In the third quarter of the 20th century, the majority of the world’s states came to be ruled
by dictatorships. The final quarter of the 20th century saw a global wave of
democratization that threatened dictatorships and other autocratic regimes with extinction:
contagion effect.

Autocracies - Starting point

1.​ A coup d’état by a military organization or its leader (Pinochet) is historically the
oldest way of setting up a modern form of autocratic regimes:
a.​ There are several types of coups
b.​ Distinguishing between them is usually important
2.​ There are also revolutionary seizures (appropriations) of power (Lenin) or
misappropriations of power by an elected party or individual (Hitler)

Autocracy - Who rules?

1.​ Absolute (ruling) monarchies
a.​ Dynasties, rentier states (oil), colonial legacy
b.​ Persistence?
c.​ Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Qatar, Brunei
2.​ Personal dictators and strong-man rulers
a.​ Populist election, military coups, presidential executives
b.​ Suharto in Indonesia, Pinochet in Chile, Kim II Sung in North Korea
3.​ Military rule
a.​ Collective, open or disguised, sustained or intermittent
b.​ Burma, Thailand
4.​ One-party states
a.​ Collective
b.​ China
5.​ Theocracies(doubtful)
a.​ Iran’s Council of Guardians

Caramani’s classification
1.​ Personal rule
-​ A ruling monarch
-​ A “soldier”
-​ A president
-​ A religious leader (not anymore)
2.​ Organizational rule
​ - Military: its types depend on form of rule
​ - One-party: its types depend on ideology

CGG’s classification
 Three-way classification
1.​ A monarchic dictatorship is an
autocracy in which the executive comes
to and maintains power on the basis of
family and kin networks
2.​ A military dictatorship is an
autocracy in which the executive relies
on the armed forces to come to and
stay in power
3.​ All other autocracies are civilian
dictatorships

Monarchic Dictatorships
Monarchies tend to have more stable property rights and experience faster economic
growth compared to other forms of dictatorship, particularly in resource-rich regions like the
Middle East. This is partly due to the distinct political culture that monarchies develop, where
a leader’s promise to distribute rents (wealth or resources) is considered highly credible.

Monarchies have clear rules defining insiders and outsiders—who benefits from the
system and who does not—as well as established norms on how rents are distributed
among members of the royal family. Institutions are in place to monitor the ruler's actions
and ensure these norms are followed. This creates stability, as members of the elite have a
vested interest in supporting the regime.

Hereditary succession also plays a role in this stability. Vertical succession, where
power is passed to the first-born son, is more stable than horizontal succession, where it
goes to the oldest brother, as the latter tends to lead to more frequent power transitions. As
a result, monarchic dictatorships suffer from less violence and political instability than other
forms of authoritarianism, and monarchs tend to stay in power longer. The combination of
credible rent distribution and stable succession contributes to the political and economic
resilience of monarchic regimes.

Military Dictatorships
Military dictatorships tend to have shorter durations and are more likely to end through
negotiations rather than violence compared to other types of authoritarian regimes. There
is evidence that they are more likely to transition to competitive or democratic forms of
government than other dictatorships. One reason for this is that the military retains
significant leverage even after giving up power.

The military’s control over armed forces gives it a credible threat to re-intervene in politics
if its interests are not respected. This allows the military to relinquish power knowing that any
future government will have to consider its preferences. Often, military leaders negotiate the
handover of power to ensure their interests, such as autonomy and influence over key
policies, are protected.

In addition, the value of giving up power is lower for

military regimes because the military typically
remains intact after the transition, as it is necessary
for national defense. This combination of retained
influence and negotiated transitions makes military
dictatorships more likely to end peacefully and leave
behind competitive political systems.

Civilian Dictatorships
Unlike monarchic and military dictatorships, civilian dictatorships do not have an immediate
institutional base of support; instead, they have to create one. Many civilian dictators do
this with the help of regime parties or personalistic cults.

Two subcategories of civilian (politically closed) dictatorships:

1.​ Dominant-party dictatorship: a single party dominates access to political office
and control over policy, though other parties may exist and compete in elections
2.​ Personalistic dictatorship: the leader, although supported by a party or military,
retains personal control of policy decisions and the selection of regime personnel.

Dominant-Party Dictatorships
After authoritarian monarchies, dominant-party dictatorships are the longest-lived
dictatorships. Regime parties often engage in electoral fraud to deter regime party
defections and discourage opponents. Majority factions within regime parties tend to try to
co-opt minority factions rather than exclude them from power. Economic downturns can
create problems with stability for dominant-party regimes because they reduce the
resources available for buying off potential rivals.

Personalistic Dictatorships
Tend to be characterized by a weak or nonexistent press, a strong secret police, and an
arbitrary use of state violence that keeps the population living in fear.​
Many of these dictators cultivate elaborate personality cults in an attempt to maintain the
loyalty of their support coalition and the citizenry more generally.
The leader’s faction frequently keeps tight control over the spoils of office. Personalist
dictatorships are more likely to end in violence than other types of dictatorship. Personalist
dictatorships tend to become unstable only when there is an economic catastrophe, when
the security apparatus and military defect or when the leader dies.

Example: Cult of Personality in North Korea. There have been 3 dictators of the Kim
Dynasty, is it really a civilian dictatorship?

Personality cult vs Dictator’s Dilemma

 1.​ Personality cult - tends to creation of narcissistic and megalomaniacal leaders
who wish to be flattered and deified; they create loyal citizenry - ‘true believers’ - by
producing false beliefs in the population through state indoctrination
2.​ Dictator’s Dilemma - The Dictator’s Dilemma is that they rely on repression to stay
in power, but this repression creates incentives for everyone to falsify their
preferences so that the dictator never knows his true level of societal support.

Autocracies - how do they rule?

How they exercise control serves us to distinguish between totalitarianism (rarer) and
authoritarianism (more frequent):
-​ Totalitarianism; seeks total control
-​ Control under authoritarianism is much less extreme​

They can also be differentiated through types of policies: left-wing or right-wing.

There are two fundamental problems of autocratic rule:

1.​ The problem of autocratic problem-sharing (intra-elite conflict) - In authoritarian
regimes, dictators rely on a support coalition to maintain power, but there's a
constant risk of intra-elite conflict because there's no third-party enforcer of their
power-sharing agreements. Dictators are often incentivized to consolidate power at
the coalition's expense, while the coalition's ability to monitor and resist such moves
is limited. This creates instability, as the dictator may try to seize more control,
shifting from a "contested" to a "personalist" regime. To stabilize power-sharing,
institutions like ruling councils are needed to facilitate transparency and ensure the
coalition can detect and credibly punish any breaches of their agreement.
2.​ The problem of autocratic control (conflict between the elite and the masses) -
Dictators often rely on the military to suppress mass unrest, but this
dependence creates a significant dilemma. While repression helps keep the
population in check, it gives the military considerable power, potentially enabling it
to act against the dictator if their interests diverge. The military holds a unique
position because it is the only institution capable of effectively quelling widespread
violent unrest, making it essential for the regime’s survival during times of crisis.
However, this critical role allows the military to demand policy concessions, higher
budgets, and autonomy from the dictator’s control. This creates a delicate balance
of power, where the military can use its leverage to pressure the dictator for material
benefits or autonomy. When the likelihood of mass unrest is moderate, the dictator
and military may have differing views on the severity of the threat, leading to "military
brinkmanship." The military might exaggerate or even provoke signs of unrest to
emphasize its importance, gaining more influence in the process. Well-resourced
militaries can use these situations to extract concessions without directly staging a
coup, as truly powerful actors can often assert their influence without overtly seizing
power. Nonetheless, in extreme cases, this bargaining can spiral out of control,
leading to direct military intervention against the regime. Thus, the relationship
between dictators and the military is a constant balancing act, where the dictator
must keep the military satisfied while preventing it from becoming too powerful or
independent, potentially destabilizing the regime.

Autocracies - why do they rule?

Religious and ideological claims to legitimacy (The Cult)​
‘Democratic’ claims to legitimacy: dictators also hold elections (Democracia Orgánica of
Francisco Franco).

Autocracies - how do they die/end?

Dictators need to keep their support coalitions happy to stay in power. An implication of
this is that dictators will be replaced by defecting (change sides, traitors) members of
their support coalitions. The persistence of an autocratic leader’s type when the particular
autocratic leader is removed is why we often talk of dictatorial regimes rather than just
dictatorial leaders.

Session 10

Horizontal Separations of Powers: Presidentialism and Semi-Presidentialism

Horizontal Separation of Powers

Montesquieu, in The Spirit of Laws (1748), said that “tyranny is avoided by separating the
various functions of government”. He claimed separation between legislative, executive
and judicial. In the traditional view, each function must be exerted by a separate agency,
without interference from the others, and with different personnel in each agency. It is a
theory of functional separation and specialization.
So, how do we prevent one power from invading the other? What if, for example, the
legislature tries to expand its power? Who guards the guardians? What body can control
that the three powers stay within limits?

The response was to introduce the system of checks and balances, in which different
branches of government interfere with each other (principle of horizontal separation).

James Madison, Federalist 51: “But the great security against a gradual concentration of
the several powers in the same department consists in giving to those who administer each
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachment of the other. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”

Checks and balances in the American Constitution:

-​ The President may veto decisions made by the Congress
-​ One branch of the legislature, the Senate, has control over the President
regarding executive appointments and treaty making
-​ The President can appoint judges
-​ The judiciary can check the legislative and the executive branches (judicial review)
-​ The Congress may impeach the President

With checks and balances there is no danger of tyranny or encroachment, no need of

external enforcement and the system is in equilibrium because each brand of government is
controlled by the others.

Parliamentarism, Presidentialism and Semi-Presidentialism

Democracies are classified according to their form of government: presidential,
semi-presidential and parliamentary

These three
systems
differ
regarding
the existence of
political
responsibility, which refers to a situation in which a legislative majority has the
constitutional power to remove a government from office without cause (usually a vote
of no confidence; linked to semi-presidential and parliamentary democracies).

A vote of no confidence involves a vote in the legislature (also initiated by them) on

whether the government should remain in office. The government must resign if it fails to
obtain a legislative majority.
In a constructive vote of no confidence those who oppose the government must indicate
who will replace the government if the vote is successful. The new government takes
office immediately (Spain, Germany). It reduces government instability (elections are not
held again), although it is easier to get people to vote against a government than it is to get
them to agree on who should replace it.

A vote of confidence is initiated by the government; if the government does not obtain a
legislative majority in this vote, it must resign. It is a mechanism to ensure the government
still has a legislative majority.

Presidentialism and semi-presidentialism systems: Heads of State

A head of state who is popularly elected for a fixed term:
-​ A head of state is popularly elected if he/she is elected through a process where
voters either (i) cast a ballot directly for a candidate or (ii) they cast ballots to elect
an electoral college, whose sole purpose is to elect the head of state.
-​ To serve a fixed term means that the head of state serves for a fixed period of time
before needing to be reappointed and cannot be removed in the meantime.

Types of heads of state: in a democracy, either a monarch or a president:

​ - Presidents can exist in all types of democracies
​ - Monarchs only exist in parliamentary democracies - they do not serve fixed
terms and are not directly elected.

Presidentialism
The government consists of a president and a cabinet.
-​ The president is the head of state and the political chief executive.
-​ The cabinet is composed of ministers whose job is to be in the cabinet and head​
the various government departments (minister’s portfolio).
In a presidential democracy, the executive branch and the government are the same.
​
The government formation process is different in presidentialism than in parliamentarism,
this process does not depend on the confidence of the legislature. In presidentialism, the
government cannot be dismissed by a legislative majority, the president is always the
formateur (person in charge of the formation of the government) and her party is always in
government, and the revision point during negotiations is the president’s party in power on
its own (single party government).

That last concept is why minority governments are more frequent in presidential
democracies. A minority government or divided government is one in which the
presidential party or coalition does not command a majority (>50%) of legislative seats
(in both chambers in case of bicameralism).
​
A minority government that enjoys the implicit support of a legislative majority can
exist in both presidential and parliamentary democracies. In parliamentarism, is the
investiture vote the one who gives the explicit support; if it does not exist, then the
support is only implicit. But any support is needed because of the existence of the vote of no
confidence.
​
However, a minority government that does not have the implicit support of a
legislative majority can exist only in presidential democracies. However the most
common government type in presidentialism is majority coalitions.

Coalition Governments in Presidentialist Democracies

In a pure office-seeking world, you would not see a coalition government in presidential
democracies. But in a world in which the president cares about policy as well, the
coalition government is permitted to pass laws and policies through the legislative
better.

The extent to which a president is willing to form a coalition depends on his legislative
powers. The less legislative support she has, the more willing/necessity she has to form a
coalition government (decree-executive orders).

Cabinets
Some

presidential cabinets look more parliamentary than others.

Governments in presidential systems have more nonpartisan ministers (someone not
appointed on behalf of a governing party), because they do not necessarily have to get
the support from the legislature. Also, governments in presidentialism have no rule to
ensure that they distribute minister’s portfolios proportionately with the seats in parliament.
As a result, they allocate cabinet portfolios in a less proportional way than prime ministers
because they have less need of legislative support.

However, the number of nonpartisan ministers has

probably increased in parliamentary democracies in recent
times.

Again, this has to do with the legislative powers of the president. Presidents with relatively
weak decree power, whose parties in the legislature are small, and whose parties exhibit low
levels of party discipline, are more likely to appoint cabinets that look like those in
parliamentary democracies.

Semi-presidentialism
The executive branch comprises the president and the government. The government
in a semi-presidential democracy comprises a prime minister and the cabinet. The prime
minister is the political chief executive and the president is the head of state. Dual
executive/bicefalia.

There are two types of semi-presidential democracies.

1.​ In a premier-presidential system, the government is responsible to the
legislature but not the president. Is closer to parliamentarism (France).
2.​ In a president-parliamentary system, the government is responsible to the
legislature and the president. Is closer to presidentialism (Austria).
In a semi-presidential democracy, there is no guarantee that the president and the prime
minister will come from the same party. The term cohabitation refers to when there is a
president from one political bloc and a prime minister from another. It usually occurs when
the party of the president does not control a majority in the legislature and is not represented
in the cabinet. Example: France 1986-88, Jacques Chirac (center-right PM) and François
Miterrand (center-left president).

Periods of cohabitation can be characterized as an effective system of checks and

balances. However, cohabitation can also be characterized by “bitter and violent” conflict
when the political actors involved share starkly different ideologies and goals.

How can we prevent cohabitations and divided governments from emerging? How can
the president try to come up with a cabinet that is politically aligned with him/her? Firstly,
dissolving the assembly (rare). Miterrand did it twice in France during the 80s and
succeeded, but Chirac did it once in the 90s to reinforce his legislative majority and he lost it.
No longer needed after the 2002 constitutional reform (concurrent elections).
 Session 11

The government in a parliamentary democracy comprises a prime minister and the

cabinet. The prime minister is the political chief executive and head of the government
(but not head of state). The cabinet is composed of ministers whose job it is to be in the
cabinet and head the various government departments. In a parliamentary democracy, the
executive branch and the government are the same thing; and the head of state does
not belong to the executive.

Ministers in general
-​ Ministerial responsibility refers to the constitutional doctrine by which cabinet
ministers must bear ultimate responsibility for what happens in their ministry.
-​ Collective cabinet responsibility refers to the doctrine by which ministers must
publicly support collective cabinet decisions or resign.
-​ Why? Because it is very exceptional to allow votes of no confidence against
individual ministers.
-​ Example of collective cabinet responsibility in the UK during EU referenda: David
Cameron (conservative) and Harold Wilson (labor) were PM for 2010-2015 and
1974-1976 respectively. They resigned because they didn’t agree with their cabinet’s
decision.

In a parliamentary democracy voters do not elect governments directly. Instead, voters

elect representatives.

The role of the head of state

The head of state, either a monarch or a president, presides over the government
formation process. The extent to which the head of state is actively involved in the actual
bargaining varies from country to country:
1.​ In some countries, the head of state is limited to simply swearing in the
government proposed by party elites. Characterized by “​free-style” bargaining​.
(New Zealand = queen elizabeth is the head of state but she does not play a very
active role, she has some representatives called general governor that represent the
queen in the commonwealth countries)
2.​ In some countries, the head of state chooses a particular politician - a formateur -
to initiate the government formation process.
a.​ A formateur is designated to form the government in a parliamentary
democracy, and is often the PM designate (Spain). Only Greece and
Bulgaria (semi-presidential) explicitly state how the formateur must be
chosen. In Spain everyone could be, but the king selects the person who is
more likely to form the government.
b.​ Despite the discretion of most heads of state, the first formateur is usually
the leader of the largest legislative party. Once the formateur is chosen,
she has to put a cabinet together that is acceptable to a legislative majority.
c.​ Since it is rare in a parliamentary democracy for a single party to control a
legislative majority, the formateur must begin bargaining with other
parties.
 3.​ In some countries, the head of state is restricted to appointing an informateur. An
informateur ​examines politically feasible coalitions and nominates a formateur.
These countries are often constitutional monarchies (Belgium and Netherlands)

The investiture vote

Once a cabinet has been proposed, the support of a legislative majority may or may not
have to be demonstrated by a formal investiture vote.

Distinction between positive and negative parliamentarism:

1.​ Positive parliamentarism refers to the type of system in which an investiture vote
is needed to form the government - such as in Spain.
2.​ Negative parliamentarism exists when the government does not need an
investiture vote to become the prime minister, he is only appointed by the head of
state - such as Denmark where the monarch appoints a prime minister which will
have to select a cabinet and avoid no-confidence votes from opposition.

An investiture vote is a formal vote in the legislature to determine whether a proposed

government can take office.
1.​ If the investiture vote fails, then the government formation process starts again
(with a likely scenario of repeated elections)
2.​ If the investiture vote succeeds (or there is no investiture vote), then the head of
state appoints the cabinet to office:
a.​ The government is then free to rule until:
i.​ it is defeated in a vote of confidence/no confidence
ii.​ a new election is necessary.

The government process is long, about 1 month on average. However the duration of the
process depends on positive vs negative parliamentarism and the number of parties. Spain
was 314 days “without government” and Belgium has the record with 589 days. In the
meantime, the previous cabinet stays in office as a caretaker government (en
funciones).

Caretaker government
A caretaker government (gobierno en funciones) occurs when an election is called or
when an incumbent government either resigns or is defeated in a ​non-constructive​
vote of no confidence:
-​ A caretaker government remains in office until the next government formation
process is completed
-​ In most countries, there is a strong norm that caretaker governments will not make
important policy changes.

The role of parties in government formation

The leader of the CDU/CSU, Helmut Kohl, was
appointed the formateur because he was in the
best position to form a government.

Politician’s motivation
 1.​ An office-seeking politician is interested in the intrinsic benefits of office; he wants
as much office as possible.
In an office-seeking world, a formateur can get other parties to join the
government only by giving them office. Strong empirical evidence shows that a
formateur gives large parties more office than small parties.
Gamson’s law states that cabinet portfolios will be distributed among government
parties in strict proportion to the number of seats that each party contributes to the
government’s legislative seat total.
Example: Party A (80 seats) and Party B (40 seats) form a government of 120 seats.
Party A should receive 80/120=2/3 of the cabinet portfolios, while party B should
receive 40/120=1/3 of the cabinet portfolios.
An implication is that you will not want more parties in government than is strictly
necessary to obtain a legislative majority, this is, a minimal winning coalition. A
MWC is one in which there are no parties that are not required to control a legislative
majority (low number of surplus seats). In the example of Germany, the MWC are
CDU/CSU + SPD (160 surplus seats), CDU/CSU + FDP (20 surplus seats) and
CDU/CSU + Greens (16 surplus seats).
A second implication is that you will choose the smallest minimal winning coalition,
this is, the least minimal winning coalition (or minimum). A LMWC is the MWC
with the lowest number of surplus seats (seats in the legislative of the coalition -
absolute majority). In Germany, it would be CDU/CSU + Greens.

2.​ A policy-seeking politician only wants to shape policy; so, office is a means to
obtain policy goals.
In a policy-seeking world, a formateur can get other parties to join the government
only by giving them policy concessions. It is likely that a formateur will have to give
more policy concessions to large parties than small parties.
An implication is that you will want to form coalitions with parties that are located
close to you in the policy space: a connected coalition is one in which the
member parties are located directly next to each other in the policy space.
A second implication is that you will choose the connected least minimal winning
coalition to make the least concessions.
Also, you have to identify what is the ideological dimension that is relevant and to
take into account that not all ideological neighbors are at the same distance.

The least minimal winning coalition for the case of Germany was CDU/CSU +
Greens, but they are not neighbors in the policy space. Least connected minimal
winning coalition:
CDU/CSU + SPD (160 surplus seats) NOT LEAST MINIMAL
CDU/CSU + FDP (20 surplus seats)​
CDU/CSU + Greens (16 surplus seats) NOT CONNECTED
Types of government - Numerical criteria
 1.​ A single-party majority government comprises only one party that controls a
majority of the legislative seats (50% + 1)
2.​ A single-party minority government comprises only one party does not command
a majority of the legislative seats.
3.​ A coalition minority government comprises multiple governmental parties that do
not together command a majority of the legislative seats.
4.​ A coalition majority government comprises multiple governmental parties that do
together command a majority of the legislative seats:
a.​ A minimal winning coalition (MWC) is one in which there are no parties that
are not required to control a legislative majority.
b.​ A surplus (oversized) majority government comprises more parties than
are strictly necessary to control a majority of the legislative seats.

Riker was right when he said MWCs are the most frequent form of government but not for
that much. Importance of the number of parties! Spain and the UK are the only two countries
without a coalition government, but the conservative-liberal coalition government in the UK in
2010-2015 and the current progressive coalition in Spain changed this.

Against MWC’s
1.​ Minority governments
A minority government in parliamentary democracies must always have an implicit
majority in the legislature.
-​ In some countries, we know who makes up the implicit because parties publicly
state that they will support the government in any no confidence vote. (Example:
“Confidence and Supply” agreements in New Zealand (Jacinta Ardem, Labor leader
and PM in 2017 with the Green Party, plus a coalition agreement with NZ first).
-​ In other countries the government does not rely on specific “support” parties, but
instead builds legislative majorities on an ad hoc basis (Spain).
Minority governments are not anti-democratic as they have the support of a legislative
majority like all parliamentary governments
Minority governments occur quite frequently and are not always short-lived. They are
common in countries such as Denmark (82%), Sweden (81%) and Norway (65%) and they
last about 539 days on average in Western Europe.

Minority governments are more likely when opposition influence is strong

(parliamentary committees). They are less likely when there is a formal investiture vote
(Spain). They are more likely when there is a “strong” party, for example, when it faces a
bilateral/divided opposition. This is, the party is in the middle and the opposition is on both
sides of the ideological line.
Example: Denmark 1966. According to Laver and Shepsle, 1990, the median legislator (the
strong party) is a social democrat (SD). Any viable coalition needs the social democrats.
Outcome: SDs form a minority government. Forcing them to resign would mean that left and
right reach an agreement (bilateral opposition).

2.​ Surplus Majority Governments (Oversized)

There are various reasons a surplus majority government might form:
1.​ They may occur in times of crisis such as during or after wars. Churchill and
Clement Attlee in the Second World War, France after WWII.
2.​ They may form because a surplus majority is required to change the constitution.
3.​ There are strategic reasons for forming a surplus majority government (for example,
in bicameral systems) (Italy)
a.​ A bicameral system is a system according to which both legislative
majorities can vote against the government and force its resignation.
b.​ If there is a perfect bicameralism: both legislative chambers can force the
resignation of the government, because you need allies in the Senate and the
House.
4.​ Pre-electoral coalitions (PECs)

What type of governments last more?

1.​ Majority governments > minority governments (on average)
2.​ Single-party governments > coalition governments (on average)

Reasons for government termination

Elections (+), PM’s dimission, PM’s health, governments’ dimission, lack of parliamentary
support, Head of State, extension of coalition

When do elections take place?

In presidential systems, legislatures are fixed terms. But in parliamentary systems and
some semi-presidential systems, the government can or does trigger the elections.

Political business cycle: The government actively manipulates the economy to engineer
a short-term economic high and then calls an election. The election is then followed by
an economic decline. Thus, the economy goes through cycles of boom and bust that
are politically driven.

Endogenous election timing refers to the fact that the constitution/electoral laws have not
set a stable cycle of elections.
-​ Political surfing: The government waits until the economic conditions are right
before calling an election.
-​ Signaling: The government is better informed about future economic performance
than the voters and can time elections to occur prior to economic decline.
​
To call or not to call an early election. The main argument is that “a rational government
will try to make the year before an election a ‘happy one’ in order to be reelected”.
Hence, we should expect incumbents to opportunistically call early elections when the
economy is growing or inflation rates are low.
Example: Theresa May (UK PM) calls an early election for June the 8th, 2017, but it
backfires. We cannot fully predict the voter’s actions. However, a counterexample exists.
The British Labor Prime Minister did not call an early election despite the economic growth
because the pools gave him the defeat.

12. Vertical Separation of Powers: Federalism and

Decentralization
During the 1990s, many international institutions, as well as academics consistently advised
governments in developing countries to undertake reforms to decentralize political and
economic authority to sub-national governments.

There has been a kind of process of diminishing the power of the national-state along
history since the start of the 1650s, which means that the sub-national and the
supra-national have acquired these powers. This can be called a process of
decentralization vertically (from public to private) and horizontally (from nation to
supra- national like the EU) of the national-state powers.

The division between federal and

decentralized states has become blurred:
Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium
(1993) are federal, but differ a lot from
Canada and USA.

UK devolved & Spain decentralized (Spain

federal?).

There exists a negative correlation between

federalism and revenue centralisation (central
government’s share of tax revenue)

The story of these vertical dimensions in

the world is an increasing
decentralization, as well as an
increasing federalism. A unitary state
can easily decentralize political power
(like Spain’s decentralization).
RAI index​: measures the level of
decentralization we have in one country.
Regional Authority Index. Overtime, this
index has been enlarging geographical
scope.
Increase in the decentralization process.
Communities are increasing the
expenditure and the central gov.
decreases. Spain 's Estado Autonómico.

Why is Federalism / Decentralization growing?

-​ Bottom-up Demand
-​ Reaction against perceived failures of the central state
-​ Post communist people, post ​WW-II Germany
 -​ Aspirations of nationalist movements
-​ Spain​, Belgium, UK, Canada, Indonesia, Russia…
-​ Post-war peace-building process
-​ - Uganda, South Africa, Cambodia, ​Bosnia and Herzegovina…
-​ Role of international development agencies
-​ Part of the neo-liberal ‘Washington consensus’
-​ World Bank Intervention

Federalism (vs Unitary States)

A ​federal state is one in which sovereignty is ​constitutionally split between at least two
territorial levels so that independent governmental units at each level have final authority in
at least one policy realm. States that are not federal are known as​unitary states.

Despite the huge variety among federal countries, there is consensus in that Federation
implies an irrevocable entrenchment of some local or regional (state) government in
the national (federal) making process with significant powers that are protected by the
Constitution. There are guarantees that ensure that the basic federal division of power
will be preserved.

In federal countries there is ​shared sovereignty between a central authority and the units
of federation. Thus, ​separation of powers both in territorial and functional dimensions:
units enjoy rights and powers guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Federalism as ​vertical
​separation of powers IS NOT horizontal, among classic bodies (legislative, executive and
judiciary).

Federalism has three structural components:

1.​ Geopolitical division: requires that the country be divided into mutually exclusive
regional governments that are recognized in the constitution and that cannot be
unilaterally abolished by the national government.
2.​ Independence: requires that the regional and national governments must have
independent bases of authority. This is typically ensured by having them elected
independently of one another.
3.​ Direct governance: requires that authority be shared between the regional
governments and the national government such that each citizen is governed by at
least two authorities. Each level of government must have the authority to act
independently of the other in at least one policy realm, and this authority must be
protected by the constitution.
4.​ Less important are:
a.​ Bicameralism, with Senators representing the territorial units
b.​ An extremely rigid constitution (is like a contract, so we need to have lots
of consensus to reform the constitution)
c.​ A supreme or constitutional court with judicial revision

Federal countries are rare, there were only around 25 in the late 2000s: Brazil, Canada,
India, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Switzerland or the US. The first federal country in modern
history was the Dutch republic of United Provinces; the second, the US. Modern federal
countries include some of the largest countries of the world such as India, Canada and
Brazil → 40% of world population. Belgium (1993) is probably the most recent federal
country.

Federal countries are very different among them

1.​ Population, area and number of units (many or not many subnational units: states,
territories, länders, regions, provinces, cantons...)
2.​ Fiscal and intergovernmental relations
3.​ Asymmetries in the powers of the units (symmetric vs. asymmetric federalism)
4.​ Role of the Upper Chamber (bicameralism).

The particular design of fiscal federalism (the allocation of expenditure and taxing powers
across levels of government) is the crucial factor to understand constituent units’ ​real
​levels of autonomy.

It is useful to distinguish between federalism in structure (de jure federalism, e.g., United
Arab Emirates (autocracy) and Brazil (democracy) / federalism) and federalism in practice
(de facto federalism, e.g., Spain / decentralization).

Decentralization refers to the extent to which actual policy making power lies with the
central or regional governments. Most political scientists see decentralization as a
revenue issue. The greater the share of all tax revenues going to the central government,
the less decentralized the state (fiscal federalism).

Devolution occurs when a unitary state grants powers to subnational governments but
retains the right to unilaterally recall or reshape those powers. Regional governments in
a unitary state do not have a constitutional right to any of their powers (Spain and UK).

Gray zones: India (the national legislature has the power to change state boundaries and to
create new states from existing ones; the president is allowed to take over a state’s
executive and rule directly through an appointed governor) and Spain (The Constitution is
based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation; if a regional government “doesn’t
comply with the obligations the Constitution or other laws impose, or acts in a way that
seriously undermines the interests of Spain”, the national government can ask the Senate to
vote on the use of measures).

Confederations: When pre-existing polities form a common government for a certain

limited purpose (economic development, defense, terrorism, culture) but each maintains
its sovereignty. Confederations are weaker than federations, less centralized and less
stable.

Whether a state is ​federal or ​unitary​ is ultimately a constitutional issue. Whether a state

is​decentralized o​r not is about where policy is actually made.

Types of federalism
Federal states can be congruent or incongruent
-​ Congruent federalism exists when the territorial units of a federal state share a
similar demographic makeup with one another and the country as a whole (US and
Brazil)
 -​ Incongruent federalism exists when the demographic makeup of territorial units
differs among the units and the country as a whole (Switzerland and Belgium)

Federal states can be symmetric or asymmetric

-​ Symmetric federalism exists when the territorial units of a federal state possess
equal powers relative to the central government (US)
-​ Asymmetric federalism exists when some territorial units enjoy more extensive
powers than others relative to the central government (Canada)

Federal states can be coming-together or holding-together

-​ Coming-together federalism is the result of a bargaining process in which
previously sovereign polities voluntarily agree to give up part of their sovereignty in
order to pool together their resources and improve their collective security or achieve
other economic goals. (BOTTOM-UP federalisation such as US)
-​ Holding-together federalism is the result of a process in which the central
government of a policy chooses to decentralize its power to subnational governments
in order to contain secessionist pressures. (TOP-DOWN federalisation such as
Belgium)

Federal states can be marble-cake or layer-cake

-​ Marble-cake:​a more intertwined arrangement across levels of government​
(Germany= predominance of shared authority)
-​ Layer-cake:​ there is a level of government that clearly predominates over the
other (USA, “watertight compartment”)
​
Determinants of federalism
Functionalist theories showing the benefits of federalism:
1.​ Democracy - greater participation, responsiveness and accountability
2.​ Efficiency:
a.​ Allocative efficiency - it brings governments closer to citizens. Local
governments are better able to meet citizens' demands (politicians as
benevolent planners that care about welfare)
b.​ Productive efficiency - expenditures are better tailored to costs.
Interjurisdictional competition (“thereat of the mobile” - “voting with the feet”)
can prevent governments from “expropriation” (politicians as leviathans)
3.​ As a result of economic inequalities across territories. Ex: EU.
4.​ To accommodate different demands in a plural society
(language/ethnicity/religion) -> it creates relatively homogeneous areas. (Belgium)
5.​ Big territories are better organized with federalism -> giving power to the center to
maximize overall welfare. (US)

But, as a result of politicians’ strategy to survive in power: “getting rid” of unpopular policies
(problems of attribution of responsibility → accountability) (ESP COVID-19).
Federalism usually strengthens democracy. Nevertheless, many conditions matter in
plural societies, including the boundaries drawn across or within ethnic communities.
 Advantages of federalism Disadvantages of federalism

Closer match between policy and Facilitates blame shifting and credit
citizen preferences. Decentralized claiming, thereby reducing government
forms of government are best for accountability which may possibly lead to
satisfying popular preferences in corruption.
democratic countries, particularly in large
countries.

System of check and balances acting Increases collective action problems in

as a bulwark against tyranny. Also policy formulation, particularly in developing
useful to minimize citizen coercion. countries.

Greater government accountability and Competition leads to downward

responsiveness to citizen preferences harmonization (race to the bottom) in an
by bringing it closer to the people. It attempt to attract investment and retain
encourages political participation and citizens. Which may ultimately lead to
enhances democratic legitimacy. difficulties of implementing certain tax
distribution systems.

Competition among states creates an Competition amplifies pre-existing

incentive for good government. inequalities in population, wealth and political
Competition arises if subnational power. It is likely to create conflict and
governments have a strong incentive to political instability, with communities
perform well due to the ability of demanding increased autonomy.
investors and citizens to move from one
region to another.

Encourages policy experimentation Unnecessary duplication of government

and innovation without putting the and inefficient overlapping of contradictory
whole country at risk. policies.

Consequences of federalism
Is decentralization good or bad? Consequences depend on the particular design of
decentralization:
-​ Consequences on macroeconomic efficiency: fiscal irresponsible behavior if
local expenditures are not tied to taxes (politicians don’t integrate the costs of
imposing taxes → overspending)
-​ Consequence on the stability of the federation: it may spur further
decentralization. Mechanism: political parties (centrifugation of statewide parties or
emergence/reinforcement of regionalist parties)
-​ Lower government quality: competition may reduce tax pressure → problems
to provide basic public goods/reduction of revenues on central government →
reduction of redistribution
Bicameralism
A unicameral legislature is one in which legislative deliberation occurs in a single
assembly.
A ​bicameral legislature is one in which legislative deliberation occurs in two distinct
assemblies. About 40% of countries in the world are bicameral
Members of the lower chamber in almost all countries are supposed to represent all
citizens equally. The most common role for the upper chamber is to represent the
citizens of subnational geographic units: this is always the case in federal states, but is
also the case in some unitary states.

Bicameralism increasingly became seen as a way for federal states to represent their
constituent territorial units:
-​ The lower chamber would represent the popular dimension of the people's will.
-​ The upper chamber would represent the territorial dimension of the people's will.
Members of the upper chamber have characteristics of value - wisdom, age,
knowledge - that members of the lower chamber may not have.

Two basic arguments in favor of bicameralism

1.​ ​In federal countries,​bicameralism is primarily defended as an institutional means
for protecting the federal system and promoting the distinct preferences of
different territorial units
2.​ In unitary countries​, bicameralism is primarily defended as an institutional means
for improving the quality of legislation

Types of bicameralism
Bicameral systems can be congruent or incongruent
-​ Congruent bicameralism occurs when 2 legislative chambers have a similar
political composition (UK)
-​ Incongruent bicameralism occurs when the 2 legislative chambers differ in their​
political composition (Germany)

The level of congruence depends on how the membership of the two chambers is selected
and whom that membership is supposed to represent.

Bicameral systems can be symmetric or asymmetric

-​ Symmetric bicameralism occurs when the two legislative chambers have equal or
near equal constitutional power (Italy).
-​ Asymmetric bicameralism occurs when the two legislative chambers have unequal
constitutional power (Spain).

13. Electoral Systems

Elections are increasingly used to fill legislative

and executive offices around the world: 185 of the
world’s 193 independent states now use direct elections to elect people to their lower house
of parliament. Democracies are sometimes classified in terms of their electoral system.

There is no democracy without elections but there are autocracies and oligarchies with
elections.

In the early 2000s, the UK rarely experienced hung parliaments—instances where no party
wins a majority of seats in Parliament. This changed in 2010 when a hung parliament
resulted in the first coalition government since WWII, formed by the Conservative and Liberal
Democrat parties. A referendum was held on May 5, 2011, to consider replacing the
first-past-the-post electoral system with the alternative vote (AV), which aimed to provide
fairer representation for all parties in the House of Commons. However, the proposal to
adopt AV was decisively rejected by voters.

Electoral systems: the intuition

An electoral system is the set of rules governing the conversion of votes into seats. So,
it has an impact on a country’s party system, type of government, representation etc.

Electoral systems can be categorized along the type of electoral formula:

-​ Majoritarian or non-PR systems → “winners takes all” system. You are elected
when you receive a plurality or a majority of the votes/seats.
-​ Proportional Representation Systems → “correspondence votes-seats” systeM
-​ Mixed → a combination of the other two

The important thing is the ​mechanics ​of the electoral systems. When we classify electoral
systems, we have to pay attention to how it is written down in the law (its mechanics).

The important thing is the ​mechanics ​of the electoral systems. When we classify electoral
systems, we have to pay attention to how it is written down in the law (its mechanics).

Electoral Systems: Dimensions and Variations

 1.​ Interparty dimension: How electoral systems affect the translation of votes into
seats for competing political parties, and how electoral systems affect the overall
nature of the party systems.
a.​ Vote for big parties (majoritarian)
b.​ Vote for small parties (proportional)
c.​ Main consequence: Strategic/tactical vote

2.​ Intraparty dimension: electoral rules also vary in the ways they affect the internal
organization of parties and the ways in which individual legislators (or legislative
candidates) relate to constituents.
a.​ Vote for a party (closed list)
b.​ Vote for a candidate (nominal voting: all the other electoral systems)
c.​ Main consequence: personal vote (could lead to pork barreling and vote
buying) and socio-demographic representation.

Electoral systems: elements

-​ Electoral formula (interparty): how votes are counted to allocate seats. The
mathematical method to translate votes into seats.
-​ District magnitude (interparty): the number of seats allocated per district and
district size
-​ Legal threshold (interparty): the minimum votes needed by a party to secure
representation
-​ Assembly size (interparty): the total number of seats to be allocated
-​ Ballot structure (intraparty): how voters can express their choice

Electoral formula

1.​ Majoritarian
a) Single-member plurality, also known as First Past the Post (FPTP). Individuals cast a
single vote and the candidate with the most votes is elected. Majority is not needed, only
plurality. It is used only in single-member districts (SMDs). Used in countries like Canada,
India, UK and legislative USA (all English colonies).

In FPTP systems the geographical dispersion of the vote is critical: parties do not focus
on getting majority in individual counties, but to get plurality in as many districts as possible.
Thus, there is a high “threshold” (un número alto de votos mínimos) for non-spatially
concentrated minor parties (para partidos minoritarios) and ethnic groups, even if in the
overall country there are many (los partidos minoritarios lo tienen más complicado). It
benefits the 2-3 big parties.
Another problem is the lack of proportionality in terms of votes and seats. This is,
spurious majorities, such as Trump: the winner in votes is not directly the winner in
seats.

b) Another plurality (majoritarian) system is the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV),

such as the one applied in Japan 1948-93, Jordan, Vanuatu and Afghanistan. It is applied
in small multi member districts where there are multiple candidates from the same
party. A single vote is cast, and plurality vote is required. But it can confront members
from the same party and divide the vote.

c) There is also a Two-Round Majority (runoff, ballotage, not plurality, majoritarian)

system such as the French. If no candidate reaches the majority (50%+) in the first round,
the least successful candidates are eliminated and a second round takes place within SMDs
(single-member districts). In the second round, usually only the two top candidates pass. It is
used in most presidential elections and some parliamentary elections such as Egypt,
Mali and Vietnam.
The Two-Round majority aims to produce party coalitions on left and right and popular
legitimacy for the winner. It also produces a “heart” or sincere vote in the first round
and a “head” or strategic vote in the second.

d) A second example of a majority system is the Alternative Vote (Instant runoff). Voters
rank candidates within SMDs (1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc.). A majority is required to pass the first
round. If no majority is achieved, the lowest placed candidate (the one that was placed first
the least) is eliminated and his votes are redistributed according to second preference. The
process is repeated until one candidate gets the majority. Is used in Australia (House
of Representatives), Fiji or Papua.

e) Problems with all SMDs systems: Gerrymandering

The problem happened in the US when Elbridge Gerry divided electoral districts in a way
that their FPTP system ensured their friends would be elected. A more recent example is the
boundary of Texas in 2003 Congressional elections.

2.​ Proportional Representation Systems

In PR, seats are allocated proportionally to votes on the basis of a formula in multimember
districts. It is used in countries such as Brazil, Ireland, the Netherlands or South Africa.
They vary in terms of type of list (open or closed), electoral formula (divisors or
quotas), district (national or regional), and threshold (present or not).
a) D’Hondt Method (or Sainte-Laguë): It is a divisor-based PR system applied in Spain.
Votes per party are divided by a series of 1,2,3,4,5,6... and then a ranking is done with
the highest cells in which the highest numbers equals one seat.

Ex: Spain, Portugal, Argentina, Finland, etc.

b) Hare Method (or Droop method) uses a quota-based formula (largest reminder) to
allocate seats. A quota is essentially the “price” in terms of votes that a party must pay
to guarantee themselves a seat in a particular electoral district.

There are remainder seats when votes are not sufficient for a party to get to the “next”
quota. Then, we use as a second step the largest remainder method. This is, if we
subtract to the votes/quota the seats automatically allocated, we have the remainder
votes of each party. The party with the largest remainder will get one seat, the second
largest remainder the second remainder seat, and so on.

Ex: Germany in specific and local federal states, Slovenia, Slovakia, etc.

3.​ Mixed systems

In a mixed electoral system voters elect representatives through two different systems, one
majoritarian and one proportional. Some mixed systems lean towards majority
(mixed-member majoritarian, MMM) and some towards proportionality (mixed-member
proportional, MMP). An MMP is currently used in Germany (and New Zealand).
Most mixed systems employ multiple electoral tiers: an electoral tier is a level at which
votes are translated into seats. The lowest electoral tier is the district or constituency
level. Higher tiers are constituted by grouping together different lower-tier
constituencies, typically at the regional or national level.

In a mixed system, it is often the case that a majoritarian system is used in the lowest tier
(district level) and a proportional system is used in the upper tier (regional or national
level).

In most mixed systems, individuals have two votes: one vote is for the representative at
the district level (candidate vote), and the other is for the party list in the higher
electoral tier (party vote).

District magnitude
The number of members of Parliaments (MPs) elected from each constituency. “The decisive
factor”. There are two basic typologies: single-member districts (SMDs) and
multi-member districts (and whole-country districts). The greater the district magnitude, the
higher the number of parties and more proportional the outcome/system.

Legal Thresholds
The minimum votes needed by a party to secure representation. Vote share (or number
of seats) that parties need to obtain in order to participate in the allocation of seats. Two
basic typologies: at national level or at district level. Its goals are to prevent excessive
fragmentation and facilitate stable governments.

Higher legal thresholds (or higher first divisor) exclude small parties of power. In majoritarian
systems thresholds are basically unworthy because only the biggest/most voted party wins
in a zero-sum game, minorities will not win anyway.

Assembly size
The total number of seats being allocated (regardless of district). Called the “general
neglected variable”. It is a function of the cubic root of the population.

Ballot structure (intraparty)

The extent to which voters are able to decide which of their party’s candidates takes
the seats that the party wins. It determines the candidate's incentives to cultivate a personal
vote. Three basic typologies:
1.​ No choice (closed-list systems [party ballots], SMDs [candidate-ballot])
2.​ Voters can express their preference on the candidates (Preferential List PR
systems and Single Transferable Vote [preference ballots])
3.​ Dual ballots (mixed system)

In a closed party list, the order of candidates elected is determined by the party itself,
and voters are not able to express a preference for a particular candidate (Portugal and
Spain).
In a PR flexible list, voters rank up the party list but can only vote for one party
(Netherlands).

In a PR open-list, voters can indicate not just their preferred party, but also their favored
candidate within that party (just one candidate). The ranking is the creation of the people.
(Brazil)

A single transferable vote (STV) system is currently used in Ireland, Australian Senate,
Malta... Redistribution in successive counts of votes from eliminated candidates and
surplus votes from elected candidates to the remaining candidates until all of the seats are
filled.

Effects of electoral systems

-​ Democracy - the relationship is not causal.

-​ Proportionality from votes to seats (PR > majoritarian).

Poor are small (underrepresented) parties, and rich are big (overrepresented) parties. So
money are seats.

The determinants of proportionality are many: number of parties in the electorate (more
votes will not be used), geographical distribution of the vote (because of district
magnitudes), district magnitudes, legal thresholds, electoral formula (e.g. D’Hondt the
least proportional among PR).​

-​ Party system fragmentation (PR > majoritarian)

It means the number of parties competing in an election, and their success in obtaining
votes (and seats). Two remarks: (1) The plurality single-ballot rule tends to party dualism
and (2) The double-ballot system and proportional representation tend to
multipartyism.

Two mechanisms exist: Mechanical effect and psychological effect.

-​ Electoral turnout (PR > majoritarian)

-​ Socio-demographic representation (PR > majoritarian)

-​ Personal Vote
It could lead to pork barreling (appropriation of government spending for localized projects
secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district.) and vote buying
(he voter sells his or her vote to the highest buyer).

Normative issues (Trade-offs)

-​ Adversarial democracy
In an Adversarial Democracy based on majoritarian elections, elections would promote
accountability (decisive elections, transparency on decision-making), effectiveness
(single-party executives, responsible parties, unitary states) and scrutiny (effective
opposition, vigorous parliamentary debates) and yet dangers of elective dictatorships,
permanent majorities, lack of checks…

-​ Consensus democracy
A Consensus Democracy would function with PR elections. Elections would promote
consensus (in decision-making, bargaining and compromise), pluralism (multiple
parliamentary parties, diversity in the legislature) and decentralization (disperse
decision-making), yet dangers of ineffective governance, extreme multiparty
fragmentation, lack of accountability…

14. Party Systems and Social Cleavages

Political Parties are groups of officials or would-be officials who are linked with a sizable
group of citizens into an organization; a chief object of this organization is to ensure that its
officials attain power or are maintained in power.

They a) structure the political world, b) recruit and socialize the political elite, c) mobilize the
masses and d) link rulers and the ruled.

Party Systems
“A party system is the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition”. “Party
systems are sets of parties that compete and cooperate with the aim of increasing their
power in controlling government”. For a democratic party system, there has to be more
than one party. Democracies are unthinkable if there are no political parties.

Typologies
The crudest distinction of party systems is the one of two-party systems vs multi-party
systems, but this is not a simple dichotomy; there is huge variation.
Before looking at explanations of those difference, let’s first establish criteria of classification:
1.​ Fragmentation (or fractionalization):
a.​ The number of parties competing in an election + their success in obtaining
votes.
b.​ The degree to which votes and seats are scattered or concentrated
across parties.
2.​ Party Competition/Polarization

Fragmentation
Refers to the number of parties competing in an election, and their success in obtaining
votes (and seats). It is the degree to which votes and seats are scattered across parties.

How many parties exist and how big are they?

-​ Idea of Significant Parties: Taking into consideration their blackmail (chantaje) and
coalition potential.
-​ Effective Number of Parties (ENP): Counting the number of parties and weighting
them according to their electoral/parliamentary strength.

Consequences of fragmentation
Increasing openness/greater opportunity windows for new parties; higher likelihood of
coalition/minority governments; increasing complexity of domestic politics; higher
unpredictability of political outcomes.

Party competition dynamics/polarization

Moving from quantity of parties to quality of party competition. The polarization may
influence outcomes of the elections and the country’s politics. There are two models:

1.​ Downsian spatial model: voters choose parties ideologically close to them; may
consider to abstain if equidistant from two parties or too far away from any parties.
2.​ Sartori’s classification:
a.​ Centrifugal forces in proportional systems (parties are more likely to tend
towards the extremes, potentially delegitimizing democracy, Weimar
Republic)
b.​ Centripetal forces in majoritarian systems (parties tend towards the
center)

Consequences of polarization
Polarization may undermine democratic legitimacy, if taken to the extreme (too much or
too little polarization) and eventually lead to democratic collapse. But it does, on average,
increase interest in politics and turnout.

Democratic types of party systems: fragmentation and polarization

1.​ Dominant-party systems: Sweden (SAP), Norway (Labour), Ireland (FF), pre-1993
Italy (DC), pre-1975 India (Congress), Japan (LDP). Do they exist anymore?
2.​ Two-party systems: UK (until 2010), US, Australia, pre-1993 Canada, Portugal,
Spain, Austria, Greece (not anymore)
3.​ Bipolar systems:France, post-1993 Italy, Germany (two coalitions of parties)
4.​ Multiparty systems (at least three political parties):
a.​ Moderate: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Netherlands, Switzerland
b.​ Polarized: Weimar Republic in Germany
Pros and cons
Determinants of Party System Fragmentation
1.​ Cleavage Structure
a.​ Social divisions are the primary driving force behind the formation of parties
b.​ The more social cleavages there are and the more cross-cutting they are, the
greater the demand for distinctive representation and the greater the
demand for political parties.
2.​ Electoral system
a.​ It influences how social divisions are translated into political parties
3.​ Time

1.​ Cleavage structure

A specific type of conflict in democratic politics that is rooted in the social structural
transformation that has been triggered by large-scale processes such as nation building or
industrialization. In democracies, it ends up with the creation of specific political parties
or to be incorporated to the public discourse.

Only divisions that have these 3 elements are cleavages:

1.​ Empirical (attribute): different people in terms of attributes (places, religion, etc.)
2.​ Normative (identity): different people in terms of their identity (religion, etc.)
3.​ Organizational/Behavioural consequences of these previous elements
Parties are not cleavages, they are consequences of cleavages.

Types:
-​ Centre - Periphery (ethnic/linguistic) → Regionalism
-​ State - Church → Chrisitan-Democratic (religious) parties
-​ Owner - Worker → Socialist/Communist parties
-​ Urban - Rural → Agrarian parties

Freezing hypothesis - The party structure created in the 1920s was the same in the 1960s,
and they predicted that it would be the same 40 years later, but it wasn’t. In the long term,
social cleavages have changed and are not the same anymore. For example, now there
are new social cleavages: immigrants, ecological crisis, Euroscepticism…

The logic of political competition focuses voter and elite attention on some cleavages
and not others. Not all cultural and ethnic divisions become politicized by politicians.

Cross-cutting or reinforcing cleavages

 1.​ Cross-cutting: high probability that two randomly chosen people are in the same
group on one cleavage but different groups on the other
2.​ Reinforcing / Overlapping: high probability that two randomly chosen people will be
in the same group on every cleavage
Societies in which social cleavages are cross-cutting tend to be more stable (more parties
as well), while societes with key social reinforcing cleavages tend to be less stable, more
polarized (fewer parties as well).

2. Electoral Systems
Voting systems affect the number and form of political parties. Electoral formulas can be
majoritarian, proportional and mixed. PR produces more parties than majoritarian
systems (which favor a two-party system) with mixed systems lying somewhere in the
middle.

Mechanisms in order to explain the effect of electoral systems on party systems:

-​ Mechanical: Disproportionality & the Sheriff of Nottingham (votes → seats)
-​ Psychological: Strategic entry & Tactical vote (incentives)

Careful with the type of majoritarian system (UK/FR) → Duverger’s Law and Hypothesis
-​ The simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system (UK)
-​ The simple-majority system with second ballot [run-off] and proportional​
representation favours multipartism (France)

Careful with the type of PR system (Spain/Sweden) → District Magnitude

-​ The smaller the number of representatives elected from an electoral district, the more
disproportional the party system, and the smaller the effective number of parties.

1 & 2. Social Cleavages and Electoral Systems

Social cleavages create the demand for political parties. But electoral institutions
determine whether this latent demand for representation leads to the existence of new
parties. Specifically, non-proportional or non-permissive electoral systems act as a brake on
the tendency for social cleavages to be translated into new
parties.

15.

Consequences of Democratic Institutions

Types of democracy
 -​ Typologies and classifications are important to understand how democracies work.
-​ Developing typologies of democracy as a whole system has always been proved to
be very difficult.
-​ The increasing transnational diffusion of institutions and ideas tends to make models
of democracy less internally coherent and consistent: globalization.

Majoritarian versus Consensus democracies

The most important attempt to develop a comprehensive typology is seen in Lijphart’s
distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracy.

1.​ Majoritarian (Westminster) democracies: those in which a winning party could

exercise virtually limitless power within a political system (UK).
2.​ In consensus democracies, power was more likely to be shared rather than
contested, minorities were formally included in decision-making processes and
executive power was limited by other government branches.

Majoritarian vision of democracy

Two alternative teams of politicians compete for the support of voters. The team selected
is the one with the majority of the voters, which must implement the policies that it ran on
during the election campaign.

Citizens know which team is responsible for policy outcomes, and they can use their
evaluation of the policy record when deciding whether to reward or punish the incumbent in
the following election. Citizens only get to exert influence at election time.

Policy should be determined only by the majority. The involvement of the minority in the
policy-making process is considered illegitimate. Power is to be concentrated in the hands
of a single majority team of politicians.

Consensus vision of democracy

During elections, citizens are to choose representatives from as wide a range of social
groups as possible. These representatives are advocates who bargain on your behalf in the
promotion of the common good.

Elections should produce a legislature that is a miniature reflection of society as a whole.

Elections are not designed to serve as some sort of referendum on the set of policies
implemented by the government. Citizens exert influence over the policymaking process
between elections through the ongoing bargaining of their elected representatives.

Policy should be determined by as many citizens (and their representatives) as possible.

Citizens with majority preferences do noy have a privileged status. Restrictions placed on
the ability of the majority to ride roughshod over the preferences of the minority.
Types of political representation
-​ Formalistic: how representatives are authorized and held accountable
-​ Descriptive: whether representatives resemble and ‘stand for’ their constituents
-​ Symbolic: the symbolic ways that representatives ‘stand for’ the citizens
-​ Substantive: how representatives ‘act for’ the people and promote their
interests

1.​ Authorization / Accountability

Accountability refers to the extent to which it is possible for voters to sanction parties for
the actions they take while in office. Authorization and accountability are treated
differently in the majoritarian and consensus visions of democracy.
-​ In majoritarian systems, it is majority support that authorizes political actors to
wield power.
-​ In consensus systems, power is to be distributed among political actors in direct
proportion to their electoral size
The two systems do not always live up to these ideals in practice.

Clarity of responsibility is the extent to which voters can identify exactly who it is that is
responsible for the policies that are implemented, and is thus a necessary condition for
accountability. It tends to be high in majoritarian systems and low in consensus
systems.

2.​ Substantive representation

Substantive representation occurs when representatives take actions in line with the
substantive and ideological interests of those they represent. It can be evaluated in
terms of ideological congruence or ideological responsiveness.
-​ Ideological congruence: the extent to which the actions of the representatives are
in line with the interests of the people at a fixed point in time.
-​ Ideological responsiveness: how representatives change their behaviour to
become more congruent with the interests of the people over time.

Majoritarian and consensus systems differ in how they think about ideological
congruence:
 -​ Majoritarian systems want congruence with the majority, represented by the
preference of the median voter.
-​ Consensus wants congruence with the full distribution of voter preferences.

Empirically, the ideological congruence of governments with their citizens is very similar in
majoritarian and consensus systems. Theoretically, majoritarian systems should exhibit
higher levels of ideological responsiveness. The incentives and ability to be responsible
should be higher in majoritarian systems.

3.​ Descriptive representation

It calls for representatives who share the same characteristics, such as race, gender,
religion and class, as those they represent. Descriptive representation is valued more
highly in consensus democracies than in majoritarian democracies. Two arguments:
-​ It is valuable in its own right - it signals a policy of recognition and acceptance, and it
promotes a sense of fairness and legitimacy.
-​ It can be a pathway to improved substantive representation.

Critics of descriptive representation argue that it can promote group essentialism, the idea
that all members of a group share an essential identity that only they can have and
understand. This can be divisive and causes people to ignore heterogeneity within
groups.

-​ Women: average level of women’s legislative representation is 20,9%. In only two

countries, Rwanda and Bolivia, do women comprise a legislative majority.

Gender distortions can arise in each stage of the political recruitment process:
set of eligible candidates, only some aspire to compete for office/are nominated by a
political party/are elected.

Proportional electoral rules help the election of women candidates. Somehow

mixed evidence as to whether open list or closed list PR systems are best.

Over the last two decades, gender quotas have played a significant role in
increasing the share of women legislators around the world: reserved legislative
seats, legislated candidate quotas, voluntary political party quotas.

Some evidence suggests that the descriptive representation of women

improved their substantive representation. The strength of the evidence is
however contested. ​

4.​ Symbolic representation

It constructs boundaries that allow us to see who and what is being represented. It
challenges the notion that there are constituencies out there waiting to be represented. It
suggests that representatives ‘create’ constituencies for themselves to represent
through the symbolic claims they make about their constituents.

If constituencies are constructed, then symbolic representation is a process by which

certain groups or identities are deemed worthy of representation and others are not.

In addition to identifying who is worthy of representation, the constitutive process of symbolic

representation also identifies who can appropriately represent particular groups.