G.R. No.

L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent public officials to publish
and/ or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,
letter of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.

The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it would be granted to a private
individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds
with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ
when public rights are to be subserved.

The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the said petition
for the reason that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.

ISSUE:
Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required considering the clause in
Article 2 unless otherwise provided.

HELD:
Unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not with the
publication requirement which cannot be omitted as public needs to be notified for the
law to become effective. The necessity for the publication in the Official Gazette of all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, was affirmed by
the court on April 24, 1985. This is necessary to provide the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which regulate actions and conduct as citizens. Without this,
there would be no basis for Art 3 of the Civil Code Ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TAADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

FACTS:
In relation to writ of mandamus obtained by the petitioner, Lorenzo Tanada where the
Court affirmed the necessity of publication, said petitioner is now asking for
reconsideration / clarification of that decision.

ISSUES:
(1) What is meant by law of public nature or general applicability?
(2) Must distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not?
(3) What is meant by publication?
4) Where is the publication to be made?
(5) When is the publication to be made?

RULING:
(1) All laws as defined shall immediately upon their approval or as soon as thereafter
possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15
days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
(2) The term laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application,
for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general although there are some that
do not apply directly; covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
(3) Publication of statues must be in full otherwise it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the law;
(4) Publication of statutes must be made in Official Gazette and not elsewhere;
(5) Laws must be published as soon as possible to give effect to the law pursuant to
Article 2 of the Civil Code.

G.R. No. 176951 November 18, 2008

G.R. No. 177499 November 18, 2008
G.R. No. 178056 November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS

FACTS:

These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the
League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P.
Treas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the
municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to
enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant
to the subject laws.

In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted
the petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating
Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause.

In another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4,
declared the Cityhood Laws as constitutional.

On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6,
resolved the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision
of December 21, 2009.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution
2. Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 6 and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution
3. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws is unconstitutional.

RULING:
1. The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative
power.
Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and
to alter and repeal them.
The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their original,
sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of
the Philippines.
The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers.
Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A.
No. 9009.
Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress
enacted the Cityhood Laws.
When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable
indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government units
income, population, and land area.
However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities
from such a belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to
uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and
thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy,
especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic
growth in their respective provinces.
R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC but the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No.
9009 through the exemption clauses found therein since the Cityhood Laws
explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A.
No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC
itself.

2. Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent

municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces.
Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability
of respondent municipalities to become the States partners in accelerating
economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very
thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the
11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present.
3. Yes, the operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an
unconstitutional law.
Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains
unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial
declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair
play.
In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the
unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.
Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood
Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution.
However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the
declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by
the new cities or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may
be recognized as valid and effective.
This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void.
Only the effects of the implementation of these unconstitutional laws are left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent people who may
have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Courts
declaration of their unconstitutionality.