• Garcia v.

COMELEC, 1993

RECALL

Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. The
people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in the absence
of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations. Such power has been
held to be indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs. 12 Not undeservedly, it is
frequently described as a fundamental right of the people in a representative democracy.

RECALL TWO MODES OF INITIATING RECALL PROCESS

1. Preparatory Recall assembly (PRA)

NOTE: ALREADY REMOVED BY R.A. 9244

2. registered

Rationale for empowering a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall from office of local elective
officials

(a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and

(b) to cut down on its expenses.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRA AS A MODE OF INITIATING RECALL

The Constitution did not provide nor prohibit the mode of initiating recall election. The constitution
merely mandates the Congress to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate,
Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall

PRA IS STILL AN INITATION DONE BY THE PEOPLE

PRAC is also initiation by the people, although done indirectly through their representatives. It is not
constitutionally impermissible for the people to act through their elected representatives.

PRA WOULD NOT BE INFLUENCED BY POLITICAL INTEREST

The PRA is composed of all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the municipalities and
component cities thus its membership is not apportioned to political parties. No significance is given to
the political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly,
At the provincial level includes all the elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their
number, the greater probability is that no one political party can control its majority.

Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss
of confidence of the people and not because of political rivalry.

THE RESOLUTION ISSUED BY THE PRA IS NOT THE RECALL ITSELF

The resolution is a mere proposal which will passed upon by the sovereign electorate of Bataan. Thus,
The electorate of Bataan may or may not recall the official concerned.

• Angobung v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 126576 (1997)

Section 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. -

(d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may also be validly initiated upon
petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of registered voters in the local
government unit concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was
elected.

The law does not state that the petition must be signed by at least 25% of the registered voters; rather,
the petition must be initiated of or by at least 25%.

Hence, while the initiatory recall petition may not yet contain the signatures of at least 25% of the total
number of registered voters, the petition must contain the names of at least 25% of the total number of
registered voters in whose behalf only one person may sign the petition in the meantime.

NOTE: R.A. 9244 now requires that the petition must now be signed

Section 74. Limitations on Recall. -

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or
one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
SK ELECTION IS NOT REGULAR ELECTION

A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by those who
possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and Who are registered voters. One
Of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under Section I, Article V Of the Constitution is that the
person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is that he be a registered
voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Section 113- 118).

Under Section 424 of the LGC provides that the SK includes the youth With ages ranging from 15 to 21
Accordingly, they include many Who are not qualified to vote in a regular election, viz., those from ages
15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election (whether
national or local).

BARANGAY ELECTION IS REGULAR ELECTION

In the barangay election, the qualification to participate is that the person must be at least 21 years old
and a registered voter. Thus, barangay elections are considered local elections.

• Sps Morata v. Sps Go, GR No. L-62339

We find the petition impressed with merit. Section 6 of P.D. 1508 reads as follows:

SECTION 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint.— No complaint, petition, action for

proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall
be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a
confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement
has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or
Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly
to court in the following cases:

[1] Where the accused is under detention;

[2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus
proceedings;

[3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of
personal property and support pendente lite; and

[4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations

Section 2 of the law defines the scope of authority of the Lupon thus:

SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement.—The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority
to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of
all disputes except:
[1] Where one party is the government ,or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his
official functions;

[3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;

[4] Offenses where there is no private offended party;

[5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine upon
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government.

Thus, except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the law, the Lupon has the authority to
settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same city or municipality.
The law, as written, makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that
should be compromised at the barangay level, in contradistinction to the limitation imposed upon the
Lupon by paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its authority over criminal cases. In fact, in defining
the Lupon's authority, Section 2 of said law employed the universal and comprehensive term "all", to
which usage We should neither add nor subtract in consonance with the rudimentary precept in
statutory construction that "where the law does not distinguish, We should not distinguish.

• Uy v. Estate of Fenandez, GR No. 200612

Pursuant to the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. It bears stressing that only individuals may be parties to
barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents. Complaints by or against
corporations, partnerships or other juridical entities may not be filed with, received or acted upon by the
barangay for conciliation. The Estate of Vipa, which is the complainant below, is a juridical entity that has
a personality, which is separate and distinct from that of Grace Joy. Thus, there is no necessity to bring
the dispute to the barangay for conciliation prior to filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer with the
MTCC.

• Pascual v. Pascual, GR No. 157830

In the 1982 case of Tavora v. Veloso,11 this Court held that where the parties are not actual residents in
the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them to submit their
dispute to the lupon as provided for in Section 6 vis a vis Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang
Pambarangay Law).

[B]y express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over disputes
where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality, except where the barangays
in which they actually reside adjoin each other. (Underscoring supplied)

In the 2000 case of Vercide v. Hernandez,12 this Court, noting that the Tavora ruling, reiterated in other
cases including the 1996 case of Agbayani13 cited by petitioner, was decided under the provisions of P.D.
No. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay) Law which were, except for some modifications, echoed in
Sections 408-409 of the Local Government Code which took effect on January 1, 1992, held that
the Tavora ruling remained.

To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as applicable to the attorney-in-fact of
the party-plaintiff, as contended by respondent, would abrogate the meaning of a "real party in interest"
as defined in Section 2 of Rule 314 of the 1997 Rules of Court vis a vis Section 3 of the same Rule which
was earlier quoted but misread and misunderstood by respondent.

In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in interest, is not an actual resident of the
barangay where the defendant-herein respondent resides, the local lupon has no jurisdiction over their
dispute, hence, prior referral to it for conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.

• Zamora v. Heirs of Izquierdo, GR No. 146195

IT IS IMMATERIAL WHETHER OR NOT IT IS THE DEFENDANT WHO INITIATED THE COMPLAINT IN THE
BARANGGAY FOR CONCILIATION

It is of no moment that the complaint was initially made by defendant-appellant Avelina Zamora because
herein plaintiff-appellee was given by the Sangguniang Barangay the authority to bring her grievance to
the Court for resolution.

BARANGAY CONCILIATION BEFORE THE LUPON CHAIRMAN ONLY IS SUFFICIENT

"SECTION 412. Conciliation. – (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court.– No complaint, petition,
action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted
directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation
between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement
has been reached as certified by the lupon or pangkat secretary and attested to by the lupon or pangkat
chairman x x x." (Underscoring supplied)

Moreover, in Diu vs. Court of Appeals,21 we held that "notwithstanding the mandate in Section 410(b) of
R.A. No. 7160 that the Barangay Chairman shall constitute a Pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts,"
the same "Section 410(b) should be construed together with Section 412(a) of the same law (quoted
earlier), as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case." Here, while the Pangkat was
not constituted, however, the parties met nine (9) times at the Office of the Barangay Chairman for
conciliation wherein not only the issue of water installation was discussed but also petitioners' violation
of the lease contract. It is thus manifest that there was substantial compliance with the law which does
not require strict adherence thereto.22
• Peregrina v. Panis, 1984, 133 SCRA 72, 75 • GR No. 168935

RULE 57

Preliminary Attachment

Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. — At the commencement of the action or at any
time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse
party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following
cases:

(a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or damages, other than moral and
exemplary, on a cause of action arising from law, contract, quasi-contract, delict or quasi-delict against a
party who is about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors;

In the case at bar, although writ of preliminary of action can be filed at any time, nonetheless,
respondents application for the writ is not proper because the damages sought to recover is not
specified or unliquidated.

• Banares II v. Balising, 2000, 384 Phil 567

DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF JUDGEMENTS STILL APPLIES TO SUMMARY CASES

The rationale behind the doctrine of finality of judgments and orders, likewise, supports our conclusion
that said doctrine applies to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:

The doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and
sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at
some definite date set by law. This is to settle these cases expeditiously.

Moreover, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure expressly provides that the Rules of Court
applies suppletorily to cases covered by the former:

Sec. 22. Applicability of the regular rules. — The regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court shall
apply to the special cases herein provided for in a suppletory capacity insofar as they are not
inconsistent therewith. 43

Thus, it is applicable likewise to summary cases. Otherwise, courts would be prevented from settling
justiciable controversies with finality, 50 thereby undermining the stability of our judicial system.
Order of dismissal of the case which had become final and executor can no longer be revived

• Vidal v. Escueta GR No. 156228

AMICABLE SETTLEMENT IS A FINAL JUDGEMENT

SECTION. 416. Effect of Amicable Settlement and Arbitration Award. - The amicable settlement and
arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten
(10) days from the date thereof, unless repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition to
nullify the award has been filed before the proper city or municipal court.

We agree with the contention of the petitioners that under Section 416 of the LGC, the amicable
settlement executed by the parties before the Lupon on the arbitration award has the force and effect of
a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days from the date thereof, unless the
settlement is repudiated within the period therefor, where the consent is vitiated by force, violence or
intimidation, or a petition to nullify the award is filed before the proper city or municipal court. 25 The
repudiation of the settlement shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of a certification to file a
complaint.

WHEN A WRIT OF EXECUTION CAN BE FILED

Section 417 of the LGC grants a party a period of six months to enforce the amicable settlement by the
Lupon through the Punong Barangay before such party may resort to filing an action with the MTC to
enforce the settlement.

REASON: to afford the parties during the six-month time line, a simple, speedy and less
expensive enforcement of their settlement before the Lupon.

However, Section 417 should be construed to mean that if the obligation in the settlement to be
enforced is due and demandable on the date of the settlement, the six-month period should be counted
from the date of the settlement; otherwise, if the obligation to be enforced is due and demandable on a
date other than the date of the settlement, the six-month period should be counted from the date the
obligation becomes due and demandable.

MTC HAS THE JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE THE AMMICABLE SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE LUPON

By express provision of Section 417 of the LGC, an action for the enforcement of the settlement should
be instituted in the proper municipal or city court. This is regardless of the nature of the complaint
before the Lupon, and the relief prayed for therein. The venue for such actions is governed by Rule 4,
Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. An action for the enforcement of a
settlement is not one of those covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure in civil cases;30 hence, the
rules on regular procedure shall apply, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended.31

respondents failed to personally appear during the conciliation proceedings as required by Section 415
of R.A. 7160.47 They were, however, represented by Maureen.48 Although dismissible under Section 1(j),
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the Court finds that respondents have substantially complied with the
law.49

The CA, the RTC, and the MCTC unanimously found that petitioners and respondents' representative
underwent barangay conciliation proceedings.50 Unfortunately, they failed to arrive at any amicable
settlement.51 Thereafter, upon agreement of the parties, the Office of the Punong Barangay issued a
Certification to File Action.52 During pre-trial, the parties again underwent mediation before the PMC and
JDR before the court. Still, no settlement was reached.53 Given the foregoing, the Court finds that the
purposes of the law, i.e., to provide avenues for parties to amicably settle their disputes and to prevent
the "indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts,"54 have been sufficiently met. Considering that the
instant complaint for unlawful detainer, an action governed by the rules of summary procedure, has
been pending for 6 years, the Court finds it proper to relax the technical rules of procedure in the
interest of speedy and substantial justice.

SPOUSES BELVIS V. CONRADO G.R. No. 239727

PARTIES CAN AMICABBLY SETTLE THE DISPUTE IN THE BARANGGAY THROUGH THEIR
REPRESENTATIVES, THERE BEING SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE.

Here although the parties failed to personally appear in the baranggay, however, the parties was still able
to participate in the amicable settlement through their duly authorized representatives, thus the
purpose of the law which is to provide avenues for the parties to settle their dispute and prevent the
indiscriminate filing of cases in the court have been sufficient met.

Duran v. Inoferio, Sr. ( G.R. Nos. 217608 & 217609 (Notice) )

December 10, 2018

WRIT OF PRELMINARY INJUNCTION WITHOUT BASIS IS DISMISSIBLE FOR FAILING TO COMPLY THE
KATARUNGANG BARANGAY LAW

It appears that the dispute falls squarely under paragraph 8 (c) of AC No. 14-93 as the present action is
coupled with a provisional remedy of a preliminary injunction. Thorough scrutiny of the present
complaint, however, reveals otherwise. A reading of the complaint demonstrates that the prayer for
preliminary injunction is baseless — there is no actual relief for preliminary injunction prayed for. 27 Not
only did Duran fail to prove the presence of the elements of preliminary injunction, worse, he failed to
even recite the presence of the following requisites of a preliminary injunction: (1) the complainant has a
clear legal right; (2) such right has been violated and the invasion by the other party is material and
substantial; and (3) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. 28 No act requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from doing a particular act
or acts was specified. The complaint for quieting of title also failed to mention what particular act or acts
were requested to be performed. Conversely, there was no recital of the basis of extreme urgency of the
provisional remedy sought for or showing of grave and irreparable injury, that is, injury that would
warrant the issuance of a preliminary injunction. 29 Simply put, the prayer for preliminary injunction was
but a recitation of general allegations. Indeed, it was a mere ploy to avoid going under the ambit of the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law. 30

Hence, without complying with the conditional precedent of first submitting the case to barangay
conciliation, the complaint for quieting of title was premature and must be dismissed.

Notwithstanding the dismissal of Duran's complaint, however, the counterclaim o

• Quiros v. Arjona, GR No. 158901

Article 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) The civil status of persons;

(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;

(3) Any ground for legal separation;

(4) Future support;

(5) The jurisdiction of courts;

(6) Future legitime. (1814a)

Article 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall
be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise. (1816)

Article 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or
falsity of documents, is subject to the provisions of article 1330 of this Code.

However, one of parties cannot set up a mistake of fact as against the other if the latter, by virtue of the
compromise, has withdrawn from a litigation already commenced. (1817a)
Generally, the rule is that where no repudiation was made during the 10-day period, the amicable
settlement attains the status of finality and it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to implement
and enforce it.

However, such rule is not inflexible for it admits of certain exceptions. In Santos v. Judge Isidro,4 the
Court observed that special and exceptional circumstances, the imperatives of substantial justice, or
facts that may have transpired after the finality of judgment which would render its execution unjust,
may warrant the suspension of execution of a decision that has become final and executory. In the case
at bar, the ends of justice would be frustrated if a writ of execution is issued considering the uncertainty
of the object of the agreement. To do so would open the possibility of error and future litigations.

By the plain and clear language of the law, the arbitration award will have the force and effect of a final
judgment of a court upon the expiration of 10 days from date of receipt of the award, unless a petition
for nullification of the award has been filed before the appropriate trial court.

• GR No. 219645

REPUDIATION OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS TO THE LUPON

Section 413. Arbitration. -

(a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings, agree in writing that they shall abide by the
arbitration award of the lupon chairman or the pangkat. Such agreement to arbitrate may be repudiated
within five (5) days from the date thereof for the same grounds and in accordance with the procedure
hereinafter prescribed. The arbitration award shall be made after the lapse of the period for repudiation
and within ten (10) days thereafter.

REPUDIATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD IS TO THE COURT

Section 416. Effect of Amicable Settlement and Arbitration Award. - The amicable settlement and
arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten
(10) days from the date thereof, unless repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition to
nullify the award has been filed before the proper city or municipal court.
DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF JUDGMENT

The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and
sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become
final at some definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to
naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.

the doctrine of finality of judgment admits of several exceptions, to wit:

(1) the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party,

(2) void judgments, and

(3) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable

• GR No. 164594

MTC HAS JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE any settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon
REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE ISSUE AND THE AMOUNT INVOLVED>

Section 417 of the Local Government Code that after the lapse of the six (6) month period from the date
of the settlement, the agreement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court.

Section 417 made no distinction with respect to the amount involved or the nature of the issue involved.
Thus, there can be no question that the law’s intendment was to grant jurisdiction over the enforcement
of settlement/arbitration awards to the city or municipal courts the regardless of the amount. A basic
principle of interpretation is that words must be given their literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity
• GR No. 164594

PETITION FOR EXECUTION AND NOT A MOTION FOR EXECUTION

It is well-settled that what are controlling in determining the nature of the pleading are the allegations in
the body and not the caption

Section 3. Complaint. — The complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiff's cause or causes of action.
The names and residences of the plaintiff and defendant must be stated in the complaint.

In the case at bar, A perusal of the motion for execution, however, shows that it contains the material
requirements of an initiatory action.

First, the motion is sufficient in form12 and substance.13 It is complete with allegations of the ultimate
facts constituting the cause of action; the names and residences of the plaintiff and the defendant; it
contains the prayer for the MCTC to order the execution of the kasunduan; and there was also a
verification and certification against forum shopping.

• Magno v. Velasco-Jacoba, A.C. No. 6296

Section 415 of the LGC of 19917, on the subject Katarungang Pambarangay, provides:

Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties
must appear in person without the assistance of the counsel or representative, except for minors and
incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.

The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance of the parties in katarungan
pambarangay conciliation proceedings, unassisted by counsel or representative. The rationale behind
the personal appearance requirement is to enable the lupon to secure first hand and direct information
about the facts and issues,8 the exception being in cases where minors or incompetents are parties.
There can be no quibbling that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and settle their disputes
between themselves without what sometimes is the unsettling assistance of lawyers whose presence
could sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues.9 Worse still, the participation of lawyers with their
penchant to use their analytical skills and legal knowledge tend to prolong instead of expedite
settlement of the case.

The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation proceedings was not, to be
sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does not apply since
complainant addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual who thereafter
proceeded to hear the same is specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to state that complainant wrote
her Sumbong with the end in view of availing herself of the benefits of barangay justice. That she
addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain is really of little moment since the latter chairs
the Lupong Tagapamayapa.10

Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to all katarungan barangay proceedings.
Section 412(a)11 the LGC of 1991 clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the
parties shall go through the conciliation process either before the lupon chairman or
the lupon or pangkat. As what happened in this case, the punong barangay, as chairman of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa, conducted the conciliation proceedings to resolve the disputes between the two
parties.

Given the above perspective, we join the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline in its determination that
respondent transgressed the prohibition prescribed in Section 415 of the LGC. However, its
recommended penalty of mere admonition must have to be modified. Doubtless, respondent's conduct
tended to undermine the laudable purpose of the katarungan pambarangay system. What compounded
matters was when respondent repeatedly ignored complainant's protestation against her continued
appearance in the barangay conciliation

• Nuyda Jr. v. Joson, A.C. No. 11814, 2018

. The rule that lawyers cannot appear in barangay conciliations does not apply when the lawyer
himself/herself is the party to the case.