CA-G.R. No.

12114 ​ ​ May 25, 1955

The People of the Philippines, plaintiff and appellee, vs. Jose Mandoriao, Jr. defendant
and appellant

DE LEON, J.:

At about 6:00 in the evening of March 31, 1953, the Iglesia Ni Cristo held a religious rally at a
public place in the City Camp, City of Baguio. Approximately 200 people attended the meeting,
about 50 of whom were members of the Iglesia Ni Cristo and the rest were outsiders and
curious listeners. While Plutarco Salvio, a minister of the congregation, was expounding on his
topic to the effect that Jesus Christ is not God, but only a man, the crowd became unruly and
many of them shouted and made noise. They were some people the gathering who urged the
appellant, Jose Mandoriao, Jr., to go up the stage and have a debate with Salvio. Among those
who were shouting were the appellant’s father, Jose Mandoriao, Sr., and co-defendant Alipio
Rivera. Appellant went up the stage and challenged Salvio to a debate. Said appellant,
however, was not able to speak before the microphone because the wire connecting it was
abruptly disconnected.

Jose Mandoriao, Jr., and Alipio Rivera, were accused of a violation of Article 133 of the Revised
Penal Code in the Court of First Instance of Baguio under the following information:

“The undersigned accuses Jose Mandoriao, Jr. and Alipio Rivera of the violation of
Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows: “That on or about the 31st
day of March, 1953, in the City of Baguio, Philippines and with the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, and while the devotees of the ‘Iglesia ni Christo Church’ were holding a
religious service or rally at City Camp, Baguio, with proper permit, the said accused,
corispiring, confederating and mutually aiding each other, did then and then willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously disturb the same, that is, the accused Jose Mandoriao went
up the stage and grabbed the mike from the preacher. Mr. Plutarco Salvio, and the
accused Alipio Rivera uttering derogatory remarks against said Igiesia ni Christo and
threatening to shoot the preacher, all of which were notoriously offensive to the feelings
of the devotees therein."

After due trial, Alipio Rivera was acquitted, while Jose Mandoriao, Jr., was found guilty of
the crime charged and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day of
arresto mayor and to pay the costs.

After due trial, Alipio Rivera was acquitted, while Jose Mandoriao, Jr., was found guilty of the
crime charged and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor
and to pay the costs.
Mandoriao’s counsel contends that the lower court erred in finding that the religious rally in
question was a religious ceremony within the purview of Article 133 of the Revised Code, and
that the acts ascribed to the appellant were notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.

Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

“ART. 133. Offending the religious feelings.-The penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prison correcional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon
anyone who, in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any
religious ceremony shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.”

The law punishes “acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful” performed “in a place
devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony.” There is no
question that the place, where the rally was held is not a place devoted to religious worship. But
was the meeting held a celebration of a religious ceremony within the meaning of the phrase
employed in the above-quoted provision of the law While Plutarco Salvio claims that the
meeting in question was a religious ceremony of his sect, yet the application of the Church of
Christ to hold the meeting (Exhibit 1) and the permit (Exhibit 2 or A) expressly state that the
purpose was to hold a religious rally. After carefully examining the evidence of record before us,
we cannot see our Way clear in declaring that what was held on that occasion was a religious
ceremony. A religious meeting has been defined as “an assemblage of people met for the
purpose of performing acts of adoration to the Supreme-Being, or to perform religious services
in recognition of God as an object of worship, love and obedience, it matters not the faith with
respect to the Deity entertained by the persons so assembled.” (27 C. J. S. 497). By this
definition, it seems that a person attends a religious ceremony, like a procession during a
religious holiday or the saying of special prayers for burying the dead, not because he is invited
to attend, but because it is his duty or obligation to his religion to do so. Salvio testified that the
meeting was not limited to the members of his congregation. This statement of Salvio
corraborates the declaration of the appellant who said that he joined the rally because it was
broadcast through a loud speaker installed at the place of the meeting that the people were
invited to attend the same. According to Salvio, out of the 200 people approximated by him to
be present in the meeting, only about 50 were members of his sect. Ambroio Daludado, another
State witness, testified that the meeting was held with the end in view of acquiring new
members of his church. We surmise that Daludado is a ranking member of the Iglesia Ni Cristo.
In fact, he was the one who secured the permit for the meeting from the proper City authorities.
He knows, therefore, what he is talking about.

By the admissions of the prosecution witnesses themselves, it would show that the supposed
prayers and singing Of hymns were merely incidental-to attract the inquisitive ‘to attend the
rally-and that the principal object thereof was to persuade new converts to their religious belief
and creed. This seems to be the most logical explanation for the holding of the meeting
because, according to Salvio, the Iglesia Ni Cristo had 2 chapels located in Guisad and Pacdal,
of the. City of Baguio, besides other chapels outside said City. As such, the congregation could
have celebrated its religious rituals solemnly and without any possible interruption in any of
these chapels and without the necessity of obtaining a permit from the authorities or of
constructing a temporary stage in an open space, as it did in this case.

It has been held that the reading of the Bible, or any incidental “religious service, in a public
schoolhouse, does not transform such schoolhouse into a place of worship (People vs.
Fernandez, CA-G. R. No. 1128-R, May 29, 1948). By analogy, we believe that the mere saying
of prayers and the singing of hymn in an open space do not render such place as one devoted
to religious worship and much less make such an occasion a religious ceremony within the
purview of Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code. While it is not our desire to deny to any one
the right to free speech and the right of a religious sect to preach its church doctrine or gospel
and seek new followers, it must be borne in mind that “religion and religious worship are not so
placed under the ban of the Constitution that they may not be allowed to become the recipient of
any incidental benefit whatsoever from the public bodies or authorities of the State.” (People vs.
Fernandez, supra). If we were to hold that the meeting in question was a religious ceremony,
entitled to protection under Article 133, said provision of the Code is apt to be abused. Other
religious denominations in this country, whose early history was marked by a bitter struggle
between Church and State and whose early people suffered and died by reason of religious
intolerance, would follow the instant incident of the Iglesia Ni Cristo and hold open meetings
under the guise of religious ceremonies and avail themselves of the opportunity to criticize and
villify rival sects, their Deities and teachings, and make every inch of the country a place to
celebrate their so-called religious ceremonies, without fear of interruption and without reverence
for the religious leanings of others. We believe such a case, where disagreements are bound to
crop up and passions to run high among those in the audience who hold views contrary to those
who might compose the negligible few, is not within the constitutional guaranty of freedom of
religion, which inspired our legislators to make the offense defined under Articles 132 and 133 of
the Revised Penal Code punishable as crimes against religious worship.

But assuming, arguendo, that the rally in question was a religious ceremony, did the appellant
perform “acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful?” His Honor, the trial judge, said:
“It must be stated here that said accused Mandariao had not then stated any notorious offensive
words. At least, there is no clear evidence that he had pronounced any insulting word.” To this,
we fully agree. Even the information filed by the City Attorney does not charge the appellant with
having uttered any offensive word. The information merely accuses Mandoriao of disturbing the
meeting by going up the stage and grabbing the mike from the preacher, ”which acts the City
Attorney alleges were notoriously offensive to the feelings of the devotees therein. His Honor,
the trial judge, concurred in this View of the City Attorney. To this, we beg to disagree.

Justice Albert has this to say: “An act is said to be notoriously offensive to the religious feelings
of the faithful when a person ridicules or makes light of anything constituting a religious dogma ;
mocks or scoffs at anything devoted to religious ceremonies; plays with or damages or destroys
any object of veneration by the faithful” (People vs. Baes, 68 Phil., 203). Justice Laurel, in his
dissenting Opinion in People vs. Baes, supra, said: “I believe that an act, in order to be
considered as notoriously” offensive to the religious feelings, must be one directed against
religious practice or dogma or ritual for the purpose of ridicule; the offender, for instance, mocks,
scoffs at or attempts to damage an object of religious venaration; it must be abusive, insulting
and obnoxious (Viada, Cemen-tarios al Codigo Penal, 707, 708; vide also Pacheco, Codigo
Penal, 359).” The act complained of must be directed against a dogma or ritual, or upon an
object of veneration. There was no object of veneration at the meeting. The mere fact that
Mandoriao ascended the stage, challenged Salvio to a debate, and allegedly grabbed the
microphone do not constitute acts calculated to ridicule or make light of a religious ritual. They
might be punishable as a public disturbance, under Article 153 of the Revised Penal Code, but
we cannot consider them as acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.

However, may the appellant be held criminally liable under Article 153 of the Revised Penal
Code? While the information in this case is a sufficient indictment, the evidence of record does
not show the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt under this provision of the Code.
Antonio Dulay, who did not know the appellant before the incident in question, declared that
there was already a commotion before Mandoriao went up the stage; and, that there were some
people who urged the appellant, who is himself a minister of the Association of Baptist
Churches, gym-have a debate with Salvio. The lower court believed this claim of Dulay when it
found: “Some of those in the crowd asked and urged the accused Mandoriao, Jr., to go up the
stage and debate with Plutarco Salvio. Mandoriao went up the stage and challenged Plutarco
Salvio to a debate.” Dulay also said that the commotion came about because of the remarks of
Salvio that Christ is not God, only a man; that those who believed that Christ is God are
anti-Christ; that all the members of the Roman Church, from the highest official down to the last
“Ember, are marked by the demon; and, that the Pope is The commander-in-chief of Satan. If,
therefore, on that occasion any one has, done or said , anything beyond the limits of propriety
and in clear abuse of his freedom of speech and religion, it, certainly, was not the appellant; it
was Plutarco Salvio who made those uncalled for remarks notoriously offensive to the feelings
of the faithful. We find that the meeting was interrupted because of those remarks of Plutarco
Salvio which naturally sparked indignant and antagonistic comments from the crowd. Even the
lower court admitted that these dissertations of Salvio irked and offended those of the audience
who were not members of the Iglesia Ni Cristo so that the crowd became unruly and many
shouted and made noise. It was when the crowd was already indignant and many were shouting
and making noise that appellant Mandoriao went up the stage on the insistence of the crowd.

Furthermore, the appellant denied that he grabbed the microphone from Salvio and said that he
did not need a loud speaker in order to be heard by a crowd of only 200 people because his
voice was loud enough to dominate such a small gathering. Antonio Dulay said that he did not
see the appellant grab the microphone. The lower court dubbed this testimony of Dulay as
evasive and concluded that it was tantamount to a direct admission that ‘Mandoriao grabbed the
microphone Even as His Honor observed, while the appellant was on the witness-stand, that
said appellant had a powerful physique and lungs, with solid penetrating voice, His Honor
rejected the claim of appellant and Witness Dulay and said that “it is non-sensical and highly
impossible that Dulay, who was among the crowd in front of the stage, would not see an
important happening on that stage,” that is, the alleged grabbing of the microphone by the
appellant. We find no plausible reason why witness Dulay should tell the truth on some points
and perjure himself on others in order to help the appellant whom he did not know until the latter
was charged in court. In a commotion or disturbance, it is hard for 2 witnesses to tell all the
details that occurred. This is because one’s attention is not always focused at one place or
event. It might happen that, while one’s, attention is fixed at one place or event, others are
simultaneously taking place in another. It must be remembered that the crowd became unruly
and indignant because of the uncalled-for slurs made by Salvio against Christ. It is probable
that, for some time, Dulay’s attention was involuntarily switched to those behind him who were
shouting and when he again reverted his attention to the stage, Mandoriao already was holding
the microphone. The rally had already ceased to be peaceful when appellant went up the stage.
Appellant was not able to talk before the microphone because the wire connecting the said
microphone with the loud speaker was already disconnected. If anyone was to blame for the
disturbance in that meeting, it was the principal speaker, Salvio, whose mocking and insulting
remarks about Jesus Christ had naturally irked the ire and indignance of the audience.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the appellant, Jose Mandoriao,
Jr., acquitted, Without costs. So ordered.”

Dizon and Rodas, JJ., concur.