Chapter 1.

PRESENTING A WORLD VIEW

Calculations, Culture and Clarity

T
hree years ago, in my earlier book The India Way: Strategies for an
Uncertain World, I had urged that ‘this is a time for us to engage
America, manage China, cultivate Europe, reassure Russia, bring
Japan into play, draw neighbours in, extend the neighbourhood, and expand
traditional constituencies of support’.1 In the period that has passed, much
of this has advanced but, obviously, not equally on all fronts. Some have
progressed smoothly; others have been more complicated than expected. In
the meantime, the world itself has witnessed deeper transformation. The
challenges of a global order in transition have been magnified by the back-
to-back impact of the Covid pandemic, the Ukraine conflict and the fighting
in West Asia.
There is no question that this has now become a much tougher world.
For India specifically, the going has been far from easy. Many of the larger
concerns have impacted it directly. The changed posture of China on the
border, in particular, is a major factor in its strategic calculus. But a
determined leadership and a supportive society are helping it to navigate
this turbulent era. Rising powers seek stability most of all; India must plan
to rise amidst serious unpredictability.
International relations for the last quarter of the century have been
dominated by five phenomena: globalization, rebalancing, multipolarity,
impact of technology and the games that nations have always played.
Globalization, the most fundamental of them, will only intensify, even
though its earlier model of creating dependencies has come under growing
challenge. It has led to rebalancing the relative weight of players in the
world order. That initially unfolded economically, but its political and
cultural facets are now making themselves felt. As it proceeds, rebalancing,
in turn, will create multipolarity. A new lot of more consequential powers
will separate out, joining those dominant since 1945. This is still work in
progress, one could even say in the early stages. Much will increasingly
depend on how and with what agenda combinations of states come together.
Technology, too, has become more of a game-changer than in the past.
Its ability to impact the daily routine is much deeper, as indeed the
capability to weaponize our normal activities, needs and resources. In fact,
the pace has reached a point where we are compelled to think in terms of
‘techades’. And then there are the perennial games that nations play,
expressed through competitive politics between individual countries or,
sometimes, groupings. Each of these phenomena is a key factor in the
fashioning of contemporary Indian foreign policy, individually as much as
cumulatively. Today, India has to not just prepare for a re-globalization that
corrects economic and technology concentrations but also use that
opportunity to strengthen comprehensive national power.
Given that there is at least as much change as there is continuity in
world politics, it is obvious that our approach cannot be overly reliant on
muscle memory. Certainly, the structural framework and previous
experiences have a critical bearing. But, at the same time, the processes
described above that are continually shaping our current existence need to
be given full recognition. There are important shifts in power between and
within states that are also relevant to the overall calculation. Much of that
centres on the US, whose dominance is clearly not what it was in the past.
That it has changed is indisputable; what it leads to will be still very much a
matter of debate. And recent events have demonstrated that neither its
capabilities nor its influence should be underestimated. Reading its new
posture right is a challenge in itself, especially when it exercises influence
in a more off-shore manner. How invested it is in various regions is a
natural question, one juxtaposed against the growing presence of other
nations, especially China.
Political polarization within societies is also a factor that the diplomacy
of many states needs to take into account. Domestic changes, in the US as
much as China, are compelling some countries to recalibrate their posture
accordingly. As geopolitical arenas go, a world long used to thinking of
West Asia and Europe as the central theatres of competition is increasingly
looking at the Indo-Pacific instead. Even distant countries are, therefore,
compelled to come up with their respective Indo-Pacific approaches. The
Ukraine conflict and its energy consequences, significant as they may be,
are unlikely to dilute this development.
Each of these trends also had their own resonance on Indian foreign
policy. Handling this volatility effectively has required both intensive
strategizing and tactical fine-tuning. Our domestic policies not only ensured
recovery from the pandemic but also, thereafter, became the basis for Covid
diplomacy. In regard to Ukraine, a political posture took into account not
only the imperatives of energy and food security but the broader dynamics
of Eurasia as well. On China, a robust deployment on the border was
accompanied by conscious constraints on cooperation. With Quad partners,
we were one of the few nations who made the transition smoothly between
successive administrations so different from each other. But there were also
important political calls taken at the right time, including the upgradation of
the Quad, creating the I2U2 and devising the IMEC.
The exercise of engaging in multiple directions and constantly
balancing competitive relationships was also tested in this period. Having
invested so much in intensifying cooperation with Europe, harmonizing that
with maintaining traditional ties with Russia was not easy. As the North–
South divide deepened, undertaking the Voice of the Global South Summit
at the commencement of the G20 presidency was a timely move. And when
multipolarity continued to unfold, the broadening of India’s engagement
sought to keep pace.
The factors that drive the choices of nations have also undergone a
profound change in the last few years. Earlier, the established way to
measure the advancement of power was to use more orthodox military and
economic metrics. Our assessment of opportunities was also more
predicated on partnerships between nations. Recent events have, however,
introduced many more parameters to evaluate security and calculate gains.
And our outlook, be it directly economic or more broadly national security,
must adjust accordingly. De-risking the global economy is now a principal
preoccupation. For market economies and democratic polities, this focusses
on establishing more resilient and reliable supply chains. In the digital
domain, we see a parallel emphasis on the importance of trust and
transparency. A more decentralized world economy is increasingly
perceived as the most viable solution to current anxieties. Such sentiments
against economic concentration are only likely to intensify as tech wars
gather greater momentum. We must also accept that interdependence, in
itself, cannot always be an assured basis for international peace and
security. Re-globalization in an open-ended techade will call for trusted
collaborations of a kind that will be a new experience for all of us.

SAGA OF A RISING POWER

It is this scenario that confronts India and the world as they both
contemplate and calculate. We are heading into volatility and upheaval,
where mitigation and navigation go side by side. In fact, the transformation
that we long speculated about is now actually upon us. Externally, India is
discovering the merits of converging with like-minded nations, even while
maintaining its distinct identity. Its domestic journey enables it to offer new
terms of engagement to a growing range of partners. As the most populous
nation and currently the fifth largest economy, its salience is underlined by
the manner in which it conducted the G20 presidency. The interaction
between a changing India and a more dynamic world is clearly novel for
both of them. In that situation, the quality of its leadership will make the
difference. I have sought to capture the various happenings of a world under
exceptional stress and present them as trends against which we assess
India’s prospects. Like my previous effort, this too is intended to contribute
to an ongoing debate in an argumentative society.
Major nations that make an impact on the world do so after a defining
event. It could be a conflict, a revolution or a major economic shift.
Underlying all of them are both a jump in capacities and the character traits
of a new player at that level. In India’s case, its early diplomacy was
eventually constrained by the capability factor. It may have shown up in
national security and political challenges, but was actually a cumulative
outcome of limited progress in socio-economic and technological fields.
But somewhere, there was also the inadequate projection of a great
civilization. India’s progress has been more staggered than others in its peer
group. Today, all these variables are coming together into play as India
advances across multiple fronts in a self-supportive manner. Politics,
economics, demography, culture and ideas make a potent combination.
These deep changes across broad domains are contributing to the creation
of the New India.
The last decade has witnessed an expansion of India’s space and a rise
in its international profile. The mandala of its diplomacy has taken a clear
form, even as the Neighbourhood First policy struck roots and the extended
neighbourhoods advanced in all directions. The global footprint is widening
too, visible as much in Africa and Latin America as in the Pacific and the
Caribbean. Multiple engagements simultaneously with major power centres
have also intensified, though not always without challenges. The Vaccine
Maitri strongly reaffirmed credentials as a champion of the South, just as
first responder operations highlighted our international commitment.
Operations like Kaveri, Ganga, Devi Shakti and Ajay underline that Indians
abroad could count on their government during times of difficulty. And a
decade that began with the advocacy of yoga is appropriately seeing the
espousal of Sri Anna (millets). The journey will continue but this is a time
to take stock and assess what difference we have made. And that exercise
will surely bring out why we matter more to the world.
At the end of the day, foreign policy is very much about clinically
assessing the global landscape and calculating one’s prospects. Only if the
larger picture is accurately read can the risks and benefits of any course of
action be assessed. But no nation plans or acts in a vacuum. It must have a
vision for itself, an architecture in mind and objectives to attain. For both
practical and cultural reasons, these may not always be spelt out explicitly.
But by analysing the world, describing processes and suggesting solutions,
their outlines can nevertheless be discerned. To that extent, this is also a
volume to be read between the lines.
India’s G20 presidency is also instructive in offering insights about how
to navigate current world politics. By relentlessly shining the spotlight on
the concerns of the Global South, we were able to ensure that the G20
returned to its basic mandate of promoting international growth and
development. Defining priorities in that regard and devising collective
solutions were also objectives that were attained to considerable measure.
Faced with the parallel challenges of East–West polarization and North–
South divide, each was utilized to mitigate the other problem. A firm
diplomatic posture that included some new practices on interim outcomes
encouraged consensus to be reached when it really mattered. Taking the
initiative to enable the permanent membership of the African Union (AU)
was notable in itself and helpful in strengthening the larger narrative.
A takeaway from the G20 Summit in Delhi was the demonstration that
the more ambitious the agenda, the harder it would be for others to play
spoilsport. Equally, by nurturing crucial relationships over a period of time,
all the participants developed stakes in India’s success. Whether it was the
manner in which diplomacy was conducted, culture and heritage projected
or popular participation was encouraged, the G20 presidency was very
much an exercise in the India way.
As a practitioner long associated with our diplomacy, there are two
responsibilities that I seek to discharge through this book. One is to share
the thinking of a rising power with a world that has become increasingly
aware of that happening. The other is to communicate the necessity of
accurately understanding global developments to our own people. Only
then can our nation fully appreciate the opportunities and challenges that lie
before it. These twin exercises are, however, united in their cultural
underpinnings. After all, this foundation influences our approach to the
world as a family, as it does the pluralistic and consultative nature of our
society. They shape our political ethos too, just as they promote our
democratic choices. The manner in which debates are conducted, decisions
reached and positions articulated, all have their own cultural signature. But
above all, they bring out the values and ethics that are at the core of our
collective personality.
Sagas of nations, while developed to grip the imagination of their
peoples, are a distillate of wisdom, beliefs and habits. For those whose
cultures and traditions came under pressure in difficult periods of history,
they are also a crucial motivator. The really great tales offer insights that
help to spread influence beyond boundaries and to help propagate
messages. It is, therefore, tempting to draw from them lessons that can be
applied to the contemporary world. Especially in times of turbulence,
episodes and outcomes can provide guidance, offer parallels and strengthen
self-belief. Indeed, because epics serve as an instructive way to view the
happenings of any period, they remain eternally relevant.
Of India’s two major epics, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, it is the
latter that is normally associated with statecraft and diplomacy. There are
many reasons for this perception, among them the storyline itself. But even
that arises from the fact that these two sagas are set in different eras, each
with their own behavioural expectations. The Ramayana, which is the
earlier one, has purity of thought and nobility of conduct as its central
message. In contrast, the Mahabharata is much more a chronicle of human
frailty and pursuance of ambition. In today’s terminology, we would see one
as a quest for the observance of rules and norms, while assessing the other
as an exercise in realpolitik. Since the international order cannot be built on
unrestrained competition, the quest to establish and uphold standards has
always been relevant. This is perhaps even more relevant today in a world
that is so much in ferment. The Ramayana could be studied from that
perspective, highlighting both the merits and challenges of building a rules-
based order.
The ethical dimensions of the Ramayana are exceptionally strong as
compared to not only the Mahabharata but even to the epics of other
cultures. Its grassroots understanding is one of a clear-cut battle of good
against evil. This is why it is celebrated through festivals and fables across
much of Asia. But even within this template, there are complexities,
dilemmas and compulsions that hold lessons for a student of strategy. How
goodwill is leveraged, commitments are made, coalitions are built and
choices exercised are all graphically illustrated by the narrative. In most
cases, the decisions appear obvious, yet, the crucial events have a backstory
without which our understanding is not complete.
In essence, the Ramayana is a saga of a divine force that assumes
human incarnation, Rama, to cleanse the world of evil. In that process, he
sets the norms for personal conduct and promotes good governance. For
that reason, we may see his rule as the epitome of a rules-based order,
known as ‘Ram Rajya’. The narrative, as it unfolds, is understandably much
more complicated than only these propositions. It begins with building
strengths and acquiring capabilities that give Lord Rama, the chief
protagonist, his formidable reputation. While subject to various tests, he is
able to handle them with a dexterity that prepares him for the final
challenge. His relationship with his half-brother Lakshmana is particularly
close, though he also commands the affection of his two other siblings,
Bharata and Shatrughna. The tale is one of political intrigue, as Rama’s
stepmother Kaikeyi invokes one of the two boons given by his father
Dasaratha to insist on Rama’s exile at the very time when he is to be
crowned. The abduction, during his forest exile, of his wife Sita by the
demon-king Ravana is the key event on which subsequent developments are
centred.
As Rama prepares a campaign to rescue her, a number of stratagems
emerge, all of which have found their way into folklore. The 10-day battle
in which Rama is ultimately successful is not without its moments of
anxiety. The role of Hanuman as his devotee, emissary, resource person and
adviser is particularly noteworthy. But whether it is the importance of
reliable friends, the challenges of creating coalitions, the dangers of open-
ended commitments, the perils of strategic complacency, the value of
effective diplomacy or the need for informationized warfare, there is much
that today’s world can learn from this era.
Most of all, the story of Lord Rama is an account of a rising power that
is able to harmonize its particular interests with a commitment to doing
global good. The tests that he is subjected to encourage strategic creativity.
Many of the decision points are those of principle, and the choices are,
consequently, less ambiguous. But there are also occasions of self-interest,
where the justification for an action stems from a particular need. Lord
Rama’s intervention in the battle between the monkey-kings Vali and
Sugriva, explained at length later, is a case in point. It is not without its
ethical aspects; it is just that the understanding of ethics is different from its
orthodox assumptions.
Life is rarely a black-and-white choice, and appreciating the
complexities of decision-making is an essential part of grasping
international relations. A major rising power, however, needs more than just
an accurate landscape analysis and the ability to act on it. It must, first of
all, be confident of its own values and beliefs and base its policies on those
convictions. These will draw from the totality of its culture, heritage and
traditions. That is why India can only rise when it is truly Bharat.

1S. Jaishankar, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World, HarperCollins India, 2020.
 Chapter 5.
A TRANSFORMATIONAL DECADE
Laying the Foundations of a Leading Power

I
n 2015, PM Narendra Modi publicly articulated India’s quest to become
a leading power one day. Some treated it as a statement of arrival when
it was actually meant to be an expression of an aspiration. In the decade
that has passed, it has also become clearer that this is now work in serious
progress. While inaugurating the Bharat Mandapam in 2023, the same
thinking was reiterated by the PM in a determination to emerge as the third-
largest global economy. And a year before, in a departure from tradition, he
made a public appeal to think and plan for an entire era, not just a term in
office. This was characterized as Amrit Kaal, a quarter century with its goal
as India’s emergence as a developed nation.
Each of these assertions has a profound foreign-policy implication,
especially because they are being voiced not merely as a broad ambition but
with specific targets and goals for which India is now strategizing. The
achievements of the last decade point to how steadily and systematically the
foundations are being laid for a global footprint.
From his first day in office as the PM, Narendra Modi put his stamp on
the nation’s foreign policy. He demonstrated diplomatic imagination by
inviting neighbouring leaders to his oath-taking ceremony in 2014, a step
that orthodox thinking had not even contemplated. His US visit later that
year served to bring on stage a new kind of public diplomacy. He infused
greater energy into Indian endeavours, reaching out with an intensity and
spread that was so different from his predecessors. In the time that has
passed, PM Modi tabled fresh ideas and initiatives in various geographies
and domains, ranging from energy and climate to counter-terrorism and
connectivity. He has been active on key global issues, often directly shaping
the outcomes.
 This is not someone who is content with simply extrapolating on what
he inherited. Instead, he has given foreign policy greater strategic clarity,
stronger conceptual basis, heightened activity and better delivery. This was
evident in the manner in which the immediate neighbourhood was
approached and the extended one was engaged. It was also visible in the
assessment of the global order and building stronger relationships with
major power centres. There was then the planned cultivation of middle
powers, of regions and sub-regions. This was paralleled by publicly
upholding the interests of the Global South. The delivery of Indian projects
there was radically improved, making them a visible symbol of a New
India. First responder capabilities were effectively demonstrated, as was the
ability to look after our citizens abroad when in distress. Fresh strategic
concepts emerged, and so did new mechanisms and memberships.
The cumulative results were visible in India’s higher global standing
now. In other circumstances, it could well be called a transformational
decade. But given the ambitious objectives set out, real changes have just
begun. There is still a considerable road to traverse.

Nations and individuals come of age through demonstrations of strength. In the Ramayana,
the relevant episode is the stringing of Shiva’s bow by Rama when he goes to visit Janaka,
the king of Mithila. This was a weapon of extraordinary capability that Shiva himself had
given for safekeeping to Janaka’s ancestor Devaratha, at a particular time when he could
not trust himself to keep his emotions in check. Janaka had decided that he would allow
only the person who could lift and string this bow to marry his daughter Sita. And it was this
feat that not only ensured the marriage of Rama and Sita but announced the arrival of
Rama into the world of warriors. This was immediately tested in a confrontation with
Parasurama, a sage who obsessively fought the warrior community. Rama bested him by
capturing and stringing Vishnu’s bow made by Vishwakarma, the counterpart of Shiva’s bow
he had just strung, which had first come into the possession of Parasurama’s grandfather.
These were but the beginnings, and at every stage of his journey, Lord Rama overcame
obstacles to realize his true potential.
Major tests do not come out of the blue. More often than not, they are preceded by
earlier experiences of a significant nature. That is the natural evolution of people as it is of
states. In Rama’s case, this first happened when sages demanded his services to deal with
demons that were ruining their sacrifices. Rama’s father, Dasaratha, was naturally reluctant
to expose him to such risks but finally consented with great hesitation. This attitude is also a
systemic response in most countries when confronted with new threats.
In Rama’s case, he first had to overcome the female demon Tataka in the Kamasrama
forest. The next encounter in Siddhasrama was with more serious adversaries, the demons
Maricha and Subahu. One was vanquished and the other reduced to ashes. Rama and
Lakshmana then traversed the hermitage of Sage Gautama, where Rama was destined to
revive the former’s wife Ahalya who had been cursed earlier. It was only thereafter that the
brothers proceeded to Mithila to perform the feat with Shiva’s bow.
For a nation like India, it is to be expected that there will be rivers and mountains to
cross as it moves towards becoming a leading power. Some of them could be direct
challenges, others a product of larger circumstances. There could be recurring issues, as
indeed Lord Rama was to experience with the demon Maricha. At the end of the day, the
rising of a power is an exercise in perseverance, endurance and mental strength. If we are
to look for a contemporary reflection of these events where India is concerned, this may be
in building its infrastructure, upgrading its human resources, countering territorial
challenges, developing deep strengths, exercising the nuclear option and improving the
quality of governance. As it moves on to the next stage of its rise, India, too, needs to
broaden its vistas, be more aware of competitors and strengthen its comprehensive national
power.

THE NEW MANDALA

In any assessment, it is relatively easy to point to individual events and

outcomes to demonstrate a sense of change. That may not be altogether
without merit, but it cannot be the full story. Even inflection points are just
that; they only serve to highlight a larger trend. Given the scale of what
India is seeking to do over an extended period, it would be completely
natural to expect that there would be a comprehensive approach to
achieving its goals. And indeed, that is exactly what has emerged steadily
over this period.
Some facets required an occasion to be unveiled, such as the
enunciation of the SAGAR outlook during a prime ministerial visit to
Mauritius in 2015. In other cases, the rationale followed the action such as
the formalization of the Neighbourhood First policy some months after the
2014 swearing-in ceremony or, as was the case with ASEAN and beyond,
additional layers had to be added for ‘Look East’ to become ‘Act East’.
But there were also stark strategic decisions, such as the commitment to
propagate the message of Indo-Pacific. Sometimes, particular events were
devised to make a new move, such as the Forum for India–Pacific Islands
Cooperation (FIPIC) summits. On occasion, certain circumstances brought
out latent thinking, a good example being the Voice of Global South
Summit in the aftermath of Covid and Ukraine. As we near the end of a
decade, the overall strategy is obviously very much clearer than it was at
the beginning. The dots have joined into lines, even forming concentric
circles of interest.
What then is the mandala that captures India’s thinking of the world
today? At its core is obviously the immediate neighbourhood, the objects of
attention at Modi’s oath-taking ceremony in 2014. The approach here is to
begin by recognizing that India occupies a unique position in the
Subcontinent by virtue of its size, location and, increasingly, economic
weight. It is obviously in India’s interest that its immediate periphery be
stable, secure and sensitive. Ensuring this in a competitive world will
require us to underwrite the larger region and invest in the connectivity,
cooperation and contacts that make for a more cohesive geography. There
are challenges from both history, sociology and economics to overcome in
this pursuit. While they need to be managed, the heart of the
Neighbourhood First policy is for India to convince its immediate
neighbours of the benefits of closer ties and then proceed to make that
happen on the ground. This is essentially what we have seen unfold since
2014.
Today, we are looking at a distinctly different picture, where trans-
border transmission grids, fuel pipelines, roads, railways and waterways,
and smooth border crossing have become the hallmark of our times. All this
is underpinned by the usage of each other’s capabilities, be it in goods
movement, ports or power generation. It has allowed the entire region to
benefit through larger scale and greater efficiency. The real test of
Neighbourhood First came in Sri Lanka’s economic crisis and India’s
expeditious response has done much to enhance the credibility of its stance.
The second circle of priority is the extended neighbourhood. In every
direction, the Modi government has, by now, laid out an intricate plan of
engagement. In the case of ASEAN and Pacific nations, the upgradation of
cooperation is expressed in domains like security, development and digital.
As a result, the Act East Policy not only deepens India’s presence in
Southeast Asia but also positions it as a launching pad to the Pacific region
and beyond.
Towards the Gulf, the ‘Link West’ approach has seen an unprecedented
intensification of activities in a range of areas. Ties with the UAE, in
particular, have helped to accelerate the pace of progress. Obviously, India
only stands to benefit as others seek to compete. From the days when our
vision of the Gulf was limited to energy and labour, this now extends to
technology, education, innovation, investment and security. Even traditional
areas like energy have witnessed broader Indian participation. Not least, the
Gulf also serves as a bridgehead for greater involvement with Africa.
To the south, the SAGAR outlook brings together our maritime
neighbours in an integrated manner. Some countries like Sri Lanka and the
Maldives overlap with the Neighbourhood First policy. But others today
note the stronger focus and larger resources that India is prepared to devote.
Our development partnership with Mauritius has emerged as an exemplar in
this context. The underlying maritime cooperation has also become the
basis for an emerging security conclave that encourages more cooperative
thinking.
To the north, Connect Central Asia Policy is the last piece of the puzzle
which forges more systemic linkages with culturally comfortable partners.
The agenda here is much more about connectivity, de-radicalization and
development. For many of these states, India offers options that strengthen
their overall positioning.
Clearly, how smoothly India advances in its multiple quests depends on
the nature of its ties with major powers. In certain cases, Europe being one,
constituent segments of a collective also need to be engaged individually.
Many of them have the ability to facilitate this process; some have the
ability to obstruct as well. It is naturally our endeavour to continually create
an optimal mix. And this cannot be done by always staying the middle
course or ducking the difficult problems. Obviously, there is a strong case
for both prudence and perseverance. But there is an even more powerful
one for understanding which relationship serves our interest best on which
issues. As a result, contemporary diplomacy looks far from linear, often
ending up in apparent zigzags. But the real test of its effectiveness is
whether it puts India ahead in the competitive game. And such periodic
assessments, therefore, assume importance in both policy validation and
course correction, where required.
An essential part of preparing for a global footprint is to expand the
breadth of interactions. The truth is that a very large number of nations have
been engaged very perfunctorily by India for many years now. Even today,
there are countries that are receiving an Indian foreign minister for the first
time in their history. Realizing this, our efforts in the last decade have been
to find more efficient ways of conducting global diplomacy.
A vigorous participation in existing mechanisms and the invention of
new ones helps to address this challenge. The Quad and FIPIC in the Indo-
Pacific, the I2U2 in West Asia, and the India–Nordic Summit in Europe are
relevant examples at the highest level. The IMEC is the latest in the list.
Those with ASEAN, the EU, Africa and BRICS have, of course, continued
apace. But these are now also supplemented at ministerial levels by formats
with Central Europe, Caribbean and Central America. As with Europe and
the rest of Asia, we can relate more purposefully to broader geographies
like Africa and Latin America by dealing with sub-regions. The opening of
new embassies, especially in Africa, is part of the same endeavour.
An important source of strength is the growth in investments, trade and
projects of Indian businesses abroad. India is today among the top five
economic partners of many countries of Africa and Latin America. The
movement of our professionals is adding an additional layer to many
relationships. Similarly, development projects supported through grants and
soft loans across 78 nations of the Global South demonstrate capability as
much as a solution to a local need. Quite apart from our national branding,
it is the presence on the ground in so many manifestations that is imprinting
India in the mind space of societies even far away.
The spatial mandala is accompanied by a conceptual one. Indian foreign
policy today recognizes more explicitly the imperatives of national security
in setting priorities and making choices. But security itself is perceived in
much broader and deeper terms. AatmaNirbhar Bharat Abhiyan and Make
in India are neither economic protectionism nor political slogans. They are,
in fact, a quest to build deeper strengths and greater strategic autonomy that
is required by a nation aspiring to be a leading power. Increasingly,
economic security also cohabits with technological security.
The digital domain is its most visible expression, though obviously far
from being the only one. India’s goal is not of moving the needle in the
direction of autarky but, instead, to create the capabilities that would make
it a serious player at a global level. The demand for resilient and reliable
supply chains are a chance that could be exploited with the right policies.
Similarly, the knowledge economy is its big opportunity, and transparent
and trusted data flows assign a value to India that must be fully appreciated.
Participating more intensively in the global economy will not just require
better preparations and the right outlook but also the appropriate human
resources.
Investing in skilling them for contemporary times is now being
paralleled by endeavours to promote Indian talent through start-ups and
innovation. These are not just economic or even social initiatives but
strategic steps laden with deep meaning for international relations. Let us
not forget that one important driver of the transformed India–US
relationship was the H1B visa flow. Addressing the rising aspirations of
people at home and realizing ambitions abroad are but two sides of the
same coin.

THE INDIA STORY

While the manner of engaging the world may be more considered, its
effectiveness will really be judged by how the world views us now. It is,
therefore, worthwhile to reflect on the changing external perceptions of
India. Much of this centres on the nation’s economic and technological
progress. We were seen as the global back office for many years, but India
has now surged well past that limited image. The knowledge economy has
increasingly made us the crucial technology partner for many economies.
The talk has now shifted to collaboration in complex fields like defence
manufacturing and semiconductors. Our infrastructure improvements,
coupled with making it easier to do business, have propelled us to become
the largest destination for foreign direct investment (FDI). The Covid
experience established us as the pharmacy of the world. That India handled
the Covid well is widely recognized, but it is the economic bounce-back
that is seen as the more consequential happening.
A lot of the India story discussed abroad revolves around improved
governance. A digital delivery on such an enormous scale has been a
particular source of fascination. Progress on the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDG) front magnifies the sense of a society on the move. The
mosaic is made up of many granules, from vaccines and health industry to
5G stack and space launches, or indeed, to educational branding or Make in
India outcomes. The G20 presidency has also served to acquaint a wide
cross-section of policymakers and influencers with infrastructure
improvement and governance progress. This emphasis on delivery has led
to more effective implementation of project commitments abroad. That
great care is taken to synchronize budgeting is only proof again of how
much diplomacy is an art of the detail. A successful diaspora certainly adds
to this positive view.
There are also leadership factors and decision-making record in play. To
begin with, a sharper strategic clarity has enabled India to prioritize and
plan better. A relevant example is of Neighbourhood First and the
seriousness with which it is implemented on the ground. Another is about
overcoming hesitations of history with the US in particular and the West in
general. Here, too, India has not let changes in Administration deflect it
from pursuing its goals. At the same time, it has ensured that other balances
are maintained to make this a smooth exercise.
Strategic clarity has also been accompanied by strategic
communication. India’s interests and intentions have been steadily
messaged in appropriate forums and adjusted to changing circumstances. It
could be about the Indo-Pacific, critical technologies, Covid-related needs
or the Ukraine conflict. Partners are neither confused about our thinking nor
doubtful of our intentions. A strongly independent stance has also helped
India to effectively navigate a more multipolar and fractured world.
There is also a conscious endeavour to shape global issues, such as
climate action, the pandemic, terrorism and digital infrastructure, and
unleash the full power of ideas, be it in solar energy, disaster resilience,
sustainable lifestyle, food security or even wellness. This has been backed
up by projecting Indian traditions, history and culture more visibly on the
global stage.
New India may be a message at home; it is equally an image abroad. It
is not simply a more powerful and capable India that the world perceives; it
is a more authentic and participative one, at ease as much with its
nationalist spirit as with its international contributions.
The resulting interest in engaging India is today visible in many
quarters. When it comes to matters of technology and economy, there is a
growing perception of our relevance to the challenge of trusted
manufacturing. This is all the more so since those processes have become
so intensively data driven. One aspect of it is the reliability that emanates
from our political and social characteristics. After all, it is evident that we
are a political democracy, pluralistic society and market economy.
Increasingly, the misalignment of global demography and demand is
making our human resources valuable for the international economy in a
more tech-driven era. The establishment of the Trade and Technology
Council with the EU is an indicator of the direction in which the winds are
blowing. There has been even more marked progress with the US on this
front, as indeed with the other two Quad partners.
A different dimension is the contribution we can make to the stability
and security of the global commons, especially in the Indo-Pacific. At the
same time, India is a partner of value in forums like BRICS and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Our independent stance always
leaves open participation in any endeavour at conflict mitigation or
resolution. The combination of Covid support, digital delivery and
development projects has also created a deeper constituency in the Global
South. It is not lost on the developing world that we commenced our G20
presidency with the Voice of the Global South Summit. Nor, for that matter,
that we championed the membership of the AU in the G20.
The last decade has also established convincingly that Indian
development initiatives are truly demand-driven and do not conceal a
hidden agenda. Certainly, India’s ability to straddle the big fissures that
global politics is currently grappling with is part of its overall standing in
the world.

DECODING MODI-ERA DIPLOMACY

We have till now focussed on how India has dealt with the world differently
and the extent to which this, in turn, has shaped global views about India.
Our appreciation, however, would be incomplete if we do not give adequate
attention to the change in the very understanding of what foreign policy is
all about. It may look as a shift in emphasis but is very much more than
that.
Foreign policy is now seen as a direct instrument to accelerate national
development and modernization. The flow of technology, capital and best
practices are the ensuing focal points. Wooing the world is expressed in
encouraging investors, especially by making it easier to do business.
Interactions with them are as frequent as those with technology-providers
and high achievers in different domains. AatmaNirbhar Bharat Abhiyan and
Make in India provide an overall framework that facilitate such exercises,
supported by initiatives like Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) on
manufacturing or Gati Shakti in infrastructure.
 The quest for technology and best practices is even visible in the PM’s
itinerary abroad, whether it related to a battery storage facility in the US,
river cleaning in South Korea, bullet trains in Japan, skill development in
Singapore, or railway stations in Germany. As this mindset was applied
outwards, it also witnessed the export of projects, products and services that
spoke of India’s improved abilities. This includes a range of infrastructure,
connectivity and public facilities that extend from South Asia to Africa and
Latin America and, not least, a steady increase in defence exports to a
growing list of nations.
The aggregate result is a developing perception of India as a partner of
growing consequence. This has helped exports and market access abroad,
with beneficial consequences at home. When a PM personally engages with
all his ambassadors in that regard, we really know that India is changing.
In many ways, the operational culture of foreign-policy decision-
making has adjusted to the new era. Central to that endeavour is a conscious
effort to overcome silos by tighter coordination, more intensive strategizing
and stronger feedback. Whether it is global trade negotiations, national
security situations or multilateral concerns of development, the emphasis is
on collective deliberations and decision-making. Starting as it does from
ministers and secretaries, this has had a natural impact on the bureaucracy
at large.
The same outlook is also demonstrated in respect of important partners
and key issues. We see this now in respect of a multi-ministerial interaction
with Singapore, the Trade and Technology Council format with the EU and
the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogues in Defence and External Affairs with key
nations. Behind that process was also a deliberative exercise that sought to
prioritize, maximize and intensify India’s international relationships. It
could be the attention given to leadership-level exchanges, including to the
chief guest for the Republic Day, and how they fit in with the larger game
plan. Where feedback was concerned, the national-level Pro-Active
Governance and Timely Implementation (PRAGATI) exercise was
customized for the objectives of foreign policy. Drilling deep down to
specifics enabled delays, roadblocks and policy obstacles to be identified
and addressed. As a result, many development projects abroad began
witnessing more efficient execution.
The systemic improvements came into full play during Covid, whether
it was in the Vande Bharat Mission or the Vaccine Maitri initiative. They
were demonstrated during evacuation exercises as well, ranging from
Yemen and Nepal to Afghanistan, Ukraine and Sudan.
From 2014, there has also been a strong conviction that India should be
more active in shaping the global agenda. Obviously, some issues of
particular priority for India itself, like terrorism and tax evasion, did not get
the attention they deserved in the councils of the world. There were others
like maritime security on which India could make a crucial contribution. In
due course, when an important debate like the one on connectivity
unfolded, the strong confidence level of the Modi government allowed it to
take the lead. When it came to climate challenges, India, till 2014, was
widely perceived as a reluctant participant. Since then, it has emerged as a
credible champion of both climate action and climate justice by becoming
an exemplar on renewables and advocate of resourcing.
There was also a belief that we were mostly responding to the initiatives
of others rather than putting forward our own thinking. However, whether it
was at the UN, G20 Summits or COP meetings, the flow of ideas turned
into more structured proposals, like the ISA and the CDRI. The creativity
continues, recent examples being One Sun One World One Grid
(OSOWOG), Lifestyle for Environment (LiFE) and the International Year
of Millets (2023). To take the agenda forward, there was an openness to
explore new partners and collaborations where required. The Quad, the
I2U2 and the SCO are relevant examples. As confidence grew in our ability
to contribute to global solutions, it took diverse forms, a collective one like
the development agenda for Africa as well as a unilateral one like the
Vaccine Maitri. By dint of application and imagination, the early thoughts
about making our presence felt more strongly have now become reality.
While addressing practical challenges to India’s progress, much thought
has also been given to branding India in a manner reflecting the rise of a
civilizational state. The truth is that two centuries of colonialism had
skewed the global discourse so drastically in favour of the West that the
heritage, culture and traditions of the rest of the world were relegated to the
sidelines. Part of the responsibility for that predicament also rests with the
leadership of developing societies. They subscribed to equating modernity
and advancement with emulating the West. For reasons both ideological and
political, many of them often ran down their own past.
As a result, the imperative for cultural rebalancing to accompany its
economic and political facets has only grown with times. Prime Minister
Modi has led from the front in this regard. His initiative in 2015 to globally
celebrate yoga has been phenomenally successful. The propagation of our
medical and wellness practices has also gained traction. When it comes to
environment, the advocacy of lifestyle changes is being widely welcomed.
Even food habits are relevant in this regard, reflected in the Indian
endeavour to lead greater cultivation and consumption of millets, our
ancient grains. Some of this is expressed through the optics of how the
leadership carries itself and expresses its views.
A large part of the challenge that still needs more effective redressal is
in the deeper concepts and entrenched assumptions of contemporary
international relations. That is still work in progress but hopefully one that
will see improvements in the coming years.
Yet another notable feature of the Modi-era diplomacy has been its
people-centric approach. There were multiple drivers for this greater
emphasis on the human factor. One, of course, was the external reflection of
a domestic campaign to improve development indices and extend social
welfare. Supporting Indians abroad is a natural extrapolation of this
approach.
Another is the understanding that India needed to prepare for the
requirements of the knowledge economy. It was essential to envisage a
global workplace, not just a trading place. And that meant working out the
requisite institutional arrangements and practices rather than leaving our
citizens at the mercy of the vagaries of the mobility industry.
Then, there was greater consciousness about the importance and
contribution of Indians abroad, be they students, professionals or those
more settled. Their welfare was envisaged as an obligation that should be
addressed with utmost seriousness. And finally, there was a sense of a
changing India itself. A rising power should not leave its people abroad to
face adversity on their own. Such detachment not only reflects badly on our
standing but could also undermine the faith with which Indians could
proceed abroad.
Instituting robust welfare measures applicable beyond our borders,
extricating our citizens from crisis situations and organizing repatriations as
they happened during the Covid pandemic are all steps in that direction.
Indeed, the transformation begins right at home with radical reforms in the
ease of issuing passports. This was paralleled by initiatives to facilitate
mobility while ensuring that Indians were not treated in a discriminatory
manner. Concluding Migration and Mobility Partnership Agreements
(MMPAs) with countries ranging from Australia to Germany are the policy
reflections of this concern.

DELIVERING ON PARTNERSHIPS

The progress report of the last decade is an encouraging one. Stronger

expressions of diplomatic energies and activities have clearly raised India’s
profile in global councils. Prime Minister Modi, in particular, is perceived
as a global figure who, while advancing his national interest, has a broader
vision and a commitment to collective good. When it comes to the complex
challenges that inevitably arise in world affairs, India is no longer seen as
ducking the tough decisions.
The regional perception in the Subcontinent started to change from
2014. Understandably, this has not been a linear path, but overall, there is
appreciation for the enormous strides that connectivity, cooperation and
contacts have made. The extended neighbourhood also appreciates India’s
stronger sense of purpose as well as high-level visits happening after such
long gaps. Where the major powers are concerned, they, too, have seen
India prepared to engage more confidently and independently, perhaps in its
engagement with multiple partners on defence, technology and energy or,
indeed, standing its ground firmly when it comes to protecting its national
interests from external pressures.
There is a global dimension to India’s progress, which is no less
important. In myriad ways, we have been active on a range of international
issues that actually shape our contemporary era. Whether it is debt relief,
global minimum tax or fairer market access, India has been a powerful
voice in global conversations. When it comes to terrorism, India’s own
counter-actions and collaboration in restricting terror financing and listing
of sanctioned terrorists have contributed to greater international awareness.
We not only took the debate on maritime security to the UNSC but are
participating in concrete initiatives across the Indo-Pacific, including
hosting a key fusion centre.
One subject on which India made a decisive difference was
connectivity. By taking a comprehensive and clear-cut view of the
principles underpinning it, its policymakers were able to shape the debate in
favour of greater transparency and better viability. But what has affected
global perception most profoundly has been the Indian stance during the
Covid pandemic. By providing vaccines to a 100 partners and medicines
and materials to 150 nations, India demonstrated an altogether different
level of global responsibility. The accrued goodwill has clearly helped
define its profile at a time when the world is in transition.
In international cooperation, a lot depends on the willingness to walk
the talk. For decades, we were known for partnering with other nations in
their development efforts, mostly through training and exchanges but also,
on occasion, through projects. In the last decade, this development has been
significantly scaled up. There has been a visible expansion in lines of credit,
grant assistance, capability building, infrastructure and economic projects
as well as human resources enhancement.
But more than this scale, what has really changed is the effectiveness of
delivery. Monitored continuously and supervised strongly, long-pending
projects were brought to successful conclusion and new ones undertaken
with greater professionalism. Connectivity, socio-economic facilities,
logistics and energy in our immediate neighbourhood have been particular
beneficiaries. Post-earthquake projects in Nepal and infrastructure in
Mauritius are prominent examples of the enhanced quality of delivery.
Despite the Covid challenges, India was also able to keep most of its
commitments made to African nations as part of the India-Africa Forum
Summit (IAFS).
During this period, the footprint of India’s international partnerships has
also expanded perceptibly. It now ranges from renewable energy in the
Pacific to community projects in the Caribbean. It could be the refinery in
Mongolia, the Metro Express in Mauritius, a textile factory in Kenya or
water supply in Tanzania, many India-supported endeavours have been
game-changers for the partner countries.
A more vigorous India has been able to forge new relationships that
recognize its growing value. An obvious example is the Quad, which has
facilitated other Indo-Pacific engagements in domains like technology,
supply chains, education, maritime security, etc. When it came to Eurasia,
India’s inclusion in the SCO in 2017 underlined its salience to that
grouping’s agenda. During this period, membership of export control
regimes like Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group and
Wassenaar Arrangement were as significant as plurilateral initiatives led by
India, especially on sustainability. These memberships also spoke of a
larger phenomenon of India’s rise and the response of the world to it. That
all 54 African states attended the IAFS Summit, that all 10 ASEAN leaders
were present at the 2018 Republic Day and that India engaged 27 EU
countries in Porto in 2021 and that 125 nations participated in the Voice of
Global South Summit in 2023 are illustrations of where it stands today.
Often, that proposition is tested through elections to international
organizations, and by and large, India has come through successfully.
Indeed, the growing demand for our participation in different forums,
engagement in various formats and presence on multiple occasions are
reflective of our global stock.

FINDING OUR OWN SOLUTIONS

As we come out of Covid, like every other country, India is also assessing
its costs, evaluating its experiences and drawing its lessons. What can be
said with some degree of confidence is that we have weathered the storm
better than many others. Strong fundamentals and considered policies
ensure that India stays very much on course to becoming a leading power in
the future. While much of that is dependent on continuously enhancing
capabilities, it is equally essential that India’s vision of its prospects remain
confident. After all, we have struggled with decades of downsizing,
hyphenation, non-involvement and risk aversion.
The pathway for the future is built on a mindset of fierce independence,
though the challenge is to refresh it for contemporary times. Our ability to
express this outlook has naturally changed with our strengths. Today, we
have many more resources and instruments at our command to achieve
national goals abroad. But even capabilities and aspirations produce results
only when filtered through an accurate understanding of the world in which
we live.
A crucial aspect of diplomacy, therefore, is a comprehensive landscape
analysis, which captures the contradictions and nuances so essential to
make policy choices. At the highest level, it centres on multipolarity and
rebalancing while taking into account the contradictions between major
nations. Drilling down region by region has meant a more granular
appreciation of the issues involved. In all of this, there is the overarching
reality of globalization, the ideologies of which can often mislead us
through simplistic propositions. As we are increasingly discovering, one
truth mainly works for one street.
The quest to develop capacities clearly benefits from domestic reform
and modernization initiatives. This linkage was dumbed down to the
assertion that 8 per cent growth was the best foreign policy! The reality,
however, is that growth gained without transforming the foundations and
framework had in-built limitations. This decade has consequently been a
much more comprehensive effort that departed from established mantras. It
also sought to avoid the pitfalls that were presented by a less strategic
understanding of globalization. India’s decision not to accede to the RCEP
agreement in 2019 was significant in that respect. One important indication
of the changed approach was in its very conceptualization. For the first
time, Indian policymakers started framing the rise of India in terms of an
era that is called the Amrit Kaal. By doing so, they articulate a thinking that
is more long-term, comprehensive and transformational. And the fact is that
the achievements of the last decade justify such a view point.
There is no shortage of indices that would point to the progress of recent
years. And these do not in any way deny the magnitude of challenges that
still confront India. But among them, perhaps it is worth focussing on those
that are directly relevant to India’s rise in the international system. A
starting point is the steep decline in poverty, notable not only because it is
among the more extreme problems facing India but also as it represents a
wider drag on society. Equally important is the Indian middle class, which
is expected to double during the Amrit Kaal, that is, by 2047. The world is
surely assessing these developments, both from contribution and
consumption perspectives. As it studies the quality of India’s human
resources, it would also note major expansion of universities, medical and
nursing colleges and engineering and technical skills. Indeed, there is a
change underway in the approaches to education and skill development that
are designed to make them more world-friendly. The transformation in
infrastructure is also underway, reflected in expansion of highways,
railways, airports and digital networks. India is no longer seen as just
limited to services. Even at home, energetic digital delivery has
revolutionized governance and helped prepare the ground for deeper
participation in a range of domains.
By raising the definition of basic amenities and, more importantly,
delivering on them, India is rapidly changing the quality of life of one-sixth
of the world. Depending on the country concerned, it is perceived by them
as an innovator, producer, contributor or exemplar. Each one of these
attributes make it a more attractive partner in international relations.
Developing the boldness and fortitude to advance one’s prospects is
almost as hard as growing actual capabilities. Learning to compete at
increasingly higher levels does require confident leadership and systemic
changes. As stakes get higher, it is also necessary to outthink competitors
and outlast mindgames. Each phase in a power’s rise has different
benchmarks and changing peer groups. Adjusting our ambitions and
calculations constantly will never be easy. In India’s case, we have steadily
outgrown the hyphenation with Pakistan and are being increasingly
perceived as sui generis.
A part of the challenge is also to strike the right understandings on the
optimal terms with the most appropriate partners. How to get the give-and-
take right is crucial. These could be in a field of commerce and investment
or indeed in domains like technology and connectivity. There are always
opportunities to leverage if a nation plays to its strengths. Similarly, it has
additional possibilities that could emerge from global demands of reliable
supply, trusted data or critical technologies.
That said, we cannot be oblivious either to structural obstacles created
by a world order devised more than 75 years ago. The heart of the matter is
that in those crucial years, India was either present nominally on the high
table or not there at all. Especially because of what happened to it in 1947,
India consequently operates in a world where the dice is often loaded
against it. Indeed, its rise in the last seven decades is really a story of
changing the terms of engagement with the world, many of which were
particularly adverse when it started this journey.
The problem is not one that can be quantified economically; it is even
more that of assumptions and narratives. The world order consists of
institutions and practices that are often closely interlocked. They determine
what is politically correct and what is not. And because its key players have
not only built an architecture to serve their purpose but still retain the
influence to promote it, a power like India will have to swim upstream for a
long time to come. Among the most formidable currents it has to navigate
are the challenges emanating from ‘freezing the moment’. This is a widely
practised stratagem by hegemonic powers that seek to make permanent the
advantageous elements of a landscape.
 At its broadest level, this is visible in the manner in which the outcomes
of 1945 are utilized to define an international hierarchy. The trick obviously
is to imbue a particular moment with enormous significance and, thereafter,
derive continuous benefit from it. Arguments to make the world more
contemporary are rebutted by conflating them with challenging the original
outcome in question. This, however, is but one example of the larger tussle
to maintain or change the world as we know it today. There are many more,
some limited in scope and others more sweeping. They help to create and
maintain frameworks, operate and defend structures and, crucially, establish
and advance narratives. And they succeed to a great degree because global
behaviour is shaped so much by muscle memory. We are all not just
creatures of habits but followers of norms and believers of storylines.
A combination of these factors conceals the vested interests that
underpin the arrangements of the day. It could be the UN and its working,
nuclear non-proliferation, the selective focus on human rights, the equally
calculated balancing of realpolitik and values, as well as the utilization of
Cold War imagery. Particular moments also serve to define the ‘other’
sharply, such as after the 9/11 attack. So does the evocation of past
conflicts, especially the last World War. For all these reasons, attempts to
reshape global debates and concepts meet with the fiercest resistance. That
is something India must expect and counter.
As a rising power, India encounters freezing the moment in different
formats. It can come up against institutions and practices that do not give it
its due. That is why it is such a strong proponent of reformed
multilateralism. It can shape its approach to other powers, sometimes to our
detriment. This requires confident thinking to create more up-to-date terms
of engagement. On occasion, impactful moments can lead to such strong
perceptions that it puts pressure on policy to adjust. To a considerable
degree, that is the case with Pakistan after the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack.
The Indian public clearly saw the governmental response as weak-kneed
and pushed for a change.
There could even be situations when we will want to move on rapidly
beyond an action. That was certainly the case of the Vajpayee government
in reaching out to key partners soon after the 1998 nuclear tests. It is
sometimes the fate of nations to also inherit the concepts and assumptions
of others. The global understanding of India’s place and influence is a
relevant example, one very much shaped by other powers. It is only in
recent years that we have managed to break out, first of the post-Partition
hyphenation and then from the Indian Ocean box. The reaction to an Indo-
Pacific presence is, therefore, only to be expected. One facet of a
transformational decade has been to overcome this natural inclination to be
a prisoner of our own history.
The difficulties of the past need not always be an encumbrance. The
creativity of political leaderships is sometimes demonstrated by an ability to
make it an asset in a changed context. In recent years, our nation has seen a
renewed interest in Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian National
Army, as well as in those who resisted British colonialism in an earlier era.
The great tribal leader Birsa Munda and the revolutionary Alluri Sitarama
Raju are two such cases. While such figures may not have been entirely
successful in achieving their immediate objectives, their longer-term impact
as inspirational icons is very apparent today. Imageries from history are, in
fact, extremely powerful in articulating aspirations for the future.
Indeed, when we look back at our own record over the last seven
decades, it is still specific events like the conflicts of 1962, 1965, 1971 and
1999 that stand out as milestones. As India goes about its endeavour to
ascend the international hierarchy, it must play well this game of using
narratives and experiences to establish practices and habits as well.
The messaging out of New Delhi has also been far more energetic on
key issues. Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (the world is one family) conveys a
commitment to international cooperation; ‘Reformed Multilateralism’
underlines the urgency of addressing the effectiveness of the UN; ‘A World
Free of Terror’ underlines a determination to combat this long-standing
threat; ‘Digital for Development’ speaks of how effective it has been as a
governance tool; ‘Mother of Democracy’ is a reminder that our pluralistic
and consultative traditions go back deep in history; and ‘One World One
Health’ is an assertion of the need for timely, effective and non-
discriminatory responses to global health challenges.
Developing our own lexicon, concepts, mechanisms and ideas and
socializing them in world politics is also a testimony to India’s continued
rise. Their unfolding underlines the reality of India’s vigorous participation
in global platforms.
Within India, there will always be lively arguments about the balance
between continuity and change in our foreign policy. That is only to be
expected and, perhaps, in some ways, is even contributory to the emergence
of new ideas. Normally, when it comes to diplomacy, analysis focusses on
how we see the world and all its complications. Sometimes, it is useful to
invert that and reflect on how the world, on its part, could be visualizing
India and the opportunities there.
India’s rise is a relentless exercise where the sensible only pause to take
stock, never to declare victory. Without neglecting the past, it works best
when our eyes are fixed firmly on the horizons and we read the
international situation right as well as fashion our strategies and tactics
accordingly. But to do all this and more, it is essential that Bharat is true to
itself, its interests and its ambitions.
 Chapter 6.
MAKING FRIENDS, INFLUENCING
PEOPLE
Why India Must Create a Global Constituency

I
n its quest to become a leading power, India has to successfully navigate
the two big contradictions of our times, even while steadily enhancing
its comprehensive national power. One is the East–West divide that has
been sharpened by the Ukraine conflict. The other is the North–South gap
that has been aggravated by Covid, debt, climate change as well as food and
energy insecurity. This is on top of the natural compulsion of a rising power
to maximize its friends and minimize its problems. India’s search for ideal
positioning in the global arena may be an unceasing effort. But those with
larger ambitions must definitely develop reliable partners and assured
sources of support. Their endeavour is also to shape the landscape rather
than just operate in it.
The days when India could stir itself episodically while allowing
processes to make their own progress are now behind us. Our interests are
only expanding with time, and so must our activities and profile. The task
before us is to lay the foundations in the Amrit Kaal for India to not only be
a developed nation but also a leading power. That is why Sabka Saath,
Sabka Vikas (working with all for the progress of all) is as relevant in
foreign policy as in the domestic one. After all, diplomacy is all about
making friends and influencing people. And the scope for a country that has
a natural inclination to treat the world as a family (Vasudhaiva
Kutumbakam) is immense in this regard.
In India, the term ‘Rama–Lakshmana’ is popularly used as an expression for describing
closeness between siblings. But transpose this to the domain of global politics and reflect
on its implications. The fact is that every Rama needs a Lakshmana, someone trustworthy
and vigilant who will share both successes and sorrows. At crucial moments, he provided
courage, counselled composure and steadied his principal. When the demon Viradh
kidnapped Sita in Dandakaranya forest, it was Lakshmana who exhorted a shaken Rama to
take swift counter-action. When Rama vented his frustration after Ravana’s more successful
abduction, it was again his brother who narrated how others dealt with misfortune through
patience and fortitude. Thereafter, as Rama lost his cool with the seagod Varuna, who
would not allow him to cross into Lanka, it was Lakshmana who persuaded him not to
intimidate the god more than necessary. How to build close and reliable partnerships is the
perennial task of diplomacy.
Every nation, however large or powerful, needs such sources of support. They may
have a situational salience but the fact is that once established, such relationships have
multiple ways of making themselves valuable. This is obviously a far cry from the normally
transactional nature of international relations. It requires generosity, care, consideration
and, sometimes, even affection. There is even some place for sentiment in world affairs,
illustrated by that adage of blood being thicker than water. The solidarity of shared
experiences is no weak bond either. India opened its heart through Vaccine Maitri, it was a
gesture that will stand it in good stead for a long time. Indeed, as it rises up the global
hierarchy of power, the requirement for reliable friends will grow, not lessen. The broader
the footprint and greater the interests, the more is the importance of Lakshmanas.
The unstinted devotion of another player may be a relative rarity in real life, but
significant enterprises in global history generally require assembling a larger coalition of
support. This is particularly so when the nature and outcome of endeavours are open-
ended. As activities are taking place far away from one’s zone of familiarity, the value of
associates goes up commensurately. This is further enhanced if they bring a particular skill
or contribution to the collective effort. When confronting a larger or unusual opponent, the
need for allies and well-wishers is still more keenly felt. We have seen this even in modern
history, whether we think back to the World Wars, the Gulf War, Afghanistan or even
ongoing situations. In the case of Rama, he was utterly at a loss to even guess how and
where his abducted wife could have been taken. He finally tracked her through the multiple
contributions of well-wishers and allies of various kinds. It does not always take a combat
situation for this to be realized. In the competitive world of international politics, each friend
who stands up in a difficult situation is one to be prized.
The coalition of vanaras that set out in every direction to gather intelligence is an
equally powerful example of such sentiment. It was the force under Prince Angada, which
had gone south, that learnt of Sita being in the gardens of Lanka. Without the army of
monkeys, the bears and the eagles, Rama perhaps could not have got his bearings right.
The need to be situationally aware when making important decisions is evident.
Often, some challenges may be beyond purely national capabilities and the contribution
that well-wishers can make could be invaluable. Sampati’s extraordinary sight is an analogy
for accessing vital information about competitors and adversaries. And when the time came
to cross the oceans, it was Nala, the bridge-building son of Vishwakarma, who provided the
technology solution. Varuna went against his very nature in promising not to wash over the
bridge that Nala built. This was the result of coercion by Rama, who in his anger, had
threatened to dry up the seas if he was not allowed to cross.
Making friends and influencing people does involve a range of motivating factors, from
incentives and flattery to assistance and threats. For most nations, this is an exceptionally
patient and arduous task and may not be as easy as it seems. Generally speaking, it
requires an astute identification of its components and accommodation among competing
interests. On exceptional occasions, there could even be difficult choices made for larger
good. At the heart of one such case is the most debated action of Lord Rama in the epic. In
an ongoing battle between the two sibling monkey chieftains, Vali and Sugriva, Rama
intervened to kill the former. It was, of course, Vali’s destiny to meet his end by divine hands
and his own personal conduct was clearly not above reproach.
But the episode and its consequences offer important insights into undertaking larger
operations. Viewed from a power perspective, Rama favoured the lesser entity, the younger
brother Sugriva, who was earlier ousted from his position. Common sense indicates that the
weaker side is always more welcoming of intervention and even more inclined to tie its
fortunes on a lasting basis. Having gained the services of Sugriva, it was farseeing of Rama
to maintain the unity of the vanaras by taking Vali’s son, Angada, under his personal
protection. Inspiring his allies to act with alacrity was no easy task either. Predictably,
Sugriva went back to a good life in Kishkinda after assuming the throne, and it required
Lakshmana’s anger to remind him of his obligations.
The entire period when the vanara sena (army) is sent in multiple directions is also an
experience of strategic patience for Rama and Lakshmana. The coalition must not just
assemble but be given time to do its work, often at the speed of its less efficient
components. Sometimes, partners may not be able to deliver in time. That was the case for
Rama later on with Pratardana, the king of Kashi, whose promised legions did not arrive in
time to join the battle in Lanka. But it is to Rama’s credit that he publicly acknowledged their
intent. In life, there is always a next time and diplomacy must never foreclose possibilities.

THE PAST AND THE FUTURE

As it goes about its business of rising in the international order, India has to
bear in mind that the world is continuously changing, as indeed are its ties
with various players. In the early years after Independence, we sought to
build a relationship with the West while creating our decisional space. At
the same time, constituencies in the developing world were nurtured by
building on the obvious empathy of post-colonialism. Cooperation with the
Socialist bloc was explored, with tangible outcomes in the economic and
security spheres. As the pressures of the Cold War grew and Sino-US
rapprochement unfolded, it compelled India to double down on its Soviet
relationship. A large part of its difficulties with the West emanated from the
preference that the latter showed for a military-ruled Pakistan.
It was, therefore, natural that the end of the Cold War would lead to
readjustments on India’s part and of the world towards India. These
processes have gained steady momentum in the quarter of the century that
has passed. Their consolidation has been facilitated by the fact that in the
last decade, New Delhi has shed much of the ideological baggage of the
past. The US, in particular, is seen much more as part of the solution than of
the problem. The diplomatic challenges now are one of advancing new
relationships while retaining earlier ones. And, within that overall mix,
assigning the appropriate weightage to specific ones, so that India gets the
optimal results in a world that is under transformation.
Analysing India’s ties with the five permanent members of the UNSC is
a good place to start an assessment of both its record and its prospects.
Those with the US and China are addressed in further chapters.

The UK: A Contemporary Compact

More than any other relationship, India’s ties with the UK carry the burden
of a complex past. The scars of that period are both material and
psychological. The challenge now is to make history work for the future of
the relationship, where comforts and convergences overcome frictions and
fissures.
Interestingly, it began as a symbiotic relationship in the immediate
aftermath of India’s independence. Current generations will probably be
astonished at the extent of influence that the UK wielded in India for the
next two decades. In fact, an Indian leadership anxious to stay out of the
Cold War and keep the US at bay actually perceived the UK as its best foil.
So much so that its radical segment even overcame initial reservations
about joining the Commonwealth, believing that a British association would
shield them from American pressure.
The recent success of the movie RRR is a reminder of how strongly
feelings about the colonial era resonate with the Indian public even today. It
is quite natural that there are sensitivities and wariness in the India–UK
relationship that derive from this period. The partitioning of India may have
left its own deep impact thereafter, but the subsequent India–Pakistan
hyphenation clearly gave it even further life. Starting from 1947, when
Pakistan attacked Jammu & Kashmir, the UK was perceived in New Delhi
as being partial to Pakistan. This view, which grew further from the
workings of the UNSC, was aggravated by the position that the UK took in
the 1965 and 1971 conflicts. Britain’s Cold War compulsions, the
withdrawal from East of Suez and accession to the EU gradually eroded the
proximity of the initial years. When it came to developments in Afghanistan
after 2001, it did not escape New Delhi’s notice that Great Britain was the
strongest advocate of dealing with the military leadership in Rawalpindi.
From the Indian perspective, whether it was the exercise of the nuclear
option, a security concern like Afghanistan or the politics of the Indian
subcontinent, British diplomacy was understandably viewed with suspicion.
Moreover, as it gradually came into its own, the desire to put the past
behind was also commensurately stronger in Indian politics. Weakening
bonds between the elites as a result of deeper democratization of India
accelerated the process. By the time Brexit arrived, the case for setting new
terms of engagement was apparent.
While the past continues to cast its shadow, the present is not without its
own complications. British politics is often driven by vote-bank
considerations, though not to the extreme extent of Canada. And this has
given space for secessionist forces targeting India to operate from its soil
and misuse its freedoms. Ideological hostility in influential quarters against
the current dispensation in India has also added to irritants. Some are
visibly so resentful of changes in India that they do not wish to understand
the reality. When the UK claims to have a special bond with India, its
impact is all the more.
However, there is also a parallel reality of the two nations cooperating
in a range of domains. This long-standing duality is one of the
characteristics of the ties; whether the UK would follow the US to
comprehensively reset it is the major question. Till now, the UK has lagged
behind, but there is growing consciousness of the distance that this has
created with India. Making adjustments requires introspection on a range of
concerns, from political sensitivities and security issues to export controls
and mobility. That this is no longer the India of the past should be evident
by now. Whether it is replacing British-era legal codes, expressing its
cultural beliefs or asserting the symbolism of Netaji, times are surely
changing. Because of the close past association, it is particularly incumbent
on the UK to appreciate the nature of this transformation.
On the other hand, it is also essential that Indians approach the future of
this partnership more clinically. They must recognize that the UK has
served as an effective gateway for Indian businesses in Europe and that it
hosts a successful diaspora. Its global influence may not be the same, but it
is still very real in parts of the world. In certain domains, British technology
and capabilities are clearly world-class. From an Indian viewpoint, there is
a case for building further on the convergence that the two countries may
currently have. That answer, once both countries put their mind to it, veers
in a positive direction. This is reflected in their agreed 2030 Roadmap,
among others.
Connecting the two countries and peoples can be pursued through
different avenues, including closer political contacts, deeper economic and
financial exchanges, greater skills and education flows, stronger research
and innovation partnerships, and, of course, by nurturing the living bridge.
Underlying this exercise is how we look at the world and grapple with
issues that both nations confront every day.
The UK is a very different polity in the aftermath of Brexit. And some
of these changes are precisely those that can provide impetus to a more
contemporary partnership. Greater national control has allowed the UK to
contemplate an Enhanced Trade Partnership with India. An agreement on a
migration and mobility partnership helps to match demand, demographics
and talent. The UK’s Integrated Review locates it as a Euro-Atlantic actor,
but with an increasing stake in the Indo-Pacific. That makes a compelling
argument for a stronger understanding with India.
From India’s viewpoint, there are many UKs that we seek to engage
simultaneously: the Global Britain, the Atlantic UK, the post-European one,
the City of London, the diaspora one, the innovation and education UK,
and, of course, the strategic one. The internal balance among them has
clearly shifted as a result of Brexit and the global aspect is now much more
at the forefront. While refreshing their ties, India and the UK cannot ignore
the issues carried forward from their history. But their conversation in the
future will necessarily be different. In the final analysis, the true test of a
transition to a new era will be in the ability to work together both on issues
of the Indian subcontinent and the larger global stage.

Russia: A Steady Partnership

The story with Russia (erstwhile USSR) has been very different. A power
that was suspicious of the Indian national movement, often to the point of
being downright hostile, developed increasing shared interests as post-
Independence diplomacy took root. This picked up after 1953–54,
especially once Pakistan joined US-led alliance systems. Many political
parties in our country also viewed the USSR as a progressive force. For an
India increasingly worried about the Western arming of its neighbour, the
relationship was both an insurance policy and an active contributor to our
national strengths. It grew to a level where Russia’s role, then as the USSR,
was critical to a strategic inflection point in the Indian subcontinent in 1971.
The resulting goodwill, combined with a continuing sensitivity to
India’s interests, has kept these ties steady despite global tumult. Even the
break-up of the USSR had limited impact, with the two nations re-
discovering their mutual priority within a decade.
Today, it is this Indian relationship with Russia that is most on the
global radar. In terms of significance, it compares in many respects to that
with the US and China. Its economic content may be less, but for India, it
has enormous strategic and security relevance. The unintended
consequences of an unforeseen conflict, however, have paradoxically
hastened some possibilities long under discussion. As a result, Russia could
well emerge as a primary supplier of resources at the very time that India
ramps up its economic growth and expands such needs.
The irony today about the partnership is that it is the subject of attention
not because it has changed but because it has not. In fact, ties between
Russia and India have been among the steadiest of the major relationships
in the world after the Second World War. Each country has seen ups and
downs in its ties with many other partners. Yet, for a variety of reasons,
both have managed to insulate their own relationship from the volatility of
global events. It appears that the logic of geopolitics combined with the
mutuality of benefits have provided an exceptionally strong ballast to their
ties.
If relations have been stable, this is not to say that either nation has
remained static as a polity or even as a society. In the last quarter of a
century, India has grown to emerge as the fifth largest economy, a nuclear
weapon power, a technology centre, a reservoir of global talent and an
active shaper of international debates. Its interests and influence have
grown well beyond the Subcontinent.
Russia has, meanwhile, defined itself more nationally, with the
accompanying changes in orientation and priorities. Its inherent character as
a Eurasian power and its global status make it salient to the world order.
Russia has also demonstrated an ability to influence outcomes across
regions and issues. Its importance in domains like energy, resources and
technology remains noteworthy.
The last three decades have seen the autonomous evolution of both
Russia and India. They may have forged partnerships with others that may
not always be convergent. Their own bilateral balance and equation have
also developed with time. Yet, there appears to be a continued intersection
of interests built on a legacy of goodwill that shapes their thinking about
each other. What has made a difference is that they have taken great care
even in a changing world not to act in a manner that adversely affects the
core interests of the other. Preserving that is obviously crucial.
Though coming from different histories and geographies, India and
Russia conceptually share a commitment to a multipolar world and have
gravitated towards its establishment as a global modus vivendi. Their
understanding of that may not be exactly the same when applied across
geographies. Precisely because Russia is a Eurasian power, it is essential for
India that it appreciates a multipolar world must have a multipolar Asia at
its core. The operating principle of such a world is the legitimate pursuit of
partnerships without seeking exclusivity. Two nations that have such a
strong sense of independence should have less difficulty in appreciating the
intent of the other. While Russia has stakes in the larger direction of global
change, it is also a polity that has deep interests in the current international
architecture. An important aspect of the future of our ties is the extent to
which this accommodates India’s rise.
Given the history of their ties, Indians would have expectations of
Russian support, including on the reform of the UNSC. The Ukraine
conflict has also led Russia to reassess its traditional focus westwards. Its
consequential shift towards Asia is already visible on the economic front.
For India, that will broaden an engagement that, till now, was almost
exclusively reliant on the triad of military, nuclear and space cooperation.
In the coming years, the focus with Russia can be expected to shift,
capturing its Asian facets more and more. The outlines of that have started
to emerge. It could be connectivity like the International North–South
Transport Corridor or the Chennai–Vladivostok maritime route and greater
Indian involvement in the Russian Far East, or perhaps closer collaboration
in Central Asia and the Arctic. All in all, India–Russia ties are poised for
evolution even as they maintain their trajectory.
 In very different ways, the British and Russian relationships evoke
emotions with the Indian public. But policy, while not impervious to
sentiment, is finally driven by empirical facts and a cost–benefit analysis.
As India takes stock of a transforming landscape and seeks to chart its way
forward, adjustments are only to the expected.

France: The Third Way

In contrast to the UK and Russia, France is a relatively newer diplomatic
discovery, one whose colonial past has receded more in public
consciousness. The minimal overhang of history offers it opportunities, just
as its focus encourages growth of select domains.
For two decades now, this relationship has been steadily advancing, free
from surprises and shifts triggered by external factors. The two nations not
only share values and beliefs but put considerable emphasis on building
national capabilities. Both of them navigated the Cold War era trying to
maximize their strategic space. In modern times, they have developed
strong convergences that go back to the 1950s. Since then, succeeding
generations of French platforms and equipment have been an integral part
of the Indian military force. India, therefore, has good reasons to see it as a
major partner for its national security.
France was also an important influence in the development of India’s
strategic thinking, especially its nuclear-force posture. Indeed, the very
concept of credible minimum deterrence was derived from the learnings of
the French experience. Not just that, after the 1998 nuclear tests, this nation
was the first nuclear power to show an understanding of our strategic
compulsions. So, it was no surprise that PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee made
Paris his first bilateral stop after the nuclear tests. Along with President
Jacques Chirac, he launched the strategic partnership between our two
countries that still serves us well till today. French support played an
important role in India getting an exemption from the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) in 2008 to resume international cooperation in civil nuclear
energy.
In the UNSC and other international forums, where competing and
complex sets of interests affect choices, France has been a consistent
partner. Our synergies have enabled us, for example, to be more effective in
mobilizing UN action against terrorism and terrorist groups. France has also
been a forthright supporter of India’s case for permanent membership of the
UNSC.
In the past few years, the uncertainties and disequilibrium of a world in
transition have encouraged a stronger sense of common strategic purpose.
Among the current priorities, one is to cooperate more closely in the Indo-
Pacific, where India is in the middle and France present at its bookends. It
is revealing that the two nations have entered into trilaterals with Australia
and the UAE recently.
For India, in recent years, ties with France fit the challenge of ‘right-
sizing’ its crucial partners. A nation that espouses the Third Way also holds
an intuitive appeal to an independent-minded India. Its autonomy and self-
reliance resonate strongly, as does its reticence on bringing in larger
concerns. Once the two nations consciously decided to make this a
foundation, their collaboration grew steadily over multiple regimes. As a
result, in the pursuit of its larger aspirations, India has found in France
another significant player committed to multipolarity.
However, while the long-standing insistence by both India and France to
maintain their decisional freedom may produce convergences, each will
have its own perspective. After all, they are located in very different
geographies that will naturally decide both priorities and interests.
Like every other relationship, this one, too, will require assiduous
tending. What should give most cause for optimism is that they have
actually set out a perspective of cooperation for Horizon 2047.
The P-3 examples of the UK, Russia and France may be contrasting, but
they do bring out the intrinsic value of the relationships. The fact is that
permanent members of the UNSC have an importance much beyond that
body. Nurturing these ties is, therefore, all the more important as India’s
interests unfold across the world.

RESETTING WITH THE WEST

Since international relations is simultaneously a collective and national

activity, it is perhaps worthwhile to assess India’s approach to the West as a
whole. Understandably, some of that remains coloured by the experience of
colonialism. That said, it is also a fact that this era has facilitated elite
bonding to a considerable degree.
 The one Western country that could have escaped the colonial taint was
the US. It, however, blotted its copybook in India by strongly aligning with
the Pakistani military and, thereafter, with China. These negatives were
nevertheless set off against the substantive economic, technological and
societal linkages that were built up after India’s independence. Interestingly,
even the political frictions were sometimes mitigated by circumstances.
India may not have always been treated as a friend but was not regarded as
a foe either.
The very same nations that evoked anxiety through their geopolitics
were the ones that stepped forward after the 1962 conflict with China. Their
contribution to infrastructure creation and agricultural self-sufficiency also
cannot be underestimated. Our stance towards the Western bloc as a whole
was influenced by the totality of these experiences and considerations.
Looking back, it is telling that for the first few decades, India’s
preferred partners in the Anglosphere were the UK and Canada. Indeed,
much of its early international forays took place in tandem with them, the
mediations on Korea and Vietnam being prominent examples. The US was,
of course, an overwhelming presence, but one long regarded with suspicion
due to our ideological proclivities as much as strategic calculations.
A measurement of the distance that India’s foreign policy has travelled
over 75 years is also in changed attitudes in this respect. The more we got
beyond the romanticism of the early years and viewed the world through
the lens of hard realities, the greater was the merit that was discovered in
partners hitherto kept at a distance. This was accelerated when India started
looking eastwards and developing an Indo-Pacific agenda. As a result, it is
now the US and Australia that are assessed as having critical value,
including at the Quad. If there is a pointer here, it is that the alignment of
geopolitical outlook is so central to the development of ties. Indo-Pacific
strategies now offer a contemporary pathway in that regard.
Challenges, however, are not with just individual nations. India’s
relationship with the West as a whole needs an objective evaluation. In
many ways, this group is a natural partner because its members share the
attributes of a pluralistic society, democratic polity and market economy.
Yet, this very commonness can also create its own frictions. The continuing
hegemonism visible in many quarters in the West leads to an excessive
advocacy of their particular practices and convictions. Often, it is lost on
them that others have different traditions, practices and yardsticks, and that
the West itself would not necessarily come out well if they were evaluated
objectively and publicly. Moreover, these attitudes do not stop at advocacy
and extend to promoting an actionable agenda as well. That comes into
conflict with post-colonial polities like India, which are reasserting their
identities and standing their ground.
There are developmental frictions as well, as those more advanced seek
to protect their leads. This is evident in the domains of trade, climate,
patents and cross-border transactions, among others. At the heart of the
contestation with the West is the tension between those who have
dominated for long and others who now seek to challenge. The promotion
of a rules-based order is regularly advocated, just as respect for the UN
Charter is frequently invoked. But for all the talk, it is still largely Western
nations that shape the agenda and define the norms. A fairer and less
selective application of rules in various domains is, therefore, very much
part of rebalancing. If global conversations have become more animated of
late, much of it emanates from the courage to call out what is unacceptable.
But for all these differences, the fact remains that those Asian nations have
progressed fastest who have done so in partnership with the West.
For India, there are lessons to be learnt from how East and Southeast
Asian nations leveraged geopolitics to accelerate national development.
This is particularly relevant in our contemporary era of polarization. After
all, no relationship is conducted without context, and the immediate one
must inform India’s choices even more than the distant.
In the discourses of Delhi, the term ‘strategic autonomy’ is usually
defined as keeping a distance from the West, especially the US. The irony is
that this has led us instead to develop deep dependencies elsewhere. The
same logic applied in the case of non-alignment too. As we now move into
a capable and confident era, it is important that our outlook is determined
more by our interests and less by our insecurities.
Going by common sense, Indians must ask themselves which
geographies give better access to their products and talents. As a long-term
trend, there is also a fit between Western demand and Indian demographics
that will help shape the global knowledge economy. Political choices,
therefore, should not be divorced from those of economics, sociology or
culture. There may be a process of subtle contestation between India and a
world largely shaped by the West. Some of that may also show up in
hedging, a phenomenon well established in the political domain. But here
too, there are good reasons to be discerning and deliberate, rather than
allow an attitude to become a strategy. India may be non-West but must
realize that there is little profit in being anti-West.
Certainly, a calculation to broaden partners and ensure maximum
benefits is an obvious one. But increasingly, in a tech-driven world, not all
choices can be straddled or sidestepped. This is particularly so in respect of
the digital domain and critical and emerging technologies. And while
engaged in that exercise, the global scenario itself must also be clinically
assessed from our perspective. Convergences and contradictions can be
systemic in certain domains.
Developing affinities with the West will definitely pay well in the era of
the knowledge economy. It is, therefore, crucial that we approach the larger
issue as much with our heads as with our hearts. Eventually, new compacts
will come into being that could more accurately reflect rebalancing and
multipolarity.
The attention that the Modi government has devoted to building ties
with Europe is a significant departure from the passivity of the preceding
decades. Earlier, Indian diplomacy mostly concentrated on larger states,
especially the UK, France and Germany. This continues to a certain degree,
but there is now a more sustained focus on the EU as a collective body, and
also sub-regions and smaller states. Regular India–EU summits have done
much to change the atmosphere, leading to the resumption of FTA
negotiations.
For India, Germany is clearly the account where there is visible space
for further growth. Till now, much of that country’s attention has been on
other parts of Asia. That could well change somewhat in the light of new
strategic circumstances. Indeed, it is the progress with the India–Germany
relationship which could make the difference with that of the EU as a
whole.
Among the sub-regions, the Nordic engagement has been particularly
prominent, delivering results in the political and economic domains. The
Mediterranean one, including Italy and Greece, has been less collective but
still enthusiastic and impactful. It could acquire a new significance in the
context of IMEC. The MMPA with Portugal was particularly timely in
catalysing the rest of the EU.
Reinforcing relations with Central and Eastern Europe remains a work
in progress, and different formats are being explored. Indian energies have
also been expended in the Baltic and the Caucasus, including through the
opening of embassies.
Handling the East–West contradiction is today one of the major
challenges for Indian diplomacy. But the East is not a simple proposition for
India. After the first decade of Independence, that has never been India’s
preference. Its relationship with Russia has been qualitatively different from
its ties with China. It is clearly not helpful for India if the two are perceived
to be in the same basket. From time to time, efforts have been made to
advance such an analysis and India, on its part, has refused to be drawn in.
There has been no competitive element at all in its relationship with Russia.
On the contrary, it is the continuous consideration that the two countries
have extended to each other that has been the foundation of their
partnership. Where China is concerned, it is a very different story, in part
due to the unresolved boundary question. Therefore, India’s geopolitical
posture will not be amenable to the extrapolation of the Indo-Pacific into
Europe, and it is essential that we get the West to understand this logic of
strategy.
While countries are naturally impelled by their national interest, it is
also true that this positioning can help to mitigate global frictions when the
time comes. This has been already evident in the workings of the G20 and
some other international platforms. Indeed, it could even be asserted that
calming the global discourse and stabilizing the global economy is in itself
a contribution to common good.

THE AFRICAN SOLIDARITY

When PM Modi announced at the New Delhi G20 Summit the membership
of the AU in that body, it was a very special moment for India–Africa ties.
A year before, he had made that commitment in Bali and, thereafter, took it
up personally and seriously with other G20 leaders. To many African
countries, it was natural that India should step forward and advance their
cause.
Yet, the fact remains that the story of India–Africa relations is a
relatively uncommented one. It is often forgotten that there is a really long
history of contacts, whether fostered by the dhow or the caravan. The
period of Western colonialism added its own texture, creating the
beginnings of an Indian diaspora in that continent. The subsequent
independence struggles have generated a unique solidarity that is still on
display in global forums.
As with many other regions, what was a steady but unremarkable
relationship got a quantum jump due to PM Modi’s personal interest.
Perhaps this also reflected the extensive contacts that his home state of
Gujarat had with this region. A clear approach to cooperation with the
continent was articulated by him in July 2018 in an address to the Ugandan
Parliament. Its essence was that India would respond to Africa’s priorities,
demands and needs rather than unilaterally propose an agenda. Since 2014,
there have been 34 outgoing visits by the Indian president, vice president
and PM to Africa, and more than a hundred incoming ones at the same
level. The IAFS of 2015 laid out particularly ambitious targets for
cooperation.
A decade later, despite the interruption by Covid, much of that was
agreed upon has been delivered in terms of projects, capabilities, training
and exchanges. Apart from practical collaboration, the solidarity with
Africa is best expressed by how strongly India has pushed for its
membership of the G20.
To date, India has done about 200 projects in Africa, with 65 more
under execution and 81 in the works. Many of these projects were the first
of their kind in Africa. Some are truly iconic in nature such as the Tema–
Mpakadan Railway and Presidential Palace in Ghana, National Assembly
building in Gambia, the Rivatex textile factory in Kenya, the Metro Express
project in Mauritius and the Mahatma Gandhi International Convention
Centre in Niger.
The narrative in other related domains has also been encouraging. More
than 40,000 scholarships have been extended since the last IAFS meeting.
A pan-Africa e-network launched a decade ago is supplemented by the e-
VidyaBharti and e-ArogyaBharti initiatives on distant education and health
respectively. We are today Africa’s fourth-largest trade partner and fifth-
largest investor. India’s contribution of vaccines, medicines and equipment
was particularly crucial during the Covid pandemic. The discussion is
increasingly now on digital delivery, green growth and affordable health as
the three themes of future development collaboration.

THE BRIDGES NOT TOO FAR

While Africa has been the main focus of lines of credit and grant assistance,
India’s growing footprint in Latin America is also worth noting. From being
perceived as a faraway destination, that continent is gaining salience as a
supplier of energy, natural resources and food. Its expanding middle class
are natural customers for Indian products in pharmaceuticals and vehicles.
The Indian IT industry is also firmly entrenched in the Latin American
market. If the overall trade turnover is growing so rapidly, then the
seriousness of our presence cannot be ignored. Currently, India is among
the top five trade partners of both Brazil and Argentina. Indian investments
are growing apace in diverse sectors, matching the strengthening political
collaboration. In the task of making friends and influencing people, Latin
America is no longer a bridge too far.
The example of Pacific Islands is a reflection of how much India’s reach
has extended in the last decade. But it is equally a reminder of what awaits
it: a more intensified engagement with regions that are not proximate.
Within this period, India has undertaken three summit-level meetings with
Pacific Island countries, the most recent being in 2023 in Papua New
Guinea. While the warmth of that reception got public attention, what is
also important to appreciate is a development agenda that is demand-driven.
Much of it focussed on the acute health priorities of the Pacific region.
Indian commitments included a super-speciality hospital in Fiji, Jaipur Foot
camps, dialysis units and sea ambulances in all member states and centres
for supply of cost-effective pharmaceuticals. The digital deficit was also
sought to be bridged by creating an IT hub in Papua New Guinea. A
warehouse to host geo-spatial data sets was launched, alongside a centre for
sustainable coastal and ocean research. Ongoing endeavours at solarization
and community skill-building will also be taken forward.
Many Pacific nations were vocally appreciative of Indian assistance
during the Covid pandemic, and all of them clearly saw merit in its climate-
action initiatives. That Indian calculations have started to focus on a region
where there were previously only tenuous contacts obviously speaks of an
expanding horizon. But it also underlines how integrated global politics has
now become and the importance of extending one’s hand generously.
In a different quarter of the world, a similar story has begun to unfold in
respect of the Caribbean Community, where there is a significant diaspora
as well. Here again, a long-standing but low-key relationship is being
energized through development projects, larger investments, enhanced trade
and focussed capacity building. Enabling this through a politically-led
framework is also beginning to yield results. The Covid pandemic provided
an opportunity for India to display solidarity in a manner that will resonate
for long.

NEIGHBOURHOOD: TRULY FIRST

Even as it spreads its wings, a rising India must remain focussed on its
immediate neighbourhood and the extended one. The current decade has
seen a radical improvement in India’s linkages as a result of the
Neighbourhood First policy. Whether it is rail, road, air or waterway
connectivity; supply of energy; restoration of heritage; construction of
housing; or expansion of capacities, India has demonstrated the value of its
friendship. Neighbours are increasingly realizing that India can be a source
of prosperity for them as well. In difficult times, especially during Covid,
their well-being was greatly enhanced by contributions from India. Those
who faced serious balance of payments crisis, like Sri Lanka, could also
turn to India for support. As a result, the sense of regional togetherness has
grown steadily.
That has also been the case with the regions a little more extended from
India. ASEAN has discovered in India a firm advocate of its centrality and
cohesion. The agenda of cooperation has widened to cover connectivity,
development assistance, research and education, as well as security. The
Gulf has seen a degree of attention that has been missing for the last four
decades. The stresses of the Covid period have only intensified this growing
closeness. The levels of investment, trade and strategic collaboration have
improved markedly.
With Central Asia, too, the template of comprehensive engagement
announced in 2022 has opened up possibilities in a wide range of domains.
Indian capacities and partners are being explored with a much greater sense
of enthusiasm.
As for the island neighbours of the Indian Ocean, they have seen India
come through in both difficult and routine times. The overall picture that
emerges is now of an India that is more engaged, more responsible, more
contributive and, therefore, more reliable.

GLOBAL SOUTH AND GLOBAL GOOD

As it ascends the international hierarchy, India speaks not just for itself but
for a larger Global South constituency as well. The last few years have been
particularly tough on developing countries. The impact of Covid was much
harder, whether in terms of health accessibility or affordability. That they
were then subjected to travel restraints added insult to injury. Already
fragile economies reeled under the weight of lockdowns and disruptions,
made worse by growing debt and declining trade. The knock-on effects of
the Ukraine conflict have added to the woes, especially when it comes to 3F
prices. In many regions, terrorism has been endemic along with its
economic costs. Developing societies are also more vulnerable to extreme
climate events that we are witnessing with greater frequency. Whether it is
the 2030 Agenda or climate commitments, there is growing concern about
the ability to sustain progress.
In all of this, India is widely perceived to be an exemplar in many areas.
Developing countries also expect a nation like India to articulate their
concerns in forums where they may not be present. For India, this is both a
moral responsibility as well as an expression of global strategy. After all,
the re-balancing process will extend beyond its current beneficiaries, and
India is well served by investing deeply in the Global South.
There are also occasions when friends are won and opinions influenced
by doing greater good. Some of it again may be directly relevant to national
interest. But there is more expected of India as its capabilities grow. In
recent years, we have been effective in providing succour in situations
ranging from the Türkiye and Nepal earthquakes and Yemen civil war to
mudslides in Sri Lanka and floods in Mozambique. The Covid period too
saw intensification in international collaboration, be it the Vaccine Maitri
for 100 partners, supply of medicines or equipment to 150 countries, or
indeed the deployment of Indian personnel in the Maldives, Mauritius,
Madagascar, Seychelles, Comoros and Kuwait.
Beyond emergency situations, however, India can help make the world
safer and more secure by contributing to the well-being of the global
commons. This could take the form of the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative
(IPOI) that India announced at the East Asia Summit in 2019. This has
since gathered momentum with a growing list of partnering nations. It could
be the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA),
which will focus on challenges like illegal, unreported and unregulated
(IUU) fishing. Or indeed the Quad itself, which has taken on
responsibilities ranging from collaborative connectivity and pandemic
response to emerging and critical technologies. There are also practical
examples of demonstrating climate action in which India has played a
crucial role. The same spirit drives India’s championing of the International
Year of Millets. This could have substantial implications for food security
and greener agriculture, especially for Africa.
Many elements of the logic that drives India’s engagement with Africa
also apply to its larger approach to the Global South. There is a broad
message of empathy and solidarity, but their expressions could be specific
to the region or the country involved. It is visible in multilateral forums
through platforms like the G-77, Non-Aligned Movement or the L.69
Group. With Small Island Developing States, this is evident in development
projects, renewable energy spread and disaster resilience efforts.
At a time when much of the world has fallen back to a nationalism of an
earlier era, enlightened Indian interests dictate that it puts even greater
emphasis on internationalism. This is made easier by the fact that in Indian
tradition, there has never been tension between the two. The presidency of
the G20 provides just the right platform for this message to be driven home.
It is not just that important bilateral relations have started to get the
attention that they long deserved. There are also more innovative group
engagements at various levels. In the immediate and extended
neighbourhood, we can see that in the East Asia Summit platforms, Bay of
Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
(BIMSTEC), Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) and a Central Asia collective engagement. Beyond that,
there are the IAFS, the Arab League dialogue, the SCO, the Pacific Islands
Forum, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Community of Latin
American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Dealings with Europe have
acquired a new intensity, not just with the EU but also with constituent
members like the Nordic countries or the Slavkov format. The
Commonwealth remains a long-standing commitment while the G20 has
evolved into a growing priority. All of these are backed up by a plethora of
ad hoc arrangements, like the BRICS, RIC, IBSA, Quad, I2U2 and multiple
trilaterals. In addition, there are some key bilaterals and certain specific
regions that will determine the smoothness of India’s rise.
India has now entered a new phase of a multi-vector engagement that
seeks to maximize outcomes and benefits. Its results have heightened its
profile and changed its image. As a consequence, it is today perceived as a
source of ideas, a champion of causes, a driver of initiatives and an
advocate of consensus. No country or region is now seen as irrelevant to
India’s global calculus. Each of these examples highlights the importance of
making friends and influencing people. This generous, intensive and
enlightened engagement with the world is key to Bharat’s journey towards
becoming a leading power.