Tracks of Tamerlane USA

In the Tracks
of Tamerlane:
Central Asia’s Path
to the 21st Century
In the Tracks
of Tamerlane:
to the 21st Century
edited by Dan Burghart

Theresa Sabonis-Helf
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
2004
��
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The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied
within are those of the individual authors and do not represent the views of the other
contributors, the Department of Defense or any other agency or department of the
Federal Government. This publication is cleared for public release; distribution
unlimited.
Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without further permis-

sion, with credit to the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. A
courtesy copy of any reviews and tearsheets would be appreciated.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in Publication Data

/ edited by Dan Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 1-57906-068-4
1. Asia, Central — Social Conditions — 1991 – 2. Asia, Central — Politics
and government — 1991 – 3. Asia, Central — Economic conditions.
Daniel L. Burghart. II. Title.
First Printing, July 2004
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DEDICATION vii
D E D I C AT I O N
To the heroes working for reform in Central Asia,

and to Gavin and the girls, and Susan and the boys,
the heroes in our hearts
vii
viii
ix
Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xv
Chapter One
In the Tracks of Tamerlane:

Central Asia’s Path to the 21st Century . . . . . . . . . . .3
Daniel L. Burghart
Part I—Political Changes

Chapter 2
The Politics of Central Asia:

National in Form, Soviet in Content . . . . . . . . . . . .25
E.Wayne Merry
Chapter 3
Political Reform Strategies:

Early Starters, Late Starters, and Non-Starters . . .43
Gregory Gleason
Chapter 4
Legal Reform in Central Asia:

Battling the Influence of History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65
Roger D. Kangas
ix
x CONTENTS
Chapter 5
Human Rights in Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Michael Ochs
Chapter 6
Democracy-Building in Central Asia

Post September 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .115
Sylvia W. Babus
Chapter 7
Islam in Central Asia:

The Emergence and Growth of
Radicalism in the Post-Communist Era . . . . . . . .139
Tiffany Petros
Part II—Economic Concerns
Chapter 8
The Rise of the Post-Soviet Petro-States:

Energy Exports and Domestic Governance
in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . .159
Chapter 9
Cooperative Management of
Transboundary Water Resources
in Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .187
Daene C. McKinney
xi
Chapter 10
Central Asian Public Health:

Transition and Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Genevieve Grabman
Chapter 11
From Rio to Johannesburg: Comparing

Sustainable Development in Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, and The Kyrgyz Republic . . . . . . . . . .245
Alma Raissova and Aliya Sartbayeva-Peleo
Chapter 12
Land Privatization and Conflict in

Central Asia: Is Kyrgyzstan a Model? . . . . . . . . . 259
1
Kevin D. Jones
Chapter 13
Environmental Management in
Independent Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .275
David S. McCauley
Chapter 14
The Future of Electrical Power

in the Republic of Kazakhstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .305
Kalkaman Suleimenov
xii CONTENTS
Part III—Security Issues

Chapter 15
Forging Relationships, Preventing Proliferation:

A Decade of Cooperative Threat Reduction
in Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .321
Emily E. Daughtry
Chapter 16
Building Security in Central Asia:

a Multilateral Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .341
Jennifer D.P. Moroney
Chapter 17
Who’s Watching the Watchdogs?:

Drug Trafficking in Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .361
Nancy Lubin
Chapter 18
Migration Trends in Central Asia

and the Case of Trafficking of Women . . . . . . . . .377
Saltanat Sulaimanova
Chapter 19
Beyond the Battle of Talas:

China’s Re-emergence in Central Asia . . . . . . . . 401 1
Matthew Oresman
xiii
Chapter 20
Regional Security Cooperation

and Foreign Policies in Central Asia:
A 21st Century “Great Game”? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .425
Robert Brannon
Chapter 21
Friends Like These: Defining

U.S. Interests in Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .445
Olga Oliker
About the Contributors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .465
Abbreviations and Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .473

xiv CONTENTS
PREFACE xv
Preface
Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf
When examining the ebb and flow of events in the region called
Central Asia, one is struck by the magnitude of the impact that this area
has had throughout history. Yet in spite of this record, very little is known
about this part of the world today. Central Asia always has found itself
wedged between Europe and Asia, and as such, has been at the crossroads
of relations between the two. In physical terms, this can be seen graphi-
cally in the trade routes of the Great Silk Road. In philosophical terms, it
is an area where Western beliefs met and mingled with Eastern ways, often
resulting in unusual and unique hybrids of thought and culture. Nor has
the area’s significance been limited to that of providing a meeting place
for other cultures. For over 100 years, between the thirteenth and fifteenth
centuries, the armies of Genghis Khan and later Tamerlane spread from
Central Asia to conquer and exert their influence over an area larger than
the conquests of Alexander, Rome or Hitler. The repercussions of these
conquests can still be seen today and serve as a reminder of the impact the
region has had, and may again have, on world events.
Great though this influence may have been, history dictated that after
Central Asia's zenith, there followed a period of decline. During this time,
the region seemed to slip from the world stage, surpassed in importance
by other areas, such as the newly discovered Americas. Though the reasons
for this decline are many and varied, the end result was that the region
seemed to fall from the attention of most scholars, political leaders and
the public in general. That the region still held importance for its resi-
dents goes without saying; that it continues to be important to the major
regional actors bordering the area will be shown. Still, little was known or
written about Central Asia after the time of Tamerlane, other than that it
was a far off and mysterious part of the world that few people traveled to
or cared about. This remained the case throughout most of the twentieth
century, until events following the breakup of the Soviet Union brought
the region into new prominence and focus.
xv
xvi BURGHART AND SABONIS-HELF
Many events can be pointed to as affecting the status of the region;

however, three stand out beyond all others as having an impact both on
the peoples of Central Asia and, in turn, their relations with the rest of
world. The breakup of the Russian/Soviet Empire, just as with the fall of
other great empires, sent shockwaves through the area and beyond. The
opportunity for the region to rule itself, as opposed to being ruled by oth-
ers, has meant significant changes in the politics, economy and social fab-
ric found there. Yet as important as these changes have been, they would
have little meaning or impact on the rest of the world were it not for the
second major event associated with Central Asia: the discovery of poten-
tially extensive reserves of gas and oil. Although the size of these stores is
debated and in truth has yet to be determined, they are significant enough
to warrant global attention and interest as an alternative fuel source in
a world concerned with the dwindling stocks of hydrocarbons. These
reserves hold the promise of economic development and prosperity, but
as has been seen elsewhere in the world, this promise can be a two-edged
sword with as many downsides as benefits. Finally, in the aftermath of Sep-
tember 11, the potential of terrorism both originating from and affecting
the region need hardly be elaborated. For all these and other reasons, the
world is showing renewed interest in Central Asia.
The genesis of this book is a response to that interest. While many
works dealing with Central Asia appeared between 1991 and 1995, taking
advantage of the fact that for the first time outside observers had rela-
tively easy access to the region, far fewer texts have appeared since then.
As often happens, general interest migrated to other parts of the world,
leaving the area to be covered by a small community of specialists. Yet
events continued to occur and changes continued to take place, so that
ten years after independence, it seemed essential to “take stock” of what
has transpired during this period, as well as to look at future prospects. To
accomplish this, we have assembled a collection of scholars and regional
specialists who are closely associated with Central Asia and whose works
cover a broad range of problems facing the region. Rather than focus on
a country-by-country analysis, each author was asked to write about a
specific topic and how it played out in at least two of the countries of the
region. They were further asked to project the potential significance of
their observations for the region over the next 15 years and how the “les-
sons learned” to date might be applied in the future.
For the purposes of this book, the changes that have taken place in
Central Asia have been grouped into three general categories, political,
economic and security. The specific subjects included in each category re-
PREFACE xvii
flect major problems or areas of concern. Although the list of these topics
is in no way all-inclusive, it does reflect a general consensus of the special-
ists gathered here as to the key issues that must be addressed when discuss-
ing the region overall. Each of these topics has an impact that goes beyond
individual country borders, and while some may affect certain countries
more than others, all have consequences for the region as a whole. Because
of this, the traditional approach which would look at each country indi-
vidually has been eschewed in favor of an approach that focuses on prob-
lems that are regional in nature, and thus must be addressed in a regional
context. In some cases, the authors compare how different countries have
addressed the same problem; in others, the issues are transboundary in
nature and the authors examine regional solutions. Although it is hoped
that this work will appeal to a wide audience, three groups in particular
may benefit from its approach: policy makers who need a general back-
ground on the issues associated with the region; regional specialists who
are seeking information on specific issues that challenge the region; and
technical specialists who wish to see how their areas of interest affect the
region as a whole. Finally, the views of the authors reflected here represent
a wide range of opinions that are often at odds with one another. No at-
tempt has been made to resolve these differences, and they are presented
to the reader for her or him to evaluate and make their own determina-
tion as to the weight they want to assign each. Out of a diversity of ideas
and differences of opinion, better solutions to the problems the area faces
hopefully can be found and better policies formulated to implement these
solutions.
Contents
After an overview of the region by Daniel L. Burghart, Part I —
Political Changes begins with a chapter on the international politics affect-
ing the region. Written by Wayne Merry, a retired Foreign Service Officer
with extensive experience in the former Soviet Union, the chapter provides
a context for understanding the various external influences that can be
seen in the region, as well as the reactions of the local political “apparat”
to these influences. In the next chapter, Gregory Gleason looks in greater
detail at the current domestic political situation in the region, and the
prospects for meaningful political reform. In the chapter on legal reform,
Roger D. Kangas summarizes the steps that already have been taken in this
area, a necessary precondition for meaningful reform in the areas of poli-
tics and the economy. This is followed by a discussion of human rights by
Michael Ochs, a Congressional staff member who has followed these issues
xviii BURGHART AND SABONIS-HELF
for more than a decade. Human rights in Central Asia are arguably worse
than anywhere else in the former Soviet Union, and must be improved if
any of these states hope to be accepted into the community of nations.
Sylvia W. Babus’ chapter furthers the political track by discussing outside
efforts at democracy building. With first hand experience in many of
these programs, she provides a unique insight into “what works and what
doesn’t” on the ground. Finally, Tiffany Petros takes on the difficult task of
assessing the role of Islam in defining the region and its future.
Part II — Economic Concerns begins with Theresa Sabonis-Helf ’s
examination of the impact of hydrocarbon development on the econom-
ics and politics of the energy-rich countries of the region. Next, Daene C.
McKinney, a noted hydrographic engineer, addresses the complex topic of
water in Central Asia, detailing its economic, political, and security im-
plications, as well as ongoing efforts to resolve disputes over the equitable
distribution of water in a peaceful manner. Genevieve Grabman examines
issues of public health, and using the example of Kyrgyzstan, postulates
the role that reform of health care systems can play in improving the well-
being of the region’s most vital economic resource—its people. Kevin D.
Jones does the same with regard to land privatization, probably one of
the most difficult issues that all of the former Soviet Republics have had
to face, given their socialist background and the state ownership of land
associated with it. Economic development within the context of sustain-
able development is addressed by Alma Raissova and Aliya Sartbayeva-
Peleo, two Central Asian scholars with extensive experience in this field.
Although economic development has been a major goal of all of these
states, these authors stress the need for such development to be moderated
so as to achieve “sustainable development” goals. Closely related to these
arguments, David S. McCauley enumerates the environmental challenges
facing the region and also examines the efforts of international donors
and the Central Asian states to meet these challenges. Finally, Kalkaman
Suleimenov describes the steps being taken to rationalize the distribution
of electricity in Kazakhstan and the surrounding area. As a regional gov-
ernment official, his piece is enlightening both in terms of the informa-
tion it provides and as an example of how local officials are attempting to
come to grips with the problems they have inherited from the old Soviet
system.
In Part III — Security Issues, Emily E. Daughtry begins with a review
of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program and its impact on
Central Asia. CTR is often cited as the most effective program the U.S.
Government has had with members of the former Soviet Union. She
PREFACE xix
documents the program’s efforts in the region and shows how its successes
to date can be built in the future. Next, Jennifer D.P. Moroney examines
existing security frameworks in Central Asia and the likelihood that these
frameworks, and the organizations which comprise them, can provide the
stability the region needs as a precondition for future development. Nancy
Lubin examines what is characterized as the greatest threat to Central
Asian security—drug trafficking and its impact on both the political and
social spheres of society. Closely tied to this is the illicit trade in human
beings. Here Saltanat Sulaimanova brings a regional perspective to this
problem, as well as to the larger issue of migration to and from the area. Fi-
nally, three chapters are dedicated to Central Asian relations with the three
major world powers that have active interests in the region—China, Rus-
sia and the United States. Matthew Oresman provides a detailed account
of China’s interests in Central Asia, as well as the response of the Central
Asian states to Chinese initiatives. Captain Robert Brannon summarizes
Russia’s interests and concerns and also outlines U.S.-Russian relations
with regard to area. Finally, Olga Oliker looks at U.S. concerns in Central
Asia and postulates how these concerns might be addressed in the future.
With the new millennium a new cycle of history is beginning, one
in which it seems clear that Central Asia will play an increasingly signifi-
cant role on the world stage. Though its importance may have ebbed and
flowed with time and the circumstances in which the region has found
itself, Central Asia continues to exist at the crossroads of East and West.
Wheras the technologies used to traverse these crossroads and the nature
of the journey may have changed, the geography and the people who oc-
cupy it remain the same. Those from the region who follow in the tracks
of Tamerlane, will face many of the same challenges their ancestors did.
However, they have at their disposal a broad new range of resources to
help them address these challenges, including many provided by foreign
sources. Their success in using these resources effectively will, in turn,
determine the course they take, as they advance into the twenty-first
century.
xx BURGHART AND SABONIS-HELF
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xxi
Acknowledgments
The primary sponsor for this work has been the Pre-Conflict Manage-
ment Project for Central Asia at the National Defense University (NDU).
The goal of this project, done under the auspices of the Center for Tech-
nology and National Security Policy (CTNSP), is to lessen the likelihood
of a crisis arising by addressing problem areas before they become crises
and by being proactive with regard to their resolution. This book seeks to
support achievement of this goal by bringing the problems endemic to
the region to light. Also, as part of the preconditions for addressing these
problems, the Project is developing a Central Asian Data Exchange, envi-
sioned to be the largest single source of information on the region. It is
hoped that with both knowledge of the problems that the region faces and
sufficient information about these problems, solutions can be formulated
and policies implemented that ultimately will assist in bringing about the
peace and stability that the region so desperately needs.
In addition to the generous support of the Pre-Conflict Management
Project and its Director, Joe Eash, several individuals and organizations
have played key roles in bringing this project to completion. Thanks are
particularly owed to the NDU Foundation and Frank Eversole, whose
support early in the process allowed this work to be initiated. Hans Bin-
nendijk and Michael Baranick of the CTNSP provided not only fiscal
support, but also administrative assistance and most importantly, encour-
agement throughout the project. Kathleen Toomey Jabs and Leah Johnson
performed above and beyond the call of duty in doing the technical edits
for the work. Their efforts greatly improved the quality of the text and
helped bring it to its final published form. Thanks are also due to the NDU
Graphics Division, especially Rick Vaughn for his layout work and cover
design and Holly Gannoe who brought the work to completion under the
supervision of Alex Contreras, Chief of Graphics.
Gavin Helf provided equally valuable assistance by translating the
chapters originally written in Russian into clear expository English. The
xxi
xxii
staff of the NDU Library provided research assistance throughout the

preparation of the text, and the NDU community overall, provided the
supportive academic environment that helped to bring this work to its
conclusion.
Finally, many thanks must be given to our contributors, whose work
on this volume has gone beyond what might be expected for an academic
work and passed into the realm of a labor of love. Not only have they been
willing to share their hard earned expertise, but they have freely given that
most precious commodity for any scholar, their time. Without their efforts
there would be no book. By their efforts, they have helped to mark and
define the path for those who follow in the tracks of Tamerlane, so all such
travelers may find their way to a better future.
Dr. Daniel L. Burghart Dr. Theresa Sabonis-Helf

In the Tracks
of Tamerlane:
to the 21st Century
TRACKS OF TAMERLANE 3
Chapter One
In the Tracks of Tamerlane:

to the 21st Century 1
Daniel L. Burghart
W
hile there is hardly a corner of the world that has not been af-
fected in one way or another by the events of September 11,
the repercussions are especially evident in the region known as
Soviet Central Asia.2 The countries and people in this region were already
in the process of adjusting to the major changes in their status brought
about by the breakup of the Soviet Union a scant ten years before, when
they were plunged into the international spotlight. Even though proximity
to Afghanistan and the hiding place of Osama Bin Laden was the catalyst
for this most recent round of attention, the fact that the region sits astride
some of the largest known gas and oil reserves in the world already had
brought the area a fair amount of notoriety.
Though interest in Central Asia appears to be a fairly recent phe-
nomenon, this should hardly be the case. Throughout history, the area,
bracketed roughly by the Caspian Sea and China, has served as the cross-
roads of Asia and Europe and been home to succeeding waves of migrating
populations as well as the great Silk Road. Empires have risen and fallen,
only to rise again in different forms; groups have been dominant and then
been assimilated by succeeding dominant groups. Although history is
filled with the names of these groups and their leaders, ranging from the
armies of Alexander the Great to the Arabs and the Turks, the ones best
known in the West are the Mongols and Tartars who, under Tamerlane,
spread their influence to the gates of Europe in the late fourteenth cen-
tury.3 After the death of Tamerlane, the region fell under succeeding out-
side influences, most notably Russian and British, in what Kipling referred
to as “The Great Game.” Yet even as the object of the game rather than a
player, Central Asia retained an importance to those around it.
3
4 BURGHART
Today finds the countries of Central Asia in a period of rebirth, not

only in terms of outside interest, but also in their own self-awareness of
their potential importance on the global scene. Almost no one would be
willing to predict that any single country from the region, or even the
region as a whole, is going to rise up and attempt the type of political
dominance exerted by Tamerlane 600 years earlier. On the other hand,
through their control of hydrocarbon resources, the countries of Central
Asia stand poised to exert an influence far beyond what anyone might have
expected as little as a dozen years ago. Following in the tracks of Tamer-
lane, the countries of the region are seeking to carve a path that will define
the nature of their existence well into the twenty-first century and beyond,
a path whose repercussions will be felt throughout the world. With this
in mind, it seems appropriate to examine where the tracks of Tamerlane’s
successors may lead.
Picking up the Trail

Before one can successfully follow any trail, it is necessary to be
familiar with the land on which it is located. Central Asia roughly can be
considered bounded in the west by the Caspian Sea, which separates the
region from the Caucasus. From west to east, the region stretches over 1500
miles, encountering few natural obstacles until the mountains of western
China. These mountains, the Tien Shan, literally “the Roof of the World,”
run southwest into the Himalayas making up a large portion of present-
day Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, before turning south into Afghanistan. The
remainder of the southern border becomes desert in what is present day
Turkmenistan. The bulk of the territory is arid grassland or steppe, which
stretches from the desert and mountains in the south to the Siberian for-
est or “Taiga” of Russia that forms its northern boundary. Overall, the area
comprises more than a million and a half square miles.4
The land contained in this region, for the most part, is a vast plain.
The soil, while fertile, suffers from a continental climate that does not
guarantee sufficient moisture for most crops; as a result, the people in this
area traditionally have been nomads. Substantial runoff from the moun-
tains is carried to the region by several rivers, primarily the Amu Dar’ya
and Syr Dar’ya, which fill the Aral Sea in the east-central part of the plain.
Those areas without sufficient water have reverted to desert, as found in
Turkmenistan. The climate, without the benefit of the moderating influ-
ence of an ocean, tends to be harsh, with temperatures ranging from 120
degrees Fahrenheit in the summer to minus 40 and below in the winter.
Although less than ideal for agriculture, the land possesses tremendous
mineral wealth in addition to the already mentioned supplies of gas and

oil. Almost every strategic metal can be found in Central Asia, especially in
the mountains of the south, and new deposits continue to be discovered.
As might be expected, the geography of the region has influenced its
history and development. With few natural borders to define or protect it,
the region has been subject to the influences of wave after wave of tribes
and peoples who have crisscrossed the landscape. Those who stayed to
occupy the land for any time tended to be nomadic, grazing their herds on
the abundant grasslands and then moving with the seasons, the weather,
or at the prodding of their neighbors. While the original inhabitants have
been all but lost in history, it can be determined that waves of Mongols
from the east, Persians from the south, and Turkic peoples from the south
and west all dominated portions of the region at one time or another,
intermarrying with the local populations and making their contribution
to the existing cultures. Arab invaders in the tenth and eleventh century
brought with them the Islamic faith, which continues to be the dominant
religious influence, though its practice tends to be far from the stringent
form found in other parts of the world.
If there was one unifying influence at any time in the region’s his-
tory, it would be the period of conquest and domination by Tamerlane,
or Timur as he is known locally. Born outside of Samarkand in the four-
teenth century, Tamerlane claimed to be descended from the great Mongol
leader Genghis Kahn, though other evidence exists that he was, in fact, of
Tartar origin.5 After securing a local base of operations, he began a quarter
of a century of conquest that has few rivals in history. He conquered Per-
sia and the lands now comprising Iraq, Azerbaijan and Armenia. He then
invaded Russia and moved west of the Ural River before being called back
to put down a revolt in Persia. After conquering Mesopotamia and Geor-
gia, he turned his attention to India, storming Delhi and advancing into
the Himalayan foothills before withdrawing. He then turned west again,
capturing Syria, defeating elements of the Ottoman Empire, and receiving
tribute from both Byzantium and Egypt. Only his death en route to invad-
ing China in 1405 stopped the expansion of his empire to an area greater
than that achieved under Genghis Khan.6
While successful on the battlefield, Tamerlane failed in creating a
governing structure that could perpetuate his empire, and it soon broke
up into a collection of tribes, khanates, and independent city-states after
his death. This patchwork of entities exerted control over various por-
tions of the territory, without any one being able to control the whole.
However, starting with the rule of Peter the Great in Russia in the late
6 BURGHART
seventeenth century, external influences began to make their presence felt.

The Russians spread their influence from the northwest at the same time
the British influence began spreading from India in the southeast. Central
Asia was caught between these two great empires. Given the competition
between Russia and Great Britain, Central Asia became the buffer, with
each nation vying for the type of influence that would give it an advantage
over the other. The consequences of this arrangement for the local popula-
tion are brilliantly described in the works of Peter Hopkirk.7 The collapse
of Tsarist Russia did little to change this situation in the twentieth century,
as the Bolsheviks were quick to establish themselves in the region, and
continued to perform the same basic functions as the previous regime.
Although Russification meant that the local populations were, at
best, second-class citizens with local rulers co-opted by, or at worst token
figureheads for, Russian domination, there were benefits. Literacy was
brought to the region, so that by the end of the Soviet rule better than 90
percent of the local populations could read and write. Health standards
were improved, and while agriculture continued to be the primary source
of revenue, fledgling industries were introduced. Though the area’s min-
eral wealth was exploited, the necessity of introducing the infrastructure
needed for this exploitation provided the region with essential communi-
cations and transportation facilities. In addition, security in the region was
insured on two levels. Externally, the region’s borders were secured by the
Soviet military; internally, the organs of the Soviet State provided stability.
While possibly not an ideal existence, it was one that the local populations,
for the most part, seemed willing to embrace.
Independence – Old Wine in New Bottles?

It has often been commented, and not without justification, that the
states of Central Asia did not seek independence in 1991, but instead had
it thrust upon them.8 Leaders such as Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbaev
argued strongly for the continuation of some sort of union, which among
other things would ensure the continuation of the power and perks en-
joyed by the ruling elite. This elite was a mixture of local ethnic and Rus-
sian nationals, who were all products of the Soviet system and were less
than enthused to see it go. Still, these leaders had gotten to the positions
that they occupied by being astute politicians in the sense of reading the
prevailing trends and being ready to jump on the train (or caravan) wher-
ever it might lead. While it is sometimes commented that local national
leaders were merely figureheads who did their Russian masters’ bidding,
this is an oversimplification of an extremely complex working relationship.
Moscow, for the most part, had recognized the need for ethnic leaders as
a way of ennsuring the complacency, if not the loyalty, of the local popu-
lations. Those times when this lesson was forgotten, as when Gorbachev
tried to appoint an ethnic Russian as head of the Kazakh republic in 1996,
resulted in massive unrest.9 In truth, these local leaders were likely to be
zealots in their allegiance to Moscow, since they owed their positions to
“the center” and not to any local movements or activity. Having said that,
local leaders already had developed their own local support structures,
based among other things on family, tribal or clan affiliation. In this sense,
the Soviet system actually had adapted and grafted itself onto the existing
ruling patterns already in place in Central Asia.
With independence and without the need for vetting from Moscow,
the local structures came into greater prominence, though it can be argued
that this was more a matter of visibility than any great shift in the exist-
ing order. Russians who had been part of this structure either departed
to return to Russia or were moved to less visible positions, allowing local
ethnic populations to occupy a greater share of the leading roles. This did
not occur overnight, as there were often not enough qualified locals to
fill all these positions; however, there were sufficient numbers so that the
predictions of social collapse due to removal of ethnic Russians from the
existing order never materialized.10
The situations facing the newly independent states of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan were strikingly
similar in both number and nature. All of the countries shared a common
geo-strategic location in the world, manifested among other things, by lack
of access to the sea and general remoteness from established world trade
routes. All of the republics were controlled by a small elite that had been
molded by years in the communist party and a socialist (or what passed as
socialist) system. As a legacy of that system, all of the republics had high
rates of literacy and a body of trained workers, especially in comparison
with other developing areas of the world, though the quality of that edu-
cation and the skills possessed by those workers may have left something
to be desired. Each country also inherited a crumbling infrastructure, in
terms of industry, transportation and services, yet what was there did pro-
vide the rudiments required for a civilized society to function. A depen-
dency on raw materials, both natural resources and agricultural products,
was the basis for the economies in all of the new states and provided the
majority of their income. One major aspect of these economies, closely
related to the dependence on natural resources, was a legacy of environ-
8 BURGHART
mental problems stemming from the exploitation of these resources under

the Soviet regime.
Despite the similar situations faced at the outset, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan each have struck out
on their own path since independence, leading each to come up with dif-
ferent approaches to deal with the problems they collectively faced. That
such differences exist should hardly be surprising, since in spite of their
similarities, each country has elements that make it different from the oth-
ers, ranging from geographic and cultural peculiarities to those relating
to the personalities of their leaders and composition of their elites. Parts
of these differences are tied to their relations with each other, for each is
unique in terms of the neighbors with whom they must deal. In Soviet
times these differences were present, but had less significance under the
overarching template put in place by Moscow. Now, with decision-making
effectively decentralized to the respective regional capitals, the perspec-
tive has changed from the one that Moscow provided. Thus, to gain an
appreciation for these differences in perspective, it is necessary to look at
each of these countries in turn before returning to examine the region as
a whole.
Kazakhstan
As the largest of the five former republics in terms of landmass,
Kazakhstan’s location as the northernmost country in Central Asia gives
it the distinction of being the only former republic in the region with a
shared land border with Russia. In truth, it can be argued that Kazakhstan,
on at least its northern portion, should not be equated to the rest of the
area. Commentators during Soviet times would use the phrase Central Asia
and Kazakhstan, indicating that the two were somehow different. During
the 1930s, when the borders of the republics were drawn, it has been said
that Stalin specifically included a large portion of what had traditionally
been considered Russian lands, so as to ensure the loyalty of the region.
Whether true or not, the result was that at the time of independence only
40 percent of the population were ethnic Kazakhs, with another 40 per-
cent Russian, and the remainder comprised mostly of other Slavic ethnic
groups. This led to an early concern that the northern, ethnically Russian
portion of the country would move to break away from the new state and
attempt to reintegrate with Russia. While there have been scattered inci-
dents caused by Russian nationalist groups, the majority of the Russian
population seems resigned, if not content, with their current situation.
This can be attributed to the fact that stories coming back from Russia
indicated that conditions there were worse then those in Kazakhstan.11 In

addition to other mineral resources, Kazakhstan possesses the largest oil
reserves in Central Asia, with some estimates indicating that these reserves
may make the country the new Saudi Arabia.12 Thus, the country’s future
is inexplicably tied to the development of these reserves.
Externally, Kazakhstan’s security concerns were perhaps best de-
scribed by the country’s Defense Minister, who on several occasions has
commented that with Russia to the north, China to the east, Islamic fun-
damentalism to the south and disputes over the Caspian to their west,
Kazakhstan finds itself in a tough neighborhood.13 Still, with an external
border of approximately 6,000 miles, only the portion with China is
guarded, representing the concerns of the Kazakhs themselves.14 In the
south, Kazakhstan shares borders (and border disputes) with three of the
other Central Asian States, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Of
these, relations with the Kyrgyz are the most cordial, most strained with
the Uzbeks, and fall somewhere in-between these two with the Turkmen.
Kazakhs and Kyrgyz are extremely close ethnically, and the marriage of
the daughter of Kazakh President Nazarbaev to a son of Kyrgyz President
Askar Akaev led to speculation that the two would eventfully merge into
one.15 This situation is reversed with Uzbekistan, which is viewed as a rival
in terms of being the dominant power in the region. The border with
Turkmenistan is composed largely of desert and is of little concern.16 What
is of concern is the eventual division of sovereignty over portions of the
Caspian Sea and the tremendous energy deposits there. Indeed, the divi-
sion of the Caspian Sea and the oil wealth associated with it may be one of
the thorniest security issues the country faces in the future.
Though less openly discussed by the Kazakhs themselves, there exist
several equally telling concerns that may affect the long-term security of
the country. In addition to the normal problems associated with a weak
economy, the inability to generate sufficient jobs, especially outside of the
large cities such as Almaty, has led to staggering levels of unemployment.
In cities such as Termez, the only real option for young people to obtain
money is to enter into the illicit drug trade, a growing concern throughout
the region. Not only does this represent yet another level of illegal activity
in a society known for corruption, but drug use among young people has
skyrocketed as availability has increased.17 Also related to the weak econ-
omy is the inability of the government to address effectively the myriad of
environmental problems left from Soviet times. The diversion of waters
from the Aral Sea for irrigation use and contamination left at sites associ-
ated with the Soviet nuclear program are but two examples of large-scale
10 BURGHART
problems that impact both the economy and health of the population,
and add further burdens to a system unable to cope with either the scope
or the costs of correcting such problems. Finally, the ruling establishment,
beginning with President Nazerbaev, actively has taken measures to stifle
dissent and ensure the continuity of their rule. While effective in the short
term, by allowing no outlet for the frustrations arising from internal prob-
lems such as those described, this may create a situation in the long term
where dissent turns violent and the fragile social structure of the country
is torn apart.
Kyrgyzstan
In contrast to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan is the second smallest country
in Central Asia in land size and population, and some would argue the
least significant. Roughly 80 percent of its territory is taken up by the Tien
Shan Mountains, limiting the amount of land available for agriculture. It
also lacks the energy reserves of its sister states, and while the country does
possess some mineral wealth, it is extremely difficult to extract at a profit.
The one resource that it does possess, water flowing from runoff in the
mountains, is a two-edged sword. Although the potential exits to harness
this water for the production of badly needed energy, any interruption of
the flow also has the potential of bringing the country into conflict with
its downstream neighbors, especially Uzbekistan, which depends on this
water for irrigation. In addition to Uzbekistan in the west, Kyrgyzstan
shares borders with Kazakhstan to the north, China to the east, and Tajiki-
stan to the west and southwest. There are border disputes with all of these
countries, the most contentious of which center on the Ferghana region in
the southwestern part of the country.
The Ferghana Valley is an extremely fertile area shared with Uzbeki-
stan and Tajikistan. Besides containing some of the richest, and therefore
most desirable land in the region, it is home to the most fervent brand of
Islam found in Central Asia. While this in itself might not be a concern to
the Kyrgyz, the area has served as a base of support for movements such
as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and has been tied with
outside radical groups, such as the Taliban. In 1999, IMU forces moved
through Kyrgyz territory and engaged Kyrgyz security forces during an at-
tempt to escape attack from Uzbekistan. This, in turn, sounded alarm bells
in Bishkek, and President Akaev was quick to join in the chorus of other
Central Asian leaders decrying the threat fundamentalists posed to stabil-
ity in the region, not to mention their own positions of power.
Domestically, Kyrgyzstan suffers the same problems as the other

Central Asian countries, though the way these problems combine is
unique to the Kyrgyz situation. Ethnic Kyrgyz constitute a little more than
50 percent of the population, with Russians the next largest group at 22
percent. Uzbeks constitute 12 percent of the population, making them the
largest Central Asian ethnic minority outside of their home territory and
a concern for the Kyrgyz government, which has several disputed border
areas with their far larger and more powerful Uzbek neighbor. Although
the country suffered a severe economic downturn tied with the collapse
of the ruble in 1998, the fact that a large number of people still owe their
existence to subsistence agriculture meant they did not starve. In terms of
domestic politics, President Akaev is the only Central Asian ruler who was
not a party apparatchik at the time of independence. A university profes-
sor and physicist, not only was he popularly elected, but his early rule
was marked by hopeful signs of genuine political and economic reform.
Unfortunately, time and pressure from his neighbors have made him more
politically repressive. This, in turn, has begun to radicalize the opposition,
a trend the does not bode well for future stability, something that the
country desperately needs.
Uzbekistan
Though Kazakhstan is the largest of the Central Asian states in terms
of landmass, the largest in population and arguably the most dynamic is
Uzbekistan. Geo-strategically located in the center of the region, it is the
only country that shares a border with each of the other states. This al-
lows it to claim concerns with regard to the affairs of all the others since
they have the potential of affecting its own interests. Sitting astride inter-
nal lines of communication and commerce also places Uzbekistan in a
position to exert influence to see that its concerns are addressed. At the
same time, with the exception of a small border area with Afghanistan,
Uzbekistan does not share a border with any of the external regional ac-
tors, specifically Russia, China or Iran, and thus is insulated from the sort
of pressures that can be mounted on its neighbors. While not possessing
the quantities of oil and gas that Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan do respec-
tively, Uzbekistan does have sufficient energy reserves to be independent
of outside sources, unlike Kyrgyzstan. If there is an external dependency,
it is on water from Kyrgyzstan, which is used for the irrigation of cotton,
the country’s primary cash crop.
This favorable turn of geography has allowed Uzbekistan a fair
amount of leeway in its relations with its neighbors, as well as with other
12 BURGHART
states in the region. Uzbekistan has been the most fervent of the five in
asserting its existence as an entity separate from Russia. With no shared
border and only eight percent of its population ethnic Russians, the politi-
cal leadership has felt free to institute a number of measures to separate
itself from its former “big brother,” ranging from refusing to participate
in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) functions to eliminating
the use of the Cyrillic alphabet.18 Likewise, Uzbekistan is far enough away
from China to not feel particularly threatened. Within the region, Uzbeks
believe themselves to be superior and often adopt an arrogant attitude in
their relations with other states and people.19 This is particularly irksome
to the Kazakhs, who openly resent their treatment as “country cousins.”
Not surprisingly, Uzbekistan has border disputes with all of its neighbors.
Although to date the Uzbeks have not resorted to the use of force to re-
solve these disputes, their size and economic potential, combined with
their attitude, has led the other states to believe that the Uzbeks might
resort to force if they felt it in their best interests. The Uzbeks themselves
believe that they should be the dominant power in the region and give the
impression that they are willing to take issue with anyone who does not
share this belief.
While Uzbekistan seems to have been dealt a favorable hand in terms
of its external security, this has not been the case with regard to its internal
affairs. President Islam Karimov has established a regime that is one of the
most repressive in the region. In an effort to insure no opposition to his
rule, Karimov not only has silenced what little legitimate opposition there
was to his regime, but gone on to suppress potential opposition in the
form of new Islamic groups. Though nominally claiming to be a Muslim,
Karimov views the more conservative variants of the faith who refuse to
bend to his every whim and decree as representing a threat to his rule. His
response has been to ruthlessly crack down on what he calls the threat of
“fundamentalism” and arrest more than 7,000 dissenters. This, in turn, has
only served to act as a catalyst for an actual Islamic opposition to form,
the IMU. This movement has been blamed for the 1999 bombing of gov-
ernment offices in the capital of Tashkent and is responsible for an armed
insurgency in the southern part of the state centered in the Ferghana re-
gion. Although Karimov has been quick to try to tie this movement with al
Qaeda and the Taliban, it appears to be a domestic opposition movement
that only has grown with efforts to repress it. Parallels have been drawn
between this process and what took place in Iran under the Shah, where
increasingly harsh efforts to suppress conservative Islamic leaders led to
public discontent and the eventual overthrow of royal rule. Whether the
same outcome will come to pass in Uzbekistan is yet to be determined;

however, in spite of warnings of the possible consequences, Karimov has
shown little or no inclination to change his policies.
Tajikistan
Of all the countries in the former Soviet portion of Central Asia,
Tajikistan comes the closest to claiming the title for being the first “failed
state.” Though sharing borders with two other Central Asian states,
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as well as with China and Afghanistan, the
country’s primary security concerns have been domestic rather than exter-
nal. Part of this can be explained in the territory it occupies; the terrain is
extremely mountainous with more than 50 percent of the country above
10,000 feet altitude.20 While occupying a crossroads of sorts, the country is
also extremely inaccessible to the outside world and difficult to travel even
internally. The arable land is composed mostly of valleys running between
the various mountains, which, with runoff from mountain snows, possess
sufficient water for agriculture. The Tajik people themselves are descended
from Iranian speaking people, making them the only republic in Central
Asia not sharing a Turkic heritage. The Tajiks comprise 62 percent of the
population of roughly 6.2 million, with Uzbeks in the northern part of the
country making up the next largest group, 23 percent, and Russians filling
in approximately seven percent.
Historically, based on their Persian background, the Tajiks occupied
a type of elite status within the region. Yet always subject to the influence
of regional actors, the area of Tajikistan was at one time controlled by
the Emirate of Bukhara in Uzbekistan, the Afghanistan government, and
eventually the Russian Empire, though control is used in the loosest sense,
since both the terrain and the independent nature of Tajik mountain
tribes were less than hospitable to outsiders. This became particularly ap-
parent when Soviet forces tried to reestablish control of the region after
the Bolshevik revolution, leading to the Basmachi revolt that was put
down in 1924. With Kyrgyzstan to the north, China to the east, Afghani-
stan to the south, and Uzbekistan to the west, Tajikistan has long found
itself in a far from enviable situation with regard to geo-strategic location.
Only the ruggedness of the terrain, as well as its isolation, has served to
preserve its sovereignty.
Neither of these, however, have been enough to ensure domestic
stability. Falling prey to clan politics and animosities, Tajikistan rapidly
degenerated into a protracted civil war between various domestic fac-
tions after independence, and the Russian military forces remaining in the
14 BURGHART
country were left to try and preserve some semblance of order. This con-
flict, while originally not centered on religious differences, became more
so as the losing side sought support from Islamic factions outside their
borders, in particular from Afghanistan. This turn of events worried both
Tajikistan’s Central Asian neighbors and Russia, which maintains the 201st
Motorized Rifle Division in the country in an attempt to stem the influx
of fundamentalist forces from the south. A ceasefire and power shar-
ing agreement reached in 1997 brought an uneasy truce to the fighting,
which continues to flare up now and again. As a result, President Imomali
Rakhmonov, who first came to power in elections in 1994, continues to
preside over an assembly of factions and clans whose sole unifying tenant
would seem to be that everyone is exhausted from the continual fighting
that has marked the country since the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Turkmenistan
Of all the former Central Asian republics, Turkmenistan is the one
that, paraphrasing Lenin, has taken “two steps back” since independence,
but has yet to take a step forward, and in fact may be continuing its back-
ward path. A large but sparsely populated nation (4.5 million in an area
equal to California plus half of Oregon), most of the country is occupied
by the Kara Kum or black sand desert. Turkmen were originally nomads
who drove their herds in search of forage; only with the coming of Rus-
sian rule and irrigation projects during the Soviet period did agriculture
develop in importance, and this mostly tied with the cultivation of cotton.
While hardly the type of environment that would at first be cause for op-
timism, the country sits astride some of the largest natural gas reserves in
the world and early prospects for development fueled by the profits from
gas sales seemed bright. Instead, Turkmenistan has found itself a prisoner,
both of its geography and of a political regime that has been described as
mirror imaging all of the worst aspects of Stalin’s cult of personality.
Externally, Turkmenistan’s problem is with finding a secure route to
send its gas to world markets. Bordered in the north by Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan, in the east by Afghanistan, in the south by Iran, and in the
west by the Caspian Sea, the primary existing pipelines used for Turkmen
gas flow through Russia, which controls both the amount of this flow and
its destination.21 To avoid this Russian chokehold, Turkmenistan has at-
tempted to negotiate routes to the south and west. The former, involving
Iran, has been frowned on by the United States, without whose support
financing is all but impossible. The other alternative, some sort of trans-
Caspian route exemplified by the long heralded Baku-Cheyhan line, has
yet to get far beyond the drawing board. The gas that does make it to
market via Russia is often routed to countries such as Ukraine, which are
renowned for not paying for their energy supplies. Complicating this situ-
ation, in the early 1990s Turkmenistan borrowed heavily in international
finance markets against profits from future gas production. Now these
debts are beginning to fall due, and with still no reliable way to get their
gas to market, Turkmenistan is increasingly finding itself in a cash-flow
crunch.
Further compounding these problems is the nature of the Turkmen
regime itself. Headed by Saparmurat Niyazov, Turkmenistan’s Communist
Party head at the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union, the government
has evolved into an autocracy that bends to the every whim of the ruler. As
just one example of the control exerted by Niyazov, a referendum held in
1994 on whether to extend his term in office to 2002 was passed by a mar-
gin of 1,959,408 for, to 212 against.22 Since that time, Niyazov has declared
himself President for Life and has taken on the moniker of Turkmenbashi,
roughly translated as father of the Turkmen people. Along with autocratic
rule at home, he has adopted a policy of positive neutrality in his foreign
relations. This policy can best be summarized as the forswearing of all
foreign alliances and connections, resulting in an almost isolationist stance
that has not helped attempts to gain outside assistance for development in
Turkmenistan. Recently, this policy has been modified somewhat. While
initially shunning contacts with Russia and other former Soviet republics,
the fear of Islamic fundamentalism has brought Turkmenistan into re-
gional security consultations with its neighbors. Likewise, in the aftermath
of September 11, some agreements have been reached with the United
States to allow the use of Turkmen facilities in the war against terrorism.
Still, these negotiations have done little to soften the harsh nature of the
Niyazov regime, whose sole concern appears to be its own self-perpetua-
tion.
The Security Situation Post-September 11

Although much has been said and written about the effects of Sep-
tember 11, September 14 may well prove to be a more important date for
Central Asia. On that day, the first mention was made in the open press
about the stationing of American forces in the region as part of the Global
War on Terrorism. Along these lines, three of the five former Soviet Cen-
tral Asian states, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, were approached
about using their territory to support U.S. military operations. Uzbekistan,
in particular, was of interest because of the shared common border with
16 BURGHART
Afghanistan and the presence of Termez, the former Soviet military base
that had been a primary logistics staging area during the Soviet-Afghan
war. While Tajikistan also shared a border with Afghanistan, the condition
of facilities there required substantial work before they could be used. Kyr-
gyzstan, which did not share a border, did have a relatively modern airport
and soon became the home to more than 3,000 U.S. Air Force personnel
supporting air operations into Afghanistan. Kazakhstan, located further
from the fray, also offered support to the Americans, while Turkmenistan,
with the longest border with Afghanistan, continued its policy of positive
neutrality, though making several pro “anti-terrorist coalition” statements
and quietly allowing the transit of humanitarian assistance.
Though the speed with which this coordination was orchestrated
was surprising to some observers, the groundwork for this effort actually
had been laid throughout the 1990s. Shortly after the breakup of the Soviet
Union, the United States established diplomatic relations with all of the
former republics in Central Asia and opened embassies in each as soon
as it was possible. Included in the embassy staffing were military officers,
designated either as Military Representatives or fully accredited Defense
Attachés. Their job throughout the 1990s was to establish ties with the
host nation militaries, coordinate material assistance and military educa-
tion programs, escort host countries officers on official visits to the United
States, and perform an entire range of activities that fell under the Clinton
Administration general policy of engagement. Central among these pro-
grams were: foreign military sales and assistance, International Military
Education and Training (IMET), Partnership for Peace (PfP), courses
offered at the Marshall Center in Germany, and the creation of a Central
Asian Peacekeeping Battalion (CENTRAZBAT). While all these programs,
as well as others, had specific goals in mind, the cumulative effect was to
establish relationships and procedures for working with these counties, as
well as to create a cadre of military within each of the countries involved
who had experience in working with U.S. forces. Though difficult to quan-
tify, there can be no doubt that these efforts facilitated establishing a U.S.
military presence in Central Asia, once it was decided that this was neces-
sary in the battle against terrorism.
Perhaps more surprising than the speed of this deployment, or even
that it should have taken place at all, was the response of the Russian
government to Americans operating in what had been traditionally a Rus-
sian sphere of influence. Though protests rapidly appeared from military
leaders and opposition politicians in the Russian press, these were just as
quickly countered by none other than Russian President Vladimir Putin,
who welcomed the American move as part of his overall support for the
war on terrorism. While the changing nature of the U.S.-Russian relation-
ship in the aftermath of September 11 is still being evaluated, it is enough
to note that President Putin did much to stifle domestic criticism of U.S.
deployments. Russians themselves seemed to be torn between the image
of America as a former sworn enemy now conducting military operations
on their very doorstep and the realization that American efforts would, in
the long run, help Russia and the other countries of Central Asia coun-
ter what all now viewed as one of their greatest concerns—the spread of
Islamic fundamentalism. For their part, U.S. officials, such as General
Tommy Franks, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander,
emphasized that although the United States did not know how long forces
would remain, it was not America’s intent to maintain these forces and
installations in the region on a permanent basis.
From the standpoint of the regional actors, the events of Septem-
ber 11 may have served as a catalyst in a number of respects. While the
threat of Islamic fundamentalism spreading from the south long had been
pointed to as a significant security concern, other problems and regional
disputes, combined with a lack of outside recognition for these concerns,
had resulted in few concrete steps being taken to address this threat. Prior
to September 11, the formation in 1998 of the “Shanghai Five” (Russia,
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and more recently the ad-
dition of Uzbekistan, to make “5 plus 1”) was the most notable attempt
to form a regional security coordinating body.23 Since September 11, there
has been a flurry of meetings, visits and continuing contacts designed not
only to coordinate efforts in the war against terrorism, but also to take
steps toward insuring regional security in the future. The most obvious
result has been an increase in security assistance to the region, primarily
from the United States, but from other nations as well. Though much of
this effort is directly tied to the ongoing conflict, the attention focused on
the region has brought about other assistance, such as the recent agree-
ment signed between the United States and Uzbekistan to clean up the
former Soviet biological testing site at Vozrazhdeniya (Rebirth) Island.
However, assistance alone will not provide security. The greater signifi-
cance in the long term may be that with a common cause uniting both
the Central Asian States and the major external actors with interests in the
region, a climate now exists where achieving a true cooperative security
environment may be possible.
18 BURGHART
Some Thoughts for the Future

While outlining a comprehensive strategy for Central Asia is beyond
the scope of this compendium, it might be worthwhile to point out the
elements that must be considered as a starting point. It first should be
noted that, in spite of the problem areas noted above, all of the states, to a
greater or lesser degree, have achieved an element of success in orchestrat-
ing their affairs. All five continue to exist as sovereign states ten years after
the breakup of the Soviet Union. At the time of the breakup, their viability
as nations, and even their capability of continuing to exist, was highly
questioned. With the exception of Tajikistan, all have managed to avoid
major domestic conflicts, and while the form and policies of the govern-
ments that exist today may not be to our liking, the fact that they have
been able to constitute and maintain themselves as sovereign states must
be acknowledged. That the states did this with limited resources, little or
no experience in governance, and in a geo-strategic environment that was
less than ideal at best, speaks even more to the likelihood that with proper
aid and nurturing the countries in this region can continue to exist and
develop in the future.
To move forward will require several things. First, the states must
possess sufficient means to ensure the continued integrity of their terri-
tory. All of the states inherited portions of the Soviet forces stationed on
their territory, including a large number of armored vehicles and a force
structure built along the Soviet model. Unfortunately, this has proven to
be as much of a liability as a blessing. The forces they possess are not nec-
essarily the ones they need. The money to maintain these existing forces
uses up limited funding that would be better spent on meaningful military
reform. All of the countries involved have plans for military reform that
call for downsizing and modernization, with the goal of achieving small,
high tech, and highly mobile force structures to act as deterrents to any
outside threats.24 Unfortunately, limited resources, opposition from the
existing military (which feels it might lose its perks and privileges if such
reforms were carried out), and bureaucratic inertia all stand in the way of
such changes. Cooperative programs with foreign militaries, such as PfP
with NATO, have made some progress, and the more members of the re-
gional militaries are exposed to Western ideas and ways, the easier reform
will be. Training programs for other institutions normally associated with
state security, such as interior troops and customs officials, also will help.
The ultimate goal in all of these efforts is to achieve a balance, so that each
country believes it has the capability to defend its own territory against the
threats it perceives, without creating a force that is perceived as a threat by

its neighbors.
Once stability and security can be guaranteed, the stage will be set for
economic development. The long-term stability of the states in the region
is not dependent on military capability as such, but on economic viability
that ensures the well-being of the nation. One of the reasons often cited
for the failure to attract the outside investment so desperately needed is
the fear by such outside sources that regional instability will put their in-
vestments at risk. This is particularly true in the energy sector where large
investments in infrastructure, such as pipelines and refineries, must be
made up front. These types of facilities are extremely vulnerable to attack,
both from external and domestic threats. Consequently, investors are re-
luctant to make long term commitments where they fear even a slight risk
of regional conflict. If regional stability can be achieved, the area’s wealth
in minerals and energy will bring the capital that can serve as the engine
for other forms of development, thereby increasing the well being of the
populations and heading off domestic sources of discontent by offering
the prospect of a better future.
With economic development must come political change and the
issue of political reform. One of the debates that continues, not only with
regard to the countries of the former Soviet Union but also with almost
all developing states, is whether economic reform, designed to create a
market economy, can be carried out at the same time as political reform,
designed to achieve some type of representational democracy. While
certainly the ideal, there are numerous examples, beginning with Russia,
that would seem to indicate that trying to accomplish both at the same
time is just “too hard.” Focusing on political reform, while possibly more
manageable, means that the creation of the economic basis to answer the
needs of the people must be postponed. Any government pursuing such
a policy places itself at risk no matter how democratically inclined and
well intentioned. However, focusing on economics first brings its own set
of problems, as seen in the number of dictatorships that have claimed to
be ruling in the name of the people and stability, but ended up enriching
their own pockets while doing whatever was necessary to maintain power
for themselves. At best, advocates of the latter strategy point to examples,
such as South Korea, where authoritarian governments were tolerated, but
continually nudged toward democracy as economic conditions at home
improved. At worst, the example of Iran under the Shah looms large,
where toleration and support of an authoritarian regime was justified as
20 BURGHART
a strategic necessity, but ultimately resulted in catastrophic consequences

for the United States.
All of these concerns lead to the question of how the West in general,
and the United States in particular, should approach Central Asia, so as to
protect both its own interests and those of the people in the region. While
there is probably no set answer to such a question, some general guide-
lines would seem apparent. First, the key to stability in the region depends
on creating an environment where development of the area’s resources
proceeds relatively unhindered and where profits from that can be put
back into development of the region as a whole. To do this requires that
the countries in the area themselves understand that there is more to be
gained by regional cooperation than with traditional animosities. That the
leadership of these countries can work together when faced by a common
threat has been proven by recent events and the combined efforts to com-
bat the threat perceived from Islamic fundamentalism. If this cooperation
can be expanded to other spheres, a large step in the right direction will
have been taken. Next, some sort of agreement must be made between the
outside influences vying to achieve access and influence in the region, pri-
marily among the “great powers.” The acceptance by President Putin of an
American military presence in what has traditionally been Russia’s “home
turf ” is again an example that can be built on, where the players involved
accept that there is more to be gained by all from a stable and prosperous
Central Asia, than one that is not. Finally, the regional leaders must real-
ize that their legacy will be measured by the condition in which they leave
their countries, as opposed to their own individual wealth and power.
While Tamerlane created a mighty empire, it quickly disintegrated after
his death because he failed to establish any viable structure for ensuring its
continuation once he was gone. If this lesson is lost on those who would
follow in the tracks of Tamerlane, they must constantly be reminded of it,
lest history repeat itself and the region, once again, fail to take the place in
the world order it is capable of achieving.
Notes
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published in European Security, http://www.tandf.
co.uk,Vol. 11, no. 3, Winter 2002.

2 Though specialists disagree on exactly what comprises “Central Asia,” this paper examines the
five former Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.
3 For a concise summary of Tamerlane’s accomplishments, see R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor
N. Dupuy, Harper’s Encyclopedia of Military History (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc. 1993),
424-425.
4 A complete listing of areas and distances cited here can be found in M. Wesley Shoemaker’s,
Russian and the Commonwealth of Independent States 2002, (Harpers Ferry, Stryker-Post Publications,
2002).
5 Dupuy and Dupuy, 424.
6 Ibid., 424-425.
7 Hopkirk’s trilogy, which includes The Great Game, Like Hidden Fire, and Setting the East
Ablaze (New York: Kodansha America, Inc. 1994, 1994 and 1995 respectively) combine to give the
definitive history of the region from ancient times to the beginning of the twentieth century.
8 Shoemaker, 74.
9 Ibid., 182.
10 For detailed breakdowns of the percentages of various ethnic groups, see individual country
listings in Shoemaker, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States 2002.

11 In a conversation with the author, a member of the Kazakh Foreign Ministry noted that,
while everyone pointed to the fact that two million ethnic Russians left Kazakhstan to return to Russia
in the period from 1991-1994, very few noted that some 600,000 returned between 1995 and 1999.
While his figures cannot be confirmed, a return of ethnic Russians to Kazakhstan has been noted by
several sources.
12 Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan—Unfulfilled Promise (Washington: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 2002), 3.

13 The author was present when the Kazakh Defense Minister M. Altinbayev made this com-
ment to Secretary of Defense Cohen during an official visit to Washington D.C. in 1998.
14 While formally maintaining that their goal was to have good relations with all of their
neighbors, members of the Kazakh military, on multiple occasions, told the author that their greatest
security concern relating to their neighbors was with China.
15 Though much speculation has surrounded this pairing, it appears that the two, who met
while both were attending school in the United States, were genuinely in love. Unfortunately, as of this
writing, the two have separated.
16 There have been discussions about closing this border, not because of any threat posed by
Turkmen, but because Turkmenistan has no visa requirements on Iranians crossing their border, and
several Iranians have been found to have entered Kazakhstan without documentation, in spite of
Kazakhstan requiring such visas.
17 In a discussion with the author, one local official indicated that he believed up to 40 percent
of the youth in his region were drug users. He further went on to say that, because unemployment in
the area was 60 percent, the only work youth could get was in the drug trade, where they were paid
with a portion of the drugs they were trafficking.
18 This made traveling in cities such as Tashkent extremely interesting in the early years after
independence, when the Cyrillic street signs had been removed, but nothing was put up to take their
place.
19 This type of attitude has been observed by the author on numerous occasions and is repeat-
edly noted by other Central Asian ethnic groups when describing Uzbek behavior.
20 Ibid., 186.
21 It has been a longstanding Russian policy that Turkmen gas is routed for CIS consumption,
while Russian gas is sent to hard currency customers. This leaves Turkmenistan in the awkward posi-
tion of trying to collect from countries like Ukraine that have a habit of not paying for the gas they
use.
22 Shoemaker, 194.
23 C. Fairbanks, S. Frederick Starr, C. Richard Nelson and Kenneth Weisbrode, Strategic Assess-
ment of Central Asia (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2001), 36.
24 Recognizing the near impossibility of maintaining a force capable of defending the long
borders involved, each country envisions the type of force that could be kept in the central part of their
country and then be rapidly deployed to repel any outside threat.
22 BURGHART
Part I
Political Changes
POLITICS OF CENTRAL ASIA 25
Chapter 2
The Politics of Central Asia:

National in Form, Soviet in
Content
E. Wayne Merry
T
he politics of Central Asia—limited in this discussion to the five
states of former Soviet Central Asia—are neither as obscure nor as
complex as is sometimes thought. Certainly, the region and each of
its component societies are rich in indigenous traditions and culture and
they did not merit the Western neglect, which was their lot during their in-
corporation in the Russian and Soviet empires. Nonetheless, the contem-
porary political institutions and prospects of the five states—Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—reflect little of the
millennial history of the region, other than for purposes of propaganda,
but are instead overwhelmingly the products of their recent Soviet past.
Future Central Asian generations may draw on pre-Soviet traditions to
deal with modern issues, whether for good or ill, but today’s ruling elites
remain wedded to the Soviet way of doing things, which is how they came
to power in the first place.
Alone among the nearly 30 successor states of the former “socialist
camp,” ranging from Albania to Mongolia, Central Asia has experienced
no regime change. The bosses and ruling elites today are those of the late
Gorbachev era with some purging, especially of Slavs. Regime change
elsewhere has not always been positive, for example, in Belarus, but every
other socialist successor state has at least experienced a political or a gen-
erational transformation of top leadership, or both. However, in the five
Central Asian states, the rulers that came to power within the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), with all that implies about methods
and mentality, have stayed. They have remained in power by applying
Soviet techniques to independent statehood. While some Communist par-
ties have produced remarkably progressive figures, a few even validated by
25
26 MERRY
genuine popular elections, this has not been true in Central Asia, where
old-style CPSU politicians retain power indefinitely with periodic sham
ballots of affirmation.
Thus, a key starting point in understanding the region is the recog-
nition that these countries cannot be compared properly with the Slavic
or Caucasian successor states of the Soviet Union, and still less with the
Baltic or East European countries. Rather, the Central Asian regimes are
in the same category of governance as those of Cuba and North Korea,
with whom they have much in common. They are a combination of post-
colonial nationalism and neo-Sovietism, and can be characterized as “na-
tional Soviet” in form.
The decade since the Soviet collapse and the emergence of the
Central Asian republics as independent states (albeit, initially, reluctant
ones) is a short period in political development, although other successor
states experienced rapid changes in the same time. These are regimes of
the first post-colonial generation, comparable to many African and Asian
countries three or four decades ago. Present conditions in these states are
neither stable nor reliable indicators of what they will be like in the second
and third post-colonial generations. In common with other post-colonial
experience, including that of North America, Central Asia will almost
certainly undergo dramatic changes in the coming decades. Political and
economic systems will alter, and borders may move. This analysis will not
speculate about what Central Asia will look like in mid-century, other than
to note that straight-line extrapolations of that future from the present
will certainly be wrong. We can, however, reasonably look at the region’s
prospects in the next decade, based on an examination of the twin identi-
ties which define its politics today—post-colonial and neo-Soviet—and its
potential to respond successfully to the challenges it faces.
The Imperial Legacy in the Heart of Eurasia

Properly speaking, “Central Asia” is much larger than the five states
under consideration, encompassing significant parts of the Russian Fed-
eration and the People's Republic of China, plus much of Iran, Afghani-
stan, and Pakistan. In terms of culture, and especially of religious culture,
much of Central Asia remains occupied by alien political systems based
in Moscow and Beijing. The region sometimes known as “Turkestan” (to
reflect the Turkic ancestry of many of its inhabitants) was divided into
western and eastern areas of domination under Russian and Chinese rule
in the nineteenth century. The famous “Great Game” rivalry between Im-
perial Russia and Imperial Britain in the same century drew lines defining
the southern frontier of Western Turkestan, an identity reinforced by the

violent imposition of Soviet rule in Central Asia in the twentieth century.
Soviet nationality policy, under the motto “National in Form, Social-
ist in Content,” was in reality little more than the age-old imperial device
of divide-and-rule. Stalin deliberately drew republic borders in Central
Asia to separate large and potentially unruly ethnic groups—in particular,
the Uzbeks and Tajiks—into ethnically-mixed areas for political adminis-
tration and to create majority-minority tensions to facilitate Soviet rule.
The states which emerged from the failure of Soviet power in late 1991 had
external borders which no rational ethnographer would have drawn for
titularly-ethnic “nation states” and reflect little more than Joseph Stalin’s
nationality policies. These states should be seen first and foremost as po-
litical systems, rather than as reflecting national identities.1
Challenges of Post-Colonialism
Irrational borders spawning ethnic conflicts are common in the
Third World as legacies of European imperialism. While one always
should be cautious in applying general principles of political develop-
ment to diverse societies, what European powers wrought on the African
continent is, in broad outline, very similar to the imperial handiwork of
the Soviet Union in Central Asia. This point, while seemingly obvious, is
important because Western analysis of Central Asia sometimes treats the
region’s problems as entirely sui generis and ignores relevant experience of
other parts of the Third World.
To simplify, if one wants to project in broad outline where Central
Asia is likely to go, it is instructive to look at where Central Africa has
been. The objective circumstances of the post-colonial experience of the
two regions are sufficiently similar, despite obvious differences, to make
the comparison useful. The parallels are particularly acute in the realm of
politics, with the Central Asian regimes even less likely to adopt political
pluralism or genuine rule of law than the bosses of Central Africa have
been, because neo-Soviet regimes possess better instruments of domes-
tic repression combined with the habits of an ideological monopoly of
power. Central African rulers also have positive models in their former
European overlords, while those of Central Asia are surrounded by the
dubious examples of Russia, Iran, Pakistan and China. Central Asian elites
dislike comparisons with other Third World regions and proclaim, and
perhaps even believe, themselves to be exceptional. However, the assertion
of national exceptionalism is well-nigh universal and is generally a poor
excuse for rigid or reactionary policies. An objective observer cannot help
28 MERRY
but notice how after ten years of independence the Central Asian states are
traveling down a well-trodden Third World path.
To be fair, the region’s problems are the poisoned legacy of imperial
exploitation and would pose huge challenges even to progressive leaders.
As with most imperialism in Africa and Asia, Russia conquered Central
Asia for purposes of domination and exploitation, rather than for mass
colonization. While Slavic people did enter and settle in the region, they
did so slowly and without demographically displacing indigenous popula-
tions. The only major Slavic settlement region in Central Asia (analogous
to South Africa) is the heavily-Russified northern part of Kazakhstan,
which, at some point, could either attempt secession to join Russia or de-
mand effective self-rule. Elsewhere, the Slavic inhabitants of Central Asia
were not rural pieds noirs as in French Algeria or British Kenya, but urban
dwellers and members of the administrative and technical elite. This set
the stage for “white flight” after independence and a rapid loss of many
skilled Slavic cadres who left the region for personal security or from loss
of status and employment. In parallel, Soviet military formations in Cen-
tral Asia were largely composed of local conscripts, led by both Slavic and
native officers, thus allowing the new states to inherit established armed
forces, though with a loss of many Russian officers.
The Enduring Mentality of Empire

In common with imperial practice elsewhere, the Soviet Union
maintained its rule in Central Asia by developing and training local elites
in ways that deliberately alienated them from the broad mass of the native
population. These cadres were living extensions of the power of Moscow
and often became more Soviet in mentality than the Russians themselves.
They enjoyed great status and affluence, all dependent on their position in
the Soviet nomenklatura with its shared attitudes, practices and imperial
vernacular. While spoken Russian became common throughout Central
Asia, though weak in rural areas, local elites employed the imperial lan-
guage in preference to their mother tongues for purposes of prestige, edu-
cation, communication within the broader Soviet elite, and for acceptance
by their Slavic overlords. Higher education often took aspiring members
of native nomenklaturas to Moscow (as Africans went to Paris or London)
to acquire the habits, manners and lifestyles of the imperial “center.” Such
persons often had little contact or empathy with the poor and semi-edu-
cated masses at home, who were a constant reminder of the privileges and
comforts they obtained by serving the empire and potentially could lose
in the post-colonial environment. In the Central Asian case there was the
additional factor of ideology, which, however much cynicism may have

attached to the ideals of communism, did reinforce the arrogance of elites
in their possession of scientific socialism, making them even less inclined
to accept political pluralism or accountability after independence.
While use of Russian is fading on the streets in Central Asia, it is likely
to remain the elite lingua franca. The only regional substitute would be
Uzbek, an unwelcome option for other nationalities. Although English as
the world language has spread very quickly among younger and educated
people in the region, this will not obviate the need for a regional language
to communicate with other successor states, which can only be Russian.
By way of comparison, English has not displaced French or Portuguese in
much of Africa but occupies a place alongside. In Central Asia, the utility
of maintaining Russian is obvious, from its use in technical manuals to
ease of dealing with the region’s leading trading partners. However, as in
other parts of the Third World, the persistence of the imperial language
sustains imperial attitudes and behavior, especially in officialdom.
Manmade Economic Nightmares

Central Asia also has parallels with Africa and South Asia in the
inherited burden of misdevelopment and unbalanced economies. In the
Soviet plan, Central Asian economies were structured around commodity
exploitation, with consequent massive ecological damage. While Soviet
planners did not employ the terminology of plantation colonies, they
were even more single-minded than their capitalist counterparts in foster-
ing commodity mono-cultures, especially of cotton in Central Asia. The
depletion of water supplies, degradation of soil, and destruction of the
existing nomadic and farming environment are well-documented, in some
places attaining ecocide, as in the overuse and near evaporation of the Aral
Sea. The focus of the Soviet central plan on the extraction of minerals and
hydrocarbons, combined with the use of Central Asia for testing nuclear,
chemical and other weapons, produced a legacy of economic imbalance at
least as severe as the coffee, hemp or cocoa-based economies of sub-Saha-
ran Africa or of “banana republics.”
In addition, Central Asia is challenged by the results of the most be-
nign of imperial policies, the spread of public health services and sanitation,
which, in turn, have led to rapid demographic growth. In common with
much of the Third World, these states face population increases far beyond
their ability to generate new employment, especially given the deteriora-
tion of Soviet-era infrastructure and the limited job-producing capacities
of high-capitalization commodity-extractive industries such as oil and
30 MERRY
gas. The loss after 1991 of investment funds and subsidies from the Soviet
central plan robbed the newly-independent states both of the wherewithal
to maintain existing industry and agriculture and of the means to establish
productive enterprises independent of the Russian market (even assuming
that local political interference and corruption would have allowed such
enterprise). A by-product of population growth is distortion of education,
as schools established in the colonial period churn out graduates in excess
of available jobs equivalent to their training, which in Central Asia is often
oriented to Soviet-era standards. While public education is an area where
Central Asia is ahead of some Third World regions, the advantage is erod-
ing in many skills, especially in high technology where Indian and Chinese
training models are more competitive.
Politics Following the Worst Models

It is in the political realm, however, that the post-colonial experience
of the Third World is most relevant to Central Asia, in the replication there
of what in Africa is called the “Big Man” regime type. Such regimes tend
to be dominated by members of single ethnic groups or clans and by the
enshrinement in power of a single individual or, more commonly, a Great
Leader and his family (leading to the sotto voce witticism in several post-
Soviet states that Stalin’s quest to build “socialism in one state” has been
replaced by the goal of “socialism in one family”). Such regimes do not
distinguish public from private wealth, transforming corruption from a
form of social deviance into effective state policy. These regimes maintain
political control by strictly limiting participation in the political process;
by extending state authority over a wide range of civil institutions, includ-
ing business, labor unions, organized religion, and the media (or, as play-
wright Tom Stoppard once put it, by establishing a “relatively free press”
in the form of a press run by one of the ruler’s relatives);2 and by lecturing
Western critics that the local populations are “not ready” for democracy
which “takes time.” Finally, such regimes almost invariably encounter a
crisis when attempting a generational transfer of power within the ruling
family or clan, as the authority and legitimacy of the first post-colonial
“Big Man” creates shoes too large for a successor to fill.
The Central Asian regimes, with individual variations, fulfill all the
“Big Man” criteria. This is not only because of their former Soviet experi-
ence, but also due to policy choices by the new regimes. Among socialist
successor states there have been cases of political maturation mostly in
Eastern Europe and the Baltics; violent transfers of power as in Azerbai-
jan, Armenia and Georgia; democratic transitions which made things no
better or worse as in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova; and shifts of public

opinion to either left or right, or, as in Bulgaria recently, in both directions
at the same time. Alone among socialist successor states, the Central Asian
regimes still are of the first post-colonial generation, while all the rulers,
perhaps with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, intend to remain in personal
control indefinitely. These are classic “Big Man” regimes of the type Africa
has experienced to its continuing cost. In common with their African
counterparts, these states will experience systemic crisis when they finally
transfer power, especially difficult where there are dynastic aspirations as
in Kazakhstan.
A Genuine, if Grim, Exceptionalism

As the Central Asia regimes replicate the experience of “Big Man”
states, they are also different and exceptional, although not in a positive
sense. In contrast to other parts of the Third World, these five states remain
strongly Soviet in institutions and practices. While the Communist Party
is gone in a formal sense, its personnel and methods remain in revamped
ruling parties under national banners. The leaders, to a man, are all former
Soviet Communist Party bosses, who changed their Communist lapel pins
for nationalist ones while retaining a purely Soviet approach to political
power. While many of the Soviet successor states have regressed badly in
recent years, only in Central Asia have the bosses of the Soviet era avoided
competitive politics or the challenge of a legitimate ballot box.
In sharp contrast to Third World leaders who took part in anti-colo-
nial movements or at least aspired to independence, Central Asia’s rulers
were propelled into independence by happenstance. These states entirely
lack the genuine nationalist credentials of the Baltic States, Caucasian
republics or Ukraine—let alone those of Eastern Europe. With the excep-
tion of Kyrgyz leader Askar Akaev, the rulers opposed Gorbachev’s efforts
to reform the sclerotic Soviet system and welcomed the reactionary coup
attempt of August 1991. At the time of the Soviet collapse, they hoped to
remain within some kind of renewed Soviet system, with Moscow pro-
viding subsidies and support for their rule.3 As cosmetic nationalists, the
party bosses who chanced to be in power when their republics became
independent could not inspire an “end of empire” boost in public morale
common when Third World liberation movements come to power. For
most inhabitants, very little changed politically other than the removal
of the top tier of Moscow-based party icons and the suitable enlargement
of portraits of the former republic CPSU First Secretary as new national
32 MERRY
president. In other respects, daily life for average people became even
harder and more repressive than under Gorbachev.
The single factor that most sharply distinguishes the Central Asian
states from most post-colonial countries is their possession of the fully-
formed mechanisms of a modern authoritarian police state. While other
imperial powers developed security agencies in their colonies and in some
cases bequeathed them to the new governments, none bear comparison
with the Soviet KGB which passed almost intact into the hands of the
new Central Asian rulers. This advantage assured a high level of domestic
control by the new regimes, except in Tajikistan, which quickly descended
into civil conflict, and in the Ferghana Valley, an area of serious unrest
during much of the Soviet period. The comparative social peace enjoyed
by the Uzbek, Kazakh, Turkmen and, until recently, Kyrgyz regimes is in
large measure due to the coercive Soviet institutions they have employed
with greater vigor than had been true under Gorbachev. In particular, the
repression of peaceful manifestations of independent religious activity is
more severe in post-Soviet Central Asia than had been the case under late
Soviet rule.4
In addition, these countries inherited the former Soviet armed forces
deployed on their territories. These were not first-line units like those
stationed in Germany or along the Chinese border; most were reserve or
mobilization formations of limited operational capability. Nonetheless,
they constituted substantial military establishments for newly-minted
Third World states. In the Kazakh case the presence of parts of the former
Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal engaged the United States directly in Cen-
tral Asia for the first time, which brought substantial financial and techni-
cal benefits to Kazakhstan and provided some limited improvements to
their conventional armed forces. At independence, Uzbekistan by accident
possessed one of the world’s largest inventories of conventional heavy
weaponry due to the Soviet practice of using the dry Uzbek interior as a
parking lot for treaty-limited equipment (especially battle tanks, artillery
and armored personnel carriers) withdrawn from west of the Urals under
the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE). While this weaponry greatly exceeded Uzbek defensive require-
ments, it fed Tashkent’s pretensions to regional hegemony. Uzbekistan also
possessed the best officer corps in the region, significant training facilities,
and a more balanced overall force structure than its neighbors. Turkmeni-
stan and Kyrgyzstan inherited armed forces of greatly inferior quality and
operational capabilities, and the prolonged civil conflict in Tajikistan not
only dissipated its limited military strength but soon required intervention
by Russian and regional troops.5
In sum, although some Western critics have perceived in Central Asia
a reversion to a kind of pre-Soviet “Asiatic despotism,” the reality may be
even worse. A form of medieval rule could not long succeed in the con-
temporary world, but a modern police state—with sufficient political will
at the top—can be quite robust. Across the region, the will power has not
yet faltered. Indeed, the regimes become more rather than less repressive
with each manifestation of domestic unrest or attempts at political plural-
ism. Therefore, sadly, Central Asia is not so much moving in the tracks of
Tamerlane, but regressing into those of the CPSU and KGB.
Geography and Geology as Destiny

Central Asia’s potential to meet its challenges is limited by objec-
tive circumstances in addition to its political makeup. First, it is the most
land-locked region on the globe and suffered a long enforced separation
from the outside world by the Soviet prohibition on interaction with
historic neighbors, especially Iran and China. While most colonies are in-
corporated into an imperial trading system, they nonetheless retain some
contact with the broader world. In contrast, Soviet policy insulated the
Central Asian peoples from their ethnic and spiritual hinterlands, while
all legal economic activity was oriented northward toward Russia despite
natural trading routes to the east and south.
The opening of the region’s external frontiers in 1991 introduced ex-
ternal influences, which the regimes perceived as challenges rather than as
opportunities. To the west, Turkey initially saw itself as the natural leader
of Turkic peoples of the former Soviet Union. However, as Turkey made
efforts to exercise a benign hegemony in Central Asia, its leaders quickly
encountered cultural tensions and conflicting agendas. The regional lead-
ers rejected Turkish pretensions and disliked the Kemalist political model.
To the southwest, Iran and some other Islamic states sponsored construc-
tion of mosques and training of religious personnel and introduced a radi-
cal tinge into the traditionally moderate Central Asian practice of Islam.
Islamic proselytizers alarmed the elites of the region who exhibited their
Soviet-trained incomprehension of religion and fear of any challenge to the
state monopoly of belief. To the south, the Tajik-Afghan frontier had been
fairly porous during much of the Soviet decline and ceased to be an effec-
tive barrier after 1991, contributing to the complex domestic conflicts in
Tajikistan and greatly expanding the narcotics trade. More worrisome was
the importation of Taliban and al Qaeda-inspired extremism into some of
34 MERRY
the poorest parts of Central Asia, such as the Ferghana Valley. Finally, to
the east, the immense and growing Chinese economy quickly established
a major trading presence in Central Asia, while Beijing exhibited concern
about separatist tendencies in its own slice of “Turkestan,” Xinjiang. Under
the umbrella of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China is expand-
ing its influence in Central Asia to include even military ties, probably with
a long-term view to replacing Russia as regional hegemon.6
Of all post-colonial regions of the world, Central Asia is the most dis-
tant from any ocean and the most cut off from direct interaction with the
global economy, and hence from the positive influences of globalization.
The problem of transit through neighboring states, most with ambitions
in Central Asia, limits regional economic prospects and potential for polit-
ical reform. The countries of Central Asia remain critically tied to Moscow
despite Russia’s own status as a semi-failed economy. The Central Asian
states want to diversify their external trade, but have little to offer to the
more balanced economies of Eurasia. At the same time, investment from
First World economies is concentrated in commodity exploitation, mainly
oil and gas. Western business engagement in the region in other than
extractive investments actually has declined in recent years, due to disap-
pointed expectations, corruption and regime interference. One business
survey assessed Western investment potential in Central Asia beyond the
hydrocarbon sector as negligible.7 The only important external economy
now expanding in a broad range of commerce in the region is the Chinese,
which is certainly freighted with political influence.
A Future Built on Oil, Gas, Water, and Drugs

In the early 1990s, the Western vision of vast oil and gas wealth in
Central Asia obscured the seriousness of the region’s economic plight, but
even the substantial recent discoveries in the Northern Caspian basin can
no longer conceal that these states are not Persian Gulf emirates in the
making. Most of the region has little or no hydrocarbons. Only Kazakh-
stan has major proven oil reserves on a scale to become significant on
world markets. Turkmenistan’s vast holdings of natural gas are an asset
largely devoid of a market. Turkey was the logical customer, but Ankara
already has contracted to purchase more gas from other sources than it
may be able to use in the years ahead. The proposed trans-Afghanistan
pipeline for Turkmen gas faces many obstacles, not the least of which is
that India (the largest potential customer) does not want to depend on
a pipeline crossing Pakistan for energy supplies. In addition, the global
hydrocarbon market is much more diversified than it used to be, with the
higher transport and transit costs of Central Asian energy creating a price
disadvantage. Finally, as in other hydrocarbon-rich countries, oil invest-
ments tend to distort broader economic development, discourage enter-
prise, warp labor markets, and spawn corruption. In this regard, Central
Asia is following the examples of Nigeria and Indonesia rather than that
of Norway.
For the region as a whole, two other commodities are likely to be as
or more important than hydrocarbons. The first of these is water, due to
the inherent aridity of most of Central Asia and to the depredations of
Soviet development policies, which drained the Aral Sea, over-exploited
the few rivers and depleted water tables. The water-rich areas of Kyrgyz-
stan and Tajikistan might seem natural complements to the energy-rich
but water-poor areas to the west and north, but the deal is not so simple.
Water is a shortage item for most inhabited parts of Central Asia. The
mountainous states are unable to satisfy the needs of their northern
neighbors and face the dilemma that supplying water for summer use in
the lowlands prevents hydroelectric generation in the winter. The Uzbek
and Kazakh authorities prefer to sell their oil and gas on world markets
for hard currency than swap it for Kyrgyz water, while Tashkent prefers
saber-rattling toward Bishkek rather than commercial compensation. The
regime in Ashgabad is fostering vast new irrigation schemes and a “Lake
of the Golden Turkmen” which, if realized, would require the entire flow
of the major regional rivers. Thus, rather than serve as a regional unifying
factor, water is a cause of tension and rivalry.8
The other commodity likely to dominate Central Asia in the years
ahead is narcotics, as the region is the main transit route toward growing
European markets for the output of Afghanistan, today the largest raw
opium producer in the world. As elsewhere, the vast illegal profits involved
in the narcotics trade easily can overwhelm weak political institutions
and dominate fragile economies. If comparatively mature republics like
Colombia can be enervated by this commerce, how likely are the Central
Asian states—much poorer than in Soviet days and already famous for
corruption—likely to withstand the pressure? The fatal double impact of
this burgeoning illegal trade is that it appeals to the dispossessed of society
excluded from other economic opportunities while suborning law en-
forcement and politics. The narcotics traffic is also likely to fund extremist
Islamist elements of the region, especially in places like the Ferghana Valley
that combine population growth, poverty, religious ferment and political
repression.9
36 MERRY
What Lies Ahead?

The probability is high that all five Central Asian regimes will suf-
fer systemic failure. Failure in this context can mean one or both of two
things. First, they can fail to achieve viability in the tasks of modernization
and in reversing their decline ever deeper into the Third World. Second,
they can fail as structures of political control. By the first definition, the
Central Asian states already are failures, having all moved in the wrong di-
rection on almost every relevant index, with little likelihood of more than
cosmetic reforms in the years ahead. By the second definition, the regimes
are currently successful, but in unsustainable ways.
The basis of regime failure in Central Asia is their Janus-like com-
bination of post-colonial and neo-Soviet forms of governance. “Big Man”
regimes throughout the Third World have demonstrated a very high fail-
ure rate in modernization and development. There are instances of limited
success, for example, Tunisia and Malaysia, but they combine fairly mod-
erate authoritarian rule with avenues for political pluralism, free speech
and non-violent change. The Third World regimes most similar to those of
Central Asia are case studies of lost opportunities for economic progress
and eroding living standards since the end of colonial rule. Central Asian
officials respond to such comparisons by saying their future will be better
due to their stronger Soviet-style institutions. This is curious logic, as the
Soviet model suffered systemic failure over a broader geographic area and
in more varied conditions than any other form of governance in modern
times. Even fascism did not collapse so completely, and often only under
external pressure. Why should Soviet-style institutions and policies which
failed in the Baltics and Balkans, in Albania and Ethiopia, in the Slavic
states and the Caucasus, from Eastern Germany to East Asia, now prove
viable in Central Asia to meet the demands of the post-Cold War world?
Nothing is less probable. Indeed, the amalgam of “Big Man” and neo-So-
viet ruling modes is almost a certain guarantor of systemic failure of the
first type: failure to meet the needs of developing societies.
What are the prospects of failure of the second type? Cannot the
addition of neo-Soviet police-state methods to Third World authoritari-
anism preserve regimes in power for long periods regardless of their sub-
stantive failings? Perhaps. This is the core political issue for Central Asia.
Will these neo-Soviet regimes collapse more quickly than would a typical
Third World dictatorship or can they prolong the process of decay behind
a facade of nationalism for years to come? Will the internal contradic-
tions of these systems (contradictions of a truly Marxian character) cause
them to implode relatively quickly or will the rulers demonstrate that they
learned well their lesson from Gorbachev’s experiment, the lesson not to
ease up the strong hand of dictatorship? In short, are these regimes rigid
and brittle or rigid and strong? The region’s rulers believe the latter, that
the Soviet Union would have endured indefinitely under a forceful leader.
They clearly credit themselves with the strength necessary to deny reforms
at home and to defy pressure for reforms from abroad, especially after the
2001 terror attacks on the United States.10
However, in the long term, the Central Asian states can avoid sys-
temic failure only by true modernization, especially fostering development
of active civil societies. Civil society refers to activity taking place between
the institutions of the family and the state. In advanced countries, even
those with very large state sectors, civil society encompasses most business
activity, labor unions, organized religion, media, political parties, science
and culture, and other organized human endeavors. In authoritarian re-
gimes, the state seeks control if not outright monopolization of these roles.
The importance of a vibrant civil society is that most creative human en-
terprise takes place there, as does essential pluralism and accountability of
state institutions. The health of a country’s civil society bears a close cor-
relation to its success in responding to political and economic challenges.
By this standard, the Central Asian states rank extraordinarily low. All five
regimes seek monopolies of civil institutions and treat independent or-
ganized activity as threatening to their control, which, indeed, it is. While
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were initially somewhat amenable to civil so-
ciety development, they reversed course to the comfortable Soviet norm.
Barring regime changes, prospects throughout the region for expansion of
civil society are very poor.
Diversity Within the Regional Pattern of Failure

A case-by-case examination of the five current regimes indicates
they are likely to experience different fates, at least in terms of the timing
of their ultimate failure as power systems. Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan,
the worst and least-repressive regimes, respectively, are the most likely to
experience regime change or at least significant political turmoil in the
near term. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have the wherewithal and authori-
tarianism to hold on considerably longer.
The megalomaniac ruler of Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Niyazov,
emulates some of the world’s worst dictators in his cult of personality;
Romania’s Nicolae Ceaucescu and Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the short-lived
Central African Empire are legitimate comparisons. In addition to his as-
38 MERRY
sumed name of Turkmenbashi or Father of the Turkmen, Niyazov has been

anointed by his stooge parliament as president for life, a field marshal, and
“The Great,” among many other honorifics. However, for all his vainglory,
Niyazov does not exercise the kind of bloodthirsty tyranny needed to
maintain his rule for the long haul. While life in Turkmenistan certainly
is marked by pervasive repression, it lacks the anxiety psychosis of a true
Stalinist state. This weakness, combined with fatuous incompetence in
running the economy (with fantasy statistics, such as the allegation of 21
percent growth in 2001), make Turkmenistan a good candidate for regime
change by disgruntled domestic forces. The supposed coup attempt in late
2002, the facts of which are still unclear, may indicate the potential for an
end to Niyazov. More recently, Niyazov has challenged Moscow in ways
that inspired condemnation even by the Russian State Duma and is also
verging on open conflict with Uzbekistan. How and when the transition
will come is unclear (who could have said in advance what would expose
Ceaucescu’s feet of clay?), but it is difficult to believe the sixty-two year old
Niyazov will remain in power as long as his regional neighbors.11
Kyrgyzstan President Askar Akaev is a great disappointment to
many in the West who naively saw him as a Jeffersonian democrat in the
heart of Asia. Sadly, a better parallel is Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, who
also won many admirers in his early years before his agenda narrowed to
maintaining personal power. The two men betrayed supporters at home
and abroad as they presided over corrupt regimes (the rot starting in their
own households), moved to imprison former close political collaborators,
became increasingly intolerant of criticism, suspicious of all domestic op-
position, and unresponsive to Western pressures. Akaev has, so far, been
less heavy-handed in his repression than Mugabe or his Central Asian
counterparts. The mass popular unrest in Djalalabad province during
2002 demonstrated genuine grassroots opposition, which could be dif-
ficult to control over time. Akaev has at least held out the public prospect
of leaving office voluntarily at the end of his current term in 2005, but
the common regional practice is to extend terms at will.12 Akaev’s blatant
manipulation of a series of constitutional changes to shore up his hold on
power in early 2003 does not bode well for a peaceful transition. Indeed,
Akaev’s very moderation, by regional standards, may prove his undoing, as
his poor stewardship of the economy gives little basis to appeal for public
support of his continued rule.13
Tajikistan is something of a special case, due to the extended and
complex civil violence of much of the post-Soviet period, which domi-
nated domestic politics. So far, the 1997 arrangements that brought most
of the fighting to an end have held up. Nonetheless, Tajikistan remains

in many ways the most fragile of the Central Asian states and the one
most dependent on external economic and military support to retain
cohesion. The regime of Imomali Rakhmonov is little more than a Rus-
sian protectorate and resembles some of the weak states of Francophone
Africa, which are sustained through French beneficence and occasional
intervention. As a semi-failed state for most of its independent history,
Tajikistan is a poor prospect for serious reforms or even basic steps toward
modernization. In many respects, Tajikistan resembles Angola, where the
enervating impact of prolonged civil strife deprives domestic political and
economic life of normal incentives, replacing these with the distortions
of a war society and its potential for corruption, official malfeasance, and
deterioration of what remains of civil society. In such conditions, political
reform faces huge hurdles.14
If Kazakhstan maintains its current political order, it will be because
the regime of Nursultan Nazarbaev has petroleum revenues adequate to
buy and bribe his continuation in power. While in different hands the oil
wealth might create real development, it is clear from the past decade that
Kazakhstan has the same kind of “kleptocratic” ruling system that dis-
sipated the riches of Nigeria and Indonesia.15 These examples of oil-rich
but probity-poor states demonstrate that money flow can prolong a “Big
Man” in power for years, but the regime ultimately will fail due to the cor-
rosion of social peace and the inability of the ruling clique to keep a firm
grip on political realities. There is little prospect of a voluntary regime
change in Kazakhstan, as Nazarbaev had his term prolonged in 1995, ex-
tended in 1998, and has openly spoken of a new term in 2007.16 In such
circumstances, opposition elements have few alternatives but to encourage
domestic unrest, hoping the security forces will abandon the rulers in the
face of massive popular protests (as did occur in Indonesia and Nigeria).
Thus far, Nazarbaev and his clan have met every manifestation of op-
position with harsher and more repressive measures, including arresting
moderate politicians and journalists despite Western protests. In severe
circumstances the regime could experience a loss of will or an inability
to have its orders obeyed, but for the time being Nazarbaev’s rule looks
likely to continue for a considerable time, with the waste of the country’s
petroleum earnings lasting for at least as long.17
Finally, Uzbekistan is likely to retain authoritarian rule for an ex-
tended period. Among the Central Asian regimes, the Uzbek is truest to
its Soviet roots. Islam Karimov certainly does not lack will in using his
security services to repress any manifestation of a genuine civil society,
40 MERRY
including even moderate religious practice. However, as ever more moder-

ate Moslem practitioners are imprisoned, tortured or killed, the trend in
underground Islamic teaching moves in increasingly extreme directions.
This trend can only go from bad to worse. How bad things already are
is shown by the fact Tashkent treats statistics on use of the death pen-
alty as a state secret. Although Uzbekistan began the 1990s with the best
regional prospects for balanced economic development combined with
moderate petroleum wealth, these opportunities have been wasted in an
unreformed structure of state controls and disincentives for enterprise or
investment.18
Karimov combines relative youth and a focused political intelligence
with a boundless ambition in his control of Central Asia’s largest popula-
tion. His aspirations for regional hegemony and his still-active dreams of a
restored “Turkestan” centered on Tashkent (and himself) not only obviate
effective regional cooperation but shift state priorities onto external ambi-
tions at the expense of pressing domestic needs. Like the ill-fated Shah of
Iran, it is difficult for such a self-absorbed ruler to accommodate change at
home while lusting for regional great power status, especially as Karimov
sees nothing really wrong with a Soviet-style centrally-directed economy
and monopolization of civil society. The weakness of Karimov’s outlook
is illustrated by the analysis of a courageous Uzbek human rights activist
who noted that Karimov initially had considered following the Turkish
Kemalist model of development, but ruled it out because it involved a free
press and genuine political opposition; he then toyed with the post-Mao
Chinese model, but thought it allowed far too much economic freedom;
he then examined the South Korean model, but again judged its openness
and vibrant civil society as intolerable for Uzbekistan; finally, Karimov
settled on a model he could feel entirely comfortable with, that of North
Korea.19 Therein lies Karimov’s near-term strength and long-term fallibil-
ity: He knows how to dominate but not how to adapt to changing circum-
stances. Such a regime—whether in Pyongyang or in Tashkent—may last a
long time, but ultimately has painted itself into a corner with no exit.
What Is To Be Done?
Although prospects for the five Central Asian regimes vary, the
countries all need the same things. First, regime change. The neo-Soviet
“Big Man” leadership in every Central Asian state has demonstrated in-
ability and unwillingness to adapt to the conditions of the modern world.
New leadership is required, although one cannot have high expectations
for what may come in the initial transition. Second, political pluralism.
This need not mean participatory democracy in the Western sense, but
at least the involvement of all ethnic, geographic and economic groups
in governance and in accountability for policies. Third, expansion of the
civil society. The state effort to control activities not related to the neces-
sary roles of government effectively prohibits creativity and development.
The challenges of modernization can only be met outside the stultifying
embrace of a pervasive bureaucracy, while an active civil society is also the
best antidote to state-sponsored corruption.
Obviously, such a program of political change in Central Asia is not
currently in the cards, nor will change be easy or perhaps, even peaceful
when it comes. The region’s periphery does not supply good role models,
as Russia, Iran, Pakistan and China are themselves examples of regimes in
need of reform. Even the more positive experience of Turkey and India
show how slow, difficult and uneven progress can be, while also proving
that current conditions in Central Asia are far worse than they need be.
One thing is certain: “Stability” is no answer to the problems of Central
Asia; indeed, a focus on stability is the heart of the problem. Central Asia
needs profound political and economic transformations to escape its neo-
Soviet morass—changes comparable to those of Eastern Europe—and the
sooner the better.
Notes
1 Zamira Eshanova, “Central Asia Border Issues: An Eighty-Year-Old Headache for Region,”
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Prague, October 18, 2002.

2 Tom Stoppard, Night and Day (Faber,1978).
3 Author’s diplomatic reporting from United States Embassy, Moscow, 1991-94.
4 Briefing on Religious Liberty Issues in Central Asia, United States Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, March 7, 2002; “Central Asia: Islam and the State,” Interna-
tional Crisis Group (ICG), Osh/Brussels, July 10, 2003.
5 Author’s experience as Regional Director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Washington, 1995-97.

6 Discussed in the author’s “Russia and China in Asia: Changing Great Power Roles,” American
Foreign Policy Council, Washington, 2002, 41-47; “Central Asia Fears Over China’s Power,” RFE/RL
Newsline, Prague, June 17, 2003.
7 Robert Cottrell, “Asian Entanglement,” Financial Times, April 17, 2002.
8 Michael Wines, “Grand Soviet Scheme for Sharing Water in Central Asia is Foundering,” New
York Times, December 9, 2002, 14; “Turkmen Lake Project Marks Third Birthday,” RFE/RL Newsline,
Prague, May 7, 2003.
9 Justin L. Miller, “The Narco-Insurgent Nexus in Central Asia and Afghanistan,” In the National
Interest, 2, no. 18 (May 7, 2003); “The Globalization of Narcotics,” RFE/RL Organized Crime and Ter-
rorism Watch, Vol. 3, no. 19 (June 5, 2003).
10 “Central Asia: Fault Lines in the New Security Map,” (Osh/Brussels: ICG, July 4, 2001);
Hooman Peimani, “Abusing the ‘War on Terrorism’ in Central Asia,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst
(August 14, 2002); “Central Asian Perspectives on 11 September and the Afghan Crisis,” (Osh/Brus-
42 MERRY
sels: ICG, September 28, 2001); “Central Asia: Last Chance for Change,” (Osh/Brussels: ICG, April 29,
2003).
11 “Turkmen Leader Renames Months After Himself, His Mother At Grand Council,” BBC
Monitoring International Reports, August 9, 2002; RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 2, no. 31 (August 15,
2002); Claudia Rosett, “The Real World,” Wall Street Journal, August 28, 2002; Sergei Blagov, “Turk-
menistan and Its Leadership Cult,” Turkistan Newsletter, September 7, 2002; “Cracks in the Marble:
Turkmenistan’s Failing Dictatorship,” (Osh/Brussels: ICG, January 17, 2003); RFE/RL Central Asian
Report, 3, no. 22, (June 26, 2003).
12 RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 3, no. 9, (February 27, 2003).
13 “Kyrgystan at Ten: Trouble in the ‘Island of Democracy,’” (Osh/Brussels: ICG, August 28,
2002); “Kyrgyzstan’s Political Crisis: An Exit Strategy,” (Osh/Brussels: ICG, August 20, 2002); RFE/RL
Central Asia Report, 2, no. 32, (August 22, 2002); RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 2, no. 34, (September
5, 2002); RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 3, no. 6, (February 6, 2003); RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 3, no.
29, (August 29, 2003).
14 Konstantin Parshin, “Of Tajik War and Peace,” Transitions Online (August 22, 2002); “Tajiki-
stan: A Roadmap for Development,” (Osh/Brussels: ICG, April 24, 2003).

15 Jeff Gerth, “Bribery Inquiry Involves Kazakh Chief, and He’s Unhappy,” New York Times,
December 11, 2002, 16; Seymour Hersh, “The Price of Oil,” The New Yorker, July 9, 2002; RFE/RL
Organized Crime and Terrorism Watch, 3, no. 17, May 15, 2003.
16 “Kazakhstan’s President Says He Might Run For Another Term,” RFE/RL Newsline, Septem-
ber 23, 2002.

17 Robert G. Kaiser, “Kazakh’s Season of Repression,” The Washington Post, July 22, 2002; RFE/
RL Central Asia Report, 2, no. 24, September 5, 2002; RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 3, no. 48, January
2, 2003.
18 “Uzbekistan at Ten: Repression and Instability,” (Osh/Brussels: ICG, August 21, 2001); RFE/
RL Central Asia Report, 2, no. 33, August 29, 2002; “Uzbekistan: U.S. Rubber Stamps Human Rights,”
Human Rights Watch, New York, September 9, 2002; “Uzbekistan’s Reform Program: Illusion or Re-
ality?,” (Osh/Brussels: ICG, February 18, 2003); “Uzbekistan: Religious Freedom Survey,” Forum 18
News Service, Oslo, July 16, 2003.
19 Briefing at RFE/RL’s Washington office, March 28, 2002.
POLITICAL REFORM 43
Chapter 3
Reform Strategies in
Central Asia: Early Starters,
Late Starters, and
Non-Starters
Gregory Gleason
F
or nearly a decade prior to independence, Central Asian govern-
ments had discussed reform in the context of economic “accelera-
tion” and governmental “restructuring” (perestroika). Soon after in-
dependence in 1991, all five Central Asian states developed new strategies
to meet the immense challenges of post-communist transformation and
“de-statification.” Today, after more than 12 years of reform efforts, it is
clear that none of these Central Asian states have been successful in at-
taining their goals for political and economic development. To date, no
country has announced that reform has been brought to its conclusion.
To the citizens of Central Asia, reform has become a permanent condition
of governance and more of an explanation for why things do not work
than for why they do. In order to change that perception, significant work
remains to be done and many challenges must be faced.
On the whole, the governments of the Central Asia states have been
more enthusiastic about economic than political reform. The reasons for
giving priority to economic reform are straightforward and to a large
extent understandable. First, existing political leaders and government of-
ficials sought to increase their states’ economic potential without limiting
their own ability to benefit from their positions as public officials.1 They
were inclined toward economic reforms that offered the promise of greater
economic rewards, but shied away from political reforms that might give
advantage to competing individuals or groups. Second, the leading ana-
lytical approaches to development stressed that economic reform should
be ordered logically prior to political reform.2 According to many analysts,
41
44 GLEASON
countries that suffer from poverty, insufficient investment in human

capital, underdeveloped infrastructure, antagonistic or exploitative trad-
ing relationships, excessive bureaucracy and government over-regulation,
cannot be expected to implement political reforms successfully. However,
once economic reforms begin to create new opportunities, the theories
maintain, new constituencies will form and political reform will follow.
A third reason why economic reform has been more forthcoming than
political is that the international community has provided more moral,
technical and material assistance in this area. The level of external sup-
port offered by international donor institutions is a matter of academic
debate. Some analysts view the post-communist support offered by the
donor community as insufficient, misguided and generally irrelevant to
the domestic circumstances of the countries. Whatever the real effects of
international aid, international donors have, in fact, played a crucial role
in communicating the expectations of the international community for
political and economic practices.
While the Central Asian countries have made headway in economic
reform, they face the criticism that economic reform alone cannot en-
gender the long-term social and cultural changes that also are needed.
For people to demand integrity, accountability, fair play, openness, and
effective administration from their governments, they must be prepared
to provide public support in the form of taxes and public participation
in shared self-government. For democratic development to be truly sus-
tainable, cardinal changes must take place in the relationship between the
individual and the state. Moreover, some analysts argue that the long-term
viability of economic change hinges upon the character of governance.
Poor governance quickly cancels the benefits of economic transformation
and growth.
What strategies for reform have been adopted by the Central Asian
states? What is the relationship between economic reform strategies and
political reform strategies? How successful have these strategies been? This
chapter surveys the relationship between economic and political reform in
Central Asia, arguing that the assumptions, methods, conduct, and results
of political reform strategies have varied significantly by country. The
chapter concludes with extrapolations of reform trends for future Central
Asian political development.
Economic Reform and Political Reform

The principal development challenge to emerge from communism is
one of transforming previously authoritarian, centrally planned societies
POLITICAL REFORM 45
into market-led democracies, with vibrant economies and open politi-

cal systems. The rationale for these changes is not primarily cultural, but
functional. Globalization clearly tends to reward those countries that suc-
ceed in such practices and punish those who do not. In order to succeed
in globalized commercial and information markets, governments find
themselves under pressure to conform to accepted international standards
of policy and practice.
Prevailing international standards tend to be those practiced and
promulgated by the upper-income countries of the West. As a conse-
quence, “best practice” in political and economic organization tends to be
identified with practices that are prevalent in Europe and North America.
Although political organization in the developed world exhibits a variety
of institutional forms and procedures, a small number of principles are
common to all economically advanced, stable democracies. The political
organization of advanced countries tends to stress individual rights, vol-
untary contractual relationships, popular political participation, limited
government, public accountability and financial transparency.
These features are common, but not necessarily self-initiating and
self-regulating. They do not emerge from good intentions alone, but de-
pend upon a finely tuned and continually evolving framework of public
processes. Most often, public organizations are used to ensure that rules,
standards, norms and procedures of openness are enforced. For example,
although markets are elemental forms of human exchange and have been
in existence as long as people have been free to enter into relationships and
transactions on a voluntary basis, market relationships are not self-establish-
ing and self-regulating in all cases. They require that governments or some
alternative organizations solve collective action problems by discouraging
free riding, opportunism and rent-seeking behavior.
Over the years, the world’s international financial institutions, led
by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have
developed a consensus on policy prescriptions to help their member
countries solve problems of economic development. Informally, this set of
policy prescriptions has come to be known as the “Washington consensus.”
An externally motivated structural adjustment package usually involves
policy correctives in a number of areas including: fiscal responsibility;
disinflationary policies; price liberalization; trade liberalization; currency
stabilization; and foreign investment attraction. A policy package may, for
instance, seek to tighten fiscal discipline through reducing government
budget deficits and subsidies to private sector, helping to privatize public
enterprises that might work more efficiently in the private sector, and
46 GLEASON
bringing interest rates into line with market forces. Another type of pack-
age may also seek to aid in opening national economies to foreign imports
and establishing conditions to support foreign exports on the basis of
comparative advantage. The policies of the “Washington consensus” have
been criticized for differentially serving commercial interests represented
primarily in developing countries. Critics claim that the Washington con-
sensus tends to encourage underdeveloped countries to rely on importing
industrial goods made in the advanced countries while exporting primary
commodities and raw materials for markets in the developed countries.
Prices for industrial goods tend to be less sensitive to changes in market
cycles. Primary commodity prices, in contrast, tend to fluctuate widely,
creating destabilizing cycles of boom and bust in the underdeveloped
countries. These cycles are reflected in the instabilities and uncertainties
that characterize political processes in developing countries. As the Cen-
tral Asian states emerged from the Soviet period to become independent
countries, they quickly became subject to the pressures of the interna-
tional marketplace.
At the time of independence in Central Asia, all the governments and
important political leaders of the region endorsed the ideas of democratic
politics and market-oriented economics. Yet the countries adopted very
different national strategies for achieving their goals.3 After more than
a decade of independence, it is apparent that the differing development
strategies adopted by the five new governments of Central Asia in the first
years of independence have led to significantly different policy outcomes.
In assessing how the contrasting strategies of these states affected
their progress toward economic liberalization and democratization, it
must be acknowledged that progress toward democracy in all the Central
Asian states has been limited. Four of the five Central Asian states are gov-
erned by former leaders of the Communist Party, and each of the Central
Asian republics are largely administratively run by former communist
party officials. By the end of the first decade of independence, all the
governments of Central Asia had “presidents,”4 but in all cases, these were
officials from the Soviet apparat or high rungs of the Soviet establishment.
Moreover, all the countries established “presidential” systems, giving the
presidents the power to rule by decree.
Although all of the countries have conducted elections, none of the
governments can be said to have conformed to international standards for
free and fair elections. Three of the governments have former communist
leaders who have extended their mandates in extra-constitutional ways.
None of the governments has what could be described as an independent
POLITICAL REFORM 47
judiciary. None of the governments has established a functioning legis-

lature with true powers of the purse. Even in the most open and liberal
of the countries—Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—the parliaments have
been routed by presidential decree. Judging by the benchmark criteria
for measuring democratic progress used by Freedom House,5 in the years
since independence the Central Asian societies have failed to realize their
potential for democratic change.6
Although the Central Asian states may have made limited progress
toward establishing sustainable systems of democratic governance, impor-
tant relative differences do exist among them. The status of democratic
reform is quite different in each of the states. To some extent, these dif-
ferences are the product of Fortuna—some of the Central Asian countries
have significant natural resource endowments, some have advantages of
position, some have simply been fortunate. But much of the variation
can be attributed to the substantive policies pursued by the states in the
a wide variety of areas, including governance, rule of law, adjudication of
disputes, human and civil rights, treatment of dissidents and opposition,
treatment of non-nationals, and tolerance for religious, ethnic, and ter-
ritorial differences.
While the international community has urged the countries of
Central Asia to adopt policies that would encourage democratization,
by far the most important impetus for change—both in terms of donor
resources and in steps taken by the countries themselves—has come in
the form of international efforts to support relatively non-political “gov-
ernance” reforms or “structural reform.” Structural reform of governance
standards, policies, and practices generally is regarded as a way of induc-
ing changes that will help bring countries into line with international
standards—without compromising the countries’ national sovereignty
and right to non-interference in domestic affairs.7 Structural reform is
seen as a non-political process of improving the technical capacity of
governments to carry out public policy. To the extent that this is accurate,
structural reform does not entail “modernization” or “westernization,”
rather, it implies conformance with standards, policies and practices of the
international community.
Structural reform, in the broadest sense, is anything that happens
within a country that allows the country to participate more effectively
in the global economy. Structural reform entails a process by which a
country’s institutions, policies and practices are brought into line with
prevailing international standards. The purpose of structural reform is
to create a favorable policy environment for accountable, transparent
48 GLEASON
economic policy, with well-defined public and private sectors working in

mutually reinforcing ways to promote prosperity and sustainable develop-
ment. Countries undertake structural reform programs because they real-
ize that participation in the global economy requires policy conformance
with international standards. Some structural reform measures are nar-
rowly economic in their purpose; others are more broadly oriented and
aim to improve the policy environment that facilitates economic activity.
Policy changes alter the status quo, producing winners and losers. As a
consequence, all policy changes influence the balance of constituencies in
a society. Moreover, economically oriented structural changes and politi-
cally oriented structural changes are linked in terms of reciprocal effects.
However the relationship between structural economic reform and
democratization is, at best, a probabilistic one. While free markets in the
long run may lead to free minds, the effects of long run processes often are
beyond the time horizons of most political systems. Political leaders rarely
rely upon economic change to bring about desired political change. For
this reason, political leaders often adopt conscious strategies of political
reform to further their goals. All political leaders, even the most cynical,
have some concept of the public interest.
There are typically two basic thrusts of political reform strategies,
one formal and the other informal. The first method is to use political in-
stitutions to shape future political change. The formal political institutions
offer ways of engaging elected officials, representatives and the public in
the process of change. The other method relies upon political exchange.
This method consists primarily of using economic reform to support
favorable constituencies. All economic changes, even the most non-po-
litical, necessarily produce winners and losers. Political leaders recognize
that no matter how strong or deep their support, they are surrounded by
challenges and sometimes even by threats. Using the changes introduced
by economic reform to reward friends and punish enemies is one of the
most fundamental forms of political strategy, and far more important in
most developing countries than using the formal political institutions
themselves.
The formal institutions of democratic governance require an ac-
countable executive branch, a deliberative legislature, an honest and fair
judiciary, and the governance standards of probity, transparency, and
efficiency necessary to carry out the public mandate. Promoting change
through the use of the formal political institutions requires reliance upon
civil procedure, elections, public participation, recognition of the profes-
sional independence of the judiciary, and the vetting processes of opera-
POLITICAL REFORM 49
tional independence of auditors and review commissions. None of these

strike insecure political leaders as efficient mechanisms of rule.
Reliance on political exchange to reward supporters and punish those
who dissent or oppose the government appears to many political leaders to
be a more direct, and thus more efficient, means of achieving objectives.
Even when political leaders are not so cynical as to see the political process
as consisting primarily of quid pro quo exchanges, they nonetheless tend
to interpret the public interest in terms of their own desire to garner sup-
port and avoid opposition.
The pages to follow survey the main features of structural reform in
the countries of Central Asia. Extensive data and information are available
regarding the results of economic structural reform. Much less is avail-
able regarding the results of political reform. What has not yet emerged is
whether each country has arrived at its current state as a result of specific
economic or political factors.
Kazakhstan: Outlines of a Petrocracy

Many areas of Kazakhstan’s macro-economic reform have been suc-
cessful and some provide a model for other post-communist countries.8
Soon after independence, the Kazakh government established a legal
foundation and regulatory system for a private economy.9 The government
introduced a convertible national currency, the tenge. It moved quickly to
establish sound monetary and fiscal policies, including modern civil and
tax codes as well as banking and investment laws in accordance with inter-
national standards. The government also carried out macroeconomic re-
forms including price liberalization and freeing markets from government
controls. It turned major enterprises over to the private sector, including
a majority of the power generation facilities and coalmines. Seeking to
encourage international trade and foreign investment, the government
passed environmentally sound oil and gas legislation that met interna-
tional standards.10
In contrast with these economic policy successes, Kazakhstan has
made less headway in other areas. On the whole, the economic benefits of
Kazakhstan’s rapid economic growth have been available to only a small
portion of the population. With an average per capita annual income
of $1,300 in 2000, most Kazakhstan citizens still had not benefited fully
from the transition to market based economics. Structural reform means
that changes must take place in the country’s economic structure. These
changes will benefit some, but will be detrimental to others. The costs of
structural reform, that is the unemployment created by closing out-of-
50 GLEASON
date enterprises, the loss of value of tangible assets, and the psychological
uncertainty introduced by the reforms, are rarely borne by the rich. The
costs of structural reform usually are imposed upon the poor or the less
well politically connected. In the wake of structural reform, Kazakhstan
continued to rely upon oil sector revenues, fiscal redistribution and for-
eign donor assistance to finance the costs of structural adjustment. Unless
exceptional steps are taken, further development of Kazakhstan’s oil and
mineral sectors cannot be expected to lead to a wide redistribution of in-
come. The situation is also grim in the agricultural sector where adequate
investment in infrastructure, such as roads, processing equipment and
farm inputs is lacking. Moreover, the banking reforms virtually ignored
agriculture, failing to provide much needed credits for farm expansion.
Although Kazakhstan has adopted a private pension system, moving ahead
of other former communist countries, the social safety net has worn thin
in many areas.
Given Kazakhstan’s decade of experience with structural reform, one
of the critical issues for Kazakhstan’s future is how economic and political
reforms will be linked in terms of policy cycles. Economic development
strategies that emphasize a dominant economic sector under close gov-
ernment control run substantial risks. Too heavy a reliance on primary
commodity exports could lead to the so-called “Dutch disease”—a situa-
tion in which oil-rich countries draw in large amounts of foreign capital
for needed oil development, but find that the resulting strong exchange
rates hinder their ability to competitively price other goods and services.
While the government may be able to count on future revenue from rents
on oil and gas extraction rather than from broadly based and relatively un-
popular forms of taxation such as personal income tax or excise taxes, the
political consequences of government dependence on such an easily mo-
nopolized sector as oil and gas can present real challenges to other aspects
of liberalization. Government control of the natural resource sectors has
led to policies that conceal incomes, compromise fiscal transparency and
benefit insiders far more than the general public. The long-term success of
Kazakhstan’s structural reform is likely to rest upon policies that serve to
diversify the economy on a sector and regional basis.
The political reform strategy of Kazakh political leaders has put little
emphasis on the formal political institutions, or, for that matter, reform.
When the first post-Soviet legislature proved to be recalcitrant from the
point of view of the executive, it was dissolved summarily in December
1993 by the order of the president. The new parliament elected in March
1994 proved not much more effective and also was dissolved. Since then,
POLITICAL REFORM 51
the president has succeeded in winning overwhelming voter approval for a

new constitution which greatly expanded his powers. In addition, Kazakh
leadership has used adroitly the results of economic reform to politically
enfranchise its supporters.
Privatization created a stratum of “new Kazakhs” who gained influ-
ence in government and society because of their wealth, which largely
was acquired as a result of government supplied credits and special ben-
efits. Back door privatization through “management contracts” and other
stratagems allowed close supporters of the political leadership to profit
in the early post-communist reform. The government’s emphasis on the
development of an export-led economy, particularly energy and minerals,
helped promote the expansion of a stratum of close supporters who had
everything to gain from continuing their support and everything to lose
by arguing in favor of new directions.
Kyrgyzstan: Winning Friends and Losing Ground

Kyrgyzstan’s enthusiasm for reform early on earned it a reputation
as the “democratic showcase of the former Soviet Union.” Soon after in-
dependence, the Kyrgyz government embraced the international financial
institutions’ policy prescriptions known as the “Washington consensus.”11
Following the standard policy prescription, the Kyrgyz leadership sought
to liberalize prices, scale back the size and scope of government, intro-
duce competition, and encourage foreign trade. Kyrgyzstan attempted to
implement these prescriptions in good faith, but at the same time, faced
substantial obstacles to successful economic reform. While the economic
reform measures did result in rapid and significant advances in state ca-
pacity, they did not lead to expected economic growth, improvements in
social welfare, or do much to improve the government’s capacity to protect
civil rights. Furthermore, these economic policy changes had negligible
effects and in some instances even negative effects on the processes of
political liberalization.
Kyrgyzstan’s particular path is closely related to its unusual back-
ground and circumstances. Prior to independence, Kyrgyzstan occupied
a highly specialized niche in the communist economic system, serving
primarily as a provider of commodities for industries located in the
European parts of the Soviet Union. When cut off from Soviet-era sup-
pliers and customers, Kyrgyzstan’s small and uncompetitive industrial
enterprises quickly became insolvent. The agricultural sector was blocked
from access to farm inputs such as tractors and advanced agricultural
technology. Unable to import expensive farm equipment and technology,
52 GLEASON
the country quickly began slipping toward low-technology subsistence

farming. The transition to an open trading economy also proved difficult.
Between 1991 and 1994 farm and industrial output fell, trade dropped,
inflation soared, and the government ran a large fiscal deficit. The Kyr-
gyzstan economy reached a nadir in 1994, at about the time that foreign
development assistance began to arrive. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, and the other major international
financial institutions began pumping money into the Kyrgyzstan economy
to make an example of this small, rugged country that was willing to risk
the unknowns of entering quickly into the world economy.
Not until 1996 did the Kyrgyzstan economy begin to rebound from
the post-Soviet Union collapse contraction. During the period 1995
through 1997, inflation was reduced, the budget deficit as a proportion
of GDP was cut in half, and with international donor assistance, the
Kyrgyzstan government made good headway in establishing the legal
and regulatory foundation for a market economy. Kyrgyzstan carried out
privatization of small enterprises and overhauled the country’s banking
and financial systems. In 1998, the Kyrgyzstan constitution was amended
to allow for private land ownership and Kyrgyzstan became the first post-
Soviet country to join the World Trade Organization. The Kyrgyzstan
government eliminated export registration in 1998 and export duties in
1999.
Kyrgyzstan’s population has been growing modestly since indepen-
dence. The estimated population was five million people in mid 2001.12
Prior to independence, Kyrgyzstan’s workforce was spread evenly among
agriculture, industry and services. Yet in the past decade, industrial employ-
ment dropped to less than half of its 1991 level and industrial production
saw steep declines, especially in the early years after independence. With
the exception of a few mining sectors, the industries have not rebounded.
Coal production in 2000 was less than a quarter of its 1991 level, although
hydroelectric production did increase. During the same time, agricultural
employment grew by 50 percent. Agricultural output, which dropped ini-
tially after independence, increased overall by the end of the decade. Rus-
sia, historically Kyrgyzstan’s largest destination for exports, was overtaken
by Germany for first place among Kyrgyzstan’s export partners after the
1998 Russian financial crisis. Russia continued to be the largest source of
imports for Kyrgyzstan, followed by imports from neighboring Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan.
POLITICAL REFORM 53
While the numbers and trends are discouraging in many sectors,

Kyrgyzstan, in absolute terms, has made the most visible progress of the
Central Asian states toward becoming a democratic institution. Even
though Kyrgyzstan retained a “presidential” form of government, the
parliament has grown relatively independent and challenges presidential
authority on key issues. Opposition political figures are often subject to
harassment and intimidation, but the very fact that such figures do speak
out indicates a domestic political context where competing views and
constituencies have some room to maneuver. Non-governmental civic
organizations are becoming more widespread and influential. In 2000,
heads of local administrations were elected for the first time rather than
appointed. While Kyrgyzstan’s human rights record receives criticism from
international organizations, more open discussions and fewer instances
of direct coercion and intimidation of human rights activists occur there
than in other Central Asian states.13
Despite these promising signs, freedom of the press has suffered,
aided in part by a growing government concern with terrorism and insur-
gency. The political reform strategy of Kyrgyz political leaders, like that of
Kazakh leaders, places only minor emphasis on formal political institu-
tions. In 2001, the World Bank Institute of governance indicators ranked
Kyrygzstan as below the fortieth percentile in all six key governance cat-
egories.14 Electoral process, judicial independence, and human rights prac-
tices in Kyrgyzstan have been criticized by leading international human
rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch and the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
In Kyrgyzstan, just as in Kazakhstan, when the first post-Soviet legis-
lature proved to be recalcitrant, it was summarily dissolved by the order of
the president. A new parliament that favored pro-government candidates
was elected in a voting process managed by a central electoral commission.
The Kyrgyz government has found that the informal processes of reform
offer more easily manipulated mechanisms for influencing supporters
and opponents. Kyrgyz officials also have found that their influence over
government credits may be used to their advantage and many have prof-
ited from their connections. Conversely, some high ranking government
officials who fell out of favor have been prosecuted for corruption.
Tajikistan: The Struggle for Reconciliation

and Development
Physically remote and economically isolated from its neighbors by
the specter of political instability, Tajikistan’s social and economic indica-
54 GLEASON
tors cascaded downward in the first five years of independence. Between

1992 and 1996, the Tajik economy contracted by nearly 40 percent.15 As
much as 40 percent of the country’s population was directly affected by
the civil strife; as many as 50,000 people lost their lives; 600,000 were dis-
placed; and 60,000 fled to neighboring countries.16 Thousands of women
were widowed and tens of thousands of children were orphaned. The
wartime damage was compounded by a series of natural calamities that
beset the country, including torrential rains, floods and earthquakes. By
the beginning of 1997, the year of the Tajik peace accord, Tajikistan ranked
115 out of 174 in the United Nation Development Programme (UNDP)
Human Development Index.17
In 1996 the Tajik government embarked on the first comprehensive
effort at structural reform and the adoption of international standards of
fiscal and monetary management. The economic program targeted re-
ducing inflation, regularizing relations with external creditors, increasing
foreign exchange reserves, liberalizing external trade and payments, and
improving the social safety net. The government liberalized bread and
grain prices, replacing bread subsidies with targeted price compensation
payments. Trade restrictions were almost completely eliminated, as export
and import licenses and duties were lifted. The state grain fund was ter-
minated while liberalization of cotton marketing was begun. Shortly after
these initial steps toward structural reform were taken, the continuing
costs of the civil conflict, in addition to weak commodity prices, drove the
government to abandon some aspects of its reform program and policy
targets. Faced with a widening budget deficit, the government resorted to
administrative measures late in 1996 to raise new revenue and imposed
export and excise taxes and import duties, as well as halted foreign ex-
change auctions in favor of directed lending of foreign exchange by the
National Bank of Tajikistan (NTB). Following a United Nations brokered
peace agreement that was signed in June 1997, the Tajik economy began to
turn around.18 In 1997, the country registered the first post-independence
economic growth, as GDP grew by 1.7 percent, with most of the gain in
the last quarter of the year. Since then real GDP has been growing in Ta-
jikistan on an annual basis. Inflation, which had reached 164 percent in
early 1997, declined to 2.7 percent in 1998 as the GDP grew by more than
five percent.19
Significant changes still must take place for Tajikistan’s structural
reforms to spur political liberalization. Tajikistan, like all of the countries
of Central Asia, claims to support the principle of free trade. However,
unsatisfactory arrangements regarding government subsidies, currency
POLITICAL REFORM 55
controls, banking, customs and taxation, infrastructural development, and

control over access to markets, continue to hamper trade and development
in the country. At the urging of international financial institutions, the
Tajik government undertook a comprehensive program of structural eco-
nomic reform. The government’s program was established in the form of a
policy matrix with timetable benchmarks. The priorities for the structural
reform agenda were: improved governance, privatization, bank restructur-
ing, land reform and energy sector reform. Governance measures included
reform of the treasury system and establishment of a single independent
auditing agency. The goal of privatization was to raise productivity and
support growth targets, as well as assist in achieving fiscal goals, by bol-
stering revenues and lowering direct or indirect subsidies. In structural
reform, particular emphasis was placed on measures that would lead to
a greater use of monetarized commercial transactions and a reduction in
inefficient and non-transparent barter relations.
Much of the legal and regulatory framework for reform was already
in place. As early as March 1992, the Tajikistan Supreme Soviet, their par-
liament, had approved land reform legislation giving citizens the right to
own, lease and inherit land. Both the Tajik constitution and the laws on
privatization guaranteed property rights, including intellectual property,
real estate and business property. Agricultural land remained under state
ownership, but could be leased. Under the land code, lease rights are in-
heritable and may be sold. The initial privatization process in Tajikistan
moved slowly, stalled by the civil conflict and a weak banking sector. With
the assistance of the World Bank and the IMF, the “Law of the Republic
of Tajikistan on Privatization of State Property in the Republic of Tajiki-
stan” was passed on May 16, 1997. This law established the framework for
privatization, including a legal framework, title registry, and procedural
guarantees. New privatization legislation changed the process from a top-
down to a competitive bottom-up program, with more rapid wholesale
transfer of assets into the private sector.
Banking reform followed a similar course. In 1994 a new law, “On
Banks and Banking Activities,” established procedures for forming statu-
tory capital and specified the processes for: starting and terminating com-
mercial bank activities, issuing and recalling licenses for bank audits,
filing bankruptcies, and operating non-banking financial organizations.
A new tax code took effect in January 1999, while a reform in the value-
added-tax (VAT) took effect in July. These improvements in tax policy and
administration contributed to an improvement in government revenue
in 1999. However, the practice of tax offsets remained a hindrance to full
56 GLEASON
monetization of the economy.20 To enhance the role of the domestic cur-

rency, the Ministry of Finance started collecting all taxes in Tajik rubles in
September 2000.
The Tajik government has made major efforts in its foreign trade
sector through improvements in the public infrastructure for transport,
communication and banking services. As these efforts succeed, they can be
expected to exacerbate the trends in the region regarding organized crime
and drug trafficking. Traffickers use legitimate transportation infrastruc-
ture and banking operations in order to move their wares and to conceal
the funds derived from trade in handguns, weapons materials, drugs, drug
precursors and drug production materials.
Mirroring the economic reform strategy, Tajikistan’s political reform
strategy is extraordinarily complex. The growth of the Tajik economy has
not created a class of “new Tajiks” in the way that Kazakhstan’s economic
development has. Moreover, most of the political competition in Tajiki-
stan takes place in the context of civil war. While the civil war seemed to
center on ideology, in fact, the most significant dimensions of the dispute
were regional, reflecting Tajik traditions of long-standing. The winners
in the early years of reconciliation were the battlefield commanders who
had sided with the Rahkmonov government. Gradually, members of this
coalition broke up as the leader of the Hujand faction fell from favor.
More recently, the country’s political leadership has distanced itself from
this group as the political situation has grown more stable. What is not
clearly understood is the degree to which the government has benefited
directly or indirectly from the region’s drug trade revenues. Journalists
have speculated on relations between government officials and the drug
traffickers, but these accusations have proven to be ephemeral, in part,
because Tajikistan for a time is one of the most dangerous countries in the
world to be a journalist.21
Turkmenistan: The New Sultanate

Among the countries of Central Asia Turkmenistan has been the most
resistant to the adoption of genuine structural reform. Those changes that
have taken place have been, for the most part, directed at increasing the
capacity of the state and in particular at enhancing the glory and authority
of the country’s authoritarian president, Saparmurat Niyazov. Bordered by
Iran and Afghanistan to the south, Kazakhstan to the north, Uzbekistan to
the north and east, and the Caspian Sea to the west, Turkmenistan’s deserts
dominate the country’s physical terrain. Turkmenistan is a country with
POLITICAL REFORM 57
great potential for economic development but is constrained by physical

circumstances and poor governance.
In mid 2001, Turkmenistan had an estimated population of 5.5 mil-
lion people, growing at an annual rate of 1.3 percent.22 Turkmenistan’s
workforce historically had been predominantly agricultural and service
oriented. However, since independence, the service workforce has dimin-
ished in size and the agricultural workforce and industrial labor sectors
have each grown by about 25 percent. Official statistical materials on
economic activity, supplied by the Turkmenistan government, are viewed
with skepticism by outside observers. According to the statistical data pro-
vided by the state, agricultural production is reported to have increased
substantially in the years since independence, especially the production of
food and forage crop. Cotton production also is reported to have increased
sharply.
While agriculture is the largest employer in Turkmenistan, the coun-
try’s energy sector is the largest revenue earner. Because gas and oil sec-
tors revenues are so closely related to Turkmenistan government revenues
(with allegations that gas revenues have enriched individuals responsible
for public decision making) and because those revenues are critical to
Turkmenistan’s official credit rating, statistical reporting on the energy
sector is an item of great sensitivity for the Turkmen government. The
government began concealing production figures for natural gas in 1997,
and some suggest actual output levels for gas and other forms of industrial
production in the latter 1990s are considerably below 1991 pre-indepen-
dence levels. Turkmenistan’s foreign trade figures are similarly unreliable.
Thus, it is difficult to develop a clear picture of Turkmenistan’s balance
of payments. There are indications that the 1998 financial crisis in Russia
impacted heavily on Turkmenistan’s balance of payments, by leading to
the cancellation of Russian gas orders along with delays in outstanding
payments. Some evidence also shows that Turkmenistan ran a significant
balance of payments deficit in recent years. Despite Turkmenistan’s great
potential energy wealth, problems of administration and governance have
prevented the country from fully benefiting from its natural resource
base.
Turkmenistan’s first and only president, Saparmurat Niyazov, was
the former first secretary of Turkmenistan’s communist party during the
Soviet period. Until the Soviet collapse, Niyazov appeared to be a staunch
communist, ideologically committed to the Soviet Union. However, as the
Soviet Union began unraveling, Niyazov changed his ideological colors,
assuming the position of a Turkmen nationalist. Like other Central Asian
58 GLEASON
communist party leaders who suddenly became presidents of independent

states, Niyazov was a public proponent of building a democratic, market-
oriented state. Since independence, however, Turkmenistan’s progress in
democratization has been negligible. Political authority is concentrated
in the office of the president, with little legislative or judicial autonomy.
Non-governmental civic initiative is routinely curtailed, and political
opposition figures are isolated and excluded from the political process.
Human rights abuses are frequent and severe. While Turkmenistan was
ranked in the top fiftieth percentile in terms of political stability in 2001
by the World Bank Institute governance indicators, the country scored in
the bottom tenth percentile in the categories of regulatory quality, voice
and accountability, and government effectiveness.23
Turkmenistan’s political reform strategy does not warrant the dig-
nity of being called a reform strategy. The political leaders have done little
more than to pay off friends and eliminate enemies. Any idea of reform
ended with the assassination attempt on Niyazov’s life in late 2002.24 In the
wake of this event, the country’s human rights situation has deteriorated
markedly as the sole criterion for advancement in the society has become
unquestioned loyalty to the country’s leader.
Uzbekistan: National Consolidation and Social

Consensus
Uzbekistan, with an estimated population of 25.1 million people in
mid 2001, has the highest rate of population growth among the Central
Asian countries.25 Traditionally, Uzbekistan’s workforce has been ori-
ented toward the largest sector of the economy, agriculture. However,
over the past decade, while the agricultural workforce has continued to
increase, the largest employment growth has occurred in light industry,
food processing, and the service sector. Cotton remains the mainstay of
Uzbekistan’s agriculture, but crop diversification has occurred as Uzbek
agricultural officials, in response to the demand for more foodstuffs, have
placed greater emphasis on the production of cereals and grains. Industrial
diversification, reflecting market forces, also has taken place. Coal produc-
tion has fallen substantially, while oil, natural gas and electricity produc-
tion have increased. Although Russia traditionally has been Uzbekistan’s
primary trading partner, the Uzbek government has sought to diversify its
trade patterns. Uzbek foreign trade began to develop in the early 1990s,
but the import of manufactured goods and luxury items led to trade
deficits in 1996. To restrain the growth of this deficit, promote domestic
production, and curb capital flight, the Uzbek government introduced im-
POLITICAL REFORM 59
port substitution measures in 1996. Between 1996 and 2001, Uzbekistan’s

self-reliance measures profoundly impacted both its domestic and foreign
markets.
Under the stern leadership of President Islam Karimov, the country’s
first and only president and a former communist party chief, Uzbekistan
has become a highly authoritarian state. The executive branch dominates
the administration, the legislature and the judiciary. The activities of
non-governmental civic organizations as well as the media are tightly
monitored and controlled by the government. Fundamental freedoms of
speech, association and political expression are similarly limited by the
government. However, strident political opposition, fueled by insurgency
movements originating during the Afghanistan war and in the Tajik civil
conflict, has grown increasingly active over the past decade, breaking
into violence in the late 1990s. In response to the growth of political op-
position, the Uzbek government mounted significant counter-insurgency
efforts, which have had the effect of stifling civil and human rights. The
2001 World Bank Institute governance indicators ranked Uzbekistan in the
bottom third percentile in all six key governance measures.26
Still, Uzbekistan’s political reform strategy has been the most suc-
cessful in Central Asia in terms of supporting the political stability of the
leadership. It remains to be seen though, if this strategy has succeeded in
consolidating political support within the country. Critics of the Karimov
regime claim that the government’s stress on the “Uzbek path” with its
go-slow approach to macroeconomic structural reforms has undercut
the expected benefits of true market liberalization. Uzbekistan’s strategy
emphasizes: self-sufficiency in energy and food grains; the export of pri-
mary commodities, particularly cotton and gold; and the creation of an
internally oriented services market. Fundamental reforms in agriculture,
state enterprises, state procurement, and the financial sector, (includ-
ing foreign exchange) have been postponed. The reforms that have been
enacted primarily have benefited middle-level government officials who
tend to support the Karimov regime. It is quite possible that the economic
rationale of these policies was much less important than the political con-
siderations.
In the mid-1990s, a significant political opposition emerged within
Uzbekistan, fueled by popular dissatisfaction with stagnating incomes,
government intervention in the economy, and a dearth of opportunities
for meaningful participation in public affairs. As the Uzbek government
consolidated political control during the mid-1990s with heavy-handed
methods, some government opponents were drawn to Islam as a natural
60 GLEASON
counterforce to the new regime. Seeing this development as a threat, the

Uzbek government identified Islam with the political opposition and
began a series of campaigns aimed at isolating and neutralizing opponents
of the regime by branding them as criminals, Islamic political fanatics and
terrorists. The counterinsurgency campaign cast a wide net, ensnaring
both the regime’s legitimate and illegitimate opponents alike.
The situation in Uzbekistan changed dramatically following the Sep-
tember 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. The American response
led to the formation of an international coalition to remove the Taliban
from power. The realignment of strategic purpose in the region brought
Uzbekistan’s foreign policy closely into sync with the strategic policies of
the United States in the region. This new coalition fundamentally altered
Uzbekistan’s role in international affairs. Central Asia, with Uzbekistan at
its center, once again became a hotly contested area, a “Great Game” for
influence in Asia. The country’s prominent role in the U.S. formed inter-
national coalition brought Uzbekistan considerable international good-
will within the global diplomatic community. In March 2002, President
Karimov met with President George W. Bush in Washington, D.C. and
reaffirmed Uzbekistan’s commitment to accountable, democratic govern-
ment, an open economy, and the observance of international standards of
civil rights. The year 2002 also witnessed a series of visits to Uzbekistan by
high-level diplomatic and military delegations from a number of countries
and international organizations, culminating with the visit to Uzbekistan
by United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan in October. Uzbekistan’s
political reform strategy clearly had acquired an international dimension
to complement the domestic. The Uzbek government’s increasing empha-
sis on the importance of conforming to international standards of practice
created rising expectations for substantive change.
Conclusions
This survey of the structural reform policies pursued by the Central
Asia republics since independence leads to a few general conclusions about
the process of reform, and the role of deliberate government strategies in
promoting it. The success in economic reforms has not been uniform, but
it has been notable and in some countries, particularly Kazakhstan, signifi-
cant. Economic reform strategies are never purely economic in the sense
that they always entail some political consequences. Every reform strategy
has a political aspect.
Reform is not free of risk. One of the most significant consequences
of the disintegration of communism was the steep decline in government
POLITICAL REFORM 61
revenues. Since independence the new leaders of the post-communist

states have faced rising public expectations and declining financial re-
sources. Even those reform-oriented leaders who sought to conduct real
reforms found financing reform to be more challenging than expected.
Financing reform, in fact, may be the single most difficult task confronting
the political leader in any country undertaking post-communist transi-
tion. To support the changes they favor, political leaders must somehow
mobilize resources, and this usually entails winning supporters and neu-
tralizing opponents. The experience of the Central Asian states illustrates
the myriad compromises involved in carrying out economic and political
reforms.
Notes
1 See Beverly Crawford, ed., Markets, States, and Democracy: The Political Economy of Post-Com-
munist Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); Richard Pomfret, The Economies of Central
Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995 NJ); and Roald Z. Sagdeev and Susan Eisenhower,
eds., Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution and Change (Chevy Chase: CPSS Press, 1995).
2 Janos Kornai, The Socialist State: The Political Economy of Communism (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1992).

3 Strategy is defined here as way in which ends are brought into line with means.
4 Nursultan Nazarbaev, now president of Kazakhstan, is the former first secretary of the Kazakh
republic communist party organization. Islam Karimov, now president of Uzbekistan, is the former
first secretary of the Uzbek republic communist party organization. Saparmurat Niyazov, now presi-
dent of Turkmenistan, is the former first secretary of the Turkmen republic communist party organi-
zation. Imomali Rakhmonov, now president of Tajikistan, is a former Kuliab region communist party
official. His predecessor as president, Rakhmon Nabiev (who died under mysterious circumstances in
May 1993), was the former first secretary of the Tajik republic communist party organization. Among
the Central Asian leaders, only the president of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akaev, did not belong to the former
party nomenklatura, although in some respects even Akaev, a physicist who was trained in Leningrad,
can be considered a member of the Soviet intellectual elite.
5 Freedom House is an international philanthropic research organization established in 1937
by Eleanor Roosevelt. It has grown to become one of the world’s most respected research organizations
on subjects of human rights and governance standards.
6 The Freedom House Annual Surveys measure progress toward democratic ideals on a seven-
point scale for political rights and for civil liberties (with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least
free). Changes in countries’ scores from year to year are monitored via annual surveys. The political
rights measurement addresses the degree of free and fair elections, competitive political parties, oppo-
sition with an important role and power, freedom from domination by a powerful group (e.g. military,
foreign power, totalitarian parties), and participation by minority groups. The civil liberties measure-
ment addresses the degree to which there is a free and independent media; freedom of discussion,
assembly and demonstration; freedom of political organization; equality under the law; protection
from political terror, unjustified imprisonment and torture; free trade unions, professional and private
organizations; freedom of religion; personal social freedoms; equality of opportunity; and freedom
from extreme government corruption.
62 GLEASON
7 The basic axioms of the Westphalian international system, following Grotius (1583-1645),
assert that all states enjoy national sovereignty, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and the right of
non-interference in domestic affairs.
8 Nursultaqn Nazarbaev, Kazakhstan-2030: Prosperity, Security and Ever Growing Welfare of all
the Kazakhstanis (Almaty: Ylim, 1997).

9 The expression “Kazakhstan government,” as opposed to “Kazakh government,” is sometimes
used to avoid the implication of ethnicity. While ethnic Kazakhs make up more than a majority of the
country’s population, other ethnic groups, including Russians, Ukrainians, Koreans, and many others,
also make up the country’s citizenry. To use the term Kazakh government, some observers contend,
implies a “government of Kazakhs.” One convention that has been adopted to avoid this problem is to
refer to the “Kazakhstani government.” This expression does seem to imply generality and thus refers
to the “government of Kazakhstan citizens.” However, the Kazakh language is a Turkic language, and
the “ani” suffix is Persian in origin, not Turkic. Persian is not spoken in Kazakhstan. The expression,
therefore, does not represent an indigenous form. In this chapter, for the sake of simplicity, I simply
refer to the governments by the national names. I intend no ethnic exclusiveness with this conven-
tion.
10 Sally N. Cummings, Kazakhstan: Centre-Periphery Relations (London: The Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 2000).

11 One celebrated critique appears in the work of the former Chief Economist of the World
Bank who came to see the international financial institutions’ policies as counterproductive. See Jo-
seph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002).
12 Population Reference Bureau 2001 World Population Data Sheet. Available on-line at www.
prb.org.
13 Assessment materials on civil and human rights are drawn from the annual and periodic
reports produced by Amnesty International, Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, and from the
annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices issued by the U.S. Department of State. See in
particular the annual compilation on human and civil rights in post-communist countries, Nations
in Transit. Nations in Transit appears annually under the editorship of Alexander J. Motyl, Arch Pud-
dington, and Amanda Schnetzer and is published by Longman Publishers.
14 See the Governance Research Indicators Dataset maintained by the Governance Group at
the World Bank Institute. These indicators are available on the internet at the World Bank’s site (www.
worldbank.org).
15 International Monetary Fund, “Republic of Tajikistan: Recent Economic Developments,”
IMF Staff Country Report no. 00/27 (March 2000), 50.

16 “UNHCR Report on Tajikistan,” “January 1993-March 1996”; United Nations High Com-
missioner on Refugees, May 1996, 4. Also see “Return to Tajikistan, Continued Regional and Ethnic
Tensions,” Human Rights Watch/Helsinki (HRW/H), 7, no. 9, (May 1995), 4-7.
17 The ranking in the Human Development Index of the UN Human Development Report in
1997 was 115; in 1998 it was 118. Tajikistan rose in the 1999 HDI rank to 108. The 2000 HDI ranking
was 110.
18 IMF, “Republic of Tajikistan—Recent Economic Developments,” IMF Staff Country Reports
no. 96/55 (July 8, 1996).

19 IMF, “Republic of Tajikistan—Recent Economic Developments,” IMF Staff Country Reports
no. 98/16 (February 11, 1998).

20 Tax offsets occur when enterprises that supply the government with goods and services are
not paid in cash but in compensating reductions of tax payments. Non-monetized transactions are
more likely to lack transparency than cash transactions.
21 See Attacks on the Press in 1999 (New York: The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ),
2000).
22 Population Reference Bureau, “2001 World Population Data Sheet.” Available on-line at
www.prb.org.
POLITICAL REFORM 63
23 Governance Research Indicators Dataset maintained by the Governance Group at the World
Bank Institute (<www.worldbank.org>).
24 Although official accounts are contradictory, the Turkmenistan government has claimed that
four former government ministers organized an armed attack on the Turkmen president on November
25, 2002. A group of gunmen were said to have fired shots at the President’s motorcade after a truck
blocked the path of the president’s car. The following day, the Turkmenistan government claimed to
have arrested 16 people in connection with the assassination attempt. On December 2, the General
Prosecutor, Gurbanbibi Atajanova, announced that 23 people had been arrested for involvement in the
coup attempt. According to Atajanova, the government discovered proof that former Foreign Minister
Boris Shikhmuradov masterminded the assassination plot from Russia in order to take political power
himself. On December 18, Atajanova provided a public report on Turkmenistan national television in
which she detailed a sequence of events and claimed that Boris Shikhmuradov directed the assassina-
tion attempt from inside Turkmenistan. She further claimed he had entered the country November 23,
from Uzbekistan, with the help of the Uzbek Ambassador to Turkmenistan, Abdurashid Kadyrov. The
report claimed that Shikhmuradov, together with other conspirators, remained in hiding in the Uzbek
Embassy until December 7. On December 24, a website under the direction of Shikhmuradov issued
a statement which claimed that Shikhmuradov had been in Turkmenistan since September 2002. On
December 25, Turkmen President Niyazov announced that Boris Shikhmuradov had been captured.
Four days later, Turkmen national television aired footage of Shikhmuradov in a purported confession
admitting to masterminding the assassination attempt. A chilling account of these events is available
in Emmanuel Decaux, “OSCE Rapporteur’s Report on Turkmenistan,” OSCE Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (March 12, 2003).
25 Population Reference Bureau, “2001 World Population Data Sheet.” Available on-line at
www.prb.org.
26 See the Governance Research Indicators Dataset maintained by the Governance Group at the
World Bank Institute. These indicators are available on the internet at the World Bank site (<www.
worldbank.org>).
64 GLEASON
LEGAL REFORM 65
Chapter 4
Legal Reform in
Central Asia: Battling the
Influence of History
Roger D. Kangas
F
or much of the past decade, discussions of legal reform in Central
Asia have been couched in terms of “Soviet-era versus Western ap-
proaches” with respect to how laws are codified and how improve-
ments might be made. More fundamental to the current debates and the
problems facing the Central Asian states in the twenty-first century is the
influence of pre-Soviet tradition on the contemporary legal environment.1
Specifically, the region must resolve the contradiction inherent in the im-
personal nature of codified law, and the fluid, personal aspect of the cur-
rent power relationships that reflect long-held traditions in the region.
Lack of true reform in countries such as Turkmenistan and Kazakh-
stan has created relatively high levels of mistrust, doubt, and concern
among the respective populations, thus weakening the ability of states to
carry out their constitutional and legal duties. This was a problem that
faced great unifiers of the past, such as Tamerlane.2 The notion of creating
a strong state structure and a concurrent legal environment was of utmost
importance to this medieval leader of Central Asia. His contemporary
counterparts face similar problems. Adherence to the law, as such, is
tainted by mistrust among the general population and capricious viola-
tions by those supposedly charged with enforcing it.
This chapter is an effort to assess the developmental level of legal re-
gimes in the five Central Asian states. When discussing such broad notions
as legal reform, one must be mindful of defining terms. In this instance,
the focus will be on the notion of rule of law, which can be defined as the
ability to abide by an external, abstract set of norms that allow members
of a society to co-exist. When there are disputes, the parties involved seek
solutions through a mechanism framed by these very norms. The empiri-
65
66 KANGAS
cal evaluation of constitutions, legal and criminal codes, and the ability of
law enforcement agencies to abide by such measures are fundamental.3 In
evaluating the legal aspect of the Central Asian states, the basic develop-
ments of these concepts in Central Asian society will be outlined. With
independence, the Central Asian governments had to quickly create their
own structures, the products of which were largely follow-on measures
from the previous era. However, in the past decade some changes of note
have occurred, providing a modest base for comparison of the respective
developmental paths of the five Central Asian states. Finally, the current
challenges to true legal reform in the region will be assessed and the ef-
forts of foreign assistance measures designed to address these concerns
outlined. While the governments of Central Asia have been self-congratu-
latory in their own assessments of legal reform at home, the reality appears
to be different.
Legal Antecedents
Central Asia has had a long history of legalism and legal studies.
Documents and books showing early efforts at creating rule of law are
often on display in national museums in Central Asia.4 Unfortunately,
intertwined with the tradition of legal scholarship in the region are the
results of despotism that prevailed for the past half-millennium. It was
often the case that rather complex legal codes repeatedly were flaunted by
ruling houses or dynasties at various times. This tension between “rule of
law” and the absolute authority of the ruler is key to understanding legal
traditions in Central Asia.
Given the rich history of the region, it is no surprise to find many
layers of legal structures, political entities, and the interpretative frame-
work for them. These influences have been both positive and negative, and
reflect the tension between the need to standardize law and the ability of
leaders to assert their own authority. While this tension parallels events in
Europe throughout the past two millennia, unique aspects of the Central
Asian environment ensured that the outcome would be different. More-
over, these differences themselves are often difficult for outsiders to fully
understand, as they reflect cultural patterns specific to the region. These
developments have been visible in both the pre-Russian and Russian/
Soviet eras, which have provided their own lasting legacies to Central
Asian legal thought.
LEGAL REFORM 67
The Pre-Russian Legacy

It is impossible to assess thoroughly the pre-Russian legal tradition
in Central Asia in a few pages. However, several key points can be stressed,
as noted by past works on this subject.5 One can point to four specific
waves of influence in the pre-Russian era: Islamic, Mongol, Timurid and
Emirate/Khanate. Each of these periods created potential frameworks for
legal discourse and action, but at the same time gave significant latitude to
the ruling elite and, ultimately, the leader.
Islamic
First of all, in accounts of pre-Soviet Central Asia, a strong empha-
sis on the role of Islam is present in the creation of political and societal
relationships. The adherence to the Muslim faith was, and remains, the
cornerstone of interpersonal interaction. Law, as a system of governance,
was rooted in the Islamic tradition introduced to the region as early as
the late-600s A.D., but really took root when the region was consolidated
a century later. Unlike past invaders, the Muslim forces of the eighth and
ninth centuries sought to do more than simply conquer territory. As an
example, when Alexander the Great traveled through Central Asia in the
third century B.C. and subdued regional potentates, his goal was to pacify
the region for territorial and financial gain, before proceeding to the next
target of opportunity. He did not consider instilling new legal codes or
frameworks within the region.6 In contrast, the Islamic invasion of the
eighth century A.D. involved the actual conversion of communities and
the total restructuring of belief and fealty systems. As happened in other
territories conquered by Muslim armies, there was a fundamental under-
standing that Islam as a way of life would dominate, replacing what existed
prior to its arrival.7
From a legal perspective, the central element of Islamic tradition
in the region was Shari’at law. Based upon a mix of sources, such as the
Qu’ran, hadith and subsequent documents, Shari’at law was, and remains,
an evolving concept.8 Indeed, over the centuries, differences of interpreta-
tion within the Muslim community have arisen. Such law was critical in
the settled regions of Bukhara, Khiva and other oases communities, as
these were more regulated than nomadic regions. Bukhara and Samar-
kand, in particular, became centers of Islamic jurisprudence and learning
for the entire Muslim world in the tenth and eleventh centuries. What was
created in these cities eventually was applied to the surrounding region.
However, as time passed, these cities represented a much more conserva-
68 KANGAS
tive and unreformed interpretation of Islam, especially as Central Asia was

cut off from most of the Sunni Muslim world by the sixteenth century.9
The above sequence of events was particularly important to the
settled regions of Central Asia. In contrast, the nomadic communities in
Central Asia, while incorporating some aspects of Islamic law into their
legal codes, also relied heavily on existing traditional measures. Called by
different names, such practices often were honed to reflect the specific
needs and communal priorities of a given group. The most common term
used was Adat, which is often called customary law. Adat was regulated
through precedent and past practices.10 Moreover, it took into account
differences between tribal and clan grouping, with the variations found
among Kazakh, Uighur, Kyrgyz and Turkmen clans. Power of arbitration
often rested in the hands of a particular individual (the bey among the
Kazakhs, for example).
Overall, the Islamic influence created a framework for Central Asia
within which legal issues could be evaluated and discussed. It also linked
the region to the broader, outside world and afforded legitimacy to the
ruling elite. After all, if this elite could structure its authority under the
auspices of Islam, the population could not legitimately seek an alterna-
tive form of government. The significance of Islam was thus profound: It
offered both a way in which people could interact within society and also
provided justifications for the form of government that dominated the
region.
Mongol
The thirteenth century saw the introduction of the Mongolian public
administrative system, the longer-lasting influence of the invasion and
conquest by the armies of Genghis Khan.11 The great Khan introduced
to the region a form of public administration that permitted a rather
thin layer of Mongolian, Turkic and Chinese bureaucrats to rule over
vast swaths of territory. For the next two centuries, the Mongol empire
gradually broke up into a number of sub-regions, with Central Asia fall-
ing under the authority of Genghis Khan’s son Chaghatai. The Chaghatai
dynasty ruled Central Asia until the beginning of the fifteenth century.12
During this period, the basic concepts of Islamic jurisprudence sur-
vived, but were subsumed under Mongol law. The reality of having such a
far-reaching empire meant that at local levels, autonomy was allowed. As
long as the subjects in the region paid their taxes and supported the larger
empire at specific times, they were left alone. The Mongols were the first
major empire in the region where the center of power was a significant
LEGAL REFORM 69
distance away from Central Asia, and thus required the employment of
indigenous bureaucrats and lawgivers. Ultimately, this proved to be the
undoing of Mongol control over Central Asia.
Timurid
The collapse of the Mongol empire’s hold over Central Asia in the
fifteenth century was due primarily to the rise of Tamerlane also known as
Timur the Lame.13 The historic significance of this period is less a case of
how the legal framework changed, as to how its legitimacy was articulated.
For the most part, the Timurids adopted the same structure as their pre-
decessors. The successive reigns of Shah Rukh and Ulugh Beg saw a greater
emphasis on reinforcing Islamic precepts into the legal framework.
Perhaps more important was that legal authority was indigenous
and not dependent upon an outside power. For the first time in almost
700 years, the seat of power and the cultural roots of authority were from
Central Asia itself. Interestingly, the Timurid dynasty exemplified the same
caprice and omnipotent power that previous leaders had.14 This was be-
cause there remained the strong belief that the ruler was above the law, and
that the personal qualities of Central Asian leadership were paramount.
However, even today’s scholars note that this shift of legal authority from
an outside source to a local one was a critical step forward for legal de-
velopments in the region. Though the Timurid period is often cast as one
mired in violence and expansion, the very survival of the state depended
on a cohesive legal regime.
Khanate/Emirate
Barely 100 years later, the unified, Timurid political system came
crashing down. The armies of Shaybani Khan sacked the key cities of Sa-
markand and Bukhara and drove the Timurid dynasty out of the region.
Babur, who was the ruler at the time, eventually re-established his author-
ity in the South Asian subcontinent, founding what was to become the
Moghul dynasty. Within Central Asia, Shaybani Khan was unable to so-
lidify his authority over the entire region, and competing political entities
soon emerged. Thus began an era of fragmented Khanates and Emirates
in Central Asia.15
With the demise of any unifying force, rule of law also was frag-
mented. Dynastic leaders ruled the key political entities in Central Asia.
Writers and poets of the succeeding centuries noted, often with despair,
the lawlessness that prevailed across the region.16 Indeed, intellectuals
from Bukhara found reason to criticize the form of government in the
70 KANGAS
state, hoping to reform the system to reflect a more legally sound system.
This was particularly true in the late-nineteenth century, when the rul-
ers of the Emirate of Bukhara were Muzaffar al-Din and Abd al-Ahad.17
In short, while a written and precedent-based tradition of rule of law in
Central Asia existed prior to the Russian conquest, it remained at odds
with the political reality of the time. Ultimately, law became a mere shell
for despotic rule.
The Jadidist movement exemplified the pressure for political and
legal reform in Bukhara and Khiva. Much has been written on the compet-
ing reform agendas of the Jadids.18 Even the more conservative members
of this movement advocated a change in the current legal regime in the
protectorates. Whether it was a return to traditional Shari’a law or the
introduction of Western (Russian) law, the consensus view was that the
very nature of political power in the region was an impediment to order
and progress. Because of the absolute authority of the Emir of Bukhara
and Khan of Khiva, such reform efforts ultimately failed. Consequently, up
through the Russian Revolutions of 1917, the legal reformers of Central
Asia often remained in exile.
Russian and Soviet-era Law
For the present-day regimes in Central Asia, the Russian and Soviet
eras hold special significance. The existing legal structures in the region
are products of what transpired during this period, as is the current
generation of political officials and legal experts. The institutional ar-
rangements that developed were at odds with the traditional notions of
law cited earlier, but in numerous instances, one finds a merger of such
concepts and an accommodation of traditional forms of authority within
the new Russian, and then Soviet, legal regime.
Imperial Russia
The territories fully incorporated in the Russian Empire saw a more
forceful introduction of Russian law. The protectorates of Bukhara and
Khiva, on the other hand, were able to rely on their own traditions. From
the Russian perspective, the feeling was that Russian law was superior to
local custom and law; however, the general policy allowed local law to exist
in certain cases.19 As Russian political structures were established in the
region—particularly in the area of today’s Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,
and parts of northern Uzbekistan—the Russian overlords had to decide
the extent to which local law would prevail. These regions, designated
LEGAL REFORM 71
Turkestan and Transcaspia, saw the development of Russian law not only
for Russian subjects, but also for the indigenous population.
The application of law was always a challenge, as noted by evalua-
tions coming from St. Petersburg. In the 1880s and again in the early 1900s,
commissions were sent from St. Petersburg to evaluate the colonial rule in
the region. For example, the Giers Commission of 1882 focused on how
effective public administration could develop where there was a dearth of
qualified officials and a lack of proper funding.20 Most critically assessed
was the notion that bureaucrats resorted to relying on traditional, and
often corrupt, forms of governance.
Bukhara and Khiva, the two remaining protectorates, remained
stagnant in their own personality-based systems.21 The frustration experi-
enced by reform-minded individuals in these territories prompted some
to find common cause with various revolutionary and reformist groups in
Russia itself, including the radical Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social
Democratic and Labor Party—the precursor to the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU).22 Thus, ironically, the Jadidist reformers came
to the conclusion that external assistance would most likely be required to
enact change in their countries—and they sought assistance from groups
that would eventually result in their downfall.23 Naturally, there were criti-
cal debates within the reformist community and a significant number did
not side with the Bolsheviks, either joining the local insurgencies24 against
the Red Army or simply emigrating.
The Soviet Period
The Soviet era actually began with a nod towards local custom. It
was not until the mid-1920s that various diktats were announced which
folded local courts and juridical proceedings into the Soviet experience.25
By the 1930s, the Central Asia region was under Soviet control, although
this continued to be a struggle for Soviet officials in the ensuing decades.
The tension between trying to enforce objective legal codes and the reality
of personal rule continued through this period, often with tragic results.
Soviet publications and contemporary studies are replete with accounts
of how the Soviet government tried to quickly institute their own legal
norms in the region. From the initial “unveiling” campaign in the 1920s,
which advocated that women should remove their traditional veils as a
sign of modernity, to the legal restrictions placed on Islamic organiza-
tions, the Soviet leaders sought to radically transform the concept of law
in Central Asia.26
72 KANGAS
In the beginning, the Soviet leaders were keen to introduce law as a

form of social engineering and development. As noted by Peter Solomon
in his work on Soviet law, the ramifications were legion. Law played sev-
eral key roles: it was an explanation of socialist legality, it possessed an
educational function, and it legitimized the new economic system that was
being put in place. It was imperative to ensure that the population under-
stood how and why the centrally planned economic system was necessary.
Indeed, economic crimes were often considered more severe than crimes
of violence, with a greater share of capital punishment decisions made for
embezzlement, forgery and bribery.27
While varying in practical importance, “socialist law and order” (sot-
sialisticheskaya zakonnost’ i pravoporiadok) was the defining framework
during most of the Soviet period. During the 1920s and 1930s, Stalin
flaunted these laws and the notion that a legal structure was in place
seemed dubious at best. The arbitrary nature of the Great Purge has been
well documented, and it was the object of Soviet legal reform in the 1950s
and 1960s, when there was an attempt to return to “Soviet law.” Central
Asia experienced all of these shifts within the Soviet system. In reaction to
the Stalinist era, the emphases on institutions and frameworks were criti-
cal to the Soviet leaders. For example, in 1987, the CPSU Central Com-
mittee adopted a resolution entitled “On Measures to Increase the Role
of the Prosecutor’s Oversight in Strengthening Socialist Legality and Law
and Order.” Such cumbersome measures were designed to specify how the
Procuracy, for example, could carry out its duties.28
Because of its subservient place in the Soviet Union, Central Asia did
not become a source of reform or opposition. For the most part it was a
passive participant in these discussions—with one important exception.
During the Brezhnev era, there was a return to the sort of administrative
policies that existed during the Mongol and Imperial Russian periods—
one of demanding fealty and loyalty from the region while simultaneously
leaving the internal workings of the region to the devices of the local lead-
ers.29 Up through the Gorbachev reforms of the 1980s, there were varying
interpretations of the extent to which this de facto autonomy existed.
Contrast of Traditional and Soviet Structures
It was the emphasis on institutions and structures within the Soviet
system that created problems for the Central Asians. Ultimately, the role
of personalities remained important in Central Asia, in spite of measures
adopted during the Soviet period. Highlighting the problems on Soviet
law in the region was the “Cotton Scandal” of the 1980s, often referred to
LEGAL REFORM 73
as the “Uzbek Affairs.” In it, Soviet investigators uncovered a widespread

corruption network in the Central Asian republic of Uzbekistan that in-
volved government officials fabricating cotton production figures. By re-
cording higher-than-actual numbers for cotton harvests, extra income was
provided to local officials. Scores of top officials in the Uzbek S.S.R. were
indicted, tried and punished for a range of economic crimes centering
around the misrepresentation of data on annual cotton harvests. Indeed,
First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, Sharaf Rashidov, was sus-
pected of being the key figure in this scandal, but his death in November
1983 pre-empted any trial or serious investigation.30 However, the long-
term damage of this event was that it pitted the Russian perception of local
adherence to law (or the lack thereof) with the Uzbek feeling that law was
really a tool of the Russians to repress the local community.31
The Gorbachev reform agenda further exacerbated tensions in the
region vis-à-vis Moscow. Not only did Gorbachev replace key leaders in
the republics, but he also stressed the need to combat lawlessness and cor-
ruption in Central Asia. Indeed, the stereotype within the Soviet Union
of Central Asians as being lazy and corrupt had fallen to a new low. The
legacy of the cotton scandal and Russian view of the archaic clan relations
that permeated the systems in the region only worsened the situation.32
Limited attempts were made in 1989 and 1990 to reform the entire Soviet
legal framework, divorcing it from communist ideology. However, any
lasting impact was cut short as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union in 1991.
At the time of independence, the Central Asian states found them-
selves in difficult situations with respect to the legal regimes in the newly
created countries. Previously, legislation had been dictated from the
central government, with such efforts not being trusted. Now, the burden
was on the new national governments to establish order. But serious ques-
tions faced these states: Should there be a return to past legal frameworks?
Did this require a reconsideration of Islamic law? How did one factor in
traditional custom, or even the historic legacies of individuals such as
Tamerlane? These questions became the subject of discussion and debate
within the region and among Western scholars, shaping the understanding
of legal reform in Central Asia. As will be seen, each state approached these
questions with great trepidation and concern, mainly as there was a sense
that too much reform could lead to political and social instability.
74 KANGAS
Respective Frameworks of Legal Regimes

in Central Asia
Common to all five Central Asian states was the suddenness of in-
dependence. Initial legal structures were often replications of the existing
Soviet models. When reforms along Western lines were introduced, one
saw slight divergence from the foundations of socialist legalism. However,
the extent to which these new legal norms were adopted varied, often with
a gap between what was on paper and what took place in practice. In the
past decade, all five countries of Central Asia have introduced distinct
structures, such as constitutions, legal codes and procedures for law en-
forcement agencies. At the same time, there are difficult challenges, includ-
ing the forms of leadership, corruption and an inability or lack of desire by
officials to actually enforce these very codes. Not surprisingly, the extent
to which a given country has been able to develop legal reforms depends
upon a number of internal dynamics.
Kazakhstan
Communist Party of Kazakhstan First Secretary Nursultan Naz-
arbaev assumed the position of “President of the Kazakh S.S.R.” in the
waning months of the Soviet Union and has remained in office ever
since. An erstwhile supporter of Gorbachev’s reform agenda in the 1980s,
Nazarbaev took on the public persona of a reformer himself.33 As a result,
there was a flurry of legislation in the early-1990s that suggested a real ef-
fort to transition from an authoritarian communist party system to one
based on rule of law.34 He presented an initial constitution in 1993 and
electoral laws in 1994 that supported a more vibrant notion of political
pluralism. These provided a template for diversifying power and author-
ity within the Kazakhstani political and legal system. Indeed, the electoral
laws may have been too successful, for the legislature began to challenge
Nazarbaev’s reform measures and sought to introduce their own.
By 1995, it was clear that the country was not developing into a de-
mocracy. The constitution had been re-written and extensive legislative re-
form was enacted in that year under the auspices of correcting potentially
corruptive rules and regulations. In addition, the constitutional reform
was carried out in order to minimize the importance of the legislature,
which could have developed as a base of opposition to the president.35 To
his critics, it was obvious that Nazarbaev passed criminal codes directed
against his opponents and created legal support for maintaining his tenure
in office.
LEGAL REFORM 75
Eventually, attention was directed at a broader range of legal issues.

The 1997 criminal code currently sets the framework for legal actions in
the country.36 For the most part, it remains a hybrid document, including
some of the Soviet-era rights and responsibilities, as well as new concepts
introduced from Western advisors and programs. These include the rights
of citizens, criminal procedures, the rights of the detained, and other basic
measures. Questions continue to arise as to how these are to be enforced.
Either the wording is sufficiently vague, or the responsibilities of law en-
forcement agencies are simply not spelled out. Perhaps most troubling
from a structural perspective is that the legal system is exclusively an
executive branch prerogative. The Interior Ministry, which houses the
police and security forces, is responsible for upholding the law. On occa-
sion, these forces are unaware of legislative changes and ignore acts by the
legislature. Law enforcement officials continually stress that they do not
have the resources sufficient to fight real corruption and crime. When one
sees police officials signaling cars for inspection at major intersections in
Almaty in order to extort money from the motorists, it is clear that corrup-
tion hits at all levels of the law enforcement community.37
In addition to these structural challenges, other problems remain.
While a legal regime exists in the country, the personal rule of President
Nazarbaev remains paramount, and he has repeatedly used the legal system
to undermine his political opposition. The apogee of these attacks came
in 2001, when former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin was tried in
abstentia for crimes ranging from corruption to abuse of power. Another
individual who was targeted in recent years is the former Akim (Governor)
of Pavlodar Oblast, Galymzhan Jakianov. Charged and convicted on cor-
ruption charges in 2002, Jakianov had reportedly challenged Nazarbaev on
a number of procedural issues, specifically that Akims should be directly
elected and not appointed by the President.38
In sum, legal reform in Kazakhstan is at a crossroads. After an initial
flurry of activity and a de-Sovietization of the legal language, it is still dif-
ficult to conclude that the country has a strong sense of rule of law. Arbi-
trary enforcement, irregular funding of police and a leadership system that
encourages the outright flaunting of the law by top officials underscore
the range of problems that still confront Kazakhstan. That these issues are
at least being discussed in the country is an indicator that reform is pos-
sible; however, recent signs are less than hopeful.
76 KANGAS
The Kyrgyz Republic

Perhaps the most intriguing case of legal reform in the 1990s was
the Kyrgyz Republic. Once cast as a showcase success story for the region,
the government of President Askar Akaev received extensive support
from international aid organizations and foreign governments to create
an island of democracy in Central Asia. For much of the 1990s, foreign
analysts continued to support this belief.39 However, electoral missteps in
the late-1990s and a series of attacks on opponents to the president soured
this belief.
Compared to the other states in the region, the Kyrgyz Republic does
have a more developed sense of rule of law. The Kyrgyz legislature adopted
its first post-Soviet constitution in 1993, a document praised by numerous
outside organizations and governments as being the most progressive in
Central Asia.40 Citizenship is not restricted by language competency or eth-
nicity, and basic rights of speech, assembly, religion, movement and even
ownership of private property are all noted. It took another five years, but
a completely new criminal code has been introduced in the country. Up to
that point, a hybrid of Soviet-era and new measures were in place. In the
new code, particular attention is paid to what the courts, procurators and
law enforcement agencies can and cannot do. For the latter, detailed re-
strictions on search and seizure, detentions and arrests, and even evidence
handling are provided.41 The new code represents certain innovations that
have taken place in the areas of law enforcement and prosecution. The
court system that was established is based on a prosecutorial model more
in line with European countries than the former Soviet Union.
Similar to the situation in Kazakhstan, the reality is somewhat less
encouraging. Ethnic minorities, especially the Uighurs, claim that they are
purposefully targeted in police actions. In addition, they complain of un-
fair practices in employment and advancement in the government sector
and in state-owned business. The sense of being second class citizens per-
meates such groups. Some, such as the Russians, Ukrainians and Germans,
have left for their home countries. The government has made gestures to
these groups by creating societies that can channel interests in cultural
events and educational institutions, but these are often underfunded and
poorly supported.42 Religious groups, in particular, feel pressure directed
at them as part of the global war on terrorism. As a result of the actions in
Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks in the United States, Kyr-
gyz officials have stepped up their own measures against suspected terror-
LEGAL REFORM 77
ist supporters in the country. Not surprisingly, this approach has targeted
ethnic minorities and religious-based organizations.
Another noticeable shortcoming in the country’s rule of law is that
key opposition figures remain subject to harassment. Daniyar Usenov
and Feliks Kulov are undoubtedly the most celebrated cases, but other
activists are targeted as well. These individuals have voiced their opposi-
tion to President Akaev’s administration and have questioned the reform
measures enacted in the past decade. These figures were not allowed to
run in the 2000 presidential election on dubious, technical grounds, thus
Akaev avoided a situation where he might not actually continue in office.43
In fact, President Akaev repeatedly has used the legal system to target op-
ponents and have them declared ineligible to stand for office. In addition,
Zamira Eschanova, the editor of Res Publica, periodically spends time in
jail for her articles criticizing the president, proving the fact that the media
has limits, as well.
This emphasis on protecting the reputation of the president under-
scores an emerging trend in the country: the elevation of the status of
Askar Akaev to that of supreme leader. While his authority is perhaps less
secure than that of his neighbor, Nazarbaev, it is apparent that Akaev is
not above obviating the rule of law to strengthen his position. As he ma-
neuvers through restrictions on running for an additional term in office
in 2004, it is likely that he will be declared immune from all prosecution if,
or when, he eventually steps down as president.
Uzbekistan
Unlike the governments of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic,
Uzbekistan was reticent to accept Western assistance in attempting legal
reform. Indeed, when the Uzbek constitution was under review for ratifi-
cation by the Oliy Majlis (legislature), an external panel of the American
Bar Association was given barely a week to assess, evaluate and make
recommendations on the document. The constitution was accepted in
December 1992, without including any of their cursory comments. As
with the other Central Asian states, the Uzbek constitution lists a range
of freedoms: speech, religion, assembly, property ownership, and the like.
In an effort to stress the multi-ethnic nature of Uzbek society, the right to
express one’s national heritage is also enshrined in the constitution.44
The current criminal code was enacted in 1994, with several amend-
ments and additions taking place since that time. In 1998, the code was
overhauled and the death penalty restricted for certain types of crimes.
Further reforms took place in late-2001 and punishments were reduced for
78 KANGAS
many non-violent crimes. Given troubles with the Islamic Movement for
Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb ut-Tahrir and the conflict in Afghanistan, crimes
related to acts of terrorism were given high priority, and are currently the
only ones permitting capital punishment.45 In the years after the Afghan
campaign, the government has expressed a sense of being under siege.
Structurally, the Uzbek judicial system is quite comprehensive. A
Constitutional Court oversees the legality of parliamentary laws and
executive decrees, a Supreme Court is the highest court for criminal and
civil cases, and a Supreme Economic Court oversees matters such as priva-
tization law, foreign investment and monetary disputes. The court system
exists at multiple levels, with local level courts and appellate equivalents
at regional and wiloyat (state) levels. Ostensibly, one can appeal cases to
higher levels, much along the lines of the U.S. court system.46
Since independence, Uzbekistan has followed a path of solidifying
the power of the executive, creating a rather feeble legislature, and estab-
lishing a legal code that is impressive on paper, but has enough loopholes
to allow the government to do as it wishes. For example, the president is
now above reproach with respect to prosecution, and those who criticize
him are subject to investigation and trial. More important, with respect to
the rule of law, the president has the ability to override Oliy Majlis deci-
sions and circumvent normal legislative procedures if he deems it neces-
sary. Rule by decree has been the norm for much of the past decade.
Perhaps the most common criticisms leveled against the Uzbek no-
tion of rule of law is that it is arbitrary and that law enforcement agencies
enact it with varying levels of excess. The government arrested thousands
of individuals following the February 1999 bombings in Tashkent, often
holding them for weeks and months before pressing charges. Human
Rights Watch, a non-governmental organization that focuses on human
rights conditions worldwide, has been particularly vocal on Uzbekistan’s
record. Years after the February bombings, some individuals still remain
in custody and have yet to be officially charged. Once an individual is
charged, trials have become difficult to monitor and it appears that ir-
regular standards are being used time and again.47
The Interior Ministry, which is responsible for the prison system in
Uzbekistan, has been accused of being responsible for numerous deaths
of prisoners under suspicious circumstances. These prisoners range from
individuals suspected of being Islamic extremists to secular political op-
ponents, most of whom find themselves in the Jaslyk prison, located in the
far western reaches of the country. More recently, Human Rights Watch
LEGAL REFORM 79
reported additional cases of mistreatment and persecution of secular op-

position figures.48
The problem of Uzbek human rights abuses has been the topic of
several protests by foreign Ambassadors to the country, most notably the
Ambassadors from the United Kingdom and the United States. Of par-
ticular concern has been that Uzbekistan is of strategic importance to the
United States. Human rights groups have often said that Uzbekistan is now
using this connection to shield its own abusive policies. On the other hand,
several amnesties of prisoners have taken place in recent years and it seems
that the Uzbek government is being more receptive to the criticisms levied
against it by the international community.49
As with the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan, the presidential system
of Uzbekistan dominates the country’s political process, ultimately affect-
ing the notion of rule of law. As in the other two states, Uzbek leaders tend
to act as if personal connections and influence are much more important
than impersonal laws. The fact that Uzbekistan was never considered to
be a bastion of reform actually might help it in the near future, for un-
like in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, the international community
still has some interest in seeing if reforms can take place. Indeed, the U.S.
government expressed this argument in the early-2000s.
Turkmenistan
Without question, the most dubious legal regime in Central Asia
belongs to Turkmenistan. As with the other countries, a constitution and
basic legal code were adopted in the first few years. Much of this was a di-
rect regurgitation of the Soviet-era documents, replete with the same flow-
ery verbiage. The reality remains much the same—rule of law is arbitrarily
honored and the government itself does not abide by these documents.
The current constitution was ratified in May 1992. Not surprisingly,
it harkens to the 1977 Soviet constitution with its emphasis on citizen
responsibilities, as opposed to rights. There is the usual listing of rights,
such as speech, assembly, religion and press. However, these are limited
by Article 19, which notes that they cannot harm the social order and na-
tional security. The constitution is also silent on the issue of enforcement
of rights. The criminal code finally was modified in June 1997. Like those
of its neighbors, Turkmenistan’s code notes punishments, procedures and
rights.
The court system of Turkmenistan is structurally balanced: Local
and regional courts hear criminal and civil cases. Decisions can be ap-
pealed to the higher levels, if that level deems the case important enough.
80 KANGAS
At the highest level is a Supreme Court, which ostensibly only will hear
cases of national importance. The president appoints all judges and chairs
the Supreme Court. The court system to date has not challenged the
constitutionality of any presidential decree or law, nor has it established
a strong legacy of legality. Making things more difficult, no independent
lawyers currently practice, and the notion of fair legal representation is
still wanting.50
The Interior Ministry is responsible for enforcing the criminal code.
International human rights organizations repeatedly have criticized the
means by which police and security forces uphold the law.51 Human
rights violations are legion and the conditions of prisons are considered
to be some of the worst in the former Soviet Union. Minority groups and
religious organizations, in particular, have experienced the difficult legal
environment. For example, the Law on Religious Organizations restricts
the way in which faiths can be registered in the country. Given the number
of signatures needed, only the Sunni Muslim and Eastern Orthodox faiths
are technically legal.52
The personalistic rule of President Saparmurat Niyazov means that,
ultimately, the caprice of a leader sets the tone for politics and society
in Turkmenistan. Individuals who run afoul of the president often are
convicted on trumped-up charges. President Niyazov has declared that
a fundamental feature of Turkmen law is the adherence to the Ruhnama,
or “holy book” that he supposedly wrote.53 It is a collection of sayings and
narratives that suggest specific ways in which Turkmen must live. This
book, representative of Niyazov’s leadership style, discards any form of
structure and objectivity.
In short, Turkmenistan represents perhaps the widest gap between
rhetoric and practice. However, it is also important to note that inter-
national organizations seldom are able to conduct interviews or collect
data in the country independent of official Turkmen sources. Thus, it is
difficult to gauge the extent to which rule of law issues are actually being
addressed within the country’s judicial and political systems. At best, anec-
dotes from exiles or observations from foreigners working in the country
are the most reliable information.54
Tajikistan
A possible exception to these rather pessimistic case studies is Tajiki-
stan. Mired in a civil war for most of its first six years after independence,
Tajikistan has been viewed as a country in perpetual crisis and lawlessness.
A number of volumes have been published outlining the course of events
LEGAL REFORM 81
that dominated the country between the years of 1992, when the fight-
ing began, and 1997, when a peace accord was signed.55 To an extent, the
government was never able to extend a rule of law to the entire country.
Indeed, today pockets of Tajikistan remain effectively outside of the cen-
tral government’s control.56
However, an important legal reform development in Tajikistan is
the founding document of the National Reconciliation Committee that
set the terms of the 1997 peace agreement. In it, the warring sides agreed
to abide by certain rules, based on an equitable sharing of political offices
in the government. The Constitution of 1994 remains the primary legal
document of the country. Again, on paper, the constitution lists a range
of individual freedoms and responsibilities. Yet the period of the civil war
witnessed countless violations of constitutional authority. A reversal of
this trend was, and remains, a key element of the post-war agreement. The
criminal code has yet to be significantly reformed and the current struc-
ture resembles that of the Soviet period. In short, the notion of “guilty
until proven innocent” prevails, and harsh penalties still apply to most
levels of crime, including economic crimes, which were often deemed the
most severe in the Soviet Union.
Tajik law does prohibit discrimination for ethnic, religious and gen-
der reasons, although this is not always enforced. Uzbek minorities, for
example, consistently complain of being left out of the political process. In
addition, religious minorities have difficulties in Tajikistan. Jews, Baha’is
and Zoroastrians are often relegated to fringe status in the country. Sunni
Islam remains paramount in the country with the small Russian minority
practicing Eastern Orthodox. In addition to the common problems of ar-
bitrary enforcement and government caprice, regional and local warlords
periodically use their own form of frontier justice. Every year, rival clans
murder scores of officials and businessmen. This form of frontier justice
is particularly problematic in the outlying regions, especially the Badakh-
shon region.57
Following the example of the other four presidents, Imomali Ra-
khmonov also has created conditions where ultimately he will be immune
to any future prosecution if he steps down from office. Still, the focus on
the leader does not exist as strongly in Tajikistan as it does in, say, Turk-
menistan. However, it is clear that individual personalities and familiar
relationships dominate the political process in Tajikistan. Moreover, the
groups excluded from this inner circle, such as the Uzbeks of Sogd wiloyat,
find themselves unprotected in the legal system.
82 KANGAS
Basic Dilemmas and Reform Efforts

To varying degrees, all five Central Asian states face the conundrum
of trying to establish viable legal systems. At the same time, the respective
presidents are reluctant to give up their power and actually abide by “rule
of law” principles. These challenges have been the focus on international
assistance programs, the success of which is dependent upon how dili-
gently the countries accept and implement reform.
Challenges
Corruption
Without question, corruption is deemed critical in Kazakhstan and
the Kyrgyz Republic, according to public opinion polls. One would suspect
that such views are held in the other three states of the region, although
full, clear surveys on the situation are not forthcoming. As opposed to no-
tions of episodic corruption in the respective states, corruption in Central
Asia is seen as being systemic.58 While much of what is known about cor-
ruption in Central Asia is based on a few studies and anecdotal evidence,
they shed light on the general problem throughout the region.59
Not surprisingly, the effect of corruption on the legal system is pro-
found. To ensure judgment, payments must be made. Judges are poorly
and irregularly paid, and often are swayed by much-needed financial gain
in their decision-making. Likewise, defense attorneys require fees beyond
their salary, and even investigative police require some form of bribery.
Studies by Transparency International and Freedom House indicate that
such corruption exists in all five Central Asian states.60 However, because
of access problems, it is not surprising that the only detailed studies have
taken place in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic.61
Ultimately, this type of corruption erodes the moral foundation of
the legal system and precludes citizens from truly respecting the judicial
process. This lack of confidence means that citizens often go to alternative
sources of justice, including tribal and clan leaders or even the mafia and
other criminal elements. The former only reinforces traditional modes of
authority while the latter perpetuates a lack of adherence to the law.
Retribution
The legal system in each of the countries has been used to punish
political opposition, often on spurious charges. In Kazakhstan, political
opponents of Nazarbaev, such as Akezhan Kazhegeldin, have been brought
up on charges of corruption. The same can be said for Abdy Kuliev in
Turkmenistan, Feliks Kulov in the Kyrgyz Republic, and Shukhrullo
LEGAL REFORM 83
Mirsaidov in Uzbekistan. In Uzbekistan, such charges also befall regional

hakims and other subordinates of Karimov, when they’re deemed to be
getting too powerful. The Cabinet of Ministers today is a collection of
survivors of these periodic, but not fatal, purges. In Kazakhstan, even a
family figure has been recently charged with corruption: The previously
mentioned Zhakianov, who was the Hakim of Pavlodar Oblast, is a relative
of Nazarbaev’s wife.
Nowhere is the legal system used with such caprice as in Turkmeni-
stan. For many years, President Niyazov has used the legal system to charge
his opponents and subordinates who are acquiring too much power with
various crimes to remove them from possible opposition. It is rare for top
officials to remain in the same office for more than a year, and in the past
three years, the president has completely re-staffed his cabinet on several
occasions. The November 2002 assassination attempt was yet another pre-
text for reshuffling individuals in the power ministries.62 It is interesting to
note that these charges, particularly the ones that deal with abuse of office
or corruption, are probably grounded in reality. However, the arbitrary
nature of filing charges against some corrupt hakims while letting another
equally corrupt official go free is what many find disturbing. Indeed, all of
the problems previously noted are accentuated when retribution against
actual forms of corruption are unevenly applied.
Retribution is not only directed against political figures. In addition
to the case of Zamira Eschanova in the Kyrgyz Republic, the political lead-
ers have targeted other journalists. In October 2002, Sergei Duvanov, a
journalist from Kazakhstan, was charged with sexual crimes. That he was
about to embark on a speaking tour of the United States and Europe to
discuss the state of the media in Kazakhstan was most likely more than a
coincidence; previously, he had written negative articles about the Naz-
arbaev family.63 In general, due to such potential threats, journalists in the
region tend to censor themselves and avoid such confrontations.
Transparency
Another factor is transparency, which is defined for this context as
the ability to clearly see and evaluate the decision-making process in the
legal system. In short, a transparent process is one in which there is an
openly-understood logic, devoid of back-room deals and capriciousness.
According to the non-governmental organization Transparency Inter-
national, the states of Central Asia fare poorly in this respect. In recent
reports where the states have been mentioned, their rankings are abysmal
and charges of systemic corruption are rife. Besides these external evalua-
84 KANGAS
tions, anecdotal evidence from citizens and officials in the region indicate
that this is a key concern for domestic stability and ultimately, regional
security. Uncertainty plays a large part in the legal system and corrodes any
confidence that citizens of the Central Asian countries have in a reform
agenda.
This situation parallels that of the Khanate period in Central Asian
history, as well as the Soviet era. The difference today is that foreign in-
vestment was not a factor during those times. Indeed, besides eroding
the public confidence in the legal code, the impact on foreign investment
must be noted. According to a number of impartial reports, the business
climate in all five Central Asian states is abysmal, at best, for potential in-
vestors—unless they are the major corporations in the energy sector. The
basic rule of thumb is that all discussions that are looked on favorably at
the presidential level are most likely going to succeed.64 However, those
that have to deal with the ministries and bureaucracies of the region more
often than not fail. In the long run, the reality of an unstable business
environment may be the most harmful effect of the lack of effective legal
systems in Central Asia.65
Efforts at Reform
The question that remains, in light of this rather pessimistic ap-
praisal, is what can be done? Indeed, legal professionals have been work-
ing for over a decade to rectify the current situation and infuse a more
rigorous adherence to law. Surprisingly, there have been internal efforts as
well, although these tend to be adversely affected by financial constraints.
In Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, independent lawyers have estab-
lished their own associations. In Uzbekistan, a similar effort is underway
for defense attorneys. Because the legal professions in each of these states
had been state-run for much of the past century, the level of independence
remains rather low. In addition, human rights organizations within the
countries have attempted to register in order to open up offices within
the respective countries, with a recent success being the legalization of the
Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan in 2002. It is hoped that if such of-
fices do open—whether for international or country-based groups—they
will provide the impetus for governments to be more transparent in the
legal reform process.
The key obstacles for reform efforts, as noted, are financial and struc-
tural. In both areas, international organizations have played key roles. Ini-
tially, groups such as the American Bar Association provided expert advice
on the drafting of legal codes and constitutions. However, the problem has
LEGAL REFORM 85
been that with each re-write of constitutions, power becomes more cen-
tralized and obstacles for opposition groups greater. Indeed, advice offered
by outside observers has largely been ignored.
In other areas, success has been greater. The American Bar Associa-
tion continues to support one of the earliest efforts to aid the legal system
in Central Asia: the Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI)
Project. Working with lawyers in the region, CEELI lawyers and staff
members conduct analyses of draft laws and civil codes, as well as train
the newly-emerging cadre of lawyers within these countries. Initiated in
all states, CEELI remains active in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz
republic.66 Other non-governmental organizations are also engaged in
the region, offering their services to governments and non-governmental
associations alike.
Because the obstacles noted above adversely affect the economic
and business climate in Central Asia, the World Bank has remained en-
gaged in the reform process. This international financial institution is
devoting resources to stabilizing the legal regimes in the countries, so as
to promote a more active investment climate. In addition, transparency
is a central theme in recent Bank reports, which note the trend towards
limited improvements in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, with more
serious shortcomings in Uzbekistan.67 As one example, the World Bank is
initiating a legal reform project in Kazakhstan that has a budget of up to
$18.5 million.
This compliments an initiative by the European Bank of Reconstruc-
tion and Development (EBRD) on court reform that is being offered to
all five Central Asian countries. According to EBRD officials, this effort
follows on legal reform measures that have included reform programs
on transaction security, bankruptcy law, telecommunications, leasing, ar-
bitration, and taxation. Finally, the European Union (EU) has focused
its attention on strengthening the legal regime in Central Asia. Through
its Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
(TACIS) Program, the EU has offered training programs for procurators
and other legal experts. Perhaps more ambitious is the effort by the EU to
create a common legal regime in the Central Asian and South Caucasus
regions, paralleling the efforts to do the same within Europe. Such goals
are long-term, but it is clear that support is available.
With each of these efforts, there are shortfalls and obstacles. The
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which
contributes millions of dollars in assistance to the region each year, must
balance out programs for legal reform with those devoted to economic,
86 KANGAS
environmental, educational and health reform, to name a few.

Moreover, as security assistance continues to be a high priority for
the countries in the region, the receptivity of the governments for
extensive legal aid is questionable.
Conclusion
In each of the Central Asian states, efforts have been made
to resuscitate legal systems that many considered to be moribund.
Both internal and external organizations have initiated reform
measures, although it is too early to tell how effective they will be.
More broadly speaking, several observations can be made regard-
ing the status of legal reform in Central Asia. First of all, all of
the countries have made efforts to use the discourse of Western
legalism in their respective frameworks. Second, this has both
been a product of, but also a reason for, substantial international
assistance in reconstructing constitutions, legal codes, and pro-
cedures for law enforcement agencies. Third, in spite of this aid,
much remains to be done. It is clear that many of the pre-Soviet
and Soviet-era traditions and methods are still applicable to the
current states, and a true transition to a rule of law society has yet
to take place.
In all five states, while there is evidence that legal reforms are
taking place, much work is still required. Indeed, it appears as if
the initial flurry of activity involved in creating actual codes and
constitutions was deemed sufficient and the actual enforcement of
the laws has yet to be fully implemented. That said, it is also clear
the respective states are attempting to reshape the legal discourse
from the Socialist legalism framework of the twentieth century
to a more Western-oriented legal code that focuses on rights and
responsibilities of the individual, as opposed to groups. However,
even this latest layer of legal discourse has yet to tackle what re-
main key dilemmas and challenges to the respective systems.
Admittedly, it has been just over a decade and to expect a
complete transformation in such a short period of time is asking
too much. Since a transition in logic, theory and belief is required,
it is no surprise that common citizens and those who find them-
selves in the legal system are more than cynical. Fundamental to
the problem of legal reform in Central Asia is the notion of trust.
Do the respective populations actually believe in the authority of
LEGAL REFORM 87
law in their countries, versus the notion of a powerful leader? Are those
surrounding the leaders viewed as mere kleptocrats who are pillaging the
system in manners little different than their Soviet-era predecessors? To
date, the status is mixed. While the situation varies in the respective coun-
tries, the problems are still apparent in all.
The problem of trust is a significant legacy from the Soviet era. Be-
cause justice and law were deemed arbitrary, a general lack of trust and
respect for the concept of law developed. Previous, indigenous forms
of law were banned, leading some to insist that return to such practices
would enhance the respect for law. That said, it is evident that even pre-So-
viet/pre-Russian law was not always seen as just and fair. When given the
option of having a case heard in a Russian or a Shari’at court, the parties
involved often opted for the Russian court, where renumeration was in
monetary terms, not in disfigurement or death. In the Soviet era, the legal
system was seen as competent at the lower level for minor offenses. How-
ever, for politically designated crimes, it was seen as a tool of the Commu-
nist Party. Today, it seems, this mentality has not changed. Ultimately, for
the political systems of Central Asia to survive past the current generation
of autocrats, a sound and credible legal system must be firmly entrenched.
The written and rhetorical foundations exist—now it is incumbent upon
the five states to put meaning into these words.
Notes
1 For the purposes of this chapter, Central Asia is defined as the states of Kazakhstan, the
Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Clearly, references to pre-1924 Central
Asia will include names of states and empires that existed within the geographic setting of these five
states.
2 Harold Lamb, The Earth Shakers (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1949); Rene Grousset, The
Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, translated by Naomi Walford (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 1970), 409-469.
3 The challenge remains trying to assess what is in writing and what is actually enforced.
Throughout much of the Soviet period, laws were quite extensive and often appeared to be rather fair
and judicious. The actual implementation of these laws, on the other hand, revealed a system that was
often capricious and unbalanced. Often legal codes were used for political reasons and to maintain a
certain power relationship.
4 Many of these are designed to prove the origin of certain civilizations in the region, predating
those outside Central Asia. Perhaps as a Soviet legacy, they are also presented as relics (“perezhitki”)
of oppressive, pre-capitalist societies. This is particularly evident in the national museum in Bukhara,
Uzbekistan.
5 For an assessment of these periods, see Grousset, op cit. The strengths of these traditions are
discussed in Edward A. Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present, a
cultural history (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), and Vasiliy V. Barthold, Four Studies on
the History of Central Asia, translated by V. Minorsky and T. Minorsky (Leiden: NL: E.J. Brill, 1958).
88 KANGAS
6 Peter Green, Alexander of Macedon 356-323 B.C.: A Historical Biography (Berkeley, CA: The
University of California Press, 1992). This is also assessed in Russian scholarship. See I.S. Shiffman,
Aleksandr makadonskii (Leningrad: “Nauka,” 1988).
7 A basic precept of the growing Muslim world was to establish a broad framework within
which various societies and cultures could live. These developments were evolutionary and reflected
a maturation of Islamic thought over the first several centuries of the faith’s existence. See Wilfred
Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), and Svat
Soucek, A History of Inner Asia (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
8 Shafi’is Risala, Islamic Jurisprudence, translated by Majid Khadduri (Baltimore, MD: The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1961).

9 The “decline” of these Central Asian centers of learning was the result of geographic isola-
tion, the struggles of the Islamic world vis-à-vis the European Christian world, and even the opening
up of trade routes to the orient that bypassed the “great silk road.” Consequently, Central Asian Islam
did not experience the reform movements that took place in the Arab world in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.
10 For a concise discussion of Adat, see Anuar Galiev, “Traditional Institutions in Modern Ka-
zakhstan” (1997), electronically published by the Slavic Research Center in Hokudai, Japan,
<http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/sympo/97summer/galiev.html>.
11 Depending upon the source material and transliteration method, Genghis Khan is also
referred to as Chinggis Khan or Ghenghis Khan, among others. See Leo de Hartog, Genghis Khan:
Conqueror of the World (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989), and Robert Marshall, Storm from the East: From
Genghis Khan to Khublai Khan (Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 1993).
12 Grousset, op cit., 326-346.
13 Of the Barlas tribe, Tamerlane (1336-1405) was a local political and military figure who
quickly consolidated his authority by forging alliances or defeating opponents in swift attacks. At
the time of his death, Tamerlane had conquered most of Central Asia and territories stretching into
modern-day Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China.
14 Soucek, op cit.
15 Seymour Becker, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968). See also Helene Carrere d’Encausse, Islam and the Rus-
sian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asia (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988).
16 Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia. (Berkeley,
CA: The University of California Press, 1998), and Faizulla Khodzhaev, Kistorii revoliutsii v Bukhare
(Tashkent: Uzbekskoe gosizdat, 1926).
17 In Central Asian history, these two Emirs were notorious for their corrupt regimes and
opulent lifestyles at a time when the “forces of modernization” were slowly enveloping the Emirate.
Critics from within the country wrote of the regime’s shortcoming, and Russian officials in Central
Asia parlayed this into a dependency relationship by creating a “protectorate system” for Bukhara and
the neighboring Khanate of Khiva. See Seymour Becker, op cit.
18 See Khalid and Carrere d’Encausse as two excellent studies of Jadidism at this time.
“Jadidism” itself means “new school,” or “new method” and represented a reformist movement that
existed in the Muslim regions of the Russian empire and the neighboring protectorates in the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Modeled after the reformist movements that emerged in
nineteenth-century Egypt and the twentieth-century Ottoman Empire, this reform movement had a
number of sub-groupings. Some advocated political reform; others sought a return to a “more pure”
form of Islam; and still others emphasized a greater unity of the various Turkic peoples. The Jadidist
movement was eventually overtaken by events in the Russian empire, particularly the Bolshevik Revo-
lution and the creation of the Soviet Union, at which time many either emigrated or were victims of
the Stalinist purges for being “nationalists.”
19 Helene Carrere d’Encausse, “Organizing and Colonizing the Conquered Territories,” in Cen-
tral Asia: 120 Years of Russian Rule, edited by Edward Allworth (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
1989), 151-171. For a range of interpretations of this policy, see Russia’s Orient: Imperial Borderlands
LEGAL REFORM 89
and Peoples, 1700-1917, edited by Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1997).
20 Carrere d’ Encausse, 155.
21 Khalid, op cit.
22 Tragically, the Jadidists believed that the Bolsheviks would ultimately leave the region alone,
supported by Lenin’s concept of “national self-determination.” However, by the mid-1920s, J.V. Stalin
had compromised the parameters of national self-determination so much that it was impossible for
the minority regions to gain their independence. The respective leaders of the various ethnic regions
were subsequently targeted in the purges of the 1930s. See Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet
Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923 (New York: Atheneum, 1980).
23 This was the dilemma faced by regional elite such as Faizulla Khojaev. A member of the
Young Bukharans, Khojaev agreed to work with the new Soviet government and was instrumental in
bringing Bukhara into the Soviet Union as a central component of the newly-formed Uzbek Soviet
Socialist Republic. He remained active in Uzbek politics until 1937, when he was arrested for a range
of anti-state crimes. He was executed the following year. The bulk of this “First Generation” of Central
Asian leaders met similar fates. See Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslim National
Communism in the Soviet Union (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1979).
24 The most prominent insurgency was the “Basmachi” movement, which lasted from 1919-
1923 as a full-fledged force and until the early 1930s as a less-effective guerilla force. See Glenda Fraser,
“Basmachi (parts I and II),” Central Asian Survey (1987) 6, no. 1, 1-73, and 6, no.2, 7-42.
25 Gordon B. Smith, “The Legal System: Toward a Civil Society,” in Soviet Politics: Struggling
with Change (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 202-232.

26 For a discussion of restrictions on Central Asian culture, see Shoshana Keller, To Moscow, Not
Mecca: The Soviet Campaign Against Islam in Central Asia, 1917-1941 (New York: Praeger, 1991).
27 See Peter Solomon, Soviet Criminal Justice Under Stalin (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1996).

28 For an assessment of the legal reforms that took place in the 1980s, see works by Eugene
Huskey, including “Soviet Justice in the Age of Perestroika,” Christian Science Monitor, August 22,
1989, 18 and “The Soviet Criminal Process: Expanding the Right to Counsel in Pre-Trial Proceedings,”
American Journal of Comparative Law, 34, no. 1 (1986).
29 Gregory Gleason, “Fealty and Loyalty: Informal Authority Structures in Soviet Asia,” Soviet
Studies, 43, no. 4 (1991).

30 Even today, there is controversy surrounding Rashidov’s death. Russian journalists claim
that he committed suicide, while those sympathetic to him suggest a more sinister demise. Most
likely, his death was through natural causes (officially, a heart attack). Through much of the 1980s, his
reputation was tarnished in the Soviet Union. It was not until the 1990s that President Islam Karimov
officially “rehabilitated” Rashidov. For an assessment of the “Cotton Scandal,” see Gregory Gleason,
“Nationalism or Organized Crime? The Case of the ‘Cotton Scandal’ in the USSR,” Corruption and
Reform, 5, no. 2 (1990), 87-108.
31 James Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic’s Road to Sovereignty (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1991).

32 James Critchlow, “Prelude to ‘Independence’: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus Broke Mos-
cow’s Grip on Elite Recruitment,” in Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation, edited by William
Fierman (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 131-158.
33 Nursultan Nazarbaev, My Life, My Times, and the Future (London: Pilkington Press, 1998).
34 Martha Brill Olcott, “Nursultan Nazarbaev and the Balancing Act of State Building in Kazak-
stan,” in Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership, edited by Timothy J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1995), 169-190.
35 The drama of this intra-Kazakh power struggle is well noted in Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakh-
stan: Unfulfilled Promises (Washington, DC: CEIP, 2002).

36 “Kazakhstan,” Nations in Transit, 2002 Report (New York: Freedom House, 2003), 217-220.
90 KANGAS
37 A common practice is for militsia (police) to occasionally flag motorists down and cite a vio-
lation. However, a modest “fee” will generally satisfy the arresting officer, and the motorist is allowed to
proceed. While motorists dislike this occurrence, some do see it as the only way in which street police
actually get paid (wage arrears are major problems in government departments).
38 Ironically, Jakianov was viewed as a “protégé” of Nazarbaev, distantly related to the president
via Nazarbaev’s wife.

39 For writings that assess these conflicting reputations, see Bruce Pannier, “The Kyrgyz Repub-
lic: The Early Dawn of a Bright Day?,” Transition OnLine <www.tol.cz>, January 16, 1998 and John
Anderson, Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia’s Island of Democracy (New York: Harwood Academic Publishers,
1999).
40 Eugene Huskey, “Kyrgyzstan: The Fate of Political Liberalization,” in Conflict, Cleavage, and
Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, edited by Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 242-276.
41 “Kyrgyz Republic,” Nations in Transit, 2002 Report (New York: Freedom House, 2003), 233-
235.
42 In the mid-1990s, the Kyrgyz government established the “Slavonic University” in Bishkek,
which would be an institute designed to cater to Russian-speaking citizens of the country. Because of
the relatively high number of non-Kyrgyz speakers, there is a greater effort to establish such entities.
43 Most likely, President Akaev would have received the plurality of votes in a potential second
round and would have continued his term in office. However, the fear of receiving anything less than
an overwhelming majority is perceived to be a weakness in the region—perhaps a holdover from the
Soviet-era elections where 95 percent+ “voter approvals” were common.
44 Roger Kangas, “State Building and Civil Society in Central Asia,” in Political Culture and Civil
Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, edited by Vladimir Tismaneanu (Armonk, NY: M.E.
Sharpe, 1995), 275-277.
45 One can see a parallel with the Soviet death penalties for economic crimes. Terrorist groups
today challenge the legitimacy of the current regime, much in the way that “speculators” and “capital-
ists” were seen as challengers to the legitimacy of the centrally-planned economy of the Soviet Union.
46 “Uzbekistan,” Nations in Transit, 2002 Report (New York: Freedom House, 2003), 423-425.
47 In mid-February 1999, a series of bombs exploded in Tashkent, killing and injuring scores
of Uzbekistani citizens. While no group claimed responsibility, the government has concluded that it
was the work of Islamic terrorists, specifically the IMU. Over 2000 individuals were arrested in the
ensuing months, with over 100 receiving significant prison terms or the death penalty. The govern-
ment explanation of these events can be found in the sensationalist book by Oleg Yakubov, The Pack
of Wolves: The Blood Trail of Terror (Moscow: Veche Publishers, 2000).
48 Persecution of Human Rights Defenders in Uzbekistan (New York: Human Rights Watch, May
1, 2003) is a recent example of these reports. Also see Uzbekistan at Ten: Repression and Instability, Asia
Report N.21 (Osh/Brussels: International Crisis Group, August 21, 2001).
49 Critics of the United States’ global war on terrorism use the “geopolitical argument” in
explaining why it maintains ties with Uzbekistan. The U.S. Congress has had several hearings on this
issue since October 2001.
50 “Turkmenistan,” Nations in Transit, 2002 Report (New York: Freedom House, 2003), 395-
398.
51 Cracks in the Marble: Turkmenistan’s Failing Dictatorship, Asia Report no.44 (Osh/Brussels:
International Crisis Group, January 17, 2003).

52 “Unrecognized” faiths include Baha’is, various Evangelical Christian groups, and Hare
Krishnas, among others. Churches with strong missionary components find it particularly difficult
to work in Turkmenistan.
53 Saparmurat Niyazov, Ruhnama (Ashgabat, TK: TurkGosIzdatel’stvo, 2002). The book is
published in Turkmen, Russian, and English and is currently being translated into other languages
as well.
LEGAL REFORM 91
54 For example, when the International Foundation for Election Systems conducted public
opinion surveys in Central Asia on issues of politics, economics, and social welfare, four of the five
countries permitted the surveys to take place, even allowing the U.S.-based Non-Governmental Orga-
nization to partner with local organizations. Turkmenistan refused to permit the survey to take place.
55 See Shirin Akiner, Tajikistan: Disintegration or Reconciliation? (London: Royal Institute of In-
ternational Affairs, 2002) and Muriel Atkin, The Subtlest Battle: Islam in Soviet Tajikistan (Philadelphia,
PA: The Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1989).
56 Tajikistan is over 90 percent mountainous, with the eastern part of the country including
some of the most remote villages in the region. Outside of Dushanbe, the government’s control is
sometimes challenged, although any violence is considered low-intensity as compared to the period
of the civil war.
57 Central Asia: The Politics of Police Reform, 14-20.
58 Simply put, “episodic” corruption suggests that cases of corruption are isolated and are
based on specific personalities and situations. They do not reflect on the legal or political system as a
whole. “Systemic” corruption, on the other hand, is just that: corruption is required to function in the
society, and the very nature of corruption permeates all levels of society—from politics to economy
to healthcare and education.
59 Nancy Lubin, Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption, and Identity (Washington, DC:
USIP, 1995).
60 While Transparency International has not conducted an in-depth study of Central Asia, they
have included specific cases in the region for their annual reports. See <www.transparency.org> for
further information, as well as the country reports in Freedom House’s Nation in Transit, 2002 Report,
op. cit.
61 These “rates” refer to illegal fees that one must pay for items ranging from licenses for res-
taurants, building permits, entrance fees for schools, opportunities for certain jobs, etc., See Roger
Kangas and Craig Olson, Anticorruption Assessment: Pavlodar Oblast, Kazakhstan (Bethesda, MD:
Development Alternatives Incorporated, November 1998).
62 On November 25, 2002, shots were allegedly fired at President Niyazov’s car as he drove to of-
fice in Ashgabat. Almost immediately, key opposition figures such as Boris Shikhmuradov, Hudaiberdy
Orazov and Nurmuhammed Hanamov were implicated. In addition, Niyazov went so far as to suggest
the Uzbek and American ambassadors were somehow linked to the “criminal organization” that was
out to assassinate him. Roger Kangas, “Memories of the Past: Politics in Turkmenistan,” Analysis of
Current Events, Vol.14, no.4 (December 2002),16-19.
63 The investigation and trial have been covered extensively by the publication Eurasianet
(<www.eurasianet.org>).
64 This is a theme addressed by a number of recent articles, including Charles William Maynes,
“America Discovers Central Asia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, no. 2 (Mar/Apr 2002), 120-132; Martha Brill
Olcott, “Pipelines and Pipe Dreams: Energy Development and Caspian Society,” Journal of Interna-
tional Affairs, Vol. 53, no. 1 (Fall 1999), 305-323; and most recently Mark Berniker, “Despite Corrup-
tion Concerns, Kazakhstan Continues to Lure Investors,” <www.eurasianet.org> (April 28, 2003).
65 This view was most recently expressed in a report by the International Crisis Group at the
time of the annual conference of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),
which was held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in May 2003. See Central Asia: A Last Chance for Change
(Osh/Brussels: International Crisis Group, April 29, 2003).
66 For a variety of reasons, Uzbekistan remains a difficult country for the ABA to work. How-
ever, when addressing less political issues, such as property law, progress has been made. For example,
see Analysis of the Draft Civil Code Section on Property Rights for the Republic of Uzbekistan (Washing-
ton, DC: CEELI, January 19, 1996).
67 Anticorruption in Europe and Central Asia (Washington, DC: World Bank, May 2003).
92 KANGAS
HUMAN
INTRODUCTION
RIGHTS 93
Chapter 5
Human Rights
in Central Asia 1
Michael Ochs
T
he defining trend of political development in Central Asia has been
the emergence of presidents far more powerful than the legislative
and judicial branches of government. Central Asian constitutions
generally sanction this imbalance by according the head of state extremely
broad prerogatives. But the actual practice of presidential rule has tran-
scended constitutional provisions, which also formally enshrine separation
of powers. Only in Kyrgyzstan, for example, has parliament occasionally
managed to frustrate the executive. Kazakhstan’s few opposition-minded
legislators at best can try to embarrass their president. Elsewhere in the
region, parliaments are rubber stamp institutions, while courts every-
where reliably rule in political cases as instructed by the powers that be.
Official justifications for the phenomenon of “super” presidents in Central
Asia emphasize the need for a strong hand to consolidate independence,
ram through reforms and maintain stability during a difficult transition
period. More cynical views point to still strong “eastern” and/or Russian-
Communist traditions of exercising authority.
The most extreme case of authoritarianism is Turkmenistan, where
Saparmurat Niyazov sponsors a full-scale cult of personality while over-
seeing the most repressive regime in the former Soviet Union. In Tajiki-
stan, by contrast, President Imomali Rakhmonov has had to make conces-
sions: a military stalemate in the 1992-1997 civil war forced him to come
to terms with Islamic and democratic opposition groups and agree to a
formal coalition government.
Rounding out the spectrum are Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov, Kyrgyz-
stan’s Askar Akaev, and Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbaev. Karimov, after
permitting some political opposition, in mid-1992 banned all dissidence.
Akaev and Nazarbaev tolerate opposition parties but curtail their influ-
ence—Nazarbaev much more effectively than Akaev.
93
94 OCHS
Central Asian publics for the most part have accepted strongman
rule, though not without grumbling, when possible. This is not surpris-
ing, considering the regimes’ control of security organs, law enforcement,
and prosecutorial agencies; the region’s lack of democratic traditions; and
the natural human focus on surviving severe economic decline. Moreover,
after seeing the bloodshed in Tajikistan (or Azerbaijan or Georgia), many
people are grateful for “stability.”
At the same time, a series of unfair elections has deepened popular
disillusionment with “democracy.” Most people believe that presidents and
lower level officials derive significant economic gain from their positions
and will not willingly leave office. Consequently, relatively few protests
have been lodged against the development of executive privilege. Only in
2002, in the most liberal Central Asian country—Kyrgyzstan—has this
pattern begun to change.
When the Central Asian countries joined the Organization for Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)2 in 1992, their leaders pledged
to implement all past and future commitments of the Helsinki process. In
fact, however, they want no part of democracy. The best evidence for this
proposition is their miserable record of elections. It is unclear what the
region’s presidents fear more—losing or not winning by an astronomical
figure—but it is certain they rig elections and strive to eliminate all risk
from electoral exercises.3
Apologists often point to Central Asian traditions and argue that
democracy must be built slowly. But while an undemocratic history, real
or alleged Islamic fundamentalism, the Soviet legacy, and poverty are all
important, leaders determined to remain in office require repressive po-
litical systems. Implementing commitments on democracy, the rule of law
and human rights would create a level playing field for challengers and let
the media expose presidential misdeeds.
Another key factor in Central Asia’s poor human rights record is
high-level corruption. Presidents wishing to continue enriching their
families and friends (or “clans”) cannot allow a free press or an indepen-
dent judiciary. Nowhere is the nexus between corruption and intimidation
of the press clearer than in Kazakhstan, where journalists who write about
foreign investigations into President Nazarbaev’s finances risk physical
retribution or legal action.
Nor is normal politics possible. Fear of the consequences if an out-
sider should come to power and uncover the scale of abuse induces lead-
ers to ensure that no serious rivals emerge and that elections are carefully
controlled—when they take place at all. The result has been the emergence
HUMAN RIGHTS 95
of an entire region in the OSCE space where fundamental freedoms are

ignored. Along with large-scale conflicts like Kosovo or Bosnia, unre-
solved low-level conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia, and
the trafficking in human beings, the systemic flouting of commitments on
democratization and human rights in Central Asia is the single greatest
problem facing the OSCE.
Consequently, human rights observance in these states has tended to
reflect not the leaders’ commitment to reform, but rather goading from
abroad. Such pressure, however, has had—and can have—only limited ef-
fect. While the United States had urged progress in democratization even
before September 11, Central Asian leaders apparently had concluded that
Washington is more focused on strategic and economic interests and the
threat of Islamic fundamentalism. U.S. disapproval of lagging democrati-
zation never kept American businessmen from seeking to exploit Central
Asia’s natural resources or restrained Washington from encouraging them.
Nor did flagrant human rights abuses cause the United States to cut sig-
nificantly programs such as Partnership for Peace, cease foreign aid, or
otherwise slow the development of bilateral relations.
After September 11, the U.S. government moved to consolidate its
relationships with Central Asian states, seeking cooperation in the war on
terrorism. But Washington also made plain its expectations of some type
of political reform, warning that without such reform, Islamic radicalism
would threaten stability in Central Asia and the entire Western world.
Kyrgyzstan’s Akaev and Uzbekistan’s Karimov faced incursions by
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in 1999 and 2000. They and
other regional leaders quickly pledged support in the campaign against
terrorism and seem happy to build closer ties with the United States. But
loosening their grip on power is as unpalatable to them as ever. And if
they saw little reason to fear sanctions or abandonment by Washington
before September 11, they apparently feel even less concern now, with U.S.
troops deployed in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and military and intelli-
gence cooperation developing apace. By the end of 2002, all Central Asian
presidents, except Turkmenistan’s Niyazov had been to the White House
to meet President Bush.
Bush Administration officials deny that the U.S. human rights
agenda has taken a back seat to military and anti-terrorism collabora-
tion. They claim that working together on security facilitates the raising
of human rights issues, more often and with greater success.4 As evidence,
they point to incremental victories, such as Uzbekistan’s registration of an
96 OCHS
independent human rights organization and the sentencing to jail terms

of policemen who had tortured detainees.
Still, regional leaders have not shown any sign that they are ready for
fundamental, systemic changes. On the other hand, indications of grow-
ing ferment abound. Since September 11, opposition and human rights
activists have complained that growing U.S. closeness with Central Asian
governments has emboldened these governments to indulge their repres-
sive instincts with a greater conviction of impunity. Perhaps despairing of
reliable American pressure for reform, opposition groups apparently have
begun to count more on their own endeavors to create societies which
respect human rights. These efforts have had mixed results so far, and the
prospects for reform from below seem bleak.
Kazakhstan
In the early 1990s, Kazakhstan seemed to be building a democratic
state with societal input into decision-making and relative freedom of
speech. Today, President Nursultan Nazarbaev gives every indication of
intending to remain in office for life. He has kept the legislative and ju-
dicial branches well in hand while not permitting any alternative sources
of power to emerge, and turned energy- and resource-rich Kazakhstan
into a virtual family enterprise. Meanwhile, the possibilities for opposi-
tion political activity or speaking one’s mind have narrowed and become
increasingly dangerous.5
With normal politics impossible inside Kazakhstan, an important
locus of opposition activity has gone abroad. Former Prime Minister Ake-
zhan Kazhegeldin, whom Nazarbaev has accused of corruption and who
cannot safely return home, has led a campaign of international lobbying,
providing information about Nazarbaev’s regime to Western governments
and anyone willing to listen. These efforts have helped publicize alleged
corruption, which Nazarbaev has sought to stifle inside Kazakhstan
through control of the media.
In late 2001, Nazarbaev faced several new threats, including an open
rupture with his powerful son-in-law and an attempt to mount an intra-
elite opposition movement. Nazarbaev responded with a crackdown, in
spite of U.S. government calls for political liberalization in Central Asia.
He quashed all challenges and intensified assaults on the opposition
media, indicating both his concern and his sense of impunity.
Nazarbaev, elected president in 1990 by Kazakhstan’s Supreme So-
viet, confirmed his position in a non-contested election in 1991. In 1995,
he inaugurated a period of presidential rule and convened an Assembly
HUMAN RIGHTS 97
of the People, which extended his tenure until 2000. Official results gave
Nazarbaev 81.7 percent of the vote in the first nominally contested, pre-
term presidential election in January 1999. Because of the exclusion of
would-be candidates, intimidation of voters, and attacks on independent
media, the OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR) refused to send observers. A small reporting mission concluded
that the “election process fell far short” of OSCE standards.
In October 1999, Kazakhstan held elections for parliament’s lower
chamber, in which political parties, for the first time, could submit party
lists for 10 of the 77 seats. Otan (Fatherland), Nazarbaev’s party, came in
first, followed by the opposition Communist Party, the pro-presidential
Civic Party, and the Agrarian Party. In the first round, ODIHR observers
saw some improvements in the legislative framework and lauded the in-
troduction of party list voting, but criticized the second round. Citing fla-
grantly falsified protocols and continued interference by officials, ODIHR
judged that the election fell short of OSCE commitments.
Freedom of association is restricted in Kazakhstan. Opposition
parties, such as the Communist Party and the Republican People’s Party
(RPPK) have been registered and allowed to function, and some of them
have parliamentary representation. But it was only after long delays that
the RPPK registered, as a result of strong OSCE pressure before the Octo-
ber 1999 parliamentary election.
Recent attempts to create new opposition parties, especially the
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK), have been crudely suppressed.
Two DCK leaders are in jail: Mukhtar Ablyazov, former Minister of Power,
Industry, and Trade, and Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, former Governor of
Pavlodar. In July 2002, Ablyazov was sentenced to six years in jail; in Au-
gust of the same year Zhakiyanov received a seven-year term. Nazarbaev
clearly wanted to make an example of them for any other would-be op-
position activists among Kazakhstan’s officials.
On June 25, 2002, Kazakhstan’s parliament raised from 3,000 to
50,000 the number of members needed for party registration and re-
quired parties to have a branch office and at least 7,000 members in each
of Kazakhstan’s regions. The new law likely will lead to the de-registration
of most of the 19 parties currently represented in parliament. The OSCE
Center in Almaty strongly criticized the law for threatening political plu-
ralism, but to little visible effect. Indeed, in recent months the number of
parties has since shrunk to nine and the RPPK is no longer registered.
Freedom of assembly is restricted in Kazakhstan. A March 17, 1995
presidential decree, issued while parliament was disbanded, remains in
98 OCHS
force and limits the ability of citizens to participate in unsanctioned

demonstrations. Gaining permission for such gatherings is difficult, and
authorities have detained or jailed violators. For example, on April 25,
2002, police in Almaty detained 12 members of the RPPK and other op-
position groups to prevent them from picketing a hotel where a govern-
ment-sponsored media conference was taking place. The demonstrators
hoped to publicize the government’s systematic violations of human rights
and media freedoms. They were held for seven hours before being charged
and then put on trial.6
Freedom of speech is highly restricted in Kazakhstan. Dariga Naz-
arbaeva, the president’s daughter, runs Khabar, the main TV station.
Newspapers and TV can report on intra-government discord and low-
level corruption. But stories about Nazarbaev, his family or allegations of
their corruption are likely to result in harassment or worse. In 1996 and
1997, the government began closing down independent TV and radio
stations by manipulating tenders for broadcasting permits. In 1998, the
publisher of Karavan was forced to sell the country’s most popular news-
paper, which is now widely believed to belong to the president’s relatives.
Cruder methods were employed in September 1998, when the offices of
the opposition newspaper 21st Century were firebombed.
As a result of these policies, the opposition press largely has been
silenced. In May 2000, the New York-based Committee to Protect Journal-
ists (CPJ) placed Nazarbaev on its annual list of “Ten Worst Enemies of
the Press.” The head of the OSCE office in Kazakhstan said in June 2002
that independent and opposition media in Kazakhstan face increasing
legal and economic pressures, while national media are concentrated in
the hands of persons close to Nazarbaev.7
In May and June 2002, after official revelations about a secret Swiss
bank account with $1 billion under Nazarbaev’s name, the assault on in-
dependent media intensified. Irina Petrushova, the editor of an opposition
newspaper, found a decapitated dog hung by its paws outside her office.
On a screwdriver driven into its torso was a warning: “There won’t be a
next time.” The Almaty TV station TAN was forced off the air when its
cable was sliced in the middle of the night.8
On August 28, 2002, independent journalist Sergei Duvanov was
severely beaten by three men. He already had been charged with “insulting
the honor and dignity of the president” after writing an internet article
about the international investigation into alleged corruption by Nazarbaev.
On October 27, Duvanov was arrested on charges of raping a teenage girl.
He maintains his innocence and many human rights groups in Kazakhstan
HUMAN RIGHTS 99
and abroad view the charge as politically motivated. If convicted, Duvanov

could face a 10-year jail term. In January 2003, Duvanov—whose case at-
tracted substantial international attention—was sentenced to three and a
half years in jail. Another journalist who published an article on alleged
corruption, Lira Baseitova, suffered the worst of tragedies: her daughter
died in mysterious circumstances while in police custody on June 21,
2002.
Kazakhstan initially permitted fairly unrestricted religious freedom,
but in the mid-1990s the government increasingly sought control over
new religious groups. In 1998, the national security apparatus (KNB),
concerned about Islamic extremism, became more active in the surveil-
lance and deportation of Muslim missionaries. KNB leaders openly stated
that prohibiting the spread of Islamic and Christian “religious extremism”
was a top priority.
Religious groups must register to rent or purchase property, employ
workers, or obtain visas for foreign co-religionists. A new article in the
Administrative Code, introduced in 2001, imposes criminal sanctions on
leaders of groups refusing to register, and local authorities have detained
and beaten leaders of groups which do not. In addition, parliament
introduced a new religion law broadening the government’s ability to
control and monitor religious groups. However, the Constitutional Coun-
cil deemed the draft law unconstitutional in April 2002, and President
Nazarbaev chose not to appeal. While officially the law may not be on the
books, the number of fines and court orders closing down churches of
Baptists who refuse to register steadily has increased.
Kyrgyzstan
Under President Askar Akaev, Kyrgyzstan was long the most demo-
cratic country in Central Asia. Parliament enjoyed some independence,
and while several newspapers which covered high-level corruption were
forced to close, criticism of the government and even of Akaev was pos-
sible. In this relatively liberal atmosphere, civil society blossomed. In
the second half of the 1990s, however, the honeymoon ended. In 1999,
when several politicians announced their intention to run for president,
Akaev’s regime turned toward open repression. Since then, various op-
position leaders have been arrested, co-opted or otherwise removed from
politics, while independent media have come under severe pressure. Both
Kyrgyzstan’s reputation as an oasis of freedom in Central Asia and Akaev’s
democratic image have dissipated.
100 OCHS
In early 2002, pent-up popular discontent erupted after the arrest in

January of a southern legislator, Azimbek Beknazarov, who opposed a bor-
der deal that would cede territory to China. On March 17, police fired on
demonstrators denouncing his imprisonment and six people died. In the
ensuing crisis, thousands of people protested all over the country; Akaev
was forced to dismiss his government in May and agree, in principle, to a
coalition government.
On August 26, Akaev decreed the formation of a Constitutional
Council to redistribute powers among the president, government and
parliament. Kyrgyzstan’s plan to hand over presidential prerogatives to
other branches of government was unique in Central Asia and, if all sides
had acted in good faith, could have served as an important precedent for
neighboring countries. Yet well into 2003, tensions remain as high and
some opposition groups—including several parliamentarians—are deter-
mined to bring down Akaev. To date, Kyrgyzstan remains the only country
in Central Asia where civil society is powerful enough to pose a possible
threat to the president.
In a snap presidential election held in December 1995, two would-
be candidates were disqualified shortly before the vote. By the late 1990s,
Akaev faced more serious challengers, especially from Felix Kulov, leader
of the Ar-Namys (Honor) party, who had been Vice President, Minister of
National Security, Governor of Chu oblast and Mayor of Bishkek. Another
contender was entrepreneur and independent parliamentarian Danyar
Usenov, who headed the El Bei Bechara or Party of Poor People.
In the February-March 2000 parliamentary election, the authorities
barred three of four opposition parties. They excluded Usenov from run-
ning in the second round and ensured Kulov’s defeat; the ODIHR explic-
itly concluded that he had been robbed of victory. On March 22, 2000, the
Ministry of National Security arrested Kulov for alleged abuse of power
while he was Minister of National Security. He has since been sentenced
to a 10-year jail term and is considered a political prisoner by Amnesty
International and other human rights groups.
With his leading rivals jailed or out of the race, Akaev won easy re-
election in the October 2000 election. Despite rumors that he would hold
a referendum to extend his tenure from five years to seven, in August 2001
Akaev denied any such intentions and has not done so.
In May 2002, the CPJ listed Kyrgyzstan among the world’s 10
worst places to be a journalist. Newspapers critical of the government
have been crippled by slander lawsuits. Such publications include Asaba,
which has resumed publication with a new editor. After the editorial
HUMAN RIGHTS 101
offices of Vecherniy (Evening) Bishkek were occupied by the militia in

1999 and the chief editor forced out; it reportedly now is run by Akaev’s
relatives.
In 1995, chief editor Zamira Sydykova of the opposition newspaper
Res Publica received a suspended sentence for libel and was banned for 18
months from working as a journalist. She was jailed again in 1997 for libel
and Amnesty International condemned her sentence. Res Publica most re-
cently had to pay $2,700 in fines for allegedly having offended a claimant’s
“honour and dignity.” The paper was not published from January to May
2002, until it paid the fine.
Freedom of assembly has been restricted in Kyrgyzstan. Hina Jilani,
the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General on Human Rights
Defenders, said in summer 2001 that “the right to denounce and protest
human rights violations has been repressed . . . and that freedom of assem-
bly and freedom of association, though guaranteed by the Constitution,
are frequently violated in practice.” In 2002, however, large crowds dem-
onstrated throughout the country, particularly in the south. The January
arrest of parliamentarian Azimbek Beknazarov mobilized thousands of
protesters who blocked the country’s main highway. They demanded the
release of Beknazarov (which was done on May 19); the resignation of
Akaev; the rescinding of the border accord with China; and the punish-
ment of officials responsible for the March 17 shootings.
In September 2002, the opposition again organized a large protest
movement which aimed to descend on Bishkek and force Akaev out.
Another bloody confrontation seemed likely, with unpredictable conse-
quences. On September 12, however, both sides blinked: the marchers dis-
persed after the authorities promised to punish those responsible for the
Aksy shootings by November 15. Afterwards, the authorities became more
adept at managing demonstrations, which for the most part have ceased.
More than 30 political parties now are registered in Kyrgyzstan. Four
opposition political parties—Ar-Namys, Ata-Meken, El and the People
parties—have united to form the Peoples Congress. The imprisoned Felix
Kulov was elected chairman of the movement.
Kyrgyz authorities have targeted non-government organizations
(NGOs) critical of the government, especially the Kyrgyz Human Rights
Committee, headed by Ramazan Dyryldaev. The Committee was de-regis-
tered in 1995 and 1998 and its members have regularly experienced harass-
ment; about fifteen have been arrested at various times. In July 2000, the
authorities occupied the Committee’s offices, which they sealed, effectively
shutting down the NGO. Dyryldaev, in Vienna at the time, remained there,
102 OCHS
fearful of arrest. He returned to Kyrgyzstan only in May 2002, accom-

panying Gerard Stoudmann, Director of the ODIHR, and continues his
political activity. Still, several of Dyryldaev’s associates have been beaten
by police. With large-scale demonstrations almost a daily occurrence in
2002, NGO leaders, especially those with oppositionist leanings, have been
singled out for criticism in the government-controlled media.
Kyrgyzstan has enjoyed a degree of religious freedom since inde-
pendence, although recent government actions are troubling. The State
Commission on Religious Affairs, created in 1996, oversees registration
of religious groups and is charged with protecting freedom of conscience.
However, under a 1997 presidential decree, all religious communities
now must register with the Ministry of Justice. While many Muslim and
Christian religious communities have registered successfully, the govern-
ment repeatedly has turned down the Catholic Church, whose members
are mainly ethnic Kyrgyz.9 In addition, the registration of new churches
has slowed, as the government fears creating religious-based conflicts in
rural areas.
Due to security concerns about Islamic extremists, the government
has intensified its surveillance of mosques throughout the country. In 2002,
the government also issued a decree tightening publishing regulations for
religious groups and called for an “audit,” which would affect Muslim and
Christian groups equally.10 Work is underway on a new religion law. Input
from an OSCE/ODIHR Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief
is expected to try to safeguard religious rights.11
Tajikistan
Tajikistan is the only country in Central Asia that has endured a civil
war. After the September 1991 declaration of independence, the United
Tajik Opposition (UTO), a cluster of nationalist and Islamic groups, took
up arms against the Russian-backed Popular Front led by Imomali Rahk-
monov and elites from the southern Kulyab province. The conflict turned
into a struggle between secularists and Islamists, leading to the death of
at least 50,000 people, the displacement of some 800,000 and widespread
economic devastation.
War weariness and military stalemate brought about the June 1997
accord ending the hostilities. In return for disarming which occurred by
1999, the opposition was to receive 30 percent of government posts until
parliamentary elections in 2000 and, in fact, UTO members have been
given government posts at national and local levels. Thus, Tajikistan is the
only Central Asian country where the government has formally reached an
HUMAN RIGHTS 103
agreement with the opposition about nominal power sharing, and where a
legal Islamic political party may function openly.
While Rahkmonov largely has consolidated power and controls the
countryside, former guerillas still hold sway in some areas, undermining
overall stability. Several high-ranking officials have been assassinated,
including a deputy interior minister, a former UTO political representa-
tive, a peace accords negotiator, a presidential foreign policy advisor, and
a Minister of Culture. Democratic institutions and rule of law remain
weak; most of the population is impoverished and the rebuilding of
dysfunctional institutions has been slow. Drug use has risen sharply, and
the country is a major transit points for narcotics. Moreover, the return
of Islamist fighters from Afghanistan has raised concern about religious
extremism. Tajikistan’s prospects hinge on whether, in this unpromising
environment, the government can build democratic institutions, combat
rampant corruption and develop the economy.
Tajikistan’s record on elections is poor. Rahkmonov became presi-
dent in November 1994, subsequently extending his five-year term to
seven. The OSCE declined to monitor the 1995 parliamentary elections,
which the UTO refused to recognize while continuing its armed rebellion.
In the November 1999 presidential elections, Rahkmonov ran alone: two
candidates were excluded a month before the election, while Two oth-
ers withdrew in protest. An Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) candidate
was registered just before election day. On election eve, Rahkmonov and
Abdullah Nuri, former UTO leader and now head of the IRP, agreed to
hold fair, multiparty elections the following year to make up for the flawed
presidential race.
But the February-March 2000 elections were preceded by violence,
including bomb blasts in Dushanbe. A joint OSCE-UN mission cited
many irregularities, concluding the election fell far short of OSCE stan-
dards. Still, six parties fielded candidates, giving voters some choice. The
balloting itself was peaceful; all parties received free air-time on state
media, and all candidates were permitted to hold rallies. Official tallies
gave the ruling PDP about 65 percent, the Communist Party 23 percent,
and the IRP 7 percent. By breaking the 5 percent threshold, the opposition
was given two seats in parliament.
Though conditions for journalists have improved markedly since
the civil war, the state controls many of the publishing and media outlets.
The government offers “friendly advice” to reporters about content, and
the State Committee on Television and Radio controls the issuing of li-
censes—which are expensive and require long waits. As a result, journalists
104 OCHS
often exercise self-censorship. The government also maintains financial

control by subsidizing nearly all publications and electronic facilities, as
well as the country’s only publishing house. Still, the IRP maintains its
own independent printing press.
Asia-Plus, an independent Tajik news agency, began broadcasting in
September 2002, making it the capital’s first non-governmental source of
information. Asia-Plus originally sought a license in 1998; its application
was rejected in July 2002. President Rahkmonov, under international pres-
sure, had to intervene to reverse the decision. Dushanbe remains without
an independent television station, although independent stations do oper-
ate in other cities, particularly in the relatively liberal northern region of
Soghd. In August 2002, TV Servis was granted a license to rebroadcast 12
foreign television channels in Dushanbe.
Journalists who offend the government or powerful individuals risk
arrests, beatings or worse. In May 2000, Saifullo Rahimov, the director of
the state radio and television, was murdered. Saifadin Dostiev, correspon-
dent of the Tajik-language service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
(RFE/RL), was badly beaten the same month. However, Internews reported
no beatings of journalists in 2002, and in July of the same year, charges
were dropped against Dodojon Atovulloyev, exiled editor of Charoghi Ruz,
which often had been critical of the government.
Freedom of assembly is limited in Tajikistan. NGOs and political
groups must obtain permits from local authorities to demonstrate; dem-
onstrations are rare and participants normally do not face reprisal. Per-
mits for political rallies, however, are more difficult to obtain than those
for NGO-related events. In May 2001, local Kulyab authorities obstructed
an IRP meeting and briefly detained two members. The authorities
strictly-controlled political demonstrations prior to the 1999 presidential
elections.
Five political parties are registered in Tajikistan. Rahkmonov’s Peo-
ple’s Democratic Party is dominant; the leading opposition party is the
IRP, which no longer calls for an Islamic state but rather a society in which
“Muslims would be accorded a fitting place.” The IRP was registered in
September 1999 following the reversal of a law prohibiting parties based
on religious affiliation. Some IRP members occupy senior government
posts (including Minister of Emergency Situations, Deputy Prime Minis-
ter, and most other deputy ministerial posts), and its members hold local
positions as well.
Registration of political parties can be an arduous process. In sev-
eral cases, applications were denied on technicalities, such as “insufficient
HUMAN RIGHTS 105
membership,” or for unknown reasons. Six parties were banned in 1999

alone, as was the Adolatkhoh (Justice) Party last year in two oblasts. More-
over, the government has “made politically motivated arrests, and there
were credible allegations of cases of illegal government detention of rival
political factions.”12
The NGO community is fairly active in Tajikistan; officials estimate
some 2000 are operating. Freedom House (2002) reports that the govern-
ment generally does not interfere in their operations, and that “groups
that do not officially register are not necessarily illegal.” Advocacy by Tajik
NGOs yielded Resolution 132, which slashed registration fees for com-
munity organizations and national-level NGOs. The number of registered
NGOs dramatically increased in 2001: 320 NGOs were registered that year
alone, a 35 percent increase from the previous year.
Though the Islamic party is legal and its representatives are in gov-
ernment, mosques and religious schools must be approved by the religious
authorities (muftiate). Tajik authorities required all mosques to re-register
two years ago, resulting in the closure of smaller and more radical ones,
and religious schools had to submit their curricula to authorities. In an
unpopular move, Tajik authorities also outlawed the use of loudspeak-
ers for call to prayer in large cities. Although members of Hizb ut-Tahrir,
whose explicit goal is the non-violent restoration of the Caliphate, have
been arrested in Tajikistan, the number of arrests is much smaller than in
neighboring Uzbekistan, and trials appear to be more open.
Christian groups that do not comply with registration procedures
have faced petty harassment, and others have had their applications turned
down. In late 2001, three Christian churches were bombed. In one of these
cases, Islamic extremists reportedly were involved; in the other two, three
persons were accused and one escaped. Baha’i and Hare Krishna groups
have experienced some instances of discrimination; in 1999, Abdullah
Mugharebi, a prominent Baha’i leader, was murdered.
Turkmenistan
President Saparmurat Niyazov has created a near-totalitarian political
system and one of the world’s most repressive regimes. He has not allowed
alternative leaders, political parties, or movements to emerge and has
maintained Soviet-style controls on a fearful populace. A defining feature
of Niyazov’s political system is his cult of personality. He renamed himself
Turkmenbashi “father of the Turkmen” and calls himself “The Great.” In
2002, Niyazov released the Rukhnama, a book of his teachings that citizens
must study, and he appears intent on displacing other sources of historical
106 OCHS
information and spirituality.13 In August 2002, he renamed the months of

the year, reserving two for himself and his deceased mother.
In November 2001, former Foreign Minister Boris Shikmuradov
resigned from the government, fled the country, and declared his opposi-
tion to Niyazov. His move sparked other defections and marked the first
time that a group of former high-ranking officials publicly declared their
intention to topple Niyazov and formed a movement in exile to do so. Ni-
yazov responded by purging the security apparatus—hitherto seen as his
staunchest prop—and the military.
On November 25, 2002, official Turkmen sources reported an as-
sassination attempt on Niyazov. Opposition representatives disclaimed
any involvement and accused Niyazov of staging an attack to justify the
mass arrests which followed. According to opposition and independent
sources, scores of people, especially relatives of opposition leaders, have
been jailed and tortured. Some, including Boris Shikmuradov, who was
either captured or turned himself in at the end of December, have already
confessed on television. At least two of those sentenced reportedly have
died in prison.
Saparmurat Niyazov has never demonstrated the slightest inclina-
tion to loosen his control of Turkmen society, to rethink his views or to
regard seriously his OSCE human rights commitments. There is no reason
to expect any liberalization in Turkmenistan while he is in power or to
believe that he will leave office voluntarily.
All elections in Turkmenistan have been farces. Races were uncon-
tested in the December 1994 parliamentary election, and official figures
claimed 99.8 percent turnout. Though seats were nominally contested in
the December 1999 parliamentary elections, the ODIHR declined to send
observers, concluding that the pre-election process “does not meet mini-
mal OSCE commitments for democratic elections.”
Saparmurat Niyazov was the first Central Asian leader to cancel elec-
tions. In January 1994, he organized a referendum to extend his tenure in
office until 2002; according to official results, 99.9 percent of the electorate
cast ballots, and 99.99 percent of voters approved the initiative. In Decem-
ber 1999, the Halq Maslakhaty (People’s Council), ostensibly the country’s
highest representative body but actually a rubber stamp for Niyazov, gave
him the right to remain in office permanently. His virtual coronation as
“president for life” flagrantly flouts OSCE commitments, which call for
regular and competitive elections. Niyazov has since announced that he
will remain in office until 2010, when contested presidential elections will
be held.
HUMAN RIGHTS 107
There is no freedom of speech in Turkmenistan. All media are rig-

orously censored and glorify Niyazov. In May 2002, Freimut Duve, the
OSCE’s Representative on the Media, offered the following assessment to
the OSCE’s Permanent Council: “Turkmenistan . . . is the only member of
the OSCE where currently media freedom . . . is non-existent . . . the no-
tion of freedom of the media has not undergone any real changes since the
days of the Soviet regime.” On December 12, Duve said, “In this ‘declared
democracy’ the media are currently being used to humiliate and terrorise
anybody who is even remotely contemplating the legitimacy of the current
state of affairs. Some of the television programmes I have been informed
about remind me of the show trials on Soviet radio and in the newspapers
during the thirties.”
Freedom of association is forbidden in Turkmenistan, the only re-
maining one-party state in the former Soviet bloc. The Democratic Party
is the sole registered party. No opposition groups were ever registered and
none are allowed to function today. In May 2002, Niyazov said, “Turk-
menistan will get a multiparty system and an opposition in time, but it
has had more important things to do since independence, such as ensuring
that the people’s living standards don’t plummet.” In fact, living standards
have plummeted for the great majority of the population.
According to independent sources, there are about 500 NGOs in
Turkmenistan, of which 60 are registered. However, no new NGOs have
been registered since 1995, nor can NGOs engage in any activity that even
hints of political opposition. In June 2002, representatives of various Turk-
men parties and NGOs convened in Vienna. Turkmenistan’s opposition-
in-exile formed a coordinating-consultative body, called the “Roundtable
of the Turkmen democratic opposition.” Members include “Agzibirlik,” the
Russian community of Turkmenistan, the Communist Party, the Social-
Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, the Board of Veterans of the Turkmen
international warriors, the Turkmen diaspora in Afghanistan and Iran, the
National Patriotic Movement of Turkmenistan, the National Democratic
Movement of Turkmenistan, and the popular social movement “Mertebe.”
To date, this body has held meetings and issued statements condemning
ongoing human rights abuses but has not visibly been able to undermine
Niyazov’s position.
There is no freedom of assembly in Turkmenistan. The atmosphere
has been so repressive that one rarely even hears of attempts to organize
demonstrations. Nevertheless, RFE/RL reported in April 2002 that protest-
ers gathered outside the building of the Committee for National Security
(KNB) in Ashgabat for the second day to complain about misdeeds by the
108 OCHS
security organs and to demand the punishment of KNB members who

violated the law.14 In August 2002, opponents of Niyazov’s regime report-
edly distributed anti-government leaflets in the main bazaar in Ashgabat.
The most publicized demonstration in Turkmenistan took place in
July 1995, when about 1,000 people marched in Ashgabat and called for
new presidential and parliamentary elections. Subsequently, law enforce-
ment officials described the marchers as “drug addicts” on television, and
several participants remained in jails for years afterwards. They were re-
leased before Niyazov’s 1998 visit to Washington.
Turkmenistan allows no freedom of religion. The 1991 Law on
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, amended in 1995
and 1996, requires religious groups to have 500 adherents in each locality
wishing to register. Unregistered communities may not hold any religious
meeting or proselytize. Individuals caught participating in such meetings
risk monetary fines and criminal sanctions.15
Accordingly, approved religious communities are limited to govern-
ment approved Sunni mosques and Russian Orthodox Churches. Govern-
ment raids against unregistered religious groups are common, often fol-
lowed by arrests and seizures of property. The government even bulldozed
an unregistered Adventist Church in 1999, seized the property, and now
is turning the site into a public park.16 While longtime Baptist prisoner
Shalgeldi Atakov was released in January 2002, several Jehovah’s Witnesses
remain jailed for refusing to swear an oath of loyalty to President Niyazov.
Recently, Turkmen authorities forced a group of Protestants from a small
eastern village to renounce their faith and swear an oath on Niyazov’s
Ruhnama.17
Uzbekistan
Under President Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan is a repressive police
state, where opposition is banned, media are censored, and civil society has
been crippled. Karimov apparently means to remain in power indefinitely
and has manipulated elections for that purpose. None of the five parties
in Uzbekistan’s parliament can even be remotely considered oppositionist.
The courts are tightly controlled, sentencing those accused of political or
religious crimes to long prison terms.
The most populous country of Central Asia, Uzbekistan is also the
state where political Islam has emerged as a threat, particularly in the
form of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which the U.S. Gov-
ernment has classified as a terrorist organization. For the last five years,
Karimov’s regime has been engaged in a virtual war against religious Mus-
HUMAN RIGHTS 109
lims who want to worship outside state-controlled mosques. Uzbek and

international human rights groups estimate that thousands of people have
been jailed; planting of evidence is common, as is torture in prison. Kari-
mov has ignored advice from many sources, including Washington, which
warns that his crackdown only strengthens the radical Islamic dangers he
claims to be combating.
Since the post-September 11 rapprochement with Washington, Kari-
mov has made some gestures: He permitted the registration of an indepen-
dent human rights organization, amnestied prisoners, and most recently,
has claimed that pre-publication censorship has been lifted. In 2002, two
cases were reported of policemen who had tortured detainees receiving jail
terms. On August 29, 2002, Karimov urged “radical” democratic changes,
telling parliament that the country is ready for freedom of the media,
political activity, independent courts, and economic liberalism.18 Based
on past practice, however, there is no reason to expect more than tactical
concessions or to look forward to genuine political reform.
In the December 1991 presidential election, Karimov allowed Mo-
hammad Solih, poet, writer, and leader of the opposition Erk party, to
run. Abdurrahim Polat, leader of the opposition Birlik movement, was
not allowed to register as a candidate. Official figures gave Solih about 12
percent of the vote, in Uzbekistan’s last election with any suspense.
The OSCE refused to send observers to the 1999 parliamentary elec-
tions, in which five pro-government parties participated. In the January
2000 presidential elections, which OSCE also did not monitor, the person
permitted to run against Karimov said he would vote for the incumbent.
Still, Karimov was not content with another five-year term. In January
2002, Uzbekistan held a referendum which extended his tenure in office
from five years to seven.
There is no freedom of assembly in Uzbekistan. Attempts to organize
demonstrations are rare and participants are usually jailed. Still, on April
23, 2002, more than 20 women protesting the torture of their relatives in
prison gathered on a Tashkent street. They were quickly surrounded by
militia and KGB and dragged into waiting buses. This was the second such
attempted demonstration in recent months.19
On August 27, 2002, Uzbek authorities detained Elena Urlaeva and
another woman who were protesting government abuses outside the
Ministry of Justice. The next day, the two were transferred to a psychiatric
hospital for compulsory treatment, including forced administration of
drugs.20
110 OCHS
Freedom of association is not permitted in Uzbekistan. Karimov

created several pro-government parties, perhaps to check the power of
the National Democratic Party (successor to the Communist Party) and
to create a semblance of pluralism. These parties include Adolat (Justice);
Milliy Tiklanish (National Rebirth), and Fidokorlar, apparently Karimov’s
favorite. However, since 1992, the opposition parties Erk and Birlik have
not been able to participate in elections or distribute literature. Erk
spokesmen claim party members are in jail for their political activity and
are tortured; Erk activists not in jail are closely monitored by police. A
September 21, 2002 appeal by the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan
listed eight of its members behind bars.
On April 4, 2002, Karimov said he would meet with opposition mem-
bers in exile who return to Uzbekistan, particularly if they could promote
economic reforms. His invitation extended only to those not involved in
terrorist activities, especially the February 1999 explosions in Tashkent,
and those who do not seek to reestablish the Caliphate, i.e., Hizb-ut-Tahrir.
But there is no reason to expect sanctioned opposition parties soon.
After September 11, Karimov yielded to American pressure on behalf
of independent human rights groups. Before Karimov’s visit to Washing-
ton in March 2002, the Ministry of Justice registered the Independent
Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan, a breakthrough by Uzbek
standards. Other independent human rights groups remain unregistered,
although they do function. The best known is the Human Rights Society
of Uzbekistan. Recently, several more have emerged, including Ezgulik
(Good Deed) and Mazlum (The Oppressed). On May 21, 2002, Ezgulik’s
application for registration was rejected by the Ministry of Justice.
There is no freedom of speech in Uzbekistan. While stories about
low-level corruption may appear, Karimov and his policies are off-limits.
Those who try to print or distribute unsanctioned newspapers or bulle-
tins, such as those associated with Erk or Birlik, risk criminal penalties. Ka-
rimov has himself criticized Uzbekistan’s media, skirting the issue of how
media can develop in such a tightly run political system. On May 10, 2002,
he raised the issue on national TV, acknowledging that, “Despite what is in
our laws . . . we are still far from international standards. The media today
is not the fourth estate that it is in all developed countries.”
Shortly thereafter, Uzbekistan’s chief censor lost his job and on
May 13, for the first time, Uzbek newspapers were published without
censorship. Nevertheless, the Committee to Protect Journalists declared
in Tashkent on June 10 that little has changed, as the authorities “rou-
tinely encourage self-censorship by threatening critical journalists with
HUMAN RIGHTS 111
imprisonment.” The CPJ called for the release from prison of journalists
Mukhammad Bekjonov, Yusuf Rozimurodov, and Majit Abdurahimov.21
Karimov’s commitment to media freedom remains to be demonstrated
and pending the publication of articles critical of government policy
should not be taken seriously.
Uzbekistan’s government claims that Islam has regained its revered
place after 70 years of Soviet atheism and indeed, many new mosques have
been opened. But Karimov has always feared politicized Islam and sought
to control religion. He has some reason to worry, especially about two or-
ganizations that openly challenge the state’s avowedly secular stance—the
IMU and Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Party of Freedom). The IMU, which is linked
to al Qaeda, has pledged to overthrow Karimov, and in 1999 and 2000
staged incursions into Kyrgyzstan with the aim of establishing bases in
Uzbekistan. Hizb-ut-Tahrir, though professedly non-violent, is openly
anti-Semitic and anti-Western.
Accordingly, the Uzbek Government decides who may become an
Imam and what can be preached in mosques.22 Moreover, Imams require
periodic re-approval from the Muftiate, the State’s Committee on Religion
and the National Security Committee. A 1998 law on religion restricts
religious freedom to groups deemed a threat to national security, bans
proselytizing and private religious instruction, and only permits govern-
ment approved clerics to wear religious dress.23 Under 1999 amendments
to the criminal code, individuals attending an unregistered group risk
three to five years in jail for belonging to an “illegal” group. Individuals
caught attending meetings of “banned” religious groups face up to 20
years imprisonment.24
Since the February 1999 explosions in Tashkent, which Karimov
called an assassination attempt and blamed on radical Muslims, thousands
have been jailed for practicing Islam outside of government-regulated
religious institutions, and for their affiliation with unregistered Islamic
organizations. Human Rights Watch has documented more than 800
such cases since 1999; detainees are held in secret, tortured, and denied
access to counsel. At trial, judges ignore allegations of torture—used to
extract confessions—and sentence defendants to as many as twenty years
in prison for possessing or distributing unsanctioned religious literature,
belonging to unofficial religious organizations, or adherence to religious
ideals viewed as hostile to the state.
Christian communities exist in relative peace as long as they do not
attempt to proselytize to indigenous groups not traditionally Christian.
112 OCHS
Still, a Baptist church in a Tashkent suburb has been ordered closed, and
Jehovah’s Witnesses have been fined and harassed.
Conclusion
In many aspects, citizens of Central Asian states enjoy less freedom
than they did a decade ago. At that time, opposition movements could
operate, even in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The press was freer in
the early 1990s in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan than in 2002, and political
pluralism had far better prospects. Tajikistan’s unhappy experience would
seem to indicate that only violence can bring the region’s governments and
opposition to terms.
Unfortunately, one cannot project with any confidence the develop-
ment of democratic societies in Central Asia from today’s trends. More
likely outcomes are variations of “strongman” regimes, where leaders-for-
life control their country’s economic assets, while they and lower-level of-
ficials keep the press from informing the public about their misdeeds.
But the absence of even the possibility of normal politics leads to
abnormal politics. The refusal of Central Asian leaders to allow turnover
at the top or permit newcomers to enter the game means that outsiders
have no stake in the political process and can imagine coming to power,
or merely sharing in the wealth, only by extra-constitutional methods.
Kyrgyzstan’s protest movement in 2002 is one form of the phenomenon;
the recent reported assassination attempt on Turkmenistan’s Saparmurat
Niyazov is another.
Only Kyrgyzstan offers some cause for cautious optimism. Akaev has
pledged not to run for a third term in 2005. His stepping down would be
unprecedented for the region, as would be a sincere, successful transfer
of some of his presidential powers to other branches of government. The
Kyrgyz model would not necessarily apply to neighboring states, whose
leaders disdain Akaev as weak, but a redistribution of powers is a guide-
post for reform. Perhaps more important, the 2002 demonstrations in
Kyrgyzstan were the first large protests in Central Asia in years, indicating
the depth of popular resentment and the capacity for public galvanization.
They also showed Kyrgystan’s leaders, opposition and public, as well as the
entire region, that “street politics” is effective, whereas no other vehicle of
registering popular discontent and influencing government policy works.
The lesson will not soon be forgotten.
HUMAN RIGHTS 113
Notes
1 This article is adapted from Ten Years After, a forthcoming report on the state of democra-
tization and human rights in the twelve states of the Commonwealth of Independent States by the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, U.S. Congress.
2 The organization was called the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
until January 1995.

3 The interested or skeptical reader can test this contention by looking up the reports of the
OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which has monitored elec-
tions in Central Asia for years—except when ODIHR declined because the conditions were too poor
to justify an observation mission.
4 See, for example, the testimony of Assistant Secretaries of State Elizabeth Jones and Lorne
Craner at a Helsinki Commission hearing “U.S. Policy Towards the OSCE,” October 10, 2002.
5 For the best and most recent account, see Martha Olcott, “Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington 2002.

6 RFE/RL Newsline, April 26, 2002.
7 RFE/RL Newsline, June 14, 2002.
8 Peter Baker, “New Repression in Kazakhstan: Journalists Targeted After President Implicated
in Scandal,” The Washington Post, June 10, 2002.

9 International Religious Freedom Report-Kyrgyz Republic, Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, Department of State, 2001.

10 Igor Rotar, “Kyrgyzstan: New Decree Set to Tighten Religious Controls,” Keston News Ser-
vice, February 8, 2002.

11 Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion and Belief of the OSCE/ODIHR, Analy-
sis of the Draft Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On Freedom of Religion and Religious Organizations,”
March 30, 2001.
12 U.S. State Dept. Country Report on Human Rights, March 2002.
13 In August 2002, he renamed the months of the year, reserving two for himself and his
deceased mother. Claudia Rosett, “The Real World: Turkmenistan’s Dictator Is No Joke to Those He
Rules,” The Wall Street Journal Europe, August 28, 2002.
14 An RFE/RL correspondent on the scene estimated the group to number 300 the first day,
about 50 the next. Niyazov, in sacking high-ranking members of the KNB, complained the service had
been selling drugs, as well as torturing suspects and raping young women.
15 International Religious Freedom Report-Turkmenistan, Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, Department of State, 2001.

16 Ibid.
17 Felix Corley, “Turkmenistan: Protestants Forced to Renounce Their Faith,” Keston News
Service, May 17, 2002.

18 The Washington Post, August 30, 2002
19 Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, April 25, 2002.
20 Human Rights Watch, “Uzbek Rights Defender in Psychiatric Detention,” August 30, 2002.
21 Khabar Television, Almaty, June 11, 2002. RFE/RL Newsline, June 12, 2002.
22 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1993-Uzbekistan, Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, Department of State, (1994). Igor Rotar, “Special Report - Uzbekistan:
Muslim Clergy Under State Control,” Keston News Service, April 23, 2002.
23 International Religious Freedom Report-Uzbekistan, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor, Department of State, 2001.

24 Ibid.
114 OCHS
DEMOCRACY-BUILDING 115
Chapter 6
Democracy-Building
in Central Asia
Post-September 11
Sylvia W. Babus
C
entral Asia is back on the map of U.S. foreign policy. After the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the five
“stans” of Central Asia became “frontline states” in the global war
on terrorism, with important roles to play as strategic partners in military
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Budgets for assistance funds soared.
The bulk of the new funds paid for military equipment, training, and vari-
ous forms of counter-terrorism programs. However, the heightened U.S.
interest in closer strategic relationships with these states also was matched
by renewed enthusiasm—and more money—for promoting democratic
political development. In fact, the Bush administration’s new conceptual
framework for national security strategy and foreign aid offered strong
reasons to build democracy in Central Asia.
This chapter will examine the scope and character of the democracy-
promoting re-engagement in Central Asia. How much are we spending
on such assistance, and what part does it play in our relationships with
these states now? What kind of democracy promotion do we support, and
how has our assistance changed over time? How does democracy promo-
tion in Central Asia fit into the Bush administration’s plans for national
security and foreign aid? Specifically, how has our assistance changed since
September 11? Is our assistance worthwhile? Despite the persistence of
obstacles in the Central Asian environment, and despite some fundamen-
tal contradictions and tensions in the U.S. policy formulations, optimism
persists about the value and long-term promise of such assistance.
Foreign assistance practitioners are cheering America’s renewed
interest in Central Asia and are eagerly expanding established democracy-
building assistance activities — or designing new ones. Some of these
115
116 BABUS
initiatives are exciting, and all of them promise to enlarge the political
space for political reform. However, all parties recognize that the room
to maneuver is still extremely limited. None of the sitting governments
appear ready to warm up to democracy just because the United States
believes that repressive regimes produce discontent and potential terrorist
recruits.
While some have charged that strategic-level alliances with today’s
undemocratic strongmen in Central Asia ruin the chances for meaning-
ful democracy promotion, this charge seems overdone. The path toward
democracy in Central Asia was rough and steep well before September 11,
and the follow-on U.S. rush to embrace these governments as partners in
the war on terror. Most of those who are implementing America’s democ-
racy-promoting assistance projects in Central Asia are both realistic and
sophisticated about what can be accomplished. There is no reason to reject
their faith that a prominent U.S. presence, coupled with greater visibility
for Central Asia and attention to its societies, can enhance the possibilities
for successful small steps forward in the coming years.
The Assistance Surprise: Suddenly, Close Ties with

Central Asia
The Central Asian states did not take long to decide to support the
U.S. war on terrorism, or the U.S. military action against the Taliban in Af-
ghanistan.1 By the end of September 2001, Russia had offered its support
for a U.S. military presence in Central Asia, and all five states had offered
use of their airspace, airports, roads, or bases in return for various forms
of assistance. Agreements, memoranda, and joint declarations conveying
these understandings were the subject of a number of high-level visits to
and from the region in 2001 and 2002. In the case of Uzbekistan, a “non-
specific security guarantee” took the form of an American pledge to regard
any external threat to Uzbekistani security “with grave concern.”2
Congress quickly granted President Bush’s request for more money
to pay for expanded cooperation with the Central Asian (and other)
frontline states, through supplemental appropriations in December 2001
and March 2002 that designated nearly $150 million in additional fund-
ing.3 The effect was to quadruple total assistance funds for Uzbekistan,
nearly double funding for the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, while
sizably increasing funds for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Some of the
extra money did supplement assistance activities to support democratic
and economic reform; however, the bulk of the funds were for security-
related purposes. Much of this covered provision of equipment to support
enhanced border security capabilities by ground or airborne forces, com-

munications equipment for interoperability with U.S. forces, as well as
improved counter-narcotics capacity.4 The data for budgeted funds over
the last four years is presented in Table 6–1. The trend in total obligated
assistance funds appears also in Figure 6–1.
Table 6–1. Budgeted Assistance to the Central Asian States, 1999 – 2002
(Millions)
1999 2000 2001 2002
Kazakhstan 74.49 71.04 74.92 86.25
Kyrgyzstan 64.19 50.11 41.60 93.53
Tajikistan 37.63 38.85 72.04 133.41
Turkmenistan 17.78 11.24 12.88 18.86
Uzbekistan 49.34 40.20 58.68 219.35
Data from the summary tables in “U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia, Fiscal Year 2002.” These figures
represent total FSA and agency transfers budgeted, excluding the estimated value for donated commodity humanitarian assistance.
Figure 6–1. USAID Funds for Central Asia, 1996 - 2002

118 BABUS
Figure 6–2. Democracy Promotion as Part of USAID Assistance to the

NIS, 1996-2002*
*NIS refers to the 12 former Soviet republics (excludes the Baltic states); Obligated funds from Agency transfers. Data from USAID and the
Annual Reports of the Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance to Europe and Eurasia.
Just how much more money has been made available to promote
democracy? Figure 6–2 gives a closer look at the trend in the proportion
of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funds obligated
for democracy and governance activities. These funds are not large when
compared with the millions made available for security, military, and law
enforcement, but they still represent an overall increase.6 Moreover, these
funds were shared among a great many kinds of programs, ranging from
activities to promote nuclear safety to medical advice about HIV/AIDS, to
budget training, to student exchanges.7 On the other hand, most democ-
racy promotion activities have been relatively inexpensive. Where other
kinds of assistance provided materials or equipment, democracy promo-
tion generally has emphasized training as well as conferences, seminars
and materials and small grants for citizen groups.
Promoting Democracy While Fighting Terrorism

What is the role of democracy promotion assistance in the post-Sep-
tember 11 environment? Has the global war on terrorism swept aside the
old dream of democratic transformation in the former Soviet republics?
Strategic partnerships with the decidedly undemocratic governments

of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan cer-
tainly pose risks. Human rights groups quickly questioned the wisdom of
closer ties to these states.8 Despite widespread agreement that the United
States would need the broadest possible set of cooperative partners to
exterminate the kind of terrorism that had so brutally attacked the U.S.
homeland, the five Central Asian states were not attractive partners. In the
words of one observer:
Courting these ex-Soviet republics has obliged the administration to
cozy up to unsavory autocrats hitherto known chiefly for economic
mismanagement, a contempt for democracy and human rights, and
a single-minded determination to retain their hold on power by
whatever means necessary . . . Freedom of religion does not exist, but
then neither do most other freedoms, as the State Department’s own
annual report on human rights demonstrates.9
Another critic pointed out that these states could try to exploit the
partnership to avoid political and economic reform:
Clearly, these governments will wish to use the U.S. need for access
to their territory to slacken pressure on them with regard to political
and economic reform. Worse, aid money provided to autocratic gov-
ernments may exacerbate corruption making better governance more
difficult instead of less. They will also try to leverage their relationship
with the United States in their regional rivalries with each other. And
of course, the United States risks being associated with unpopular
regimes in the eyes of the peoples of these countries, and suffering
when those regimes eventually fall.10
From the outset, however, the Bush administration voiced their po-
sition that any partnership with these Central Asian governments would
require the states to declare their commitment to democracy and market
economies. Congress, too, wanted to ensure that the new security rela-
tionships would not eclipse U.S. support for democratic values. Proposed
amendments to the legislation authorizing extra funding to the “frontline
states” linked the new money to satisfactory human rights performance.
There were no illusions: Everyone recognized that the Central Asian re-
gimes were politically unsavory, and that it would be unwise—not to men-
tion politically unacceptable—to neglect concerns about democracy and
human rights when dealing with countries like the “Stans.”
120 BABUS
In every instance, agreements with the Central Asian states included

provisions that renewed or confirmed their pledges to advance the reform
agenda, both politically and economically. The U.S. side also affirmed its
plans to continue efforts to promote democracy through foreign assistance
to Central Asia, right along with heavy funding to re-equip and train
military and security forces. While the increases in funding for democracy
promotion are dwarfed by those for military and security assistance, more
money for democracy really has been made available.
Fallow Ground: The Record of Democracy Promotion

Prior to September 11
Initial efforts in the 1990s to promote democratic development in
Central Asia did build contacts with reformers, exposed thousands to
Western ideas, and helped local people experience the power of organized
citizenry. However, the overall impact of the efforts by the United States
and others was limited, given the authoritarian styles of the region’s firmly
entrenched leaders. While not identical, all the Central Asian regimes to
some extent restricted speech, limited citizen action, avoided competitive
elections, stifled dissent, and suppressed or harassed potential opposition.
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also resisted the emergence of markets and
entrepreneurs, perhaps fearing the political consequences of a restructured
economy they could not control. This restrictive environment retarded the
emergence of local reformers, and limited the possibilities for democracy
promotion by outsiders.
The bleak outlook for democracy promotion in Central Asia
prompted a reorientation of assistance strategy. A five-year assistance
strategy for Central Asia prepared by USAID in 2000 lamented the “over-
all lack of reform across the region.”11 Noting that the Eastern European
model of a “rapid, structural transition to open market democracy is not
appropriate for the Asian republics,” this new strategy called for a shift to a
longer-term approach that would build pressure for change by expanding
opportunities for citizen participation. That is, USAID would “concentrate
assistance on selected organizations, enterprise and people at local levels to
grow dialogue, pluralism, the non-governmental sector, and partnership
to build common good and mutual interest in stable change.”12 In other
words, USAID adopted a “democracy from below” approach, emphasizing
indirect efforts to support a “more open, democratic culture, with em-
phasis on nongovernmental organizations, independent information and
electronic media, and progressive parliamentarians.”13
What had gone wrong? Primarily, it was anti-democratic behavior

by governments. Each of the five Central Asian states provided some rea-
son for disappointment. The bad news included Kyrgyzstan,14 which had
seemed to be a success story for democracy promotion in Central Asia
because of its “progressive leadership, vocal commitment to democracy
and a market-based economy.”15 However, President Askar Akaev’s moves
in 2001 to harass citizen groups and restrict independent media changed
this assessment.16
Despite its initial pledges to join the world economy and create a
democratic, secular system that would protect citizen rights, Uzbekistan
proved resistant to both political and economic reform. USAID’s 2000
report to Congress complained about the Uzbekistani government’s re-
luctance to introduce broad-based market reforms, and the “serious de-
bilitating effect” of its restrictions on convertibility and access to foreign
currency. “Citizen participation in economic and political life [in Uzbeki-
stan] is limited and ill-informed. Political opposition to the regime is not
tolerated, and the upcoming elections are not expected to meet interna-
tional standards.”17 A more recent report charged that Uzbekistan’s leader-
ship “remains entrenched in a closed and stagnant political and economic
system . . . Citizens remain poorly informed and their participation in
economic and political life restricted. Political opposition is not tolerated
and interference with the independent media persists.”18
Kazakhstan, often praised for its economic reforms, began to draw
criticism for its political shortcomings. Unfair presidential elections,
crackdowns on the media, and restrictions of freedom of assembly pro-
voked a complaint in USAID’s FY 2000 Congressional budget presentation
that despite some “great strides” in civil society, “hoped-for changes have
not occurred at the national level.”19
Very little serious democracy promotion could occur in Tajikistan
until the civil war had ended and recovery was underway. A political settle-
ment in 1997 eventually brought the opposition into the national political
process and created important openings for U.S. assistance directed at
democracy building. However, this was a late start, and the subsequent
American assistance program was quite small.
Turkmenistan, with a government uninterested in change, was clearly
the most difficult case. As USAID’s FY 2001 program summary noted, “the
Government of Turkmenistan has not yet made a demonstrable commit-
ment to democratic and economic reform. Turkmenistan remains a reso-
lute one-party state with power vested in a communist-turned-nationalist
leadership.”20
122 BABUS
These developments clearly showed that democracy promotion in

Central Asia would be working, in practice, against governments. This
seemed to make any real progress toward democracy building in this re-
gion part of a fundamentally political equation: Would the United States
(and other democracy-promoting governments) be ready to pressure the
governments of this region to tolerate and accept such programs? And
how receptive would the Central Asian governments be to such pressures?
Would further progress depend on unlikely political shifts within these
states?
Just two months before the September 11 attacks, Michael Parmly of
the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
outlined a rather depressing state of affairs in testimony on Central Asia
before hearings on the Hill. While he indicated the United States would
not give up its efforts to support the emergence of democracy in this re-
gion, his statement left little room for hope so long as the current Central
Asian governments remained in power. Parmly’s statement on July 28,
2001 is worth quoting at length:
The overarching goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia is to see these
states develop into stable, free-market democracies, both as a goal in
itself and as a bulwark against regional instability and conflict. This
broader goal serves three core strategic interests: regional security,
political/economic reform and energy development. While our secu-
rity and energy interests are important, in the long run none of these
goals can be achieved until these governments undertake compre-
hensive reforms to enfranchise their people both economically and
politically. . . .
We have therefore encouraged, both through across-the-board politi-
cal engagement and a variety of assistance programs, the formation
of democratic civil societies and the development of free-market
economies . . . In some countries, there has been progress on eco-
nomic reform. However, despite such efforts, progress towards de-
mocracy has been uneven at best, while in places like Turkmenistan,
it is almost non-existent. Even more disturbing, however, has been
the varying degrees of backsliding in countries like Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan . . . Political accountability, particularly as embodied by
national elections, is the most obvious and well-monitored aspect of
democracy. In this area, the Central Asian republics have performed
abysmally . . . .
Unfortunately, our efforts to promote democracy and respect for

human rights in Central Asia have not been enough. Indeed, these
governments seem to be giving up on the reality of democracy
(though they cling to the rhetoric). As a result, we have altered our
approach. Democracy and human rights issues take up more of the
agenda in our bilateral discussion . . . In addition we have reoriented
our assistance programs to these states, shifting our democracy,
economic and humanitarian assistance more toward direct grants to
local communities or via local NGOs [non-governmental organiza-
tions], and rely less on government to government aid.21
Ambassador William Taylor, then serving as the U.S. Coordinator
for U.S. Assistance to the New Independent States,22 also appeared at
these hearings. He raised the practical problem associated with the factors
Parmly had described: “What can the United States do to help the people
of Central Asia create democratic societies, given the fact that their gov-
ernments are standing in the way of reform?”23 This constraint, he said,
explained why our democracy programs in Central Asia are “targeted
almost exclusively at the non-governmental sector, with the exception of a
few programs that work with reform-oriented local governments.” He also
noted the importance of support for local independent media outlets and
praised the popular academic and professional exchanges that were expos-
ing so many of Central Asia’s young generation to the West.
Based on testimony by Ambassador Taylor and other regional ex-
perts, U.S. assistance providers had lowered their expectations for demo-
cratic change in Central Asia well before September 11, and shifted gears to
longer-range strategies. This might be described as “democracy promotion
from below,” but how bold would such a strategy be? Whatever assump-
tions one makes about U.S. capabilities and resources, no foreign govern-
ment can force change on an unwilling society. Even where groups and
individuals in a foreign state are receptive or even eager for democratic
change, official U.S. assistance programs to support them can only oper-
ate by agreement with the host government. Such governments may resist,
inhibit, or forbid efforts to enhance civil society and empower citizens at
the grass roots.24 How far would the U.S. government be willing to go, and
how successful would its attempts to carry out democracy building be?
Long-time democracy assistance providers have reacted differently
to the range of options available. Some of them have objected strenuously
to any suggestion that the United States “give up” by limiting support for
pro-democracy forces in undemocratic countries. Everyone seems to sup-
124 BABUS
port educational exchanges that may prepare more pro-democratic future

generations, and sing the praises of support for the emergence of civil
society in former socialist states.25 But for those impatient to see progress,
educational exchanges and efforts to promote cultural change are not
enough. The poor prospects for indigenous democratic reform in Central
Asia brought new attention to the foreign policy priorities that would be
set by the new U.S. administration under President George W. Bush.
The Bush Administration Reframes Assistance Policies

The conceptual framework behind the Bush administration’s new
National Security Strategy, and a fresh approach to foreign assistance, give
democratic values a prominent place. However, the new concepts have
produced some still-unresolved tensions between national security and
democracy promotion activities in Central Asia.
USAID, under its new Administrator Andrew Natsios, had already
begun to redefine foreign assistance in ways that would emphasize per-
formance, accountability, and cost-effectiveness. Essentially, this new ap-
proach stressed that assistance designed to support democratic develop-
ment and market reforms would be wasted if it were given to governments
unable or unwilling to pursue reforms. Early in 2002, USAID released a
commissioned study26 that buttressed these ideas by examining the ac-
cumulated experience of development assistance. This work attributed
some of the failures of development assistance to faults of the recipient
states themselves, noting that those performing most poorly had failed
to achieve either democracy or good governance. Accordingly, the report
offered five suggestions for promoting—and rewarding—political will to
reform:
■ Levels of foreign assistance must be more clearly tied to develop-
ment performance, and to demonstrations of political will for
reform and good governance.
■ Good performers must be tangibly rewarded.
■ If there is no political commitment to democratic and governance
reforms, the United States should suspend government assistance
and work only with nongovernmental actors.
■ The United States should use its voice, vote and full influence
within the World Bank and other multilateral development banks
to terminate development assistance to bad governments and to
focus on countries with reasonably good governance.
■ The United States must work closer with other bilateral doors to
coordinate pressure on bad, recalcitrant governments.27
This analysis also reflected impatience with undemocratic, nonre-

forming governments:
Only if governance becomes more democratic and accountable will
development occur in the poorly performing countries. And only
with a comprehensive, consistent, ‘tough love’ approach from the
international community is political will for governance reform likely
to emerge and to be sustained . . . Political leaders must learn that
they will pay a heavy international price for bad governance, forfeit-
ing material resources and becoming more isolated diplomatically . . .
Strategies for promoting democracy and good governance must focus
relentlessly on generating and sustaining political will for systemic
reform, with diplomacy and aid working hand in hand.28
President Bush incorporated the key elements of this incentive- and
performance-based concept of foreign assistance in his proposal for a
Millenium Challenge Account (MCA), announced in March 2002. His
plan proposed a $5 billion annual increase in assistance to developing
countries with the funds intended to support development projects by
poor countries that have enacted sound policies and achieved some mea-
surable progress. A key element of the MCA is the plan to fund projects
proposed by developing countries themselves.29 Congress has accepted this
program, but at much lower levels of initial funding. Considerable con-
troversy remains over how to identify qualifying countries and administer
the assistance. Despite tough talk about the need to promote political will
for democratic development, the overall approach of the MCA makes it
inapplicable to the Central Asian states. Instead, the MCA is directed at
reducing poverty more efficiently by working with reform governments
in very poor states.30
But while a shift toward a “tougher” development assistance strategy
seemed at odds with the new funding commitment to the Central Asian
states, the Bush administration’s strategy for dealing with terrorist threats
appeared consistent with it. The National Security Strategy issued in Sep-
tember 2002 noted, “poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make
weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels.”31 Repression
also makes states vulnerable to terrorists. Hence, democratic reform—and
efforts by foreign allies and supporters to promote democratic reform—
offer an antidote to the growth of terrorism. Democratic reforms are ex-
pected to promote good governance and improve prospects for prosperity,
while also defusing unrest by assuring all citizens a voice and improving
the prospects for justice. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Lynn Pascoe
126 BABUS
in testimony to Congress on U.S. policy toward Central Asia made a prac-

tical link to assistance policy:
Authoritarian governments and largely unreformed economies, we
believe, create the conditions of repression and poverty that could
well become the breeding grounds for further terrorism . . . Thus, not
only do we believe it is strongly in our national interest to engage fully
with these governments to urge the political and economic reforms
that we judge are essential to alleviate the conditions that breed ter-
rorism, but we also firmly believe it is in these countries’ own national
interests. When citizens, and especially youth, feel that they have a
voice in how they are governed, when they believe that they have an
economic stake in the future, then they are less likely to be attracted
to a radicalized path cloaked in Islam that offers a utopian solution
to their discontent. It is extremely difficult to convince Central Asian
leaders that long-term economic and democratic reforms are necessary to
eliminate the roots of terrorism if we are not willing to help them counter
terrorism in the short term and prove that we will be engaged for the long
term. (Italics supplied)32
How Does the United States Promote Democracy in

Central Asia?
Dozens of programs, activities, and projects by many different U.S.
government agencies and departments reflect the great variety of U.S. in-
terests involved in our relationships with these countries. Most offer some
form of technical assistance (advice and training), although a few provide
equipment, and some give commodities, such as medicine, or surplus ag-
ricultural products that can be sold to support a designated purpose. Not
all programs address development: U.S. assistance programs range from
arms control efforts that involve dismantling and destroying weapons and
support for safeguards to prevent the theft of nuclear materials, to train-
ing for public health and law enforcement officials. In contrast to the scale
and costs of many of those programs, democracy-building activities gen-
erally involve relatively low-cost in-country training, advisors, and small-
grants. USAID is the main administrator of such assistance, planning and
monitoring activities it funds primarily through U.S. NGOs or companies
under contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements.33 USAID Missions
abroad oversee implementation of the assistance, and play a critical role in
ensuring that this aid is designed and assessed for results and impact.
Since American assistance began in the wake of the collapse of the

Soviet Union, USAID has modified its strategies, specific assistance objec-
tives, and methods incrementally and often. While it is true that almost any
U.S.-sponsored assistance can be considered to contribute to democratic
development, at least indirectly, USAID has identified several categories
of democracy-promoting assistance that apply in most countries. This is
a long list that can be sorted in various ways. By purpose these activities
promote the rule of law, including fair legal procedures, civil and human
rights, free speech, and independent courts; citizen participation in public
life; democratic political processes, including competent legislatures, com-
petitive elections, political parties; independent media; responsible local
government; independent trade unions; civic education; and civil society.
The activities funded in the Central Asian states present similar pack-
ages, with variations that have reflected the opportunities and constraints
in each society, political and economic circumstances, as well as overall
socio-political conditions as they have evolved. The mix of assistance
activities also has responded to emerging problems, and shifted focus as
experience closed off or opened new areas of concern—or as funding lev-
els rose or fell. This process of adaptation and adjustment is supported by
regular program reviews and reports, as well as by assessments and evalu-
ations contracted in particular activity sectors for specific countries.
Democracy-Promotion Packages Before and After

September 11
The five Central Asian states present different needs and problems.
A closer look at the democracy promotion packages before and after Sep-
tember 11 shows both the similarities and the variations. Turkmenistan,
led by Saparmurat Niyazov, opted for a foreign policy of “positive neutral-
ity,” and remained uninterested in committing to Western-style reform.
Tajikistan suffered civil war and faced recovery, political restructuring,
and the need for reform, all at the same time. Desperately poor Kyrgyzstan
embraced economic, fiscal and trade policy reform, and at first welcomed
assistance that helped strengthen an emerging civil society. Kazakhstan,
with key nuclear and space installations, quickly built solid security rela-
tionships with the West and set out to establish a market economy as well;
however, democratic forms were shoved aside in the rigged elections of
1999. Uzbekistan was blessed with many natural resources, but limited its
economic development options by turning away from Western-sponsored
economic reforms. The Uzbekistani government says it is threatened by
128 BABUS
radical Islam, and uses this threat to justify harsh suppression of political
and religious dissent.
In general, the political environment in all five Central Asian states
has left little room for outsiders to encourage citizen empowerment or
democratic laws and practices. All five governments have been unreceptive
or actively hostile to some forms of democracy-building assistance ac-
tivities, and all these governments stand accused of serious human rights
abuses. According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), none of the elections in the region have met international
standards for fair practices.34 It is not surprising that the array of democ-
racy-promoting assistance activities in each of the Central Asian states
are somewhat similar, reflecting comparable circumstances and limita-
tions as well as some common social features. The array of activities also
reflects USAID’s choices of programs appropriate to the agency’s overall
strategy for promoting democracy in the region. USAID’s shift toward
the non-governmental sector, work with citizens at the grass roots, and
long-range programs, such as student exchanges, affected portfolios in all
five countries.35 By 2001, so little money was being spent on democracy
promotion that even modest funding increases after September 11 meant
doubling the resources for some existing activities, and unexpected fund-
ing for some new initiatives. USAID programming accounted for some
of these increases, but grants issued by the State Department Bureau for
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) funded the most innovative
steps. The DRL grants, made through the Human Rights and Democracy
Fund, have emphasized political party building, training for human and
civil rights advocacy, and support for free and independent media.36
In Uzbekistan, increasing citizen participation in non-governmental
organizations was the chief emphasis through training, small grant pro-
grams, and civil society support centers. Counterpart International, the
Initiative for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia (ISAR) and Winrock
International implemented these activities. Specialized advice on NGO
legislation to help Uzbekistanis secure a better legal climate for citizen
groups was provided by the International Center for Not for Profit Law
(ICNL). USAID also funded Internews, an organization specializing in
media development, to provide support to some independent local tele-
vision stations, and to train journalists, including training on media law
and legal rights. The American Bar Association’s Central and East Euro-
pean Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI) provided modest programs of training
and technical assistance to support legal professionals and help advance
important reform legislation, as well as women’s legal literacy. In view of
Uzbekistan’s persistent failure to follow international standards for free

and fair elections, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems
(IFES) had bypassed technical elections assistance in favor of a civic
education program for high school students, but this had ended before
September 11.
How did this set of activities change after September 11? The activi-
ties underway or in the planning stages today represent a slightly different
mix of old and new.37 In Uzbekistan, the established programs already
underway received additional funding which enabled them to expand
their work to reach more people. Counterpart started a new civic advocacy
program for NGOs, and ABA/CEELI opened the first free human rights
legal clinic at Tashkent’s main law school—to be followed by another in
Namangan. Freedom House began a program to train and support human
rights defenders and opened three resource centers for human rights
NGOs that offer internet access, reference materials, and meeting space.38
Both the National Democratic Institute (NDI)and the International Re-
publican Institute (IRI) received funding to support political party build-
ing through training and seminars. Complementing an extension of an
internet access program to Uzbekistani schools, USAID established a new
program to support basic educational reform. The new money also funded
two information initiatives: one on anti-trafficking, and the other, a new
civic education project for high schools that may start in 2004. The Com-
munity Connections program began taking Uzbekistani professionals and
entrepreneurs to the United States for short-term internships and training.
Another new idea is a Central Asia regional project called the Community
Action Investment Program (CAIP). CAIP works to defuse potential eth-
nic conflict by stimulating multi-ethnic community problem solving. This
project initially targeted communities in the Ferghana valley, a troubled
border region between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan; but also
parts of southern Uzbekistan, Lebap in Turkmenistan, and Shymkent and
Turkestan in Kazakhstan.
In Kazakhstan, democracy promotion included a broad program of
support for civic participation, as well as a set of activities to promote more
effective and accountable local governments. Counterpart International
provided training and grants to NGOs, supported civil society resource
centers, and worked with ICNL and other donors to promote NGO-
friendly legislation. ISAR promoted advocacy and community education
by environmental citizen groups. Internews supported independent media
and trained professional journalists. ABA/CEELI helped build professional
associations of lawyers and judges, encouraged reforms in legal education,
130 BABUS
and assisted those working for an independent judiciary. IFES introduced

and supported a civic education program for high schoolers that spread
widely. The International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) provided
public access internet sites and training. The International City/County
Managers Association implemented activities directed at local government
officials designed to improve their management skills, their commitment
to citizens, and their willingness to include citizen input.
After September 11, all democracy-promoting activities in Kazakh-
stan expanded somewhat. NDI received additional funding to support a
full-time trainer, and thus increased its capacity for training political par-
ties and democratic activists. NDI also expanded its civic advocacy work.
The IRI established a presence and resumed its party-building work. More
money has been allocated to support independent media through help for
the National Association of Broadcasters and a production fund admin-
istered by Internews. Freedom House will be starting a new program of
support for human rights defenders. Assistance to support judicial train-
ing is up, and the new CAIP began its work in ethnically mixed cities near
the border with Uzbekistan. The National Endowment for Democracy
received more money for grants to support public discussion on political
issues.
Kyrgyzstan’s set of democracy promoting assistance activities in-
cluded elements similar to those in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. However,
greater progress in the development of civil society, citizen advocacy, legal
reform, and elected local governments enabled these assistance programs
to have more advanced objectives. Civic organizations had begun to form
social partnerships at the local level, and had demonstrated skill in form-
ing coalitions to advocate for or against proposed legislation on a national
basis. ABA/CEELI’s rule of law program established legal information
centers, and assisted Parliament with the development of a manual on
legislative drafting. The NDI worked closely with a non-partisan national
civic organization, the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, hosted
seminars for political parties, and also conducted programs to support
professional development of the members of Parliament.
New elements in Kyrgyzstan’s democracy promoting assistance ac-
tivities after September 11 included funding for an independent printing
press; a new program in basic education; training and grants through the
National Endowment for Democracy for human rights NGOs; support for
NGO advocacy campaigns; and the region-wide CAIP, designed to reduce
the potential for conflict in ethnically mixed areas. Freedom House has
begun a program to support human rights defenders. Additional funds
meant expanded efforts by existing activities—such as ABA/CEELI’s work

with lawyers and law students, and ARD/Checchi’s commercial law train-
ing, and programs that support independent media. Both the NDI and
the IRI received funding from the State Department’s Human Rights and
Democracy Fund (HRDF) to support work in Kyrgyzstan.39 NDI and IRI
programs work to promote the growth of democratically oriented political
parties and parliamentary factions, foster the development of civil society,
and encourage constructive dialogue between government and opposition
groups. NDI has received additional support for its civic advocacy work,
and its assistance to a dozen civil society resource and information centers.
The Urban Institute’s local government program was reoriented slightly to
stress work with local governments to cultivate a more democratic civic
culture—including support for public hearings.
Funding for Turkmenistan’s democracy promotion assistance was
tiny, even when compared with the budgets for the other Central Asian
states. Assistance designed to promote democratic culture focused on
Counterpart’s program to help build non-political, non-governmental
organizations and develop citizen advocacy. ABA/CEELI and others pro-
vided a smattering of training, seminars, and technical assistance to law
students, legal professionals, and journalists. After September 11, the
increase in funding for Central Asia meant that the existing NGO-sup-
port activities could expand, and gave them more money for community
development grants and for the kind of civil society resource centers that
had proved so helpful in other countries. The regional CAIP would be ac-
tive in Turkmenistan as well, but has been slow getting started because of
host government reluctance. USAID decided to use some of the new funds
to introduce a basic education project that would help retrain teachers
and introduce a modern curriculum into Turkmen schools—a long-term
method for promoting democratic culture.
In Tajikistan, democracy promotion began modestly after the end of
the civil war. Support for NGOs that promoted reconciliation and encour-
aged citizen participation in elections were key aspects of the initial efforts.
USAID also funded training for political parties and legislators, voter edu-
cation, civic education, and development work with legal professionals,
journalists, and teachers. Small grants to NGOs supported advocacy cam-
paigns that pressed for citizen access to Parliament and helped secure laws
friendly to citizen groups and independent media. After September 11,
the programs already underway received some additional funding. New
initiatives included a civic advocacy center; a civic education program;
anti-trafficking activities; a training program for journalists; more train-
132 BABUS
ing for judges, lawyers, and law students; and a local government activity
that offers training to city officials. With support from the Educational
and Cultural Affairs Bureau at the State Department, IREX started a small
grants program to train local media on anti-trafficking. The increased
funds also supported new efforts in basic education, legal literacy cam-
paigns, and a set of conflict prevention programs—including Tajikistan’s
substantial share of the CAIP.
Renewed Democracy Promotion: Is It Worthwhile?

An in-depth assessment of the impact of U.S. democracy promotion
in Central Asia is clearly beyond the scope of this brief account. Practi-
tioners who implement the small but vigorous activities in Central Asia
are enthusiastic, and believe much more useful work could be done there.
From their perspective, democratic development and the outlook for
those who seek democratic change benefits when the United States takes a
stand in its favor. This may be especially true for those who speak against
human rights abuses. They—and their foreign supporters—are convinced
that U.S. interest in their fate helps keep them alive and active.40 Others
are less hopeful about the merits of the re-engagement and more skeptical
about the U.S. government’s commitment to promote democracy while
pursuing strategic partnerships against terrorism, despite many official
statements confirming that both goals are central ones.41
Many recent assessments are gloomy. Martha Brill Olcott claims
“developments are not moving in directions that the United States would
want them to go. Central Asian leaders have made many promises that
they would support democratic reform, but most of them are proving to
be quite hollow.” Acknowledging that U.S. assistance efforts “remain lim-
ited in scope and by necessity take the long-term view of the problem,” she
nonetheless concluded that overall, “the past year has been a dismal one for
anyone who supports the goal of democratic transition in Central Asia.”42
Fiona Hill of the Brookings Institution has said that the new spotlight on
Central Asia “has had little positive impact on domestic developments . . .
Indeed, in the case of Central Asia, the war on terrorism has empowered
governments to continue aggressive campaigns against their opponents
and given an added impetus to repression.”43
Lorne Craner, head of the State Department Bureau for Democ-
racy, Human Rights, and Labor, has visited the region many times, and
has spoken eloquently and often about the importance the U.S. places
on the promises that our Central Asian partners have made to respect
human rights.44 However, human rights organizations have objected to his
bureau’s report on human rights support efforts as unrealistically optimis-

tic.45 The acting Assistance Coordinator, Tom Adams, recently provided an
overall assessment that was upbeat, but offered frank appraisals of the “less
than rosy” picture on democratic reform, where “noticeable backsliding”
had occurred. Taking a historical view, he noted that “the Soviet successor
states have faced more difficult transitions than initially anticipated – both
due to their long tenure under Soviet rule and their lack of historical expe-
rience with democratic and market systems.”46 A similar tone of realistic,
resigned, and unhappy appraisal appeared in USAID’s most recent budget
presentation to Congress:
While economic growth for [Eurasia] has been positive, social condi-
tions are dismal and trends in democratic freedoms are unfavorable .
. . Lackluster reform in several countries has increased their economic
and political isolation. With widespread corruption and an incom-
plete reform process, public trust in government and private institu-
tions continues to deteriorate . . . Funding increases in Central Asia
pose a different challenge. There, USAID is managing a greater mag-
nitude of assistance resources with limited staff who manage activities
in five countries. The program challenge is to continue pressing for
progress in democracy and human rights within the context of high
budget levels resulting from their cooperation in the war on terror.47
The Future: Keep On Keeping On

Clearly, the United States will continue its efforts to support demo-
cratic development in Central Asia. Whether or not the level of funding
and energy applied to this task will survive the inevitable fall-off in inten-
sity of our strategic cooperation with these states in the war on terrorism
remains to be seen.48
Our approach to the newly independent states of Central Asia began
with contradictions, and remains constrained by competing goals, as-
sumptions and needs. In time, we learned that democracy building in
these former socialist states will be a long process, and can become ir-
reversible only if the next generation internalizes the norms, habits, and
discipline of daily democratic practice. Experience has shown many ways
that outsiders can help the process along, but also has taught respect for
the complexity of the transformation task. To ensure success, each of these
countries also must nurture its own democracy advocates who can and
will lead the transformation, and forge a new civic culture to support and
sustain the new system.
134 BABUS
Foreign assistance in support of fundamental political transforma-

tion is a tricky business. Realists recognized that a true restructuring of
the political system in the former Soviet republics would be a mammoth
challenge. And despite pro-democracy declarations by the new leaders,
the lack of democratic experience and the strength of statist approaches
and attitudes presaged a long and difficult road. It did not take long to
learn that pro-democracy assistance programs were a hard sell in Central
Asia. Across the region, assistance programs accordingly adopted a longer
time frame for thinking about democracy building, and shifted toward
programs that were less overtly political or threatening to the sitting re-
gimes.49
The mix of U.S. interests in the region has lent an interesting dy-
namic to relationships with these states, with some interesting effects on
our democracy building activities. Security interests and larger foreign
policy concerns in the region appeared at first to complement the efforts
to help these states transform their economic and political systems. For
example, the United States established a large presence very early in Ka-
zakhstan, in order to support the removal of this large state’s many nuclear
weapons, employ its weapons scientists, and improve safety and security
at its nuclear research institutions. This cooperative effort laid a solid
foundation for security cooperation and good working relationships with
its new government. Kazakhstan, along with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan,
also proved quite receptive to the various military training and exchange
opportunities provided through NATO’s nonthreatening Partnership for
Peace.50 All three states also helped build the Central Asian Peacekeeping
Battalion, and participated in associated training. A steady traffic of mili-
tary delegations to and from the United States paralleled a similar move-
ment of administrators, educators, economists, and health officials invited
to the United States for training. Promotion of trade and commerce in the
region also seemed to have a reinforcing effect on our interest in economic
transformation and serious movement toward world trade standards and
free markets.
The Global War on Terrorism drove an American re-engagement in
Central Asia—one that has included a re-energizing of our support for
democracy there. This has brought a re-examination of lessons already
learned about post-socialist transformations, and a search for a more ef-
fective mix of techniques and approaches that can achieve real progress
without alienating the current regimes that ultimately may be affected by
such changes.
The prospects seem mixed: The United States now has additional
handicaps to overcome in convincing Islamic populations of its good
intentions. Should the main currents of political reform in Central Asia
takes an Islamic form, U.S. democracy promotion must remain appropri-
ate to these cultural settings, while offering realistic and achievable alter-
natives to the region’s entrenched autocracies. The political space is small,
and the tolerance of these governments to outside meddling is likely to be
low. However, even if America and its allies cannot find ways to leverage
their new strategic role into greater local tolerance for democracy promo-
tion efforts, the renewed engagement in support of democracy in Central
Asia will still nurture constituencies for future change.
Notes
1 See chapter 21 in this volume on U.S. security relations with Central Asia.
2 For details about the reactions of Central Asian states to the September 11 attacks, and the
first steps toward security cooperation with the U.S. against terrorism and the Taliban, see Jim Nichol,
“Central Asia’s New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” CRS Issue Brief
IB93108, Updated April 1, 2003, 2-4 and 11-12. Previous versions of this IB were issued in August, Oc-
tober, and November 2002. The U.S.-Uzbekistan Declaration on their strategic partnership of March
2002 is available at <www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/2002/11711pf.htm>.
3 Details regarding assistance in FY2002 may be found in Nichol, IB93108 as updated for
August 30, 2002, 1415. The supplemental funds came through existing instruments (the Freedom
Support Act, which authorizes assistance to the former Soviet Union), as well as through the new
Emergency Response Fund.
4 Details are available in the country assessments, in “U.S. Government Assistance to and Co-
operative Activities with Eurasia, Fiscal Year 2002,” the Annual Report of the Coordinator of U.S. As-
sistance to Europe and Eurasia, at <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/c10250.htm>. Another source
for information about U.S. assistance programs by country and region is the annual USAID Budget
Presentation to Congress, available at <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/>. USAID’s Washington
headquarters houses specialists in development and democracy assistance, supports strategic plan-
ning, compiles lessons learned, and oversees adjustments to assistance strategy and implementation.
As a results-oriented organization, USAID routinely re-examines its assumptions about development,
and the models and expectations that underlie the goals and objectives of its assistance programs.
Such models and strategies are not just academic exercises, as they build on accumulated experience
in many countries and incorporate awareness of the tools and methods appropriate and acceptable to
their foreign hosts. While USAID is not directly involved in designing assistance sponsored by other
government agencies, its staff and specialists often indirectly contribute to such plans. Some of these
other-Agency assistance programs contribute to the promotion of democracy directly or indirectly.
The most important such pro-democracy programs are lodged in the State Department. These include
educational exchanges run by the Education and Cultural Affairs Bureau, visitors and educational as-
sistance programs run by the Public Affairs Bureau, and grant funding to support human rights and
democracy from the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. The office for coordination of
U.S. assistance to Europe and Eurasia (housed in the State Department) holds responsibility for overall
coordination and tracking and covers all sources of U.S. assistance in its annual reports.
5 It should be noted that identifying which assistance funds support “democracy” can be tricky,
and practices vary somewhat. Some accounts do not include educational exchange programs.
6 The diversity of these assistance categories and activities can be reviewed in the annual re-
ports of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, available on the internet at <http://
136 BABUS
www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/c10250.htm>. An excerpt from the table of contents of the FY2001 report

(Appendix A) provides a handy list of all the agencies that provide assistance.
7 See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, Dangerous Dealings: Changes to U.S. Military Assistance
Since September 11 (Human Rights Watch, 14:1, February 2002) available at www.hrw.org and Jen-
nifer Windsor, Executive Director of Freedom House, Testimony before the House Committee on
International Relations, July 9, 2003 on the State Department’s report on “Supporting Human Rights
and Democracy.” (The testimony is available at <www.freedomhouse.org>.) Note that Freedom House
(Nations in Transit 2002) rates all five Central Asian states as either “autocracies” or “consolidated
autocracies.”
8 Andrew J. Bacevich, “Steppes to Empire,” The National Interest (Summer 2002), 44.
9 Charles Fairbanks, “Being There,” The National Interest (Summer 2002), 40. Among the
many others who raised such questions are: Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, “New Friends,
New Fears in Central Asia,” Foreign Affairs (Mar-Apr 2002), 61-70; Elizabeth Wishnick, Growing U.S.
Security Interests in Central Asia (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2002); Jessical T.
Mathews, “September 11, One Year Later: A World of Change,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace Policy Brief 18, August 2002 [available at <www.ceip.org>]; Thomas Carothers, “Promoting
Democracy and Fighting Terror,” Foreign Affairs (Jan-Feb 2003), 84-93; and the pair of articles on
America in Central Asia by Charles Fairbanks and Andrew J. Bacevich in The National Interest (Sum-
mer 2002), 39–53.
10 USAID’s Assistance Strategy for Central Asia 2001-2005, USAID Regional Mission for Central
Asia, July, 2000. Available at <www.usaid.gov/regions/Europe_ eurasia/car/PDABS400.pdf> (accessed

in November 2002) Hereafter: USAID Central Asia Strategy
11 USAID Central Asia Strategy.
13 While the state is commonly called “Kyrgyzstan,” the Constitution of 1993 refers to the
government as the “Kyrgyz Republic.”

14 From USAID’s FY2001 Budget Justification program summary for Kyrgyzstan, available at
<http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001/ee/kg/>.
15 The statement of Michael Parmly, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, before the Subcommittees on International Operations and
Human Rights, and Middle East and South Asia of the House Committee on International Relations,
July 18, 2001, is available at <www.Eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav072701a.html>
(Acessed June 2, 2003).
16 From the USAID Congressional Presentation for FY 2000, section on Uzbekistan, available
at <www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/eni/uzbekist.html> (accessed in June 2003).

17 From the program summary for Uzbekistan in USAID’s FY2003 Congressional Budget Jus-
tification, available at <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2003/ee/uz/> (accessed September 15, 2003).

18 From the program summary for Kazakhstan in USAID’s FY2000 Congressional Presenta-
tion, available at <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/eni/kazak.html>.

19 From the Turkmenistan overview in the USAID FY2001 budget justification, available at
<http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001/ee/tm/>.
20 The statement by Michael Parmly, in Congressional testimony on July 18, 2001, is available
at <www.Eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav072701a.shtml>.
21 This State Department position, established by the Freedom Support Act, has now been
renamed the “Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia.”

22 William Taylor’s remarks and prepared statement are available through the site in Note
21, or at <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/group8/summit01/wwwh01071805.html> (accessed

6/2/03).
23 Ukraine’s government, for example, has chafed under U.S. criticism of its elections, its treat-
ment of journalists, and its business practices. The activities of U.S. organizations that work with
Ukrainian political parties and democratic activists (some of which oppose the current President,
Leonid Kuchma), have clearly been an irritant. The Ukrainian authorities withheld registration from
both the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute for more than two
years (2001– September 2003), yielding only after considerable pressure from the U.S. made it clear
the bilateral relationship would suffer otherwise. (Ukrainian law requires foreign organizations to re-
register when funding instrumentalities change, as they did for both NDI and IRI in 2001.)
24 See, for example, Charles William Maynes, “A New Strategy for Old Foes and New Friends,”
World Policy Journal (Summer 2000, 17:2), 68-76. Maynes is President of the Eurasia Foundation, an
organization that funds many civil society activities in former socialist states.
25 Foreign Aid In the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity (USAID,
2002) is available at <www.usaid.gov>.

Ibid., 10-11.
Ibid., 50-52.
28 See the articles by Lael Brainard, “Compassionate Conservatism Confronts Global Poverty,”
and Steve Radelet, “Will the Millennium Challenge Account be Different?” Washington Quarterly
(Spring 2004, 26:2), 149-87. Recent Congressional action is discussed in Susan B.Epstein, “Foreign Re-
lations Authorization, FY 2004 and FY 2005: State Department, The Millennium Challenge Account,
and Foreign Assistance,” CRS Report RL 21986, Updated September 2, 2003.
29 See the analysis by Steven Radelet, “Bush and Foreign Aid,” Foreign Affairs (September-Oc-
tober 2003, 82:5), 104-117.

30 The National Security Strategy is available at www.whitehouse.gov.
31 B. Lynn Pascoe, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, “The U.S. Role
in Central Asia,” Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Central
Asia and the South Caucasus, June 27, 2002. Available through www.state.gov.
32 A helpful short overview of the instruments of U.S. assistance to the former Soviet republics
is included in Curt Tarnoff, “The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance,” CRS Issue Brief
IB95077 (Updated July 24, 2003), and previous versions. Tarnoff noted that USAID transfers some of
the funds obligated to it for these states to other agencies (such as the Commerce, Justice, and Labor
Departments). These transfers have grown from about one fourth to over 40 percent of the total—an
indication that other agencies are more involved in designing and overseeing assistance to the region.
This Issue Brief points out that very little cash is involved (except for equity investments and loans to
the private sector), that close to three-fourths of our assistance goes to the private or non-governmen-
tal sector, and that roughly 78% of funds used for programs run by USAID are spent on U.S. goods
and services.
33 Reports of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights may be located
through the organization’s website, <http://www.osce.org/>.

34 Details about all assistance activities from all agencies and funders is available in the Coordi-
nators Reports, available through the Department of State website. As sited above, the Report for 2002
is available at <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/c10250.htm>.
35 The State Department’s Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (<http://www.
state.gov/g/drl/>) has taken on a more important direct role in democracy promotion through its
administration of the Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF). The Fund has grown from $9
million in 2000 to over $31 million in 2003. The Fund was intended to permit highly responsive
support for unique or especially timely short-term human rights or democracy promotion projects.
In 2003, $4.5 million was committed for projects in the non-Middle East Muslim world (including
Central Asia), with the following priorities: 1) Empowerment of Muslim women, including projects
that promote capacity building and/or networks of women or women’s organizations, especially as
they relate to human-rights; 2) Addressing the problem of disenfranchised youth and the need to
reach out to this group to prevent growth of extremism; 3) Political reform programs that would
entail support for conducting free and fair elections, issues of good governance and corruption; 4)
Independent media and access to a diversity of sources of information; 5) Judicial systems, especially
in the context of Shari’a; 6) Promotion of the compatibility of democracy with Islam; and (7) Civil
society and increasing political participation.
138 BABUS
36 See Appendix B for a summary of USAID activities prepared by the USAID Central Asian
Regional mission in Almaty. Again, the Coordinator’s Report for 2002 is the best source for detail on
the activities of all funders. See <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/c10250.htm>.
37 Two of the Freedom House centers were open as of November 2003 in Tashkent and Naman-
gan; a third is planned, probably to open in 2004.

38 IRI is currently in the process of re-establishing a resident office to support its work in
Kyrgyzstan.
39 The author interviewed representatives and officers of Counterpart International, ABA/
CEELI, Freedom House, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute,
and IREX, and is grateful for their assistance in preparing this chapter.
40 In testimony before the subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of the House
International Relations Committee, October 29, 2003, Beth Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Eurasian Affairs, reaffirmed that democracy promotion is a key pillar of U.S. policy
in Central Asia. The testimony is available through the State Department website, <http://www.state.
gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/25798pf.htm>.
41 Martha Olcott, “Taking Stock of Central Asia,” Journal of International Affairs (Spring 2003),
3-17.
42 Fiona Hill, “Central Asia and the Caucasus: The Impact of the War on Terrorism,” in Nations
in Transit 2003 (Rowman and Littlefield: Freedom House, 2003), 39-49.

43 See, for example, his remarks at a media roundtable in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on June 7, 2002
at <www.state.gov/g/drl>.
44 Jennifer Windsor, Executive Director of Freedom House, Testimony before the House
Committee on International Relations, July 9, 2003 on the State Department’s report on “Supporting
Human Rights and Democracy.” (The testimony is available at <www.freedomhouse.org>.)
45 Thomas C. Adams, Acting Coordinator of U.S. assistance to Europe and Eurasia, “U.S. As-
sistance Programs in Europe: An Assessment,” Statement to the House International Relations Com-
mittee, Subcommittee on Europe, March 27, 2003 (<www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/19203pf.ht>,
accessed 6/2/2003).
46 Europe and Eurasia, USAID Congressional Budget Justification, FY2004. (<www.usaid.
gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/europe_eurasia/>, accessed June 2003).

47 Budget levels for U.S. assistance to the former Soviet republics are coming down. While the
largest drops are for Russia and Ukraine, this trend will affect Central Asia too. President Bush’s FY
2003 budget cut the total outlay by four percent; his request for FY 2004 represented a cut of 24 percent
from 2003. See Curt Tarnoff, “The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance,” (Updated July
24, 2003), 1, 4.
48 I disagree with the analysis of Thomas Carothers, author of many works analyzing U.S.
democracy assistance, who has suggested that the “transition paradigm” has died. See the debate in
Journal of Democracy on this issue, beginning with the Carothers article, “The End of the Transi-
tion Paradigm” in the January 2002 issue, and continuing two issues later with essays by Guillermo
O’Donnell, Kenneth Wollack, Ghia Nodia, and Gerald Hyman.
49 All the Central Asian states but Tajikistan joined the PFP in 1994. Tajikistan joined after
September 11, in 2002.

ISLAMIC RADICALISM 139
Chapter 7
Islam in Central Asia:

The Emergence and Growth
of Radicalism in the Post-
Communist Era 1
Tiffany Petros
T
he breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 allowed for the revival of
Islam in the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajiki-
stan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan after seventy years of religious
repression. Despite long-standing efforts by the Soviet regime to eliminate
religious identity across the empire, the Central Asian populations main-
tained Islamic beliefs and traditions that had been handed down over cen-
turies. The collapse of Communism and opening of state borders not only
offered Central Asian Muslims new opportunities to practice their faith,
but also allowed for the importation and development of radical forms of
Islam.2 Although the majority of Central Asian Muslims do not support
radical Islam, radical Islamic movements have attracted followers among
a growing minority of the population. Increased support for radical Islam
in Central Asia over the past decade has been attributed to foreign influ-
ences, coupled with a rise in government corruption and oppression,
and deteriorating economic conditions. Radical Islamic groups active in
Central Asia have capitalized on public discontent and provided a voice of
opposition to the secular authoritarian governments. Regional rulers have
responded by outlawing all non-government sanctioned Islamic activity
and have cracked down aggressively against both Islamic organizations
and their followers.
Radical Islam in Central Asia also has attracted U.S. attention, par-
ticularly in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. In 2001,
the Central Asian states found themselves on the front lines of the global
war on terrorism, as a U.S.-led coalition entered neighboring Afghanistan
139
140 PETROS
to topple the hard-line Islamic Taliban regime. The Taliban was a known
sponsor of al Qaeda—the network held responsible for the attacks on U.S.
targets—and maintained ties to radical Islamic elements active in Central
Asia. Central Asian leaders offered varying degrees of assistance to the
U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom in an effort to enhance ties with the
United States and further their fight against “Islamic terrorists” whom they
blamed for anti-government activities at home. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan
were particularly active in this effort, offering the U.S. military basing rights
in support of the operation. Although U.S.-led action in Afghanistan ulti-
mately disrupted Taliban sponsorship of radical Islamic activity in Central
Asia, Islamic radicalism continues to draw support from Central Asian
populations.
This chapter will examine the roots of Islam in Central Asia and pro-
vide a brief historical overview of the changing relationship between Islam
and the Central Asian peoples. This background is essential for understand-
ing the emergence and growth of radical Islam in Central Asia since the
early 1990s. The chapter will also examine the three Islamic elements that
have had the greatest impact on Central Asia in recent years, the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), and the Islamic
Renaissance Party (IRP). Finally, it will seek to answer two questions: Why
is radical Islam being embraced by a growing segment of Central Asian
populations today? Does support for radical Islam in Central Asia pose a
threat to regional regimes and/or U.S. interests in the region?
A Brief History of Islam in Central Asia
Early History
The radical Islamic elements that have gained support in Central Asia
over the past decade differ greatly from strains of Islam indigenous to the
region. Since Central Asian Islam traditionally has diverged from Islam
found in other parts of the world, including the Middle East, Asia, and Af-
rica, the recent drive toward radicalism in the region must be viewed in the
context of the global Islamic movement.3 However, before examining the
factors that have given rise to radical Islam in Central Asia in the 1990s, one
must briefly consider the history of Islam in the region. This history dem-
onstrates that Islam has served and continues to serve as an important part
of Central Asian identity. Although the populations of Central Asia have
long embraced Islam, the identity has played a limited role as a vehicle for
political mobilization. Given this history, the question arises as to whether
or not radical Islam will serve as a mobilizing factor in Central Asia in the
twenty-first century.
The path of Islam in Central Asia has been one of continuity and
change. Islamic traditions have been passed down for centuries, despite
periods of repression of the faith. The religion was first introduced to
Central Asia in the seventh century by Arab invaders arriving from the
Middle East. It was not until the ninth century, however, that Islam was
adopted by local rulers and became the predominant religion in the re-
gion. During this period, Islam was promoted from the top down, rather
than forced upon the Central Asian populations by foreign conquerors.4
Central Asian rulers viewed their endorsement of Islam and its acceptance
among the people as one means of creating and maintaining their bases
of power. Support for Islam continued to grow in the tenth century, with
the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara in present-day Uzbekistan becoming
great centers of Islamic learning and culture.6
The majority of Central Asian Muslims embraced Sunni Islam,
although Shia Muslims also can be found throughout the region. Shia
minorities exist primarily in Tajikistan, but also have a presence in the
cities of Bukhara and Samarkand.6 Sunni Islam was first embraced by the
settled populations of today’s Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, while the no-
madic peoples of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan maintained
stronger ties to their pre-Islamic culture and beliefs. Sunni Islam eventu-
ally spread to Central Asia’s nomadic populations by incorporating local
traditions and aspects of Sufism—an indigenous form of Islamic mysti-
cism.7 Sufism appealed to the nomadic peoples by emphasizing a direct
experience with God, as well as preaching tolerance and respect for other
forms of worship.9 Early differences in how Islam was embraced in Central
Asia continue to be reflected in local practices in the region. In the twenty-
first century, identification with Islam remains stronger in Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan than in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.9
Islam under Soviet Rule
Islam was an important aspect of Central Asian culture up to and
including the period of Russian colonization of the region in the nine-
teenth century. Central Asian Muslims did not begin to experience re-
pression at the hands of the Russians until after the Bolsheviks came to
power at the end of World War I. In the 1920s, the Soviet state launched
an attack on Islamic beliefs, traditions, and institutions as it initiated the
process of replacing religion with a new form of “scientific atheism.”10 The
crack down on Islamic identity coincided with Soviet leader Josef Stalin’s
142 PETROS
creation of the five Central Asian republics between 1924 and 1936. The
republics, including Uzbekistan (1924), Turkmenistan (1924), Tajikistan
(1929), Kazakhstan (1936), and Kyrgyzstan (1936), had not existed previ-
ously as separate entities and had no historical basis for division. Accord-
ing to Martha Brill Olcott, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, “Stalin drew the map of Soviet Central Asia not
with an eye to consolidating natural regions, but rather for the purpose
of reducing the prospects for regional unity.”11 Upon division, the five
republics contained multiple ethnic groups, which had not yet come to
view themselves as independent nationalities. As part of a larger effort to
eliminate loyalty to the Islamic identity and replace it with loyalties to the
newly formed republics, purges of the Muslim leadership also took place
throughout the 1920s and 1930s.12
Official hostility toward Islam in the Soviet Union lifted slightly fol-
lowing World War II. The Soviet policy of suppression, which had marked
the earlier period, turned to one of religious co-optation. Soviet authori-
ties attempted to regulate Islam by creating an “official” authorized version
of the religion. A Muslim Religious Board was formed and charged with
overseeing “Official Islam” in the Central Asian republics. This body was
one of four religious boards established in the Soviet Union. Despite these
efforts to suppress and then co-opt Islam, the religion continued to serve
as an important marker of identity for the Central Asian populations.
Central Asian Muslims also continued to practice their own unofficial or
“parallel Islam” underground.13
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 marked another signifi-
cant turning point for Islam in Central Asia. The mobilization of thou-
sands of Central Asian men to fight in the Soviet army against the Afghan
Mujahedeen put many Soviet Muslims in contact with foreign Muslims for
the first time. The Central Asian Muslims were impressed by the commit-
ment the Afghan people had for Islam. They also recognized shared ethnic
and linguistic ties with the people they were fighting. This reminded them
of how the Soviet Union had incorporated their lands and deprived them
of their true identity and national pride.14 Contacts that were made be-
tween Central Asians and Muslims from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi
Arabia during this period later would weigh heavily on the resurgence of
Islam in Central Asia, following the breakup of the Soviet Union.
The relationship between Islam and Central Asia again entered a new
phase with President Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power in the Soviet Union
in the mid-1980s. Along with the introduction of Gorbachev’s policies of
glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) came greater religious
freedom. Gorbachev’s reforms led to a religious revival in which many

Central Asian Muslims were allowed to make a pilgrimage to the holy city
of Mecca, Saudi Arabia for the first time. The reforms also allowed outside
Islamic influences to begin filtering into Central Asia. Foreign Islamic gov-
ernments, organizations, and individuals began sending money to Central
Asia to fund the construction of new mosques and reinvigorate Islamic
practices.15 These influences would come to play an important role in the
development of radical Islam in Central Asia in the 1990s.
The Rise of Radical Islam in Central Asia Post-Independence
External Factors
The renewed interest in Islam that developed in Central Asia in the
1980s gained momentum following the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991. Although the Soviet state actively tried to destroy the multiple loyal-
ties of clan, family, republic, and religion, Islam remained an important
source of identity for many Central Asians. Communism had promoted
the idea that religion was incompatible with the Soviet ideology. Now that
the ideology was discredited by the collapse of the Soviet empire, a new
opportunity emerged for Central Asians to embrace their Islamic past.16
Once the Central Asian republics’ borders were open to the world,
among the first visitors were Islamic missionaries from Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan and Afghanistan played a particularly
significant role in influencing the revival and radicalization of Islam in
Central Asia.17 In addition to providing funding and religious training to
support mosques and madrassas (religious schools), these sources distrib-
uted free copies of the Koran, which had been translated into Russian and
other Central Asian languages.18
Sources in Saudi Arabia also contributed to the rise of Islam in Cen-
tral Asia. In early 1990, these sources funded the development of Adolat
(Justice)19—an Islamic movement that arose in the Uzbek part of the
Ferghana Valley.20 The movement worked not only to introduce Islam, but
also to expose corruption and social injustice among the ruling regime.
Adolat quickly gained support and began to spread across the Ferghana
Valley in 1991. However, by March 1992, following the break up of the
Soviet Union, the movement was banned by independent Uzbek authori-
ties.21 Leaders of this movement then fled to Tajikistan where they helped
prepare for the Tajik civil war.
In addition to developing schools, mosques, and movements inside
Central Asia, foreign actors also provided opportunities for future mem-
144 PETROS
bers of the radical IMU and HT to receive religious training abroad.22

Through their activities, supporters of the Taliban in Afghanistan, mili-
tants in Pakistan, and followers of the Wahhabi movement (an extreme
Sunni Islamic doctrine) found in Saudi Arabia, brought new strains of
Islam to the region. These strains differed greatly from the form of Islam
that had long-standing roots in Central Asia.
Internal Factors
Although external factors played a significant role in the emergence
of radical Islam in Central Asia, they have not been alone in affecting the
changing nature of Islam in the region. If there were not fertile ground for
the radicalization of Islam in Central Asia, foreign radical elements would
have been unable to attract support among the local populations. Support
for radical Islam in Central Asia developed in large part as a form of op-
position to authoritarian governments in the region. As government cor-
ruption and oppression increased and economic conditions deteriorated
throughout the 1990s, segments of the Central Asian population viewed
radical Islam as an alternative to the status quo. Not surprisingly, the rise
of radical groups has been most pronounced in Uzbekistan where gov-
ernment repression has been most severe. There also has been a strong
show of support for radical Islamic movements in northern Tajikistan and
southern Kyrgyzstan, particularly among ethnic Uzbeks who have experi-
enced discrimination based on their ethnicity.23
Immediately following the collapse of communism, Central Asian
leaders initiated the restoration of mosques and other symbols of Islam as
a means of distinguishing themselves from the Soviet system and increas-
ing their legitimacy among the local populations. As evidence of their use
of Islam to gain support, Central Asian leaders, including Uzbek President
Islam Karimov, made the pilgrimage to Mecca and were sworn into office
on the Koran.24 Although Central Asian leadership made an effort to re-
embrace Islam, the regimes kept a watchful eye on religious activity. This
was particularly true in southern parts of Central Asia where Islam had
developed deeper ties, such as in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and the Ferghana
Valley region of Kyrgyzstan.25
As it became clear that Islam was growing in importance and provid-
ing Central Asians a link with their past, regional rulers increasingly came
to view Islam as a threat rather than an avenue for harnessing support for
their leadership. The ruling elites wanted to ensure that Islam would not
develop into a base of political opposition and, therefore, began to repress
Islam, as had been the tradition under the Soviet system. This reaction, in
turn, pushed some moderate Muslims to embrace more radical views.26
The failure of Central Asian leaders to introduce democratic and/or
economic reforms, coupled with the repression of Islam, increased sup-
port for radical Islamic elements.27 Participating in radical activities also
has provided many Central Asian youth with a sense of purpose and ac-
complishment not available elsewhere, given the lack of jobs and educa-
tional opportunities. The Central Asian governments must address these
systemic issues, if the trend toward radicalism is to be halted.
Central Asian Government Responses to Radical Islam
The Central Asian regimes have been deeply concerned by the rise
in radical Islam, which they attribute to meddling from Islamic move-
ments abroad. Despite their shared concerns, the leaders of the Central
Asian republics have responded differently to the emergence and growth
of radical Islam in the region. Uzbek President Islam Karimov introduced
a swift and severe crackdown on Islamic activity beginning in the early
1990s. In 1992, Islamic supporters gathered in Namangan, Uzbekistan to
directly challenge President Karimov’s policies and demand the legaliza-
tion of Islamic structures. In response to this pressure, Karimov outlawed
Adolat and began to suppress the Islamic opposition.28 Repression against
Islam became even more severe following an alleged attempt on the
President’s life in February 1999. Although Karimov was not killed in a
series of six car bombings that ripped through the capital city of Tashkent,
13 others were left dead and several more injured.29 Karimov and other
Central Asian leaders used this incident, as well as the previous outbreak
of civil war in Tajikistan, to justify outlawing political opposition. Mass
arrests were instituted in Uzbekistan followed by the subsequent torture
of Islamic opponents. Karimov’s response to Islam throughout the 1990s
forced many Uzbek Muslims to flee to neighboring Tajikistan and Afghan-
istan, where they helped to form and strengthen the radical IMU—an ally
of Afghanistan’s Taliban.30
As of 2003, President Karimov continues to keep a tight reign on
Islamic activity in Uzbekistan. At present, an estimated 6,500 people are
jailed in Uzbekistan due to their religious or political beliefs. Approxi-
mately half of those held have been accused of belonging to the radical
Islamic movement HT, while the majority of the rest have been branded
Wahhabis.31 Not only has Karimov jailed a large number of Muslims, but
the Uzbek government—like the Soviet government before it—monitors
the Spiritual Board of Muslims in Tashkent. In addition to monitoring the
146 PETROS
Board, the state frequently dictates to official clergy what they may or may
not say in their religious sermons.
The other states of Central Asia have introduced similar policies,
though they vary in degree of severity. In Turkmenistan, laws on religion
are very restrictive. Although Islam does not have strong roots as an orga-
nized religion in Turkmenistan, President Saparmurat Niyazov “has com-
bined widespread repression of any independent religious activity with
attempts to create a pseudo-Islamic spiritual creed centered on his own
personality.”32 Turkmenistan has seen the number of mosques operating in
the country rise from four during Soviet times to 318 in 2003. The spend-
ing of millions of dollars on mosque construction, however, has primarily
been aimed at Niyazov’s “own glorification, rather than the religious needs
of the people.”33
Official response to radical Islam has been less in Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakhstan, since these countries have not seen significant opposition
from extremist groups. Unlike in Uzbekistan, religious communities have
been tolerated in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and laws on religion have re-
mained more liberal. There have been arrests, however, particularly among
individuals found distributing banned HT literature. In November 2002,
Kyrgyz officials also introduced legislation restricting the licensing system
for religious publications.34
Tajikistan has taken a different approach to dealing with the rise of
Islam than have the other countries in Central Asia. It is the only country
in the region that did not outlaw the emergence of an Islamic political
party. Shortly after Tajikistan gained independence, a civil war broke out
between members of the Communist elite and the opposition, which had
Islamic backing. Although this conflict led to the other Central Asian states
banning opposition parties in their own countries, in the case of Tajiki-
stan, the IRP ultimately was able to gain seats in the government as a result
of the negotiated ceasefire.
While Tajikistan may appear to have taken a more moderate stance
on Islamic participation than the other republics, it should be noted that
many view the Islamic party in Tajikistan as having been co-opted by the
government, and therefore not a true voice of opposition. Others argue
that despite Tajikistan’s slightly more liberal laws on religion, compared to
the other Central Asian republics, in reality the practice of respecting such
laws has been undermined.35 For example, the Tajik government requires
the collection of 15,000 signatures for the building of a Mosque, whereas
only 10 to 15 signatures are required to build a Christian church.36 Tajik
authorities also have cracked down on the expression of Islam in Soghd,

the Tajik-controlled territory of the Ferghana Valley.
Although the Central Asian governments have taken different ap-
proaches to the rise of radical Islam in their respective countries, each is
cautious about what public support for radicalism might mean for their
leadership. This concern has led to the arrest of thousands of ordinary
practicing Muslims along with the militants. Not only have prisoners been
subjected to long jail terms, but they also have been tortured at the hands
of the regimes.37 In an attempt to gain tacit support for their repressive
practices, the Central Asian governments have argued that their domestic
fight against Islamic radicalism is but a small part of the global war on ter-
rorism. By violating human rights in the name of cracking down on “radi-
cal Islamists” and “terrorists,” however, regional rulers have strengthened
support for the very opposition they have attempted to eliminate. The
Central Asian leaders have tried to convince the United States that their
secular, albeit authoritarian leadership, is the only alternative to the ac-
ceptance of radical Islam in the region.38 This puts the United States in the
position of choosing between two unwelcome options, and in the process
legitimizing the actions of the current regimes.
Islamic Opposition in Central Asia
In order to translate support for radical Islam and opposition to
regional governments into action, several organizations have been formed
in Central Asia in support of radical ideals. These organizations differ in
their tactics (violent vs. non-violent) as well as their goals (overthrow of
existing government vs. becoming a viable opposition party). The three
most significant organizations to emerge are the previously mentioned
IMU, HT and IRP.
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Among Islamic groups active in Central Asia, the IMU has received
perhaps the most attention. Prior to the U.S.-led Operation Enduring
Freedom, the IMU was considered the most radical Islamic organization
operating in the region. The IMU was known to have close ties with the
Taliban and had set up training bases in the north of Afghanistan. The
IMU also reportedly was receiving financial backing from Osama bin
Laden and his al Qaeda network, as well as from Saudi Arabia. Given the
IMU’s cooperation with known terrorists and involvement in violent at-
tacks against regional regimes in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the U.S. State
148 PETROS
Department designated the group as a foreign terrorist organization in

September 2000.39
The IMU began forming in 1992-1993, when future IMU members
fled Uzbekistan in response to President Karimov’s crackdown on Islamic
activities. Some of these members, including future IMU military leader
Juma Namangani, fled to Tajikistan and joined the Islamic Tajik opposi-
tion (later United Tajik Opposition) in its fight against the Communist
government of Tajikistan from 1992 to 1997.40 During the course of the
Tajik civil war, Uzbek fighters met up with Afghan groups and began
forging relationships with members of both the Taliban and the North-
ern Alliance. This led to the initial military training of Uzbek fighters in
Afghanistan.
The IMU was founded officially in 1998 by ethnic Uzbeks dissatisfied
with the more moderate stances of the IRP in Tajikistan. The initial goal
of the IMU was to topple the Uzbek leadership. The organization’s man-
date was later enlarged to include overthrowing all of the region’s secular
governments and replacing them with regimes based on Shari’a (Islamic
law). The IMU promised to form a state in the Ferghana Valley—a center
of Islamic traditionalism for centuries.41 In order to achieve their goal of
removing Uzbek President Karimov from power, the IMU launched ter-
rorist attacks against the Uzbek government in 1999, 2000, and 2001 from
bases in neighboring Afghanistan and Tajikistan.42 Although the IMU
mainly operated out of Afghanistan, the movement also had set up bases
in Tajikistan prior to 2001 and the beginning of the U.S.-led Operation
Enduring Freedom.43
As of September 11, 2001, between 3,000 and 5,000 members of
the IMU were believed to be operating in Central Asia. It was reported
in early 2001 that the IMU had formed an umbrella organization called
Hezb-e Islami Turkestan (Islamic Party of Turkestan) with the intention of
expanding its areas of operation to include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajiki-
stan, and China’s Xinjiang region.44 IMU activities were significantly cur-
tailed by U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. In November 2001, the IMU’s
military commander, Juma Namangani, was killed in a U.S. attack, and its
political leader went underground. Most observers argue that the IMU no
longer poses a significant threat in Central Asia, having lost its bases in
Afghanistan, as well as its Taliban and al Qaeda sponsors.45 Although the
IMU is no longer active in Afghanistan, it continues to maintain ties to the
IRP, which remains active in Tajikistan.46
Hizb-ut-Tahrir
HT, the Party of Islamic Liberation, is a second well-known Islamic
movement that has taken hold in Central Asia and is steadily increasing
its influence. It draws a large base of support among ethnic Uzbeks, as
well as recruits among Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks. HT shares with the
IMU the desire to overthrow the secular governments of Central Asia. In
their place, HT proposes to introduce an Islamic Caliphate across present
state borders in Central Asia similar to that established in seventh century
Arabia following the death of the Prophet Mohammed. Like the IMU, HT
does not offer a specific social, economic, or political agenda for governing
the Caliphate. An important difference between HT and the IMU is that
HT rejects violence as a means of bringing about political change. This has
allowed the group to gain a broader base of followers than the IMU, which
was in part discredited as a result of its support for violence.
The HT movement, headquartered in London, was first founded be-
tween 1952 and 1953 in the Middle East, and has since grown to operate
in approximately fourty countries worldwide. The movement was origi-
nally established by Palestinian activist Taqiuddin an-Nabhani Filastyni,
who served as a judge in the Jerusalem appeals court. Filastyni’s successor,
Abd al-Kadim Zallum, oversaw the introduction of HT to Central Asia in
1995 when the party opened its headquarters in Uzbekistan. HT activities
quickly spread to the Ferghana Valley between 1995 and 1996, where it
has been particularly successful in attracting support. By 2000, HT activi-
ties had branched out further to include parts of northern Tajikistan and
southern Kyrgyzstan. As of 2003, the organization claimed to have 80,000
members from across Central Asia.47
HT originally drew its support from educated urban youth, mainly
in Uzbekistan, who then helped to spread the HT message among poorer
segments of the population living in rural areas.48 HT has successfully
drawn upon networks of family and clans in Central Asia, particularly in
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, to recruit new members and increase partici-
pation in group activities. HT has relied on traditional social networks to
distribute leaflets on HT goals. It also has developed a Web site to circulate
information on the organization and its activities.49 Although HT has in-
creased its membership in recent years, there is little evidence that Central
Asian Muslims support the introduction of Shari’a, or other strict Islamic
practices as the organization advocates.50 Instead, HT has gained support
in Central Asia by serving as a voice of opposition in otherwise repressive
political environments.
150 PETROS
In response to growing popular support, the governments in Central

Asia have cracked down on HT activities, and the organization has been
banned across the region. In 2001, hundreds, if not thousands, of alleged
HT members were arrested in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
Despite the arrests, HT continues to attract followers, especially in Uz-
bekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In southern Kyrgyzstan, 10 percent of the popu-
lation is believed to be involved in HT activities.51 The success of HT in
Central Asia has been attributed in part to its ability to target its message
to post-Soviet grievances. Unlike HT activities in London and elsewhere
in the West, where the organization distributes leaflets and holds meetings
denouncing the United States and Israel, in Central Asia the organization
criticizes local governments for their inability to fight corruption, pov-
erty, drug use, HIV/AIDS, and other social and economic ills. Since the
outbreak of war with Iraq in 2003; however, there has been an increase of
anti-Western/anti-U.S. sentiment expressed in HT literature being distrib-
uted in Central Asia.
HT has not been as broadly successful in Kazakhstan as it has been in
other Central Asian countries, since Islam is not as widely embraced there
as in the other former Soviet republics. Further, Kazakhstan’s oil-economy
has not left it in the dire conditions shared by other Central Asian states.
Although HT is not likely to make significant inroads into Kazakhstan by
capitalizing on poor economic conditions or anti-U.S./Western sentiment,
support may be gained as popular disillusionment with Kazakh President
Nursultan Nazarbaev increases. There is evidence that HT has made some
headway in Kazakhstan, where HT literature has become more aggressive
since the recent war in Iraq. In April 2003, two members of HT were de-
tained by Kazakh authorities in the South of the country for distributing
leaflets with statements against the United States and its British ally.52
Unlike the IMU, the United States has not designated HT to be a
foreign terrorist organization, since it has not used violence to achieve its
political goals. Although the United States distinguishes between the IMU
and HT with respect to the “terrorist” label, the U.S. government contin-
ues to closely monitor HT activities.53 There is concern that since the start
of Operation Enduring Freedom and the global war on terrorism, the HT
message has become increasingly militant. The fliers distributed by the
group throughout Central Asia have begun to denounce the presence of
coalition forces in Central Asia and have praised suicide attacks in Israel.
Although HT has not been directly linked to involvement in violent activi-
ties, it is believed to incite violence, and could become a stepping-stone for
disenfranchised youth who could be recruited into more violent Islamic
groups. Some also fear more radical members of HT could break away
from the organization and promote the use of violence to increase the pace
of reforms in Central Asia.
Islamic Renaissance Party
The IRP was established in 1991 as an outgrowth of Gorbachev’s
reforms for the purpose of protecting the Islamic identity of the Muslims
in the former Soviet Union. Given its objective, the party was able to gain
publicity not only in the Soviet Union, but also among academics and
strategists in the West.54 IRP sought to increase awareness and understand-
ing of Muslims in the Soviet Union, while representing their voice within
the Communist framework.55 However, the party remained fragmented
with regional branches introduced throughout the Soviet Union.
The IRP gained increased attention during the civil war in Tajikistan
from 1992 to 1997. The party, which claimed to support a moderate, na-
tionalist version of Islam, was part of a larger anti-government coalition
active during the Tajik civil war.56 Although many labeled the party “fun-
damentalist,” the IRP sought to unite clans during the civil war, and did
not use the party to push for establishment of an Islamic state in Tajiki-
stan.57 The IRP is the only legally recognized religious party in Central Asia
and entered the Tajik government as a result of a peace agreement ending
the conflict.58 Since becoming part of the government, the IRP has kept its
commitment to work within the constitutional framework of Tajikistan.
IRP Deputy Chairman Muhiddin Kabiri has emerged as the face of the
party. He says that the IRP supports the existence of a secular democratic
Tajikistan, but notes that the party approves of increasing religious tradi-
tions and values in state political life. According to Kabiri, Turkey is an
example of a state that has been able to incorporate these values and could
serve as a model to other states in the region.59
Although IRP has entered the Tajik government, its position as a
voice of opposition has been weakened. Tajik President Imomali Ra-
khmonov has increasingly consolidated power in his own hands. While the
ruling elite continues to view the IRP as “too Islamic for the government,”
radical Islamic forces have accused the party of selling-out to the state’s in-
terests. According to Kabiri, this view could serve to benefit radical Islamic
elements, which can attract support from a population that continues to
view itself as having little to no voice in general.60
Some observers have argued that the success of the IRP in working
within the Tajik coalition government must not go unnoticed. Referring
to IRP’s participation in Tajikistan’s governance, President of the Eur-
152 PETROS
asia Foundation Charles Maynes said, “Unfortunately, the world largely

ignored this experiment, the success of which could have had profound
implications for the way that the Western world reacts to resurgent politi-
cal Islam elsewhere . . . The Tajik example could well inform political de-
velopments in the region and elsewhere—and should help define Western
perceptions of Islam.”61 Although Tajikistan continues to face multiple
political and economic challenges, there is evidence that it remains one of
the more open countries in Central Asia.
U.S. Interest in Central Asia and the Future
No single factor can fully explain the emergence and rise of radical
Islam in Central Asia. The states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have faced multiple and varied internal
and external pressures since gaining independence, which have contrib-
uted to differing levels of support for Islamic radicalism. These pressures
include: increasing government corruption and repression, declining eco-
nomic conditions, and growing influence from foreign Islamic elements.
The rise in popular support for radical Islamic groups in Central Asia can
be viewed as a sign of discontent with the status quo, rather than a voice in
support of Islamic government and radical views. The majority of Central
Asian Muslims do not support the end of the secular state and many per-
ceive radical Islamic groups as a threat to state and regional stability.
Scholars and practitioners continue to debate the nature of the threat
posed by radical Islamic elements in Central Asia to regional regimes and/
or U.S. interests. The majority of the Central Asian regimes have labeled
all non-government sanctioned Islamic activity as “radical” and banned Is-
lamic groups as “terrorist” organizations. The United States should guard
against this hardline approach and consider that not all forms of Islam are
dangerous or antithetical to U.S. interests. This is especially true in Central
Asia, where Islam has long been respected as a tolerant religion and an im-
portant source of identity. In order to combat the spread of radical Islam
in the region, the U.S. government and the Central Asian regimes should
work to promote and incorporate moderate strains of Islam in a way that
does not allow it to destroy the current order.62 By banning all unauthor-
ized Islamic activity, the regional regimes have effectively eliminated inde-
pendent, moderate voices of Islam, which could be used to attract people
away from radical groups and activities.63
In order to neutralize the influence of radical Islamic elements in
Central Asia, significant political and economic changes also are needed.
The introduction of reforms leading to political change and economic
growth could lessen the appeal of radical Islamic organizations as a voice

of opposition in Central Asia. However, if the current regimes disregard
the worsening political and economic conditions, membership in organi-
zations such as HT will grow and could have an increasingly destabilizing
effect. Another danger is that HT or other radical Islamic groups could
resort to violence in order to ensure that their message is heard.64
The United States is likely to maintain a long-term interest in Cen-
tral Asia, given the region’s strategic location, natural resources, and con-
tributions to the global war on terrorism. While the United States seeks
to maintain stability in Central Asia, it must not be perceived as blindly
backing authoritarian secular governments without recognizing the need
for opposition and reform. Recent global events have clearly demonstrated
the importance of encouraging voices of moderation, while simultane-
ously promoting state stability. The United States does not want to see
a situation in Central Asia where the only alternative to authoritarian
regimes is radical Islam.
Notes
1 The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily represent
those of DFI Government Services or the U.S. government. The author would like to thank Daniel
Burghart, Sylvia Babus, Daniel Chiu, and Erin Craycraft for their comments on this chapter.
2 In this chapter, the term “radical” refers to anti-Western forms of Islam that espouse the over-
throw of secular regimes and introduction of Shari’a (Islamic law). It is recognized that the majority
of Central Asian Muslims do not support this radical strain of Islam, though there is concern that
support may rise and, in turn, threaten regional regimes and U.S. interests.
3 Radical Islamic movements are not entirely new to Central Asia. For example, during WWI,
Islamic militants forcefully opposed Russian government attempts to deploy Muslims to work near the
front. Again in the 1920s, Muslim partisans in the so-called Basmachi movement opposed the takeover
and advance of Soviet power into Central Asia. See Fiona Hill, “Central Asia: Terrorism, Religious
Extremism, and Regional Stability,” Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations
Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia (July 23, 2003), 2.
4 Nazif Shahrani, The Islamization of Central Asia: Politics, Economics and Society, Woodrow
Wilson Conference Participant June 11, 2003.

5 The cities of Samarkand and Bukhara grew in wealth and prestige as a result of their location
along the Silk Road, the trade route between the West and East. See Edward W. Walker, “Roots of Rage:
Militant Islam in Central Asia,” Panel presentation at the University of California, Berkeley (October 29,
2001), 1-9. Available at <http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~iseees/>, accessed July 2003.
6 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2002), 26.

7 Walker, 3.
8 Rashid, Jihad, 27.
9 Walker, 3.
10 Shahrani
11 “A History of Islam in Central Asia, Part II,” July 25, 2002. Available at <http:www.muslim-
uzbekistan.com/eng/ennews/2002/07/ennews25072002.html>, accessed July 6, 2003.

12 Walker, 3.
154 PETROS
13 Walker, 4.
15 Walker, 4.
17 Rashid, “Islam in Central Asia: Afghanistan and Pakistan,” 213.
19 Michael Fredholm, Uzbekistan & the Threat From Islamic Extremism, Conflict Studies Re-
search Centre (England: Defense Academy of the United Kingdom), 3.

20 The Ferghana Valley encompasses bordering areas of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan
and claims a population of more than 10 million.

21 Fredholm, 3.
23 Hill, 1.
24 Shireen Hunter, The Islamization of Central Asia: Politics, Economics and Society, Woodrow
Wilson Conference Participant, June 11, 2003.

25 Svante E. Cornell and Regine A. Spector, “Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists,” The
Washington Quarterly (Winter 2002), 194.

28 Central Asia: Islam and the State, (Osh/Brussels: International Crisis Group, July 10, 2003),
4.
29 Walker, 7.
30 Central Asia: Islam and the State, i.
32 “Islam in Central Asia: Contrasts between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan,” The Economist (May
15, 2003). Available at <http://www.uzland.uz/2003/may/16/11.htm>, accessed July 6, 2003.

34 Mike Redman, “Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Making Inroads into Kazakhstan?,” Central Asia-Caucasus
Analyst (June 4, 2003). Available at <http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1460>,

accessed July 6, 2003.
36 Hunter.
38 Rajan Menon, “The New Great Game in Central Asia,” Survival 45(2003), 191.
39 “Frequently Asked Questions about U.S. Policy in Central Asia,” U.S. Department of State Fact
Sheet: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (November 27, 2002). Available at <http://www.state.
gov/p/eur/rls/fs/15562.htm>, accessed July 6, 2003.
40 Cornell and Spector, 196.
41 Fredholm, 2.
43 “Frequently Asked Questions about U.S. Policy in Central Asia”
44 Fredholm, 10.
45 “Islam in Central Asia: Contrasts between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan”
47 Fredholm, 13.
49 For more information on Hizb-ut-tahrir see www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org
50 David Lewis, ICG. Guest speaker at the Brookings Institution on July 11, 2003.
52 Redman.
54 “A History of Islam in Central Asia, Part III,” July 27, 2002. Available at <http:www.muslim-
uzbekistan.com/eng/ennews/2002/07/ennews27072002.html> accessed July 6, 2003.

55 “A History of Islam in Central Asia, Part III”

57 “A History of Islam in Central Asia, Part III”
58 Neighboring Uzbekistan was disturbed by this development.
61 Charles William Maynes, “America Discovers Central Asia,” Foreign Affairs, 82 (2003), 120-
132.
63 Azizulla, ICG. Presenter at the Brookings Institution on July 11, 2003.
156 PETROS
Part II
Economic Concerns
Chapter 8
The Rise of the Post-Soviet

Petro-States: Energy Exports
and Domestic Governance
in Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan
T
he future prospects for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are pre-
sumed to be better than the prospects for most post-Soviet states,
since they are fortunate to have two of the most desirable commod-
ities in the world: oil and gas. Oil is the most important internationally
traded commodity—both in terms of value and volume. It would seem to
follow, then, that possessing oil offers hope to a state that it also will have
wealth and power. Hydrocarbons have indeed captured the lion’s share
of foreign and domestic investment in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan,
and both investment—and the returns that will follow—are expected to
increase in the coming years. But even as Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan
are beginning to enjoy signs of success in the international oil arena, their
domestic economies and political structures are already beginning to show
some of the classic negative side effects of becoming “petro-states,” nations
which are defined and to an increasing extent structured by their role as
oil/gas exporters.
In spite of the perception that oil is a source of wealth for nations
and can be an engine for development, the actual history of political and
economic development in petro-states has not been one of success. In the
words of one analyst, OPEC “is never far from disaster . . . partly because
it’s a cartel of mostly undemocratic, mostly impoverished nations that can
balance their budgets only if oil prices stay above $25 a barrel.”1 In spite of
the original goal of the OPEC states to “sow the oil wealth” and encourage
159
160 SABONIS-HELF
development that would last after their oil monies ran out, OPEC mem-
bers on the whole now suffer double-digit inflation, cost overruns on vast
public projects, insolvent banking sectors, and a collapse of agricultural
and manufacturing sectors in those states that have them.2 Most experts
in the political economy of energy agree that being an oil exporting state
is associated with certain pathological development tendencies, including
lack of transparency, lack of separation of powers within the government,
a conspicuous lack of equitable distribution of wealth and power, high
levels of state debt, and a “permanent tendency toward rent seeking by
state officials.”3
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan both already exhibit some “petro-
state” tendencies. Are the classic political and economic instabilities of
petro-states unavoidable? What are the larger global security ramifications
if Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan continue to fail locally, while succeed-
ing—or at least capturing market share—in global energy markets? This
chapter begins with an overview of the classic problems of the petro-state.
It will review the political and economic trends in Kazakhstan and Turk-
menistan associated with their increasing reliance on energy exports, and
conclude with the potential security implications of these developments.
The Problem of the Petro-State
One commonly known impact of oil booms in countries that have
other, non-oil industries is Dutch Disease, so-called because of the unex-
pected impact the discovery of North Sea gas had on the Dutch economy.
The discovery of gas caused the relative strength of the guilder to increase
dramatically. This, in turn, made Dutch-manufactured products non-
competitive, causing unemployment and inflation within the country.
The nation found itself unexpectedly impoverished by its riches in natural
gas. The Dutch experience has been replicated in many other countries.
In sum, newfound success in oil or gas tends to take a toll on all other
industrial sectors within a country. Persistent Dutch Disease can cause
domestic resources to shift away from traded commodities, such as manu-
factured goods and agriculture, toward non-traded goods, such as services
and transportation.4 This is not inevitable, but aggressive state policies are
needed to protect against such effects.
Kazakhstan has been studying the problem of Dutch Disease since
the early 1990s, and has made an effort to learn from Norway’s successes
in particular. However, Kazakhstan may have chosen to focus on the
wrong petro-state pathology: a single economic effect rather than the
political-economic interactive effects. Evidence from Turkmenistan and
POST-SOVIET PETRO-STATES 161
Kazakhstan suggests that if Dutch Disease is a factor, it is but one of many

pathologies and perhaps one of the lesser challenges these states are likely
to face as they increasingly embrace energy exporting.
In 1979,5 (during the second oil crisis of the 1970s) one of OPEC’s
two founders, Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo, said about the oil in his native
Venezuela: “It is the devil’s excrement. We are drowning in the devil’s
excrement.”6 Within a few years the oil boom had caused dramatic, unan-
ticipated economic and political problems in Venezuela, nearly destroying
the government and the economy. In her book, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil
Booms and Petro-States, Terry Lynn Karl examines Venezuela as a classic
example of a state that found oil booms holding it captive to a particular
path of underdevelopment, rather than providing the hoped-for resources
that would serve as an engine for wider development.
Karl notes that the capital-deficient oil exporting states of Algeria,
Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela—although otherwise very dissimi-
lar—evolved along the same lines following the oil booms of the 1970s.
She demonstrates that these states followed a common trajectory in which
the policy environment first became “petrolized,” serving the interests
of the oil industry, but not the larger state. Vested private interests, once
entrenched, reinforced the further petrolization of the state. Increasingly,
the state relied on “the progressive substitution of public spending for
statecraft,” and state capacity became even weaker. In the final, weakest
stage, oil booms actually had “pernicious effects,” leading to the economic
decline and destabilization of the regimes.7 This grim picture suggests that
oil is a hidden curse, rather than a blessing, for a developing state. Why
does oil appear to have the effect of weakening the state that relies upon
it?
First of all, Karl makes the point that all her case states are “late de-
veloping” states, ones that were on the periphery of an already established
global trading system. Boundaries were given them by colonialism, rather
than established through conflict or negotiation by the states themselves.
As a result, these states experienced oil booms before they had strong na-
tional identities or administrative structures. More important, these states
depended on revenues from export rather than revenues from taxation.
In states that tax a commodity, such as oil, instead of taxing their people,
the state fails to develop a basic accountability link: government spending
tends not to become an issue for public consideration.8 The net result of
reliance on export revenues is that the state is largely free to build a “no
taxation, no representation” system of governance.9 The state tends not to
develop a coherent budgeting system, and since revenues are closely tied to
162 SABONIS-HELF
fluctuations in the price of energy exports, annual revenues are highly un-
predictable. Instead of building a coherent public bureaucracy (the origins
of most government bureaucracies are in taxation), the petro-states tend
to engage in uncontrolled public spending. In years when oil revenues
are less than expected, the promise of oil enables them to borrow. During
times of high revenues, the public perception that oil booms should mean
new benefits for all often leads the state to extend subsidies and take on
expensive projects which cannot be abandoned when oil prices fall. Fur-
ther complicating the problem of fiscal governance, oil booms can throw
the entire petro-state economy into hyperinflation, causing the state to go
further into debt even when revenues are at their highest.10
The limited capacity of a fledgling or weak state makes it more easily
captured by the strongest interests within the state—the energy interests.
Absent transparent democratic institutions, oil interests become the only
actors invited by the government to develop business policies, and hence
become the only non-state (or parastatal) voice that the government hears.
This means that the government increasingly tends to favor the energy
industry over time, and that politicization of the industry is inevitable.11
Limited state capacity also makes it impossible for the state to put in place
policies to protect against the economic effects of Dutch Disease. In the
absence of strong policy measures to diversify the economy, oil tends to
crowd out other sources of national productivity and state revenue, push-
ing the oil exporting state further along the trajectory Karl describes.
The Post-Soviet Petro-State?

If we apply Karl’s definition of the “petro-state,” four post-Soviet
states qualify: Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. In each
case, the oil and/or oil and gas sector is at the center of the state’s economy,
accounting for a high share of total exports and a high share of gross do-
mestic product (GDP).12 For Kazakhstan, oil and oil products constituted
52.8 percent of exports in 2002.13 For Turkmenistan, gas constituted 57
percent of exports in 2002 with oil accounting for an additional 26 per-
cent.14 Karl divides the oil exporting countries into “capital deficient oil ex-
porters” and “capital surplus oil exporters.” Her analysis focuses on capital
deficient oil exporters, which have larger populations, smaller reserves, and
lower per capita incomes than the capital surplus oil exporting states. She
asserts that capital deficient oil-exporting states feel their oil dependency
more acutely because “their opportunities are so clearly bounded.”15
At present, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are capital deficient oil
exporters by this definition,16 possessing skilled labor forces and relatively
diversified economies. They have been net importers of capital and appear
to be capable, in the mid term, of absorbing all the revenues from energy
market booms. In terms of reserves to population ratios and gross national
product (GNP) per capita levels, (measures Karl uses in dividing capital
surplus and capital deficit oil exporting states), they are also comparable to
Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela, all capital-deficient case
states according to Karl.17 Table 8–1 shows these states in comparison with
key OPEC members.
Table 8–1. Examples of Oil/Gas Exporting States18

State Type: Oil Nat Gas Population Oil Reserves GNI per
(Capital Surplus or Reserves Reserves (millions) per capita Capita
Capital Deficient) (billion (trillion (billion bbl (US$)
bbls) cubic feet) per million
persons)
Capital Deficient
Russia 60.000 1680.00 144.8 0.4140 1,750
Kazakhstan 9.000 65.00 14.9 0.6040 1,350
Azerbaijan 7.000 30.00 8.1 0.8642 650
Turkmenistan 0.546 71.00 5.4 0.1011 950
Iran 89.700 812.30 64.7 1.3860 1,680
Venezuela 77.800 148.00 24.6 3.1626 4,760
Capital Surplus
Saudi Arabia 261.800 224.700 21.4 12.2336 8,460
Iraq 112.500 109.80 23.8 4.7269 --
Kuwait 96.500 52.70 2.0 48.2500 18,270
Libya 29.500 46.400 5.4 5.4629 --
All reserves estimates from Energy Information Administration, World Crude Oil and Natural Gas Reserves, Most
Recent Estimates,” from
PennWell Corporation, Oil & Gas Journal, Vol. 100 No. 52 (Dec 23, 2002), can be accessed at: http://www.eia.doe.
gov/emeu/international/
reserves.html
World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank
Gross National Income per capita, World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan both reject the suggestion that they

are developing economies, preferring the World Bank term “economies
in transition.” They do have some characteristics that differentiate them
from typical developing countries: high literacy, full electrification, and
an industrial infrastructure (albeit decaying in many places). Yet although
164 SABONIS-HELF
the distinction between transition economy and developing economy can

be analytically useful, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan also share important
characteristics with developing states that are relevant in examining oil ex-
port dependency: lack of transparent democratic institutions, a post-colo-
nial legacy of limited state capacity (in the Soviet era, all critical decisions
were made in Moscow), bloated public bureaucracies, and incompetent
budgeting systems.
Both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have made fundamentally dif-
ferent choices about the ownership of their oil resources and the appropri-
ate role of the state. In a sense, they are the most-different cases of post-
Soviet petro-states. Is the petro-state model useful given the considerable
differences? What, if anything, can be learned from the experiences of the
OPEC states that might be applicable to both Kazakhstan and Turkmeni-
stan? Sovietologists may be troubled to see the pathologies of Turkmeni-
stan and Kazakhstan explained in oil terms, since non-oil exporting post-
Soviet states share some of the most significant pathologies of corruption
and imploding state capacity. The question of interest here is how, if at all,
these states have managed to use their new-found oil wealth to offset the
difficulties of transition from Soviet rule to independence, and how the
exploitation of hydrocarbons is likely to shape their futures.
The OPEC states, like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, had to over-
come social capital deficits to achieve independence and international
economic power in their post-colonial era. In some important respects,
OPEC states have failed to establish strong governments with internal and
external legitimacy. Might there be a resource-driven model for post-So-
viet transition that can draw usefully from their experience? This chapter
will examine elements of similarity and difference in Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan, with an eye towards highlighting what a petro-state based
analysis can contribute to understanding the evolution of post-Soviet
governance.
The Case of Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan is the post-Soviet state most nearly resembling an
OPEC-style petro-state. One also could observe that it is, perhaps, the
post-Soviet state most nearly resembling the pre-perestroika Soviet Union.
The “Sedar” (Great Leader) and “Turkmenbashi” (Father of the Turkmen),
President-for-Life Saparmurat Niyazov, was a Communist Party boss in
the 1980s, and had significant differences with Gorbachev over the desir-
ability of reforming the Soviet system. After the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Niyazov took his own Republic, renamed the Communist Party
the Democratic Party (now the only legal party in Turkmenistan), and set
out to preserve a Soviet-style authoritarian welfare state in a post-Soviet
world. Mixing Soviet experience with classic OPEC enthusiasm for state
ownership, state welfare, and state interventionism, Turkmenistan appears
to have moved further along Karl’s petro-state trajectory than the other
Caspian states.
Political Factors in Turkmenistan
Politically, Turkmenistan is a highly authoritarian state. The Kalkh
Maslakhaty (The People’s Council) and the Mejles (Parliament) are not
permanent legislative bodies; instead they are convened annually or at
the pleasure of the President. There is virtually no free press. In 2002,
the Special Representative of the Organization for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (OSCE) summarized the situation in Turkmenistan by
saying there existed an “absolute lack of any freedom of expression . . .
unseen in the OSCE region since the establishment of the organization.”19
Turkmenistan has been described as a “sultanistic regime,” a category of
regimes first named by Max Weber, and characterized by personal rule,
large-scale corruption, and manipulation of fear and rewards.20 The key
political aspects of Turkmenistan today include nation-building (that is,
establishing a strong Turkmen identity among citizens), demographics,
and Turkmenistan’s international relations.
Nation-Building
The project of nation-building in a post-colonial state is a critical
task for preserving identity and security. In Turkmenistan, nation-build-
ing has been helped somewhat by the fact that Turkmen constitute 78.5
percent of the population.21 This population is divided among five key
tribal/clan groups, which comprise the five welayats (oblasts) of Turkmen-
istan. Some scholars believe that divisions among these groups are possibly
important faultlines.22 In an effort to build a collective national identity,
Niyazov has incorporated the symbols of each of the five key clans in the
flag. His symbol for the nation, the five-headed eagle, also emphasizes this
unity in diversity.
Russians were previously the largest ethnic minority in the country,
but are currently second with an estimated 5.2 percent.23 Turkmenistan’s
recent unilateral abrogation of the dual-citizenship pact with Russia
means that Turkmenistan no longer recognizes dual citizenship and this
has forced citizens to choose (and has raised significant protest in Russia).
However, it also has had the desired effect of limiting the ability of expa-
166 SABONIS-HELF
triate Turkmen to mount opposition movements from abroad. Currently,

the largest ethnic minority is Uzbek, at 9.8 percent.24 The ethnic Uzbeks
are a matter of some concern, as they are geographically concentrated near
Bukhara, and have more cultural and geographic ties to Uzbekistan than
to their own distant capital of Ashgabad.
Niyazov has made some aggressive efforts toward building a com-
mon national identity. As of 2000, Turkmen is the only state language and
Cyrillic letters have been eliminated systematically from public view. The
state is attempting forced assimilation through actions such as requiring
Turkmen national dress in all schools even for non-Turkmen students.25
The entire nation has adopted the president’s book, Ruhname, for use in
schools at all levels. First published in October 2001, this book is part
history, part religion, and part mythology, placing the Turkmenbashi at
the center of development of the Turkmen state, and Turkmenistan at the
center of the history of mankind. In spite of the sometimes-absurd ele-
ments of the President’s cult of personality, discernable popular discontent
remains low.26 In OPEC states and elsewhere, large-scale prestige projects
are almost always justified in terms of nation-building, and increasing the
pride of citizens in their government. In Turkmenistan, prestige projects
abound. Niyazov has overseen the construction of a new monument every
year since independence, the most recent being a statue in honor of his
book.
Population
Although popular discontent remains low, and services relatively
high, the number of citizens to supply is growing. Population explosion is
a pattern typical of the OPEC states and markedly untypical of the post-
Soviet states. Population explosion, coupled with rising expectations of
that population, could make sustaining the level of state subsidies increas-
ingly difficult over time, as has been the case in OPEC states. Curiously, in
spite of the fact that the population is clearly growing rapidly, it appears
that Turkmenistan is over-reporting its growth.
The Turkmen government claims a population of 5.73 million, an
estimate that the United States has modified to 4.6 million.27 Beneath the
dubious state statistics, there is evidence that the state is having trouble
providing its citizens with full services. Although Turkmenistan’s absolute
poverty level is lower than other Central Asian states—approximately 7
percent in 1998—mortality indicators are worse. At the same time, some
state services have been reduced, most significantly in education. Compul-
sory schooling is now nine years, down from eleven, and free university
education has been abolished. Evening classes also have been eliminated
at the university level.28
International Relations
Key characteristics of the evolution of Turkmenistan in its first de-
cade of independence include state weakness in international relations and
extreme concentration of wealth and power in the hands of the President-
for-Life. Turkmenistan espouses “positive neutrality towards all states,”
an official state policy registered with the United Nations. In practice,
positive neutrality has been a means for Turkmenistan to avoid alliances
and remain isolationist in all matters, except those dealing with the export
of gas. This isolation is seen as necessary for the success of the socialist
experiment at home.
Turkmenistan’s geographic situation as a landlocked, gas exporting
state, poses some persistent challenges. The pipelines built in the Soviet era
all run through Russia, giving the Russians a near-monopoly on transit.
Although Turkmen gas mixes in the pipes with Russian gas, Russia has or-
dered that all Turkmen gas be sold to the “near abroad,” which means the
states of the former Soviet Union. This policy, in place since 1994, forces
Turkmenistan to collect from states with high payment arrears, such as
Ukraine. It also affords Russia the luxury of being able to say to successor
states that it is unable to trade gas debt for political favors. The only exist-
ing non-Russian line to which Turkmenistan has access is the Korpeje-
Kord Kuy pipeline, a small gas line which runs from Turkmenistan to Iran.
This line was opened in 1997 during a period when Turkmenistan had
halted gas exports to Russia, due to Russia’s lack of payment deliveries.29
However, other export routes are possible. The prospective future
pipeline which holds the most attraction for Turkmenistan is the Trans-
Afghan pipeline, a line which would originate in Turkmenistan and then
extend across Afghanistan (avoiding Iran), continue to Pakistan, and pos-
sibly end in India. The Asian Development Bank currently is conducting
a feasibility study on this project, based on a similar project that had been
designed before the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s
enthusiastic pursuit of this pipeline has been an irritant to Russia, as has
Turkmenistan’s decision not to join a “Eurasian Alliance of Gas Produc-
ers,” which Russia attempted to form in 2002. At that time, Turkmenistan
noted that it preferred to engage in bilateral trade.30 Since then, Turkmeni-
stan has been securing long-term contracts with former Soviet republics,
most notably Ukraine. Turkmenistan also has secured a favorable rate
168 SABONIS-HELF
for its gas from Russia, although Russia persists in paying nearly half the
amount in barter.31
In spite of the need to access as many markets as possible and the
fact that Turkmenistan’s share of offshore resources in the Caspian Sea is
considerable under any agreement, Turkmenistan has contributed signifi-
cantly to the stalling of development in the Caspian Sea.32 Turkmenistan’s
position in the Caspian Sea dispute has been inconsistent. Its current
position is that it “favors division of the seabed and water surface with a
condition to keep 20 miles zones (sic) for free navigation.”33 Yet at times,
Turkmenistan has supported Iran’s position—that the sea should be man-
aged as a lake, or divided evenly among the states. Under the median line
approach to the Caspian, Turkmenistan would receive 18 percent, rather
than the 20 percent it would be entitled to under an even division.
The key issue for Turkmenistan is a set of disputes with Azerbaijan
over a field they both claim in the Caspian, called Kyapaz or Serder. The
case has been referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and some
expect their decision to resolve the dispute.34 Until this issue is resolved,
the extent of Turkmenistan’s reserves is difficult to determine—which
accounts, in part, for the wide disparity of estimates among sources. How-
ever, the disagreement is also said to be connected to the personal rivalry
between Niyazov and Azeri former President Heydar Aliyev.35 It may be
the case that a resolution will be possible, now that Aliyev has passed the
presidency to his son. Only a negotiated solution is possible; no scientific
precedent has been set on how to objectively determine if a body of water
is a lake or a sea. The decision of which body of law applies must be made
by the states themselves.
Economic Factors in Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan has a statist, highly indebted economy. Its currency re-
mains unconvertible, and hence the legal and black-market exchange rates
have a great discrepancy. By Turkmen reporting, real GDP has exceeded
1989 levels since 2001; if true, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are the only
former republics with this level of success.36
Structure of the Economy
During the era of OPEC’s rise to power, optimism concerning state-
led development was high. It was believed that the state would “allocate oil
windfalls . . . in such a way as to optimize popular satisfaction.”37 In OPEC
states, state ownership of a majority of the oil industry continues to be
a necessary component of membership. Turkmenistan resembles OPEC
states in its economic structure, in that the state owns an overwhelming

majority of the oil and gas industry. However, state ownership in Turk-
menistan is even more extensive than in most OPEC states, since the gov-
ernment owns and manages all land and industrial structures. In fact, the
state has used its gas wealth to prevent transition away from Soviet-style
welfare authoritarianism.
Turkmenistan is proud that it is the one former Soviet republic that
has not attempted to follow an International Monetary Fund (IMF) pro-
gram for economic restructuring.38 Rather than succumb to the “Washing-
ton consensus” as to the appropriate sequencing of economic transition,
Niyazov has instead pursued an older (and largely discredited) develop-
ment strategy—import substituting industrialization (ISI), and is financ-
ing this ISI strategy with natural gas exports. Turkmenistan has continued
to invest in infrastructure, including non-oil infrastructure. In addition to
the natural gas supply mentioned earlier, railways and motorways also are
under construction, and a rail link was opened with Iran in 1996.39
The price of Niyazov’s “socialism in one country” has been an in-
creasing reliance on gas and oil for state revenues. The statistics in Table
8–2 end with 2001, the last year for which full data is available, but in-
dicators suggest that Turkmenistan’s reliance on hydrocarbon exports is
continuing to increase. This means that the state is increasingly bound to
hydrocarbon revenues, hence, increasingly hostage to fluctuations in price
and increasingly likely to be responsive to the needs of only one industrial
sector: oil and gas.
Table 8–2. Energy as a Percentage of Exports
1998 1999 2000 2001

Turkmenistan 54.7 63.7 79.8 82.9
Kazakhstan 34.9 38.0 50.2 58.1
Russia 36.7 38.9 62.9 61.0
IV Energy data are aggregated somewhat differently for Russia. Estimated from tables in (EIU Russia), including
mineral products and
chemicals. Data from EIU Turkmenistan, and The Economist Intelligence Unit, Kazakhstan Country Profile 2003, and
Russia Country Profice 2003, The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, (Henceforth EIU Kazakhstan, EIU Russia), Lon-
don: 2003
As is common among petro-states, Turkmenistan has suffered from

persistent problems with taxation; personal income tax accounts for only
seven percent of revenues. Of this amount, approximately 68 percent of
170 SABONIS-HELF
revenues collected are in money, with the remainder paid in barter of

goods and services.41 Most tax revenues are from value added taxes (VAT)
and profit tax. The central bank, which had some limited autonomy from
1997 to 1999, now has none. Since the dismissal of its pro-reform director
in May 1999, the Bank’s role is confined to printing money to cover bud-
get deficits and extending credit to state owned companies.42 Even strong
advocates of State Oil Funds for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan concede that,
in a state as strongly presidential and non-transparent as Turkmenistan, a
fund would be unable to have any positive impact.43
Investment Climate
Turkmenistan has sought to attract foreign investment, but the
perception that the business environment is unfavorable and the legal
and regulatory systems non-transparent have caused investors to forgo
most opportunities. The size of the shadow economy in Turkmenistan is
estimated as 60 percent of the official GDP, which is in the upper half of
Central Asian economies.44 As is typical in petro-states, political power
is closely intertwined with the hydrocarbons sector. President Niyazov is
said to approve all contract awards personally.45 Another indicator of the
flow of energy and power is that the President’s son, Murad Niyazov, is an
owner of an offshore firm, registered in Cyprus, which is responsible for
receiving payments for gas consumed by Ukraine.46 The government has a
reputation for shifting policies and demanding changes in already existing
contracts, at the whim of the President. Consequently, Turkmenistan has
one of the lowest private sector-to-GDP ratios in the region, estimated by
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to be 25
percent.47 Of an original list of 4,300 small enterprises and 280 medium-
sized enterprises supposedly available for privatization, only 200 of the
smaller and six of the medium had been sold by June 2000.48 Even the oil
and gas enterprises have trouble attracting investment.49
A key barrier to investment remains the lack of transparency of all
government statistics. Uncertainty about the population of Turkmenistan
already has been mentioned. There is also uncertainty about as basic an
issue as whether Turkmenistan possesses the eleventh largest proven gas
reserves in the world50or the fifth largest.51 With such information being
self-reported,52 Turkmenistan’s statistics in all sectors continue to be re-
garded as highly suspect. GDP is similarly difficult to estimate. EBRD,
using a weighted average of official and unofficial exchange rates, arrives
at the figure of $538, while the Economist Intelligence Unit, by estimating
purchasing power parity, proposes $2574 as a more accurate reflection.53
Corruption, a standard feature of petro-states, is a definite problem. In

spite of the high level of authoritarianism, corruption is widespread and
borders are notoriously porous. In addition, Turkmenistan has a reputa-
tion for being a significant transit point for trafficking in narcotics and
arms.54
Debt
Hydrocarbon industries dominate the economy, while the second
largest industrial sector—construction—is financed largely by Niyazov’s
enthusiasm for prestige projects. As a result of large-scale subsidies, pres-
tige projects, and state mismanagement of the economy, Turkmenistan
already qualifies as a highly indebted country under World Bank classifica-
tions.55 In contrast to the Russian experience (where windfalls in oil were
immediately used in part for debt reduction), Turkmenistan appears to be
continuing along a path of increasing indebtedness.
Table 8–3. Debt as a Percentage of GDP
1997 1998 1999 2000

Turkmenistan 50.6 64.6 NA NA
Kazakhstan 19.2 27.3 36.2 36.4
Russia 31.5 65.6 89.0 61.7
Data from (EIU Turkmenistan), (EIU Kazakhstan), (EIU Russia), Reference Tables from the appendices
Part of the debt can be accounted for by problems in 1997, when

Turkmenistan ceased exporting gas during disputes with Russia about
non-payment. But this does not fully account for the sheer magnitude of
debt as shown in Table 8–3. High spending on domestic subsidies is typical
of petro-states. It is estimated by a former Iranian Finance Minister that
subsidies in the Persian Gulf ran as high as 10 to 20 percent in some years
of the 1970s and 1980s.57 Turkmenistan follows in this tradition. Domestic
energy consumption is highly subsidized. Every citizen has a free natural
gas quota, and far more households are connected to gas now than were
10 years ago. By 1999, fully 92 percent of households were connected, up
from 40 percent in 1990.58 This demonstrates a significant state commit-
ment to expanding subsidies. In Turkmenistan a driver pays 400 manat
(two cents) for a liter of gasoline, which is less than half the 1000 manat
(four cents) he would pay for a liter of bottled water.59
172 SABONIS-HELF
The World Bank estimates that currently in Turkmenistan, 21 per-

cent of GDP is spent on subsidies for oil and gas alone.60 One side effect of
this high level of energy subsidies is that consumption of energy per unit
of GDP is estimated to be 13 times the U.S. level, making Turkmenistan
the least efficient in a region of relatively inefficient countries.61 Although
energy is the most significant sector in terms of government subsidies,
water is also heavily subsidized, which has important implications for the
viability of agriculture in Turkmenistan.
Threats and Patterns of Governance
The governance strategy in Turkmenistan is one familiar to many
OPEC states: following the “no taxation, no representation” model, the
state is failing to establish competence in taxing or budgeting. A complete
lack of transparency has made even the most basic statistics suspect, yet—
based on the promise of hydrocarbons—the international community
remains willing to lend money where it is unwilling to invest. President
Niyazov has relied on hydrocarbon revenues to support a high level of
uncontrolled public spending. In years of low gas export revenues, he has
been willing to assume vast national debt in an effort to keep his people
from experiencing a decline in their Soviet-era living standard. In effect,
President Niyazov has implemented—for the time being—the system that
Brezhnev attempted to apply to the whole Soviet Union: use of energy
export revenues as a substitute for economic reform.
The key threats to Turkmenistan appear to be continued high debt
levels and the complete absence of an apparent line of succession. The debt
will be inherited by any subsequent government, even one that decides
to make less of a commitment to state subsidies. The lack of an apparent
successor (Ministers who attain too high a level of visibility are sacked,
and the Parliament is generally regarded as being laughably weak) almost
ensures that chaos will follow in the wake of the “Great Leader’s” passing.
Due to Russian and Iranian interests in the stability of the gas fields in
Turkmenistan, a period of chaos in Turkmenistan could leave both Russia
and Iran tempted to intervene.
The Case of Kazakhstan

Key characteristics of the evolution of Kazakhstan in its first decade
of independence include continuing state weakness and limited state
capacity, as well as increasing concentration of wealth and power in the
hands of a few. Like Turkmenistan, it can be classified as a “sultanistic
regime,”62 a state that runs on highly personalized leadership, corruption,
fear, and systematic rewards. In three significant areas—ownership, geog-

raphy, and demography—Kazakhstan differs from the typical petro-state.
Kazakhstan’s approach to ownership reflected the post-Soviet pessimism
about state-led development. Instead of considering oil revenues as be-
longing to “the nation as a whole,” as do all the OPEC member states,63
Kazakhstan has chosen to allow privatization and an unusually high level
of direct international investment in extraction and development of the
oil sector. In March 2002, in recognition of the openness of its market,
Kazakhstan became the first CIS country to be granted a “market economy
country” status by the United States.64
Political Factors in Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan is nominally democratic, but in reality it is a highly presi-
dential, authoritarian state, though much more open and pluralist than
Turkmenistan. The Senate (upper house) and the Majilis (lower house)
are permanent legislative bodies, although they typically rely on leadership
from the Ministries and Presidential apparat. Key opposition leaders are
in exile, and political parties other than those supportive of the President
do not tend to endure. Members of President Nursultan Nazarbaev’s ex-
tended family own substantial stakes in promising private and parastatal
industries. Key political aspects of Kazakhstan include the task of nation-
building (that is, establishing a strong Kazakh identity among citizens),
demographic information, and Kazakhstan’s international relations.
Nation Building
Nation-building in a post-colonial state is a critical task for preserva-
tion of identity and security. Like many late-developing states, Kazakhstan
faces significant challenges in its efforts towards nation-building. With the
collapse of the Soviet Union, it inherited boundaries that do not reflect
a polity with strong national loyalties or identity. In fact, Kazakhs, who
constitute 53.4 percent of the population,65 only achieved the status of an
absolute majority in Kazakhstan following independence. Russians make
up the largest minority ethnic group, with 30 percent of the population.
Ukrainians and Uzbeks make up the next largest minorities with 3.7 and
2.5 percent, respectively.66 The state was not unified by a struggle for in-
dependence. Rather, independence was thrust upon it when the Kazakh
President and Communist Party Chief Nursultan Nazarbaev failed in his
long-standing efforts to negotiate a compromise between Gorbachev and
Yeltsin to prevent the Soviet Union from collapsing. With the onset of
independence, Nazarbaev became the leader of a state with limited capac-
174 SABONIS-HELF
ity to govern. Under the Soviet empire, all bureaucracy in the Soviet-era
capital of Almaty was designed to require direction from Moscow.
In OPEC states and elsewhere, large-scale prestige projects are al-
most always justified in terms of nation-building, and some do increase
the pride of citizens in their government. In Kazakhstan, the key prestige
project has been construction of the new capitol city, Astana. Although the
reason for moving the capitol is oft-debated, it probably was done for a
mix of reasons, including an effort to better integrate the northern portion
of the country, a desire to bring the center of power closer to Russia, and
a desire of President Nazarbaev to create a new post-Soviet city to his own
specifications, in the region of his own clan.
Population
Kazakhstan’s demography and declining population appear to pose
something of an opportunity to the state. In contrast to most OPEC states,
which experienced dramatic population growth with their prosperity,
the Kazakh government is more concerned about stemming population
decline. The 2000 census delivered the unwelcome news that the popula-
tion since independence had declined from 16.1 million in 1989 to 14.8
million. Much of the decrease can be attributed to emigration. A dispro-
portionate share of emigrants have been ethnic Russians, which has caused
a “brain-drain” of some key skills. At the same time, however, this has en-
abled ethnic Kazakhs to become a majority in their own territory for the
first time since the 1920s.67 Declining population eventually may lead to a
shortage of manpower and other challenges, but it does spare Kazakhstan
the classic developing petro-state challenge of meeting the rising expecta-
tions of a burgeoning population.
International Relations
Kazakhstan’s geographic situation poses some persistent challenges
for the country. As a landlocked, oil-exporting nation, distant from all its
prospective consumers,68 Kazakhstan is faced with the strategically critical
choice of how to bring its oil to market. As in the case of Turkmenistan,
this geographic factor forces the government to commit to long-term ex-
port strategies. The pipelines built in the Soviet era all run through Russia,
giving the Russians a monopoly on transit of Kazakh oil. Russia has al-
located irregular space in its pipelines to Kazakhstan since independence,
consistently favoring Russian oil. In an effort to create a pipeline just for
Kazakhstan, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) was founded in 1993
and the pipeline opened in the summer of 2001. This pipeline also runs
across Russian territory, but is owned by a mixture of state and private

actors. However, problems with Russia over transit fees and privileges
have persisted. In just one example, Russia is seeking to extend access to
the pipeline to non-shareholders at shareholder rates.69 Until an alternate
route is constructed that does not cross Russia, Kazakhstan will remain
reliant on Russian goodwill to get its oil to market.
Non-Russian possibilities for the future export of Kazakh oil do
exist. China, for one, has expressed interest in an eastbound pipeline. Yet
Russian-Kazakh trade relations remain fairly positive due to the power
asymmetry between the states. Since September 11, the United States has
encouraged Russia to make good-faith agreements with Kazakhstan to
discourage the Kazakhs from moving more towards OPEC’s sphere of in-
fluence. Kazakhstan and Russia, together with Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Ta-
jikistan, are striving for a “harmonization of legislation” as a component of
an eventual free trade zone. This movement towards harmonization gives
Kazakhstan the opportunity to avoid capacity building. It also means that
Kazakhstani legislation, in many sectors, is based very closely on existing
Russian laws. Critics claim that the harmonization amounts to “legislation
by white-out.” It also ensures that weaknesses in Russian laws will most
likely be passed on to the other four states.
One aspect of Russian-Kazakhstan cooperation has been on the Cas-
pian Sea issue.70 Kazakhstan consistently has supported the Russian posi-
tion. When the positions of the other littoral parties remained unchanged
after several years of negotiations, Russia and Kazakhstan were the first to
sign a bilateral agreement in 1998, which marked borders on the seabed
in keeping with the “Median Line” solution.71 One cost to Kazakhstan of
the Caspian Sea dispute that remains unresolved is that several pipeline
options cannot be pursued without a resolution. The United States has
expressed interest in Kazakhstan joining the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline
currently under construction. While the government of Kazakhstan ex-
presses interest in each new option, at present no non-Russian routes are
under construction.72
Economic Factors in Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan has an open economy. The currency is fully convertible
and has been relatively stable since 1998. Real GDP has yet to exceed 1989
levels, but Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian state to have attained a
GNP of over $1,000 per capita.73 Kazakhstan also has a relatively small
shadow economy, estimated at only 39 percent of its official GDP.74 Wealth
is very unevenly distributed, however, with 26 percent of the population
176 SABONIS-HELF
below the poverty line.75 Due, in part, to the high level of foreign invest-
ment, the UN Human Development Index ranks quality of life in Kazakh-
stan as the highest in Central Asia and the Caucasus.76
Structure of Economy
Kazakhstan, like most post-Soviet states, came to independence with
a profound skepticism about the state’s role in all sectors of social and
economic development. Turkmenistan, in which the state retained control
of most sectors, was the exception rather than the rule. In Kazakhstan, the
state made little effort to cushion its population from the economic im-
pacts of the Soviet Union’s collapse. Instead, in the early years of indepen-
dence, the population (like that in many other post-Soviet states) had their
expectations dramatically reduced, even as oil production was beginning
to provide windfalls to the state and elites.
Kazakhstan received enthusiastic support from international finan-
cial institutions and from the oil interests for its early decision to privatize
most of the economy, including the oil sector. This privatization had the
positive effect of preventing the state from sharply expanding, as hap-
pened in OPEC states during oil booms. Instead, Kazakhstan’s oil industry
rapidly became dependent on foreign investment; in the first quarter of
2002, foreign investors underwrote 80 percent of oil production.77 Foreign
investment was attractive initially because it had the short-term effect of
providing emergency revenue in the wake of the Soviet collapse. Privatiza-
tion was used to fill the budgetary gap, particularly during the time period
of 1996 to 1998.78
Because of the dramatic opening of its industry to foreign invest-
ment as well as the simultaneous privatization of the domestic energy
sector, by 1998 Kazakhstan was the largest per capita recipient of direct
foreign investment in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).79
Yet in retrospect, the rush to privatize is sometimes regretted. As the state
enjoys more success in oil exports, the government on several occasions
has expressed a desire to renegotiate its contracts with foreign investors,
many of which it now feels were not designed sufficiently in its favor.
Although the government is reluctant to improve its capacity in
terms of its ability to tax or provide services, it has not been immune
to the temptation of “prestige” projects. Such projects are a hallmark of
petro-states and the new capital of Astana is a classic example. A richer and
more established state, Germany, opted in recent years to move its capital
slowly to Berlin, in order to reduce the cost. By contrast, government min-
istries in Kazakhstan were ordered to relocate to Astana within a year of
the presidential announcement designating the new capital. Converting a

small, provincial town in the Virgin Lands of the steppe into the nation’s
capital has been an expensive project, and a top investment priority for
the government. Construction in Astana is estimated to have cost at least
$500 million by 1999, not including the power and water infrastructure
that was sorely needed.80 In addition to direct government projects, oil
companies, both foreign and domestic, also were expected to contribute to
the President’s new city. Luong estimates that Kazakh oil alone has spent
$25 to 30 million in improvements in Astana.81
The Kazakh state also has failed to address the issue of taxation.
State revenues declined to 20 percent of GDP by 1995, and dropped by
an additional six percent in 1996. By 1997, the government acknowledged
that it had been failing to collect taxes effectively, and created a new State
Revenues Ministry. This Ministry was tasked with responsibility for fiscal
policy, tax regulation, and customs. Tax revenues, as a percentage of GDP,
continued their decline in 1998.82 This lack of success is best explained by
the government’s conviction that it can rely primarily on oil and gas rev-
enues; in 1998, it borrowed money rather than improving tax collection
methods. The lack of success in raising tax revenues for the federal budget
also may be explained by the simple fact that the State Revenues Ministry,
like most lucrative Ministries, is headed by a relative of the President and
has the power to determine the type and level of taxes applicable to each
new oil contract. These contracts must be made directly with the govern-
ment, each is unique and each is reviewed by President Nazarbaev.83
With the failure of other forms of taxation, increasing reliance on
oil for state revenues has been inevitable. Energy exports constitute an
increasing share of all exports in Kazakhstan, rising to the current level
of 58.1 percent of total exports (see Table 8–2). Although energy as a per-
centage of exports remains lower in Kazakhstan than in Turkmenistan, the
rates of increase are similar; Kazakhstan’s reliance increased 23.2 percent
from 1998 to 2001, only slightly less than Turkmenistan’s increase of 28.2
percent during the same time period. Again, increased reliance means the
Kazakh state is increasingly hostage to fluctuations in price and export
levels, and the state is therefore increasingly likely to be responsive to the
needs of the oil sector alone. One very good sign in Kazakhstan is the es-
tablishment of a new State Oil Fund, designed to provide consistent fund-
ing to the social sector. This is an oft-recommended strategy for improving
the fiscal competence of petro-states.84 Its success, however, depends on it
being run in a transparent manner.
178 SABONIS-HELF
Investment Climate
Although privatization may have limited expansion of the state, it has
not begun separating money from power. The presidential family remains
vital to all oil deals, and the President himself is the principal partner of
a number of major energy companies operating in Kazakhstan. The link
between economic and political outcomes is both typical of petro-states
and reminiscent of the former socialist systems.85 It also leads inevitably to
corrupt practices on the part of the foreign oil companies attempting to do
business in Kazakhstan, as evidenced by the investigation of Exxon Mobil,
said to be the largest U.S. investigation of alleged bribery abroad under
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.86 The level of corruption at the highest
levels is widely recognized: in June 2000, a bill in parliament assured the
President and his family lifetime immunity from charges of corruption.87
Kazakhstan has managed to put a spin on privatization that is a curi-
ous inverse of the tendency of the petro-state to expand. Instead, multina-
tional corporations operating in Kazakhstan were asked, in the early crisis
years, to assume certain social costs—in lieu of paying taxes. Hence, com-
panies took on tasks such as paying back wages, building roads, and fund-
ing schools. Such participation had the short-term effect of making the
regions more welcoming to foreign investment, but the long-term effect
has been to deprive the federal government of revenues (tax exemptions
were offered in exchange for these services at the local level). This practice
also has served to trap the foreign companies into running Soviet-style
“company towns,” rather than devolving the management of such towns
to local, elected authorities. The predictable consequence of such schemes,
as Luong notes, has been “to place both the responsibility and the blame
for local socioeconomic conditions on foreign investors rather than on
government officials.”88
A similar strategy was pursued when the insolvent electricity sector
was sold to foreign investors; the government was able to direct the inevi-
table citizen hostility about higher tariffs towards the foreign investors and
away from the state. The Belgian electricity company, Tractebel, is under
investigation in Belgium for allegedly paying $55 million in bribes to its
Kazakh business partners. Apparently, the money bought Tractebel very
little, since regulators refused to raise the electricity rates, the life of the
chief Tractebel representative has been threatened, and Tractebel ended
up selling its holdings to a state company for $100 million—about half the
amount it had invested.89
Debt
With the inability to tax or provide social services, coupled with
presidential fondness for the new capital city, it is not surprising that Ka-
zakhstan’s external debt is rising. Although Kazakhstan’s debt as percent-
age of GDP (36.4 percent in 2000—see Table 8–3) seems low compared
to Turkmenistan (64.6 percent in 1998 and rising), in absolute terms Ka-
zakhstan, by 1997, had accumulated the third largest debt among former
Soviet republics, following Russia and Ukraine. As early as 1996, the state
was spending almost 10 percent of its budget on debt service, while cut-
ting back on domestic social programs.90 A local journalist estimates that
public expenditures by 1998 were running a half to a third of pre-inde-
pendence levels.91
Threats and Patterns of Governance
Although a much weaker—and less ambitious—state than Turk-
menistan, Kazakhstan also appears to follow the “no taxation, no represen-
tation” model familiar to OPEC states. Kazakhstan has failed to establish
competence in taxation or budgeting. Transparency and high levels of
corruption remain problematic. Rapid privatization was a short-term so-
lution to offset the costs of collapse of the Soviet Union, but the one-time
influx of revenues did not solve the deeper problems. In an effort to pro-
tect the weak state, without making efforts to strengthen its competence,
Kazakhstan apparently has relied on a strategy of privatizing and using
that privatization to shuttle blame for government deficiencies to foreign
investors.
Kazakhstan does have some characteristics that may enable its devel-
opment to depart from the classic petro-state pattern. Privatization is an
encouraging sign, offering the potential of some market controls on gov-
ernment behavior. The State Oil Fund, if properly managed, may provide
some fiscal discipline. The demographic decline of Kazakhstan suggests
it will not be subject to the kind of social pressures caused by dramatic
population increases in OPEC and other states such as Iran, Nigeria, and
Indonesia.
However, if we match the evidence from Kazakhstan with Karl’s
trajectory, it appears that Kazakhstan has more in common with the
“petrolization” trajectory than not. “Petrolization,” that is, “a process by
which states become dependent on oil exports and their polities develop
an addiction to petrodollars,”92 does appear to be under way. The state has
not yet moved to dramatic public spending, but neither has it improved its
state capacity or bureaucratic competence. Instead, the state appears to be
180 SABONIS-HELF
capturing oil rents without accepting obligations to its people. This may be
the first of the anticipated “pernicious effects,” which will lead to economic
decline and destabilization of the regime, but it is too early to say. For the
moment, Kazakhstan watchers are more concerned that, as Luong notes:
if current trends continue, Kazakhstan will emerge as a quasi-state
– that is, one with international legitimacy but without the domestic
capacity to generate sufficient revenue, address basic social problems,
and promote even minimum levels of economic growth.93
As Kazakhstan continues to increase reliance on oil exports, and
continues to fail to develop bureaucratic competence, one troubling
trend is that, as a state with significant oil reserves, it can continue to
borrow money in the international community. It thereby avoids struc-
tural changes and ensures that future generations will inherit substantial
debt, as well as incoherent political and bureaucratic structures. Another
troubling trend is that economic success in oil has not motivated the state
to increase its provision of social goods, in spite of having acquired the
resources necessary to do so. Public expectations for state support remain
low. Instead of taking an OPEC-style approach toward “sowing the oil
wealth,” elites, and particularly the presidential family, have treated their
own state as a colony to be exploited. This, in the end, will constitute the
greatest threat to stability.
Petro-State Pathologies
An analysis that fails to take petro-state behavior into account may
simply conclude that the problem in Turkmenistan is too much state,
whereas the problem in Kazakhstan is not enough. A petro-state based
analysis, on the other hand, offers some insight into the similarities of
these states and their problems. Given the trajectory of oil-led develop-
ment in other states, we cannot assume that the problems of either state
will recede as they develop. Instead, we should expect that the transition to
truly strong states will simply not occur here. Karl notes:
That the petro-state depends on revenues generated by a depletable
commodity, that this commodity produces extraordinary rents, and
that these rents are funneled through weak institutions virtually
ensure that the public sector will lack the authority and corporate
cohesiveness necessary to exercise effective capacity.94
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are best understood as states tempted
by the “no taxation, no representation” model characteristic of OPEC
states. Because there is wealth to be had, and because all decisions are
political, rent seeking by state officials promises to be a permanent ten-
dency.95 The states have not developed coherent budgeting systems or
public bureaucracies—and wealth from hydrocarbon revenues means that
they may indefinitely delay in these tasks. The two have different spending
patterns, but both have been free to borrow against the future, since the
international community has faith in the value of the energy resources,
even if not in the wisdom of the states managing it. Early evidence suggests
that the energy interests within the states are already capturing the state,
and that these interests do not serve the cause of expanding democracy.
In both states, although evidence of Dutch Disease is difficult to separate
from the problems inherent in moving away from Soviet economies, there
is evidence that other sectors continue to be pushed out by the oil sec-
tor, and that the state is falling further into disrepair in spite of increased
wealth.
A petro-state based analysis offers a useful framework for outlining
what is likely to happen to these states, and what trends should be most
closely monitored. It is also useful in explaining how the future of the
energy-rich post-Soviet states (including Russia and Azerbaijan as well
as Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan) is likely to differ politically, as well as
economically, from other post-Soviet states.
Global Security Implications
The centrality of hydrocarbons to the economies of Turkmenistan
and Kazakhstan should not be confused with their significance to interna-
tional energy markets. The resources of Central Asia represent incremental
not large additions to the potential world supply. They may be significant
at the margins, but the proven reserves suggest that these resources will be
more important to the region and for would-be importing states such as
Turkey and Pakistan, than to world markets overall. What these resources
do represent are new avenues that could support diversity of supply, the
possibility of new oil and gas supply routes to regions currently facing
energy deficits, and new opportunities for investment for hydrocarbon
companies long locked out of Middle East development.
There is little doubt that, in spite of important gains in efficiency,
rising standards of living necessitate rising energy needs in the develop-
ing world. Hence, world demand for energy will continue to increase. The
International Energy Agency predicts that world oil demand alone by 2010
will be 90 million bbl/day, which is 17 percent greater than present.96 The
age of oil is not yet past, nor is the boom and bust cycle that has character-
182 SABONIS-HELF
ized oil markets. The age of gas has barely begun, as European states es-
tablish policies that make gas an attractive source of energy. Turkmenistan
and Kazakhstan offer the promise of an alternative to OPEC. The risks,
however, are evident.
In the case of Turkmenistan, its resemblance to OPEC states is al-
ready striking. The high debt levels, over-extension of the state, absence
of a line of succession, as well as the strategic sensitivity of its location,
all make it difficult to argue that reliance on Turkmenistan for resources
is in any way more sound than reliance on the OPEC states. In the case of
Kazakhstan, one cannot be too sanguine about the ability of privatization
to offset the pathologies associated with petro-states. Even if assets are
nominally privatized, Kazakhstan remains a state politicized in the man-
ner of other petro-states. Western states and investors should not be so
enamored as to forget that:
private sectors are just as rent-seeking as political authorities in oil-
exporting countries, and systematically pressure these authorities to
funnel oil money in their direction to finance inefficient and unpro-
ductive activities.97
A climate in which a wealthy state remains weak, accepting little ob-
ligation to provide social benefits for its population, is not superior to an
over-extended state with limited capacity, and no more secure.
The possible regional and global implications of petrolization of
either Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan need to be examined in a security
context—especially if oil booms in an era of increasing scarcity actually
have the “pernicious effects” of economic decline and regime destabiliza-
tion. If diversification from OPEC sources leads to expanding the number
of states with OPEC-like instabilities, the problem of avoiding petroliza-
tion should receive the active attention of both the oil importing, as well
as exporting states.
Notes
1 Justin Fox, “OPEC Has a Brand-New Groove,” Fortune, October 14, 2002, 115.
2 Terry Lynn Karl, “Crude Calculations: OPEC Lessons for the Caspian Region,” Chapter 3 in
Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, eds. (Maryland:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 35.
3 Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1997), 63.

4 See Jahangir Amuzegar, Managing the Oil Wealth: OPEC’s Windfalls and Pitfalls (London
and New York: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2001), 19-21, for a fuller discussion. Amuzegar is more skeptical of
the economics of Dutch Disease than most analysts. He asserts that the Dutch Disease effect does not
necessarily hold in countries with high unemployment.
5 During this crisis, the price of oil jumped from $13 to $34 per bbl.
6 Qtd. in Karl, Petro-States, 4.
7 Karl, Petro-States, Chapter 1.
8 See Karl, Petro-States, Chapter 3 for a full discussion of the importance of a citizen tax base.
9 The application of “no taxation, no representation” to oil states is frequent in the literature.
Its origins are unclear.

10 The OPEC states have seen debt increase with each oil boom. See tables in Karl, Petro-States,
appendix.
11 See Karl, Caspian, 39.
12 The World Bank uses 10 percent of GDP and 40 percent of total merchandise exports to
classify a mineral economy. Karl applies the same formula to classify an oil economy. See Karl, Petro-
States, Chapter 1. At the present time, Azerbaijan is the most reliant of the four on oil exports, at 90
percent of exports in 2002.
13 CIA World Factbook, section on Kazakhstan.
14 Ibid., section on Turkmenistan.
15 Karl, Petro-States, 18.
16 Karl has postulated that Kazakhstan may become a capital surplus state in the future, since
it is more sparsely populated, and additional reserves are likely to be discovered (see Karl, Caspian,
29). However, Kazakhstan’s population is large by capital surplus state standards: Iraq, with its 1973
population of 10.41 million, is the most populous of the capital-surplus states. In spite of its limited oil
reserves, Turkmenistan is presumed to have the fifth largest gas reserves in the world. Given its sparse
population, it may become a capital surplus state. At the moment, however, its export routes and op-
tions are sufficiently constrained that it is not functioning as a capital surplus state.
17 Karl, Petro-States, Chapter 2.
18 For a similar chart of non-FSU countries, see Karl, Petro-States, 18.
19 Quoted in Turkmenistan Country Profile 2003 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit
Limited, (Henceforth EIU Turkmenistan), 2003), 16.

20 See Tanya Charlick-Paley, with Phil Williams and Olga Oliker, “The Political Evolution of
Central Asia and South Caucasus: Implications for Regional Security,” Chapter 2 in Faultlines of Con-
flict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the US Army, Olga Oliker and Thomas S.
Szayna, eds., RAND Document Number MR-1598-A, 2003, 13-14.
21 Thomas Szayna, “Potential for Ethnic Conflict in the Caspian Region,” Chapter 6 in Faultlines
of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, Olga Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna, eds. (California
and Washington DC: RAND, 2003), Table 6.8.
22 See Nancy Lubin, “Turkmenistan’s Energy: A Source of Wealth or Instability?” Chapter 6 in
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000).
23 Szayna, Table 6.8.
24 Ibid., Table 6.8.
25 EIU Turkmenistan.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 12.
28 Ibid., 13 and 20.
29 Lubin, 108.
30 “Turkmenistan Undecided on Whether to Join Eurasian ‘Gas OPEC’” Interfax News Agency,
Petroleum Report, July 24, 2002.

31 The current price, $44, is actually more than Turkmenistan would be likely to get from
Western users, but Russia is currently paying half the amount in barter. Industry experts, personal
interviews, Sept. 2003.
32 In a condominium agreement, all littoral states would have an equal share in the lake’s
resources, regardless of the extent of their coastline, and would confer with each other on activities
taken in the lake. Under a sea agreement, the littoral states would have exclusive economic zones and
184 SABONIS-HELF
free passage under the Law of the Sea. For a detailed discussion of the Caspian Sea issue, see Gawdat
Bahgat, “Splitting Water: The Geopolitics of Water Resources in the Caspian Sea,” SAIS Review, Vol.
XXII, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2002).
33 “Caspian Legal Regime,” summarized by the International Center for Caspian Studies,
<http://caspiancenter.org/info_sp.shtml>.
34 CIA World Factbook, Turkmenistan.
35 See Martha Brill Olcott, “Regional Cooperation in Central Asia and the South Caucasus,”
Chapter 7 in Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, eds.,
(Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000).
36 EIU Turkmenistan, 25.
37 Amuzegar, 14.
38 EIU, Turkmenistan, 21.
39 Ibid., 16.
40 Data from EIU Turkmenistan, and The Economist Intelligence Unit, Kazakhstan Country
Profile 2003, and Russia Country Profile 2003 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited,
(Henceforth EIU Kazakhstan, EIU Russia), 2003).
42 Ibid., 8.
43 Svetlana Tsalik, “The Hazards of Petroleum Wealth,” Chapter 1 in Caspian Oil Windfalls:
Who Will Benefit?, Svetlana Tsalik and Robert Ebel, eds. (Washington, DC: Central Eurasia Project,
2003), 12.
44 Phil Williams, “Criminalization and Stability in Central Asia and South Caucasus,” Chapter
4 in Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, Olga Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna,
eds. (Washington, DC: RAND, 2003), Table 4-1.
45 Lubin, 114.
46 Centrasia, Daily Report 29 November, Russian-language Central Asian news site, at: <www.
centrasia.ru>.
47 EIU Turkmenistan, 18 and 22.
48 Ibid., 22.
49 Dragon Oil from UAE and Monument from the UK are involved in exploration--a small
list, compared to activity in other post-Soviet, energy-rich states.

50 EIU, Turkmenistan.
51 CIA World Factbook, Turkmenistan.
52 This is also because Turkmenistan prefers to count reserves that are in a Caspian Sea area
where their ownership is disputed by Azerbaijan.

54 See Lubin. Also see Williams.
56 Data from EIU Turkmenistan, EIU Kazakhstan, EIU Russia; Reference Tables from the ap-
pendices.
57 Iranian Finance Minister Jahangir Amuzegar, cited by Karl in Caspian, 36.
59 Interviews, taxi drivers in Ashgabad, October 2003.
61 Ibid., 16.
62 See Charlick-Paley.
63 See Amuzegar, Chapter 1.
64 Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “Kazakhstan in Brief,” June 2002.
65 Szayna, Table 6.5.
66 Ibid., Table 6.5.
67 EIU Kazakhstan, 15.

68 As Karl notes in Caspian, 33, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are the only oil
exporting states without sea access.
69 EIU Kazakhstan, 21.
70 Russia has long supported the notion of free passage, with clear allocation of seabed rights.
(This is usually known as the Median line solution). For a full discussion, see Bahgat SAIS.
71 A median line solution would divide the Caspian Sea in accordance with the Law of the Sea
treaty. See earlier section on Turkmenistan’s international relations issues for an explanation of the
median line debate.
72 As noted, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route is a non-Russian route, but for Kazakhstan to con-
nect with it will require construction of undersea lines in the Caspian.

73Abraham S. Becker, “Some Economic Dimensions of Security in Central Asia and South Cau-
casus,” Chapter 3 Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the US
Army, eds. Olga Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna, RAND Document Number MR-1598-A, 2003.
74 Williams, Table 4-1.
75 CIA World Factbook, Kazakhstan.
76 Williams, 74.
77 EIU Kazakhstan.
78 Pauline Jones Luong, “Kazakhstan: The Long-Term Costs of Short-Term Gains,” Chapter 5 in
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 80.
79 Luong, 88.
80 Ibid., 84.
81 Ibid., as of 1999.
82 Ibid., 85.
83 Karl, Caspian, 46.
84 See Tsalik for details
85 Karl, Caspian, 40
86 Steve LeVine, “US Bribery Probe Looks at Mobil-Firm’s Role in Payments to High Kazakh
Officials is Under Investigation,” Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2003, A2.
87 Charlick-Paley, 18.
88 Luong, 90.
89 Douglas Frantz, “Generating Much Heat but no Kazakh Profits,” The New York Times, May
13, 2001, start page 3.8.

90 Luong.
91 Cited in Luong, 87.
92 Karl, Caspian, 37.
93 Luong, 80.
94 Karl, Petro-States, 58.
95 Ibid., 63.
96 International Energy Association, International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2000,
The International Energy Agency, Paris: 2000. See website: www.iea.org/

97Karl, Caspian, 37.
186 SABONIS-HELF
Chapter 9
Cooperative Management
of Transboundary Water
Resources in Central Asia
Daene C. McKinney
S
ince independence a little more than a decade ago, the Central Asian
republics have been striving to develop fair and rational bases for
sharing and using their water and energy resources. Inheriting a
legacy of unsustainable economic development and environmental mis-
management, these former Soviet countries have faced extreme economic
inefficiencies and ecological damage in their attempts to transition to mar-
ket economies. The Central Asian republics depend on the rivers of the
Aral Sea Basin for drinking water, irrigation, and hydroelectric power. In
the upstream countries of the Basin, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the rivers
are used for hydroelectric power, especially during winter months, while
downstream, in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, they are used
for agricultural purposes in the summertime. The post-independence
upstream shift in water use away from irrigation has created disputes
between the upstream and downstream countries over how the region’s
transboundary waters should be managed. Successful cooperative sharing
of water and other natural resources is essential for the long-term prosper-
ity and security of the region.
Agriculture is the largest water consumer in the region and a major
employer of the region’s workforce, producing a large percentage of each
country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Yet water diversions for irriga-
tion have resulted in severe problems in the downstream areas of the Syr
Darya and Amu Darya Basins near the Aral Sea. Improving water quality
and increasing water quantity to meet basic human needs in these envi-
ronmentally damaged and economically depressed areas is an urgent need.
However, providing this water through reduced agricultural water use may
impose great economic damage on the basin countries. How does one
187
188 MCKINNEY
choose? The ongoing questions of water management in Central Asia cen-

ter on such paradoxical and too often restrictive choices. Finding solutions
will not be easy because the problems are inherently complicated.
The main infrastructure systems of Central Asia were developed
when the countries were part of one centrally administered area, in which
natural and economic resources were shared and costs were subsidized.
This is no longer the case, and the countries of Central Asia have each de-
veloped their own national approaches to resource use and economic de-
velopment. The past decade has brought greater national self-sufficiency
and governance but, at the same time, has contributed to a decline in eco-
nomic integration and personal living standards among the republics.
Given the great dependence of the Central Asian economies on ir-
rigated agriculture, the issue of water allocation, involving both quantity
of water and timing of allocations, has emerged as a major factor in the re-
publics’ development. Agreements on the use of the region’s shared water
resources are evolving. How the use of water resources is finally settled
will have substantial consequences for the long-term prosperity of these
nations. In addition, the ongoing process of regional cooperation in the
arena of natural resources management is a major factor in the long-term
security of the region.
The Central Asian states have made great progress during the past
10 years in cooperative management of shared water resources. However,
many issues remain unresolved and need continued development, includ-
ing:
■ Harmonizing, or at least coordinating, water management strategies
and water codes among the nations of the region;
■ Enhancingand strengthening the roles of regional water manage-
ment bodies;
■ Improvingthe 1998 Agreement on water and energy use in the Syr
Darya Basin, which is due to renew itself for an additional five years
in 2003;
■ Improving water allocation in the Basin to account for the develop-
ing agricultural and hydropower sectors in the upstream countries,
and the use of the water in downstream countries; and
■ Proper financing of water infrastructure of interstate significance.
Central Asia is a region perpetually dependent on its water resources
for existence and prosperity. Recent political changes in the region have
created a situation in which a resource once managed by a single, cen-
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 189
tralized authority must now be jointly developed and managed by five

sovereign nations. Many past decisions must be dealt with by the new
governments, such as the tragedy of the Aral Sea decline and the legacy of
over-developed irrigation systems. While new relations between the fledg-
ling countries have been established in the area of water resources, much
remains to be done to achieve secure and productive use of this resource.
This chapter will examine the history of the region in terms of water issues,
examine the ongoing strategies to deal with water management and finally
discuss conclusions and challenges which remain within the region.
Figure 9–1. Aral Sea Basin.
The Aral Sea Basin

The Aral Sea Basin, the dominant geographic feature of the region in
terms of water, comprises parts of Afghanistan and Kazakhstan, and most
of the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Figure
9–1 shows the size of the Basin in relation to the region. The Aral Sea Basin
190 MCKINNEY
occupies 1.51 million square kilometers (km2) of the total four million
km2 area of these countries. Topographically, the Aral Sea Basin ranges
from the vast Turanian plains in the west to the tremendous mountain
ranges of the Pamirs and Tien Shan in the east.
The climate in the northern part of the Basin is continental, whereas
the southern part is subtropical. The high mountain areas are humid and
account for the high volume of runoff in the Amu and Syr Darya rivers
which run from the mountains through the desert to the Aral Sea. Water
resources are mainly surface waters formed in the Tien Shan and Pamir
mountain ranges. Melt water from extensive permanent snowfields and
glaciers (more than 18,000 km2 of ice cover) feeds the major rivers of the
Aral Sea Basin, the Syr Darya, and Amu Darya, mostly during the spring
and early summer thaw.
The Amu Darya Basin covers a broad area, about 1.33 million km2,
and the river—the largest river in Central Asia—has a length of 2574 km
from the headwaters of the Pyanj River on the Afghan–Tajik border to the
Aral Sea.1 The Syr Darya Basin occupies about 484,000 km2 and the river
stretches some 2,337 km from the Naryn River headwaters in Kyrgyzstan
through the Ferghana Valley, the Hunger Steppe, the Kyzyl Kum desert,
before finally reaching the Aral Sea.2 These two rivers account for about 90
percent of the region’s annual river flow and provide roughly 75 percent
(by area) of the water to Central Asia’s irrigated agriculture. The Amu
Darya has an average annual flow of 79.3 billion cubic meters (bcm), and
the Syr Darya has a flow of 37.2 bcm.
Figure 9–2 and Table 9–1 show that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan
together produce about 77 percent of the water in the Aral Sea Basin.
Afghanistan contributes about 10 percent of the inflow to the Basin, but
it has not been a party to the recent Aral Sea Basin management because
of its political instability. However, this is likely to change in the future as
agricultural development proceeds in Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s partici-
pation in Amu Darya management notwithstanding, eventually its water
needs will have to be considered along with the other Central Asian states.
Historically, demand for water in Central Asia has been dominated by the
needs of agriculture, which accounts for more than 90 percent of total
water use. The downstream countries use about 85 percent of the Aral Sea
Basin waters, while the upstream countries use the rest. Most of the coun-
tries have increased their demands for water in the last few years and there
is little likelihood this situation will change any time soon.
Central Asia’s agricultural expansion and population growth over
the past three decades have placed a great strain on the water resources
of the region. In 1960, the Aral Sea occupied an area of 66,000 km2 and
had a volume of 1060 bcm. Since 1960 the population in the Basin has
grown from 13 million to more than 40 million people, water diversions
have increased from 60 to 105 bcm, and irrigated lands have risen from
4.5 million hectares (ha) to just over eight million. As a result, the Aral
Sea has lost half of its surface area and two-thirds of its volume and be-
come an environmentally challenged area. Figure 9–3 charts the increase
in irrigated lane and the corresponding diminished flow. In addition to
the dwindling flow, inefficient irrigation systems and mismanagement of
irrigation water diversions have resulted in elevated water and soil salinity
levels, widespread environmental degradation, and diminished agricul-
tural productivity.
Figure 9–2. Aral Sea Basin Selected Characteristics: Population; Surface

Water Flow Formation; ICWC Water Allocation; and Irrigated Lands.
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192 MCKINNEY
Figure 9–3. Decline of the Aral Sea with Increased Irrigated Area in
Central Asia
The Aral Sea Tragedy

Increased diversion of water from the Aral Sea Basin rivers over the
past several decades allowed the development of a massive agricultural
complex in Central Asia, while at the same time degrading the ecosystem
and environment of the region. The Aral Sea level has decreased by more
than 20 meters since 1950, causing the sea to separate into two water bod-
ies, the Southern and Northern Aral Seas, each fed by the Amu Darya and
Syr Darya, respectively. More recently, the Large Sea has split into western
and eastern portions.
The desiccation of the Aral Sea has had major consequences for the
population of the region in terms of employment and health. In some
villages the majority of the population get their drinking water from ir-
rigation canals and the Amu Darya. In dry years, the population consid-
ers the water too saline for drinking, tap water is limited or unavailable,
and groundwater and surface water is saline and polluted by bacteria.3
In Karakalpakstan and the lower delta of the Syr Darya, the incidence of
common diseases associated with poor drinking water quality (typhoid,
paratyphoid, dysentery, and viral hepatitis) is much higher than in the
Table 9–1. Aral Sea Basin Characteristics
Turkmenistan
Kazakhstan*
Uzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Afghan.
Total
Mln 2.6 2.2 6.1 5.4 24.3 - 40.6
Population
% Ag 23 55 50 44 44 - 44.2
$ 1,228 265 177 916 312 - -
GDP
% Ag 10 39 20 25 28 - -
Flow AD** 0 1.6 59.9 1.5 4.7 11.6 79.4
Formation SD 2.4 27.6 1 0 6.2 0 37.2
(bcm) Total 2.4 29.2 60.9 1.5 10.9 11.6 116.6
Water AD - 0.24 9.08 22.02 33.9 - 65.24
Allocation AD 12.29 4.03 2.46 - 19.69 - 38.47
(bcm) Total 12.29 4.27 11.54 22.02 53.59 - 103.71
Water Use bcm 8.24 3.29 12.52 18.08 62.83 - 104.96
Irrigated AD - 15 449 1.86 2.39 - 4.714
Area SD 786 400 269 - 1.869 - 3.324
(‘000 ha) Total 786 415 718 1.86 4.259 - 8.038
Source: Global Environmental Facility, Water and Environmental Management Project, Component A.1 Joint
Report 2 and Regional Report 2, 2002.
*Aral Sea Basin oblasts of Kazakhstan only, South Kazakhstan and Kyzl Orda oblasts.
**AD = Amu Darya Basin, and SD = Ayr Darya Basin.
rest of the Aral Sea basin. The salt content of Aral Sea now exceeds 60
parts per hundred and has killed the sea’s ecosystems, eliminating the once
commercially-valuable fishery and causing salt laden windstorms that are
detrimental to the population’s health. Most of the fish species that once
flourished in the Aral Sea have perished as the salinity of the sea has in-
creased over the past decades.4 The Aral Sea has completely lost all of its
commercial and most of its ecological importance as a fishery.
Karakalpakstan, an autonomous republic located in the delta of the
Amu Darya within Uzbekistan, has suffered more than any other region
in Central Asia from the cumulative effects of the Aral Sea crisis. Due to
decades of agricultural development that paid more attention to centrally-
194 MCKINNEY
planned quotas than the state of the environment, nearly the whole of
Karakalpakstan is either salinized or waterlogged. Key factors in this disas-
ter are the discharge of highly mineralized, pesticide-rich return flows into
rivers; the use of unlined irrigation canals leading to waste and seepage of
salts into groundwater; waterlogged fields leading to salty groundwater
and salt runoff; and the lack of drainage facilities to remove unwanted
water and chemicals from the fields.
The Aral Sea cannot be returned to its prior grandeur without totally
disrupting the economies of the Basin states. In fact, there is little hope
for even stabilizing the large, Southern Sea at its present level. Efforts are
underway to stabilize or reverse the shrinkage of the Northern Sea, includ-
ing a World Bank funded program of rehabilitation and reconstruction of
hydraulic structures in the lower Syr Darya Basin; however, the area still
ranks as one of the world’s largest manmade ecological disasters and the
outlook for future improvement is grim.
Regional Water Management in Central Asia
Pre-Independence
Soviet Water Management

Spurred by major directives for land reclamation and increased ag-
ricultural production beginning in the 1950s, Soviet planners developed
comprehensive plans for the utilization of Central Asia’s river basins. Dur-
ing this period, central planning organizations and ministries in Moscow
directed water management in Central Asia. Each republic developed
five-year plans that were coordinated by the state planning agencies and
funded through the republican or central budgets of the Soviet Union.
For transboundary basins, such as those in Central Asia, basin plans were
developed by regional design institutes and included inter-republic and
multisectoral aspects, as well as allocation of water for various uses. For
the Syr Darya Basin, the last plan of the Soviet period was approved in
1982; for the Amu Darya Basin, in 1987. These plans included limits for
water allocation between republics and targets for the development of ir-
rigated lands within these limits.
During the drought years in the late 1970s, local authorities inter-
fered in water allocation among the Aral Sea Basin republics. In the Syr
Darya Basin, the situation became so tense that Moscow had to send au-
thorities to ensure that water from the upper and middle areas of the Basin
reached lower areas. In order to ensure compliance with inter-republican
water allocations, region-wide Basin Water Organizations (BVOs) were es-

tablished in 1986 in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Basins. The BVOs were
charged with managing water resources of the Basins according to the
plans approved by the Soviet Ministry of Water Management. The BVOs
had barely begun to function when the Soviet Union began its decline in
1988 and finally collapsed in 1991. As discussed below, these institutions
were some of the only regional Soviet institutions to survive into the post-
Soviet era.
Post-Independence
Interstate Coordination Water Commission (ICWC)

Given the heavy dependence of the Central Asian republics econo-
mies on irrigated agriculture, it was necessary to stabilize interstate water
relations immediately after independence. In October 1991, the heads of
the Republican water sectors developed a regional water resources man-
agement mechanism to replace the centralized system of the Soviet period.
The newly independent countries signed an agreement “On Cooperation
in the Field of Joint Management and Conservation of Interstate Water
Resources.”5 This agreement established the ICWC for control, rational
use, and protection of interstate water resources. The agreement acknowl-
edged the equal rights of member states to use, and their responsibility
to protect, the interstate water resources of Central Asia. The agreement
affirmed the continuation of existing Soviet structures and principles of
interstate water allocation, and was approved by the presidents of the Cen-
tral Asian Republics.6 The presidents later signed a declaration confirming
the validity of previously signed agreements on water resources in the Aral
Sea Basin.7
The ICWC is the highest level of transboundary water resources
management in Central Asia. It is responsible for water management in
both the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Basins. The ICWC makes decisions
related to water allocation, monitoring, and management. It is comprised
of the most senior water sector officials of the member countries, and it
meets quarterly to determine water allocations to member counties. Deci-
sions of the ICWC are by consensus, with each State having an equal vote
in decisions. Scientific and information support to the ICWC is provided
by the Scientific Information Center (SIC). The two Basin water manage-
ment organisations, BVO Syr Darya and BVO Amu Darya (holdovers from
the Soviet days), the SIC, and the ICWC Secretariat are the executing bod-
ies of the ICWC.
196 MCKINNEY
Basin Water Management Organizations (BVOs)

Created at the end of the Soviet era, and operating as the executive
organs of the ICWC, the BVOs Amu Darya and Syr Darya are responsible
for the day-to-day operation of the main water supply facilities in the two
Basins. The BVOs’ duties include the following:
■ Development of plans for water allocation to users in the Amu
Darya and Syr Darya Basins, water diversions, and reservoir opera-
tion modes;
■ Watersupply to users, including those in deltas and the Aral Sea,
according to approved limits for water diversion from transbound-
ary water sources;
■ Operation of all major hydraulic structures on both rivers, includ-
ing reservoirs;
■ Measurement of water flow through the main water intakes and
across national borders;
■ Design, construction, rehabilitation and operation of hydraulic
structures, head water intakes, and inter-republic canals; and
■ Maintenance of water quality in the rivers.
Using forecasts from the Central Asian Hydrometeorology Services,
the BVOs prepare water allocation plans for ICWC approval at critical
times during the year. These plans set the water releases from reservoirs
and delivery to each water management region. The water allocation to
each republic is established in accordance with previously mentioned
schemes devised during Soviet times. Water delivery to the Aral Sea and its
coastal zone is based primarily on the principle of “whatever is remaining.”
Even though the BVOs have the responsibility to monitor water quality,
they do not fulfill these obligations. In addition, they are not responsible
for water use in each country. As such, their role is mainly regional flow
monitoring organizations. This provides some information that is useful
in water management, but operational control and management is largely
out of the hands of the BVOs and rests with the national water manage-
ment agencies, resulting in a conflicting and contradictory role for them,
since they were originally established as regional water management
institutions and their current status (mainly monitoring water flow with
staff and facilities exclusively on Uzbek territory) does not allow them to
execute this role effectively.
International Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS)

The Central Asian presidents created the IFAS to attract outside
resources to coordinate and finance regional programs to overcome the
problems associated with the desiccation of the Aral Sea.8 Later the same
year, the presidents established the Interstate Council for the Aral Sea
(ICAS)9 to manage regional programs.10 The following year, the Central
Asian presidents approved a “Program of Concrete Actions” on improving
the situation in the Aral Sea Basin.11 The program called for the develop-
ment of a general strategy for: water sharing among the countries; rational
water use; conservation of water resources in the Basin; and interstate legal
acts on the use and protection of water resources from pollution. In 1997,
ICAS and IFAS were merged and streamlined as a new IFAS under the
rotating chairmanship of the president of one of the five member states.12
The new IFAS’ primary activities include:
■ Raising funds for joint measures to conserve the air, water, and land
resources of the Aral Sea Basin, as well as the flora and fauna;
■ Financing
◆ Interstate ecological research, programs, and projects aimed at

saving the Aral Sea and improving the ecological situation in the
region surrounding the Sea as well as resolving general social and
ecological problems of the region;
◆ Joint studies and scientific-technical efforts to rehabilitate the
ecological balance, establish efficient use of natural resources, and
manage transboundary waters;
■ Establishing a regional environmental monitoring system in the
Aral Sea Basin;
■ Participating in implementing international programs on saving the
Aral Sea and improving the ecology of the Basin.
An IFAS Management Board, consisting of Deputy Prime Ministers
from each member country, also was formed. The Board develops priority
measures for alleviation of the Aral Sea problems and organizes and coor-
dinates the implementation of all regional programs associated with the
problems of sustainable development in the Aral Sea Basin countries.
These main regional water and energy institutions have very limited
capacity and function according to sometimes contradictory principles.
The operation modes of hydrosystems in the Aral Sea Basin are deter-
mined and approved by ICWC without participation of the energy sector.
198 MCKINNEY
The operation plans are implemented by the energy sector without par-
ticipation of the water sector. All of the executive bodies of the BVOs are
located in Uzbekistan, and their staffs are formed entirely of Uzbeks. These
organizations have, in principle, the status of interstate organizations, yet,
due to the predominant influence of Uzbekistan, they do not rotate man-
agement staff or hire specialists from other republics. Until this system is
remedied, the increased coordination necessary to ensure equitable water
allocation and control is unlikely.
Framework Agreement on Water and Energy Use
Syr Darya Basin Agreements

Toktogul Reservoir in Kyrgyzstan is the largest in the Syr Darya Basin
and the only one with multiyear storage capacity (14 bcm active storage
volume). The reservoir was designed to operate in an irrigation mode with
non-growing season (October through March) releases providing mini-
mum electricity generation. Commissioned in 1974, the reservoir did not
operate according to design until 1990, after the high water winter of 1988
filled the reservoir to capacity for the first time. The irrigation release re-
gime follows natural cycles, but the reservoir’s large storage can be used to
continue these releases in periods of drought.
Before 1991, surplus power generated by irrigation releases in the
growing season (April to September) from the Toktogul system was
transmitted to neighboring regions of the Soviet Union. In return, these
regions sent electric power and fuels (natural gas, coal and fuel oil) for
Kyrgyzstan’s two thermal power plants for winter heating needs.
This situation changed drastically in 1991 when independent states
were established in Central Asia. Because of complications in intergov-
ernmental relations and account settlements, the introduction of national
currencies, and the increasing prices of oil, coal, natural gas and transpor-
tation, the supply of fuel and electricity sent to Kyrgyzstan from the other
republics was reduced. This radically affected the structure of the Kyrgyz
fuel-and-energy balance. Because of decreased fuel production in Kyr-
gyzstan, the output and distribution of heat from thermal power plants
decreased by half and organic fuel consumption fell, resulting in a marked
increase in the demand for electric power by the population for heating,
cooking, and hot water supply. The Kyrgyz government responded to this
demand by increasing wintertime hydroelectric generation from the Tok-
togul system.
Intensive use of water resources for power generation, along with

changes in the Toktogul operating regime from summertime irrigation
releases to wintertime energy releases, created serious problems in the
Syr Darya Basin in the winter. Downstream reservoirs were not able to
store the increased releases, and, in order to prevent flooding of the lower
reaches of the Syr Darya Basin, discharges into the Arnasai depression in
Uzbekistan were required. With no means to store the water, the discharges
in Uzbekistan, more than one cubic kilometer per year, were, essentially,
wasted for agricultural use.
Beginning in 1995, to alleviate these problems and reduce the waste,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed interstate protocols and
agreements on the use of water and energy resources in the Syr Darya
Basin. These specified the amount of compensatory deliveries of fuel and
energy resources and releases from Toktogul reservoir. Based on these
agreements, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan receive excess energy from Kyr-
gyzstan generated by Toktogul reservoir in the summer, and in winter, they
provide Kyrgyzstan with energy, respectively, by deliveries of natural gas
and coal. To monitor this delicate arrangement, the Heads of State of the
countries involved turned to their regional integration and development
organization, the Executive Committee of the Interstate Council of the
Central Asian Economic Community (EC CAEC). In 1996, the EC CAEC
formed a Water and Energy Uses Round Table to develop a framework
agreement addressing the Syr Darya Basin riparian republics competing
uses for water. The work of the Round Table resulted in an agreement that
created a framework addressing trade-offs between the competing uses of
water for energy and agricultural production in the Basin.13 Compensation
is associated with a water release schedule that takes into account both
upstream winter energy needs and downstream summer irrigation water
demand. To date, the system has remained stable without major conflict
and the agreement has entered the second five-year implementation pe-
riod without major revision.14
Regional Cooperation Organizations
Over the past decade, the Central Asian states have sought to pro-
mote their separate national interests while also acting to enhance their
common goals.15 However, in many areas the losses from interstate com-
petition exceed the gains from cooperation. The presidents of these coun-
tries have acknowledged the need to create a regional concert of interests.
Several Central Asian organizations have been formed or joined over the
past decade, many concerned with regional cooperation, security, and
200 MCKINNEY
economic development. Some of the organizations, the most important

being the CAEC and IFAS, have had a mandate to consider problems of
the water, environment, and energy sectors.
As previously mentioned, IFAS was formed in 1993 as the leading
institution for raising and administering funds to address the Aral Sea
crisis. Constraints on IFAS, its credibility as a neutral broker, and its lack
of a clear mandate to deal with multi-sectoral issues have, so far, kept it
from successfully developing regional water management strategies or
negotiating regional water and energy sharing agreements. This is why, in
1996, the CAEC stepped in to mediate the annual agreements on water
and energy management for the Syr Darya Basin. IFAS recently has moved
its Presidency and Secretariat to Dushanbe, Tajikistan and initiated a series
of activities to revitalize this dormant and discredited organization. In late
August 2002, the fist IFAS Board meeting in three years was held in order
to assess the past activities and propose a new agenda. These ideas were
confirmed and approved by the IFAS Heads of State in an early October
2002 meeting. In November 2002, the international donor community
was asked to support the development of a new phase of IFAS activities. It
remains to be seen if the new IFAS management can overcome the poor
performance of the past and attract support for new activities.
The CAEC was formed to promote regional integration through
economic cooperation in Central Asia. It had a broad mandate to promote
regional economic cooperation and to organize and broker negotiations,
such as those leading to the 1998 Syr Darya Agreement. Since the CAEC
did not have direct competence in water or energy technical matters, it
wisely relied on the national water and energy ministries, as well as the
ICWC, the BVO Syr Darya, and the United Energy Dispatch Center (UDC
Energia) to support negotiations.
The Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) was estab-
lished in 2002 by the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan under the leadership of the President of Uzbekistan. Turkmen-
istan has strong reasons for maintaining good relations with Uzbekistan
due to the division of the Amu Darya River. However, Turkmenistan puts
less emphasis on Central Asian regional cooperation and more emphasis
on relations with the Caucasus, the Middle East, Iran, and Caspian egress
routes.16 This is evidenced by Turkmenistan’s observer status in most
regional cooperation organizations and refusal to participate in most re-
gional water management activities. The four participating Central Asian
states have yet to establish a CACO secretariat, although one is planned.
There is some speculation that CACO was created to be the successor or-
ganization to the CAEC; however, no decision has yet been made on how
CACO will work. Communiqués from recent meetings of the organization
have indicated that it will take up the issues of water and energy.17
Summary of Post-Independence Experience
The experience of the Central Asian countries in addressing trans-
boundary water management issues reveal several lessons:18
■ It is essential that the body organizing interstate discussions be
considered sufficiently neutral in order to gain the trust of all parties.
External support from similarly neutral third parties can play a cru-
cial role in helping participants gain access to international expertise
and add credibility to the process, but the riparians must work out the
final details themselves.
■ Given sufficient high-level commitment to regional cooperation,
the primary focus of regional organizations’ discussions should be
on technical issues, with legal and political matters held for later in
negotiations. Without a firm sense that technical issues can be solved,
no political progress can be made. However, regional cooperation
is unlikely to be achieved through technical activities and projects
alone; political will is the key.
■ It is important to take on a manageable set of issues rather than at-
tempting to solve the full range of problems. The Central Asian Water
and Energy Round Table group achieved positive results by focusing
attention on the Syr Darya Basin, rather than taking on the full menu
of issues in the Aral Sea Basin.
Country-Specific Issues19
Afghanistan
Though not part of Soviet Central Asia, Afghanistan borders three
other Aral Sea Basin countries: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.
About 8 percent of the flow of the Amu Darya is formed in Afghanistan.
The Afghan portions of the Amu Darya Basin include the territory rimmed
by the Panj and Amu Darya Rivers on the north, by spurs of the Bandi-
Torkestan and the Hindukush Ridges on the south, the Kowkchen River
valley in the east, and the Shirintagao River valley on the west.20 Irrigable
lands in this area exceed 1.5 million ha. About two-thirds of Afghanistan’s
GDP is derived from the agricultural sector, and although the country has
202 MCKINNEY
large tracts of irrigable lands, only a small portion is used due to the past
instabilities and low level of development.
Even though the Afghan lands in the Amu Darya Basin were the least
developed in the past, many expect this will change in the future, placing
even greater stress on the Aral Sea Basin countries downstream. Some esti-
mate that Afghanistan may divert as much as 10 bcm from the Amu Darya
in the future (compared to about 2 bcm today) if development plans are
realized.21 In October 2002 the Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources,
and Environment issued a list of short-term priorities which include re-
habilitating irrigation canals and existing systems. Longer-term priorities
include the Khushtapa, or “Good Hill” Project, which would pump water
from the Amu Darya River into a canal to be transported to Mazar-I-
Sharif to irrigate a large area there.
Tajikistan
Tajikistan, a small, mountainous country covering 139,800 km2, is
made up of a number of distinct and relatively isolated regions, separated
by high mountain ranges. The Vaksh and Pyanj Rivers, the main tributar-
ies of the Amu Darya, rise in the mountains of Tajikistan and Afghanistan.
The flow formation within Tajikistan’s portion of the Aral Sea Basin is
60.9 bcm and the interstate allocation of water to Tajikistan is 11.5 bcm.
In 2000, 718,000 ha were irrigated in the Tajik portion of the Aral Sea
Basin, requiring the diversion of 12.5 bcm of water to irrigation systems.
Irrigated agriculture, using about 85 percent of the water, is the largest
water consumer in the country. Still, the great elevation differences and
large volumes of flow in the rivers of Tajikistan give the country important
hydropower potential. Even now, Tajikistan is one of the world’s largest
producers of hydroelectric power. Whether this potential is tapped will
depend upon future water negotiations and the ability of the Central Asian
countries to achieve a sound policy.
In the past decade, the economy of Tajikistan experienced a sharp
decline as industrial and economic relations with Russia were broken
and civil war inflicted much damage on the country’s infrastructure and
human resources. Approximately 70 percent of Tajikistan’s six million
people live in rural areas, with about 50 percent of the population working
in the agricultural sector, making Tajikistan the most rural of the former
Soviet Republics. Tajikistan’s main agricultural production areas lie in the
irrigated valleys of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya tributaries. Cotton is the
major cash crop accounting for about two-thirds of the gross production
value of the agriculture sector.
Tajik water law, typical of all the countries of Central Asia, claims
water to be the property of the national government. Water management
in Tajikistan is transforming from the old command administrative system
to newer market based incentives. In November 2000, a new Water Code
was adopted that allowed transfer of irrigation systems management to the
private sector with collective farms as the base for development of privati-
zation and support of irrigation system operation. In an effort to provide
the population with a secure food supply, the Tajik government intends
to increase irrigated lands by 350,000 ha by the year 2010. Most of the
water required for this agricultural expansion is predicted to come from
water saved through increased irrigation efficiency. Efforts are in place to
improve irrigation efficiency through the introduction of water charges
and the improvement of infrastructure with the proceeds, as well as the
introduction and development of cooperative water user associations. The
new water code also establishes principles for Tajik cooperation in interna-
tional water relations based on international water law principles.
Tajikistan is experiencing rapid population growth, a major fac-
tor affecting its economic development and water management policy.
Achieving food security is an objective for the country, which will require
improved agricultural productivity through increased irrigation efficiency
and expansion of irrigated lands. During the Soviet period, the develop-
ment of irrigated lands in Tajikistan was limited. The Soviets favored de-
velopments in downstream areas of the Basin. Hence, Tajikistan has inher-
ited the consequences of this legacy and the allocation of the Amu Darya
and Syr Darya waters according to the old Soviet scheme which favors
downstream cotton production at the expense of expanded hydropower
and agricultural development upstream. Tajikistan supports the creation
of a new system of water allocation among the countries of the Basins that
recognizes conjunctive use of water for agriculture and hydropower gen-
eration, prevention of pollution of transboundary waters, and elimination
of adverse effects, but does not view this as a pressing issue at this time.
However, Tajikistan is a strong supporter of the concept that the institu-
tional structure of Central Asian water management should be improved
through integration of the water and energy sectors at the regional level.
Kyrgyzstan
The Kyrgyz Republic is a mountainous country with an average
height above sea level of 2,750 meters and a maximum height of 7,439
meters. This wide range of elevations, complex relief, protracted geologic
development, and other factors result in a variety of natural conditions
204 MCKINNEY
and a richness of natural resources. The Naryn River rises in the moun-
tains of Kyrgyzstan, and, along with the Karadarya and Chirchik Rivers, is
one of the main tributaries of the Syr Darya. The main watercourses of the
Kyrgyz part of Aral Sea Basin are the Naryn, Karadarya, Sokh, and Chatkal
rivers (Syr Darya Basin) and the Kyzyl Suu River (Amu Darya Basin). The
flow formation within the Kyrgyzstan portion of the Aral Sea Basin is 29.2
bcm, and the interstate allocation of water to Kazakhstan from the Syr
Darya is 4.27 bcm. The population of Kyrgyzstan in the Aral Sea Basin is
about 2.2 million. Approximately 39 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP is de-
rived from a severely disorganized and undercapitalized agricultural sector
where about 55 percent of the total population works. In 2000, 415,000 ha
were irrigated in the Kyrgyz portion of the Aral Sea Basin, requiring 3.3
bcm of water.
Like Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan finds its agricultural development con-
strained by the Soviet-era water allocation scheme for the Syr Darya, which
the Central Asian countries have agreed to honor until a new scheme can
be developed and approved. In the meantime, Kyrgyzstan would like to
expand its agricultural sector and needs additional water to do so. No
transboundary water enters Kyrgyzstan from any source and about 44 bcm
of runoff are formed within the country each year. These are transbound-
ary waters since they feed the Syr Darya and, ultimately, the Aral Sea.
The presidential decree “On foreign policy of the Kyrgyz Republic
in the sphere of water resources generated in Kyrgyzstan and flowing into
neighboring countries” (June 1997) mandates the solution of interstate
water problems, water allocation, and the use of economic instruments
for promoting water conservation and efficient use of water and energy
resources. The law “On interstate use of water objects, water resources
and water facilities of the Kyrgyz Republic” (July 2001) confirmed the
principles of cooperation of Kyrgyzstan with other countries in the field
of water resources. However, the law states that all the waters in the terri-
tory of the country belong to the State and demands that the downstream
countries pay for water emanating from Kyrgyzstan. This has caused a
certain amount of conflict with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, both of which
demand that Kyrgyzstan continue providing water free of charge, which
would be available without regulation by reservoirs.
Regional water use agreements may be of little help to Kyrgyzstan.
The 1998 Syr Darya Water and Energy Use Agreement regulates water
use in the Syr Darya Basin. This agreement is based on the concept of
compensation to upstream countries for lost energy production follow-
ing a release. Yet this regime favors irrigated agriculture in downstream
countries. Although Kyrgyzstan receives energy resources (electricity, coal,

gas, and oil) in exchange for its water, these resources must be transported
and transformed into electric power or heat at Kyrgyzstan’s expense. As
a result of this compensation arrangement, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
receive water at very low cost.
The Kyrgyz energy sector depends on power generation from the
Naryn cascade to satisfy a major portion of the domestic demand, which
existing thermal generating facilities cannot handle. The continued use of
the Toktogul reservoir in an energy generation mode, i.e. with increased
water releases in the fall-winter period, seems inevitable without new
generating facilities and capacity at thermal power stations. As recent
experience has shown, providing the required energy generation and ir-
rigation releases results in large fluctuations of accumulated storage in the
Toktogul reservoir. Several proposals for the solution of this problem are
being explored, such as energy conservation and demand management,
and construction of new hydroelectric generating capacity. For now, Kyr-
gystan must continue to rely on the 1998 water-energy trade agreement
with its downstream neighbors to obtain needed wintertime fuels.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan contains vast regions of steppe and most of the down-
stream portion of the Syr Darya Basin. The population of Kazakhstan in
the Aral Sea Basin (South Kazakhstan and Kyzl Orda oblasts) is about 2.6
million. Approximately 10 percent of Kazakhstan’s GDP is derived from
agriculture, with about 23 percent of the population working in that
sector.
Water availability in the Kazakh portion of the Aral Sea Basin de-
pends on the water policy of upstream states, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan. The Syr Darya flows 1,650 km through Kazakhstan from the
border with Uzbekistan at the Chardara reservoir to the Aral Sea. The
river’s flow formed within Kazakhstan is 2.4 bcm and the interstate alloca-
tion of water to Kazakhstan from the Syr Darya is 12.3 bcm. Since 1990,
Kazakhstan has reduced its irrigated area in the Syr Darya Basin because
many unproductive farms have been taken out of production. Kazakhstan
irrigated about 786,000 ha in 2000, requiring about 8.2 bcm of water. In
recent years, productivity has declined due to low irrigation efficiency, lack
of technical inputs (fertilizer and machinery), and lack of funds for proper
technical and operational measures.
The most recent agreement on management and operation of the
Naryn-Syr Darya cascade of reservoirs (March 1998) places certain obliga-
206 MCKINNEY
tions on Kazakhstan in order to receive irrigation water under the agree-

ment. In particular, surplus summer electricity is delivered to Kazakhstan
and, in return, Kazakh coal must be supplied to Kyrgyzstan in the winter-
time. For Kazakhstan to accept large amounts (1.1 billion kWh) of Kyrgyz
electricity in the summertime when demand is low requires restructuring
the Kazakh national power distribution system and shutting down some
thermal power stations in South Kazakhstan.22 This has been very disrup-
tive to the Kazakh power grid resulting in the need to sell expensive power
to Kazakh customers reluctant to pay the combined price of power and
water. If the Kazakh agricultural sector compensated the power sector
for the increased price of the summertime electricity, the situation might
improve.
The Water Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan was approved in 1993
and constitutes the legal basis for water policy in the country. Water use in the
country is still determined by centrally controlled economic interests, with little
regard for social and environmental consequences. There are eight Basins in
the republic, each with its own BVO. The Kazakh portion of the Aral Sea
Basin water management is carried out by the BVO Aral-Syr Darya. The
BVOs manage water resources in the Basins, including water distribution
between users, development of water supply plans, water use limits, and
reservoir operation modes. Water Users Associations have been created
in some areas, but so far they are insufficient to support many activities,
particularly drainage and water supply works.
Since it receives most of its water resources from external sources,
Kazakhstan recognizes transboundary rivers as a security problem and
is motivated to seek international agreements on shared waters. Kazakh-
stan has a large agricultural sector dependent on an adequate supply of
irrigation water. At times, the delivery of this water is complicated by
upstream water use tradeoffs between energy and irrigation. This results
in water shortages during growing seasons and flooding of lowland areas
in winter seasons. Being a downstream country, Kazakhstan experiences
difficult water quality problems, resulting from agricultural return flows
discharged by mid-stream irrigation water use. Poor water quality (high
salinity, fertilizer, and pesticide levels) impacts the health of populations
in the downstream areas that must use this water for drinking as well as
for agricultural production.
Believing that common positions and mutual interests can provide
regional stability, Kazakh officials have suggested that a new regional water
strategy for Central Asian be developed. This new framework would be
based on standards of international water law; utilize an ecosystem ap-
proach; minimize limitations on riparian countries; and be based on com-

mon interests in water resources development, use, and protection within
each country.23 Common principles of the water strategy would include
considering water needs in the lower reaches of Central Asian rivers, bal-
ancing water use between irrigation and energy production, and recycling
return flows from agriculture. The main international water law principles
that the new strategy would be based on include the following:24
■ Transboundary water resources are the common property of Basin
states;
■ Basin interests take priority over those of individual states;
■ Water supply is guaranteed to highest priority uses;
■ States’obligation to observe the “equitable and reasonable use”25
and to follow the “no harm”26 principles;
■ States’ obligation to consult with other Basin states on development
plans; and
■ States’obligation to participate in joint monitoring of water quan-
tity and quality.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan, with a population of over 24 million and 447,400 km2
of territory in the Aral Sea Basin, is at the center of Central Asia. About 60
percent of Uzbekistan’s land area is desert steppe broken by irrigated, fer-
tile oases along the Amu Darya and Syr Darya. Approximately 25 percent
of Uzbekistan’s GDP is derived from agriculture with about 44 percent
of the population working in that sector. In western Uzbekistan lie the
ecologically damaged Amu Darya delta and the autonomous Republic of
Karakalpakistan. Overuse of the Amu Darya has reduced the sea to two-
thirds its former size and salinization of the area around the sea threatens
the environmental and economic viability of a region in which more than
one million people live.
Being dominated by desert and only partially mountainous, Uzbeki-
stan contributes a modest amount of the flow to the Aral Sea Basin, 10.9
bcm, while the interstate allocation of water to Uzbekistan is 53.6 bcm. In
2000, 4.259 million ha were irrigated in the Uzbek portion of the Aral Sea
Basin requiring 62.8 bcm of water. The large amounts of water needed by
Uzbekistan to sustain the agricultural sector of its economy require that
it negotiate with its upstream neighbors on an almost continual basis. By
and large, the relations between Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan
208 MCKINNEY
in the Amu Darya Basin are good. However, the same is not true between
Uzbekistan and its upstream neighbor, Kyrgyzstan, in the Syr Darya Basin.
As previously discussed, there continue to be difficulties over the delivery
of natural gas from Uzbekistan in return for delivered irrigation water.
A major difficulty in efficient implementation of the 1998 water-energy
agreement stems from Uzbekistan’s need for, and Kyrgyzstan’s lack of, hard
currency. Monetizing the exchanges under the agreement would go a long
way toward normalizing these trade relations.
Transboundary sources make up the bulk of the water resources
available to Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is therefore very concerned about
transboundary water management. The main concerns of Uzbekistan
regarding this issue include: further development of regional cooperation
between Aral Sea Basin countries in management and use of transbound-
ary water sources; availability and compliance with international agree-
ments between the riparian countries of the Basins; the operating regime
of transboundary reservoirs in the Basins, primarily, Toktogul, Kayrakum,
and Nurek reservoirs; and the environment and effectiveness of the
ICWC.27 In addition, Uzbek officials call for improvement of information
systems for water management and expansion of these systems to consider
water quality, especially for transboundary sources.28
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan covers an area of 488,100 km2, but 80 percent of this
area is desert. The desert is bounded by a series of oases watered by the
Amu Darya in the north and by rivers (the Murgap, Tejen, Atrek) descend-
ing from the Kopetdag, Gershi, and other mountains in the south. The
central and western regions have no significant natural waterways, but the
Kara Kum Canal (more than 1300 km in length) brings water from the
Amu Darya west to the Mary Oasis and onward past Ashgabat. Approxi-
mately 25 percent of Turkmenistan’s GDP is derived from agriculture with
about 44 percent of the population working in that sector.
The amount of river flow generated within Turkmenistan is extremely
small, 1.5 bcm, whereas the interstate allocation of water to Turkmenistan
is 22 bcm. In 2000, 1.86 million ha were irrigated in the Turkmen portion
of the Aral Sea Basin requiring 18.1 bcm of water. The government expects
irrigated lands to reach 2.2 million ha by 2010. The source of water to im-
plement this expansion is somewhat of a mystery; however, it may come
from reclaimed agricultural drainage water. The Kara Kum Canal is per-
haps the most important water facility in Turkmenistan, supplying water
to irrigate more than one million ha of farmlands. An average of 11.5
bcm is diverted into the canal each year from the Amu Darya. More than
half of Turkmenistan’s total agricultural products are grown in the Canal
Zone. Today, the Canal is in a precarious condition with most of its control
structures inoperative. Water flows according to hydraulic conditions, not
management decisions. This situation may prove to be unsustainable in
the future as the system continues to deteriorate.
Agricultural runoff is a major transboundary problem for Turk-
menistan, causing downstream pollution affecting population health and
reducing agricultural productivity in the Basin. Turkmenistan receives
transboundary flows at several locations, including source water from the
Amu Darya and agricultural drainage water from the Khorezm region
of Uzbekistan. There is great concern about the quality of these waters,
especially the return water, since it is a large volume and heavily polluted.
Currently, Turkmenistan assumes responsibility for the disposal of this
drainage water to the Sary-Kamush Lake, which has become polluted with
salts and chemicals. In addition, the passage of this water through un-
lined canals creates drinking water pollution problems by contaminating
groundwater sources. At present, no agreements exist on transboundary
water quality in Central Asia. In order to prevent increased environmen-
tal damage from transboundary irrigation drainage water, Turkmenistan
has proposed to the Uzbeks the development of a Transboundary Water
Quality Agreement for the Amu Darya Basin, but there is no progress on
this yet.
Regional Water Management Issues

The following are issues that must be addressed by the Central Asian
republics if true progress is to be made on water issues at the regional
level.
Financial Obligations of Regional Institution Members
The current provisions for financing the Executive Committee of
the Intestate Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (EC IFAS) require that the host
member country must cover the costs (salary and living expenses) of two
representatives from each member country. The host country rotates be-
tween the members every two years. This has created an undue burden
on the poorer countries of Central Asia, like Tajikistan, the current host
country, which do not have the resources to cover many of these expenses.
In the case of some host countries, this may be feasible, but in the case
of others, it is impossible. This has resulted in an inability of EC IFAS to
function properly.
210 MCKINNEY
The March 18, 1992 ICWC agreement does not reflect current condi-
tions characterized by a severe lack of financing for water infrastructure
and the varying rate at which the countries are making the transition to
market economies. The member countries have not shared equitably in
the financial obligations of joint water management and development
under ICWC. Although the ICWC budget is confirmed each year, only
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have met their obligations for operation
and maintenance works. Only Uzbekistan has met the obligation for re-
search, with a small contribution from the other states. The result is that
the BVOs, as the operational arms of the ICWC, are desperately short on
resources with which to carry out their work.
BVO Functions
According to the foundation documents of the BVOs, all main
structures for controlling transboundary waters on the Syr Darya and
Amu Darya rivers should be transferred to the temporary (but long-term)
control of the BVOs. However, the only structures currently under BVO
control are the main interstate canal structures in Uzbekistan. This situa-
tion creates uncertainty as to the role of the BVOs in managing regional
water resources because the BVOs presently are not operational organiza-
tions controlling the critical structures in the Basins. If the ICWC mem-
ber countries truly intend for the BVOs to be operational management
organizations, then the main structures outside of Uzbekistan should
be transferred to BVO control. On the other hand, if BVOs are intended
as planning organizations to monitor system functioning and prepare
operational plans, then the structures currently under BVO control in
Uzbekistan should be transferred to Uzbek Ministry of Agriculture and
Water Management (MAWR) control.
Water Quality Monitoring and Control
Water quality problems in Central Asia have yet to be addressed in
any comprehensive way. One major problem is the disposal of agricultural
return flows. The agricultural return flows with transboundary impacts
are not strictly controlled. Adequate and up-to-date equipment for ac-
quisition and processing of water data (both quantity and quality) in the
main river Basins is still lacking. Agreement on appropriate interstate
water quality standards have yet to be established and alternative mecha-
nisms to achieve different water quality standards have yet to be explored.
If these issues continue to be ignored there will be a continual degradation
of drinking water quality in the lower reaches of the rivers.
Citizen Participation
Citizens are essential participants in forming national and local
water and environmental policy. Informing citizens of opportunities to
participate in such a system is often an important role of non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs). NGOs take on various roles in this regard,
including education campaigns, assistance to government ministries in
forming policy, legislation and regulations, independent assessment of
conditions, and preparing legal actions when there is evidence of a threat
to human health or to the environment. The participation of NGOs in the
formation of policy requires access to accurate and timely information.
The public should have the right to know what the standards are for po-
table, industrial, and irrigation water and for the concentration of certain
elements at particular times. When the information is available to citizens
about the real state of the environment, then citizens can formulate edu-
cated opinions about and demand environmental protection.
Syr Darya Agreement
The 1998 Syr Darya Agreement has achieved modest success in re-
lieving tensions over water and energy use in the Basin. The signing of this
Agreement by the four Prime Ministers demonstrated a show of support
for cooperative management of the Basin’s resources. This has provided an
impetus for the parties to conduct difficult and serious negotiations each
year since 1998.
Nevertheless, implementation of the agreement is difficult. A mecha-
nism by which dry and wet year hydrologic conditions can be reflected in
compensation needs to be established. In addition, Kyrgyzstan in particu-
lar suffers from a lack of longer-term assurance that compensation will, in
fact, be made by downstream countries. The 1998 agreement specifies that
surplus electricity from growing season releases is to be transferred to Ka-
zakhstan and Uzbekistan, and compensation for irrigation storage in the
reservoirs is to be made in amounts of fuel equivalent to this surplus en-
ergy. In recent wet years, the downstream countries have called for below
average releases during the growing season. This has resulted in reduced
surplus electricity deliveries to downstream countries, accompanied by
reduced deliveries of fuel to Kyrgyzstan the following winter season. On
the other hand, in dry years, downstream countries have called for above
average releases in the growing season, resulting in additional surplus elec-
tricity delivered to downstream countries accompanied, in theory, by in-
creased deliveries of fuels to Kyrgyzstan in the winter season. If the system
is to be run fairly, Kyrgyzstan should receive credit for additional dry year
212 MCKINNEY
electricity deliveries and be able to make “withdrawals” in fuels on dry year

credit during wet years when there is a fuel deficit. Currently, this is not
the case. Further negotiation and compromise will be needed to ensure an
equitable method of compensation for water storage services during wet
periods with attendant water releases during drought periods.
Amu Darya Agreements
The Amu Darya Basin is shared by Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan, and Uzbekistan. Afghanistan has not been an active partner in
managing the water in the Basin. During the 1940s to 1970s, several agree-
ments were reached between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan regarding
the waters of the Amu Darya, including an allocation of nine bcm to Af-
ghanistan. Despite these agreements, no more than two bcm per year has
been diverted to Afghan use.
In the accounting and allocation of the Amu Darya waters to Basin
states by the ICWC, neither 9 nor 2 bcm of water is considered. Turkmeni-
stan and Uzbekistan signed a bilateral agreement in 1996 agreeing to split
the waters of the Amu Darya below the river gauge at Kerki. Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan also have an informal, technical level agreement in
operation and maintenance of the transboundary drainage water collec-
tors which originate in Uzbekistan (Khorezm region) and terminate in
Turkmenistan. These agreements should, but currently do not, take into
account Afghanistan’s water needs. Further amendments likely will be
required to meet the increasing demands of all parties in the Amu Darya
basin.
Conclusions
While not as effective as it could be, the capacity for shared water
management exists in Central Asia. High level political will is needed to
achieve such cooperative management of water resources, and that will
seems to be lacking in Central Asia. Government officials from Turkmeni-
stan and Uzbekistan often exhibit a desire to handle water management
and other regional issues through the development of strictly bilateral
arrangements and agreements. Yet consensus is needed among high level
advisors to the Central Asian presidents that regional cooperation can lead
to increased benefits, stability, and security for each individual country.
Regional development assistance could demonstrate the mutual economic
benefits to be derived from a multi-sectoral approach to regional coopera-
tion in water resources management.
Multi-sectoral Paradigm for Regional Water Cooperation

Energy and agriculture sector policies have a large impact on water
management in Central Asia. Currently, no mechanism is in place to coor-
dinate or manage this inter-sectoral problem within most of the countries,
let alone at the regional level. A new paradigm for regional water coop-
eration in Central Asia is needed. Water sector managers cannot solve the
problems of regional cooperation alone. The Central Asian Heads of State
need to motivate this approach or the various concerned sectors will not
participate.
No new agreements on water or energy have reached the Heads of
State for signature since 1998, and none are presently under development.
Since it is a uni-sectoral, technical body, the ICWC is not the right forum
to achieve this sort of government-to-government interaction. Interaction
must occur at a higher level and it must be multi-sectoral. International
donor agencies should try to promote consensus at the Prime Ministe-
rial or Presidential level on principles of regional cooperation. In the Syr
Darya Basin, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan already understand
this, only Uzbekistan remains to be convinced. In the Amu Darya Basin,
increased downstream water stress in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, due
to upstream Afghan water diversions, may convince the countries to con-
tend with this serious problem.
Upstream-Downstream Priorities
Previous water management rules, based on the priority of irrigated
agriculture, do not conform to current power generation needs of the up-
stream countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Attempts to resolve this issue
on the basis of interstate energy barter have been moderately successful,
but implementation of annual barter agreements has been complicated
by difficulties in negotiating timely annual agreements. Renewed efforts
are needed to: prepare annual agreements in a timely manner; develop
multiyear schedules for compensation; include compensation for storage
services as well as flow regulation; and move away from the barter system
to a monetized exchange between the countries.
The present method of water allocation, based on Soviet era rules,
does not take into account the emerging priorities of the now independent
republics. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan often claim that the old water alloca-
tion rules limit the development of irrigation on their lands, and that
they need to reassess their future water allocation. Downstream countries
complain that poor water quality in the middle and lower reaches of the
Basins is reducing agricultural production and damaging public health,
214 MCKINNEY
and that remediation of this problem must be undertaken. In addition,

growing water demands of Afghanistan may cause new stress on the sys-
tem of water allocation.
Kambarata I and II Dams
Kyrgyz domestic energy demand has increased above the equiva-
lent of the surplus summer electricity resulting from Toktogul irrigation
releases. Negotiating higher winter fuel deliveries in exchange for the ir-
rigation releases seems out of the question, and new energy generation
capacity may be needed that can supply energy to Kyrgyz customers in
the winter. Several organizations, such as the World Bank and U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID), are considering the economic
feasibility of two dams designed in Soviet times, Kambarata I and II,
which would be located upstream of Toktogul reservoir in Kyrgyzstan.
Given the expected cost of the projects (about one billion U.S. dollars),
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are considering the formation of
a consortium to jointly develop the projects. The projects would result in
cheap summertime electricity which the consortium partners would try to
market to third parties.
Non-governmental Stakeholder Participation
Non-governmental stakeholders are not active participants in Cen-
tral Asian water management at the present time. The way that NGOs
might participate is through public awareness and information exchange
activities. In addition, NGOs can link local community opinion to the
national debate on water policy.
The Central Asian water management officials have, for the most
part, a negative reaction to the participation of NGOs in this sphere.
Officials recognize that many NGOs take a very proactive approach and
promote ideas of rapid change that are threatening to the water manage-
ment structures of Central Asia. It will take time and patience on the part
of both the NGOs and the water management officials to develop a com-
plimentary, rather than antagonistic, relationship. There are now some
NGOs not engaged in highly controversial activities who are accepted by
the water management officials as participants in some activities. NGOs
could function more effectively if they identified key water management
stakeholders both geographically (upstream versus downstream) and
topically. Such stakeholders would include water user associations or at
least key collectives along the entire system of rivers; those involved with
fisheries like Arnasai, reservoirs, and deltas; those providing river-based
transport; those living in the areas subject to flooding based on alterna-

tive management regimes including new dam construction; industrial
water users; municipal water users; and environmental groups working on
aquatic ecosystems conservation, river pollution, and other issues.
Promotion of Regional Cooperation
Regional cooperation is unlikely to be achieved solely through tech-
nical activities and projects. On the national level, plenty of these are on-
going, and more are in the design stages. Regional cooperation will come
by illustrating the benefits of participation in the development of joint,
coordinated projects and the adoption of policies that bring benefits or
reduce damages to multiple participants. These activities are not going to
arise in a single sector, but they will span two or three sectors. Sustainable
regional cooperation will most likely be achieved by creating a basis for
assessing the national and regional benefits from technical investments,
but these must be complemented by supportive national policy and insti-
tutional reforms, coupled with empowerment and capacity building for
regional institutions.
Improved or appropriate technology is important in achieving in-
creased water use efficiency and agricultural production. However, this
does not address or promote regional cooperation. By and large, a drop
saved by an Aral Sea Basin nation is viewed as another drop for expanding
the nation’s agricultural production, not for the Aral Sea. Improvements
in irrigation efficiency in upstream areas will not necessarily result in more
water flowing to the Aral Sea, rather the saved water will be diverted to
new irrigated areas. In many cases, improvements in efficiency can signifi-
cantly improve the economic benefits from national participation through
regional approaches to water resources management.
The Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan
have expressed a strong desire to develop new agreements that satisfy these
international concepts. However, there is still reluctance on the part of the
major water using countries, in particular, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan,
to enter into discussions on this issue. One of the major hurdles in achiev-
ing regional cooperation in shared water resources in Central Asia is the
focusing of the Republics’ attention on international water law. Another
issue is the lack of coordination in national water policies and legislation
across the region. While the principle of national sovereignty must be
upheld, there is no reason why the benefits from synchronization cannot
be achieved.
216 MCKINNEY
Financing Regional Water Management Projects

A few projects have been proposed that might be considered for
joint financing by the governments of Central Asia in the area of regional
water management. Most prominent of these are the development of the
Kambarata I and II dams in Kyrgyzstan. However, Kyrgyzstan is not in
a position to finance this project alone and the proposal has been made
for an international consortium of Central Asian countries for the joint
financing of the project. Kazakhstan has expressed interest in participat-
ing in this consortium—if the conditions are favorable. By joining the
consortium, Kazakhstan would change its water management position
from being the most downstream country in the Basin to assuming a
position in the uppermost part of the Basin and being able to exert some
control over the water management decisions in that part of the Basin.
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are both interested in attracting Uzbekistan
into the Kambarata consortium. However, the direct benefit to Uzbekistan
of joining the consortium is not as clear as that of Kazakhstan and, to date,
Uzbekistan has not expressed much interest in joining such a consortium.
However, Uzbekistan would be very concerned to see its neighbors work-
ing with each other and gaining additional control over the Basin’s waters
without a place reserved for its own interests in these matters.
Any decisions regarding major water management investments af-
fecting the overall regional water management regime should be made
with the full participation of all countries affected; otherwise this will
undermine trust and the basis for regional cooperation in this sphere.
The future management regime adopted for both the Syr Darya and the
Amu Darya should be based on a comprehensive evaluation of options
including new physical infrastructure, upgrading of existing physical in-
frastructure, and improved water management by user groups throughout
the Basin. Such analysis, which must include Afghanistan for the Amu
Darya, should amply demonstrate the benefits to be derived from regional
cooperation as compared to unilateral or even bilateral decision-making
and actions.
Coordination of Donors’ Activities.
Coordination among donors is desperately needed in Central Asian
regional water management activities. Lack of coordination in the past
has been noted as a cause of duplication of efforts, reduced effectiveness
of programs, inefficient use of funds, and lack of recognition of achieved
results. Most of the major donor agencies active in the region are in a
transition period at the moment. The Asian Development Bank (ADB)
is entering the area; the World Bank is considering options for new ini-
tiatives; USAID is receiving expanded resources; the Swiss Development
Commission is developing a new long-term assistance plan; and the Cana-
dian International Development Agency (CIDA) is also considering new
initiatives.
A uniform set of principles and objectives for the donors would serve
to focus the efforts more effectively to achieve results. Although donor
coordination cannot occur in the absence of government representatives,
there is a need for a donor-led mechanism for information exchange and
coordination. In the past, the World Bank and the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme (UNDP) helped to organize periodic meetings.
Areas Not Yet Addressed
The technical issues of water use and management in Central Asia
are well developed and sufficient studies have been carried out that pro-
vide a sound technical base for future work on water saving, efficiency
increases, information and decision system support, and capacity building
for regional institutions. Other areas not related to water use and manage-
ment currently demand attention. These areas include the following:
■ Water quality, including pollution from point and nonpoint sources
and especially transboundary effects. This issue requires a mandate
from a high government level before efforts can be undertaken to
mitigate the effects of water pollution.
■ Information and data exchange.
■ Past experience in Central Asia has made the governments and
donor agencies wary of the creation of regional water management
databases, due to efforts to limit access to or use of these databases.
What is needed is a new concept, where the raw data stays in the
initiating country and reports are sent periodically to the other
countries. The five national hydrometeorological services have been
working on the development of regional cooperation and data shar-
ing in their area for the past year or so, and the lessons learned from
their efforts could be applied on a broader scale.
■ Agricultural policy and its effect on national economies, water use,
and environmental effects. Some of the food security measures
implemented by some of the Central Asian states have had large
economic impacts that have not been studied. Food security is
primarily a national issue, but it does have regional environmental
impacts.
218 MCKINNEY
■ Water allocation.
Water allocation has been identified by several of the Central Asian
countries as an important issue, but Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are re-
luctant to discuss this issue for fear of disrupting existing patterns of water
use in their agricultural sectors. High-level governmental cooperation is
required to tackle this issue.
As has been seen in this chapter, water management in Central Asia
is a complex and critical issue affecting the security of all the nations of
the region. Cooperative management of this vital resource could lead to
great benefits in the future, while ignoring the opportunities for coopera-
tion will lead to roadblocks in the development pathways of the countries.
Many issues must be addressed to achieve regional management, but a
firm foundation exists from which progress can be made.
Notes
1 Y. Khudaiberganov, “About BWO Role in Amudarya Basin Water Resources Management

Issues,” ADB Regional Consultation Workshop, Cooperation in Shared Water Resources in Central
Asia: Past Experience and Future Challenges, Almaty, September 26-28 2002.
2 M. Khamidov, “Syr Darya River Water Resources Management and Environmental Effects
Caused by Changing Natural River Flow Regime,” ADB Regional Consultation Workshop, Coop-
eration in Shared Water Resources in Central Asia: Past Experience and Future Challenges, Almaty,
September 26-28 2002.
3 O. Atanyazova,“Health and Ecological Consequences of the Aral Sea Crisis,” paper presented
at the Third World Water Forum, Kyoto, March 18, 2003.

4 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), “State of Environment of the Aral Sea
Basin Regional Report of the Central Asian States 2000,” <http://www.grida.no/aral/aralsea/english/

fish/fish.html>.
5 Almaty, February 18, 1992.
6 Kyzyl Orda, March 26, 1993.
7 Nukus, September 20, 1995.
8 Tashkent, January 4, 1993.
9 ICAS had as executive bodies: an Executive Committee (EC ICAS); the International Sustain-
able Development Commission (ISDC), and the ICWC (including the BVOs and SIC ICWC).
10 Kyzl Orda, 23 March 1993.
11 Nukus, January 11, 1994.
12 Almaty, February 27, 1997; Tashkent March 20, 1997; and Tashkent May 30, 1997.
13 Agreement on the Use of Water and Energy Resources of the Syr Darya Basin, Bishkek,
March 17, 1998.

14 Under the framework agreement, during 1998-2001, Kyrgyzstan met, on average, 86.5
percent of the planned irrigation water releases and 77.8 percent of the planned surplus electricity
transmission. During the same period, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan supplied to the Kyrgyz energy
system 87.8 percent of the planned natural gas and 60.5 percent of the planned coal (A.K. Kenshimov,
“Interstate Water Allocation in the Aral Sea Basin,” Royal Haskoning, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 2002).
15 G. Gleason, “Inter-State Cooperation in Central Asia from the CIS to the Shanghai Forum”,
Europe – Asia Studies, Vol. 53, no. 7, 1077–1095, 2001.

16 Ibid., 1084.
17 RFEL, “Four Central Asian Presidents Meet in Dushanbe,” <www.rferl.org/news-
line/2002/10/2>.
18 D. McCauley, “Establishing a Framework for Transboundary Water Management in the Syr
Darya Basin of Central Asia,” Issue Paper, U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington
D.C., 2002; E. Weinthal, “State Making and Environmental Cooperation: Linking Domestic and Inter-
national Politics in Central Asia,” (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002).
19 The data and statistics used to characterize the countries of the region come mostly from
the reports of the Global Environmental Facility, Water and Environmental Management Project,
Component A.1 Joint Report 2 and Regional Report 2, 2002.
20 I.S. Zonn, “Water Resources of Northern Afghanistan and Their Future Use,” presented at
Informal Planning Meeting: Water, Climate, and Development Issues in the Amudarya Basin, Phila-
delphia, June 18-19, 2002.
21 Ibid., 9.
22 In 2000, the Kyrgyz hydroelectricity production cost was 0.006 USD per kWh, and the export
price was 0.01 USD per kWh. This price for the Kyrgyz electricity exceeds the cost of generation at the
Kazakh thermal plants (about 0.006 USD per kWh). At these prices and without consideration of the
value of the delivered water (0.004 USD per kWh or 0.0034 USD per cubic m), the Kyrgyz electricity
is not competitive in the Kazakhstan power market.
23 A.D. Ryabtsev, “Country Perspectives on Regional Cooperation in Shared Water Resources:
Water Resources of Kazakhstan,” in Cooperation in Shared Water Resources in Central Asia: Past Experi-
ence and Future Challenges; D. C. McKinney, ed., Proceedings of the Regional Consultation Workshop
on Cooperation in Shared Water Resources in Central Asia: Past Experience and Future Challenges,
Asian Development Bank, Manila, 2003, 168.
24 UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), “Convention on the Protection and Use
of Transboundary Water Courses and International Lakes”, Helsinki, 1992, and the UN “Convention
on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses”, 1997.
25 The obligation of a country to utilize a watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner
and to cooperate in its protection and development. This principle affects economic policy of each
Basin country.
26 The obligation of a country to prevent, control, and reduce pollution of waters causing or
likely to cause transboundary impact. This principle affects economic and environmental policies of
the region and each nation in the basin.
27A.A.Jalalov, “Water Resources Management in Uzbekistan: Legal aspects and Directions of
Improvement,” in Cooperation in Shared Water Resources in Central Asia: Past Experience and Future
Challenges; D. C. McKinney, ed., Proceedings of the Regional Consultation Workshop on Cooperation
in Shared Water Resources in Central Asia: Past Experience and Future Challenges, Asian Develop-
ment Bank, Manila, 2003, 168.
28 Ibid., 47.
220 MCKINNEY
Chapter 10
Central Asian Public Health:

Transition and
Transformation
Genevieve Grabman
A
dramatic demographic and epidemiological transition has oc-
curred in Central Asia during the past decade, concurrent with the
region’s political and economic transition. This chapter attempts
to explain the changing public health status in Central Asia by depicting
the historical and social context in which public health is evolving. Kyr-
gyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan inherited
their public health systems from the Soviet Union, and the demise of that
empire has greatly impacted Central Asian public health. The collapse
of centrally-controlled health care finance and planning precipitated an
increased risk of sickness and death for the public. The newly indepen-
dent Central Asian states began in the late 1990s to reform their national
health systems in order to make public health care fiscally sustainable and
responsive to health challenges. Still, Central Asia faces some critical health
needs in the new millennium. Reflecting the region’s transitional status,
both chronic and infectious health conditions urgently require interven-
tion from each nation’s public health system.
Data and Statistics

Any study of Central Asian heath requires a caveat on the data it
presents: data collection in all Central Asian countries is notoriously diffi-
cult, statistical analysis may be poor, and reported figures are often skewed
for political purposes. The infant mortality rate is only one of many gov-
ernment-reported statistics that may have little resemblance to a real fig-
ure. Doctors’ use of Soviet death criteria results in a systemic mislabeling
of infant deaths as stillborns, thus the true number of babies who die after
birth is higher than the reported infant mortality rate indicates.1 Regional
governments’ human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired im-
munodeficiency virus (AIDS) statistics also may significantly underesti-
mate infection rates, as legally-required residency permit systems discour-
221
222 GRABMAN
age many groups particularly vulnerable to HIV infection from registering

with authorities.2 In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, official statistics are
particularly suspect, given the autocratic nature of these governments.
A less distorted picture of public health in the region can be obtained
by focusing on data from the Kyrgyz Republic, or Kyrgyzstan. Although
data verification remains problematic, recent government-provided health
data is relatively reliable. Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Health has received
extensive technical assistance from the World Health Organization in
reporting health statistics. Kyrgyzstan was also the site of an extensive
United States-led Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) in 1997, per-
mitting comparison of official statistics with independently collected
information.
Kyrgyzstan: A Proxy for Central Asia

In its population’s longevity, morbidity, and mortality, Kyrgyzstan
represents the mean of Central Asian public health.3 Tajikistan and Turk-
menistan, poorer countries than Kyrgyzstan, have higher mortality rates.
Uzbekistan, a richer country than Kyrgyzstan, has lesser infant and under-
five mortality rates and longer life expectancies. Until 1999, Kazakhstan’s
relative wealth also contributed to lower child mortality and higher life
expectancy than in Kyrgyzstan.4
All of Central Asia is also mirrored in Kyrgyzstan’s internal public
health variations.5 Kyrgyzstan’s poorest oblasts or states, Talas, Naryn, and
Batken, have the country’s highest rates of infant and maternal mortality.
In cold, dry Talas and Naryn, with climates similar to Kazakhstan, acute
respiratory infections and tuberculosis are more problematic than in the
rest of Kyrgyzstan. In the southern oblasts of Jalal-Abad, Osh, and Batken,
as in Tajikistan and southern Uzbekistan, diarrheal diseases are the major
cause of morbidity and mortality in children. In these Kyrgyzstani states,
fertility rates are also much higher than in other oblasts, due to the cul-
tural and religious beliefs of the southern Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbek and Tajik
populations. Further, during the late 1990s and until 2001, the southern
portion of Kyrgyzstan suffered invasions by Taliban-backed militants.
This armed insurrection undoubtedly crippled the health care system and
caused higher death rates in the affected areas, a result similar to that seen
in war-torn Tajikistan.
Northern oblasts Chuy and Issyk-Kol have the most favorable health
indicators in Kyrgyzstan. Similar to all Central Asian capitals, wealth is
concentrated around the capital city in Chuy oblast, and the population
here has better access to higher quality health care than do people in other
PUBLIC HEALTH 223
oblasts. Bishkek residents, like the inhabitants of all Central Asia’s capital
cities, enjoy the country’s best health outcomes. Chuy and Issyk-Kol also
have a high proportion of Russians living in them, similar to the demo-
graphics of Kazakhstan and many Central Asian capitals. Russians tend
to have lower fertility rates and better mortality and morbidity outcomes
than do native Central Asian peoples.
Finally, like the other Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan is reform-
ing its Soviet-inherited health care system. Kyrgyzstan’s health reform is
the most advanced and widespread in Central Asia, having begun in the
north of Kyrgyzstan, expanded to the south, and recently spread to Naryn
and Talas. This health reform is expected to improve health outcomes
throughout Kyrgyzstan.6
The Soviet Health System

The Soviet Union’s Constitution was the first in the world to guar-
antee the right to health, stating, “Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to
health protection.”7 The Soviet health care system therefore was designed
to provide all citizens—and especially rural populations—with access to a
basic level of care. At the expense of preventative care, provider choice, and
efficiency, Soviet socialized medicine achieved impressive public health ac-
complishments. The ratio of doctors and nurses to population was among
the highest in the world. Many diseases once endemic, including diphthe-
ria, smallpox, cholera, polio, whooping cough, and typhus, were virtually
eradicated. On average and indicative of results seen in the Central Asian
Soviet republics, USSR. life expectancies doubled between the 1917 Octo-
ber revolution and 1970.8
The Soviet health system was a single-payer scheme, where the gov-
ernment provided all health care free of charge, according to norms for-
mulated by the Ministry of Health in Moscow and resource distribution
determined by the Semashko All Union Research Institute in Moscow.9
Republic-level health ministries were responsible for implementing Mos-
cow’s policies through oblast-level health departments. In turn, the oblast
health departments directed health care through rayon (county) and at the
city health administrations. In each republic and oblast, a sanitary epide-
miological service (Sanepid or SES) oversaw the control of communicable
diseases and acted as a “check” on the health departments’ work.10
To provide universal health care coverage, the Soviet system auto-
matically assigned each citizen to a polyclinic that assumed responsibility
for the person’s health and served as the portal of entrance to the medi-
cal care system.11 The patient could not choose his or her physician; the
224 GRABMAN
patient’s residence in a micro-district usually determined her polyclinic

assignment. However, high ranking members of the Communist Party and
employees in some collective enterprises, such as factories and farms, were
assigned to clinics and hospitals reserved for their use. The one polyclinic
per micro-district, staffed by an internist for men, a pediatrician for chil-
dren, an obstetrician for women, a dentist, and a nurse, provided routine
outpatient care to the micro-district’s approximately 4000 people. In rural
areas with long distances between polyclinics called selskaya vrachebnaya
ambulatorya, or SVAs, people could receive basic care from first aid spe-
cialists and midwives at health posts feldsher accousherski punkt or FAPs.
If referred by their polyclinic or if self-referred, Soviet citizens could
seek more advanced health care at the rayon’s central town hospital and
specialty polyclinics. In rural areas, limited medical care was available at
small hospitals selskaya uchaskovaya bolnitsia, or SUBs. Still more special-
ized and better equipped hospitals for specific diseases and conditions—
cancer, tuberculosis, sexually transmitted infections—could be found in
the main city of each oblast and in republic’s capital city.
Kyrgyzstan was a beneficiary of the Soviet health care system in many
ways. Although costly and hospital-heavy, the Kyrgyzstan’s Soviet health
care system successfully decreased infant and child deaths and increased
life expectancy. The Soviet system also provided all children and expect-
ant mothers with free health care.12 As a result, Kyrgyzstan’s official infant
mortality rate dropped from 111 in 1970 to 52 in 2001, and the under-five
mortality rate decreased from 146 in 1970 to 61 in 2001.13
While it sounded like a positive situation for all involved, the So-
viet model of health care had many drawbacks.14 The system relied on
vast numbers of specialists and multiple, redundant specialist facilities.15
In turn, the system produced few community-level health professionals
skilled in preventive care, such as generalists and nurse practitioners.16
Many doctors were trained only to address the needs of a specific sex or
age group suffering from a specific disease, while nurses had limited skills
and undertook only basic tasks. As an example of the extreme overspecial-
ization of Soviet health care, Kyrgyz obstetricians neither owned nor knew
how to use stethoscopes. Clinical management required lengthy hospital
stays for many conditions, such as tuberculosis and influenza, which could
have been treated in outpatient facilities.17 The system’s financing struc-
ture encouraged this tertiary care focus by funding hospitals according to
their bed quantity, rather than their number of patients. Such treatment
and financing regimes required a large number of hospital beds, which led
to low occupancy levels. Finally, the Soviet system failed to encourage a
PUBLIC HEALTH 225
sense of health responsibility among the citizenry or innovation amongst

the providers.18 Government subsidies supported health care and the
population grew to expect free healthcare services. No private health care
or health insurance was necessary or permitted.
Soviet Collapse
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the disruption
caused by a forced transition from a collectivist system to a market econ-
omy brought about a near collapse of the health care system in the newly
independent states.19 Like the other Central Asian nations, Kyrgyzstan was
left utterly without money to support its social sector, including its public
health systems.20 The share of the government budget going to health care
fell by about a third between 1991 and 1992.21 At the same time, the per-
centage of the gross domestic product spent on health care fell from just
over four to two percent.22 The country’s poor economic situation led to
health services deterioration as equipment became antiquated, drug stocks
dwindled, and buildings decayed.23 Salaries for doctors and nurses, if paid
at all, fell from 79 percent of the average salary in 1995 to just 59 percent
in 1998.24
The resource requirements of Kyrgyzstan’s socialized public health
system became untenable in the 1990s. Hospitals swallowed 73 percent of
the healthcare funds, while the primary healthcare system received only 16
percent of the already diminished health budget.25 Focus on tertiary care
resulted in resources being spread too thin, and in under-financing of local
level services. In turn, this led to mandatory informal payments to health-
care providers, a practice particularly detrimental to the poor. The World
Bank bluntly states, “Resources wasted on half-empty facilities, poorly
insulated buildings, or medical technologies that do not function rob the
system of resources that could be put to effective use” on the primary
health care level.26 A well-functioning health care system is the single most
important element in reaching the poor with prevention and treatment.27
Central Asians’ health status declined due to the effects of poverty
and lack of health care access. In Kyrgyzstan and particularly in the coun-
try’s rural areas, the poverty rate increased from 40 percent to 63 percent
between 1993 and 1996.28 Lack of funding for the state health care system
barred large segments of the population from basic medical services,29 as
the need to pay for health care prevented or delayed some poor families
from seeking care.30 Lack of adequate health care and poor nutritional
status played pivotal roles in the significant growth in Kyrgyzstan’s infant
226 GRABMAN
and child mortality rate.31 Life expectancy also dropped by several years, as
Kyrgyzstanis struggled to obtain food and health care in the mid-1990s.32
Further indicating the dire state of Central Asia’s post-Soviet public
health, Kyrgyzstani tuberculosis (TB) incidence rates increased 100 per-
cent from 1991 to 2000. While the upsurge followed trends expected for
the Central Asian region,33 Kyrgyzstan’s TB incidence grew faster than any
other former Soviet state.34 New TB infections in Kyrgyzstan may soon
approach Tajikistan’s very high TB incidence of 250 cases per 100,000
people.35
Tuberculosis is a disease of poverty, easily spread in crowded con-
ditions and infecting the sick and malnourished.36 Through coughing,
talking, or spitting, each person with active, untreated TB will infect on
average between 10 and 15 people every year.37 In infected people, the TB
bacilli can lie dormant for several years; when an infected person’s im-
mune system is weakened, his or her chances of falling ill with active TB
increase. Populations lacking food or adequate living space, alcoholics, and
people living with HIV/AIDS are at particular risk of becoming infected
with TB and in developing the active disease. As it spreads, TB further
strains the already under-funded Central Asian public health systems by
requiring them to provide needed treatment to the sick. Tuberculosis also
greatly increases the burden on the poor, as the disease spreads through
families and as its debilitating effects limit the ability of the poor to work
and better their situations.
Post-Soviet Reforms
The Soviet health care system was wasteful and, as the system’s 1990s
collapse showed, unsustainable.38 In response to the region’s unabated
economic crisis, Central Asia’s health care systems have been forced to
undergo a comprehensive reform to rationalize their financing and to
emphasize primary care.39 The type and pace of change differs in each of
the countries, and Kyrgyzstan’s reforms are the most complete and insti-
tutionalized.40
The national health reform program began in the north of Kyrgyz-
stan in 1996 and more recently expanded to the south and to Talas and
Naryn oblasts. Kyrgyzstan’s health reform fosters lower-cost primary care
through the creation of family medicine practice groups (FGPs), rational-
ization of the health system’s excess physical capacity, and development of
a tax-supported healthcare financing system.41 Supported by a World Bank
structural assistance loan and U. S. Agency for International Development
PUBLIC HEALTH 227
(USAID) technical assistance, the Kyrgyz government determines the

reform’s objectives and implements and monitors its performance.
Radically departing from the prior system of assigning patients to
doctors, the reformed health system permits families to choose their FGP
from among those in the district. Each FGP is composed of a pediatrician,
an internist, a gynecologist, and at least two nurses, all retrained in mod-
ern family medicine protocols. The FGP structure allows family members
to receive their health care at one location, and FGPs act as gatekeepers to
higher levels of care.
The architects of the health reform hoped that, if Kyrgyzstanis took
personal responsibility for their own health and used FGPs’ preventative
and primary care services, the cost of Kyrgyzstan’s system would decrease,
and the health status of the population would improve. Consistent with
these goals, a national Ministry of Health marketing team informs the
Kyrgyz population about the ongoing reforms and conducts health pro-
motional campaigns. Systemic reform cannot depend on health education
efforts alone, however. “Financial investment in family group practices
and outpatient drugs is necessary to give patients access to medicine at
the primary healthcare level and to allow FGPs to function and to expand
their scope of services.”42
As a method of freeing funding for health reform, poorly utilized or
redundant hospitals or specialized polyclinics are to be closed. Most of the
facilities slated for closure are SUBs in rural areas or city hospitals. Despite
being located close to remote population enclaves, these facilities have
little or no supplies and offer very limited services when compared with
hospitals and polyclinics in the rayon center cities. Staffing and heating
excess buildings drains oblast health budgets, taking funds sorely needed
for basic drugs, food, supplies, and salaries. Although individual doctors
oppose closing health facilities, which provide them informal payment op-
portunities, the oblast health departments are committed to rationalizing
the health sector’s resources.43 Money saved from closing high cost, under-
utilized hospitals creates pools of funds for FGP capital investments, pro-
vider salaries, and oblast drug supplies.44
Even with this rationalization of the systems’ capacity, the revenues
of Central Asian governments are insufficient to support national public
health systems. In Kyrgyzstan, a mandatory health insurance fund (MHIF)
provides additional resources for the health reform. The MHIF receives
funds from earmarked payroll taxes and pools this money. Using innova-
tive payment methods and based on information collected through new
health information systems, the MHIF then allocates the funds to oblast
228 GRABMAN
health departments for essential drugs. For hospital services, patients must
pay formalized, government-approved co-payments, although the MHIF
covers the costs of medication.
The MHIF mechanism has given impetus to the health reform’s im-
plementation.45 The availability of outpatient drugs provides an incentive
to reduce hospital admissions and to expand primary healthcare services.46
A government decree to include all children as MHIF beneficiaries in 2000
expanded the fund’s role to include coverage of health services.47 Further,
formal patient co-payments have significantly reduced informal payments
to health providers and corruption in the health system.48 Providers now
have a legitimate means of increasing their salaries, and patients are given
prior notice of the charges for their health care.
Currently, among the Central Asian Republics, only Kyrgyzstan has a
functioning MHIF. The other Central Asian republics are reluctant to rep-
licate this off-budget financing system. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turk-
menistan have not developed a health insurance fund, and Kazakhstan’s
MHIF lasted three years before it was eliminated due to political wrangling
and because of the lack of legal and regulatory systems necessary for the
MHIF’s support.49
Kyrgyzstan’s willingness to implement health sector reform has
served as a catalyst for attracting and coordinating international health
aid in Kyrgyzstan. A variety of governments and organizations, includ-
ing the World Health Organization (WHO), World Bank, the European
Bank of Reconstruction and Development, and the Asian Development
Bank, have provided training and support for doctors, nurses, and mid-
wives throughout the country. Other donors, such as the United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and USAID, have provided immunizations
and nutritional supplements and have conducted breastfeeding training
classes.50 Initial studies demonstrate that the reformed, rationalized, re-
trained, and refunded health care system also provides better quality ser-
vices.51 Improved public health and infant and child survival are expected
from these efforts.52
Demographic and Epidemiological Transitions

The transitional state of Central Asia’s public health system has pre-
cipitated changes in the area’s patterns of population and disease growth.
Immediately before and after the Soviet collapse, Central Asia’s health
indicators resembled those of a developing country with high birthrates
but high infant and maternal death rates. The leading causes of death were
infectious diseases. More recently, the causes of Central Asians’ deaths are
PUBLIC HEALTH 229
changing; chronic conditions more often found in developed countries,

such as heart disease, are increasingly producing a greater percentage of
deaths. At the same time, infant and under-five mortality rates appear
to be improving throughout the region. Maternal mortality, preventable
deaths due to pregnancy, childbirth, and abortion complications, is also
decreasing. In 1990, 110 Central Asian mothers died for every 100,000
women having a live birth.53 By 2002, the average maternal mortality ratio
had dropped to 65 women per 100,000 having a live birth.54
Demographic Transition
Like the rest of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan is undergoing a transition
from high fertility and mortality rates to low fertility and mortality rates.
Kyrgyzstan’s total fertility rate is officially 2.5, which is relatively low.55 Yet
a high prevalence of abortion in Kyrgyzstan, as in all former Soviet coun-
tries, may obscure a much higher actual total fertility rate, suggesting that
the country still is in the middle of a demographic transition.56
Central Asia’s children face a moderate risk of death during their first
five years of life. In 2001, for every 1,000 babies born alive in Kyrgyzstan,
52 died before their first birthday.57 Of children under five years of age, 61
died for every 1,000 children.58 Again, these official rates may understate
the true number of deaths of Kyrgyz children. Others estimate that 76.5
infants die for every 1000 born alive.59
Most of Central Asia’s population is slow-growing due to the effects
of migration. In Kyrgyzstan, the crude birth rate is estimated at 26.06
births per 1,000 population; the crude death rate is expected to be 9.10
deaths per 1,000 population.60 Rapid population growth is expected where
a country’s crude birth rate exceeds its crude death rate; yet Kyrgyzstan’s
population grew only by an estimated 1.46 percent in 2003.61 This lower
population growth resulted from 2.37 per 1,000 people migrating from
Kyrgyzstan.62
Uzbekistan is an exception to Central Asia’s demographic trend of
lower birth and death rates. With 40 percent of its citizens younger than
16 years old, Uzbekistan’s population is expected to double in 50 years to
50 million people.63 Such rapid population growth clearly will exacerbate
the deteriorating post-Soviet health system. To merely maintain its current
level of health care, Tashkent will need to more than double the amount of
resources dedicated to health services.64
230 GRABMAN
Epidemiological Transition
Central Asia represents a pre- and post-epidemiological transition
mix, where new health concerns, especially alcoholism and smoking,
compound the effects of diseases spread due to poverty and the collapsing
healthcare system. Throughout the region, the top causes of adult mor-
bidity and mortality are both chronic and infectious conditions found in
developing (pre-transitional) and developed (post-transitional) countries.
Most adult deaths in Kyrgyzstan, for example, are attributed to respiratory
infections, chronic cardiovascular conditions, and accidents or injuries.65
High mortality due to chronic, preventable conditions is characteris-
tic of post-transitional countries. Cardiovascular disease is the largest con-
tributor to the gap in mortality between Central Asia and industrialized
countries, with rates about five times higher than in Western Europe.66 The
high prevalence of smoking, especially among Central Asian men, is the
cause of much cardiovascular mortality.67 Alcoholism is also contributing
to a rising rate of mortality and morbidity due to cardiovascular disease
deaths68 and to injury, including injuries caused by alcohol-fueled domes-
tic and gender-based violence.69
Rising rates of deaths from non-communicable diseases notwith-
standing, sickness caused by infectious diseases indicates that Central
Asian countries remain, in many ways, “developing countries.” In Central
Asia, infectious respiratory and diarrheal diseases kill many infants and
young children.70 Sexually transmitted infections are also spreading rapidly
among Central Asian youth and adults.71 Further, the region faces growing
rates of tuberculosis and drug resistant tuberculosis infection.72 For the
Central Asian region, more years of life are lost to disability from com-
municable diseases, maternal and perinatal conditions, and nutritional
deficiencies than from all non-communicable conditions combined.73
The effects of Central Asia’s demographic and epidemiological transi-
tion can be summarized through a description of Kyrgyzstan’s population.
If they survive their early childhood, Kyrgyzstan’s ethnically diverse 4.6
million people can expect to live, on average, for 68 years before succumb-
ing to either a disease typical of a developing country or a lifestyle-related
sickness common to a developed country. Given Kyrgyzstan’s mortality
rates due to respiratory disease, which are the highest in the former Soviet
Union, Kyrgyz’s risk of dying due to tuberculosis is particularly acute.74
PUBLIC HEALTH 231
Pressing Health Challenges

Central Asia in transition exhibits some of the worst features of both
developed and developing countries, with high rates of heart disease and
childhood infections.75 This pattern indicates the importance of strength-
ening health education and addressing malnutrition and other infectious,
chronic, and injury-caused health threats.
Health Promotion/Education
The lack of basic health education and health awareness promo-
tion in Central Asia is perhaps the most important problem facing the
region’s health sector.76 The region’s top causes of mortality and morbid-
ity—both infectious and chronic—could be addressed through education
programs targeting both adults and children and focusing on behavior
change. For example, if parents and children were taught the importance
of handwashing after defecation and before food preparation, this would
help prevent the incidence of diarrhea. Similarly, educating people about
the risks of smoking and of non-monogamous, casual sexual behavior
might cause people to avoid these behaviors. Given Central Asia’s many
childhood deaths from diarrhea, and the region’s rising rates of mortality
from smoking and morbidity from sexually transmitted diseases, health
education is essential.
With decreasing health budgets, the Central Asian states’ crumbling
public health systems have scarce resources to develop and implement
health promotion programs. The region’s ongoing health reform gives
the international community opportunities to assist Ministries of Health
in the creation of health education projects. Consistent with the goals of
health reform, preventative, community-level health initiatives are less
expensive than the Soviet curative health system, and involve people in the
health decisions that affect them.
In Kyrgyzstan, USAID formatted a health promotion pilot project in
Chuy oblast. Through this project, FGPs give health talks in schools and
businesses, set up information centers in communities to distribute health
educational materials, and show video spots on prevention of various
diseases, including sexually transmitted infections (STIs).77 In Uzbekistan,
this program trained Ferghana Oblast schoolteachers to develop plans for
primary school health lessons. Lessons covered topics such as bodily and
oral hygiene, nutrition and anemia, acute respiratory infections, diarrhea,
“bad habits” (including smoking, alcohol, and drugs), and reproductive
health focused on puberty.78
232 GRABMAN
Health promotion work requires improving the communications

skills of front-line, community health workers.79 Increasing the skills of
nurses is of particular importance in Central Asia, where 70 percent of
the population is rural-based with little access to doctors.80 In many cases,
nurses and midwives at rural FAPs are the first and only health care pro-
viders available to the population. As part of the health reform in Kyrgyz-
stan, FGP nurse retraining programs in management of childhood illness
and reproductive health are active in six of the country’s seven oblasts.81
Nutrition
Malnutrition is one of the primary causes of under-five child mor-
tality in Central Asia.82 However, the effects of micronutrient deficiency
reach far beyond mere mortality; both goiter and anemia are extremely
prevalent in the region’s women and children. In the Ferghana Valley, be-
tween 60 and 80 percent of women and young children suffer from anemia
caused by an iron-poor diet.83 Throughout the Central Asia republics, only
non-iodized salt is commonly available, resulting in a steep rise in iodine
deficiency disorders over the past five years,84 and disabling up to 90 per-
cent of young children in some areas of Kyrgyzstan.85 Since a mother’s iron
or iodine deficiency may impair the cognitive and physical development
of her children, the health of future Central Asians depends on address-
ing malnutrition now. To call attention to the problem of malnutrition
in Uzbekistan, international donors created a three-part television series
entitled “Simple Truth” that promotes the consumption of meat and other
iron-rich foods.86
Another nutritional intervention, exclusive breastfeeding, could play
an important role in reducing Central Asian infant and child mortality
from causes other than malnutrition. Diarrhea and acute respiratory in-
fection are responsible for much of the region’s infant and child mortality
and morbidity. Breastfeeding helps to prevent and reduce the incidence of
diarrheal and respiratory disease in infants. Despite this beneficial effect
of breastfeeding, many Central Asian mothers wean their infants or give
their babies tea and other liquids.87 Thus, increasing the number of moth-
ers who exclusively breastfeed their children up to six months of age could
reduce the infant and child mortality rate.
Infectious Disease
AIDS
In 1999, Central Asia had the world’s steepest increase in HIV infec-
tion;88 yet the true extent of AIDS—caused by HIV—in Central Asia is un-
PUBLIC HEALTH 233
known, due to the lack of accurate reporting.89 Kazakhstan’s government

reported the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in Central Asia, with
1,122 HIV positive cases and 31 AIDS cases, but only 92 HIV infection
cases are confirmed across the border in Kyrgyzstan.90 Broader regional
data may be a harbinger of an imminent AIDS epidemic, much worse
than official figures indicate. From 1995 to 2000, the estimated number
of HIV infections in Eastern Europe and Central Asia increased by more
than twenty-fold, from less than 30,000 to more than 700,000.91 The in-
fection incidence similarly continues to grow exponentially in the region,
with 250,000 new infections in 2000 alone. In Kyrgyzstan, the majority of
new HIV cases are among injecting drug users (IDUs) living in Osh and
the Ferghana Valley. In Osh and Bishkek, over 5 percent of IDUs are likely
HIV infected.92
The AIDS epidemic will soon spread from IDUs to their sexual part-
ners and to the general heterosexual population, indicated by a rapid rise
in other STIs in the region. Central Asia syphilis prevalence rates exploded
in the 1990s, jumping almost 150 percent in Kyrgyzstan from 1990 to 1996
and a staggering 225 percent in Kazakhstan during the same period.93 In
1999, one in every 90 Kyrgyzstani men had syphilis.94 Syphilis and HIV
are both transmitted through unprotected sexual intercourse, so groups at
risk for syphilis also are at risk for HIV. In addition, STI infection increases
the likelihood of HIV transmission during unprotected sex.95
Central Asian adolescents are a particularly high-risk group for sexu-
ally transmitted infections, including syphilis and HIV. In Kyrgyzstan, the
1998 incidence of STIs in urban youth was 170 per 100,000, an infection
rate considerably higher than the average urban population (100 infec-
tions per 100,000 people).96 The causes of the disproportionate STI youth
infection rate are likely due to adolescents’ hazardous sexual activity and
lack of disease prevention ability or knowledge. Indeed, 40 percent of
sexually active urban adolescent Kyrgyz girls reported receiving remunera-
tion for sexual intercourse.97 This information about risk taking behavior
portends a serious challenge to Central Asian public health.
Tuberculosis
Despite recent efforts to diagnose and control TB, the disease is
spreading unabated in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan is combating the most
serious new epidemic of TB in the former Soviet Union. Of the country’s
4.6 million people, 126.9 out of every 100,000, approximately 5837 people,
are currently infected;98 and the new infection rate may soon reach 250 per
100,000.99
234 GRABMAN
The development of multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB)

makes addressing tuberculosis infection a public health priority for all
of Central Asia. MDR-TB is rising at alarming rates in the former Soviet
Union and threatens global TB control efforts.100 MDR-TB is virulent be-
cause the disease cannot be controlled by isoniazid and rifampicin, the two
most powerful, and least expensive, anti-TB drugs.101
Drug-resistant TB is caused by inconsistent or partial chemother-
apy—when TB patients do not take all their drugs regularly for the re-
quired period.102 Central Asians often treat themselves for TB, purchasing
antibiotics from street vendors and discontinuing treatment once they
feel better, but before the TB bacilli are killed.103 Health workers also may
prescribe the wrong treatment regimens for a patient’s TB. These TB drug
treatments are individualized and do not follow WHO recommendations,
resulting in low cure rates, cases of chronic infections, and drug-resis-
tance.104 Further, the TB drug supply is unreliable and treatment may be
interrupted when delivery of medication is delayed.105 Whereas during
the Soviet period patients were treated with at least three anti-TB drugs,
health personnel now often have to rely on only two drugs, isoniazid and
rifampin. Given the high likelihood in the region of pre-existing resistance
to one of these agents, this situation will lead to the generation and trans-
mission of multidrug-resistant strains.106
TB infection is particularly rife in Central Asia’s prisons. Prison
inmates are more susceptible to the disease because TB spreads in the
overcrowded, poorly ventilated cells, and because the prisoners themselves
are often sick and malnourished.107 Due to lack of treatment and medi-
cation, many prisoners develop MDR-TB.108 Statistics from Kazakhstan
show that the TB morbidity rate among prisoners is more than 20 times
higher than among the general population.109 In Kyrgyzstan, more than 10
percent of all inmates are likely infected with TB—close to 2,000 people
in 40 prisons.110 Of these, roughly 30 percent are likely to be infected with
MDR-TB.111 When prisoners are released and return home, they spread
their MDR-TB to their communities.112 In an effort to reduce prison
costs and overcrowding, Kyrgyzstan offered amnesty to individuals con-
victed of petty crimes—nearly 50 percent of the prisoners in the country.
Among the first groups scheduled to receive amnesty were prisoners with
tuberculosis.113
Tuberculosis control in Central Asia is needed immediately before
the disease spreads from Central Asia to other countries. The WHO is
attempting to assist Central Asian governments in implementing a rapid
TB detection and treatment strategy called Directly Observed Treatment,
PUBLIC HEALTH 235
Short Course (DOTS).114 DOTS has been effective in controlling tradi-

tional TB, producing cure rates of up to 95 percent even in the poorest
countries. DOTS also prevents the development of MDR-TB by ensuring
the full course of treatment is followed. The World Bank has ranked the
DOTS strategy as one of the “most cost-effective of all health interven-
tions.”115
Kyrgyzstan’s government has prioritized TB eradication.116 With
WHO help, DOTS protocols are being taught to primary care practitioners
at the community-level.117 Generalists’ wide coverage places them in a po-
sition to reach a much larger segment of the population than that attended
by the Soviet vertical TB control system.118 Yet the under-financed primary
healthcare system in Kyrgyzstan is limited in the care it can provide. A six-
month supply of drugs for DOTS costs eleven U.S. dollars per patient,119
thus $50,000 is needed to treat those currently infected in Kyrgyzstan. A
comprehensive TB control program also requires funds to support home
visits to the most seriously ill in their communities, to ensure that the sick
follow their treatment regimes.
Lack of funding in the health care system prevents countries from
providing the expensive medicines needed to fight MDR-TB. Although
international donors provide some TB medication, Central Asian Min-
istries of Health have no available funds to extend TB-control services to
underserved populations, such as those in prison. While the WHO and
others have vigorously promoted the DOTS program in Kyrgyzstan, little
can be accomplished without targeted monetary support for the new TB
protocols.
Gender-Based Violence
Central Asian women are suffering a growing incidence of domestic
and other gender-based violence. Post-Soviet economic hardships, chang-
ing social roles of men and women, and men’s alcohol consumption all
contribute to a greater incidence of spousal beatings, and the revival of
“traditional” practices harmful to women.120 In particular, bride stealing,
that is, the kidnapping, rape, and subsequent forced marriage of a young
woman, has increased in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and in some regions of
Uzbekistan.121 Ethnographers attribute the recent increase in bride stealing
to young men’s newfound ability to abuse women with impunity122 and
men’s desire to avoid the “inconveniences” of courtship and a wedding.123
In Karakalpakstan, Uzbekistan, bride stealing is related to the revived
practice of “qalym,” or bride price. Prospective grooms who wish to avoid
236 GRABMAN
paying a sizable qalym often resort to stealing their intended spouse with-
out her consent.124
Only scant data is available describing the incidence of bride stealing,
the prevalence of stolen brides, or the characteristics of the victim. A late
1990s study of women in a region in southern Kazakhstan found that 80
percent of these women were stolen as brides.125 In 1996, The Economist
estimated that one in five marriages of Kyrgyz (approximately 240,000
women) were a result of bride stealing.126 Only one sociological survey
has sought to depict both the practice and the characteristics of men and
women involved in Kyrgyz bride stealings. A convenience sample of over
300 bride stealings found that the abducted brides ranged in age from 16
to 28 years old (average 19.4 years), while abductors ranged from 17 to 45
(average age 23.5 years).127
Bride stealing apparently occurs at such a rate that its harm to women
constitutes a public health problem.128 The tradition affects women’s phys-
iology and psychology. A woman may suffer physical trauma at the time
of abduction. Many stealings involve the use of blunt force to “capture”
the bride.129 Following capture, the woman may be raped,130 resulting in
severe damage to her external and internal reproductive organs.131 The
bride stealing practice also may put women at risk for sexually transmitted
infections. The stolen bride is not able to negotiate her sexual initiation
with her new husband, and it is very unlikely that she will be able to insist
on condom use during intercourse.132 Similarly, bride stealing renders a
woman completely vulnerable to her abductor and his family. This power
imbalance puts the bride at risk of future domestic violence at the hands of
her new husband.133 For adolescents, bride stealing may result in a greater
risk from maternal mortality due to obstructed labor, a problem in women
whose physical development is not complete at the time of pregnancy.134
Bride stealing also harms women’s psychological health.135 A woman
kidnapped and raped by a stranger is subject to severe mental trauma136
and lingering post-traumatic stress disorder.137 Even if a bride is able to
reject her abduction and return to her home, she may suffer rejection from
her peers and family.
Central Asian governments’ prevention of bride stealing and other
forms of gender-based violence is demanded by domestic and international
law. The Kyrgyz Criminal Code, for example, imposes a two-year prison
sentence on those who “steal” a person for the purposes of marriage.138 In
addition, Kyrgyzstan is party to human rights treaties that demand coun-
tries protect and promote women and girl’s rights.139 Despite these obliga-
tions to protect women, however, out of hundreds of thousands of women
PUBLIC HEALTH 237
stolen, only two bride stealing cases were litigated in Kyrgyzstan from 1985
to 1996.140 By failing to address violence against women, the Central Asian
states also fail to protect the public’s health.
Conclusion
With their transition from dependent Soviet states to independent
countries, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmeni-
stan have undergone massive economic, social, and political upheaval.
These rapid changes have resulted in the Central Asian states’ inability to
maintain their Soviet-inherited health system. The Soviet Union obtained
its public health successes through extensive financing of regional medi-
cal and epidemiological departments that operated according to centrally
established goals. The system relied on a massive infrastructure of tertiary
care facilities and required lengthy patient management by medical spe-
cialists. These public health protocols and systems were not financially
or medically effective for independent, but bankrupt, Central Asia. The
Central Asian governments’ failure to provide preventative health care
programs, coupled with the population’s increasing poverty, created favor-
able conditions for the spread of infectious disease and the expansion of
chronic, lifestyle-related health conditions.
Driven by their legal obligations to address the causes of sickness
and death, and their desire to maintain their citizens’ health, Central Asian
republics began in 1992 to reform their public health systems. At least in
Kyrgyzstan, these reformed health care systems focus on preventative care
provided by better-trained generalists, and are supported by innovative
financing schemes. The health reforms offer a mechanism for the Central
Asian republics to increase the population’s involvement in and under-
standing of health care decision making, thus decreasing the population’s
need for costly curative care. However, Central Asia’s nascent public health
systems already face challenges from the health problems of the region’s
epidemiological and demographic transition. In some areas, the majority
of women and children suffer the effects of malnutrition. Simultaneously,
HIV/AIDS and other sexually-transmitted infections, TB infection, and
gender-based violence are increasingly prevalent.
Failure to take rapid action to meet these health challenges will have
grim results for the whole of Central Asia. Governments and public offi-
cials who blindly ignore some public health threats, such as those affecting
women or other marginalized groups, will contribute to the weakening
of norms and laws that could lessen vulnerability and that could serve
as tools for improving health status. In addition, lack of response to one
238 GRABMAN
health challenge can lead to the spread of incurable diseases throughout

the region, even to areas yet untouched. The region’s most pressing health
conditions interact with one another, each rendering the population
vulnerable to the others. As discussed in this chapter, abused women are
likely to be infected with STIs; people infected with an STI like syphilis are
more likely to contract HIV; and malnutrition weakens the population’s
resistance to TB, as does HIV infection.
Although it may have increased the health risks to the public, Cen-
tral Asia’s demographic, epidemiological, and political flux also offers the
region unique opportunities for improving individuals’ health knowledge,
raising standards of care, and empowering women. It has been only a little
more than a decade since the Central Asian republics’ independence, and
the countries are still searching for the most effective and efficient ways to
structure their public health systems. In each nation, ongoing discussions
about the potential for health care reform and engagement with interna-
tional donor organizations indicate a willingness to exchange new ideas
for old responses. The form such reforms take may differ in each Central
Asian country, according to that country’s needs and context, yet no more
can the region afford curing its sick population primarily with hospitals
and specialists. Central Asia’s pressing health problems of malnutrition,
sexually transmitted diseases, tuberculosis, and gender-based violence
can be prevented only through increasing awareness about and by giv-
ing communities the resources (vitamins, condoms, DOTS medications,
trained police, respectively) to address these conditions. Of paramount
importance is for Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan to reaffirm a focus on community-based health promotion
and education and a commitment to allocate funding to such programs.
Notes
1 W. Ward Kingkade and Eduado E. Arriaga, “Mortality in the Newly Independent States: Pat-
terns and Impacts,” in Premature Death in the New Independent States, eds. J.L. Bobadilla et al., eds.
(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997), 157.
2 Renata Rutman, “Antiquated Residency Rules Pose Public Health Threat in Central Asia,”
Eurasia Insight (December 29, 2001).

3 United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF), “Basic Indicators” Statistical Table 1, State of the
World’s Children (2003) (reporting statistics from 2001), available at <http://www.unicef.org/sowc03/

tables/table1.html>.
4 Kazakhstan’s reported infant and under-five child mortality has risen dramatically in the
past two years; during the same time, life expectancy in the country has decreased. Compare UNICEF,
PUBLIC HEALTH 239
supra note 3 with UNICEF, State of the World’s Children, “Basic Indicators” Statistical Table 1 (2001)
(reporting statistics from 1999), available at <http://www.unicef.org/sowc01/tables/table1.html>.
5 See generally, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Kyrgyzstan: Common Coun-
try Assessment (Bishkek: UNDP 2001), 99-100 (noting regional variations in Kyrgyzstan).
6 See generally, Republican Medical Information Center, Characteristics of the Health Care
Delivery Network (Bishkek: Ministry of Health of the Kyrgyz Republic, 1999).

7 Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Article 42 (1977).
8 Anita Parlow, “The Central Asia Health Care Collapse,” Eurasia Insight (December 21, 2001).
9 Martin McKee et al., eds., Health Care Systems in the Central Asian Republics (European Ob-
servatory on Health Care Systems (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2002), 7.

10 N.N. Brimkulov and S.M. Kuchuleev, “Primary Health Care in Kyrgyzstan” (Rotems Founda-
tion, 2001). Online, available at http://www.rotem.ro/engl/pages/kyrgyzstan.html, retrieved Aug. 31,

2003.
11 McKee et al., supra note 9, 71.
12 World Bank, Making Transition Work for Everyone: Poverty and Inequality in Europe and
Central Asia (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2000), 258.

13 UNDP, “Kyrgyzstan,” Human Development Report 2003 (Oxford: Oxford University Press
2003), available at <http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/cty_f_KGZ.html>.

15 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “Quality Primary Health
Care,” USAID Central Asian Republics Briefs (2003), available at <http://www.usaid.gov/regions/eu-

rope_eurasia/car/briefers/primary_health.html>.
16 Julie DaVanzo and Clifford Grammich, “Dire Demographics: Population Trends in the
Russian Federation” (Washington, DC: RAND, 2001), 50, available at http://www.rand.org/publica-

tions/MR/MR1273/.
17 USAID, supra note 15.
18 McKee et al., supra note 9.
19 Alexander Casella, “Health Care Systems Under the Weather,” Asia Times Online (January 18,
2001). Reprinted by Asia Human Rights Commission, online, at <http://www,ahrchk.net/news/main-

file.php/ahrnews_200201/2292/>, retrieved September 30, 2002.
20 Cf. N. Almagambetova, “Overhauling the Health-care System in Kazakhstan,” Lancet 354
(9175) (1999): 313 (discussing the financial crisis in Kazakhstan’s social sector). Also cf. S. Keshavjee
and M.C. Bacerra, “Disintegrating Health Services and Resurgent Tuberculosis in Post-Soviet Ta-
jikistan: An Example of Structural Violence,” JAMA 283(9) (2000):1201 (discussing the results of the
financial crisis in Tajikistan’s health sector).
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 7.
24 Ibid., 29.
25 European Observatory on Health Care Systems, Health Care Systems in Transition: Kyrgyz-
stan (Copenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care Systems, 1996), 16.

26 World Bank, supra note 12.
27 Ibid.
28 Peace Corps of the United States, Kyrgyz Republic: Country and Culture (2000). Online,
available at <http://www.peacecorps.gov/countries/kyrgyzrep/culture.htm> retrieved Sept. 30, 2002.

29 Casella, supra note 19.
31 World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, July 2002. Online, available at
<http://www.devdata.worldbank.org/data-query, retrieved Sept. 30, 2002>.

32 World Bank, supra note 12, 260; USAID, supra note 15.
33 Kabar News Agency, “U.N.: 55 Percent of Kyrgyz Population Below Poverty Line,” BBC
Worldwide Monitoring (January 20, 2000).

240 GRABMAN
34 UNDP, supra note 13.

35 Keshavjee and Becerra, supra note 20. At 88 cases per 100,000 people, tuberculosis prevelance
in Kyrgyzstan already exceeds that in Tajikistan (83 cases/100.000 people), see UNDP, supra note 13.
36 WHO, “Tuberculosis,” Information Fact Sheet No. 104 (2000).
37 Ibid.
38 USAID, “Kyrgyzstan,” FY 1998 Congressional Presentation (June 1998), available at <http://
www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp98/eni/countries/kg.html>.
39 Ibid.
41 Brimkulov and Kuchuleev, supra note 10.
42 Personal communication with Sheila O’Dougherty, Regional Director, ZdravPlus, USAID/
World Bank Central Asian Health Reform Project, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (October 10, 2000).
43 Personal communication with Mary Murphy, Kyrgyzstan Program Manager, Zdrav Plus,
USAID/World Bank Central Asian Reform Project, Washington, DC (August 25, 2002).
44 See generally, ZdravPlus, Six Month Report, January - June, 2002, (Almaty, Kazakhstan: Abt
Associates 2002), 44. This report states, “Under the old health financing system, the MOH or providers
were unable to reinvest any savings they created, as they [the savings] would revert to the [Ministry of
Finance]... Pooling funds allows reinvestment of savings as all the money is in one pool, not in budget
line items. Provider payment systems allow providers the autonomy to create and reinvest savings.”
45 Michael Borowitz et al., “Conceptual Foundations for Central Asian Republic Health Reform
Model,” Technical Report of the ZdravReform Program (Almaty, Kazakhstan: Abt Associates, 1999).
46 ZdravPlus, supra note 44, 45.
48 ZdravPlus, supra note 44, 46-47.
49 Ibid., 4-5, 18. See also McKee et al., supra note 9, 104.
50 USAID, supra note 38.
51 ZdravPlus, “Quality Improvement System Improves Reproductive Health Services, Enhances
Client Satisfaction, and Empowers Health Workers in Kyrgyzstan,” Road to Results (Almaty: Abt As-
sociates, 2001).
52 Republican Medical Information Center, Characteristics of the Health Care Delivery Net-
work (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: Ministry of Health of the Kyrgyz Republic, 1999).

53 World Health Organization (WHO), “Annex Table 1: Basic Indicators,” World Health Report
1999 (Geneva: WHO, 1999), available at <http://www.who.int/whr/2002/en/whr2002_annex1.pdf>.

54 UNICEF, supra note 4 at “Women,” Statistical Table 7.
55 United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Kyrgyzstan,” CIA World Factbook 2003
(Washington, DC: CIA, 2003), available at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/

kg.html>.
56 Population Resource Center, The Replacement on Abortion by Contraception in Three Cen-
tral Asian Republics (Washington, DC: The Center, 1998).

57 UNICEF, supra note 3.
58 Ibid.
59 B.A. Anderson and B.D. Silver, “Issues of Data Quality in Assessing Mortality Trends and
Levels in the New Independent States” in Bobadilla et al., supra note 1.

60 CIA, supra note 55.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Antoine Blua and Bruce Pannier, “Central Asia; Uzbekistan Races to Reverse Health Trends as
Population Booms (Part 3),” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) (March 22, 2002), available
at <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/03/22032002125509.asp> .
64 Ibid.
65 C.M. Davis, “Health Care Crisis: The Former Soviet Union,” RFE/RL Research Report (Oc-
tober 8. 1993).
PUBLIC HEALTH 241

67 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), “Kyrgyzstan,” Tobacco of Health: A
Global Status Report (2000), available at <http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/who/kyrgyzst.htm>.
68 Alexandra Poolos, “East:Taking the Pulse of Post-Soviet Health Care (Part 1),” RFE/RL
(March 22, 2002), available at <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/03/22032002125429.asp>.

69 Expert Center for Social Research (Uzbekistan), “Consultations with the Poor: Participatory
Poverty Assessment in Uzbekistan for the World Bank World Development Report 2000/01,” National
Synthesis Report (1999), 22.
70 WHO, supra note 53, Annex Table 3. See also UNICEF, supra note 3 (showing that Kyrgyz-
stan’s infant mortality rates and under-five mortality rates rates are similar to other Central Asian
countries).
71 World Bank Group, “Improving Health Status and Reforming Health Systems in Europe and
Central Asia,” ECA Sector Brief - Health (September 2000).

72 Ibid.
73 WHO, supra note 53, Annex Table 4.
74 World Bank Group, supra note 71.
76 Cf. DaVanzo and Grammich, supra note 16.
78 Ibid., 55.
79 Ibid., 30.
80 See generally, “Tajikistan: Urgent Need for Health Education,” Integrated Regional Informa-
tional Networks of the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (IRIN) - Kofarnihon
(July 25, 2002).
82 WHO, “Annex Table 3,” World Health Report 2000 (Geneva: WHO 2000).
83 Blua and Pannier, supra note 63.
84 “Kazakhstan: Boosting Nutrition with a Pinch of Salt,” IRIN - Almaty (August 8, 2002).
85 Personal communication with Rudy Rodrigues, Resident Project Officer, UNICEF-Kyrgyz-
stan, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (1998). See also, World Bank, supra note 12, 261.
87 Personal communication with Dr. Damira Tursunbekova, Technical Advisor, BASICS,
USAID Child Survival Project, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (1998). See also, World Bank, supra note 12, 260.
88 USAID, “Health Issues,” USAID Central Asian Republics Briefs (2003), available at <http://
www.usaid.gov/regions/europe_eurasia/car/briefers/health_issues.html>.
89 Renata Rutman, “Antiquated Residency Rules Pose Public Health Threat in Central Asia,”
Eurasia Insight (December 29, 2001) (noting that the dearth of HIV data is related to Central Asia’s
continuing reliance on the residency registration system which hinders unregistered residents, such
as refugees and internally displaced people, from seeking government-provided HIV counseling and
treatment).
90 WHO and UNAIDS, “Kyrgyzstan, 2001 Update,” Epidemiological Fact Sheet (Geneva:UN-
AIDS/WHO, 2001).
91 Doris S. Mugrditchian, UNAIDS, UNICEF, and USAID, Report from Conference on the
Prevention of HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections in Central Asia, Almaty, Kazakhstan,
May 16-19, 2001, 4.
92 Ibid.
93 WHO, “Syphilis Prevalence Rates in the Former Soviet Union Countries, 1990-1996,” Global
Prevalence and Incidence of Selected Curable Sexually Transmitted Infections (2001), 23. The inci-
dence of syphilis has decreased from its 1997 apex to 73.5 per 100,000 population, see WHO and
UNAIDS, “Kyrgyzstan, 2002 Update,” Epidemiological Fact Sheet (Geneva:UNAIDS/WHO, 2002).
94 Personal communication with Dr. Ainagul Isakova, Family Practice Group Director, Ministry
of Health of the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (1999). See also, UNDP, supra note 5, 100.
242 GRABMAN
95 UNAIDS, “Questions and Answers about AIDS: Prevention and Care” (2003), available
at <http://www.unaids.org/Unaids/EN/Resources/Questions_Answers/Q_A+III_Selected+issues_
prevention+and+care/Section+VIII_Sexually+Transmitted+Infections+(STIs).asp>, stating, “The
prevention and treatment of STIs are key strategies in the fight against HIV/AIDS because the presence
of STIs magnifies the risk of HIV transmission during unprotected sex tenfold.”
96 Mugrditchian, supra note 91 11.
97 Ibid.
98 UNDP, Kyrgyzstan 2000 program website. Online, available at <http://www.undp.kg/eng-
lish/country.html>, retrieved September 30, 2002. Website notes an increase of TB over data reported
in UNDP, supra note 5.
99 Keshavjee and Becerra, supra note 20, 1201.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 K. Lally, “As the Aral Sea Retreats, Dust and Disease Flourish,” The Sun (Baltimore, MD)
February 14, 1999, 1A.

104 World Bank, supra note 12.
105 WHO, supra note 25.
106 Keshavjee and Becerra, supra note 20.
107 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, “Kyrgyzstan,” Annual Report (1999),
available at <http://wwww.ihf-hr.org/reprots/ar99/ar99kyr.html>.
108 Project Hope, News website (2000). Online, available at <http://www.projecthope.org/news/
prisons.html>, retrieved September 30, 2002.

109 Ibid.
110 Roy Walmsley, UK Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, “Re-
search Findings,” World Prison Population List (1999), 88. See also, International Helsinki Federation
for Human Rights, supra note 107.
111 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, supra note 107.
112 Cynthia Long and Doug Rekenthaler, Jr., “Phoenix-Like, Tuberculosis Rises Again to
Threaten World Health,” Disaster Relief website (March 26, 1999). Online, available at <http://www.
disasterrelief.org/disasters/990319tuberculosis/>, retrieved September 30, 2002.
113 “Kyrgyz Mull Amnesty for Half of Prison Population,” Reuters (December 26, 2000).
114 M.C. Raviglione et al., “Assessment of Worldwide Tuberculosis Control,” 350(9078) Lancet
(1997) 624-29.
115 Ibid.
116 Kabar News Agency, supra note 33.
117 ZdravPlus, supra note 44, 43 (noting that the Kyrgyz MOH announced that it is developing
an order making FGP doctors responsible for the continuation phase treatment of tuberculosis).
118 A. Pio and K. Western, “Tuberculosis Control in the Americas, Current Approaches,” 10
Bulletin Pan-American Health Org. 3 (1976).

119 WHO, Treatment of Tuberculosis: Guidelines for National Programs (Geneva: WHO, 2nd
ed., 1997).
120 Expert Center for Social Research (Uzbekistan), supra note 69.
121 Sue Lloyd-Roberts, “Plight of Kyrgyzstan Brides Who Are Kidnapped, Raped and Aban-
doned,” Independent, March 6, 1999, 18 (arguing economic reasons for the revival of bride stealing).
See also, Lori Handrahan, “Political Participation and Human Rights in Kyrgyzstan: Civil Society,
Women, and a Democratic Future,” 1 Women: Personal is Political, Local is Global (1997) (arguing
that the renewal of bride stealing is a form of “political or national expression”).
122 U. Babakulov, “Kyrgyz Women Suffer in Silence,” ISAR (April 10, 2001). Online, available at
<http://www.isar.org>, retrieved September 30, 2002.

123 Personal communication with Gulnara A. Aipaeva, Kyrgyz Ethnology Dept., American
University in Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (March 30, 2001).

PUBLIC HEALTH 243
124 Expert Center for Social Research (Uzbekistan), supra note 69.
125 Cynthia Werner, “Marriage, Markets, and Merchants: Changes in Wedding Feasts and
Household Consumption Patterns in Rural Kazakhstan,” 19 (1/2) Culture & Agriculture 6.
126 “The Stolen Brides of Kyrgyzstan,” 341 The Economist 40 (1996).
127 Russ L. Kleinbach, Kyrgyz Bride Kidnapping: Third Edition (2001), available at <http://fac-
ulty.philau.edu/kleinbachr/new>.
128 Compare with tuberculosis, which afflicts about 0.5 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s population
and is considered an epidemic warranting immediate action; see UNDP, Kyrgyzstan: Country Report
(2000), available at <http://www.undp.kg/english/country.html>.
129 Kleinbach, supra note 126, 12-14.
130 Ibid.
131 S.A. Baker & B. Beadnell, “The Role of Domestic Violence in Heterosexual Women’s Sexual
Safety,” Nat’l. Conf. Women HIV 122 (1997) (abstract no. 122.3).
132 Ibid.
133 CDC, Family and Intimate Violence Prevention Team, Power and Control (September 12,
1998). Online, available at <http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/dvp/fivpt/spotlite/power.html>, retrieved

September 30, 2002.
134 WHO, Division of Reproductive Health, World Health Day 1998: Maternal Mortality
(1998). Online, available at <http://www.who.int/archives/whday/en/pages1998/whd98_01.html>, re-

trieved September 30, 2002.
135 Monee Project, UNICEF, Innocenti Center, “Chapter 5,” Regional Monitoring Report, 77
(6th report 1999).

136 See generally, L. Miriam Dickinson et al., “Health-Related Quality of Life and Symptom
Profiles of Female Survivors of Sexual Abuse,” 8 Arch. Fam. Med. 35 (1999).

137 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders:
DSM-IV 4th ed. (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1994).

138 Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic, Normative Acts §155 (1994).
139 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex, Agenda
Item 108, at 12-13, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/25 (1989). Signed by Kyrgyzstan on July 7, 1990; ratified on
October 21, 1991. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 53-54, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); acceded to by Kyrgyzstan on October 7,
1994. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 51, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); acceded to by Kyrgyzstan on October 7,
1994. Treaty for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180,
U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 80, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980); acceded to by Kyrgyzstan on
February 10, 1997.
140 “The Stolen Brides of Kyrgyzstan,” supra note 125.
244 GRABMAN
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 245
Chapter 11
From Rio to Johannesburg:

Comparing Sustainable
Development in Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, and The Kyrgyz
Republic
Alma Raissova and Aliya Sartbayeva-Peleo
T
he 1992 “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro led to a conceptual
breakthrough in the theory of sustainable development. By agree-
ing on “Agenda XXI,” participating countries laid the groundwork
for a new, long-term global partnership. Increased economic growth, so-
cial and political stability, and the rational exploitation and protection of
natural resources were identified as inter-related and mutually reinforcing
components of sustainable development.
One of the reasons the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbeki-
stan and Kyrgyzstan participated in the Rio conference was their eager-
ness for recognition by the international community as newly established,
independent governments. They hoped to make themselves known by
taking on the obligations of sustainable development formulated at this
historic summit. The theory was that the implementation of these com-
mitments would allow the countries of Central Asia to integrate into the
international system, and collaborate on economic, environmental and
social issues. Unfortunately, this has not happened—or at least not at the
pace previously hoped. A decade later in Johannesburg, the World Sum-
mit attempted to speed up the process of attaining sustainable develop-
ment. The result was another set of measures inadequate for the rapidly
changing economic, environmental and political situations on the planet.
The developed countries did not move far enough on implementing Rio’s
commitments to fighting poverty and promoting political stability in the
245
246 RAISSOVA & SARTBAYEVA-PELEO
world. The remaining countries, unfortunately, also could not live up to

their lofty goals. Interethnic and religious conflicts in the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) countries speak to the failings of economic
and sociopolitical development in these states and highlight the difficulties
which lie ahead.
Sustainable development means different things to different people,
but the most frequently quoted definition is from the UN report Our Com-
mon Future (also known as the Brundtland Report), which states, “Sus-
tainable development is development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs.”1 According to this definition, sustainable development, as well as a
commitment to the environment, must include a social and humanitarian
context. Hence, sustainable development focuses on improving the quality
of life for all of the earth’s citizens, without increasing the use of natural
resources beyond the capacity of the environment to supply them.
The notion of “sustainable development” in the countries of Central
Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, is usually
interpreted from the narrow perspective of environmental protection.
The economic, social, and political aspects of sustainable development
are given a secondary priority at best. In reality, sustainable development
includes three independent elements of equal value and importance: eco-
nomic, environmental and social:
Sustainable development . . . assumes that all three of these areas are
in balance, harmoniously interacting among each other to create the
conditions for a blossoming of the human potential and self-actual-
ization. Failure in one of the areas may lead to an unbalanced society
and crisis, and ultimately to an implosion of society.2
Figure 11–1. Components of Sustainable Development.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Economic Social and Environmental

Development Political Development
Development
Figure 11–1 presents a simplified schematic of sustainable develop-

ment and its components. It is important to point out that undervaluing
one component inevitably will lead to imbalance in the entire system. For
example, unemployment caused by differing levels of economic develop-
ment across the states of Central Asia inevitably leads to poverty, intereth-
nic tension, a decrease in the effectiveness of the economy and disregard
for environmental security. Some states, especially recently independent
ones, are unable to address simultaneously problems in each area of sus-
tainable development. Clear examples of this are the efforts of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to address the issues raised in “Agenda XXI.” In
the recent progress review of Agenda XXI implementation in Central Asia,
there was a proposal to establish the institutional partnership through a
regional agreement for effective management improvement in the areas
of sustainable development and security in Central Asian countries. This
proposal was supported by the statement of the Interstate Commission
on Sustainable Development at the World Summit on Sustainable De-
velopment, which proposed “to put in place an economic mechanism
and the signing of a subregional agreement” for strengthening the efforts
of sustainable development in the region.3 However, the introduction of
economic mechanisms for reaching overall sustainable development goals
presupposes the stable development of a market economy and the estab-
lished institutional framework for using market techniques to reach social
and environmental goals in an efficient way. The outlook for how well
these countries will transition from the market-economy system perspec-
tive toward overall socioeconomic sustainability is uncertain and many
policy-makers and theorists are skeptical.
Analyzing social and economic development in Central Asia over the
past decade, it is possible to note certain tendencies toward reform in the
region. The periods of reform may be divided into two stages. Table 11–1
shows that during the period 1991-1994, the new countries set almost
identical tasks for themselves, and consequently achieved very similar re-
sults. During this initial stage, the countries attempted to prevent a sharp
decline in the gross domestic product (GDP), which averaged about 10
percent annually, fight inflation, stabilize recently introduced national
currencies, and control social and political tensions in the region. Re-
forms were aimed at stabilizing the principal macroeconomic indicators,
particularly inflation. As an example, Kazakhstan’s annual rate of inflation
was brought from triple digits to 60 percent in 1995.
Beginning in 1995, the countries of Central Asia adopted different

approaches to social and economic reform, which consequently led to dif-
fering results. A summary of these differences is shown in Table 11–1.
Table 11–1. Stages of Social and Economic Development in Central

Asia, 1991-2001 (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan)
First Stage Second Stage

(1991 - 1994.) (1995 - 2001.)
■ Transition from Moscow-led (Soviet) system ■ Pension reform (Kazakhstan);
of economic management to republican level ■ Educational reform (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan);
of management; ■ Health system reform (Kazakhstan,
■ Introduction of national currency; Kyrgyzstan);
■ Establishment of two-level banking system; ■ Trade policy reform (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
■ Price liberalization; Uzbekistan);
■ Privatization of state-owned property ■ Tax reform (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan);
■ Discussions on land reform (from state-
owned to private property) (Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakhstan).
After the financial shocks of the 1997 and 1998 global economic
crisis, stabilization of world financial markets and favorable consumer
prices led to a global economic revival in the year 2000. Global economic
growth in 2000, when compared to the previous year, was up by 4.1 per-
cent. Financial indicators for the majority of CIS countries were relatively
stable, owing to improvements in principal macroeconomic indicators,
and sound fiscal and monetary policies.
The countries of Central Asia were included in these macroeconomic
improvements. Economic indicators of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), all
show positive tendencies in recent years in the principal macroeconomic
growth indicators. According to the Fitch IBCA4 investment rating, one of
the main reasons for macroeconomic improvements in the region is an
increase in national income from the extraction and export of natural re-
sources. While the increase is good news for the CIS countries, it also has a
downside. The states’ increasing dependence on natural resources, such as
oil, natural gas, coal and metals, causes more economic sensitivity to sharp
price fluctuations in the world markets and presents budgetary challenges
because of the uncertainty. However, it is possible to limit the negative
consequences of these fluctuations through both direct government action
(establishment of state funds, banks, and development of legislation) and

through market-based regulation (tax, budget and monetary policies.).
One regulatory example is the National Oil Fund and Development
Bank in Kazakhstan. The National Oil Fund can be used to counteract
fluctuations in public finance resulting from changes in world market
prices for oil exports. The Fund is modeled on the Norwegian oil fund
experience, and managed by the National Bank of Kazakhstan.5 The goals
of the Development Bank of Kazakhstan are to:
■ increase the effectiveness and efficiency of public investment
activity,
■ develop the production infrastructure and manufacturing industry,
and
■ promote the attraction of domestic and foreign investments into the
national economy.6
To better understand the differences in approaches to stabilizing
sharp fluctuations in the economic development and to establishing a
market-based policy system in decision-making processes, it is necessary
to examine each of the Central Asian countries in turn.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan has adopted a number of measures aimed at moving
toward sustainable development. The country actively participates in the
“Environment for Europe” and “Environment and Sustainable Develop-
ment for Asia” processes as well as the preparation of the regional Central
Asia Environmental Protection Plan. Active support is also given to the
preparation of the Central Asian Sustainable Development Strategy (Sub-
regional Agenda XXI for Asia).
In comparison with other CIS countries, Kazakhstan appears to have
done well. There is relative social and political stability, the economy is on
the upswing, and considerable attention is being paid to the rational use
of natural resources and environmental protection.
Figures 11–2 and 11–3 show that in Kazakhstan, per capita GDP in
2002 was $1,645.80 compared with $382.61 in Uzbekistan, and $321.24
in Kyrgyzstan.7 However, in spite of the marked difference in the GDP
of Kazakhstan from other countries, this does not reflect the level of true
sustainable development. As mentioned above, sustainable development
should be measured in terms of interrelated indicators, which include
social, economic and environmental variables.
Kazakhstan’s critical social policy problem is the imbalance between

the low level of public funding of the social sector, and the high level of
state-mandated entitlements to the population. This is because of the
contrast between promised social reforms announced by the government
and those actually provided. During the economic crisis of 1998, these
discrepancies caused a sharp deterioration in social welfare. Public funding
for education decreased to 3.3 percent of GDP; for healthcare to 2.5
percent; and for poverty reduction to a mere one percent. The de-funding
of social programs has led to a sharp decline in the condition of the
physical plants as well as personnel safety in the education and healthcare
sectors. As medical and educational services have deteriorated, skilled
personnel have fled to other sectors of the economy and the costs for
preschool and daycare, public utilities and other services have increased
precipitously. Similarly, cuts in public expenditures for health care have
caused a radical drop in the quality and quantity of medical services
provided to the population.
Hasty reform of the educational system caused a near collapse of the
preschool, elementary and secondary systems as well as professional and
technical post-secondary education. The 1999 Education Law, in contrast
to the draft 1996 Law, does not include state guarantees for preschool
education, nor does it provide mechanisms to guarantee technical, profes-
sional and post-secondary education for low-income groups. There are
also no provisions for providing student loans, without which, non-subsi-
dized education is much less viable.
Unemployment remains the most serious problem in Kazakhstan.
According to best estimates, the unemployment rate in the country may
be as high as 30 percent. As a result, living standards have declined sharply.
Real income in 1999 was a mere 10 percent of its 1991 level. By way of
comparison, in Moldavia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan this figure is 25 percent,
while in Russia it is about 50 percent.8 A large portion of Kazakhstan’s
employed population has fallen below the poverty line. This, in turn, has
caused a substantial reduction in average basic food consumption per
capita. In 1999, consumption of meat and meat products, together with
milk and milk products was only half of the 1991 level.9
One of the more pressing problems in the social sphere remains the
“war on poverty,” which is one of the main goals of the Earth Summit’s
Agenda XXI introduced at the Rio de Janeiro meeting in 1992. The pov-
erty index in Kazakhstan shows that 28.1 percent of the population can be
categorized as poor, that is, below the established poverty line. The main
causes of poverty are involuntary unemployment and the low aggregate
income of the population. Anti-poverty initiatives have taken the form of

a number of efforts to develop and support small business and open access
to capital through micro-credit programs.10 At present, a new anti-poverty
program is being developed with the assistance of international finance
organizations and outside donors.
In accordance with the Program on Privatization and Restructuring of
State Property in Kazakhstan, the vast majority of institutions in the social
sphere (health care facilities, educational, cultural and arts facilities) were
quickly privatized between 1996 and 1998. The process was completely
undifferentiated: The simple sale of all assets took place with no provision
for post-privatization financial support, state regulation or quality control.
There was also a lack of enabling legislation to codify new relationships
in the social sphere. By 1997, for example, more than 70 percent of pre-
schools simply were closed.
In accordance with the Social Security Law of the Republic of
Kazakhstan passed on June 20, 1997, a reform of the pension system was to
have begun. The new pension system proposes a transition from collective
entitlement to a more progressive system of individualized retirement
savings. However, the transition to a new system has not been well thought
out, and the main emphasis on speed rather than equality raises questions
as to the viability of the new system. During the first decade of indepen-
dence, Kazakhstan succeeded in creating a stable and peaceful country and
putting in place much of the institutional infrastructure needed for the
functioning of a market economy. However, the sustainability challenges
of the socio-economic development have been more addressed at the cen-
tral national level with institutional establishments and regulations, rather
than through implementation of the centrally-approved policies/agendas
and participation at the lower levels of local administration and district
communities. All in all, the challenges which must be faced are daunting
and sustainable development remains, at this point, a distant goal.
Uzbekistan
According to official Uzbek statistics, almost all of the main macro-
economic indicators are on the upswing. However, foreign observers are
of the opinion that the most important economic indicators are inflated
by the Uzbek authorities. According to Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
GDP growth in 1998 was not the 4.4 percent attested to by the Uzbek
government, but a mere 2.5 percent. Individual successes in financial
policy, particularly the reduction of the budget deficit to 3 percent of the
GDP, were negated by the non-convertibility of the national currency.11
Furthermore, curtailment of the free market has led to a decline in direct

foreign investment.
On paper, Uzbekistan enjoys the lowest level of “official” unemploy-
ment in Central Asia. During 1995-1997, this indicator was 0.3 percent; in
1998-1999, 0.4 percent; in 2000-2002, 0.5 percent. However, most experts
reject the official data. The low level of unemployment in the country is
explained by the fact that most of the unemployed are not registered with
employment centers, and thus are not included in official estimates.
Privatization throughout Uzbekistan is proceeding exceptionally
slowly. Implemented for the most part in name only, in the majority of
cases, it has not saved the economy from overwhelming government influ-
ence, especially in the agricultural sector. Official numbers on privatiza-
tion are also questionable. IMF data suggests that less than 30 percent of
Uzbek enterprises were even partly privatized in 1998. Yet, according to
official government information, 45.3 percent of enterprises during that
period were in non-state hands.
In a majority of cases in Uzbekistan, privatization of small and
medium state-owned enterprises has been completed. However, of those
enterprises which have attempted to privatize, most have encountered
serious problems. The registration process is exceptionally complicated.
Many companies do not have access to foreign currency accounts and
pressure from tax authorities remains strong. Moreover, the tax officers
have direct access to the bank accounts of any enterprise. As the availability
of capital in the country is limited, businesses are forced, in turn, to limit
their activities or close shop altogether.
According to official data, privatization of agriculture also is nearly
complete. Nonetheless, agricultural labor remains under the dominating
influence of the government, just as in Soviet times. Agricultural enter-
prises and dehkane12 cannot independently select which crops to grow.
Seeds and agricultural equipment remain under state control, the harvest
is sold to the government at fixed wholesale prices and private ownership
of the land is forbidden.
The primary cause behind weak direct foreign investment in Uzbeki-
stan, despite the adoption of new legislation, is the unfavorable investment
climate. Foreign investors complain of the numerous bureaucratic hurdles
they must overcome to do business and the few guarantees they receive
that their investment will be protected from the sometimes arbitrary
nature of official decision making. According to Western sources, official
statistics issued by the Uzbek Ministry of Macroeconomics and Statistics
do not reflect the true economic situation in the country. The data has
a tendentious character and is the object of direct state manipulation.

Independent observers point to evidence of a deterioration of the social
and economic situation in Uzbekistan. In Uzbekistan, until recently, there
were two official state-controlled exchange rates: a commercial rate for
business transactions and a special rate for individuals. The official rate
in 2002 was, on the average, 750 sums to one U.S. dollar; the commercial
rate was 990 sums per U.S. dollar. However, on any given day, the black
market rate might raise the rate to 1,150 sums for one U.S. dollar.13 In
addition, the government placed a restriction on the purchase of foreign
currency for businesses operating in Uzbekistan. All of this represented
serious obstacles for foreign investment, trade and business development
in the country.
A recent IMF mission to Uzbekistan in fall 2003 brought some posi-
tive results. The mission pointed to monetary and fiscal policy dialogues
and progress in implementing the Action Plan to Achieve Current Account
Convertibility of the National Currency. One of the achievements of the
government and Central Bank of Uzbekistan was the successful elimina-
tion of all multiple currency practices and exchange restrictions that were
previously in place.14
Recently, tight monetary and fiscal policies have had some positive
effects on the economy, including a decline in the inflation rate and the
unification of the exchange rate. The introduction of convertibility pro-
vides a solid foundation for further liberalization of the economy, includ-
ing free trade, agricultural reforms, privatization, banking sector improve-
ment, and mitigation of investment climate.
Uzbekistan has very low levels of import and export activity. Exports
increased from $2.8 billion in 1995 to $3.2 billion in 2000, with the high-
est volume of export reached in 1996. Export revenues come mainly from
agricultural production of cotton and wheat. Imports to Uzbekistan are
insignificant. As a result, the trade balance for 2000 was estimated at $100
million.15 Uzbekistan still suffers from the highest inflation rate in the re-
gion, which causes further declines in real incomes; as a result, an increas-
ing percentage of the population is living below the poverty line.16
Kyrgyz Republic
On January 1, 2002, the total external debt of Kyrgyzstan was esti-
mated at $1.4 billion, while the forecasted GDP for 2002 was about $1.824
billion (at 46.1949 soms to the dollar). In 2003, Kyrgyzstan was supposed
to pay out $103.7 million for debt service to foreign creditors. This is the
largest annual debt payment in the past decade, amounting to some 50
percent of state income for 2002. According to Ministry of Finance fore-

casts, the country will not be able to cover all of its obligatory payments;
even in optimistic scenarios, the government will cover only about $62
million. The situation is aggravated by insufficient gross hard currency
reserves held by the National Bank of Kyrgyzstan. The January 1, 2002 re-
serve estimates were $285 million, that is, $24 million more than in 2001.
However, according to independent estimates at the beginning of the 2003,
the reserves actually may be down by $10 to $12 million.
In the early years of independence, Kyrgyzstan pursued a market
reform program of liberal policies, agreeing in 1994 to an IMF economic
restructuring program. Kyrgyzstan began the first phase of privatization in
1995. The second phase—privatization of medium-sized industry—was
suspended in 1997, when it was approximately 60 percent completed,
amid allegations of corruption. Privatization was resumed in 1998, and
Kyrgyzstan joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in October
1998.17 The government still retains ownership of some strategic indus-
tries, and although it moved to privatize the telecom and energy sectors
in late 2002, these privatization efforts have been unsuccessful, due to
domestic opposition combined with a lack of investor interest.18 Land
privatization has had some limited success.
Kyrgyzstan inherited one of the least competitive and underdevel-
oped economies of the former Soviet Union. This condition was aggra-
vated by weak governance, ethnic tensions, limited access to trade routes,
a heavy burden of external debt, and a weak banking sector. The current
outlook for the economic situation in Kyrgyzstan is tied closely to the
remote geographical location of the country, and to resource endow-
ments—for example, a single gold mine, Kumtor, accounts for 7 percent
of GDP.
Some hope relief will be provided by the IMF whose forecasts revised
the 2002 GDP growth estimate for Kyrgyzstan from 4.5 to 1.5 percent. As
a result, a loan will be provided through the IMF Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility (PRGF). Since December 2002, the IMF already has pro-
vided two payments amounting to $30 million, with double that amount
promised.
For Kyrgyzstan, however, many economic problems remain unre-
solved. Positive movement is not apparent in many of the social and eco-
nomic indicators, and the improvement of others is inconsistent. There
are problems with production; arrears in wages, pensions, allowances and
stipends; unemployment and underemployment of labor; and the repay-
ment and installment payments for external debt of the state. Low wages,
pensions, and social allowances have brought much of the population to

the brink of catastrophe. Existing pensions and allowances, as well as the
minimum wage, do not provide a minimum subsistence. At the present
time, approximately half the population lives below the poverty line, and
GDP remains 27 percent below 1991 levels in real terms.19 Official esti-
mates put unemployment at 12 percent, but multilateral agencies working
in Kyrgyzstan estimate the level at closer to 20 percent.20 Current account
deficits have been consistently high and the debt burden heavy, making
it impossible for Kyrgyzstan to invest in sectors that would contribute
to long-term sustainable development. Infrastructure, education and the
health sector have all deteriorated significantly since the collapse of the
Soviet Union.
Conclusions
To date, the reforms that have been implemented do not give due
attention to sustainable development. The economies of Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, first and foremost, were formed under con-
ditions of an inter-republican division of labor within the Soviet Union.
In this respect, the national economies of the Central Asian countries are
complementary to a certain degree, and self-interest should favor coopera-
tion as a more direct path to sustainable development for all. Moreover,
these countries are physically contiguous and share common transbound-
ary economic and environmental problems, as well as common interests
in the areas of the rational use of water resources, energy, and land use.
Effective solutions to these problems will require close cooperation among
these countries, something that has not always occurred in the past.
At the basis of global cooperation among the countries of the world
is the concept of sustainable development, which captures the reality
of the modern economy. This is reflected in the high degree of interde-
pendence and interactive complexity in economic, social, political, and
environmental areas. Globalization provides greater access to markets and
wider opportunities for technology transfer, which promises productivity
growth and increases in living standards. Globalization also brings with
it more competition for locally produced goods, and threats to domestic
employment. Foreign capital influences also present some dangers to each
country’s economy. Capital inflow with significant increases in money
supply and unbalanced trade with inflow of cheap imports as well as
decreases in the competitiveness of domestic exports due to low-price
import expansion from neighboring countries are a concern of all these

states.
One solution might be regionalization, the creation of regional eco-
nomic blocs with the potential to better fit in with the “new niches” of the
international economy. As an example, the Eurasian Economic Associa-
tion (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) represents
a market of roughly 200 million people. Its vast natural resources and re-
maining scientific and intellectual potential could allow these countries to
develop together new technology-intensive products that could compete
in the world economy.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which consists of
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, has
good prospects as well. In this case, internal markets account for one
third of the world total. Working with its regional neighbors, as well as
with other more distant countries, it is possible to see Central Asia mov-
ing along the road to sustainable development. To do this, however, the
proper balance must be struck between the economic, political/social and
environmental elements of sustainable development—something that has
not been achieved to date.
Currently, there is a strong need for new, effective policies for busi-
nesses in the commercial sector, and regulatory policies for the public
sector in Central Asia. Even in those cases where such policies have been
created, the implementation has been weakened, due to Soviet style
managerial tools and the lack of information regarding basic concepts of
competition, market structure and business performance rooted in central
planning. The most constructive mechanisms of change can occur only
through a partnership among state actors, private enterprises, non-gov-
ernment organizations, the mass media and the public in general.
When these states realize they must act not as competitors, but as
partners, they will better be able to pursue coherent and combined policies
that can achieve the goal of sustainable development.
It is reasonable to hope that the Central Asian states will conclude
that they have more to gain from cooperation than competition. In the
face of common environmental problems (water, land degradation and
desertification), economic concerns (trade regulations, unemployment,
underemployment of resources, and flexibility of capital and labor move-
ments), and disproportion in social development (poverty, harmonization
of legal policies, ethnic and religion identity), common solutions that arise
from cooperative action hold the key to success.
Notes
1 Gro Harlem Brundtland, “Our Common Future,” Report from the United Nations Commis-
sion, 1987.
2 Kanat Berentayev, independent expert, Institute of Economic Research, Kazakhstan.
3 Environment for Europe, Fifth Ministerial Conference, Invitation to Partnership on Imple-
mentation of the Central Asian Sustainable Development Initiative, submitted by the Governments of
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan through ad hoc working group of
senior officials, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Kiev, Ukraine, May 21-23, 2003.
4 Fitch IBCA Rating Agency, <http://www.fitchibca.com>.
5 Kazakhstan Economic and Energy Update. January 29 - February 9, 2001, <http://www.bis-
nis.doc.gov/bisnis/isa/010222kzenupd.html>.
6 Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan of May 18th, 2001, 659, <http://
www.kdb.kz>.
7 Asian Development Bank (ADB) - Key Indicators 2003 <www.adb.org/statistics>.
8 Integration in the framework of Eurasian Economic Commission in metallurgy area may
increase sustainability of Kazakhstani economy, Panorama, no. 31, August 2002.

9 “Kazakhstani society has the social stratification form of Eiffel Tower”, Panorama, no. 21,
May 2002.
10 State Program on Poverty Reduction, August 2001, Ministry of Labor and Social Protection
of the RK, <http://www.enbek.kz/publik/>.

11 The Uzbek currency, the Sum, became fully convertible on October 15, 2003.
12 Uzbek farmers
13 “Uzbekistan: IMF Ready To Support Tashkent, But Keeping Its Eyes Open”, by Antoine Blua,
June 2002, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, <http://www.rferl.org>.

14 Joint Press Statement of the Government and Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan
and the Mission of the International Monetary Fund, <http://www.imf.uz/pressrelease3.html>, Tash-

kent, October 8, 2003.
15 “Western sources on current condition of Uzbekistan economy”, Panorama, no. 17, May
2002.
16 Ibid.
17 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Kyrgyzstan 2003, Economic Policy Initiatives
timeline, 25.
18 Ibid., 27.
19 Ibid., 27-28.
20 Ibid.,18.
LAND PRIVATIZATION 259
Chapter 12
Land Privatization and

Conflict in Central Asia: Is
Kyrgyzstan a Model?
1
Kevin D. Jones
I
n the summer of 1990 one of the most violent ethnic conflicts on the
territory of the former Soviet Union exploded in the southern Kyrgyz
town of Uzgen and spread from there to the neighboring villages that
sit astride the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. Lasting almost six days, 171 Uzbeks,
Kyrgyz, and Russians were killed, and more than 5,000 assaults, rapes and
robberies were committed.2 In March 2002, five people were killed and as
many as 62 wounded when police fired on a crowd protesting outside the
city of Kerben, Kyrgyzstan.3 At first look, these discrete events 12 years
apart have little in common. One involves local citizens attacking each
other based on their ethnicity; the other centers on government forces
responding to political protests. While each event had multiple causes, one
contributing factor in both instances was the dispute over the allocation
and access to land.
With the breakup of the Soviet Union and subsequent independence
of the Central Asian republics, large scale civil conflict was predicted by
both regional scholars and State Department officials.4 In Kyrgyzstan,
after more than 10 years of independence, significant advances have been
made toward privatization of land and the development of nascent land
markets, without widespread civil violence. However, as the events of 2002
demonstrate, widespread inequities exist in the distribution of land, and
tensions over these inequities can erupt without warning.
One of the difficulties in identifying indicators for conflict in Central
Asia is caused by the extreme fragmentation of the region. Ethnic, reli-
gious, socio-political, economic and geographical fault lines exist, yet none
of these is likely to cause conflict on its own. Rather, it is the interaction
of these issues combined with other influences that could result in the
259
260 JONES
escalation or prevention of civil conflict. For example, existing ethnic

tensions combined with the discrete event of a water scarcity could result
in civil conflict, or concurrently, economic stagnation followed by the
liberalization of the tax policy could prevent conflict through the increase
in business and personal worth. One discrete influence contributing both
to the current stability and to the potential for conflict in Kyrgyzstan is the
privatization of agricultural land.
Each of the five Central Asian countries developed very different
paradigms for conducting economic reforms. In comparison with its
neighbors, Kyrgyzstan chose to move the quickest to a market economy.
The actions and consequences of these efforts provide a unique oppor-
tunity to examine the entire process of land reform, as well as the impact
of land reform on civil conflict and violence, within the setting of a frac-
tious ethnic environment, poor economic growth, and a weak central
government.
In its broadest sense, land reform can be defined as “agriculture poli-
cies designed to improve productivity and profitability of small farms.”5
Often, the term land reform is used interchangeably with agrarian reform;
however, land reform has a much broader context and is critical to ensur-
ing full market reform. Two other types of reform—urban land reform
and water law reform—are also necessary components of full market
reform. However, for the purposes of this chapter, land reform will refer
only to rural agriculture land.
This chapter provides a concise background on the benefits of land
privatization for a rural society, examines the relationship between land
reform and civil conflict, and presents a brief history and comparison of
land reform in the Central Asian Republics. The primary goal is to exam-
ine the process of land reform in Kyrgyzstan and its relationship to civil
conflict, with the purpose that lessons may be applied to other countries
and regions.
In the context of this chapter, three broad analytic questions are
raised:
■ How has the land reform process in Kyrgyzstan affected its stability
(or lack thereof)?
■ Whatresults has the land reform process had on the Kyrgyz citizens’
economic and social well being?
■ Isthe land reform process increasing the potential for violent con-
flict throughout the region?
Benefits of Land Reform

Privatization of land is a vital component for the development of a
functioning market economy. In classical economics, land is one of three
necessary factors of production, and the only one that is naturally limited.6
However, the value of the land is much more than simply the use gained
from planting and harvesting; land has a “parallel life,” that is, its value as
a market asset.7
According to legal scholars and land experts, multiple components
are necessary for a functioning land market. At a minimum, a nascent legal
land market must posses: simple land tenure and ownership laws; land
registration with mapping; land evaluation; and markets with open price
information; and transparent legal recourse.8 These components provide a
foundation for a legal land market that allows the owner to make informed
decisions regarding the use of his land. This, in turn, encourages long-
range planning and commitment to development of the land, which is of
general benefit to society. The more people who are able to participate in
the land market, the more the market’s benefits spread beyond the physical
plots of land. But none of this is possible without private ownership and a
legal structure capable of enforcing and recognizing this process.
Conflict and Land Reform
The history of land re-distribution and privatization throughout
much of the world has been marked by extensive bloodshed and violence.
In the past century, unresolved issues over land rights and ownership
were important components of revolutions in Mexico, Russia, Spain and
China.9 There are almost as many different theories about the causes of
conflict as there have been instances of civil unrest, but the two primary
theories of conflict are the greed-rebellion and the grievance models.10
The greed-rebellion model is based mainly on economic considerations
and supported by several different studies, which have concluded that eco-
nomic performance is a statistically significant variable in predicting the
potential for conflict.11 The grievance model states that ethnicity or politi-
cal tensions are the underlying cause of conflict, which also may be fueled
by economic inequalities.12 These models are not mutually exclusive, and
understanding the causes of land conflict can be gained by recognizing the
relationship between the two.13
Conflicts over land in Central Asia can be motivated by either eth-
nic or economic causes as well as some combination of both. One way to
mitigate either cause is through an efficient and fair allocation of land re-
262 JONES
sources. The next sections look at the process of land reform in Kyrgyzstan
and its results on mitigating or exacerbating the potential for conflict.
Land Reform in Central Asia

The history of Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union and now the newly in-
dependent Central Asian states is one of massive upheavals and numerous
failed land policies that have left millions of people dead, starving or barely
surviving. From the Stoylpin Reforms of Tsarist Russia to the Bolshevik
Revolution and Stalin’s collectivization program, agricultural land reforms
have a long and tumultuous history affecting the lives of millions of rural
citizens.14 In Central Asia, an average of 28 percent of each country’s popu-
lation is defined as agrarian; however, the real number of people who actu-
ally depend on agriculture for their primary livelihood is much harder to
quantify. This number varies between countries; Kyrgyzstan is just below
the average with 26 percent while Tajikistan has more than 33 percent.
The unique geography of Central Asia, with arid deserts in one
country and 7000m mountain ranges in the next, has contributed to the
unusual way in which agriculture and land policies have developed for
that region. Central Asia encompasses a land area of 400 million square
miles, with a population of 56 million people living within borders
drawn as if the cartographer’s eyes had been closed.15 These geographical
obstacles present natural difficulties which directly affect the allocation,
management and economic benefit from the land.
One key indicator for measuring the economic benefit and depen-
dence on the land is the amount of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that is
derived from agriculture. Table 12–1 shows some key economic and social
indicators for all five Central Asian republics. Kyrgyzstan is distinct in hav-
ing the greatest amount of agricultural production as a percentage of GDP
along with the second smallest total land area and percentage of arable
land. Yet in 2000, it was the only country to have surpassed its pre-1990
production levels. Another important variable for evaluating dependence
on the land is the amount of agricultural production that is state owned,
and the amount that is privatized. In Uzbekistan, almost all of the agricul-
ture process is still controlled by the state, while in Kyrgyzstan the major-
ity of all farm activity has been or is in the process of being privatized.
Almost 100 percent of agriculture land in the south is in private hands.16
The individual farmer in Kyrgyzstan has a much greater stake in obtaining
the legal right to land, and in being able to use that land effectively and ef-
ficiently. Dependence on the land is cause for intense competition over the
dwindling amount of land and water resources available. This increases
the need to protect and defend these scarce resources. If legal means are
not viable, then physical force or violence may be used.
Table 12–1. Key Economic and Social Indicators.
GDP, (millions
Surface area
GDP deflator
GDP growth,
value added
Populationiii
(% of GDP)iii
Agriculture,
Population,
Agriculture
(annual %)
(annual %)
(sq km)
(‘000)
US$)
Kazakhstan 22,635 13% 13% 9% 14,825 2,724,900 20%

Kyrgyz Republic 1,525 5% 7% 37% 4,967 199,900 26%
Tajikistan 1,057 5% 32% 19% 6,223 143,100 34%
Turkmenistan 5,961 21% 12% 27% 5,293 488,100 33%
Uzbekistan 11,269 4% 44% 34% 25,100 447,400 28%
iData from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and World
Bank Development Indicators (WDI) database.
ii All numbers for 2001, unless noted.
iii 2000 data.
Land Policy Development in Kyrgyzstan

Writing in spring of 2002, long-time regional land researcher and
scholar Peter Bloch stated, “If land reform is narrowly defined as an initial
distribution of land and other assets from state-owned to private entities,
then land reform in Kyrgyzstan is almost complete.”17 If Bloch is right,
how has this happened and what does it mean for the potential for civil
conflict? Several excellent studies have been conducted which analyze the
extent of land reform in the former Soviet Union and specifically Kyrgyz-
stan, therefore it is only necessary here to briefly summarize and comment
on their findings.18
First Legal Conceptualization (1990-1995)
In 1990, virtually 99 percent of all Kyrgyzstan land, as well as all
other factors of production, were held by the state, and the parliament had
passed laws regarding land ownership. The first law was passed in Febru-
ary of 1991, giving authority to local councils to create peasant farms.19
The second important law was passed two months later and created a land
fund comprised of “unutilized or underutilized land.”20
While many of the new farms were unprofitable, by the beginning of
1994 approximately 10,000 private farms existed, totaling 150,000 hectares
of arable land.21 From early 1994 through most of 1995, important events
occurred in privatization and land reform. The government undertook
264 JONES
numerous activities and passed several laws. Foreign advisors began to

work directly with the government to undertake the first of many exten-
sive field research projects, and advisors from the Land Tenure Center were
invited by the government to assist in the development of land reform.
This began a process of a high degree of collaboration between foreign
advisors, bilateral and multilateral donors, and the government on land
reform.
Passage of Modern Land Laws and Moratorium (1995-1999)
In a November 1995 presidential decree, land use rights were ex-
tended to 99 years. This decree remained in place until 1998, when in a
county-wide referendum, a constitutional amendment was passed which
“converted all land-use certificates into ownership documents.” This was
followed by the landmark new Land Code of 1999 which, while simplifying
the process, contained some unusual and hotly contested provisions.22
One line in the 1999 Land Code stated, “Purchase and sale trans-
actions of land are permitted, but in the case of agricultural land the
right is delayed for five years.”23 This “moratorium” on land sales was
an unexpected consequence of the fierce debates in the parliament over
moving land privatization forward. The exact reasons for the parliament
implementing this change may never be known, but the reasons why they
continued to support it for several years provide an important clue to the
perceived and actual relationship between land reform and conflict.
Several different stated reasons were given for concern about com-
plete land privatization. Among these were the fear of accumulation of
land in the hands of a few wealthy individuals; the desire to prevent ac-
cumulation of land in the hands of foreigners; high levels of ignorance
by rural population of land rights; and the lack of an existing registration
and documentation process.24 Politics is about perception, and at its root,
so is conflict. The perception within the government was that immediate
land privatization would spark civil unrest, leading to general violence.25
Regardless of whether the government was right or wrong in their estima-
tion, the important point is that fear of conflict was one of the motivating
factors for many parliamentarians and government officials in delaying
the lifting of the moratorium.
Gradual Lifting of Moratorium (2000-2002)
Even with the moratorium, the process of land reform did not stag-
nate, but moved forward substantially with a presidential decree issued in
June 2000.26 With this presidential decree, the moratorium was not over-
turned, but instead partially circumvented. The idea was that pilot areas
would move forward with complete registration and allow the possibility
for the sale and transfer of land in discrete geographic regions. Because of
the ambiguities of the law, the presidential decree provided a means for
those that were pushing forward land reform.
Until this time, the public was largely ignorant of key policy deci-
sions. On one side, the government of Kyrgyzstan had promised foreign
donors and governments that they would move forward with broad land
reform.27 At the same time, many parliamentarians, administrative officials
and foreign government representatives still were fearful of widespread
conflict, based on the region’s history and the potential for inequities in
the process.28
In January 2001, the parliament passed a law On Agricultural Land
Regulation, which stipulated the legal purchase and sale of land under the
condition of lifting the moratorium. But the actual purchase and sale of
lands did not go into effect until September 1, 2001. The new law out-
lined, that in addition to the state, only citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic
who were at least 18 years old and had been residing in the rural area for
at least two years, could own agricultural land. The law clearly delineated
that no foreign citizen or foreign organization could own land. Many of
the limitations on ownership were placed in the law out of fear of Uzbek
or Chinese citizens buying land and driving off the local citizens.29 Yet with
the passage of the January 2001 law, it was finally accepted that barring any
last minute legal maneuvering, private purchase and sale of agriculture
land finally was going to become a reality.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Reform
For a comparison to the success of the Kyrgyzstan land reform it is
useful to briefly look at the current status of reform in the other two coun-
tries in Central Asia attempting land reform, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
Kazakhstan is an anomaly, in that it has the greatest amount of land
area (two times more than the combined land totals of the other four
countries), with the fewest number of citizens working on farms. The Ka-
zakh economy does not depend on agriculture or the efficient use of land.
Because of this, the country has been quite slow to implement land reform
policies. However, in the summer of 2003, through a series of unusual
events, the Prime Minister resigned ostensibly because of land reform is-
sues. Whatever the behind the scenes machinations, the President and the
Parliament wanted to send a message that privatization of land was now a
key policy objective. In his 2002 address to the nation, President Nursultan
Nazarbaev made the passage of a new land code a priority. In contrast to
266 JONES
the Kyrgyz land process, the Kazakh land reform process was less burdened
by fears of ethnic and civil conflict. While there are significant policy
differences on the best legal structure for the farms, the contentions are
generally between large farmers and small farmers.30 Because of a stable
economic environment and the lack of historical ethnic strife, these prob-
lems likely will not result in conflict. Although the Kazakh land reform has
started very quickly, one key problem is Kazakhstan’s lack of institutional
process for the registering, buying or selling of land. In addition, several
local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and institutes opposed
the law as a not very well hidden “land grab” by the ruling elite.31
Uzbekistan, on the other hand, has resisted efforts at privatization in
any areas of production. While a few efforts have been made to break up
collective farms, agricultural land reform is virtually non-existent, “with
the result that the agrarian sector looks on the surface very similar today
to what it looked like in 1991.”32 Accurate data is difficult to obtain on ag-
riculture production, but through individual interviews, the conclusions
are that individual workers on farms are much worse off than they were
five or ten years ago, with no signs of future improvement. Anecdotal sto-
ries tell of entire farms not having received any type of payment—cash or
in-kind—for several years. This severe economic decline is driving local
Uzbek peasant farmers to go across the border into southern Kyrgyzstan
and work illegally, exacerbating border tensions.33
Land Reform’s Impact on Conflict

The moratorium in Kyrgyzstan on land sales was finally lifted in
September 2001. The change in law was not greeted immediately with
widespread panic or conflict as had been feared. Yet given the expected po-
tential, two central questions remain from the land privatization process:
Are the farmers economically better off now then before the breakup of
collectives? Has the tendency toward conflict increased or decreased? Both
of these questions demand empirical data that is not available at this time;
unfortunately, few field studies of the entire process have been conducted.
However, some excellent field work has been done on the rapid rural
appraisal technique, which provides significant insights into the current
trends in development.
The first trend is toward smaller and smaller farms. As Malcolm
Childress, a land researcher, commented, “There is currently no efficient
rationalization of resources.” Individual farmers are “moving back to
farming their own strip of land.”34 This does not imply that it would be
better for the farmers to still work on the collectives; however, most farm-
ers are worse off economically then eight or ten years ago. As the national
economy continues to stagnate, and off-farm jobs are not available, the
individual farmer believes that subsistence farming provides a better
living. A very small percentage of farmers are starting to improve their
individual situations, but most remain very poor. The second observa-
tion is that the majority of people, in spite of their small land plots, ap-
pear to accept the redistribution as equitable. (However, there have been
some gross violations in the distribution of land). The third observation
is that farmers would rather own their own land and be poor, than work
on the collectives. As Renee Giovarelli points out the belief is that “there
is greater security in owning your own land.”35 While some farmers may
speak nostalgically of the stability and predictability of the collectives,
when pressed, they admit to preferring their own plots.36 The fourth ob-
servation is that there are few, if any, markets for farm products, so little
incentive exists to increase productivity or enhance quality. Most farmers
produce enough for themselves and sell any extra in small, local markets.
There is little amalgamation or redistribution of produce.37 As a result of
these observations, it can be said that the individual Kyrgyz farmer is poor,
getting poorer, but would rather have his own land, and views the process
as relatively equitable.
From the greed model of conflict analysis, as individuals get poorer,
the probability of conflict would seem to increase. But in Kyrgyzstan, this
would-be trend is assuaged by the increase in personal security and inde-
pendence gained from owning one’s own land. At this time, it appears that
the tendency towards conflict is diffused, as people focus on increasing
and maintaining their small parcel of land.
The lack of significant internal conflict over land also raises the ques-
tion of the impact of the grievance model or the ethnic disparity factor. It
appears that while definite ethnic tensions exist, primarily between Uzbek
land owners and Kyrgyz farmers, these have not yet resulted in conflict.
However, these exceptions still could provide the impetus for conflict.
Unresolved Land Issues

The primary unresolved issues facing the government of Kyrgyzstan
are managing the economic failure in spite of land privatization and the
ethnic polarization increased by land privatization. Within the broad
themes of economic and ethnic problems, five specific ones come to mind:
a scarcity of land in the south; an abundance of land in the north; Uzbeks
moving to available land in the north; an overall lack of irrigated land; and
the inequities of the land distribution fund. The agriculture land in the
268 JONES
south of Kyrgyzstan is almost completely in the hands of private owners.

Most of the available arable land is being used, while land in the north,
especially the Chi valley, has not been privatized and some available land is
not being farmed or managed.38 In addition, natural market forces cannot
provide balance, since the current land law (On Agricultural Land Regula-
tion, 2001) prohibits owning land which is more than 50 km from one’s
residence. This creates a natural tension between the north and the south:
lack of resources in one region and the inefficient waste of resources in
another. This dynamic is increasing since the southern farmers who want
more land tend to be ethnically Uzbek, while the landowners in the north
are ethnic Kyrgyz. According to Giovarelli’s field studies, “some Kyrgyz say
that they would rather have land sit unused then used by Uzbeks.”39 This
situation grows more volatile each year as available resources decrease.
Unless specific policy action is taken by the government, this is an ethnic
and economic flashpoint which could lead to civil conflict.
Another resource problem is the overall lack of irrigated land. Unlike
much of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan is rich in water resources; however, the
country lacks the financial resources to maintain irrigation systems. Be-
cause of poor or nonexistent management of water resources, land which
could be irrigated and farmed is now unusable. The second issue with
water is that irrigation lines run between borders. Due to the geographical
fragmentation of the southern region, many villages receive their water
from pipes which must cross portions of Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. Com-
munities or individuals in one community divert water for their use and
prevent the flow into the downstream communities. This situation exac-
erbates ethnic, regional and economic tensions.
The final unresolved land issue, which is a significant source of
tension and potential violence, is the land distribution fund. The land dis-
tribution fund was cited by every international consultant interviewed as
well as numerous local government officials as one of the most significant
sources of tension and problems with current land distribution. The Land
Fund consists of 20-25 percent of all arable land in the country, which is
set aside to be privately leased through an auction process by the regional
governments. In the south of the country, this land is the only new land
available to farmers who want to expand their holdings.40 One key problem
has been that the process for allocating this land has not been consistent
across regions, as each regional leader establishes their own process and
the proceeds from the land sales go directly to the local government. In a
time when allocations from the central government are decreasing, sales of
land are often one of the few significant sources of income for a regional
government.41 Cravens commented that farmers say that “they [the gov-
ernment] gave us this land, so they can take it away.” Because the land is
only leased to the farmer and not sold, “it perpetuates the illusion that the
government can seize the land, which discourages the development of land
and increases waste.”42 To diffuse latent attitudes toward conflict within
the regions, the central and regional governments must be perceived as
equitable and legitimate.
Lessons Learned and Steps Forward

This chapter began by outlining the benefits and concurrent dangers
of land reform, one of many variables which contribute to widespread civil
violence and conflict. While it is a potential source of conflict, it is not the
land reform per se, but the process of reform, which initiates unrest. This
implies that it is both the process which has been successful in mitigating
conflict, and the process which must be carefully monitored to prevent
conflict in the future.
Lessons Learned
What can be learned from the process of land reform in Kyrgyzstan,
and applied to other countries in the region? Four general successful ac-
complishments should be noted: active internal political debate; a high
degree of international assistance; the early creation of the mechanisms
for land privatization; and an informed populace. The active internal
discussion and debate over land reform policies provided a non-violent
forum for resolving many disagreements on land reform in Kyrgyzstan.
This does not imply that there was always a unified, clear voice within the
government, but rather that the parliament and the President were forced
to deal with the issue of private land through political debate. While many
of the discussions were behind closed doors and a general lack of citizen
involvement was noted, the process did allow disparate views to be heard.
As noted earlier, for better or worse, the moratorium was put into place by
the Parliament after extensive debate and heated disagreement.
The result of all the international assistance to the privatization
process is difficult to quantify. However, the support from a wide range of
international organizations and diplomatic missions has provided contin-
ued political pressure and financial assistance which has tended to move
the reform process forward. Overall, international assistance was critical
in the design of the original legal framework for the land laws. While not
always in agreement, the international community consistently provided
a reference point for the local government officials while they tackled the
270 JONES
tough issues of reform. It is unlikely that the land reform process would
have succeeded without the international financial support for land reg-
istration, the legal advice for laws and amendments, and the training and
funding for dispersing information.
Creating and implementing the mechanisms needed for efficient
land transactions is still an ongoing process. But without starting this
process in the mid-1990s, reaching the point of successful land transac-
tions in 2003 would have been impossible. This is an issue that will affect
the process in Kazakhstan. The Kazakhs want to move swiftly toward land
privatization, but almost no mechanisms or safeguards are currently in
place. In Kyrgyzstan the process is not complete, but it has a solid founda-
tion of laws and practices.
Informing the populace of their rights and responsibilities with re-
gard to land laws is also still ongoing. The information process, initiated
and funded by international organizations, has now reached a critical
mass, where the average citizen can obtain answers to general legal land
questions through a variety of forums. Both foreign and local develop-
ment workers in country have claimed that increases in information avail-
able could raise the possibility of conflict.43 The argument is that people
now know that some of their rights have not been honored. The relative
dangers of increasing access to information begs a question too large
for discussion here; however, it appears that the growth of legal material
available has mitigated conflicts, by providing accurate, timely, and under-
standable land law answers.
Steps Forward
Enforcement of a fair and equitable legal process and the removal of
barriers in the land law which prevent economic rationalization are needed
to move forward land reform and the wider development of Kyrgyzstan.
While most of the key legal statuary components of the land privatization
process are completed in Kyrgyzstan, this does not mean that the process is
over or that the responsibility of the government is finished. In many ways,
the most difficult part remains—making the new laws a reality. Granting
rights is an easy step; enforcing, protecting and honoring these rights is
much more difficult. Although Bloch and other land specialists have noted
the need for several specific land reform steps to be completed, such as the
need for the completion of the registry and functioning secondary mar-
kets, broader governmental steps still are required.44
If we accept that a fully functioning legal land market is greater than
its separate laws, then the greatest need is for fair, impartial enforcement of
the current laws by judges and regional government officials. If the popu-
lation does not believe that they will receive a fair and open hearing, then
they will have no interest in pursuing a legal process for their grievances.
The former director of the Legal Aid to Rural Citizens (LARC) project
commented that in Kyrgyzstan, “only the people with no other alterna-
tives use the law; people with power, money, or connections don’t need the
law.”45 Calculated arbitrary decisions will destroy any vestige of hope that
the populace has in the legal process with the result that they will resort to
other extra-legal means to present their grievances. In short, legal reform
is as critical as land reform in moving the country forward. Open appoint-
ment processes, publicized decisions and accountable judges are but a few
of the important steps critical for providing a legal system in which rural
citizens feel that their rights are respected.
Agricultural land is being used inefficiently. The government should
remove the barriers to efficient economic utilization of land including laws
prohibiting certain sale transactions and the restrictions on ownership by
region. One way to stimulate economic growth is to allow a broader move-
ment by landowners and sellers to maximize their return and efficiency.
Much of the responsibility now lies in the hands of the national and re-
gional government officials. Laws have been implemented and the public’s
awareness of their rights is growing. Protests and marches increased in the
spring of 2002 in the south of Kyrgyzstan, and while the primary concern
was over broader political issues, such as support for local politicians, pro-
testers are demanding more land and shouting that their rights have not
been honored. A foreign worker living in the south stated that the current
civil strife consists of “popular uprisings against years of arbitrariness.”46
The issue for Kyrgyzstan is not the speed of land reform, but the perceived
equity of the process and its results.
Land reform historically and empirically has been correlated with
civil conflict, and while Kyrgyzstan has been singed a few times, it has
managed to avoid the fire of widespread civil conflict. This is a critical time
for the government of Kyrgyzstan: They have successfully implemented
wide reaching land reform and have catapulted themselves years ahead
of their nearest neighbors. The population is learning about their rights
and the structural reform process is moving forward. Failure to follow
through with fair land allocations or judicial decisions will endanger the
entire process.
In any society citizens will have grievances and will seek to express
their displeasure with the government on these grievances. As long as
government officials arbitrarily can affect the land tenure or security of
272 JONES
a rural landholder while the landholder believes they have no recourse to

the legal process, land reform will be incapable of mitigating conflict. Land
reform can only mitigate conflict if it provides a fair and equitable process
for the farmer to increase or stabilize his personal welfare. This is perhaps
the greatest lesson that needs to be learned throughout Central Asia.
Notes
1 Much of the information and data concerning events in Kyrgyzstan is based on interviews
conducted by the author or from meetings and conversations where he was present. The author thanks
those who agreed to be interviewed and to participate in discussions regarding these events and issues.
Where possible, specific attribution is made; however, there were times when, for political or personal
reasons, the individuals quoted wished to remain anonymous.
2 Valery Tishkov, “Don’t Kill Me, I’m a Kyrgyz!: An Anthropological Analysis of Violence in the
Osh Ethnic Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research, 32, no. 2, 1995, 133-149.
3 RFE 21 March 2002, 2, no. 11. <http://www.rferl.org/centralasia/2002/03/11-210302.asp>.
4 Strobe Talbott, “A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia,”
speech delivered at the Central Asian Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced Inter-
national Studies, Washington, D.C., July 21, 1997, <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/pubs/speeches/talbott.
html>.
5 John D Montgomery, “Land Reform as an International Issue.” International Dimensions of
Land Reform, John D. Montgomery, ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), 5.
6 Capital and labor being limited through society’s influence.
7 For a careful analysis and empirical evidence on the amount of capital that is trapped in third-
world countries, see Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
8 For a comprehensive analysis of legal issues in land reform, see Roy Prosterman and Tim
Hanstad, eds., “Legal Impediments to Effective Rural Land Relations in Eastern Europe and Central
Asia,” World Bank Technical Paper no. 436 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999).
9 See Roy L. Prosterman, and Jeffery M. Riedinger, Land Reform and Democratic Development
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).

10 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” World Bank Report,
October 21, 2001, 3.

11 The purpose here is not to present an exhaustive analysis of causes of civil conflict. Unfor-
tunately, the literature is quite weak in identifying key causes through robust models. For a broad
overview see Daniel C. Esty, Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Pamela T. Surko, and Alan N. Unger,
State Failure Task Force Report, Working Papers, November, 30 1995 and Paul Collier and Nicholas
Sambanis, “Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46, no. 1, Febru-
ary, 2002.
12 Donald L Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1985).
13 James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and War,” unpublished manuscript,
Stanford University, 2000, cited in Nicholas Sambanis, “Do Ethnic and Non ethnic Wars have the Same
Causes?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45 no. 3, June 2001.
14 For a brief summary of Russian land history see Stephen K. Wegren, Agriculture and the
State in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998) and Stephen K.
Wegren and David J. O’Brien, eds., Rural Reform in Post-Soviet Russia (Baltimore, London: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2002).
15 All statistics from World Band Development Index, 2001 or Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion, 2000.
16 In the north of the country, especially the Chi valley, large enterprise reform has not oc-
curred.
Peter Bloch, “Kyrgyzstan: Almost Done, What Next?” Problems of Post-Communism, 49, no.
17
1, January/February 2002, 61.

18See the Land Tenure Center at University of Wisconsin and the Rural Development Institute
for additional surveys and field research on land reform in the region.
19 “Kyrgyzstan: Almost Done, What Next?” 54.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 56.
23 As quoted in Ibid., 56.
24 In several discussions with the author between 1999 and 2000, parliamentarians and gov-
ernment officials privately expressed many of these concerns, but some were hesitant at the time to
publicly state their reasons.
25 Author’s interviews and meetings with government officials, 1999 and 2000.
26 On pilot projects on land market and registration of rights for agricultural lands.
27 Specifically, the President had committed to both the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund.
28 Author’s interviews and meetings Spring of 2000 with U.S. and other foreign officials.
29 Views expressed to the author immediately after the passage in January 2001 by two senior
government officials.
30 Author’s interview with Timour Otobekov, USAID, CAR, EDF, July 7, 2003.
31 Medet Ibragimov, “Kazakhstan: Land Privatization Prompts Fears,” Institute for War and
Peace Reporting, RCA no. 142, August 30, 2002.

32 Peter Bloch, “Agrarian Reform in Uzbekistan and Other Central Asian Countries,” Working
Paper, no. 49, Land Tenure Center (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2002), 1.
33 Author’s interviews with local farmers and workers along the southern Kyrgyzstan and Uz-
bekistan border, July and August, 2003.

34 Author’s interview with Malcolm Childress, World Bank, August 1, 2003.
35 Author’s interview, Brian Kemple, ARD/Checchi and Renee Giovarelli, World Bank, June
27, 2003.
36 Author’s interview, Kyrgyz farmers in Osh and Batkin, July and August, 2003.
37 Author’s interview, Richard Tracy, Pragma Southern Regional Director, July 28, 2003.
38 Kemple and Giovarelli, 2003.
39 Giovarelli, 2003.
40 Ibid.
41 Childress, 2003.
42 Author’s interview with Lamar Cravens, former senior legal advisor to LARC project, July
2003.
43 Author’s interview with local lawyers and two foreign aid workers, September and October,
2002.
44 Bloch, “Kyrgyzstan: Almost Done, What Next?”, 59,61.
45 Cravens, 2003.
46 Author’s interview with foreign aid worker, 2002.

274 JONES
Chapter 13
Environmental Management
in Independent Central Asia
David S. McCauley
O
n achieving independence from the Soviet Union, the five Central
Asian Republics (CARs) faced a daunting legacy of problems de-
rived from nearly categorical neglect of environmental manage-
ment in their previously planned economies. While simultaneously coping
with the creation of new nation-states and the transition to market-ori-
ented economies, the CARs have struggled to establish new environmental
management systems consistent with their economic and social develop-
ment goals.
Efforts to improve environmental management in the CARs since
their independence have ranged from the restructuring of national and
regional institutions to enhancing environmental planning and program-
ming at both the country and regional levels. In the initial stages of their
transition, emphasis was given to stabilizing and defining a new set of
environmental and resources management institutions—still primarily
based on those inherited from the Soviet period. Former agencies of
the five Soviet Socialist Republics were upgraded to ministries and de-
partments within the newly formed national governments.1 As in other
spheres, balance was sought between central and local government roles
in environmental management, though such determinations and adjust-
ments are far from complete. Following the path of other economies in
transition, each of the five countries developed National Environmental
Action Plans (NEAPs) with international assistance, each varying signifi-
cantly in their quality and practicality.2
Efforts also have been made to develop new ways to handle environ-
mental and natural resources management concerns at the regional level.3
Building on the NEAPs, a Regional Environmental Action Plan (REAP)
has been produced covering high priority transboundary environmental
challenges in the region as well as some problems common to several or
275
276 MCCAULEY
all of the countries.4 In 2003, the CARs also presented a common environ-
mental and natural resources management vision for the region5 at both
the United Nations (UN) World Summit on Sustainable Development in
Johannesburg and the UN Economic Commission for Europe conference
on Environment for Europe held in Kiev.6 Since the five former Soviet
countries previously had been under the same governmental system and
planned economy, their efforts to develop new regional mechanisms for
the allocation and trade of water, energy, and other resources had a com-
mon starting point. However, such regional issues remain contentious and
in need of careful analysis and resolution emphasizing mutual interests.
Externally introduced institutional distortions which relate to regional
versus national environmental management are also present. For conve-
nience, regional international assistance programs often have grouped
together issues that are truly regional (such as transboundary water man-
agement or air pollution) with national or even local topics that happen
to be of common concern in the region.
Nevertheless, the international donor community has played a vital
role in helping the CARs emerge from their isolation and come to terms
with inherited environmental problems as well as new challenges. Donor
programs continue to assist these countries in developing new ways to
better incorporate environmental considerations into their transitions to
market-based economic development. Whether at the national or regional
levels, the primary target of and counterpart for this assistance has been
the national environmental ministries or state committees, but institutions
responsible for agriculture,7 energy and natural disasters management also
have received important support.
This chapter begins with an overview of key environmental and
natural resources management issues in Central Asia. This is followed by
a review of environmentally-related policy and program developments at
the country and regional levels. Some brief conclusions also are offered
concerning common directions observed.
Environmental Challenges Facing the Region
Geographical Characteristics and Determinants

From the days of Amir Timu, or Tamerlane, Central Asia has served
as a crossroads for cultures, trade and ideas. It is emerging from the isola-
tion of its colonial period and still holds the promise of becoming a dy-
namic region of growth and prosperity in the heart of Asia. Bounded by
the Russian Federation to the north, the Caspian Sea and Iran to the west,
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 277
Pakistan to the southeast, and the People’s Republic of China to the east,
the five former Soviet countries of Central Asia span an area larger than
the Indian subcontinent.
Aside from a densely populated strip across the north of Kazakhstan
bordering Russia, most of Central Asia’s more than 55 million people
reside within the area drained by the two great rivers flowing to the Aral
Sea: the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya. The upstream states of Kyrgyz-
stan and Tajikistan are mountainous and largely dependent upon their
agricultural economies, whereas the downstream states of Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan show a greater balance between agriculture
and industry. Northern Afghanistan also is hydrologically and ethnically
linked to the Central Asian states.8 The downstream countries of Central
Asia possess fossil fuel resources—especially oil and gas in the Caspian
Sea region of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, gas in Uzbekistan, and coal
in Kazakhstan—that place them among the most energy rich countries in
the world.9
The major natural resource and environmental management ques-
tions facing the region can be grouped into six areas: water resources
management, urban and industrial pollution, land and natural systems
degradation, mountain ecosystems management, and environmental
management policies and institutions. Central Asian efforts to shape na-
tional responses to global environmental challenges also have influenced
domestic policies and programs. The remainder of this section briefly
reviews current developments relating to each of these topics. Additional
detail on country and regional responses in the context of international
assistance programs follows.
Water Resources Management
Water and environmental management problems in Central Asia first
gained international notoriety in response to the ecological crisis brought
on by the shrinking Aral Sea. From 1960 to 1990, the area of this inland
sea was halved as inflows were diverted to support cotton, wheat and rice
production in the deserts of the downstream states. The results included
destruction of a vibrant fishery (including the likely loss of 24 indigenous
species of fish), devastation of surrounding ecosystems, and an undermin-
ing of the livelihoods and/or health of more than three million people.
The challenge of regional water management for these semi-arid
lands is no less acute today. The mountains of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
and Afghanistan serve as the principal sources of water for the region
(see Chapter 9 by Daene McKinney for full details). If it were not for the
278 MCCAULEY
mountain relief capturing and redistributing moisture from precipitation

(mostly through snowmelt into rivers), the arid downstream states would
not be able to support their current populations. The three downstream
CARs receive only about 13 percent of the Aral Sea Basin’s rainfall but have
86 percent of its irrigated area.
The mountains also hold tremendous hydropower potential, which
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are eager to develop. Attention has turned in
recent years from a focus on the downstream problems in the immediate
Aral Sea region to the need for a stable balance between upstream hydro-
power and downstream irrigation interests and to wide-ranging issues of
land degradation due to water mismanagement. Nevertheless, some steps
continue to be taken to address the economic and social hardships fac-
ing those living around the Aral Sea. All five CARs have a mutual stake
in the establishment of a stable post-independence regional water and
energy management regime, and this has become a principal interest of
the International Fund to Save the Aral Sea (IFAS) and its affiliate body,
the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC). Agreements
were made in 1992 and 1995 establishing the mandates of these organiza-
tions. A landmark interstate agreement on irrigation and hydropower for
the Syr Darya River also was signed in 1998 (outside of IFAS), but much
remains to be done if long-term stability is to be achieved in these matters.
Preliminary interstate agreements also have been reached between Ka-
zakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, covering the Chui and Talas Rivers, and between
Kazakhstan and China, covering the Ili-Balkash and Irtysh Rivers.
In addition to water allocation issues, water quality concerns were
reiterated as a key issue during development of the REAP. Pollution from
industrial point sources as well as municipal and agricultural wastes
are causing serious health problems in some locations, especially where
communities face shortages of potable water.10 The heavy silt load of the
region’s rivers caused by soil eroded from upstream states creates costly
downstream problems through sedimentation of reservoirs and irrigation
canals. There also are close and confounding interactions between water
quantity and quality problems.11 Chemical, biological and sediment pol-
lution discharged into the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers eventually
finds its way to the Aral Sea—aggravating other environmental and social
problems from low water flows and further threatening delta ecosystems.
Issues of river pollution crossing international boundaries are com-
monplace. The salinity of the Syr Darya River is significantly heightened
in Uzbekistan before it passes into Kazakhstan. Industrial pollutants flow
from Russia to Kazakhstan through the Ural River and from Kazakhstan to
Russia through the Irtysh River.12 The Chui and Talas Rivers flow from Kyr-
gyzstan into Kazakhstan, with the former carrying effluents from a paper
mill in the capital city of Bishkek and the latter having its salinity increased
from agricultural drainage waters. Similarly, the Surkhandarya River is
heavily polluted by the large Tursunzade Aluminum Works in Tajikistan
before flowing into Uzbekistan.13 The uranium tailings of Kyrgyzstan have
raised considerable international concern because of the risks they pose
to downstream river contamination in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan
should poorly constructed containment structures be compromised.
Urban and Industrial Pollution
Pollution problems are not limited to waterways but also extend to
the air and to solid wastes. Soviet-period environmental neglect estab-
lished patterns of urban and industrial development that, even today, pay
scant attention to environmental considerations. The exposure of Central
Asian industry to market forces has caused many of the worst polluters to
shut down, but concern remains high in many communities over urban
and industrial pollution. As is often the case, the poorest segments of soci-
ety generally pay the greatest price for environmental mismanagement in
terms of their sacrificed health and quality of life. Industrial pollution in
northern Kazakhstan and in Uzbekistan’s portion of the Ferghana Valley
are of particular concern.
Poorly-contained stockpiles of potentially dangerous wastes, includ-
ing uranium and heavy metals, have accumulated across the region. Efforts
are underway to locate toxic and hazardous waste depositories and to ar-
range for their safe disposition—mostly through containment, stabiliza-
tion and isolation, since clean-up tends to be prohibitively expensive. Such
pollution continues, especially from the mining and industrial sectors.
Mining results in 25 billion tons of waste annually that often is improperly
disposed. Current and previous mine tailing dumps occupy vast areas.
A considerable proportion of the region’s pollution is associated with
energy production and consumption. Significant negative environmental
impacts from past oil and gas exploitation—and associated urban and
industrial development—are found in the coastal region of the Caspian
Sea within Kazakhstan, concentrated around the city of Atyrau, as well as
in Turkmenistan. Pressure has been placed on oil companies operating in
and around the Caspian to follow internationally accepted environmental
management practices for new exploration and exploitation as well as for
pipeline construction. While hydropower meets an appreciable amount
of the region’s peak energy needs, reliance on inefficient fossil fuel-based
280 MCCAULEY
power plants mostly burning coal and natural gas contributes significantly
to urban air pollution and drives Central Asian carbon dioxide (green-
house gas) emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) to among
the highest in the world. This is threatening the region’s industrial com-
petitiveness and thus is of both local and global concern.
Land and Natural Systems Degradation
The region faces a host of pressures on the productivity and even
viability of its natural systems, especially from inappropriate land man-
agement practices. Soviet-period agricultural policies sought to open so-
called “virgin lands” in defiance of sustainability principles, and surround-
ing deserts are now encroaching on many of these areas. Marginal lands
face desertification driven by wind and water erosion and exacerbated by
the cultivation of inappropriate lands or overly intensive tilling practices,
deforestation, overgrazing and windborne salinization especially neigh-
boring the bed of the former Aral Sea. The pollution of otherwise produc-
tive arable lands with high concentrations of pesticides and herbicides
also is a widespread problem.14 Radioactive contaminants remain around
the former nuclear test site of Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan and there are
other troubling military wastes as well, including those at former biologi-
cal weapons development sites in Uzbekistan.
Decades of stresses placed on fragile natural systems—deserts, wet-
lands, riparian zones and mountain ecosystems—have severely damaged,
,sometimes irreversibly, their natural regenerative capacities and reduced
the region’s biological diversity. According to the REAP, the area of forest
in Central Asia has fallen by 75 to 80 percent since the beginning of the
twentieth century. Large areas of saksaul and riparian forests (tugai and
juniper) have been converted to arable land. The area of this vegetation
in the Amu Darya River basin has been reduced from around 150,000
hectares in 1928 to 22,000 hectares in 1993, and the trend continues.
Extinction threatens a growing number and range of indigenous species,
with several having been moved from “rare” to “disappearing” status due
to various habitat pressures since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Linking
biodiversity loss to land degradation processes will be important, as it is
likely to constitute a crucial element of future efforts to generate interna-
tional support for programs to address these problems.
Mountain Ecosystems Management
The sustainable management of mountain ecosystems is of such
special concern in the region that it warrants separate mention and ac-
tion. This is particularly so in the upstream states of Kyrgyzstan and

Tajikistan—which straddle the westernmost expanse of the Tien Shan
and Pamir Mountain Ranges—though Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turk-
menistan each have mountainous areas as well. The predominantly down-
stream states have a heavy stake in the wise management of mountain
areas, given their dependency on these water sources.
Mountain ecosystems provide habitats for a diverse range of flora
and fauna and are under a variety of threats, including: overgrazing;
cultivation on steep slopes; non-sustainable fuelwood and timber harvest-
ing; introduction of alien and sometimes invasive species; illegal wildlife
poaching; and poorly planned development in the transport, tourism,
housing and other sectors. The most significant physical impacts are in-
creased erosion and sedimentation of rivers and reservoirs, deforestation,
decreased pasture productivity, altered patterns of water flow and loss of
biodiversity. In turn, these changes are adversely affecting the livelihoods
of mountain communities, who already have the lowest incomes in the
region and face a disproportionate degree of threat from natural disasters
such as earthquakes, landslides, avalanches, mud flows and floods.
Environmental Management Institutions

While education levels in the region are among the highest in Asia,
the environmental management institutions inherited from the Soviet
period were rigid and top-heavy. Though well trained, most officials and
scientists had virtually no exposure to the development of international
advances and thinking in environmental fields over the crucial decades of
the 1970s and 1980s when most of the analytical tools and management
practices prevalent in the West were devised. Post-independence restruc-
turing in Central Asia also has created uncertainties regarding the roles
and responsibilities of various central and local government entities. This
has left the region with weak human and organizational resources with
which to tackle its wide array of environmental challenges.
All of the Central Asian countries have some form of national en-
vironmental management ministry or state committee represented at the
cabinet level. These bodies incorporate pollution control functions, and in
most cases they also include oversight of the protected areas system and
broader environmental planning roles (though generally only a portion of
environmental monitoring responsibilities). Except where combined with
line functions controlling natural resources management, these environ-
ment agencies remain relatively weak. Powerful departments, such as those
covering finance, energy, agriculture and industry, have thus far given only
282 MCCAULEY
limited attention to environmental considerations in development ac-

tivities despite environmental protection laws meant to be enforced by the
environment agencies. The lack of good data and analysis translating the
consequences of environmental mismanagement into economic costs also
contributes to a weak appreciation for their significance. This indicates
that a long road remains ahead for efforts to “mainstream” environmental
considerations into economic development plans, policies and programs,
and it also helps to explain why Central Asian environment ministries are
so keen to assert themselves internationally and tap into newly available
aid to address global issues.
A range of regional organizations have evolved to help these coun-
tries deal with environmental and natural resources issues. The principal
mandate of IFAS—with membership of all five former Soviet states—
should be obvious from its name.15 IFAS recently has undertaken a wider
range of environmental and social development objectives in the Basin.16
Under IFAS, the ICWC serves an important function in managing the
seasonal allocation of water for irrigation within the complex array of
water management systems and uses in the Aral Sea Basin. Also techni-
cally under IFAS, the Interstate Commission for Sustainable Development
(ICSD) operates as a standing committee of the finance and environment
ministers, though it and IFAS itself suffer from a lack of core professional
staff.17 Partly for this reason, both European Commission (EC)-IFAS and
ICSD have drawn upon the recently created Central Asia Regional Envi-
ronment Center (CA-REC) for analytical and organizational functions
on several occasions. However, CA-REC’s primary mandate is to facilitate
public participation in decision making for improved environmental
management, and it is playing an increasingly proactive role in the region,
despite the severe challenges posed by civil society restrictions, corruption,
and legal weaknesses in most countries of the region. In the past, regional
economic integration bodies, particularly the Central Asia Cooperation
Organization, have played important roles in helping to broker interstate
agreements on environmental and natural resources subjects—covering
water and energy management, environmental information sharing and
transboundary protected areas management. Today, however, none of the
several regional organizations devoted to improving regional economic
cooperation and security is much concerned with or able to tackle these
issues.18 The Central Asia Mountain Information Network (CAMIN) was
created with much fanfare when Kyrgyzstan hosted the Global Mountain
Summit as a culmination of the International Year of the Mountains
(2002). But CAMIN’s post-summit goal of serving as a focal point for

mountain ecosystem management in the region has yet to be realized.
Global Environmental Concerns

Many of the environmental issues facing the region are large enough
in geographic or physical scale to be of concern at the global level. A good
deal of attention has been paid to global environmental concerns by the
countries of the region—especially their environmental authorities—due
primarily to the availability of assistance from international donor agen-
cies on these topics. Certainly the transboundary water management
issues of the Aral Sea Basin have attracted strong international attention
and financing. As noted, Central Asia also has some of the least energy ef-
ficient countries in the world, with associated implications for greenhouse
gas emissions and corresponding global interest. The region is now waking
to the long-term threats from periodic droughts, desertification, and land
degradation, while both its desert and mountain ecosystems represent im-
portant repositories of often unique—and threatened—biological diver-
sity. The aftermath of and response to Soviet-period use of ozone-deplet-
ing substances and persistent organic pollutants also are of global interest.
The participation of Central Asian Republics in the major multilateral
environmental agreements is summarized in Table 13-1.
Because of the scale of the water management challenges in the Aral
Sea Basin, the international community has supported a wide range of
grant- and loan-financed investments under the framework of the IFAS-
led Aral Sea Basin Program (ASBP-1). This phase of capacity-building and
planning assistance—combined with selected water and environmental
management investments—has now concluded. With a mandate from the
heads of state of its five member countries, IFAS has prepared a new set of
program plans under the Second Aral Sea Basin Program (ASBP-2), meant
to serve as a blueprint for further international support to the region’s
improved water and environmental management.19 However, neither the
Central Asian governments nor their international donors now speak of
“saving” the Aral Sea. The new goal is its division—by means of a levee fi-
nanced by the World Bank—and stabilization to protect what is left of the
two delta ecosystems and some measure of fisheries restoration, at least
in the northern “Little Aral Sea.” Disappointments over IFAS’ handling
of ASBP-1 and a weak strategic framework underlying the proposals of
ASBP-2 suggest that the next phase of regional water and environmental
management efforts is unlikely to attract the same degree of international
284 MCCAULEY
Table 13–1. Central Asian Participation in Multilateral Environmental

Agreements
Turkmenistan
Kazakhstan
Uzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Agreement
Climate Change (GCC) x x x x x

Ozone Depletion (Montreal) x x x x x
Hazardous Wastes (Basel) x x x
Bio- Diversity (CBD) x x x x x
Endangered Species (CITES) x x
Wetlands (Ramsar) x x
Environmentnal Information x x x x
(Aarhus)
Trans-boundary Waters (Geneva) x
Persistent Organic x x x
Pollutants (Stockholm)
Land Degradation (CCD) x x x x x
Source: Convention Websites
X denotes ratification and/or signature.
interest seen during the 1990s. Thus far, the REAP also has failed to galva-
nize the attention of international environmental aid donors.
Central Asia’s part in addressing the issue of global climate change
also has received considerable international notice. Table 13–2 shows that
the region has some of the highest per capita CO2 emissions levels in
the world, and its economies are also among the most energy intensive.
According to the Pew Center on Global Climate Change,20Kazakhstan
is ranked second and Uzbekistan sixth in energy use per GDP. The
other countries of the region are ranked only slightly better: Turk-
menistan–eleventh; Tajikistan–thirteenth; and Kyrgyzstan–twenty-
sixth. The energy inefficiencies of the region’s economies, however,
also have created opportunities for them to engage with developed
countries as a global market for greenhouse gas emissions credits
emerges. Kazakhstan already has completed a transacion with the Gov-
Table 13–2. Economic, Demographic and Environmental Statistics for

Central Asia
Land in protected
poverty (percent)
Total land area
emissions per
2001 GNP per
Population in
capita (US$)
capita (MT)
Annual CO2
area status
Population
(1000 km2)
(millions)
(percent)
Country
Kazakhstan 14.70 34.6 1,230 2,717.3 2.7 10.9
Kyrgyzstan 4.97 55.3 300 198.5 3.6 1.3
Uzbekistan 24.78 22.0 720 447.4 2.1 4.1
Tajikistan 6.29 83.0 290 143.1 4.2 1.0
Turkmenistan 5.28 n/a 660 416.0 n/a 7.4
Total or
56.02 36.5 763 3,922.3 2.7 5.6
Average
Source: ADB Developing Member Countries Statistical Summary, 2002 (based on published Government data).
ernment of Japan involving the annual creation of 62,000 tons of CO2 re-
duction credits, and more deals are likely to follow. Projects for improved
efficiency of district heating systems, thermal power generation, industrial
production, increased use of renewable energy sources and reduced energy
loss from fossil fuel extraction are but a few of those likely to seek funding
through either the Clean Development Mechanism or the Joint Imple-
mentation window under the Framework Convention on Climate Change
and its Kyoto Protocol (assuming it enters into force).
The arid to semi-arid region of Central Asia is defined, in part, by its
two great deserts: the Karakum and Kyzlkum. Concern is increasing over
the advance of these deserts brought on by periodic drought coupled with
unsustainable land management practices. As noted, this process of land
degradation is driven especially by mismanagement of irrigation waters,
unsustainable pasture lands management, and weak protection of moun-
tainous watersheds. In response, a regional strategic partnership has been
formed to prepare and implement national and regional strategies under
the UN Convention to Combat Desertification and Drought (UNCCD).
This is receiving organizational support from the UNCCD Global Mecha-
nism (GM), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Canadian and
German governments, while the Global Environment Facility (GEF)
is expected to provide project funding at the country level in the years
to come.
286 MCCAULEY
Biological diversity losses also are gaining increased attention in

the region. The main targets of natural systems protection are mountain
and desert ecosystems, the aquatic ecosystems of the Aral Sea deltas and
other marshlands, as well as the flora and fauna of the Caspian Sea and
its shoreline. Activities are underway with support from the World Bank
and GEF to conserve the deltas of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers.
Several transboundary park projects in mountainous areas also have been
proposed or are underway. Further efforts of this kind certainly are war-
ranted, particularly in the fragile mountain ecosystems of the upstream
states and in Uzbekistan.
While production of ozone-depleting substances has been phased
out, concern still lingers over the control of persistent organic pollutants
(POPs)—particularly residual pesticides dating from the Soviet period.
This topic has only recently begun to receive systematic attention under
the initiative of the UN Environment Program (UNEP), and additional
effort will be needed to define the POP problems facing the region and to
identify and implement appropriate remedies.
Responses to Environmental Challenges
Country Level Trends and Responses

This review would not be complete without a stock-taking of current
national and regional efforts to address these environmental and natural
resources management problems. Environmental management at the
country level is strongly influenced by and correlated with each republic’s
economic development strategy. There remains almost the same degree of
variation in approaches to and progress with environmental governance
in the region as is seen in broader political and economic spheres. The
country summaries which follow begin with the two upstream states of
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and then move to the downstream republics—
providing a snapshot of the key environmental issues as well as policy and
institutional responses playing out at the national level.
Kyrgyzstan21
The basic environmental policies of Kyrgyzstan are embodied in the
Law on Environmental Protection of 1999 (as amended in 2003), which
includes environmental standards, the establishment of protected areas as
well as rules regarding the management of natural resources and disas-
ters. Interpreting the provisions of the constitution, this law emphasizes
individual rights to environmental protection, provides for respecting the
sustainable development principle, and establishes the structure of regu-

latory and economic incentives governing environmental policy and the
involvement of civil society in environmental management. A list of key
environmental laws as an example of how this Central Asian Republic is
addressing these concerns is given in Table 13–3.
As in the other CARs, the NEAP adopted in 1995 represents the best
overall statement of Kyrgyzstan’s environmental policies and objectives.
Taking economic growth and poverty reduction as its starting point, the
Kyrgyz NEAP lays out a range of environmental management activities
meant to contribute to these goals and is particularly commendable in
its attempt to develop an environmental policy framework grounded on
the use of market-based incentives. Although seminal in its review of
Table 13–3. Major Environmental Legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic
Main Subject or Year Passed

Legislation Resource Protected (Amended)
Law on Specially Protected Areas Parks and reserves 1994
Law on Waters Water and floods 1994 (1995)
Law on Fisheries Fish habitats 1997 (1998)
Law on the Subsoil Mining rehabilitation 1997 (1999)
Law on Biosphere Territories Biosphere reserves 1999
Law on Drinking Water Water quality 1999 (2003)
Law on Protection of Ambient Air Air quality 1999 (2003)
Forest Code Forest management 1999 (2003)
Law on Radioactive Safety of the Population Radioactive hazards 1999 (2003)
Law on Ecological Expertise Projects and EIAs 1999 (2003)
Law on Wildlife/Fauna Endangered species 1999 (2003)
Law on Environmental Protection Basic protections 1999 (2003)
Land Code Land management 1999 (2003)
Law on Chemicalization and Plant Protection Pesticides/agrochemicals 1999 (2003)
Law on Protection of Historic & Cultural Heritage Cultural preservation 1999
Law on Protection and Use of Flora Biodiversity conservation 2001
Law on Tailings Ponds and Dumps Tailings management 2001
Law on Waste Production and Consumption Waste management 2001
Sources: UNECE, 2000 and www.law.gov.kg.
288 MCCAULEY
environmental management priorities and pragmatic in tone, the now-

dated NEAP has served as only a very broad guidance document for
environmental policy development in the country. Nevertheless, many of
its overall recommendations have been implemented or otherwise have
helped to shape the strong evolution of the country’s environmental laws
and regulations.
The Ministry of Environment and Emergency Situations (MEES)
is the lead executive branch agency for the environment subject, with
its minister serving as the principal environmental advocate within the
cabinet. MEES is directly responsible for implementing provisions of the
Law on Environmental Protection, as well as environmental standards and
regulations associated with most other environmental legislation that is
not specifically tied to a line ministry or delegated to the President’s Office,
including environmental monitoring and impact assessment. Committees
on Environmental Protection at the oblast and city levels complement
these national institutions, and the country continues to undergo a decen-
tralization process that is encouraging ever greater self-governance at the
regional and local levels. Several other government agencies and ministries
also play crucial roles in environmental and natural resources manage-
ment—most notably the Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources, and
Processing Industry and the State Forestry Service.
Both the legislative and judicial branches of government also are
awakening to new roles in environmental governance in Kyrgyzstan. As
demonstrated by the proliferation of new environmental laws, it is clear
that these subjects are receiving a high degree of attention from the na-
tional parliament. The Parliamentary Commission on Agriculture and
Environment serves as the lead body for the legislative branch. Attention
to environmental subjects has been less prevalent in the judicial branch,
though this too is growing. Thus far an environmental/green bench within
the judiciary has had only limited development, though several success-
ful environmental cases have been brought to court in recent years. This
represents a significant institutional challenge, however, because of more
generic shortcomings of the Kyrgyz legal system.
Though considerable challenges remain, the Kyrgyz Republic is the
most open to civil society participation in decision making—including
environmental—within Central Asia. There are many non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) with environmental and/or natural resources man-
agement interests, ranging from scientific and educational groups to those
exercising advocacy functions. Though there is room for even further
government transparency and collaboration, environmental NGOs have
participated in the debate on environmental policy since the 1995 NEAP

exercise and have helped to shape the many environmental laws passed
since 1998.
Depite the country’s impressive array of environmental laws and
regulations, weak enforcement remains a serious constraint to the protec-
tion and sound management of natural resources and protection of envi-
ronmental quality. Some existing regulations and incentive structures are
inherently difficult to enforce, but capacity constraints among responsible
government institutions—coupled with severe funding shortages and cor-
ruption—lie at the core of this problem. Despite attempts to improve data
collection and management, shortages of accurate, timely and appropriate
environmental information to assist decision making continue.
While a range of programs are financed as a part of government
agencies’ routine activities, the most visible responses to environmental
protection and management needs are those involving international co-
operation. Many of these have been linked with the country’s fairly active
participation in global affairs associated with multilateral environmental
agreements. In particular, several capacity-building activities have been
funded by the Global Environment Facility (mostly through UNDP).
These are meant to strengthen the institutions responsible for overseeing
the country’s participation in global conventions, such as those cover-
ing climate change, land degradation and biodiversity conservation. The
country consistently has called for international aid to help it address the
high national and regional risks associated with poorly contained uranium
tailings inherited from the Soviet period, and the World Bank and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) now are
leading a coordinated donor response. Kyrgyzstan has been something of a
trend-setter in the region with regard to market-oriented land reform and
restructuring of water management at the local level, with World Bank and
ADB projects serving as the principal vehicles for developing demonstra-
tion activities and replicating them at the oblast and national levels.
Tajikistan22
Though Tajikistan’s policies and institutions have deviated some-
what from those of Kyrgyzstan since independence, these mountainous
neighbors share many of the same environmental and natural resources
management problems. Unfortunately, Tajikistan’s post-independence po-
litical struggles have diverted attention and resources away from natural
systems and resources management. There also has been a significant
inflow of international aid coupled with better communications since the
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end of the civil conflict, and these have strongly affected the country’s abil-
ity to respond to environmental management challenges. Civil society’s
participation is relatively high, and this includes involvement in both the
debate over and actions to address environmental concerns.
The country still lacks a clear set of environmental policies and pro-
grams to guide government and private interventions. Though consider-
able analysis and dialogue has been devoted to determining environmental
action priorities, little consensus has emerged. More important, the funda-
mental land and water resources underpinnings of the economy are only
weakly recognized. The prevailing policy view seems to be that environ-
mental management can be adequately handled by the Ministry of Nature
Protection. Though this Ministry is doing its best with limited staff and
funds, it has only weak influence over the more powerful interests govern-
ing urban and rural development in the country. The State Environment
Program (1998-2008) deals with general principles and goals but does not
offer an implementable strategy for improving environmental and natu-
ral resources management in the context of efforts to promote economic
growth and alleviate poverty. While the development of a NEAP could
potentially help, this ongoing exercise again has been concentrated largely
within the network of the Ministry of Nature Protection and delayed by
differences over its scope and structure.
The considerable international assistance rendered to the country
also has not made a substantial contribution to improving the coherence
of either environmental policies or programs. Though some local-level
initiatives have produced promising results, these have been poorly docu-
mented and seldom replicated. National-level assistance has been highly
fragmented, and much of it has centered on Tajikistan’s role in addressing
regional or global concerns with only weak attention to national or local
priorities. This includes such topics as biodiversity conservation, land
degradation, climate change and waste management.23 Reliance on donor
support for environmental analysis and programming also has under-
mined nascent efforts to establish routine government funding channels
for environmental and natural resources management topics through line
ministries or the legislature.
The key to progress in Tajikistan—as elsewhere in the region—will
be incorporating an understanding of and concern for sound environmen-
tal and natural resources management into the mainstream of economic
development planning, policy-making and programming. This principle
is gradually coming to be understood, though it requires a departure
from the traditional patterns of designing “environmental” projects and
the conduct of environmental analysis in isolation from economic plan-

ning and programming of development resources for key sectors such as
agriculture and energy. The Ministry of Nature Protection appreciates
the importance of its reaching out to the government bodies—executive
or legislative—which govern such economic interests and using its links
to civil society to advocate for expanding attention to the environmental
underpinnings of the country’s development path.
Kazakhstan24
Kazakhstan is set apart from the other CARs on the basis of several
characteristics. Its sheer size and oil-based economic growth are perhaps
the most important distinguishing factors. Along with Kyrgyzstan, it
also has embraced open-market policies to a much greater extent than
its neighbors. Despite its geographic scope, population densities remain
low—further affecting its special circumstances.
The country’s natural resource base remains degraded from unsus-
tainable practices dating from the Soviet period. The “virgin lands” policy
opened many semi-arid steppe regions to agricultural production beyond
their long-term potential.25 Mining wastes in the East, industrial pollution
in the Northeast, oil industry pollution in the West along the Caspian,
and land degradation in the South present a diverse and far-flung set of
environmental challenges.
Isolated rural populations cut off from Soviet-era subsidies are
struggling to survive, and agricultural production has fallen substantially
since independence. Efforts such as the World Bank/GEF-funded Drylands
Management Project are testing the environmental, social and economic
viability of shifting from currently unsustainable cereal-based agricultural
production systems back to traditional livestock-based systems.26 Decen-
tralized and renewable energy systems also are receiving increased atten-
tion as potential means for overcoming rural productivity losses and the
high cost of keeping distant communities linked to the national electricity
grid.
Kazakhstan enjoys by far the highest level of foreign investment
among the CARs, and—though environmental regulation of industry
remains a contentious issue—interactions with multinational firms are
leading to a gradual adoption of internationally-accepted environmental
management norms. This is most clear in the oil and gas industry located
along the Caspian Sea, though international firms are balking at being
asked to clean up pollution problems left over from Soviet times.
292 MCCAULEY
After a period in which the government mixed responsibilities for

both resource extraction and environmental regulation under a large
umbrella ministry, these functions now have been divided. Regulatory
authorities under the Ministry of Environmental Protection are gradu-
ally gaining some ability to enforce compliance with environmental laws
despite continuing and widespread corruption. As elsewhere in the region,
environmental considerations are only weakly incorporated into—or even
acknowledged by—development plans and programs of key sectors such
as energy, transport or agriculture. The formation of a National Sustain-
able Development Council to coordinate such mainstreaming efforts
holds some promise. Some indications show progress being made in some
areas, since both the intensity of pollution and energy use per unit of GDP
have begun to fall.
At the regional level, Kazakhstan continues a strong policy of politi-
cal engagement and economic integration with its neighbors (though not
limited to the CARs). Consistent with this stance, it has been perhaps the
most solid member of IFAS from the start and is taking direct measures to
address the ecological crisis in its territory surrounding the former bound-
aries of the Aral Sea, particularly with assistance from the World Bank. It
also is working with neighboring China and Kyrgyzstan on bilateral river
basin management issues—having concluded agreements governing the
Ili-Balkash and Chui-Talas Basins, respectively. Kazakhstan also actively
participates in the Caspian Environmental Program.
The country is an often vocal participant in meetings of the major
multilateral environmental agreements, and, as noted in Table 13-3, is a
signatory to most. This stance has attracted considerable international
assistance to develop national assessments and action plans for national
compliance with agreement provisions—sometimes distracting from
higher priority domestic concerns.
Turkmenistan
Like Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan is well endowed with oil and espe-
cially gas resources, but continued reliance on a planned economy and rigid
political and social controls have limited foreign trade and investment.
The country’s political and economic isolation places it at something of a
disadvantage within the region with respect to its access to international
expertise and assistance to improve environmental and natural resources
management. While a few NGOs have begun to address environmental
issues, the scope of their influence is limited by the closed attitudes of the
government toward the participation of civil society in public policy de-
bate. Government agencies—including those managing natural resources

and meant to protect the environment—are often tentative in their deci-
sion making due to rigidities in the authoritative structure.
Most of the country is uninhabitable desert, and the population is
largely concentrated along the courses of the Amu Darya River and the
Karikkum Canal which supports the capital, Ashgabad. Turkmenistan
is almost completely dependent upon water flowing from its upstream
neighbors, so it has an enormous stake in efforts to improve regional water
cooperation. Nevertheless, it has been a reluctant partner within IFAS and
other regional mechanisms promoting regional cooperation on resources
management.27 It also inherited significant land degradation challenges
from the Soviet period. These comprise waterlogging and especially sali-
nization in agricultural areas due to over-irrigation and severe drainage
problems—with half of the country’s irrigated lands considered to be in
an unsatisfactory state.28 The rapidly growing urbanized population also
is posing increasing challenges for adequate provision of water supply and
wastewater management. The country is still prone to grand construction
schemes, and the proposed creation of an enormous “Golden Lake”—as a
collector of agricultural drainage water just upstream of the Aral Sea and
for uncertain additional uses—has been met with skepticism in the region
and beyond.
A NEAP was completed in 2002, and it has begun to shape think-
ing about priorities for incorporating environmental considerations into
national economic development plans. An ecological information network
also is expanding. Much of the NEAP centers on addressing the severe
land degradation problems. Though the NEAP is an important forward
step, much remains to be done if it is to receive broader ownership among
key government and civil society stakeholders as a necessary basis for its
implementation.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan is able to support the largest population in the region in
large measure because of the fertility of the irrigated Ferghana Valley and,
more generally, due to the abundance of water resources flowing through
its predominantly arid landscape. Its territory straddles the courses of
the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers. Yet its ability to maintain land and
water management systems is increasingly threatened by severe resource
degradation—due largely to mismanagement of irrigated agriculture for
cotton and wheat production—coupled with intensifying regional com-
petition over shared water resources. The most extreme problems are in
294 MCCAULEY
the Autonomous Region of Karakalpakstan, where the Amu Darya meets

the Aral Sea. Here drought and desertification have combined with the
dislocations associated with the Sea’s desiccation to impoverish most of
the population.29
Beyond the constraints on rural development imposed by land
degradation, the country also faces a range of environmental problems
affecting the health and productivity of urban populations. These include
air pollution, industrial water pollution, deteriorating infrastructure for
wastewater collection and treatment, weak systems of solid waste manage-
ment, and energy-related environmental issues. Although both air and
water pollution from industrial sources has declined since independence
(with the fall in heavy industry’s output), there remain localized pockets
of air pollution that can have wide-ranging impacts when atmospheric in-
versions trap pollution for days on end. Likewise, some areas immediately
downstream of operating industries suffer from poor water quality. Prob-
lems from industrial air pollution are exacerbated by weakly controlled
and gradually expanding vehicular pollution sources. Uzbekistan’s air pol-
lution problems would be far worse were it not abundantly endowed with
natural gas which is widely utilized as the principal energy source—except
for vehicles—throughout the country.30 Though Uzbekistan had one of
the most developed urban water supply and wastewater collection and
treatment systems in the former Soviet Union, maintenance and manage-
ment have suffered in recent years with a corresponding decline in service.
A similar pattern may be seen with respect to solid waste management.
The “ecological safety” of the young and rapidly growing popula-
tion31 is guaranteed by the Constitution, and environmental legislation
since independence has emphasized this notion along with generally
accepted principles of environmental protection and rational natural re-
sources use. The State Committee for Nature Protection serves as the lead
government body in implementing environmental laws and regulations,
but it is weak relative to, for example, the powerful ministries governing
agriculture/water, industry, and energy. It also shares responsibilities for
monitoring and managing air and water quality with other agencies such
as the hydrometeorological service—often competing for budgetary and
project resources. The strong scientific base in the country has led to per-
haps the most rigorous analysis of environmental problems and processes
in the region. However, environmental policy-making remains fragmented
and outside of the mainstream of economic planning structures, which
have changed only marginally since the Soviet period. Further, the high
degree of state control has limited the participation of NGOs and other
elements of civil society, including the media, in environmental planning

and decision making.32
The country has been a sometimes reluctant partner with its neigh-
bors in addressing regional environmental and natural resources chal-
lenges. A core member of IFAS, Uzbekistan has not lent strong support to
its efforts since the EC-IFAS secretariat moved from Tashkent in the late
1990s. It became a signatory to the 1998 Framework Agreement on the Syr
Darya River’s management, but it subsequently ceased participating in the
associated energy-for-water swaps. In 2003, it hosted discussions on land
degradation in the region under the auspices of the Strategic Partnership
for UNCCD Implementation in Central Asia, and efforts are underway to
lay the groundwork for a tougher domestic policy stance on addressing
severe land and water management problems. It has taken part in discus-
sions under the framework of the REAP, but has made little commitment
to implement projects emanating from the planning exercise. A recently
created regional environmental planning integration and information
networking activity supported by ADB achieved buy-in from all CARs
except Uzbekistan. While the country hosted the ADB-organized Second
Ministerial Conference on Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation
held in late 2003, it vetoed inclusion of reference to the obvious connec-
tions between water and energy in the Ministerial Statement. More than
any of its neighbors (save Turkmenistan), it has viewed regional coopera-
tion from a position of very narrow national self-interest.
Its highly scientific approach to problem analysis can be seen in the
country’s responses to its obligations under the key multilateral environ-
mental agreements to which it is party. A National Strategy and Action
Plan for Biodiversity Conservation was produced in 1998. A National Ac-
tion Plan for implementation of the UNCCD was finalized in 1999, and
an Initial National Communication under the Framework Convention
on Climate Change was completed in 2001. All three of these documents
place a strong emphasis on documenting the environmental problems in
technical terms and scientifically identifying the underlying ecological or
bio-physical processes. Conversely, they are weak in their analysis of pov-
erty-environment linkages and the root causes of environmental problems
lying in past and current government policies. These documents—and
the planning exercises that led to them—are similarly lacking in strategic
thinking concerning appropriate policy and institutional responses. Such
weaknesses pervade the environmental governance atmosphere and need
to be directly addressed if Uzbekistan is to incorporate environmental
considerations into its economic development and poverty alleviation
296 MCCAULEY
planning—taking full advantage of its scientific skills and relatively strong

information base to address the wide range of environmental and natural
resources management problems it faces.
International Assistance
Improving land and water resources management in the region re-
mains the highest priority for international environmental assistance to
Central Asia. The World Bank has been perhaps the most active multilat-
eral aid agency, having served as the lead donor for ASBP-1. In addition to
the analyses under ASBP-1, the World Bank’s land and water management
programming has included country-level investments in the irrigation
sector as well as a project to divide the remainder of the Aral Sea into two
parts.33 It also has produced an insightful review of agricultural water use
and needed reform measures in the CARs.34 The ADB is playing an active
role in encouraging greater regional economic integration, and it also has
provided considerable environmentally-related technical assistance to the
CARs—including for improved water management.35 The ADB sponsored
Central Asia’s participation in the third World Water Forum of 2003 and
co-sponsored the 2003 Forum on Strategic Partnership for UNCCD Im-
plementation in Central Asia. It remains actively engaged in various efforts
to address water, land and environmental management problems at the
local, national and regional levels. UNDP has made regional water man-
agement one of three focal areas in its environmental program for Central
Asia—centering efforts on strengthening the institutional, programming
and legal framework for water resources management by assisting EC-
IFAS with completion of the ASBP-1 problem analysis and helping to for-
mulate a coherent ASBP-2.36 The EU37 has begun a third phase of regional
water assistance focusing on demonstrating principles of integrated water
management in pilot sub-catchments.38 The OSCE is leading an activity
supporting creation of a Joint Commission for the Chu and Talas Rivers,
and also is involved in an Environment and Security Initiative dealing with
regional water issues.39 The Global Water Partnership’s Caucasus and Cen-
tral Asia program is also building regional relations to support improved
integrated water management.
Several bilateral aid agencies also are assisting at the regional level.
Among others, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
provided the aid that led to the initial brokering of the 1998 Syr Darya
Framework Agreement as well as much of the core international envi-
ronmental assistance to the region in the immediate post-independence
period. USAID no longer supports environmental management programs
and most of its water management activities—other than a modest re-

gional effort on the upper Syr Darya Basin—have now shifted to field-level
demonstrations of irrigation systems and hydrological monitoring. The
Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation is supporting a multi-year
pilot-level effort on integrated management of internationally shared
canals in the Ferghana Valley, involving the Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan,
and Tajikistan, and the German development aid agency (GTZ) has a
region-wide program to address land degradation problems dealing ex-
tensively with salinization and waterlogging. The Canadian International
Development Agency also has been active, though its programs are now
almost exclusively focused on alleviating poverty in Tajikistan as the poor-
est Central Asian country.
The Central Asian REAP represents another effort to identify and
organize responses to high priority environmental problems of regional
significance. The REAP was initiated in 2000 with financial and insti-
tutional support from UNEP, ADB, and UNDP. It began by identifying
“regional” problems in five areas: air pollution; water pollution; land
degradation; waste management; and mountain ecosystem degradation.
Project concepts were developed in each of these five areas, and regional
work groups were to have prepared and overseen the funding and imple-
mentation of corresponding projects or programs. A number of the proj-
ect ideas generated under the REAP framework also are not necessarily
“regional” in nature (requiring interstate cooperation for their solution),
but rather constitute problems common to two or more countries. The
lack of emphasis on truly regional environmental issues, such as those of
an obvious transboundary nature, has interfered with efforts to appropri-
ately focus institutional attentions and resources. Progress with funding
and implementing these projects has lagged, while considerable attention
has been expended in further discussion and planning at the national and
regional levels. This is partly due to the Interstate Commission for Sus-
tainable Development (ICSD) having been entrusted with guiding REAP
implementation; during this period ICSD has been struggling to get itself
fully operational. In response to the institutional constraints encountered,
the focus of Central Asian REAP teams as well as the key donors (UNEP
and UNDP) has shifted to establishing the enabling conditions for REAP
implementation through: creating a mechanism to support regional envi-
ronmental cooperation in Central Asia; developing a REAP decision sup-
port system; encouraging stronger public awareness of and participation
in REAP-related activities; and building capacities for REAP implementa-
298 MCCAULEY
tion. Despite these constraints, a proposal has been submitted by UNEP to

the GEF for the financing of further REAP organizational activities.
Mountain ecosystems management is another environmental prob-
lem area that has attracted considerable regional as well as international
attention. As noted, Kyrgyzstan played host in 2002 to the Bishkek Global
Mountain Summit, which capped a series of events around the world
marking 2002 as the International Year of Mountains.40 A detailed strat-
egy and action plan for sustainable mountain areas development was
developed for Kyrgyzstan that was meant to serve as a model for similar
national plans covering all five CARs,41 and several papers at the Moun-
tain Summit outlined the threats to fragile mountain ecosystems in the
region—including the proposition that the region’s glaciers are receding
rapidly and contributing to a troubling over-estimation of available fresh-
water resources in the Aral Sea Basin. Though global in scope, the Bishkek
Mountain Platform that resulted from the meeting was significantly shaped
by the Central Asian experience and venue of the Summit.42 Unfortunately,
meaningful follow-up has not occurred at the national or regional levels,
and international attention to the subject has waned somewhat after the
conclusion of the Year of Mountains. Effectual responses also have been
inhibited by land tenure conflicts, security concerns and a confusing array
of government jurisdictions in the region’s mountainous areas.
The international community, including particularly the World
Bank, EU and UNDP, already has invested heavily in regional institu-
tions for natural resources and environmental management. EC-IFAS
has received considerable support through the ASBP-1, though questions
within the donor community about the likely effectiveness of the ASBP-2’s
strategic framework have thus far limited further substantial international
support. The ICWC under IFAS has continued to function as a committee
of the region’s water ministers while its Scientific Information Committee
(SIC-ICWC) has cobbled together assistance from a variety of sources to
support ICWC decision making and the training of water professionals in
the region. The network of national REAP working groups represents yet
another effort to establish institutional capacity for improved environ-
mental management at the regional level, but the REAP’s progress is being
constrained by continuing concerns over ICSD’s ability to oversee project
implementation. There are corresponding networks of national focal
points covering each of the global environmental agreements to which
all CARs are party (climate change, land degradation, biodiversity, and
ozone depletion). Another recent innovation at the regional level has been
the creation of the CA-REC in Almaty, chartered by agreement of the five
states at the Aarhus Ministerial in 1998. CA-REC, working with EC-IFAS

and ICSD, has conducted analyses of regional issues and helped to catalyze
preparations for international environmental meetings such as the WSSD
and the UNECE Environment for Europe ministerial conference. Some
regional stakeholders believe this may have detracted somewhat from
CA-REC’s mandated responsibility to facilitate public participation in
environmental decision making.
Finally, although only Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan—among the
CARs—are littoral states of the Caspian Sea, their active participation in
the Caspian Environmental Program (CEP) should be noted.43 The CEP
was established to coordinate the resource management actions of the
five countries bordering the Caspian Sea, interact with efforts under the
Ramsar Convention on the protection of wetlands and, more generally,
“to halt the deterioration of environmental conditions of the Caspian Sea
and to promote sustainable development in the area”.44 The CEP inter-
governmental process is primarily supported by the GEF, UNDP, World
Bank, UNEP and the EU, but it also includes cooperation with the private
sector—particularly the oil and gas industry. CEP has developed and ad-
opted a Strategic Action Program for the protection and rehabilitation of
the Caspian environment covering high priority environmental concern
areas as well as helping each littoral state develop its own National Caspian
Action Plan. This has proven to be quite positive for Kazakhstan and Turk-
menistan, as participation in CEP has led both nations to adopt enhanced
pollution control measures in their oblasts bordering the Sea.
Conclusion
Since achieving their independence, all Central Asian countries have
sought to improve their understanding of environmental and natural re-
sources constraints on their economic development. Varying efforts also
have been made to strengthen policy and institutional responses to these
challenges. The need for much more effective plans, policies and programs
to address land degradation and water mismanagement is an important
recurring theme in the region, while environmental dimensions of urban
and industrial restructuring also are receiving increased attention. The
capacity of most environmental agencies has been improved, and it is be-
coming more widely accepted that environmental considerations must be
built into all aspects of economic and social reform. Broader results will
require further outreach to government agencies directly charged with
resource management, such as those managing the agriculture and energy
sectors.
300 MCCAULEY
At the regional level, institutions have been formed and initiatives

undertaken to address problems of common concern to the region. Most
prominent among these are efforts to address the Aral Sea crisis through
IFAS. More recently the REAP process has sought to identify other trans-
boundary or common environmental problems for action through the
IFAS subsidiary ICSD. The Strategic Partnership for Implementation of
the UNCCD in Central Asia is becoming an important mechanism for
coordinating efforts to address land degradation in the region. Institutions
such as CA-REC have much to offer as resource bodies to encourage more
active dialogue between government and civil society, though the rigid po-
litical atmosphere pervasive in the region continues to inhibit a participa-
tory approach to developing and implementing environmental policies.
After quickly joining most of the key multilateral environmental
agreements, Central Asian countries have taken advantage of available
funding to prepare associated national strategies. Some of this analysis—
such as air pollution assessments tied to the climate change treaty—have
had positive cross-over benefits of improved understanding of the domes-
tic costs of pollution and inefficient resource management. Others have
had weaker links to national environmental issues, and some even have
distracted attention from higher priorities at home. Few of the efforts
addressing global environmental issues have engaged those policymak-
ers most responsible for managing the resources or allocating funds to
improve their management, though more recent initiatives have sought to
rectify this shortcoming.
Each of the Central Asian countries faces its own set of social, eco-
nomic and environmental challenges, but they also share a common heri-
tage and many mutual development goals. Socio-political development
varies greatly among the countries, and the degree of market orientation
and transparency exhibited in environmental management efforts tends
to mirror broader country-level trends. This suggests that environmental
management gains should result from broader governance improvements,
and that environmental considerations need to be woven into the very
fabric of economic development policies and programs. This must go
beyond mere pronouncements, the publishing of national action plans or
even legislative reform to encompass fresh political will and the accom-
panying resources needed to realize real change. With proper attention to
the strengthening of key environmental management institutions, to using
renewable natural resources only within their sustainable limits, to avoid-
ing adverse environmental impacts from other forms of development, to
reducing waste while improving economic efficiency and to encouraging
public engagement in decision making regarding these matters, the page

can be turned on the old story of environmental neglect and a new chapter
opened to wise environmental and natural resources management form-
ing the basis for healthy and prosperous societies in the lands that straddle
the Great Silk Road.
Notes
1 The State Committee structure was retained in Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan has recently re-
verted to this structure.

2 See: <http://www.grida.no/aral/main_e.html> for both the NEAPs available and national
State of the Environment Reports prepared in cooperation with UNEP in anticipation of the Jo-
hannesburg Earth Summit. The NEAP for Tajikistan is scheduled to be completed by early 2004.
Environmental Performance Reviews (EPR) conducted by the UN Economic Commission for Europe
(UNECE) supplement the NEAPs as do Country Environmental Analyses (CEAs) prepared by the
Asian Development Bank. See: UNECE, 1999. Environmental Performance Review: Kyrgyzstan (United
Nations: Geneva; UNECE 2000); Environmental Performance Review: Kazakhstan (United Nations:
Geneva; and UNECE 2001), Environmental Performance Review: Uzbekistan (United Nations: Geneva).
Also see: Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2003. Country Environmental Assessment: Kazakhstan,
ADB: Manila; ADB. 2003; Country Environmental Assessment: Kyrgyzstan, ADB: Manila; and ADB.
2003; Country Environmental Assessment: Tajikistan, ADB: Manila (an EPR for Tajikistan and CEA for
Uzbekistan are planned for 2004).
3 Afghanistan often is excluded from such activities due to its very different relationship with
the former Soviet Union and because many international assistance agencies treat it as part of “South
Asia” rather than “Central Asia.”
4 UNEP 2001. Regional Environmental Action Plan for Central Asia. UNEP.RRA: Bangkok.
5 Or at least concurrence with analysis and positions put forward by CA-REC.
6 UNECE 2003. Report of the Fifth Ministerial Conference on Environment for Europe, UNECE
Secretariat: Geneva, and UNECE 2003. Invitation to Partnership on Implementation of the Central Asian
Sustainable Development Initiative, Fifth Ministerial Conference Environment for Europe, Kiev, May
21-23, 2003, UNECE: Geneva.
7 Generally including the agencies responsible for water resources management.
8 Though not covered in this review, Afghanistan lies in the upstream watershed of the Amu
Darya River, and it is ethnically linked with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan with which it
shares a common border. For a summary assessment of its contemporary environmental issues, see:
McCauley, 2003.
9 For further detail on environmental and natural resources conditions and issues in the re-
gion, see: ADB. 1997. Central Asian Environments in Transition. ADB: Manila (covering Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan); ADB. 2000. Environmental Profile of Tajikistan. ADB: Manila; McCauley,
D. 2001. Central Asia: Summary Assessment of ADB Environmental Assistance, ADB: Manila; as well as
the EPRs and CEAs footnoted above.
10 Pollution levels were considerably higher in the CARs during the Soviet period and declined
thereafter with the demise of many high-polluting industries.

11 Mismanagement of irrigation water is resulting in widespread waterlogging of soils and
salinization, both from poor drainage and through a process whereby soil salts are brought to the
surface on waterlogged lands. In addition to the section of the REAP on this subject, see also: IFAS.
2002. Water and Environmental Management Project Sub-Component A1: National and Regional Water
and Salt Management Plan Phase III Report – Regional Needs and Constraints. GEF Agency of the IFAS
Aral Sea Basin Program: Tashkent.
302 MCCAULEY
12 The impending diversions by the People’s Republic of China of waters from the Irtysh and
Ili Rivers upstream of Kazakhstan also are of concern due both to the potential impacts on the rivers’
pollution flushing capacities as well to their overall water volumes.
13 Tursunzade also is a major source of air pollution.
14 The consequences of over-irrigation, including waterlogging and salinization, have already
been mentioned, as have the unstable uranium tailings of Kyrgyzstan.

15 IFAS’s role and history are discussed at length in Daene McKinney’s chapter.
16 This is under the Aral Sea Basin Program–2 (ASBP-2) described in further detail below.
17 ICWC is slightly better off in this regard, as it is able to draw upon its Scientific Information
Committee (SIC-ICWC), which serves as an analytical secretariat. ICSC also has an SIC, though it is
more weakly staffed and recognized.
18 In addition to CACO (with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as members
and Turkmenistan as an observer), other leading regional groupings include: the Eurasian Economic
Community (EurAsEc; with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan as members);
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO; with China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan as members); and less formal groupings such as that organized by the Asian Development
Bank (CAREC; with Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
as members and Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey and Turkmenistan as observers).
19 IFAS, 2003. Program of Concrete Actions on Improvement of the Environmental and Socio-Eco-
nomic Situation in the Aral Sea Basin for the Period of 2003-2010, EC-IFAS: Dushanbe.
20 1995 data, see: Eileen Claussen and Lisa McNeilly. 1998. Equity and Global Climate Change:
The Complex Elements of Global Fairness, Annex 1. Pew Center on Global Climate Change: Washing-
ton, DC.
21 This country is given slightly greater coverage as an introduction to national-level institu-
tional and program trends common in the region; additional details may be found in ADB, 2003b,
prepared by this author.
22 This section draws particularly from ADB, 2003c, and further background information may
be found in ADB, 1999.

23 An initiative funded by the GEF and UNDP to coordinate and integrate national action
plans in response to the Biodiversity, Land Degradation and Climate Change conventions represents a
promising counter-trend. As far as I know, National Capacity Needs Self-Assessment deals with ana-
lyzing the capacity needed to implement national actions plans and strategies on biodiversity, climate
change and desertification.
24 This section draws upon ADB, 2003a, and further detail may be found therein.
25 An indication of the remaining constraints to official perceptions in this regard may be found
in the early 2004 “celebration” of the 50th Anniversary of the Virgin Lands Policy in Kazakhstan.
26 World Bank-GEF, 2003. Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Global Environment Facil-
ity Grant to the Government of Kazakhstan for Drylands Management Project, World Bank Environmen-
tally and Socially Sustainable Development Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region: Washington, DC.
27 The country’s more active participation in the Caspian Environment Program represents
something of an exception to this trend.

28 Ministry of Nature Protection, 1999. State of the Environment of Turkmenistan, Ministry of
Nature Protection and UNEP: Ashgabat and Saigal, S., 2003. Issues and Approaches to Combat Deserti-
fication: Turkmenistan, Report of ADB RETA 5941: Manila.
29 The consequently high rate of out-migration threatens to undermine the very Karakalpak-
stani identity.
30 Rising domestic and export demand for Uzbekistan’s natural gas against an essentially fixed
supply is expected to alter the status quo over the next decade, requiring both economic and environ-
mental adjustments.
31 Almost one-half are 16 years of age or younger.
32 Uzbekistan in the only Central Asian country which has not acceded to the Aarhus conven-
tion on environmental information transparency.

33 As noted, a levee is being constructed just south of the Syr Darya River’s delta to preserve
aquatic ecosystems and partially restore fisheries but also effectively splitting the Aral Sea into two
separate lakes.
34 Bucknall, et al., Irrigation in Central Asia: Social, Economic and Environmental Considerations
(Washington: World Bank, 2003).

35 See McCauley, 2002.
36 The former analysis is co-financed by the United States State Department.
37 European Union Technical Assistance for Commonwealth of Independent States (EU/
TACIS).
38 Covering the Chui-Talas and Vakhsh River Basins.
39 For the work to establish the Chui-Talas Rivers Commission, OSCE is partnered with the UN
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific (ESCAP); for the Environmental Security Initiative, it is partnered with UNDP and
the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). The United Nations Educational and Scientific
Cooperation Organization (UNESCO) also is supporting research on sustainable water management
in the region.
40 See the Summit materials given at: <http://mountains.unep.ch/mtn/home_page.html>.
41 See: Kyrgyz CAMIN Working Group 2001. National Strategy and Action Plan for Sustainable
Mountain Development in the Kyrgyz Republic, CAMIN: Bishkek.

42 See: <http://mountains.unep.ch/mtn/papers/BMPlatform.doc>.
43 The others are Iran, Russia and Azerbaijan.
44 <www.caspianenvironment.org>.
304 MCCAULEY
Chapter 14
The Future of Electrical

Power in the Republic of
Kazakhstan
Kalkaman Suleimenov
K
azakhstan is rich in all forms of energy. With current production
rates, the country not only can be self-sufficient in energy for
the foreseeable future, but also may be able to export substantial
amounts. The Republic of Kazakhstan, which covers some 1.8 percent of
the land surface of the earth, enjoys roughly one half percent of the world’s
proven reserves of mineral fuels, or 30 billion tons. Of this, 80 percent is
coal, 13 percent is oil and gas condensates and 7 percent is natural and sec-
ondary gas.1 These resources are distributed unevenly across the Republic,
as displayed in Figure 14–1. The coal deposits, for the most part, are con-
centrated in Northern and Central Kazakhstan. These same regions have
rich deposits of minerals, which provide raw materials for Kazakhstan’s in-
dustry. Here also are located the main sources of electrical energy. Western
Kazakhstan is very rich in hydrocarbon reserves, while at the same time
being poor in electrical power. Southern Kazakhstan does not have suf-
ficient primary energy sources, and those found are inaccessible or as yet
unexploited. The anticipated scale of hydrocarbon extraction in Southern
Kazakhstan hardly can cover the region’s need for electrical energy in the
future. At the same time, however, this region possesses great hydroelectric
potential.
The primary goals of the electrical energy sector for power genera-
tion on the domestic market and production for export are:
■ To provide the country with energy security, which includes:
◆ access or access rights to energy markets;
◆ qualitycontrol and an uncompromising adherence to established
standards;
305
306 SULEIMENOV
◆ fairpricing that helps create reserves for development while tak-

ing into consideration social factors and line losses;
◆ ecological responsibility.
■ Optimization of the fuel regimen of electrical stations, with an em-
phasis on gas wherever possible and economically acceptable, and
the use of fossil fuel secondary gas;
■ Utilization of international experience to mitigate the ecological
side effects of coal, Kazakhstan’s basic energy resource;
■ Restoration of electricity production at existing electric installa-
tions, through their rehabilitation or reconstruction, whichever is
the least expensive and quickest;
■ Maintaining the designed capacity of electrical stations through
the timely replacement of equipment that has outlived its designed
service period, with new generation equipment;
■ Construction of new electrical generation capacity to replace that
going off-line, while meeting increased demand for electricity.
In 1990 Kazakhstan’s electrical power plants produced 87.4 billion

kilowatt hours (kWh) of electrical power. 2 Of this, thermal power plants
accounted for 91 percent, hydro 8.4 percent, and nuclear 0.6 percent. In
subsequent years, owing to the completion of projects that had been under
construction, a number of new plants were brought on line at Ekibastuz-2
District Electrical Plant, the Karaganda-3 Thermal Power Plant, and the
Aktube Thermal Power Plant (Akturbo). This has brought total electrical
power generation capacity up to 95 billion kWh.3 Thus, electrical power
generation in Kazakhstan is characterized by efforts to achieve self-suf-
ficiency in electrical power and provide the necessary infrastructure for
generating capacity with appropriate increases in reserve capacity for
future needs. The realization of these tasks will allow Kazakhstan to trade
energy profitably with its neighbors, and ensure a competitive electricity
market.
For the purpose of examining the issue of power generation, Ka-
zakhstan can be divided into three basic regions: Southern, Northern, and
Western. Each of these regions will be discussed in the following sections
,with emphasis on the amount of energy produced and the issues sur-
rounding this production.
ELECTRICAL POWER 307
The Southern Region

The Southern Region consists of Almaty, Jambyl, Kzyl-Orda, the
South Kazakhstan oblasts, and the City of Almaty. This region comprises
roughly 38 percent of the country’s population, and its growth has always
been above the average for the Republic. Industry here consists primar-
ily of the energy-intensive chemical production sector (which in 1990
accounted for more than 40 percent of electricity consumption in the
region), as well as metallurgy, machine-building, light industry, and other
enterprises. In addition, a significant part of the railway system has been
converted to use electricity. This zone has a favorable climate with fertile
arable land that has allowed the region to develop a highly productive
agriculture and agricultural processing sector.
Demand for electricity in this zone in 1990 reached 26.43 billion
kWh,4 while producing only 16.27 billion kWh,5 with the shortfall being
delivered from electrical power plants of the Central Asian Unified Energy
System.6 In light of the region’s deficiency in primary energy resources,
electricity production is based on outside coal, imported natural gas, and,
in part, on locally produced fuel oil from petrochemical processing plants.
The southeastern part of the region is potentially rich in hydro-electrical
resources, yet only an insignificant part is utilized. It may be exploited in
the future.7 In order to connect to the energy systems of other Central
Asian countries, a power grid was built with 500 and 220 kV overhead
transmission lines and a throughput capacity of more than 10 billion
kWh per year.8 Thus, a very good material base is in place for subsequent
cooperation with neighboring states as well as Kazakhstan’s participation
in the Central Asian energy market.
At present, the largest electrical plant in the southern part of the
country, the Jambyl District Electrical Plant, which has a design capacity
of 230 megawatts using fuel, gas and fuel oil, is practically idle. The under-
utilization of this station is the result of the non-competitiveness of the
electricity it produces on Kazakhstan’s wholesale electrical energy market,
which, in turn, is affected by increases in the price of gas and fuel oil on
the international market. The stoppage of the Jambyl Plant has led to the
creation of a palpable deficit in electricity, especially in the fall and winter
seasons. At present, the shortfall is being covered by transferring electrical
power from the Northern region of Kazakhstan (3.0 to 3.5 billion kWh per
year) and importing power from other Central Asian countries. It is worth
noting that in the Fall-Winter season of 2001-2002, the Government of the
Republic of Kazakhstan appropriated a subsidy grant from the Republic
308 SULEIMENOV
budget to acquire fuel for the Jambyl District Electrical Plant, in an effort
to make its electrical production competitive.
Domestic sufficiency and even, in the long run, export potential in
this region of traditional shortfalls could be achieved, both through the
reconstruction and reequipping of existing thermal power facilities, as
well as through new construction. As the Southern region experiences
sharp shortfalls in peak load regulating capacity, priority must be given to
new construction. According to official government sources, this can be
achieved through:9
■ Installing
a second 500 kilovolt (kV) North to South Kazakhstan
transmission line, for a total throughput capacity (two 500 kV and
one 220 kV) of 6 to 7 billion kWh of electrical energy per year;10
■ Constructing the planned Mainak Hydroelectric Station on the
Charyn river with a capacity of 300 megawatts (0.7 billion kWh);11
■ Buildingthe Kerbulak Hydroelectric Station on the Ili River with a
capacity of 50 megawatts (0.3 billion kWh);
■ Buildinga co-generation plant of 100 to 200 megawatts capacity,
using secondary gas recovered from petroleum processing at the
Kumkol fields (0.6 to 1.3 billion kWh);12
■ Thecreation of mini hydroelectric stations along mountain rivers,
with an overall output of 500 to 600 megawatts (2.0 to 2.5 billion
kWh);
■ Completion of wind energy projects, with a capacity of 500 to 600
megawatts (1.2 to 1.5 billion kWh).13
The Southern Kazakhstan zone shares borders with several other
Central Asian countries. Preliminary analysis suggests significant short-
falls in electrical power will occur in this area in the future. The risk of
energy surplus is less than the risk of shortfalls, as any overproduction of
electricity in Southern and Northern Kazakhstan could be offered to the
Central Asian energy market. Supply can be provided through the existing
network of electrical 220 and 500 kV transmission lines between Kazakh-
stan and Uzbekistan and between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which have
an overall transmission capacity of no less than 10 billion kWh per year.
The Northern Region

The Northern Region consists of East-Kazakhstan, Pavlodar, Kara-
ganda, Akmola, North-Kazakhstan, and the Kostanai oblasts. This region
possesses ample cheap and accessible fuel resources, and has a well devel-
oped energy production sector. The country’s primary coal regions are
located in this area: Ekibastuz, Karaganda, Maikuben, Turgai, and others.
Coal mined from these deposits is used at all the thermal power plants
of the southern and northern regions of Kazakhstan, and is exported to
Russia as well. Electrical power generation in the Northern Region of Ka-
zakhstan also includes very powerful hydroelectric stations located in the
East-Kazakhstan Oblast, which has very high hydro electrical potential.
In the Northern Region of Kazakhstan, it would be possible to in-
crease the output of electrical power to meet not only local demand and
transmission to the south of Kazakhstan at the necessary levels, but also
for export to the Central Asian countries and Russia. Currently, the electri-
cal power produced in the Northern Region is transmitted to the south of
Kazakhstan along a 500 and a 220 kV North-South Kazakhstan overhead
line. A small portion (300 to 400 megawatts) is exported to the Siberian
regions of Russia.14
In all potential scenarios, demand in the Northern Region, including
transmission to the south of Kazakhstan, as well as export to Russia and
Central Asia, can be met through reconstruction as well as by re-equipping
and increasing capacity at existing electrical generation facilities. With
minimal investment, this would transform the zone into a net supplier of
energy with a significant (10 to 15 billion kWh) surplus production.15
The Western Region

The Western Region of Kazakhstan, in energy terms, is comprised
of three regions and energy systems: the Atyrau-Mangistau (Atyrau and
Mangistau Oblasts), Aktyube Oblast, and the West-Kazakhstan Oblast.
The Atyrau-Mangistau system is self-sufficient and has surplus produc-
tion of more than 800 megawatts. Aktyube and West-Kazakhstan Oblasts
are net consumers of energy. Demand for electricity, 1.2 and 0.5 billion
kWh, respectively, is covered through import from the border regions of
Russia.
Since the Caspian coastal zone is rapidly developing its oil and gas
sector, including the exploitation of the Caspian Shelf, the creation of
elaborate oil pipelines will increase significantly the demand for electrical
power. According to growth estimates and the pace of implementation
of the oil and gas production program to 2015, it will be necessary to in-
crease energy production capacity by 2,000 to 3,000 megawatts. The fuel
resources in the region make it possible to meet this demand and even
create an export capacity in electric power.
310 SULEIMENOV
Current production capacity in Atyrau-Mangistau can fully satisfy

demand in Mangistau Oblast in the short to medium term, since the ca-
pacity of the electrical plants of Aktau is 1350 megawatts, while current
demand does not exceed 500 megawatts. Although there is a surplus at the
present time, the Mangistau utility cannot be transferred completely to
the Atyrau oblast because of the limited electrical capacity of the intercon-
necting lines.16
The intense growth of the oil and gas sector in Atyrau Oblast de-
mands the construction of new electrical power generation capacity, using
steam and pipeline cogeneration technologies. By 2015 new capacity likely
will be needed. It is anticipated that no less than 14 billion kilowatts per
hour of electrical energy will be needed for production on the offshore oil
platforms of the Caspian Sea.17 Since the increased demand for electric-
ity in Atyrau Oblast is tied to the growth in oil production, the growth
of energy capacity can be realized by the building of electrical plants and
by the oil companies developing the oil and gas deposits of the region.
For example, the TengizChevroil Company, which already has a pipeline
cogeneration plant with a 144- megawatt capacity, has built new gas-fired
turbines for a 120-megawatt electrical station. A portion of this facility is
currently operational, and full production capacity should be reached by
2005.
The energy resources of Atyrau Oblast, in the form of secondary gas
from the oil industry, will not only cover local demand but will also make
it possible to create a large electricity export capacity. In the medium to
long term, there is a proposal to create a high voltage, high capacity elec-
trical network to transmit Atyrau electricity to Aktyube and the West-Ka-
zakhstan Oblasts, and on to the northern regions of Kazakhstan, as well as
to Russia and other countries.
In order to make Aktyube Oblast self-sufficient, new generating
capacity is needed. The planned doubling of oil production in the Oblast
could increase secondary gas production by some 600 to 700 million cubic
meters, which is sufficient for the construction of a cogeneration plant
with a 250 to 300 megawatt capacity and production of more than 2 bil-
lion kWh per year.18
In the West-Kazakhstan Oblast, it would be possible to construct
natural gas pipeline cogeneration plants, especially at the Kapchagai
condensed gas deposits, where a cogeneration plant with a 240-megawatt
capacity is already under construction.19 In light of the planned exploita-
tion of a group of oil and gas deposits in the immediate vicinity of Uralsk,
and the corresponding release of large volumes of secondary gas, electrical
power generation will increase sharply. These gas resources translate into
potential electricity production of more than 80 billion kWh. This gas
would suffice to cover the demand for electrical power in the region for
some 30 to 40 years at current levels of demand.20
In addition to creating electrical connections between Atyrau, Ak-
tyube, and Uralsk, plans are under review to construct a 500 kV overland
transmission line between Aktyube (Ul’ke) and Zhitigora across the
breadth of Kazakhstan. The realization of this 500 kV line project across
Western Kazakhstan would make it possible to unite the energy network of
this region with the Unified Energy System (UES) of Kazakhstan.
Patterns of Demand: Past and Future

Kazakhstan’s primary electrical energy production relies on cheap
Ekibastuz coal. It should be noted that the highest production levels of
electricity in Kazakhstan were reached in 1989, when it produced 88.9
billion kWh.21 In spite of the aging of large portions of the existing plants,
Kazakhstan’s electrical power plants at present have a known capacity po-
tential which can fully cover domestic demands as well as create an export
potential. Nonetheless, due to peculiarities within the network, southern
and western Kazakhstan, as noted above, import electrical power.
The period between 1990 and 1999 in Kazakhstan was character-
ized by a drop in both demand and supply of electricity. In 1990, demand
for electricity was 104.72 billion kWh and production was 87.38 billion
kWh. In 1999, the numbers were 50.74 billion kWh and 47.47 billion
kWh respectively, while in 2000, these numbers reached 54.38 billion kWh
and 51.42 billion kWh.22 The installed capacity of Kazakhstan’s electricity
plants on January 1, 2001 was 18,100 megawatts with a usable capacity of
13,416 megawatts. Table 14–1 summarizes the basic data of energy pro-
duction for the decade. Tables 14–2 and 14–3 show installed capacity and
electricity production.
Table 14–1. General Characteristics, 1990-2000

Item Units 1990 1995 2000
Demand Billion kWh 104.7 74.38 54.38
Per Capita Demand kWh 6,236 4,480 3,664
Installed Capacity Megawatts 17,570 18,420 18,100
Supply Billion kWh 87.4 66.98 51.42
Balance (Imports) Billion kWh 17.34 7.4 2.96
312 SULEIMENOV
Table 14–2. The Structure of Installed Capacity (Jan 1, 2001)

Type Megawatts Percent
Thermal, Steam Pipeline,
15,541 85.9
and Organic Fuel
Gas Pipeline 332 1.8
Hydraulic 2,228 12.3
Total 18,101 100
Table 14–3. The Structure of Electricity Production (Jan 1, 2001)

2000 2001
Type
Billion kWh Percent Billion kWh Percent
Coal-Burning Thermal 37.3 72.5 40.52 73
Fuel-Oil and Gas-Burning 6.61 13 6.66 12
Hydro 7.51 14.5 8.06 15
Total 51.42 100 55.24 100
Table 14–4 provides the electricity balances (demand and produc-

tion) by region and for the Republic for the past decade, and estimates
to 2005 and 2010.23 As is clear from Table 14-4, the economic crisis of
the transition period in Kazakhstan led to a significant drop in electricity
demand. It is assumed that the country’s economic reform policies will
lead to a gradual recovery from this crisis, a subsequent resurgence of
demand for electricity, and eventual growth past old levels. According to
the Kazakhstan 2030 Program,24 the 1990 level of electricity demand (104.7
billion kWh) will be reached even in the worst-case scenario by 2030, and
in the best-case scenario, by 2020.25 The pace of electricity production will
depend on the development of the overall economy of Kazakhstan.
It is important to note that Kazakhstan is no longer a centralized
command economy and is moving in the direction of a free market. Since
1995, significant market reforms and transformations have been carried
out. During this period, privatization of the most important enterprises
in different branches of the economy was begun, including in such stra-
tegic sectors as electrical power and ferrous and precious metallurgy. This
transformation will have a significant effect on the energy sector’s ability
to meet the country’s future needs.
Table 14–4. Regional and Republican Electricity Balances to 2010

(Billions kWh)
1990 1992 1994 1998 2000 2001 2005 2010
Electricity Demand
Total 104.72 96.87 79.43 53.40 54.38 56.66 59.00 72.00
North 66.42 64.01 53.73 37.04 37.92 39.11 40.00 48.00
South 26.43 21.63 16.45 9.70 9.49 10.13 11.00 14.00
West 11.87 11.23 9.25 6.66 6.97 7.42 8.00 10.00
Electricity Supply
Total 87.38 82.86 66.40 49.59 51.42 55.24 59.00 72.00
North 63.89 61.27 52.04 37.42 40.43 44.02 41.90 49.80
South 16.27 14.77 9.20 7.40 5.82 5.60 9.10 12.20
West 7.22 6.82 5.16 4.77 5.17 5.62 8.00 10.00
Balance
Total (17.34) (14.01) (13.03) (3.81) (2.96) (1.42) 0.00 0.00
North (2.53) (2.74) (1.69) 0.38 2.51 4.91 1.90 1.80
South (10.16) (6.86) (7.25) (2.30) (3.67) (4.53) (1.90) (1.80)
West (4.65) (4.41) (4.09) (1.89) (1.80) (1.80) 0.00 0.00
Transformation of the Electricity Sector

Substantial transformation already has taken place in the electrical
power sector of the country. It is important to note that the reconstruction
and reorganization of the electricity sector started much later than did
other sectors of the economy of Kazakhstan.26 Yet, at this point, the level
of implemented market reforms in the electricity sector of Kazakhstan is
far ahead of other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries.
The organizational structure of Kazakhstan’s energy sector has undergone
significant change since the country became independent, and this reor-
ganization itself has gone through several stages.27
Stage One
Stage One was the separation of the state regulatory systems from
the economic functions of the industry. In February 1992, the Ministry of
Energy was reorganized into the Ministry of Energy and Fuel Resources,
with responsibility for regulating these branches of the energy sector.
314 SULEIMENOV
Operations were transferred to the newly created vertically integrated

State Electrical Energy Company KazakhstanEnergo, which was charged
with the production, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity and
heat, as well as the centralized financial management of its constituent
Territorial Energy and Electrification Utilities. The company also took
control of the departments of planning, construction, installation, main-
tenance, and repair of electrical plants, and the heating and electrical
networks. The creation of this company coincided with the liberalization
of prices on goods and services in the larger economy, but excluded sub-
sidized prices on energy.
Stage Two
Stage Two started in 1995, when the sector was broken up through a
decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan that created a Re-
publican-level State-owned Enterprise called “KazakhstanEnergo National
Energy System.” This enterprise was based on existing intersystem electri-
cal transmission lines, the Republic’s largest electrical power plants (as
subsidiaries), and nine “Territorial Energy Systems,” which also were to be
State-owned. The design, research and development (R&D), construction,
installation, and repair organizations were reorganized as independent
contractors.
Stage Three
Stage Three of the reorganization of the electricity sector began in
1996. The Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan issued a decree on
the need to reform the state monopoly of generation and distribution of
electric power, which created the prerequisites for the development of a
competitive electricity market. To this end, a privatization and restructur-
ing program was developed for the electricity sector, adopted by Govern-
ment Decree Number 663 in May 1996.28 The basic idea of this program
was a fundamental change in the form of ownership of generation plants
in the electricity sector.
Stage Four
Stage Four was set into motion when Decree Number 1188, adopted
in September 1996, created the Kazakhstani Electricity Management
Company KEGOC, from the transmission and distribution assets of Ka-
zakhstanEnergo along with the transmission lines previously belonging to
the territorial energy utilities and eighteen joint-stock electrical distribu-
tion companies. As a result of this stage, the basics of a market in electri-
cal energy and capacity emerged, based on mutual agreements between

sellers and consumers of electrical energy, as well as between consumers
and electricity distributors.29 Most important, the price of electricity was
determined by the market and set by the producers themselves.
Stage Five
Stage Five occurred when the Government adopted a program for
the further development of the electricity market during the 1997 to 2000
period, which improved the initial model of a competitive electricity mar-
ket that had been operating up to that time.30
In this way, the reorganization of the electrical power sector of Ka-
zakhstan, and particularly the privatization program and sector reorgani-
zation, has:
■ Separated the competitive sector of the electricity industry (pro-
duction and consumption) from the naturally monopolistic sectors
(transmission and distribution);
■ Realized the large-scale privatization of generating capacity:
◆ The powerful electrical plants of “national importance” (national
importance means electrical plants that are essential for the
economy of the country), which are located in the immediate
proximity of the main deposits of cheap coal (Ekibastuz) have
been privatized;
◆ High-capacityhydroelectric stations, used for regulating the grid
load of the Unified Energy System (UES) of Kazakhstan, have
remained the property of the State, and are managed as conces-
sions;
◆ Industrial electrical plants, which supply electrical energy to
major industrial enterprises, have been transferred to these in-
dustrial enterprises;
◆ Regional-level district thermal-electric systems—a source of both
heat and electrical energy—have, for the most part, been priva-
tized along with the regional electric distribution companies. The
remaining systems have been transferred to municipal owner-
ship.
■ Accomplished de-statization of the electrical network through the
creation of:
316 SULEIMENOV
◆A joint-stock company “Kazakhstan Electricity Network Com-

pany” (KEGOC) on the basis of the main high-tension networks
of 1150, 500, and 220 kV;
◆ Joint-stockdistribution companies, on the basis of regional elec-
trical networks of 110-135 kV and local networks of 6-10 and
0.4 kV.
Structures that are defined as “natural monopolies of the electrical
sector” come under the control of the State (within the Ministry of Energy
and Mineral Resources). Tariffs for electrical transmission and distribu-
tion services are regulated by the Republic of Kazakhstan Agency for Regu-
lation of Natural Monopolies, Fair Competition, and Small Business.
Conclusion
The wholesale electricity market in Kazakhstan accounts for about
60 percent of consumption, which has allowed the decrease of tariffs on
electrical power within the country.31 At present, the Government of Ka-
zakhstan is discussing the concept of organization of the electrical power
and services retail market. The development of a retail market for elec-
trical power is a serious step in preparation for joining the World Trade
Organization. Another problem under consideration is related to the price
parity between the regions and inside of each network company. Also,
there are questions related to the effective organization of electrical power
retail trading.
In the Government’s view, it is necessary to separate the selling of
goods (electricity) from services (provision of electricity) in retail trad-
ing. Thus, regional electricity companies (RECs) will purchase electricity
from traders on the wholesale market, and then sell it to final consumers.
The Government Anti-Monopoly Committee will regulate REC services,
and the trading will be competitive. It also is suggested that selling electri-
cal power be accomplished using electronic-commerce methods, which
would offer consumers the opportunity to choose their source of power.
The sale of electrical power to large-scale customers also has been
suggested. In this case, factories and plants able to purchase 500 and more
kWh in one transaction time may buy directly from a producing electric
company. Minor consumers can form groups and jointly participate in
such trading as well. Energy experts in the country support the concept of
retail market formation; however, a pilot project will be required before it
is introduced to the whole economy. The retail market is scheduled to start
at the end of 2004.
The successful realization of the government’s program for reor-

ganization of the electrical power sector of the economy, including State
monitoring of the development of the sector and the relationship between
market actors, will make it possible to ensure the energy security of Ka-
zakhstan, the reliability of the electrical supply, the reconstruction and
restarting of existing electrical plants and the construction of new sources
of energy.
Editor’s Note
The electricity sector in Kazakhstan is deeply intertwined with regional water issues.
See Daene McKinney’s chapter in this volume for a discussion of the importance of the re-
gional electricity grid in resolving transboundary water disputes. The tendency to focus on
supply-side issues in energy is quite common among energy scholars in the region. Interna-
tional Financial Institutions, however, have tended to focus on improving transmission and
management. Future demand remains difficult to predict, since it depends on the evolution
of the economy: The structure of industrial development in Kazakhstan will determine
its energy needs. Predicting demand is further complicated by the fact that Kazakhstan,
although it has improved collections rates dramatically, still does not recover the full price
of electricity. Economists focus on “effective demand,” that is, demand among those who
can pay full price. In Kazakhstan, the levels of “effective demand” remain unclear.
Notes
1 Kazakhstan’s Energy: Movement to the Market, (Russian language) (Almaty: Galim Publishing
House, 1998), 582.
2 GoK, Program of Development of Electric Energy to the Year 2030 confirmed by resolution of
the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on April 9, 1999, no. 384, 2.

3 Ibid., 3.
4 Ibid.
5 Kazakhstan’s Energy, 582, table 2.6.1.
6 The Unified Energy System was the all-Soviet system, which integrated Central Asia into a
single electricity grid.

7 K.D. Dukenbayev, E.G. Ulriks, and G.A. Papafansopulo, “Volume of the Market for Electric
Energy and Demand for Investment in Energy,” Energy and Heat Resources of Kazakhstan, 2002, no.
8, 4-12.
8 Ibid., 5.
9GoK, Program of Development of Electric Energy to the Year 2030,
10 K.A. Bozumbaev, “Five Years of Work of the National Company OAO ‘KEGOC,’” in Energy
and Heat Resources of Kazakhstan, 2002, no. 9, 5, 11, and 25-26.

11 GoK, Program of Development of Electric Energy to the Year 2030, 5, 11, and 14.
12 Ibid., 5, 11, and 14.
13 Ibid., 14.
14 V.M. Barsukov and A.A. Zeibel, “Account of Electricity Output of Kazakhstan in 2002,” En-
ergy and Heat Resources of Kazakhstan, 2003, no. 10, 5-19.

15GoK, Program of Development of Electric Energy to the Year 2030
318 SULEIMENOV
16 K.D. Dukenbayev, E.G. Ulriks, and G.A. Papafansopulo, “Volume of the Market for Electric
Energy and Demand for Investment in Energy,” Energy and Heat Resources of Kazakhstan, 2002, no.
8, 64.
17 Ibid., 6.
18 Ibid, 4-12.
19 Ibid., 12.
20 Ibid., 7.
21 Kazakhstan’s Energy, 99.
22 V.M. Barsukov and A.A. Zeibel, no. 6, 10-25.
23 Maximal scenarios in 2005 and 2010 are taken from the Ministry of Energy’s Kazakhstan
2030 Electricity Development Program.

24 Plan 2030 for Kazakhstan, adopted as Government policy in 1998, set out the long-term goals
of development for Kazakhstan.

25 GoK, Program of Development of Electric Energy to the Year 2030, 12.
26 Depending on the process of privatization in the energy sector.
27 Kazakhstan’s Energy, 4.
28 GoK, Program of Privatization and Restructuring in Electrical Energy, Decree of the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Kazakhstan, no. 663, May 30, 1996.

29 GoK, Concerning Several Measures for Restructuring of the Regulatory System for Electrical
Energy in Kazakhstan, Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, no. 1188, September
28, 1996.
30 GoK, Concerning Additional Measures for Fulfillment of the Program of Privatization and
Restructuring of the Electrical Energy and Long-Term Reform of the Electricity Market, Order of the
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, no. 1193, July 31, 1997.
31Tulegen Izdibaev, “Government Develops Concept for Organization of Differentiated Mar-
kets for Electrical Energy and Services,” Panorama, October 2003, no. 39.
Part III
Security Issues
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION 321
Chapter 15
Forging Relationships,
Preventing Proliferation:
A Decade of Cooperative
Threat Reduction in Central
Asia
Emily E. Daughtry
O
n December 21, 1991, as leaders of eleven Soviet republics gath-
ered in the Central Asian city of Almaty, Kazakhstan, to formally
dissolve the Soviet Union,1 the newly independent Central Asian
states found themselves the unwilling hosts to some of the world’s most
dangerous weapons. More than 1000 nuclear warheads were in place on
over 100 intercontinental ballistic missiles stored at two remote locations
on the Kazakhstani steppes.2 Covering a significant corner of northeast-
ern Kazakhstan was the primary nuclear test site for the Soviet Union,
where 456 nuclear tests were conducted.3 Several hundred miles to the
west, Soviet specialists were working at one of the largest factories ever
created for the manufacture and production of anthrax. To the south, the
world’s only known open-air test site for biological weapons lay under a
blanket of snow on an island shared by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the
Aral Sea.4 West of the sea, a Soviet chemical weapons test site stretched
over the Ustyurt plateau in Uzbekistan. A partially constructed chemical
weapons production plant lay dormant in Northern Kazakhstan.5 Nearly
600 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium fuel from an abandoned Soviet
submarine program lay stored, forgotten, in a Kazakh metallurgy plant.6
A fast-breeder nuclear reactor, used for desalination, was operating on the
shores of the Caspian Sea, capable of producing over 100 kilograms of
plutonium annually.7 Yet these particular sites and weapons comprise only
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a portion of the legacy of Soviet weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

bequeathed to the Central Asian states upon independence.
As of spring 2003, almost all of these threats have been, or are being,
eliminated by a relatively small U.S. Government initiative known as the
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. The achievements of this
program have been, in short, phenomenal, and few could have predicted
such success back in 1991. For the past decade, the United States has used
the CTR program to help the states of the former Soviet Union dismantle
and destroy infrastructure related to WMD and put in place safeguards
to prevent their proliferation. While Central Asia has not been the focus
of the CTR program, developments in that region have had interesting
and significant effects on the program’s evolution. CTR has been critically
important to Central Asia and has played a key role in the development of
U.S. relationships with individual countries in this strategically vital part
of the world.
History
The CTR program grew out of legislation sponsored in 1991 by
Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA, now retired) and Richard Lugar (R-IN), in
response to their concerns about control over the nuclear arsenal in a
rapidly disintegrating Soviet Union.8 The goal of the initial legislation
was to make available a relatively modest sum of Department of Defense
(DOD) money each year to work cooperatively with Russia to safeguard
and dismantle the Soviet nuclear arsenal.9 For the first two years, the legis-
lation provided $400 million per year in transfer authority to DOD, which
meant that the Department had to take $400 million from already existing
projects and use it instead on cooperative dismantlement projects with the
former Soviet Union.10 Senators Nunn and Lugar did not envision CTR as
a foreign aid program and made efforts to restrict the money to tangible
projects.11 Their intent was that CTR would contribute directly to U.S.
national security by helping to eliminate nuclear weapons aimed at the
United States, while simultaneously helping to prevent those weapons and
their components from falling into the hands of rogue states and terrorist
organizations.12
After some initial reservations, the first Bush administration sup-
ported the CTR program. However, the program did not come into its
own until the change of administrations in 1993.13 Part of the initial
inspiration behind Senators Nunn and Lugar’s introduction of the CTR
legislation had been their exposure to work on the state of Soviet nuclear
weapons done by Dr. Ashton Carter and his colleagues at the Harvard
Center for Science and International Affairs.14 In 1993, Carter joined the
Clinton administration as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy, which gave him direct responsibility for the CTR program
and propelled the program forward.15 CTR also embodied the ideas of
cooperative engagement and preventive defense, philosophies espoused by
Carter and Dr. William Perry, who became Clinton’s Secretary of Defense
in early 1994.16 With dual CTR supporters at the helm of DOD, the Clin-
ton administration embraced CTR and made it a key foreign policy initia-
tive.17 The new team included a request for an additional $400 million for
CTR in its proposed budget to Congress for fiscal year 1994, and Congress
promptly approved it.18 From that year on, CTR became a regular part of
the DOD budget, and it was no longer necessary to reprogram funds from
other DOD projects.
Initially, and to this day, the CTR program has been directed pri-
marily at Russia rather than Central Asia. The vast bulk of the literature
analyzing and evaluating the CTR program reflects this fact by concen-
trating on the program’s implementation in Russia alone. Such a state of
affairs is hardly surprising, as Russia is the sole legal successor to the Soviet
Union’s nuclear weapons arsenal and host to the overwhelming majority
of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons infrastructure, materials and
technologies. In addition, the program initially focused on reducing the
nuclear threat, which also was understandable given that nuclear warheads
were the defining weapons of the Cold War. As a result, literature on CTR’s
presence in Central Asia is scarce. Nonetheless, several success stories have
materialized over the past decade, and these stories are worthy of our at-
tention. This chapter will document some of the ways in which the CTR
program has contributed to the security of Central Asia while deepening
U.S. diplomatic relations with the region and encouraging the develop-
ment of strong, independent Central Asian states.
Early expansion of CTR beyond Russia was limited to Belarus,
Ukraine and Kazakhstan—the only three non-Russian Soviet successor
states with nuclear weapons on their territories. The primary reason these
three additional states were included in the CTR program was to provide
incentives for them to voluntarily give up their inherited nuclear weap-
ons,19 a decision that has been widely touted as one of the most significant
and concrete accomplishments of the CTR program.20 As the program
developed, however, it began to be seen as more than a narrow technical
initiative designed to accomplish specific goals related to weapons dis-
mantlement. In fact, CTR evolved into a means to engage these new states,
develop relationships with their leaders, and emphasize U.S. concerns
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about the importance of nonproliferation policies in the region.21 In Ka-

zakhstan, for example, implementation of the CTR program became one
of the most important aspects of the U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship, and
gave the United States key insights into the largely unknown and unfamil-
iar Central Asian region.
In the first part of the 1990s, U.S. policy makers treated Kazakhstan
as a smaller, less complicated Russia, with many of the same proliferation
threats and nonproliferation opportunities. As in Russia, CTR projects
focused on reducing the nuclear threat. However, in succeeding years,
CTR was recognized as an important tool that could be used not only to
deal with threats, but also to take advantage of opportunities unique to
Central Asia. For example, U.S. and Kazakhstani officials were able to build
upon their existing CTR relationships and the trust they had established
to expand the program into an area where it had been almost impossible
to work in Russia: biological weapons nonproliferation.22 Once that door
had been opened, it become logical to draw Uzbekistan into the program
as well, and as in Kazakhstan, CTR cooperation became an important
means of strengthening and deepening the U.S.-Uzbekistan relationship.
DOD now plans to expand the program to include border security, an
area all the more critical in the post-September 11 world.23 Thus, the CTR
program is likely to have lasting benefits for U.S. security, and indeed for
the security of the world.
CTR in Kazakhstan: The Early Years

After the Soviet Union fell apart, a key U.S. foreign policy goal was to
prevent the emergence of three new nuclear-armed nations, by convincing
Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine to relinquish their nuclear weapons.24
On May 23, 1992, these three countries signed the Lisbon Protocol, be-
coming parties to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) between
the United States and Russia, which had become the legal successor to the
Soviet Union for all international treaties.25 Under the Lisbon Protocol,
all three countries pledged to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) as non-nuclear-weapons states, which meant relinquishing legal
ownership of all nuclear weapons on their territories.26
It fell to the Clinton administration to ensure that these countries
followed through on their pledge, and that they did so as quickly as pos-
sible. To achieve this goal, administration officials turned to the CTR
program.27 According to one insider, the promise of CTR assistance “was
the most consistent and productive tool available to U.S. diplomats” in
negotiations on denuclearization.28 Senator Lugar stated this fact even
more forcefully when he noted, “Without [the] Nunn-Lugar [program],

Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus would still have thousands of nuclear
weapons.”29
Once the Kazakh Parliament ratified the NPT in December 1993,
effectively ensuring a nuclear-weapons-free Kazakhstan, the United States
was obligated to fulfill its end of the bargain by providing assistance under
the CTR program. Together, the two countries had to figure out what
types of projects to develop using this assistance. Because Kazakhstan was
inclined to see CTR assistance as a blanket reward for denuclearization,
it was often difficult to reconcile what the Kazakhs wanted and felt they
needed, with the restraints on the program in the CTR legislation.30 The
initial legislation was quite specific, restricting the use of CTR funds to
activities that were clearly related to the nonproliferation, safeguarding,
destruction or dismantlement of WMD.31 In the face of these restrictions,
the United States took the path of least resistance, simply modeling the
CTR projects in Kazakhstan on existing CTR projects in Russia, which
clearly fit within the scope of the legislation.
The process of providing CTR assistance involved two important
legal steps: first, an umbrella agreement was negotiated between the U.S.
government and the recipient country governments, providing the basic
legal framework for assistance.32 Then, for each specific CTR project area,
a separate implementing agreement was negotiated and signed on the
agency-to-agency level. In Kazakhstan, the umbrella agreement and the
first set of implementing agreements were signed December 13, 1993,
the same day that the Kazakh Parliament ratified the NPT. The imple-
menting agreements enabled projects in the following areas: provision of
emergency response equipment for use during the transport of nuclear
weapons to Russia; establishment of a government-to-government com-
munications link to facilitate data reporting for the START and INF arms
control agreements; strategic offensive arms elimination for the disman-
tlement of SS-18 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos; nuclear
warhead storage elimination; strategic bomber elimination; improvement
of material control and accounting and physical protection (MPC&A) of
nuclear materials; improvement of export controls; and establishment of
defense and military contacts.33
All of these program areas paralleled CTR projects in Russia. Over
the course of the previous year-and-a-half, implementing agreements also
had been signed in Russia for provision of emergency response equip-
ment, strategic offensive arms elimination, improvement of MPC&A, and
establishment of defense and military contacts.34 A defense conversion
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implementing agreement was signed with Russia in December 1993, and a

Kazakhstani agreement on defense conversion followed just a few months
later in March 1994. Additional agreements were signed with Russia for
other CTR program areas, such as chemical weapons destruction and the
conversion of plutonium-production reactor cores, but these were not
relevant to Kazakhstan. In other words, every project area in Russia that
could be copied in Kazakhstan was copied.
The projects providing emergency response equipment and a con-
tinuous government-to-government satellite communications link were
quickly and easily implemented. Projects to withdraw strategic nuclear
weapons from Kazakhstan and eliminate ICBM missile silos, strategic
bombers, and nuclear weapons storage facilities also were straightforward
and considered highly successful. U.S. and Kazakhstani specialists worked
together to implement these projects on the ground. One article from
early 2000 found the projects for elimination of strategic offensive arms in
Kazakhstan the “most successful” of all such projects in the former Soviet
Union, as they were the first to achieve the complete elimination of all
strategic weapons from a country.35 Withdrawal of all nuclear weapons
and strategic bombers was completed by April 1995;36 the few remain-
ing strategic bombers were eliminated in 1998, and all 147 missile silos
were dismantled and destroyed by 1999.37 As a result, there are no further
projects to be completed under the strategic offensive arms elimination
implementing agreement in Kazakhstan.
The next two project areas—of nuclear materials MPC&A and ex-
port controls—were inherently more complicated because they are pre-
mised not on the simple destruction of hardware, but on the creation of
lasting systems and institutions. MPC&A projects involved the provision
of equipment and training, and were established at the four primary loca-
tions in Kazakhstan where nuclear materials were located.38 For the most
part, these projects ran more smoothly than analogous projects in Russia,
due to, in the words of one analyst, “fewer nuclear facilities . . . , housing
less nuclear material, with fewer bureaucratic obstacles.”39 In addition,
because Kazakhstan is a non-nuclear-weapons state and its facilities are
subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, it had
fewer concerns about the protection of classified information.40 However,
these projects were not without their problems. For example, concerns
have been raised regarding the long-term sustainability of the MPC&A
improvements and the development of a “safeguards culture” at the vari-
ous nuclear installations.41 While it is difficult to quantify success in the
development of such a “safeguards culture,” there is no question that nu-
clear materials in Kazakhstan are more secure today than they were prior
to the completion of U.S.-funded MPC&A projects there.
These projects began life as CTR projects run by DOD, but in fiscal
year 1996 responsibility for them was transferred to the Department of
Energy (DOE) where they took on a life of their own and became part of
a larger program for the safeguarding of nuclear materials.42 In the same
year, responsibility for export control assistance programs was transferred
out of the CTR program at DOD and over to the State Department.43 The
Department of Commerce and the DOE also developed export control
assistance programs in Kazakhstan and some of the other Central Asian
states, funded primarily through the State Department.44 Although export
control projects involved the provision of some equipment (for example,
it provided Kazakhstan with patrol boats for the Kazakhstani Coast Guard
on the Caspian Sea), for the most part they focused on education and
training. U.S. experts assisted Kazakh officials with the drafting of a com-
prehensive export control law.45 In addition, the program provided the
United States with the opportunity to familiarize Kazakh officials with
international export control regimes, which have been described as “a fun-
damental but largely unappreciated part of early Nunn-Lugar contacts.”46
Defense conversion stands out as the major exception to the suc-
cess of the initial set of CTR projects in Kazakhstan. This was to be one
of the most important projects for Kazakhstan, as it had the potential to
contribute to the long-term development of their economy. According
to Kazakh officials, “conversion to civilian and commercial purposes of
industrial enterprises devoted to military production under the Soviet
system is of paramount importance to Almaty.”47 However, CTR defense
conversion projects were plagued by a number of problems caused by a
variety of political and economic factors, and were dealt a death blow by
the U.S. Congress in 1996, when it disallowed any new CTR funding for
defense conversion activities in the former Soviet Union.48 CTR defense
conversion programs were particularly susceptible to criticism, and Con-
gressional opponents argued that such programs essentially subsidized the
modernization of other areas of the post-Soviet defense establishments.49
Other arguments against defense conversion programs were that the
money would be better spent converting the U.S. defense industry, and
that the programs were too small to have any meaningful effect on the
conversion of the mammoth Soviet defense industry. Thus, CTR defense
conversion activities in Kazakhstan slowly dwindled. A few small-scale
projects continued to be funded with CTR monies from earlier years, but
others failed altogether.50
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In sum, the story thus far is one in which the United States aggres-
sively pursued its goal of a nuclear-weapons-free Kazakhstan by first
promising CTR assistance, and subsequently deciding the shape of that
assistance through a series of specific projects. These projects focused pri-
marily on nuclear weapons and nuclear materials, and were modeled after
those CTR projects in Russia that were relevant to Kazakhstan. By and
large these projects were successful, especially when compared with the
more complicated and extensive corresponding projects in Russia.
CTR in Kazakhstan: Thinking Outside the Russian Box

If, during its early years, the CTR program helped to ensure the
removal of nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan and provided concrete as-
sistance for the dismantlement and nonproliferation-related projects dis-
cussed above, it also served another, perhaps equally important, purpose:
providing the foundation for a strong, bilateral relationship between the
United States and Kazakhstan. As one official explained, DOD recognized
early on that a strong, strategic relationship with Central Asia was im-
portant to U.S. security and a useful counterbalance to Russia.51 The CTR
program helped establish this relationship while simultaneously commu-
nicating the importance the United States placed on the development of
nonproliferation policies in the region. Indeed, an article by former As-
sistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter and Steven Miller, his colleague
from the Harvard University Center for Science and International Affairs,
noted that the principle purpose of the Nunn-Lugar program was “less to
finance specific technical steps than to set an agenda for denuclearization
and cooperation and to command attention to this agenda.”52 Former ad-
ministration officials have pointed out that negotiations and discussions
over the CTR program were “the first in-depth direct channel of com-
munication” between Almaty and Washington,53 and that the non-Russian
CTR recipient states viewed CTR assistance as a “symbol of continuing
U.S. commitment to their independence, national well-being, security,
and a non-nuclear future.”54 An early Kazakhstani analysis of the program
substantiated this position, warning that Congressional reductions in
CTR funding “would reduce Kazakhstan’s basic trust in the policies of
the United States.”55 As it turned out, trust did develop between the two
countries as the initial CTR projects were negotiated and implemented.
This trust led to a second wave of CTR projects in Kazakhstan, projects
not modeled on CTR in Russia, but designed to address problems unique
to Kazakhstan.
The first such initiative was Project Sapphire, a secret endeavor that
involved the removal and transport of a forgotten stash of highly-enriched
uranium from the Ulba Metallurgy Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk to the Oak
Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee.56 Established in 1949, the Ulba
Metallurgy Plant is a massive industrial enterprise that currently produces
low-enriched fuel pellets for civilian nuclear power plants and processes
strategic metals such as beryllium and tantalum. However, for a number of
years during the Soviet era, the plant also produced weapons-grade, highly-
enriched uranium fuel for use in naval propulsion reactors. Although
production of such fuel apparently ended in the 1980s, when Kazakhstan
became independent in 1991, a cache of 581 kilograms of highly-enriched
uranium remained in storage at Ulba. Experts estimate this amount would
have been enough to build more than 20 nuclear weapons.
Kazakh officials first informed the United States of the existence of
this material in August 1993, and over the course of the next few months
conveyed their concerns about the safety of the material, requesting as-
sistance to secure it or remove it from the country altogether. This request
would have been practically inconceivable without the existence of the
ongoing dialogue between the United States and Kazakhstan on nonpro-
liferation issues, begun in the context of CTR negotiations. By the time the
United States confirmed the quantity and enrichment level of the material
in February 1994, the CTR umbrella agreement, as well as the initial im-
plementing agreements described above, were already in place, providing
a legal framework for cooperation at Ulba. After confirming that Russia
was not interested in taking the material itself (Russian officials claimed
initially not to have any knowledge of the existence of the material), U.S.
and Kazakh officials agreed that the safest option would be to remove the
material. Although removal of the highly-enriched uranium clearly con-
tributed to nonproliferation goals by eliminating the potential for the ma-
terial to be stolen, it was a novel use of the CTR program. It also was not
immediately clear that the compensation Kazakhstan sought for the fuel
could be provided out of CTR funds. CTR agreements restricted assistance
to in-kind support in the form of equipment, materials, technologies, and
training; cash grants were not allowed. In the end, however, due to extraor-
dinary efforts on both sides, the material was airlifted in November 1994
from Ust-Kamenogorsk. Eventually, a compensation package was agreed
upon that included the provision of computer equipment, vehicles, and
medical supplies, all paid for using CTR funds. The delivery of this com-
pensation was completed in August 1997.57 With Project Sapphire, U.S.
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and Kazakhstani officials proved that CTR could be used for more than
the regularly scheduled CTR activities.
Another example of a unique use of CTR tailored to regional con-
cerns was the project to destroy the nuclear test tunnels at the Degelen
Mountain and Balapan underground test facilities on the Semipalatinsk
nuclear test site. Between 1949 and 1989, 456 nuclear tests were con-
ducted at Semipalatinsk, the Soviet Union’s primary nuclear test site.58
The Degelen Mountain project involved using conventional explosives to
destroy the nearly 200 remaining test tunnels, rendering them useless for
future nuclear testing. Kazakhstan was eager to prove its nonproliferation
commitment to the United States, and every CTR project implemented
in country represented jobs for Kazakhstanis. Although this project was
clearly related to WMD, it, too, was not a traditional CTR project because
it did not involve dismantlement and the tunnels did not represent an im-
mediate proliferation threat. Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev
officially closed the test site in August 1991,59 and it was highly unlikely
that the test site would ever be used again as Kazakhstan had signed the
NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Nonetheless, the project came to be
seen as falling within the scope of the CTR legislation. One U.S. official
commented that the project represented America’s recognition of the
importance of engaging Kazakhstan for strategic and political reasons
beyond proliferation threats, noting “there was a less restrictive approach
to projects [in Kazakhstan]” than in Russia.60 A CTR implementing agree-
ment for the project was negotiated between DOD and the Kazakhstani
Ministry of Science and New Technologies, and was signed October 3,
1995.61 A Defense Department press release hailed the agreement as “a
symbol of both countries’ commitment to leadership in promoting global
non-proliferation policies.”62
Probably the most significant set of second wave CTR projects in
Central Asia involved former biological weapons facilities. The Soviet
Union had a robust but illegal offensive biological weapons program, with
numerous research and production facilities throughout Russia63 as well as
a large anthrax production factory in Northern Kazakhstan, and a handful
of research institutes in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. These outlying facili-
ties conducted at least some research and development work for the Soviet
biological weapons program.64 U.S. attempts to expand the CTR program
into the biological weapons areas in Russia were met with complete stone-
walling by Russian officials. Although President Boris Yeltsin admitted in
1992 that the Soviet Union had conducted a secret offensive biological
weapons program, in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention, the
program is still shrouded in secrecy. According to one U.S. official, when

the United States would raise the possibility of providing CTR assistance
in the area of bioweapons, the Russians simply would deny the existence
of bioweapons facilities on their soil. “Where can you go from there?” this
official asked.65 In Kazakhstan, however, the situation was quite different.
There, former bioweapons facilities were cut off from their former insti-
tutional structures, and there were no institutional actors in the central
government in denial about the former Soviet program. The Kazakh lead-
ership was able to show its commitment to nonproliferation by being open
about the legacy of Soviet bioweapons in their country, and, at the same
time, lobby for assistance from the United States to deal with that legacy.
As a direct result of the personal relationships and trust that devel-
oped between U.S. and Kazakh officials during the implementation of
other CTR projects, American officials finally secured permission from the
Kazakh government to visit the anthrax production facility in Stepnogorsk
in June 1995.66 Although they had known about the existence of the plant,
U.S. officials were horrified by what they saw—the enormous scale of the
plant, the level of decay within it, and the vulnerability of bioweapons
scientists to recruitment. The plant was clearly a proliferation danger. It
needed to be dismantled; and it was determined that CTR would be an
appropriate tool for the job. In June 1996, one year after the first U.S. visit
to Stepnogorsk, an amendment was signed to the 1995 implementing
agreement governing work at Degelen Mountain.67 This new amendment
provided the legal basis for biological weapons proliferation prevention
activities in Kazakhstan under the CTR program.
As of Spring 2003, all the equipment for production of biological
weapons at Stepnogorsk has been destroyed, and the Defense Department
is in the process of destroying the buildings themselves.68 In addition, new
projects are underway to provide effective physical protection of biological
agents at two research institutes: the State Agricultural Research Institute
in Otar and the Anti-Plague Institute in Almaty.69 Finally, a new coop-
erative biodefense project seeks to develop cooperative research projects
between Kazakhstani and U.S. scientists, to “prevent proliferation of bio-
logical weapons biotechnology, increase transparency, and enhance U.S.
force protection.”70
Thus, in the second phase of CTR, assistance again has veered from
its initial path of nuclear-related, Russia-modeled projects. Building on the
relationships that CTR helped develop, DOD has used the agreement as a
tool to address specific nonproliferation opportunities unique to Central
Asia. In recent years, additional proliferation threats have been identified,
332 DAUGHTRY
such as the partially constructed chemical weapons production plant in the

city of Pavlodar in Northern Kazakhstan. The initiation of significant work
in the former biological weapons sector in Kazakhstan was a breakthrough
for CTR in this highly sensitive area, and now represents the greater part
of CTR activity in Kazakhstan. In addition to preventing the proliferation
of biological weapons-materials, these projects have the ancillary benefit
of giving the U.S. important insights into the Soviet biological weapons
program that Russia continues to obscure. Perhaps more important to the
development of the CTR program, the biological weapons-related work in
Kazakhstan has provided a road map for biological weapons-related CTR
work in other countries, such as Uzbekistan, Ukraine and Georgia.
CTR in Uzbekistan and Beyond

The Defense Department’s expansion of the CTR program into Uz-
bekistan was very different from its expansion into Kazakhstan. The Uzbek
government approached the United States for assistance with a discreet
problem: the demilitarization of a remote facility for the research, devel-
opment and testing of chemical weapons in the city of Nukus, in western
Uzbekistan.71 Following the model for the second wave of CTR projects in
Kazakhstan, the project was identified as one that fit into the CTR frame-
work, and Uzbekistan quickly joined the CTR club without fanfare. In
fact, DOD was so anxious to begin work that it started under a temporary
agreement in 1997 with the Ministry of Defense while hammering out the
CTR umbrella agreement over a period of several years.72
In addition to the Nukus project, which was completed in May
2002,73 DOD has used the CTR program to implement a number of
projects in the biological weapons-related sphere. After concluding a new
implementing agreement for such work in October 2001, DOD began
to demilitarize the former biological weapons test site on Vozrezhdeniye
Island in the Aral Sea.74 In addition, DOD is in the process of establishing
CTR projects along the lines of those in Kazakhstan for physical protec-
tion of biological agents and for collaborative bio-defense research at
three research institutes: the Institute of Veterinary Science in Samarkand,
the Institute of Virology in Tashkent and the Center for Prophylaxis and
Quarantine of Most Hazardous Infections in Tashkent.75
DOD is currently developing a new set of CTR projects that is likely
to expand CTR further within Central Asia. This major new initiative,
called Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention (WMDPP),
is designed to provide border security assistance to all eligible non-Russian
states of the former Soviet Union, and has already received $40 million
from Congress.76 Within Central Asia, initial WMDPP projects will occur
in countries where CTR has already been established, such as Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan, but it is also likely that this initiative eventually will be
expanded to Kyrgyzstan.77 The goal of WMDPP is to provide recipient
countries with “self-sustaining, multi-agency capabilities to prevent, de-
tect, and interdict WMD and related materials,”78 and the first priority will
be to address indigenous operational capabilities at key border crossings.
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in July 2002,
Lisa Bronson, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense with responsibilities for
the CTR program, noted that this initiative will further enhance U.S. secu-
rity, not only by helping to prevent the proliferation of WMD to terrorists
and “states of concern,” but also by “facilitating future U.S. activities in
the region and reinforcing relationships with FSU [former Soviet Union]
states” and “developing relationships with foreign counterpart agencies
that will be useful in times of crisis.”79 This last comment could be a subtle
acknowledgement that U.S.-Uzbekistan cooperation under the auspices of
the CTR program played an important role in Uzbekistan’s prompt agree-
ment to allow the United States to station troops in southern Uzbekistan
during combat operations in the opening phases of the Global War on
Terrorism in Afghanistan in late 2001.
Conclusion
A decade of CTR experiences in Central Asia has given the United
States significant insights into this strategically important region of the
world. While the CTR program has been and remains overwhelmingly
focused on Russia, it is useful to note the evolution of CTR in Central Asia
and the ways it has strengthened U.S. relationships there. It is clear that
when the program was first introduced in Central Asia, there was not a
systematic evaluation of the proliferation threats in the region nor a mea-
sured application of the program to counter those threats. Instead, a top-
down approach was used, in which DOD copied Russian CTR projects to
the extent that they were relevant. As the program evolved, this approach
gradually gave way to a bottom-up approach where individuals on both
sides identified specific proliferation threats and then used CTR as a tool
to deal with those threats.
During this evolution, Central Asia has come to be understood as a
region distinct from Russia, with a different set of nonproliferation prob-
lems and opportunities. Furthermore, in the context of the current war
on terrorism, the future of the entire CTR program is increasingly focused
on the threats posed by biological weapons proliferation, an aspect of the
334 DAUGHTRY
program that has been particularly strong in Central Asia, and on border
security issues addressed by the new WMDPP initiative.80 It is noteworthy
that the CTR program has evolved to a stage at which an exclusively non-
Russian initiative could be pursued.
Over the course of a decade, the CTR program has provided Kazakh-
stan and Uzbekistan with the resources to deal with specific problems that
would have been difficult to address otherwise. It also has provided Amer-
ica with a concrete means of engaging with Central Asia on serious issues
of mutual concern. This engagement deepened the relationships between
the United States and Kazakhstan, and later between the United States and
Uzbekistan. Each new project reinforces these relationships—and as new
threats emerge, the countries will be better positioned to address them. By
engaging with Central Asia to prevent the WMD proliferation, the CTR
program has advanced U.S policies and contributed to U.S. homeland,
regional and global security. CTR has proven flexible enough to address
unanticipated threats, and at the same time maintained its primary focus
on the dangers of proliferation. It has done so at minimal expense while
yielding important side benefits. In an era obsessed with the control and
elimination of WMD, CTR may prove to be an effective alternative to the
more costly, more problematic resort to U.S. military force.
Notes
1 David Remnick, “In New Commonwealth of `Equals,’ Russia Remains the Dominant Force,”
The Washington Post, December 22, 1991, A39.

2 In September 1990, there were 104 SS-18 ICBMs, each armed with 10 nuclear warheads,
located at bases in Derzhavinsk and Zhangiz-Tobe in Kazakhstan. Table 1-C, Nuclear Successor States
of the Soviet Union: Status Report on Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and Export Controls, no. 5,
Monterey Institute of International Studies and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March
1998, 10.
3 This test site, called the Semipalatinsk Test Site, is approximately 18,000 km2. See “Research
Library: Country Information, Kazakhstan,” on the website of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, material
produced by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Stud-
ies, <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/kazakst/weafacil/semipala.html>.
4 The island is known as Vozrozhdeniye Island (translated as “Renaissance” or “Rebirth” Is-
land), and the test site was officially referred to as “Aralsk-7” during the Soviet period. Gulbarshyn
Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, and Dastan Yeleukenov, “Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities
in Kazakhstan: Past, Present and Future,” Occasional Paper no. 1, Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies, June 1999.
5 This was the Pavlodar Chemical Plant in the city of Pavlodar, Kazakhstan. Gulbarshyn Bo-
zheyeva, “The Pavlodar Chemical Weapons Plant in Kazakhstan: History and Legacy,” The Nonprolif-
eration Review, Summer 2000, 136.
6 The fuel was located at the Ulba Metallurgy Plant, located approximately 20 miles outside
Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan. William C. Potter, “Project Sapphire: U.S.-Kazakhstani Cooperation

for Nonproliferation,” Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. and NIS Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar Co-
operative Threat Reduction Program, John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds. (Cambridge 1997),
345-346.
7 Jon Brook Wolfsthal, Cristina Astrid Chuen, and Emily Ewell Daughtry, eds., Table 4.6,
“Mangyshlak Atomic Energy Combine,” Nuclear Status Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material and
Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union, no. 6, Monterey Institute of International Studies and
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2001, 165.
8 See Sam Nunn, “Changing Threats in the Post-Cold War World,” Dismantling the Cold War,
xvi, supra note 6; Richard Lugar, “Forward,” Defense by Other Means: The Politics of US-NIS Threat
Reduction and Nuclear Security Cooperation, Jason D. Ellis (Westport 2001), xii.
9 Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, P.L. 102-228. The program is also popularly
referred to as the “Nunn-Lugar program.”

10 Jason D. Ellis, 80-81; Richard Combs, “U.S. Domestic Politics and the Nunn-Lugar Program,”
Dismantling the Cold War, John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds. (Cambridge, 1997), 44.
11 For example, Senator Nunn has noted with frustration, “For some reason, [CTR] has come
under attack as if it were a foreign aid program.” Sam Nunn, “Changing Threats in the Post-Cold War
World,” Dismantling the Cold War, John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds., xvii. Senator Lugar has
written, “Nunn-Lugar is not foreign aid. It is not charity.” Richard Lugar, “Forward,” Defense by Other
Means, Jason D. Ellis, xii.
12 Congressional findings included in the first Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991
stated, “It is in the national security interests of the United States (A) to facilitate on a priority basis
the transportation, storage, safeguarding, and destruction of nuclear and other weapons in the Soviet
Union, its republics and any successor entities, (B) to assist in the prevention of weapons prolifera-
tion.” Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, P.L. 102-228, available at <http://www.thomas.
loc.gov>.
13 See, for example, Ellis, supra note 10, 112; Combs, supra note 10, 47; Rose Gottemoeller,
“Presidential Priorities in Nuclear Policy,” John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds., Dismantling
the Cold War, 65.
14 See Nunn, supra note 11, xvi, referring to Kurt M. Campbell, Ashton B. Carter, Steven B.
Miller, and Charles A. Zraket, Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating
Soviet Union, CSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, MA: Center for Science and Inter-
national Affairs, Harvard University, November 1991); Gottemoeller, supra note 13, 67.
15 Ellis, supra note 10, 119.
16 See Gloria Duffy, “Cooperative Threat Reduction in Perspective,” Dismantling the Cold War,
John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds., 25. Also, see Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Pre-
ventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,
1999).
17 Duffy, supra note 16, 25; Gottemoeller, supra note 13, 65, 67.
18 Ellis, supra note 10, 82.
19 Combs, supra note 10, 47-48; Gottemoeller, supra note 13, 65.
20 See, for example, John M. Shields and William C. Potter, Dismantling the Cold War, 386; Ellis,
supra note 10, 2, (Westport 2001); John W. R. Lepingwell and Nikolai Sokov, “Strategic Offensive
Arms Elimination and Weapons Protection, Control, and Accounting,” The Nonproliferation Review,
Spring 2000, 59.
21See John M. Shields and William C Potter, Dismantling the Cold War, 13-15; Combs, supra
note 10, 48; Duffy, supra note 16, 26-27. See also, Ellis, supra note 10, 40-41. Ellis argues that there
were “two major divergent approaches” to the CTR program. The first approach was broader and open
to many ideas for reducing the nuclear threat from the NIS, including “intensive long-term attention
to sustaining democracy in Russia and integrating it into the international community.” The second
approach was more limited and short-term, focusing on specific destruction and dismantlement
activities.
22 Author’s phone conversation with U.S. DOD official, October 2002.
23 Ibid.
336 DAUGHTRY
24 Gottemoeller, supra note 13, 65; Ellis, supra note 10, 32 (“DOD officials ranked the de-
nuclearization of the Non-Russian NIS Republics as the Chief Aim and `Ultimate Yardstick’ of the
Program’s Success.”)
25 Text of Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (“Lisbon Protocol”)
signed in Lisbon, Portugal on May 23, 1992, available on the Nuclear Threat Initiative website at
<http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/fulltext/treaties/start1/s1lis.html> and on the U.S. Department of
Defense website at <http://www.defenselink.mil/acq/acic/treaties/start1/protocols/start_1p.htm#VI>.
26 Ibid., Article V.
27 Combs, supra note 10, 47-48.
28 Gottemoeller, supra note 13, 65. Another former official has noted that CTR, “played an im-
portant role in the decisions of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to forgo nuclear weapons capabili-
ties.” Duffy, supra note 16, 25. See also, Ellis, supra note 10, 31. Ellis notes that CTR funds “provided a
key incentive for Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to forgo the nuclear option . . . .None of these three
states had the financial resources or capabilities to successfully undertake strategic denuclearization.”
29 Lugar, supra note 8, xiii.
30 See Combs, supra note 10, 48; Gottemoeller, supra note 13, 66.
31 The initial legislation for the Nunn-Lugar program limited assistance to “cooperation among
the United States, the Soviet Union, its republics, and any successor entities to 1) destroy nuclear
weapons, chemical weapons, and other weapons, 2) transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons
in connection with their destruction, and 3) establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of
such weapons.” Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, P.L. 102-228, available at <http://www.
loc.gov/thomas>. Although the subsequent versions of the authorizing legislation expanded the pro-
gram to include prevention of “braindrain” of scientists with weapons expertise, defense conversion,
and military-to-military contacts (P.L. 102-484), and later even programs for environmental resto-
ration of military sites and the construction of housing for former military officers (P.L. 103-160),
these expanded programs were quickly eliminated by subsequent Congresses. See Ellis, supra note 10,
Chapter Four, 77-106.
32 CTR umbrella agreements typically include provisions that ensure that the assistance will not
be taxed, that the U.S. will have the right to audit and examine assistance provided to ensure that it is
being used for the purposes for which it was provided, that ensure that U.S. personnel have diplomatic
protections in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and others. See Jack
M. Beard, “Recent Development: A New Legal Regime for Bilateral Assistance Programs: International
Agreements Governing the `Nunn-Lugar’ Demilitarization Program in the Former Soviet Union, ”
Virginia Journal of International Law, 894 (Summer 1995), 35.
33 See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Kazakhstan
Concerning the Destruction of Silo Launchers of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Emergency Re-
sponse, and the Prevention of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed December 13, 1993 (United
States – Kazakhstan Umbrella Agreement); Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the
United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the
Provision to the Republic of Kazakhstan of Emergency Response Equipment and Related Training in
Connection with the Removal of Nuclear Weapons from the Republic of Kazakhstan for Destruction
and the Removal of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and the Destruction of their Silo Launchers,
signed December 13, 1993 (Emergency Response Implementing Agreement); Agreement Between the
Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic
of Kazakhstan Concerning the Provision to the Republic of Kazakhstan of Material and Services for
the Establishment of a Government-to-Government Communications Link, signed December 13,
1993 (Government-to-Government Communications Link Implementing Agreement); Agreement
Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of
the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the Provision of Material, Services, and Related Training to
the Republic of Kazakhstan in Connection with the Destruction of Silo Launchers of Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles and Associated Equipment and Components, signed December 13, 1993 (Strategic
Offensive Arms Elimination Implementing Agreement); Agreement Between the Department of De-
fense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan Con-
cerning Control, Accounting and Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to Promote the Prevention
of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, signed December 13, 1993 (MPC&A Implementing Agreement);
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry
of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the Provision of Assistance to the Republic of
Kazakhstan Related to the Establishment of Export Control Systems to Prevent the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, signed December 13, 1993 (Export Control Implementing Agreement);
and Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation on Defense and Military Relations Between the
Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic
of Kazakhstan, signed February 14, 1994 (Defense and Military Contacts MOU).
34 See Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the
Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation
and Storage of Nuclear Weapons Through the Provision of Emergency Response Equipment and
Related Training, signed June 17, 1992 (Emergency Response Implementing Agreement); Agreement
Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Economics
of the Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation in the Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms,
signed August 26, 1993 (Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination Implementing Agreement); Agreement
Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Atomic En-
ergy of the Russian Federation Concerning Control, Accounting and Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material, signed September 2, 1993 (MPC&A Implementing Agreement); and Memorandum of
Understanding and Cooperation on Defense and Military Relations Between the Department of De-
fense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, signed
September 8, 1993 (Defense and Military Contacts MOU). Unlike in Kazakhstan, there has never been
an export control agreement in Russia, although it was not for lack of trying. The U.S. had hoped to
provide CTR assistance for the improvement of Russian export controls, but negotiations on an agree-
ment stalled and an agreement never materialized. Additionally, there was no need for a CTR agree-
ment with the Russian Federation on a government-to-government communications link as Russia
had inherited the Soviet Union’s link.
35 Lepingwell and Sokov, supra note 20, 60.
36 Oumirserik T. Kasenov, Dastan Eleukenov, and Murat Laumulin, “Implementing the CTR
Program in Kazakstan,” in John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold War,
194.
37 “Cooperative Threat Reduction: Kazakhstan Programs,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency
website at <http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/ctr_kazakhstan.html>.
38 The four locations are: the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Alatau, a small village outside Al-
maty, and the Institute of Atomic Energy in Kurchatov City on the former nuclear test site near Semi-
palatinsk, both of which housed a few kilograms of highly-enriched uranium fuel for use in nuclear
research reactors; the Mangyshlyak Atomic Energy Combine in Aktau on the coast of the Caspian Sea,
the site of a BN-350 fast-breeder reactor and approximately 300 metric tons of spent fuel containing
plutonium; and the Ulba Metallurgy Combine in the eastern Kazakhstani city of Ust-Kamenogorsk.
The Ulba Combine manufactures low-enriched uranium fuel pellets and various other materials that
have dual uses, i.e. that can be used both in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons and
that have other non-weapons-related uses. Wolfsthal et.al., supra note 7, 160-165.
39 Jessica Eve Stern, “Cooperative Activities to Improve Fissile Material Protection, Control and
Accounting,” in John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold War, 327-328.
40 Ibid.
41 See Emily Ewell Daughtry and Fred Wehling, “Cooperative Efforts to Secure Fissile Material
in the NIS,” The Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2000, 97.

42 MPC&A programs were transferred to DOE in accordance with Presidential Decision Direc-
tive-41, “U.S. Policy on Improving Nuclear Material Security in Russia and Other Newly Independent
338 DAUGHTRY
States.” For a discussion of some of the reasons behind this move, see Ellis, supra note 10, 123 and
Gottemoeller, supra note 13, 69-71.
43 Ibid.
44 These funds, which the Department of Commerce and Energy must apply for, come out
of the State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. See Scott Parrish and Tamara
Robinson, “Efforts to Strengthen Export Controls and Combat Illicit Trafficking and Braindrain,” The
Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2000, 114-115.
45 Kasenov et al., supra note 35, 197-201.
46 Michael H. Newlin, “Export Controls and the CTR Program,” in John M. Shields and William
C. Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold War, 305.

47 Kasenov et al. supra note 35, 203.
48 National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1997, P.L. 104-201.
49 See Amy F. Woolf, “Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues for Con-
gress,” CRS Report for Congress, Order No. 97-1027-F, updated March 6, 2002, available at < http://
www.fcnl.org/pdfs/nuc_nunn_lugar.pdf>.
50 For a discussion of CTR defense conversion activities in Kazakhstan and an in-depth analysis
of the attempt to convert the former biological weapons production facility at Stepnogorsk, Kazakh-
stan, see Sonia Ben Ouagrham and Kathleen Vogel, “Conversion at Stepnogorsk: What the Future
Holds for Former Bioweapons Facilities,” Cornell University Peace Studies Program, Occasional Paper
#28, February 2003, available at <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ous01>.
52 Ashton B. Carter and Steven E. Miller, “Cooperative Security and the Former Soviet Union:
Near-Term Challenges,” Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century, Janne E.
Nolan, ed. (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), 548.
53 Duffy, supra note 16, 26.
54 Gottemoeller, supra note 13, 65.
55 Kasenov et. al., supra note 35, 194.
56 For a detailed account of this story, see William C. Potter, “Project Sapphire: U.S.-Kazakhstani
Cooperation for Nonproliferation,” John M Shields and William C. Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold
War, 345-362. Factual information in this paragraph is drawn from that article.
57 “Cooperative Threat Reduction: Project Sapphire,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency web-
site, <http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/project/projkaz/ctr_sapphire.html>.
58 See “Research Library: Country Information, Kazakhstan,” on the website of the Nuclear
Threat Initiative, material produced by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Insti-
tute of International Studies, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/kazakst/weafacil/semipala.htm.
59 Ibid.
61 See Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the
Ministry of Energy Industry and Trade of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the Elimination of
Infrastructure for Weapons of Mass Destruction, signed October 3, 1995 (Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion Implementing Agreement).
62 “U.S.-Kazakhstan Agreement to Seal Up World’s Largest Nuclear Test Tunnel Com-
plex,” DOD News Release, October 3, 1995, <available at <http://www.fas.org/news/kazakh/951004-

409811a.html>.
63 See Ken Alibek and Stephen Handelman, Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest
Cover tBiological Weapons Program In the World--Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran It (New York
:Random House, May 1999).
64 For detailed descriptions of the Kazakhstani facilities and their former activities, see Gul-
barshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, and Dastan Eleukenov, “Former Soviet Biological Weapons
Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present and Future,” Occasional Paper No. 1, Center for Nonprolifera-
tion Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, June 1999.
65 Author’s phone conversations with U.S. DOD official, October 2002. DOD is currently using
CTR funds to pursue a limited number of biological weapons-related nonproliferation activities in
Russia, but because DOD has yet to sign an implementing agreement for work in this area in Russia, it
is forced to do so through the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow. From a legal
perspective, this is less desirable than an implementing agreement as it does not provide the same level
of protections to the United States. However, the work has been deemed important enough to U.S.
policy goals that this awkward assistance mechanism continues to be used.
66 A detailed account of this first visit is provided in Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and Wil-
liam Broad, Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War (New York, 2001), 165-182.
67 Ben Ouagrham and Vogel, supra note 47, 36. The agreement is cited in supra note 59 and
was initially amended to allow for work in the biological weapons nonproliferation sphere on June
10, 1996.
68 “Cooperative Threat Reduction: BW Production Facility Dismantlement,” Defense Threat
Reduction Agency website, <http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/project/projkaz/bw_secure_trans.html>.

69 “Cooperative Threat Reduction: BW Materials Security and Transparency,” Defense Threat
Reduction Agency website, <http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/project/projkaz/bw_prod_facil_disman.html>.

70 “Cooperative Threat Reduction: BW Cooperative Bio Defense Projects,” Defense Threat Re-
duction Agency website, <http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/project/projkaz/bw_coop_bio_proj.html>.

71 Author’s phone conversation with U.S. Department of Defense official, October 2002.
72 The temporary agreement was the Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the
United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Uzbekistan Concerning Co-
operation in the Area of Dismantlement of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Prevention of Prolifera-
tion of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Promotion of Defense and Military Relations, which
was signed on June 27, 1997. The Umbrella Agreement is the Agreement Between the United States
of America and the Republic of Uzbekistan Concerning Cooperation in the Area of the Promotion
of Defense Relations and the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. It was not
signed until June 5, 2001.
73 “Cooperative Threat Reduction: Nukus Chemical Research Institute Demilitarization [Com-
plete],” Defense Threat Reduction Agency website, <http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/project/projuzb/ctr_

nukus.html>.
74 Alan Sipress, “U.S. to Help Uzbekistan Clean Up Anthrax Site,” October 23, 2001, A2.
75 “Cooperative Threat Reduction: Uzbekistan Programs,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency
website, < http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/ctr_uzbekistan.html>.

76 Although both the State Department and the Department of Energy currently have pro-
grams that also focus on border security, neither of these programs is as well funded as the new DOD
initiative. DOD plans to coordinate its new program closely with these other agencies. Author’s phone
conversation with U.S. DOD official, October 2002. (Turkmenistan and Belarus are not eligible be-
cause they have not been certified by the State Department as required by the CTR legislation, due to
poor human rights records.)
77 It is unlikely, however, that it will be expanded to Tajikistan or Turkmenistan any time soon.
Tajikistan is still considered too unstable for the initiation of any major CTR projects. Furthermore,
the heavy presence of border guards from the Russian Federation on the Afghan-Tajik border com-
plicates any potential U.S. border-related assistance to Tajikistan. As indicated in supra note 75, Turk-
menistan is not currently eligible for CTR assistance.
78 “Combating WMD Smuggling,” Testimony of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Lisa
Bronson before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, July 30,
2002.
79 Ibid.

340 DAUGHTRY
BUILDING SECURITY 341
Chapter 16
Building Security
in Central Asia:
a Multilateral Perspective
Jennifer D.P. Moroney
O
ver the past decade, many actors—including Russia, the United
States, and to a lesser extent multilateral security institutions—
have sought to deepen their ties to the five Central Asian states
for a myriad of reasons, not least being the presence of large oil and gas
reserves. Russia views this region as within its sphere of influence and
interest, and as a bulwark to instability coming from the south, specifi-
cally from Afghanistan, Iran, and potentially, India and Pakistan. Russia
has supported the development of closer relations with the Central Asian
republics on an economic, political and military level through the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS), by including them in the security
framework, the CIS Collective Security Treaty (CST). With no shortage
of bilateral and multilateral security treaties signed between them, the
perception among many Western analysts in the mid 1990s was that Rus-
sia and Central Asia were clearly connected in the arena of security and
defense.1
In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United
States and the subsequent war in Afghanistan, a combination of support
pledged by Central Asian states to the U.S.-led coalition against terror-
ism and the need for such support have brought Central Asia into the
international spotlight. But in deepening ties with these states, the West
has become more acutely aware of the plethora of security challenges in
this region, including extremely porous borders, high-level corruption,
economic and energy insecurity, and the presence of groups determined to
overthrow the current regimes. In short, there is a new appreciation in the
West of Central Asia as a strategically crucial region at the crossroads of a
variety of influences. Western states and institutions now are taking seri-
341
342 MORONEY
ously the security problems of the region and concerns of Central Asia’s
leaders. While Western governments continue to strengthen their security
cooperation with these states, Western institutions continue to assist in
the building of democratic regimes operating under the rule of law, the
transition to market-oriented economies and the building of reliable se-
curity and economic institutions. Though progress in instituting reforms
has been slow, security assistance to these states continues to grow. To date,
security assistance to Central Asia has not been conditional on progress in
the transition to democracy and other Western ideals.
The lack of an overarching security institution to manage security
problems is mirrored in the proliferation of security threats to the region.
The West and Russia are both attempting to fill the security vacuum that
appeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Because security concerns
in this region are transnational by nature, it can be argued that transna-
tional solutions are needed, and multilateral institutions could serve in
helping these states build more effective regional ties on a number of
security-related areas. However, finding multilateral solutions to regional
security problems in Central Asia is no easy task. Regional cooperation is
a contentious issue among these states as historic mistrust and animosity
loom large, particularly between the two largest states, Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan. Multilateral programs, both military and non-military, have
met with limited success due to the difficulties associated with regional
cooperation in Central Asia. The danger stemming from a lack of regional
military cooperation is twofold according to Martha Brill Olcott, a lead-
ing specialist on the region. First, if these states were to pursue separate
military developments, the inherent distrust in the region would not be
alleviated and, in fact, could be exacerbated. Second, all of these states are
militarily weak, and even the two largest, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, can-
not provide for their own security.2
This chapter will investigate the prospects for multilateral coopera-
tion in Central Asia and the steps to necessary address these challenges.
The multilateral institutions that are discussed and evaluated for their
effectiveness in the region include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), the European Union (EU), the CIS, the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion (SCO),3 and GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova).4
The key questions this discussion will address include:
■ What are the most visible security threats in this region?
■ What are key Western and Russian security interests in this region?
■ What are the discernable benefits for the participants for their
membership in multilateral or regional organizations?
■ Which security issues tend to polarize the actors in the region?
■ Which, if any, regional or multilateral institutions are best able to
provide the types of security assistance that the Central Asian states
really need?
■ What are the implications for Central Asia in favoring one institu-
tion over another (e.g., NATO over the CIS)?
The challenges associated with improving security in this region
will continue to capture the attention of Western states, Russia and also a
growing number of regional organizations, in an attempt to improve the
security situation and maximize influence in the region. There may be no
quick fixes to the extreme security challenges in Central Asia. Yet it will
be argued that an expanded involvement of Western multilateral security
organizations can have a positive effect by facilitating regional security
cooperation and helping to build mutual trust and confidence.
Security Environment Overview

In order to better understand the consequences and potential ben-
efits of multilateral engagement in Central Asia, it is first necessary to
understand the security environment in which these states are operating.
It should come as no surprise that the Central Asia region, a crossroads
for a myriad of influences, including Slavic, Middle Eastern and Oriental,
is experiencing instability along ethnic and religious lines. Moreover, a
lack of economic reforms and free trade arrangements with the West, high
levels of corruption and the remnants of a command economy structure
left over from Soviet times add to regional stress. Although Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan inherited vast energy reserves from the USSR, the dif-
ficulty in extracting these resources thus far has hindered the economic
development of the region. Non-military or “soft security” threats, such as
the cross-border transit of terrorists, narcotics, small arms and materials
associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), are among the pri-
mary security concerns for the West, Russia, China and the Central Asian
republics themselves.
Because border security threats are transnational by nature, many
institutions and states, as well as non-government organizations (NGOs)
and the private sector (especially energy-oriented businesses), have sought
to support Central Asian states in their attempts to improve the border se-
curity situation. Assistance offered varies, but is primarily focused on pro-
344 MORONEY
viding training and equipment, as well as improving regional dialogue by

holding a plethora of international conferences and seminars. Uzbekistan
and Krygyzstan have received the greatest attention and resources because
of the threat posed by terrorist groups in the region, such as the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The IMU is seen as having links with al
Qaeda as well as other radical Islamic fundamentalist groups, and desires
to overthrow the government of Uzbekistan and create an Islamic state.
Until recently there have been few mechanisms for successfully regulating
the border situation, although the United States has provided a significant
amount of resources—over $82 million in FY02 for the largest program,
the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) assistance pro-
gram, as well as several other smaller initiatives.5
The Central Asia Security Vacuum
For the first five years following the break-up of the Soviet Union,
the Central Asian republics were not a priority for the West, primarily
because these states were viewed as within Russia’s sphere of influence.
As a result, the United States, NATO, and the EU paid little attention to
the region, even given the presence of large untapped oil and gas reserves.
America provided no substantial economic aid packages to Central Asia
and focused instead on assisting the western Newly Independent States
(NIS) of Ukraine and Moldova. The South Caucasus states (Georgia,
Azerbaijan, and Armenia) were also higher on the priority list. The Cen-
tral Asian republics had no “Western card” to play to counter Russia’s
influence in the political, economic, energy or military spheres. Further,
given objections from Russia to U.S./NATO military or political outreach
to these states, NATO did not attempt to reach out to Central Asia. With
no Western security option for Central Asia, they retained their relatively
tight security cooperation within the CIS framework.
Russia attempted to fill the security vacuum in the Former Soviet
Union (FSU) by encouraging greater cooperation among CIS members.
The creation of the CIS, and subsequent attempts to deepen cooperation
in a number of key sectors, was an attempt to increase dependency on
Russia and to create some kind of “institutional normalcy” in the region in
place of the Soviet Union. In the security sphere, the Tashkent CST of 1992
was signed by seven states including Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, and accorded Russia leverage over
its less powerful neighbors. The extent of these security ties between CST
affiliates has varied over time in response to political and economic lever-
age exercised by Russia. Moreover, the individual members have differing
relations with other actors in the region and with the West, which impacts
their participation in the CST collective security framework.
Importantly, Uzbekistan refused to sign the second phase of the CST
when it was proposed, which took place prior to September 11. Therefore,
Uzbekistan was not in Russia’s official security sphere when the United
States went in to try to negotiate basing rights on Uzbek territory. As a
result of Uzbekistan’s post September 11 role in the War on Terrorism,
Uzbekistan’s security ties with America have been improved in the form
of a “Strategic Partnership” signed in March 2002. This agreement calls
for the United States to “regard with grave concern any external threat”
to Uzbekistan.6 Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and to a lesser extent, Tajikistan
and Turkmenistan also have become important U.S. coalition partners
and like Uzbekistan have received a considerable increase in security as-
sistance over the past year. Although Russia is no longer unilaterally able
to dictate the foreign and security policy orientation of the Central Asian
states, common interests still remain between the CIS states and Russia,
and Russia remains influential in the region.
In the mid 1990s, Russia’s economic trade, as well as its military
cooperation with Central Asian states, began to decline. Russia’s main
security role centered on the sale of military supplies, a peacekeeping con-
tingent in Tajikistan, and coordination with these states over anti-terrorist
measures.7 During this time, the Central Asian states (with the exception
of Tajikistan which was heavily involved in a civil war) also sought to
diversify their international relations with actors outside the confines of
the CIS. New trends included deepening relations with China, Turkey and
Iran, in addition to the United States and other Western countries. Zbig-
niew Brzezinski noticed this shift in the late 1990s and called for a change
in the U.S. strategy, to “consolidate and perpetuate the prevailing geopo-
litical pluralism on the map in Eurasia” in response to what he saw as a
shift in the international orientation of some of the Central Asian states.8
The United States first showed interest in playing some kind of role
in the security vacuum in Central Asia in the late 1990s as U.S. policymak-
ers grew concerned over increases in small arms, narcotics trafficking, and
terrorist movement across the porous Central Asian borders. Moreover,
the shift of IMU to insurgency tactics as well as the increasing effectiveness
of the IMU, encouraged the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct
Special Forces exercises in the region. U.S. Special Operations forces thus
began engaging in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in 2000 (more modestly
in Kyrgyzstan). The widely held perception in the United States was that,
left to their own devices, the Kyrgyz and Uzbek governments would adopt
346 MORONEY
the same tactics as Russia in Chechnya, if they were not shown alternative
methods for dealing with insurgencies.9
The strategic interest in Central Asia among the United States, Rus-
sia, China, Iran and Turkey in filling the security vacuum has led to a situ-
ation of free competition, which has the potential to result in a zero-sum
game for Central Asia. The inherent danger is that the region will become
further divided, with each state preferring to develop ties on a bilateral
basis with prominent states and institutions to improve their individual
security situation, without reference to each other. The inability of West-
ern institutions to agree as to their specific roles or to identify gaps and
redundancies regarding the kinds of assistance and programs offered only
exacerbates this situation. Instead, what is needed is cooperative dynamics
with common ground for joint solutions in the framework of multilateral
groups and organizations.10
As will be discussed in the forthcoming sections, a variety of security
arrangements are taking shape in Central Asia to fill this need. Included in
these arrangements is the establishment of new bilateral and multilateral
ties, focused on military and non-military security issues. The success of
these new multilateral arrangements will depend upon three factors: the
Central Asian states’ perceived value in participating; the internal and ex-
ternal dynamics that both reinforce and curtail the development of such
ties; and the ability of the institutions to contribute in a tangible way to
regional security. The following section is an overview and analysis of the
more prominent multilateral security organizations and arrangements,
and an evaluation of their ability to address real-time security concerns of
the Central Asian nations.
Looking West
NATO
NATO’s philosophy of expanding security and stability eastward
and southward in the region means that, in theory, NATO should become
more intrinsically involved in the security of the states of the former Soviet
Union, including Central Asia. But traditionally, NATO has placed much
more emphasis on the Baltic states, Russia and Ukraine, showing less of an
interest in engaging the South Caucasus and Central Asian states, the latter
viewed until recently as almost entirely outside NATO’s purview within
the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework.
While direct contact between NATO and the Central Asian states
throughout the mid to late 1990s was modest, NATO allies did monitor
and participate in U.S.-led multilateral exercises with Uzbekistan, Kazakh-

stan, and Kyrgyzstan conducted “in the spirit of ” PfP. Multilateral exercises
such as the CENTRABAT/Regional Cooperation series, which consisted of
tabletop and field exercises in the realm of peacekeeping, were held.11 Also,
the Central Asian partners have participated for several years in the annual
International Workshop on Emergency Response (IWER), also an “in the
spirit of ” PfP multilateral exercise aimed at improving their preparedness
in consequence management and disaster relief.
Operating under an “open door” policy, NATO uses the various tools
at its disposal to work with partners. These tools allow for maximum co-
operation between the Alliance and individual partners, assisting along a
continuum to the extent desired by the partner. Beginning with member-
ship in PfP, countries are encouraged to deepen their relationship with
NATO by participating in specific mechanisms, while setting interoper-
ability, defense, and economic reform goals to jointly measure progress
along the way. Figure 16–1 is a sketch of NATO’s integration progress:
Figure 16–1. NATO Integration Progress
(PfP) = Partnership for Peace member

(PWP) Partnership Work Plan = Annual NATO drafted plan of activities under PfP
(IPP) Individual Partnership Plan = From the PWP, partners construct an IPP, which becomes the Forecast of Events for the year
(PARP) Planning and Review Process = Setting of specific interoperability goals
(MAP) Membership Action Plan = NATO membership candidate/Aspirant status
There is no set time for how quickly a partner should move through
this process; it is up to the individual partner to determine the level and
scope of cooperation with the Alliance. Geopolitical developments play a
large role, and the reaction of Russia has been an important concern for all
FSU states. However, because Russia and NATO have improved their rela-
tions due in part to the War on Terrorism, Russia’s objections to the FSU
states’ ties with NATO have waned. Ukraine and Georgia officially have
stated their intention to join MAP (declaring the desire to join NATO);
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan have joined the Planning and Re-
view Process (PARP); and Tajikistan has recently become a PfP member.12
348 MORONEY
One could argue that the timing of these decisions is directly related to this
new geopolitical environment, where Russia and NATO have established
rapport in the NATO-Russia Council.
It is important to point out that NATO-Central Asia relations have
met with some constraints, with more serious challenges along the way.
Central Asian partners are, by and large, not enthusiastic PfP participants
and prefer bilateral security ties with the United States and others, such
as Germany. Indeed, Central Asian Ambassadors to NATO and their staffs
do not actively participate in discussions at NATO Headquarters and in
military planning discussions at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE).13 One reason why NATO has been less successful in
drawing Central Asia closer to the West is that NATO advocates a model
for its engagement with partner countries in Eurasia, which is focused on
improving regional cooperation. Although this model has been successful
in promoting regional cooperation in Eastern Europe, and even in the
Western FSU, its application to a region in which deep distrust character-
ize the state of relations is a continuing challenge. However, given NATO’s
positive track record for spurring regional cooperation elsewhere in Eu-
rope and Eurasia, hope still exists. The difficulty is finding the right ‘carrot’
to extend to the Central Asian partners, since the Central and Eastern Eu-
rope carrot of NATO membership is not viable in the near future. NATO
either has to be more encouraging and accepting of Central Asian states
as partners by offering increased resources to spur defense reform and
military professionalization, or it has to offer a diversification of activities
within the confines of PfP to address the security needs in this region, such
as improved border security.
Another challenge in bringing the Central Asian states closer to
NATO and Western Europe involves providing training and equipment
to improve their defense self-sufficiency. NATO is often a slow mover in
terms of planning and executing security assistance programs, and does
not have the money to provide extensive, capacity building assistance. The
tool that NATO has at its disposal to improve interoperability, confidence
building, and regional cooperation is the PARP. This process assists in
both defense reform and restructuring, and is certainly noteworthy as a
beneficial method of engagement. For the most part, participation in PfP
has not been a political or military issue for Central Asian states, although
the financial burden often stymies their involvement.14 PARP, on the other
hand, requires partners to disclose information on the state’s range of de-
fense and military capabilities, along with details about the force structure
and the defense budgets, all of which is viewed as extremely intrusive by

the Central Asian states.
Other FSU partners, such as Ukraine and Georgia, have participated
in PARP, disclosing such “sensitive” information, and acknowledging the
importance of improving regional cooperation, information sharing,
interoperability and defense reform. As a result, they have moved closer
to Western security structures. In theory, if Central Asian states follow a
similar path, it is likely that they will move closer to NATO in the sense
of improving interoperability and possibly, security agreements down
the road. The challenge for NATO is to ensure that the mechanisms for
building partnerships in Central Asia are appropriate to the needs of these
countries in their threat-driven security environment. Both Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan joined PARP after September 11, which is a significant
step forward, but the cooperation can still be improved.15 Elements of
PfP could include, for example, more focused exercises to improve infra-
structure, military support to civilian authorities in a crisis, and regional
cooperation to counter the transnational security threats. In short, NATO
must ensure that the PfP activities are relevant to the security needs of
all of Central Asia. Otherwise, NATO runs the risk of being an ineffec-
tive multilateral engagement tool for this region, and encouraging these
states to seek bilateral security assistance from the United States and other
countries. However, NATO has something unique to offer to its partners:
a proven forum for increasing security cooperation among actors in a
given region, as well as a tested “open door” policy. The circumstances
and incentives are different for Central Asia, but the institution has many
mechanisms available to assist its partners in building solid relationships
with NATO and with each other.16
European Union
In addition to NATO, the EU also offers some positive incentives for
the Central Asian states. The EU’s relations with Central Asian partners
have a legal basis in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs),
which guide political and economic discussions.17 Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan have concluded PCAs with the EU, though
the agreement with Turkmenistan has not yet entered into force. No PCA
has been concluded with Tajikistan yet, though with the civil war now
ended, it is likely that negotiations could be underway soon.
The PCA was intended as a mechanism to establish a stronger po-
litical relationship in the developing network of Central Asia’s connection
with the EU. On the economic side, the PCA marks an important step in
350 MORONEY
helping to bring these states in line with the legal framework of the single
European market and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The PCAs
concluded between the EU and its partners are intended to facilitate the
development of free trade, and can be seen as a road map for the introduc-
tion of economic and trade-related policies in the fields of goods, services,
labor, current payments, and capital movement. Although the document
is in many ways evolutionary, its implementation is a precondition for the
development of further trade and political relations between the parties.
Moreover, the European Commission Technical Assistance to the
CIS (TACIS) program assists partner states, including Central Asia, by
focusing on the promotion of cooperation in the areas of environment,
networks (telecommunications, energy and transport), justice and home
affairs. Their focus is on certain cross-border issues, including the activi-
ties of sub-regional cooperation bodies and initiatives.18 In addition, the
Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA) program of 1993
aims to bring together trade and transport ministers from the original
eight TRACECA countries (five Central Asian republics and three Cauca-
sian republics). The goal is to develop a transport corridor on a west-east
axis from Europe, across the Black Sea, through the Caucasus and the
Caspian Sea, and onto Central Asia.19 Uzbekistan in particular is hoping to
capitalize upon its geopolitical position as the pivot in regional trade once
the TRACECA program establishes a new “Silk Road,” which will span
from China to Western Europe. TRACECA hopes to attract investments
from international financial institutions such as the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which have committed U.S.
$250 million, and the World Bank, which has pledged an additional U.S.
$40 million towards the completion of the project.20 TRACECA projects
are deemed essential for the diversification of the traditional Moscow-cen-
tered trade and transport flows and for opening trade routes to the West.
Moreover, while there appears to be some movement in the area of
EU support for police training centers and potential cooperation with the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as
improved border security measures in the region, in general Central Asian
security issues are simply not at the forefront of the minds of bureaucrats
in Brussels, and the EU does not have enough money to begin with.21 The
EU, as opposed to NATO, primarily focuses on “soft security” matters such
as trade, water management, and other environmental security concerns
in Central Asia. Politically, the EU relies on the PCA to guide discussions
between the Central Asian partners and the EU Commission. But until a
partner reaches the status of “Associate Member” (i.e., candidate for EU
membership), the tangible benefits of this association are not as signifi-

cant, particularly for Central Asia, which is still widely perceived by the
EU as outside its immediate area of interest. Although NATO is taking a
slightly more proactive role through PfP, Central Asia is still lower down
on the totem pole compared to the Western CIS and the South Caucasus,
particularly Georgia and Azerbaijan.
Looking Northwest
Commonwealth of Independent States

In the security and defense sphere, the CIS CST serves as the primary
means for Russia to maintain leverage over the Central Asian states. The
Treaty, as well as a series of initiatives to develop a CIS customs union
(CIS-wide and later between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan22
and Tajikistan), was given greater impetus by a 1995 decree issued by Rus-
sian President Boris Yeltsin. The decree detailed a new direction for the
CIS on closer security cooperation and embodied the belief that the CIS
is the basis for Russia’s reconstitution as a great power. On defense and
security matters, the decree sought to “stimulate intentions of the CIS state
parties to unite in a defense alliance”23 and urged all states to conclude
agreements in the military infrastructure and to encourage Russian mili-
tary bases on the outward perimeter throughout CIS territory. A key goal
was obtaining an obligation from the CIS member-states to refrain from
participating in alliances and blocs directed against any of the other CIS
members, specifically NATO.24
Although the CST created a formal system of collective defense,
it has been activated only for the limited purpose of consultation over
threats posed by Afghanistan. The important question is whether, if the
CST continues to exist, it can serve any utility as a mechanism to discuss
and deal with security concerns of its members, including terrorist activi-
ties, and the cross-border movement of items relating to WMD, narcotics
and small arms. Uzbekistan, for one, already has determined that the CST
does not have an important regional security role to play, as evidenced by
its withdrawal from the arrangement, and Uzbekistan has strongly indi-
cated its preference for developing security relationships with the West.
If the Central Asian states themselves are continuing to develop security
relationships with actors outside the confines of the CST and Russia is
continuing to loosen the strings on the CST, then it is difficult to see how
it can remain viable.
352 MORONEY
The Central Asian states have attempted to distance themselves from

Russia in a number of key areas, most recently in a collective proposal to
establish a nuclear weapons free zone in the region, which was recently
passed. The agreement has met with controversy in Moscow. Officials
maintain that the CST allows Russia the right to redeploy nuclear weapons
in Central Asia in the future, which is a disputed interpretation among the
Central Asian states.25
The lack of enthusiasm for the CST and the CIS as a whole, with the
notable exception of Russia, is exemplified by the fact that its members
have not attempted to implement the economic and security agreements
signed within the confines of the CIS, and actively seek to deepen their
participation in other regional organizations. Overall, the CIS is widely
viewed as an ineffective multilateral forum for dealing with regional secu-
rity concerns. The rhetoric of the CIS is similar to that of the EU, but the
CIS does not display the features of the EU, such as the Common Market,
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, or the movement toward a
shared identity.26
Shanghai Cooperation Organization
The prospects for a longer-term U.S. military presence in Central
Asia have raised eyebrows not only in Russia, but also in China, which
borders Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. China has been look-
ing to expand its influence in this region, and together with Russia has
been instrumental in establishing the SCO, which includes China, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.27 The SCO originally
was created to resolve ongoing border disputes in the wake of the Soviet
Union’s collapse. The broadening of the SCO’s focus to a more institution-
alized security organization was in response to the increased threat in the
region from non-state actors, such as the IMU.
The states in the SCO have reached agreements on military reduc-
tions and confidence building, and the SCO has become a mechanism
for consultations on trade, water and border security. Its primary goal,
however, is to counter the spread of Islamic extremism and terrorism.
However, it is important to note that China has not indicated a desire to
offer security guarantees or provide a military presence in Central Asia.
This fact reinforces the perception that Russia and the United States are
the only powers that wish or intend to develop policy toward Central Asia
from a more broad strategic perspective. At present, China’s interests are
more regionally or culturally defined, as opposed to strategic. China still
perceives Central Asia as within Russia’s sphere of influence, and Russia’s
presence in Tajikistan has dissuaded China from developing an active

strategy toward this war-torn country at its border. However, if Russia’s
influence within Central Asia continues to weaken, China may assume a
more active role in advancing its energy and economic interests.
Looking Inward
Unlike the multilateral organizations discussed above, what dis-
tinguishes those who follow is the participant’s status in the organiza-
tion—whether members are on an equal footing or whether there is a
designated or implied leader. While members are supposed to have equal
status in NATO, SCO, and CIS, this is not the case de facto. Russia is the
dominant player in the CIS, Russia/China in the SCO, and the United
States in NATO. However, in the OSCE; the Georgia, Ukraine, Uzebeki-
stan, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUUAM) group; and others discussed
below, members are considered to have equal status. This is an important
distinction to make, since Central Asian states have a long history of being
dominated by a larger power and remain relatively weak in comparison
with their neighbors.
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
One of the main benefits of membership in the OSCE, as well as
some of the other regional multilateral organizations, is that this organiza-
tion is not dominated by one or two of the more powerful states. Members
are officially on equal status with every other state. Thus, the OSCE is
perceived as a real opportunity to gain international experience in deci-
sion-making, consensus-building and diplomacy.
The OSCE has prioritized Central Asia as a region in need of its sup-
port in the security arena.28 The increased flow of illicit drugs, the presence
of criminal groups, as well as the growing trafficking in human beings
and firearms have captured the attention of the OSCE in recent years.
The OSCE has established centers in Almaty, Ashgabad, Tashkent, and has
sent a Mission to Tajikistan. Missions are established when more serious
security concerns are perceived. These centers promote the implementa-
tion of OSCE principles and the cooperation of the participating Central
Asian states within the OSCE framework. They also promote information
exchange between OSCE bodies and Central Asian authorities at a multi-
tude of levels.
The OSCE has attempted to re-focus its support to Central Asia post
September 11, as evidenced in the Bishkek Conference on Security and
Stability held in December 2001. This conference was co-sponsored by the
354 MORONEY
OSCE and the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Preven-
tion. Participants unanimously condemned terrorism in all its forms and
expressed willingness to cooperate in improving their border security. The
conference was deemed a success by participating authorities in terms of
the discussions of counter-drug efforts and the establishment of new fo-
cuses, such as the transit of small arms and light weapons.29 According to
the OSCE’s International Secretariat staff, some progress has been made in
deepening cooperation in small arms and light weapons transfers within
the OSCE forum, as well as the training of police officials in the five Cen-
tral Asian states, although much remains to be done.30 One idea is for the
OSCE to focus on control of small arms and light weapons by employing
an Information Technology (IT) tool to track activities and to help record
proliferation hot spots.31
The Central Asian states pay dues into the OSCE as members, but
are also recipients of OSCE financial support. According to OSCE officials,
these circumstances encourage the Central Asian states to be more proac-
tive in their discussions within OSCE fora. For example, the Tajik govern-
ment recently proposed the establishment of regional training centers in
Central Asia, each of which would specialize in a particular field or skill,
such as border security, peacekeeping, disaster relief, or “niche capabil-
ity,” and provide for joint training across national lines, thus facilitating
regional cooperation.32 The argument can be made that membership in
the OSCE accords a certain perception of freedom and flexibility for the
Central Asian states by proposing concrete options for improving the se-
curity situation in the region.
GUAM
The Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUAM) sub-group-
ing of pro-West, anti-CIS states is another example of a multilateral or-
ganization where the equality of members is emphasized. Uzbekistan
was a member until June 2002 when it suspended its participation in
the “GUUAM’s” formal structures because it did not see much benefit
to membership since the United States already was providing significant
military and economic assistance and the other GUUAM members were
relatively weak. But while the role of GUAM in promoting security in
Central Asia has come into question after Uzbekistan pulled out, it is still
worth considering because of the potential to promote regional dialogue
and information sharing on critical security matters.
GUAM was founded in 1996 as a political, economic and strategic
alliance designed to strengthen the independence and sovereignty of these
former Soviet Union republics, and after much delay was formally institu-
tionalized in 2001 with a legal charter and secretariat. GUAM has become
an important structure for enhancing dialogue on regional economic
cooperation through development of a Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport
corridor. It has also become a forum for discussion at various levels of
existing security problems, promoting conflict resolution and the elimina-
tion of other risks and threats.33
At a meeting of GUAM Foreign Ministers in Yalta in July 2002, the
decision was made to extend observer status of the organization to inter-
ested states. A communiqué announced that third states and international
organizations might participate in GUAM activities, provided that they
were interested in GUAM’s work and promoted its objectives. No reference
was made as to participation based on geographical location.34
Some of the key goals which unite GUAM’s members include im-
proving the economic situation; developing an energy transport corridor
from Central Asia to Western Europe; improving border security; promot-
ing a respect for human rights; building civil society and empowered and
legitimate state institutions; and most important, solidifying the indepen-
dence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of GUAM members separate
from Russia and the CIS.35 The latter is particularly important for Georgia,
Moldova and Azerbaijan, though less so for Ukraine, which has been more
successful in developing an independent status.
GUAM’s geopolitical leanings toward NATO, the EU, and the West
in general has led to backing from the United States and NATO since its
inception.36 GUAM continues to receive American support (Congress and
DOD, in particular) stemming from the Silk Road Act of 1999. In summer
2003, with U.S. political and economic backing, GUAM announced an ini-
tiative to refocus its efforts on the war on terrorism, particularly on border
security issues, such as immigration, terrorist movements, WMD, drugs,
and small arms/light weapons transfers, which could very well improve
GUAM’s importance for the Central Asian states. This refocus on border
security, coupled with U.S. backing, may draw Uzbekistan back in to the
formal structures, as well as encourage other states in the region such as
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, to take part. Overall, GUAM serves
as a mechanism to increase security in the region, provided its member-
ship is expanded and tangible projects result from political initiatives.
Beyond GUAM, Central Asian leaders have advanced several other
multilateral frameworks that should be noted. The Central Asian Euro-
pean Community (CAEC), established in 1994 by Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan, is a consultative framework for addressing security con-
356 MORONEY
cerns. However, though membership was expanded to include Tajikistan

in 1998, the forum has proven to be unable to influence the development
of the region’s economies in a significant way. Kazakh President Nursultan
Nazarbaev has proposed the creation of a Eurasian Union as a CIS alter-
native, but this proposal has not moved beyond the discussion stage. Naz-
arbaev also suggested the creation of an Asian variant of the OSCE—the
Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia
(CICA). Uzbeks and Kyrgyz officials have offered their own proposals,
one of which included an initiative to create a nuclear free zone, which
has subsequently been approved by all five Central Asian states. However,
it is clear that the majority of the proposals advanced by the Central Asian
leaders remain on paper and thus are ineffective in terms of dealing with
regional security concerns at this time. Still, the fact that proposals have
been offered in the first place is significant, and should be encouraged in
an effort to increase regional cooperation and to find common solutions
to transnational security problems.
Conclusions
The post-September 11 geopolitical environment, manifested in
the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism, has generated an unprecedented
international interest in the Central Asian states from multilateral security
institutions. Given the region’s proximity to Afghanistan and potential
for spillover of instability, each state’s willingness (to varying degrees) to
join the international coalition, and the potential for longer-term West-
ern military presence in Central Asia, it is not difficult to understand the
heightened interest in this region.
NATO and the OSCE arguably offer the best opportunities for the
Central Asian states from a multilateral perspective. NATO has been
successful in encouraging regional cooperation in eastern and southern
Europe through PfP, even when significant tensions have been present.
PfP exercises, for example, offer a forum through which the Central Asian
states could improve their consequence management, disaster relief and
other capabilities to respond to transnational threats. But the challenge
for NATO is ensuring that PfP activities evolve to address the real-time
security needs of the Central Asia partners, which may mean adding more
border security type training activities, and perhaps expanding to include
more agencies, such as the border guard, customs, ministry of interior, na-
tional guard, military police/law enforcement or other front-line security
services.
The OSCE has representatives on the ground in each of the countries,

which typically provides them with access to partner country officials. The
OSCE tends to be more innovative in coming up with new programs for
the Central Asia partners to address their security needs. The problem with
the OSCE is that it does not have much money, and therefore, is dependent
in part on the resources from other sources, such as the EU. But while the
EU has limited money for projects in Central Asia, the EU member states
are generally not that interested in this region, given its lack of geographic
proximity and their own traditional focus on the Western Eurasian states.
The EU, through the TACIS program, does offer a useful forum for mul-
tilateral discussions of transnational issues for the Central Asian states,
but the EU tends to talk at the Central Asian partners, rather than to find
common ground. Since the Central Asian states are also members of the
OSCE, dialogue is generally better and on more even ground.37
The overall effectiveness of EU, NATO and OSCE activities in the
region could be improved if these institutions collaborated to avoid dupli-
cation of effort and better identify gaps. The EU and the OSCE, in particu-
lar, tend not to coordinate their efforts very well. For example, the OSCE
focuses on small/arms light weapons transfers and police training in the
region, but collaboration with the EU on these matters is in its infancy.
However, if these bureaucratic and resource issues can be resolved and
working groups/activities established, the Central Asian partners would
be well advised to take advantage of a joint OSCE/EU approach to the
region. Such an approach would complement, without being in contrast
to, the more capabilities-building assistance provided by the United States
and NATO. Overall, the effectiveness of individual programs within mul-
tilateral institutions is hindered because of the overall lack of transparency
and information sharing in the region, as well as a lack of understanding
about the kind of assistance that Central Asian states truly need to address
specific security threats.
In addition to Western multilateral avenues, if GUAM can come up
with tangible projects for its members in the realm of border security, it
would certainly be in the interest of the Central Asian states to take part.
Even an informal network that facilitates the sharing of information and
intelligence on border security issues would certainly be a worthwhile
endeavor. The United States, NATO, OSCE and the EU are likely to take a
greater interest in GUAM with a border security dimension, and may even
provide the financial and political backing to move these initiatives along,
thereby, attracting additional members from Central Asia and perhaps
drawing back in Uzbekistan. But the original premise should come from
358 MORONEY
the partners themselves in a coordinated fashion in an effort to improve

their own security—it should not be jumpstarted by the United States or
other, more influential multilateral institutions.
The uncertain and often volatile security environment coupled
with the authoritarian nature of the regimes in power present challenges
for Western institutions. Given trends over the past five years or so, it is
highly likely that the Central Asian states will continue to seek external
assistance, and the authoritarian leaders of these regimes will continue
to play up or even exaggerate the presence of an external threat, since an
outside threat is useful in garnering additional resources from Western
institutions on a bilateral basis. Although there is no doubt of the region’s
geopolitical importance, it is not in the long term interest of the West to
provide security assistance and even security guarantees to undemocratic
and corrupt regimes. Therefore, while multilateral institutions continue
to deepen security cooperation with these states, simultaneous emphasis
should be placed on building democratic regimes, governed by the rule
of law and transitioning to market-oriented economies. After progress is
made in these areas, these governments will be in a better position to deal
with internal and external security challenges effectively and reduce their
dependency on external actors.
The internal weaknesses of these states render them extremely vul-
nerable to outside influences, especially from Russia. Although Russia is
itself rather weak, it is far stronger than all of the states in Central Asia
combined, and while its direct influence over their domestic affairs has
wavered in recent years, Russia is still the dominating military, political
and economic force in the region. Russia’s cooperation is also required in
terms of bringing stability to the region. The extent to which Western-ori-
ented multilateral institutions will be successful in developing closer rela-
tions with Central Asia from a security standpoint will depend on Russia’s
reaction and on the ability of these states to realize opportunities accorded
to them through multilateral cooperation. It is therefore in the interests
of the Western actors and institutions to actively work with the states of
Central Asia to ensure that Western methods for dealing with instabilities
are adopted.
But as Roy Allison points out, it is not clear yet whether the impulse
to cooperate through multilateral initiatives is stronger than the pressures
among the Central Asian states for fragmentation.38 However, the op-
portunity exists for the prominent Western-backed security institutions
to demonstrate the benefits of multilateral cooperation as a means of
improving regional security, and with this the condition of the region as
a whole.
Notes
1 Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, eds., Central Asian Security (Washington, DC: Brookings In-
stitution, 2001), 1.
2 Martha Brill Olcott, “Central Asia: Common Legacies and Conflicts” in Roy Allison and Lena
Jonson, eds., 32.

3 Formally known as “Shanghai Five,” which includes Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Kazakhstan, changing its name after the accession of Uzbekistan in 2001.

4 This organization previously also included Uzbekistan, at which time it was referred to as
GUUAM. Uzbekistan suspended its membership in early 2002.

5 Interview with U.S. Department of State, Europe/Eurasia Coordinator’s office, August 2002.
6 Dana Milbank, “Uzbekistan Thanked for Role in War: U.S., Tashkent Sign Cooperation Pact,”
The Washington Post, March 15, 2002.

7 Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, eds., 19.
8 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A Geostrategy in Eurasia,” Foreign Affairs, 76, no. 5, (September/Octo-
ber 1997), 50-64.

9 Interviews with U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) officials in March 2001, Tampa,
Florida.
11 For a more detailed discussion of U.S./NATO activities in Central Asia, see Jennifer D.P. Mo-
roney, “Western Approaches to Security Cooperation with Central Asia”, in Graeme Herd and Jennifer
D.P. Moroney, eds., Security Dynamics in the Former Soviet Bloc ( London: Routledge/Curzon, 2003).
12 Interviews conducted at NATO Headquarters with Defense Planning and Operations
(DPAO) staff, Brussels, Belgium, May 14, 2002.

13 Interviews at NATO Headquarters with US Mission to NATO, International Staff (Political
Affairs), Brussels, Belgium, and U.S. Eurasia specialists at SHAPE, Mons, Belgium, May 15-16, 2002.
14 NATO requires the partners to contribute a certain percentage to pay for the exercises.
15 Interview with NATO official, NATO Headquarters, Brussels Belgium, May 14, 2002.
16 Interviews conducted at NATO Headquarters with Political Affairs Division and Special
Advisor’s office, Brussels, Belgium, May 15, 2002.

17 The PCA is the framework document by which progress is assessed in each of the FSU
partners in bringing their economic, political, social, and legal structures in line with the acquis com-
munitaire of the European Union.
18 TACIS Strategy Paper, Strategic Consideration 2002-2006 and Indicative Programme
2002-2003 (europa.eu.int).
19 Interview with EU Commission officials, Brussels, Belgium, May 15, 2002.
20 See URL <http://www.traceca.org> for further information.
21 Interview with EU official responsible for Central Asia issues, London, October 15, 2003.
22 Uzbekistan left the CST in 1999 to join the GUUAM regional subgroup of anti-CIS states,
and subsequently withdrew from GUUAM in June 2002.

23 As discussed in Sherman Garnett, Keystone in the Arch (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, 1997), 65.

24 Ibid.
25 Nuclear-free Zone for Central Asia, The Washington Post, October 5, 2002, A14.
26 Martha Brill Olcott, Anders Åslund, and Sherman Garnett, Getting it Wrong: Regional Co-
operation and the Commonwealth of Independent States (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace), 232.
360 MORONEY
27 Vernon Loeb, “Footprints in the Steppes of Central Asia: New BIses indicate U.S. Presence
Will Be Felt After Afghan War,” The Washington Post, February 9, 2002.
28 Interviews with OSCE International Secretariat Staff, Vienna, Austria, May 23, 2002.
29 Interview with UN ODCCP office, New York, July 16, 2002.
30 Interviews with OSCE International Secretariat Staff (External Affairs), Vienna, Austria, May
23, 2002. and discussions held at a Wilton Park (UK) conference on Central Asia and the Caspian,
October 2003.
31 URL: <www.osce.org>, International Conference Held on Terrorism, Biweekly briefing,
March 13, 2002.

32 Multiple interviews with OSCE, U.S., and Danish officials, OSCE, Vienna, Austria, May 23,
2002.
33 “The GUUAM Group: History and Principles,” briefing paper, <www.guuam .org>, Novem-
ber 2000.
34 See Communiqué of the Yalta GUUAM meeting, July 20-21, 2001 (www.guuam.org).
35 <www.guuam.org>
36 For a more detailed discussion of Western Support to GUAM, see Jennifer D.P. Moroney and
Sergei Konoplyov, “Ukraine, GUUAM, and Western Support for Subregional Cooperation in Europe’s
Security Gray Zone,” Jennifer D.P. Moroney, Taras Kuzio, and Mikhail Molchanov, eds., Ukrainian For-
eign Policy: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives (Westport, CT: Praeger/Greenwood, May 2002).
37 Interviews with OSCE International Secretariat Staff (External Affairs), Vienna, Austria, May
23, 2002 and discussions held at a Wilton Park (UK) conference on Central Asia and the Caspian,
October 2003.
DRUG TRAFFICKING 361
Chapter 17
Who’s Watching the

Watchdogs?: Drug
Trafficking in Central Asia 1
Nancy Lubin
A
U.S. Customs Service agent won awards and accolades for seizing
more than 100 tons of marijuana over four years—but was then
found to have conspired with the drug traffickers themselves so
that other, far more lucrative drug shipments would make it safely to the
United States.2 His story is far from unique. In early 2003, for the second
time in six years, the Mexican government dismantled an elite federal
anti-drug unit because the unit was found to be working closely with drug
traffickers. “Virtually no Mexican anti-drug agency has remained free of
infiltration by powerful drug gangs,” the American press reported, largely
because of “scant public oversight.”3 A recent report on National Public
Radio (NPR) describes “a systemic and ongoing problem of corruption
among officers” of U.S. law enforcement agencies in charge of patrolling
the border with Mexico. “Easy money is an obvious factor,” the report
states, but blood ties among people with links on both sides of the bor-
der, as well as other factors, also play a large role.4 And even with tough
legislation, independent judiciaries, and an aggressive investigative press,
many other countries have discovered that corruption in counter-drug law
enforcement units can still be exceptionally high.
But not in Central Asia, this author was told last spring.5 Or at
least not until very recently. On the Tajik border of Afghanistan in May
2002, as they watched 55 kilograms of seized heroin, raw opium and
hashish being incinerated in fat rubber tires, Russian military officials
of the Moskovskii border guard detachment assured an onlooker that
virtually none of Tajikistan’s border guards had been apprehended for
involvement in trafficking, at least over the past decade. Perhaps in the
1980s, the officials considered, but they couldn’t remember.
361
362 LUBIN
Back in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, officials declared that

corruption was categorically absent from the elite drug control units,
and that government officials are uniformly committed to fighting this
scourge. The same story was repeated by high government officials far-
ther north in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. It was the rare exception when
someone went bad—a case of a bad apple, rather than the “bad barrels”
reported by NPR.
In countries with only a limited free press and no investigative jour-
nalism, where the courts and entire judicial system are heavily in the hands
of the state, where living standards are low and cross border ‘blood ties’
extensive, and where there is no independent oversight over law enforce-
ment, how have they done it? Or how would one know? Recently, Tajik of-
ficials say they have started a crackdown in Tajikistan, and many offenders
at all levels have been arrested. Why the sudden change?6
These questions lie at the heart of international counter-narcotics
trafficking efforts in Central Asia today. The history of Central Asian drug
trafficking, and the attempts to stop it, is one of smoke and mirrors; sort-
ing through the nature of the problem itself and how best to address it has
become an often unfathomable challenge. What is the nature and scale
of the drug trafficking problem through Central Asia today? Where have
local and international efforts been successful in combating this problem,
and where has their impact been controversial, or even counterproductive?
What does this say about the challenges being faced today?
Sparked by the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the United
States has increased significantly its previously modest commitment
to fight the drug trade there. In 2002 alone, the United States commit-
ted close to $100 million to counter-narcotics trafficking programs in
Afghanistan and Central Asia,7 and an army of U.S., international and
local Central Asian officials and specialists have been tasked to fight this
trade. But with oversight extremely weak, both from within and without
these countries, the allocation of greater resources also has meant greater
challenges regarding how these resources should be applied. It is critical
to examine these challenges, and to examine the record of the past, if the
substantial investments being made today are to address the range of drug
trafficking problems in this part of the world—and to avoid inadvertently
making them worse.
Background
Opium poppy used to grow wild in Central Asia. Throughout the
Soviet period, Soviet authorities declared their commitment to eradicate
drug cultivation on Soviet soil, but their efforts were slow in addressing
this problem. However fairly or unfairly, most Central Asians believed that
Soviet leaders themselves were benefiting from the drug trade. If leaders
were really committed to wiping out the crop, the thought went, it would
have been done much more quickly and effectively. Still, by the beginning
of the 1990s, drug cultivation in Central Asia had been severely cur-
tailed, and over the past decade, Central Asia has been relevant to the
drug trade primarily as a transit point for narcotics from Afghanistan
on their way to Russia, Europe and beyond. Some locals say the collapse
of the Soviet Union triggered a commitment on the part of the leaders
of these new states to eradicate the drug trade altogether; others more
cynically suggest it triggered a commitment from those benefiting from
the trade to shift their efforts to reap the profits from drug trafficking
rather than cultivation. In either case, after a decade of wars in Afghani-
stan and Tajikistan, the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent
political unrest, economic strains, and social upheavals, the flow of
raw opium and heroin from Afghanistan grew dramatically throughout
the 1990s. Opium poppy production in Afghanistan reached a peak of
between 2,900 and 4,600 metric tons in 1999 and 2000.8 The United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated that by 2000
some three-quarters of the world’s heroin supply was originating from
opium cultivated in Afghanistan and smuggled through mountainous
terrain that is particularly difficult to control.9
In early 2001, the Taliban regime began enforcing its long-stated
but long-ignored ban on opium production. The sudden reversal of
the Taliban, which since coming to power had drawn great profit from
taxing the opium trade, led to an almost total eradication of the annual
poppy crop in Afghanistan.10 But due to huge stockpiles, the trade did
not diminish dramatically. With the onset of the war in Afghanistan and
the defeat of the Taliban, Afghan farmers have renewed the planting of
opium, bringing the 2002 harvest almost to its 1999-2000 record levels.11
Afghanistan is again dominating the world market for opium, and Central
Asia is experiencing, in the words of the United Nations (UN), “a dramatic
increase in drug trafficking across all its five countries.”12
While there is some disagreement over the actual volume of narcot-
ics transported through Central Asia today, the role of Central Asia as a
transit point has grown significantly. Until the turn of the twenty-first
century, most of the drugs grown in Afghanistan reached Western con-
sumers through Pakistan and Iran, but a clampdown on drug trafficking
in Iran, and the increasingly porous borders of Central Asia, have shifted
364 LUBIN
that balance. By the turn of the century, the UN and others reported that
as much as half to two thirds of all narcotics trafficked from Afghanistan
passed through the Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz-
stan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan on their way to European and Russian
markets as well as sometimes the United States and Canada.13 Others esti-
mate that the actual proportion is lower but maintain that Central Asia’s
role remains significant.14 Most of this heroin finds its way to Russia and
Western Europe, and often brings vast profits along the way. Some experts
have estimated that by 2000, the opium cultivated in Afghanistan, sold in
the form of heroin at retail prices, was worth roughly $100 billion. In Af-
ghanistan, one kilogram of opium cost about $30; in Moscow, one kilo-
gram of heroin (made from 10 kilograms of opium) cost up to $30,000;
and in Western Europe, the same kilogram of heroin, sold at the retail
level in gram units or smaller, cost as much as $150,000.15
These drug profits reportedly have been shared generously with
local law enforcement and other key actors throughout Central Asia.
Western observers have pointed to widespread corruption among po-
lice, border guards, customs and other government officials as one of
the most important factors sustaining the large drug flow in Central
Asia.16 Customs and other law enforcement officials in all five coun-
tries customarily pay some thousands of dollars in bribes just to get an
entry-level job. Even though the salary is low, it is understood that they
will earn back their investment in a short amount of time. Citizens who
have been detained by customs officials for possession of small amounts
of narcotics independently list the same types of bribes requested for
different kinds of offenses. One destitute woman, who decided to make
one run as a courier to make ends meet, was detained with 200 grams
of heroin. She said she was told to pay $5000 and the whole case would
go away. If she had that kind of money, she lamented, she wouldn’t have
become involved in the first place. But clearly, she added, other people
do pay.17
In elite forces where salaries are higher, former border guards
report additional pressures to collaborate with traffickers, even for the
disinclined. “Imagine a smuggler approaches,” said one former border
guard, describing how guards patrol in groups of two or three over
sparse terrain. “He tells you that if you turn the other way for five min-
utes, you can be a millionaire. But if you don’t, he will send your corpse
to Moscow. What would you do? Two hundred dollars each month isn’t
enough to lose your life over.”18 A recent U.S. government interagency
report on heroin trafficking concluded that “increasing heroin transit
through Central Asia is contributing to endemic political and bureau-

cratic corruption, including in the security services and law enforce-
ment agencies, throughout the region.”19
Indeed, even Central Asian leaders have criticized their own law
enforcement officials for being deeply involved in the drug trade in one
way or another. Yet many local observers believe that corruption and
drug trafficking may be directed from top leadership levels as well. Cus-
toms officials and border guards say it is not uncommon to be called
by “higher-ups” and told to look the other way when particular vehicles
reach the border. A previous Tajik Minister of Interior was seen to be in
charge of major trafficking operations; in Kazakhstan, a Tajik Ambas-
sador was picked up with a stash of heroin in the trunk of his diplomatic
car.20 The president of Turkmenistan is himself accused of being a major
drug kingpin, perhaps explaining why the Turkmen borders are so open
to trafficking in the first place.21 The 2002 U.S. State Department report
on narcotics control gives further credence to these kinds of allegations.22
A Russian correspondent who has lived in Central Asia for many years
recently shared the same skepticism towards its leaders: borders could be
kept much more secure, he said in June 2002, if there were not “high level
interest” in keeping them at least partially open.23
Yet the biggest offenders may be the Russians themselves, long-time
locals lament, specifically the Russian military personnel stationed on
Central Asia’s border with Afghanistan who allegedly have their piece of
the action, too. High-ranking Central Asian officials and low-level citizens
alike—from Osh, Kyrgyzstan to Tajikistan and Kazakhstan—have long
taken for granted the direct lines by which the Russian military allegedly
ships heroin and other narcotics directly to Russia. At countless airports in
Central Asia, locals have pointed out the Russian military helicopters that
stop en route to Russia from Afghanistan: they refuel quickly and continue
to Moscow; no one is allowed to check the cargo. These allegations have
emerged recently into the open, prompted in part by a January 2003 ar-
ticle in the Russian newspaper Trud about the successes of Russian border
guards in the fight against narcotics trafficking.24 The article states that
90 percent of Tajikistan’s border guards are Tajiks under the command of
Russians, of which two percent have connections with narco-businessmen.
The article’s failure to address corruption among Russian border guards
has sparked a firestorm of criticism, including allegations that Russian
forces are more culpable of collusion with traffickers but ready to pass the
blame to the Tajiks.25
366 LUBIN
Few of these allegations can be confirmed, but they reflect wide-

spread perceptions that large profits are made both within Central Asia
and outside of the region. While only a small portion of these drug
profits have made their way to farmers in Afghanistan and low-level
couriers throughout Central Asia, the drug trade still has benefited them
in crucial ways. Opium poppy cultivation has allowed Afghan farmers to
make ends meet in a way that few other crops could. For some, advances
paid for their opium crop have provided their only access to credit and
sometimes their only source of survival during the winter months. In
Central Asia, the drug trade has enticed a sometimes overwhelmingly
destitute population to risk the harsh penalties imposed for drug traf-
ficking—including the death penalty—in the hope of making ends
meet. These couriers not only are the rural poor and uneducated but
include educated professionals as well. A former secretary at the main
university in Tajikistan, for example, could not support her two chil-
dren on the token salary she received (the State has not, to this day,
had the budget to pay anything but token salaries). After trying her
hand at business and falling deeply into debt, she decided to make one
drug run to Moscow in the mid 1990s to get back on her feet. In an
obvious setup, however, she found herself in prison for three years for
possession of 200 grams of heroin, before being amnestied in 2001.26
As the former Kyrgyz chairman of the Commission on Drug Control
admitted in 1997, “In some regions, the only way to survive is to take
part in the drug trade.”27
The Societal Toll

The secretary’s fate highlights the wide array of societal prob-
lems at all levels that the drug trade has produced. The growth in the
proportion of Central Asian women involved in the drug trade; the
growth in drug addiction, particularly among the young; and the con-
comitant growth in the spread of HIV/AIDS have led to serious social
problems among rich and poor alike that may have serious political
and societal ramifications in the not too distant future.
Although consistent figures are difficult to come by, all Central
Asian governments have expressed serious concern about the growing
involvement of women in drug trafficking, particularly as couriers,
or so-called “camels.” In Kyrgyzstan, for example, an estimated 30
percent of drug addicts and drug traffickers are women; in Tajikistan,
the proportion of women traffickers is estimated to be even higher
and rising.28 Most of these women, and especially rural women, are
enticed into the drug trade because of rampant poverty, discrimina-

tion and despair. Significantly, women have become particularly valu-
able to traffickers as a cover, or shirma, in a world where corruption
and collusion between traffickers and customs officials is widespread.
Customs officials allegedly are often informed in advance of whom to
search so that the “bigger fish” carrying large amounts of drugs can
pass through freely. The net result is that women increasingly have
become the targets of law enforcement, and they comprise a growing
proportion of Central Asia’s prison population. They are also increas-
ingly subject to humiliating body searches and other indignities at
Central Asian borders.29
The impact on women is only compounded by other societal con-
sequences of the drug trade. For example, more corrupt and stringent
border control has decreased contact between family members on differ-
ent sides of Central Asia borders; drug-related domestic violence is on the
rise; and youth are becoming increasingly involved in trafficking. Indeed,
the drug trade is now viewed as one of the key factors jeopardizing fam-
ily life, traditional communities, and general social stability throughout
Central Asia. This has only been further compounded by the rapid growth
of HIV/AIDS associated with drug injection: Current estimates put the
number of addicts with HIV/AIDS in Central Asia anywhere from about
1,500 to 10 times that amount. The rapid spread of AIDS over the past few
years, however, has led adherents of even the most conservative estimates
to predict a possible epidemic within the next decade.30
In response to these challenges, the past few years have seen increas-
ingly strong stated commitments by Central Asian leaders to attack the
drug trade and its concomitant societal problems head-on. While a strong
constituency in support of the drug trade survives among those reaping
huge profits—and while some argue that by addressing serious gaps in the
economy that the state cannot fill, the trade has been a stabilizing force in
Central Asian society—leaders say they regard the trade today as inher-
ently destabilizing. By widening the gap between rich and poor, sharpen-
ing rivalry among criminal groups, distorting and inhibiting any serious
reform of the formal economy, and creating its own system of rules and
laws that challenge those of the state, the drug trade is viewed as a threat
to the very domestic stability it was previously believed to preserve. These
concerns have come center stage with the recognition that drug trafficking
now is likely a key source of financing for terrorism—and perhaps a key
source of the very disaffection that can give rise to further terrorism in its
own right.
368 LUBIN
International Counter Narcotics Program

Nonetheless, the commitment of Central Asian leaders to crack
down on the drug trade has been uneven. Loath to address issues of
corruption beyond a rhetorical level, Central Asian officials blame their
countries’ traditionally weak interdiction records on the difficult bor-
der terrain and the lack of funding needed for training border guards
or for purchasing specialized equipment to challenge well-financed
narcotics smuggling rings. Central Asian leaders have begun to warm up
to the idea of addressing the problems associated with growing drug ad-
diction, but this has been slow in coming. Again, they cite lack of funding
and expertise as major impediments. They have turned increasingly to the
international community for assistance with resources to fight trafficking
on Central Asia’s international borders and to help address the serious side
effects of the drug trade at home.
Over the past decade, and particularly since September 11, the in-
ternational community has tried to support Central Asia’s struggle with
trafficking and addiction. The impact of these efforts to date, however, has
been decidedly mixed. Beginning in the 1990s, international donors insti-
tuted crop reduction programs in Afghanistan and institution-building
programs in Central Asia to limit the flow of narcotics across the Central
Asian-Afghan borders. Tajikistan’s Drug Control Agency (DCA), created
with UN assistance, boasts an impressive seizure rate. Recently, the focus
of international programs has begun to include broader societal concerns
as well, including greater attention to educating the young, supporting
women’s groups, and instituting other demand and harm reduction pro-
grams throughout the region. Yet while these endeavors have produced
impressive successes, they also have been controversial; indeed, each new
success has prompted criticism that Western programs may be a double-
edged sword, where success in one arena may be balanced by inadvertent
harm in another.
Throughout the 1990s, for example, international donors focused
their efforts in Central Asia’s drug battle on institutional development. In
each country, donor programs have assisted in developing a centralized
counter-narcotics infrastructure and have provided training and equip-
ment to support those efforts. In addition to creating and sustaining
the DCA, donors claim success in their efforts to strengthen indigenous
counter-narcotics agencies; to help draft counter-narcotics legislation,
such as laws on money laundering, asset seizure, and financial crimes; and
recently, to establish special courts for prosecuting crimes associated with
narcotics consumption or trafficking. Today, each of the five Central Asian

countries has a national drug control administrative structure, and with
the help of international advisors, the Central Asian governments have set
up inter-ministerial coordination bodies to centralize counter-narcotics
policies and administration.
Donors also count among their successes the high number of law en-
forcement officials trained both domestically and abroad in counter-nar-
cotics techniques and the large quantity of modern equipment provided
to enhance interdiction and investigative capabilities among Central Asian
law enforcement. Their programs have included training and equipment
transfers to border guards, customs officials, and other counter-narcotic
forces throughout the area, in addition to more equipment to improve
forensic capacities and to store, analyze and destroy narcotic and psy-
chotropic substances. From 1998 to 2000, for example, the U.S. State
Department sponsored projects that trained some 500 Central Asian
law enforcement and judicial officials per year, and these efforts are
expanding. More recently, the United States has expanded its law
enforcement presence on the ground in Central Asia, including the
opening of an office of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in Tash-
kent, Uzbekistan and the placement of a regional narcotics officer
in the U.S. Embassy in Kazakhstan to coordinate counter-narcotics
activities throughout Central Asia.
These efforts have helped to raise interdiction rates significantly.
UN and U.S. officials praise the high volume of drugs seized on the Cen-
tral Asian and Afghanistan borders. According to the UN, Central Asian
heroin seizures more than tripled between 1998 and 2000, rising from one
to 3.2 metric tons, and continue to grow.31
But while some praise these efforts, others question whether quan-
titative indicators, such as the volume of narcotics seized, the number of
people trained or the amount of equipment delivered, are useful measures
to assess their full impact. Instead, some argue, they may mask serious
failings that greatly impact the drug flow as well as exacerbate broader
problems throughout Central Asian society.
For example, some observers question whether seizure rates on Cen-
tral Asia’s borders have increased significantly as a byproduct of higher
trafficking rates rather than as a result of more effective law enforcement
or border initiatives.32 Critics point out that while seizures may have in-
creased, so, too, has drug production in Afghanistan, and to this day, the
amount of drugs interdicted continues to represent a very small percent-
age of the overall amount of drugs trafficked. Critics also argue that the
370 LUBIN
focus on keeping interdiction rates high may have created detrimental side
effects, such as further encouraging harassment by law enforcement offi-
cials of low-level drug traffickers, often women, in order to increase arrest
totals; further eroding the fairness of interrogation and judicial proceed-
ings in order to keep conviction rates high; and thus also contributing to
growing incarceration rates in already overcrowded prisons.33
The net effect, they believe, is ultimately weakening the war on drugs
overall as well as hindering efforts to encourage democratic reforms and
establish an effective rule of law.
For example, some locals and Westerners alike fear that provid-
ing training and equipment in a corrupt environment without highly
intrusive local and international oversight could be feeding the drug
trade with one hand as it tries to eradicate it with the other. They
express concern that international donors, like their Central Asian
counterparts, are sweeping aside issues of corruption while provid-
ing significant funds and equipment to entities widely regarded as
complicit in the trade itself. How does one know, they ask, if such
training is helping governments to eradicate drug smuggling or simply
allowing one cartel to eliminate another? How can one evaluate whether
training programs are creating more honest, efficient law enforcement or
are only empowering officers involved in trafficking to smuggle more ef-
fectively? Or, like the U.S. customs officer mentioned in the introduction,
could training and equipment be helping well-placed officials to play both
sides?
Donors argue that international organizations have attempted to
identify untrustworthy individuals through a vetting process, or, in the
words of one agency head, through “intuition.” But donors also agree that
both vetting and intuition are woefully inadequate in highly centralized
and authoritarian countries where corruption is not an individual affair
in the first place. Corruption in Central Asia is not a matter of corrupt
individuals acting purely for personal gain; it is part of a highly organized
system of economic crime that permeates all aspects of life.34 Yet few in-
ternational programs have had the capability, or the inclination, to sort
through how this system works and apply that knowledge explicitly to
donor programs. Limited resources and regional expertise often limit the
ability of programs to assess who wins and who loses from the rampant
trafficking in Central Asia—or from the Western programs introduced to
combat it.
The same concerns have been expressed regarding the impact of
counter-narcotics trafficking programs on human rights and other abuses.
Throughout Central Asia, the war on drugs often has been used for po-
litical ends—to repress political opposition, target particular religious and
ethnic groups, limit civil liberties and tighten political control—as well as
for extracting greater financial gain through bribes and extortion.
The possibility that international training and equipment may fur-
ther empower authoritarian governments to crack down more force-
fully on their own populations has raised new concerns. In Uzbekistan,
for example, law enforcement officers are widely known to plant drugs
on political opponents or religious figures and then prosecute them on
trumped-up drug charges. The crackdown on the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) and on human rights activists has employed these
tactics to increase sentences, as drug trafficking carries some of the most
severe penalties, including death. Special drug courts reportedly avoid chal-
lenging police accounts or forced confessions, particularly in trials with
political repercussions.35
How then, skeptics ask, should one evaluate the impact of training
and equipment transfers when the number of human rights abuses associ-
ated with interdiction may rise along with the number of drug seizures?
How useful are new laws and new courts if there are few mechanisms to
ensure that they are applied fairly? And how does one prevent the courts
from becoming new tools for state repression? Does the provision of more
equipment to law enforcement—widely viewed as corrupt—run the risk
of further strangling citizens’ rights? One U.S. State Department official
stated, off the record, that transferring night vision goggles to a repressive
government is “abhorrent.” “They might be used to fight drugs,” he said,
“but they’re just as likely to be used to fight the opposition.”36
These questions rarely have played a role in international law en-
forcement programs, which traditionally have viewed their mandate as
transferring interdiction capabilities and encouraging high incarceration
rates. Instead, observers and participants in these programs state that
Western trainers tend to turn a blind eye to human rights abuses when
they may interfere with the main goals of interdiction.37
Recently, international organizations have made a more concerted
effort to address the range of societal problems emerging from the drug
trade. The UNODC and the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE)—one of the key organizations dealing with human
rights as well as a range of other concerns in Central Asia—have begun
efforts to coordinate more closely on the ground. They have sponsored
meetings and conferences to discuss such issues as the role of the mass
media in countering drug-related problems and corruption, and the root
372 LUBIN
causes and economic impacts of the drug trade. The UNODC states that
it recently has instituted an educational project on prevention through
mass media and public events. U.S. State Department officials tasked with
drug trafficking issues have spoken of the need to coordinate more closely
with the State Department’s human rights bureau, and U.S. aid programs
have initiated seminars on promoting drug-free schools, including tips on
fighting drug trafficking. The U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) has contributed funds to needle exchange and other harm reduc-
tion programs in Central Asia conducted by the Open Society Institute
and others.
Most of these efforts, however, are in their infancy and face major
hurdles in the years ahead. One of the key points to emerge from media
and corruption conferences, for example, is that the media is extremely
reluctant to cover corruption and at times may be deeply corrupt itself.
Education and public relations programs require far more funding to im-
pact societies where, in a race against time, drugs are assuming an increas-
ingly entrenched role. And an equally difficult hurdle is determining how
to design and shape law enforcement programs themselves so that they
incorporate these concerns and fit the informal economic and political
realities of the Central Asian countries themselves.
Conclusion
What began as a law enforcement challenge in Central Asia, then, has
unfolded into a multifaceted set of challenges—social, economic, political
and security—emanating in all directions. Drug trafficking in Central Asia
has been defined as a target of the war on terrorism, as a key component
in the struggle for human rights, and as a part of one of the most serious
health tragedies to beset our planet. It is potentially destabilizing at a time
when the need for stability in this part of the world is at a premium. And
it embraces such issues as widespread corruption that traditionally have
been swept under the rug by all parties.
As U.S. policy makers and the international community commit to
major investments to address this challenge, it is critical that strategies be
refined, particularly in assessing priorities when these goals conflict. Past
experience in other parts of the world demonstrate that supply reduction
cannot work without a concurrent reduction in demand; but it is unclear
what the balance should be between interdiction efforts on one hand, and
demand and harm reduction programs on the other. Drugs and terrorism
have been linked in U.S. policy as if they are part of the same battle, but
they can be qualitatively different battles, where the strategies and tactics
for combating one may conflict with those of the other. Which should take
precedence? The same question can be asked for human rights, stability
and humanitarian concerns.
At the tactical level, programs and projects demand far more atten-
tion, particularly in how they are designed, implemented, monitored and
evaluated.38 Perhaps most glaring is the need for greater local and interna-
tional oversight and evaluation—particularly at a time when the trend has
moved in the opposite direction. To date, mechanisms have been weak in
this area, and resources for evaluations and follow-up have been limited
on the part of implementing agencies. The U.S. State Department and law
enforcement officials acknowledge that no formal evaluations of the coun-
ter-narcotics programs have been carried out to date in Central Asia; that
they have yet to develop a standard mechanism for reporting and evalu-
ation in the first place; and that the few evaluations that have taken place
have been cursory “trip reports,” focusing on numbers of people trained
and equipment transferred. Other donors have conducted more formal
evaluations, but the evaluation teams rarely, if ever, include any expertise
on the region or local language capability, limiting their ability to conduct
any kind of independent investigation.
In a region of “smoke and mirrors,” programs must be closely
monitored to ensure that equipment and training are applied as intended.
While this should be done through both local oversight and Western per-
sonnel on the ground, ultimate responsibility for oversight and monitor-
ing should lie with the donors who design and implement the programs.
In short, then, with record opium poppy yields and limited govern-
mental control in Afghanistan, there is more pressure than ever before on
the Moskovskii border guard detachment mentioned at the beginning of
the chapter—and every detachment along the border of Afghanistan—to
interdict some of the largest estimated drug flows in Central Asia’s history.
Donor organizations and local drug-control agencies have made impor-
tant strides in Central Asia, but this should be seen as just a beginning. For
these border guards and the multitude of others fighting the drug trade
to succeed, much more is needed. Donor efforts must be broadened and
made more nuanced and transparent, with particular attention paid to the
impacts of counter-narcotics trafficking programs on corruption, as well
as on human rights, gender, local economies and the like. More funding
must be targeted from the international community, not only for the ex-
pansion of programs, but to support broadened oversight, transparency,
and accountability on the ground. And a wider range of international and
regional actors must become more involved if any “war on drugs” is to
374 LUBIN
have a chance of success. Specialists in the informal workings of these soci-

eties must be encouraged to work hand-in-hand with technical experts to
create programs that neither can accomplish alone; and the Central Asian
public must be engaged to inject far more public oversight, both local and
international, into every program. The confluence of drug money and
terrorism, coupled with burgeoning societal ills in this part of the world,
suggest the stakes may never have been higher.
Notes
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published in Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 56,
no. 2, Spring 2003..
2 John Burnett, “Corruption at the Gates,” Two-part Series for National Public Radio, All Things
Considered, September 12-13, 2002.

3 Kevin Sullivan, “Citing Corruption, Mexico Shuts Drug Unit,” The Washington Post, Janu-
ary 21, 2003, A14.

4 John Burnett.
5 For the purposes of this article, Central Asia is comprised of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz-
stan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

6 For a good review of questions concerning drug trafficking, including corruption, in these
countries and Western assistance, see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2003, at <www.
state. ov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2002/pdf>.
7 The 2000 Congressional Supplemental allocates about $60 million to counter-narcotics and
law enforcement efforts in Afghanistan, $22 million to counter-narcotics and law enforcement in
Central Asia, and additional funds to the Caucasus. Coupled with prior 2002 appropriations and other
agency and security funds applied to counter drug trafficking in this area, the total begins to approach
$100 million--if not, some say, exceeding it.
8 Estimates for 1999 range from 2,700 to 4,600 metric tons, and for 2000, from 3,300 to 3,700
metric tons, due to discrepancies between U.S. and UN estimates. In 1999, the U.S. estimate was 1,700
metric tons, subsequently revised upward to 2,860 metric tons, but was still only some 60 percent of
the UN estimate. In 2000, however, the U.S. estimate of 3,700 metric tons exceeded the UN estimate
of 3,300 metric tons. The discrepancy is due largely to different methodologies used by the different
agencies.
9 UNODC (formerly UN Office on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP)), World
Drug Report 2000, 160, at <http.//www.unodc.org/odccp/world-drug-report.html>.

10 Barbara Crossette, “Afghan Heroin Feeds Addiction in Region, UN Report Declares,” New
York Times, February 29, 2000; John Pomfret, “Drug Trade Resurgent in Afghanistan,” The Washing-
ton Post, October 23, 2001. Although the Taliban blamed opposition forces for the high production
and trafficking of opium and state its commitment to eliminate opium cultivation, the Taliban gov-
ernment, in fact, sanctioned the growth of opium through the late 1990s. It reportedly imposed, as on
other agricultural goods, a 10 percent tax on the opium poppy and a 20 percent tax on its production
and trade. Estimates of revenues the Taliban received from the opium trade range from $30 million
to as high as $75 million--funds which enabled the government to finance ongoing wars against op-
position forces and terrorist activities. UNODC estimates the farm-gate value of the 2000 crop of
opium at roughly $91 million. See UNODC (formerly ODCCP), Afghanistan Annual Opium Poppy
Survey 2000. Some argue that incursions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Central
Asia at the end of the 1990s were not intended to found an Islamic state, but instead sought to open
new drug routes. See Scott Peterson, “Fabled Silk Road Now Paved With Narcotics,” Christian Science
Monitor, January 8, 2000.
11 The UN reports 2002 production at 3,200 to 3,600 metric tons; other sources claim it
may be as high as 4,000 tons. See UNODC (formerly ODCCP), Strategic Programme Framework:
Strengthen Drug Control and Crime Prevention Activities in the Central Asian States: 2002-2005;
and “Afghan Drug Crop Increasing,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Crime and Corruption Watch
2, no. 8 (October 25, 2002).
12 UNODC, Strategic Programme Framework, 6.
13 Some experts assert that as much as 50 to 60 percent of all drugs produced in Afghanistan
are traf-ficked through Central Asia. For the 50 percent estimate, see, for example, Prepared Testimony
of Ralf Mutsche, Assistant Director, Criminal Directorate International Criminal Police Organization
Interpol General Secretariat, before the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime,
December13, 2000; for the 60 percent estimate, see U.S. Government Accounting Office, “Southwest-
ern Asia Heroin Production,” June 21, 2000.
14 See, for example, David Mansfield and Chris Martin, Strategic Review: The Role of Central
Asia as a Conduit for Illicit Drugs to Western Europe, April 2000; Peter Reuter, RAND Corporation,
private communication to author.
15 See “As Kyrgyzstan Calculates Drug Barons’ Profits,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty News-
line 4, no. 204 (October 20, 2000). The international drug trade was estimated to produce $400 billion
per year for criminal syndicates.
16 See survey results from Central Asian law enforcement personnel and the general popula-
tion in Nancy Lubin, Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption and Identity (Washington, DC:
U.S. Institute of Peace, 1995).
17 Private communication to the author.
19 Cited in Nancv Lubin, Alex Klaits and Igor Barsegian, Narcotics Interdiction in Afghanistan
and Central Asia: Challenges for International Assistance, Open Society Institute, January, 2002. See also
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2003.
20 See, for example, Marat Mamadshoyev, “Tajik Drugs in Kazakh Capital: A Victory for the
Special Services or for Diplomatic Intrigue?” Eurasia Insight, June 15, 2000, at <http://wwweurasianet.
org/departments/insigt/articles/eavO6l 500.shtml>.
21 See, for example, Rustem Safronov, “Turkmenistan’s Niyazov Implicated in Drug Smug-
gling,” Eurasia Insight, March 29, 2002, at <http://www.eurasianet.or departments/insight/articles/

eav032902.shtml>.
22 Regarding Tajikistan, for example, the report states: “It is impossible to determine how per-
vasive drug and other forms of corruption are within government circles; salaries for even top officials
are extremely low and, at times, clearly inadequate to support the lifestyles many officials maintain.
Even when arrests are made, the resulting cases are not always brought to a satisfactory conclusion...
The lavish lifestyles of some, as noted, do give some credence to corruption allegations.” See U.S. De-
partment of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, ix-120.
24 Rakhim Abdukholikzoda, “Ch to skryvaet ‘geroinovaia zavesa,”’ (What’s Behind the ‘Heroin
Veil?) January 28, 2003.

25 E-mailed commentary on “Chto slcryvaet ‘geroinovaia zavesa,”’ (“What’s Behind the ‘Heroin
Veil?
26 Author’s interview with courier, May 2002.
27 “The Right Moves Aren’t Working ... So the Drug Trade is Roaring,” Business Week, June
23, 1997.
28 Open Society Institute employee interview with Kyrgyz counter-narcotics official. For fur-
ther discussion of these issues, see Lubin, Klaits, and Barsegian.

29 See Erika Dailey, “Drug Searches and Human Rights Violations on the Tajikistan Border,”
EurasiaNet, February 18, 2000, at <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/hrr02l800.

376 LUBIN
shtml>; see “Governmental and International Responses to Human Rights Abuses at Tajikistan’s
Border Crossing,” EurasiaNet, May 16, 2000, at <http://www.eurasianet.orWdepartments/rights/ar-
ticies/hrrO5l600.sNtml>. For an excellent discussion of women and the drug trade, see Tatiana
Bozrikova, “Women and Drugs in Tajikistan,” Open Society Institute Assistance Foundation,
Tajikistan, February 2001. Many women view strip searches as so common they avoid cross-bor-
der travel whenever possible. The situation has contributed to further destruction of formerly
strong social ties that united relatives living in different republics. Private communications to the
author.
30 The UN estimates that some 7,500 people were living with HIV/AIDS in Central Asia by
2001, most of whom were injecting drug users. Given methodological problems in assessing these
totals, however, others believe that the actual number may be 10 times that amount. See, for example,
Interfax-Kazakhstan News Agency, Almaty, reported in Russian, May 21, 2002 and reported by the
BBC, May 21, 2002.
31 UNODC, Strategic Program Framework, 6.
32 Janeis Makerenko, Intelligence Review 12, no. 1 I (Nov 1, 2000). At the global level, this is
what UNODC reports in the 2000 World Drug Report.

33 See Lubin, Alex Klaits and Igor Barsegian, Narcotics Interdiction in Afghanistan.
34 For broader description, see Lubin, “New Threats in Central Asia and the Caucasus: An Old
Story with a New Twist,” Russia’s Total Security Environment, Institute for East/West Studies, 1999.
35 For fuller discussion, see Lubin, Klaits, and Barsegian.
36 Cited in Lubin, Klaits and Barsegian.
37 Private communications to the authors and their first-hand experience in these programs.
38 Previous testimony and reports by JNA Associates outline specific recommendations. See
Lubin, “U.S. Policies in Central Asia,” and “Aid to the Soviet Union,” Congressional Testimony before
the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Committee on International Relations, March 17 1999; and
JNA Associates, Inc., U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet Union: When Less is More, 1996.
MIGRATION TRENDS 377
Chapter 18
Migration Trends in Central

Asia and the Case of
Trafficking of Women
Saltanat Sulaimanova
A
fter the collapse of the Soviet Union and the elimination of state
regulation of population movements, migration from, to and
within Central Asia has become an acute and continuous process.1
It has substantial political, social and economic implications, negatively
affecting the economies of the countries from which the migration out-
flow occurs. Traditionally, the Russian workforce in Central Asia tended
to dominate the industrial, technical, educational and medical care sec-
tors.2 However, in the years since 1991, with the dramatic outflow of
highly qualified professionals of Russian, German and Jewish origin,
most Central Asian societies have experienced a “brain drain” and dete-
rioration in the quality of education, medical fields, and other sectors of
the economy.
Central Asian republics rightfully have been called “an as-
tonishing ethnic mosaic.”3 Such multi-ethnicity is the result of the
following factors:
■ Pre-Soviet Russian Tsarist imperialistic expansion policies, which
encouraged resettlement of Russians in Central Asia;4
■ Repression and massive deportation of people to Central Asia by
Stalin;
■ Forced relocation of ethnic Germans, Greeks, Crimean Tatars,
Koreans and Turks during World War II;5
■ World War II and post-war reconstruction-era relocation policies,
when industrial plants and factories with their entire workforce
were relocated to Central Asia;
■ Soviet policies of sending young graduates and professionals to
work in the Central Asian republics.6
377
378 SULAIMANOVA
The migration of non-titular ethnic groups to the region continued

to increase until the end of the 1950s. It reached its peak in 1959, when
45 percent of the region’s population (over 10 million persons) were im-
migrants.7 However, in the following 30 years, the number of indigenous
populations in Central Asia increased threefold due to a higher birth rate,
while the immigrant population grew by half.8
Nonetheless, by the late 1970s, migration trends began to change:
some regions of Russia experienced labor deficits and became attractive
areas for relocation because of the higher wages. In the 1980s, the Rus-
sian labor market became more favorable and the government actively
promoted migration to Russia and Ukraine, not only by Slavs but also
by the ethnic populations of non-Slavic republics.9 During President
Gorbachev’s “perestroika” reforms, restrictions on travel outside the So-
viet Union finally were lifted, though at first only the selective emigration
of Jews, Germans and Greeks was allowed.10 Eventually, from 1988 on, all
individuals were permitted to migrate out of the country, although many
republics still retained exit visa policies.
Migration within and outside Central Asia can be classified as inter-
nal, external and transit migration, as well as permanent and temporary
(labor) migration. In general, ethnic minorities tend to migrate perma-
nently out of Central Asia. Most of the migrants are ethnic Russians, who
numbered more than eight million in Central Asian republics as late as
1995.11 Table 18-1 shows the extent of this migration by country. In 1989,
there were 388,000 Russians in Tajikistan, making up 7.6 percent of the
population;12 more than 100,000 Russians left the republic in 1992 alone.13
By 1996, the Russian population in Tajikistan had decreased by a factor
of two and represented 3.4 percent of the population. The civil war that
broke out in 1992 and the rapidly deteriorating economy were among the
reasons for the massive exodus of Russians as well as much of the Tajik
population.14 During the war years, approximately 300,000 Tajik citizens
left the country, while another 692,000 were displaced to other parts of
Tajikistan.
Similarly, in Uzbekistan before independence, 60 percent of the
population of Tashkent, the capital, were Russians. By 1993, Russians
composed only 40 percent of Tashkent’s inhabitants.15 The overall Russian
population in Uzbekistan decreased from 8.3 percent in 1989 to 5.6 per-
cent in 1996, spurred by the departure of 363,000 people.16 Tatars also left
Uzbekistan: between 1989 and 1996, their number decreased from 657,000
to 343,000.17
In Kazakhstan in 1989, ethnic Kazakhs were a minority in their own

country, making up only 39.7 percent of the population. By 1999, the pro-
portion of Kazakhs had increased to 53.4 percent. This increase was again
partly caused by migration of ethnic people, specifically Russians who
comprised 37.8 percent of the population in 1989 dropped to 30 percent
in 1999. Overall, between 1989 and 1999, the “European”18 population in
Kazakhstan decreased from 44.7 to 34.7 percent.19
In Kyrgyzstan, out of 102,000 ethnic Germans living in the country,
80,000 left between 1991 and 1996.20 In addition to the typical causes
behind the migration of minorities from Central Asia, the main impetus
for the German exodus was the program run by the German government
to accept and assist German descendants from the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). Russians also departed in significant numbers.
Where they once comprised 21.4 percent of the Kyrgyzstan population in
1989 the figure had dropped to 12.5 percent by 1999.21
Turkmenistan has had the lowest migration rate among the Central
Asian states. The proportion of non-Russian minorities in Turkmenistan
decreased only slightly, from 18.5 to 18 percent between 1989 and 1996.
The Russian population decreased from 9.5 percent in 1989 to 6.6 percent
in 1996. Such low rates of migration can be explained by the absence of
ethnic violence in the country, the dependence of the Turkmen gas in-
dustry on Russian personnel,22 and government policies that allowed dual
citizenship with Russia. However, this policy was reversed in 2003: Turk-
men citizens now have to either give up Russian citizenship or leave the
country. As a result, it has been reported that emigration of non-titular
citizens from Turkmenistan is on the rise.23
Motivating factors behind the decision of non-titular populations
to migrate from Central Asia include: ethnic motives,25 economic mo-
tives, uncertainty about the future and desire to provide a better future
for children, isolation from Russia, anti-democratic regimes, social and
political instability, poor ecological conditions, criminal situations, and
other personal motives (family unification, health problems, desire/need
for a different climate, etc).26 In addition to the permanent external migra-
tion, people from Central Asia have begun to migrate to other countries
for temporary jobs, and engage in shuttle trade and other kinds of com-
mercial migration. A substantial number of migrants (mostly women)
engage in the shuttle trade, traveling to other countries to purchase goods
to be resold in their home countries. Typical destination countries include
China, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Russia. The traveling
380 SULAIMANOVA
Table 18–1. Population Change in Central Asia by Ethnicity, 1989-199624

Percent Thousands
1989 1996 1989 1996
Tajikistan
Tajiks 62.1 68.1 3,172 4,006
Uzbeks 23.4 24.4 1,198 1,435
Russians 7.6 3.4 388 199
Other 6.9 4.1 350 244
Uzbekistan
Uzbeks 71 76.6 14,142 17,614
Russians 8.3 5.6 1,653 1,280
Tatars 3.3 1.5 657 343
Jews 0.5 0.1 94 18
Germans 0.2 0.1 40 22
Other 16.7 16.3 3,318 3,730
Kazakhstan
Kazakhs 39.5 47.0 6,535 7,781
Russians 37.7 33.9 6,228 5,615
Germans 5.8 2.6 957 426
Other 17 16.4 2,817 2,721
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyz 52.0 59.9 2,230 2,721
Russians 21.4 15.6 917 707
Uzbeks 12.8 14.1 550 640
Ukrainians 2.5 1.6 108 73
Germans 2.4 0.5 101 21
Jews 0.1 0.0 6 2
Other 8.9 8.3 379 381
Turkmenistan
Turkmen 72.0 75.4 2,536 3,163
Russians 9.5 6.6 334 278
Other 18.5 18.0 653 757
Population changes due to natural increase/decrease as well as emigration/immigration. Source: Tim Heleniak. The Changing
Nationality Composition of the Central Asian and Transcaucasian States.” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 38, No. 6: 357-378.
conditions of such migrants are usually miserable, and they are subject
to harassment from corrupt customs and law enforcement officers. They
also may have to pay high “passage fees.”27
Hundreds of thousands of Central Asians have left their homes for
other CIS countries in search of better work opportunities. Many leave
their families behind and send remittances back home. Russia is the most
popular destination country for such labor migrants. It is estimated that
over 160,000 Tajik citizens work in Russia, primarily in the construction
sector and open markets where unskilled labor is in demand.28 They tend
to concentrate in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Samara, Volgograd and major
cities of Western Siberia. Overall, anywhere between 200,000 to 400,000
Tajik citizens are labor migrants in other Central Asian countries and the
Russian Federation.29 Similarly, the Kyrgyz also migrate in large numbers
to the Russian Federation for work. In addition, it is estimated that 6,00030
to 50,00031 Kyrgyz migrants are working in Kazakhstan.32 Many of them
work on tobacco plantations, often living in horrendous conditions and
abused by the plantation owners. The United States is also a growing
destination for emigration. Over 500 Kyrgyz citizens are estimated to be
working in the New York area, as nannies, maids, care-givers to senior
citizens and other low-level jobs. Typically, these migrants arrive in the
United States on tourist visas and stay to work for a few years with the
intention of saving their wages to take back home and support families in
Kyrgyzstan.33
Internal migration is also an acute problem in Central Asia. The
collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the breakdown of industry, the
collective farm system and the rural infrastructure of the region. Unem-
ployment soared as land was privatized, and jobs that were traditionally
available at collective farms disappeared. Salaries for teachers, doctors and
others became irregular, and many schools and hospitals were forced to
close. Even those institutions that remain open, experience chronic short-
ages of personnel. These circumstances forced rural residents to move to
the cities in search of employment and educational opportunities.34
Internal migration includes internally displaced persons (IDPs),
who have to move within the territory of their country. For example, over
100,00035 persons were displaced during the 1980s and 1990s because
of the environmental disaster in the Aral Sea region.36 In addition, over
161,000 persons37 were forced the leave the Semipalatinsk area, a nuclear
testing site.38 In Kyrgyzstan, at least 17,000 people had to migrate between
1992 and 1997 because of landslides, mudflows, floods and earthquakes.39
Overall, according to the estimates of the United National High Commis-
382 SULAIMANOVA
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR), at least 250,000 people have been forced to
leave their homes in Central Asia because of ecological disasters.40
Another aspect of migration that affects Central Asia is transit mi-
gration of third country nationals en route to more developed countries.
The lax border control that accompanied the demise of the Soviet Union
opened the region, to human smuggling criminal networks and migrants
from as far away as South Asia and Africa en route to Western Europe.41
This issue presents a particular challenge to law enforcement agencies in
the region, as the smuggling of migrants often involves fraudulent pass-
ports and/or visas. Central Asian republics have reported irregular mi-
grants originating from China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Iran.42
Refugees who had to flee their homes because of the brutal civil war
in Tajikistan, the ethnic violence against Meskhetians in Uzbekistan, the
continuous fighting in Chechnya, and the crimes of the Taliban regime
in Afghanistan constitute another major group of people on the move
in Central Asia. UNHCR estimates that 600,000 refugees were displaced
within Tajikistan as a result of the civil war that killed at least 20,000
people. Over 60,000 Tajik refugees fled to Afghanistan, and another 13,000
sought refuge in Kyrgyzstan.43 By 1996, almost all internally displaced Tajik
refugees returned to their homes. Seventy five percent of Tajik refugees
who fled to Afghanistan also have returned. Over 74,000 Meskhetians fled
from the Ferghana valley in 1989 because of serious outbreaks of ethnic
violence. Two-thirds of them found asylum in Azerbaijan, while the re-
maining group moved to Russia.44
Overall, it is likely that migration in Central Asia will continue as re-
gional economies deteriorate. Since channels for legal labor migration are
limited, irregular migration is likely to prevail. The consequences of this
migration are serious for the countries concerned, as well as for labor mi-
grants themselves. The International Organization for Migration (IOM)
reports, “99 percent of labour migration in the Eurasian Economic Union
formed of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and
Belarus is irregular. Due to their irregular situation, most labour migrants
do not benefit from the same protection rights other regular citizens enjoy
and are thus more vulnerable to exploitation by underground employers.”45
The most despicable form of irregular migration is human trafficking. The
trafficking of human beings for the purposes of sexual exploitation, which
is becoming a salient characteristic of migration dynamics in Central Asia,
is the most onerous form of migration throughout the region.
Human Trafficking: The Scope of the Problem

Trafficking in women is a modern form of slavery that exists in
most countries of the world. It is a transnational global problem and one
of the fastest growing criminal enterprises. Traffickers find it attractive
because the profits are enormously high and the risks are low. Each year,
illicit profits from trafficking in women generate an estimated seven to
12 billion dollars for organized criminal groups.46 Trafficking in persons
has increased significantly since the end of the Cold War, as borders have
become more open, and more people, especially women, have become
economically vulnerable. For many years, Thailand and the Philippines
have been the main source of young women, but Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union are rapidly becoming growing markets. The increase
in trafficking in women is an unintended consequence and a “female
underside” of globalization.47 This chapter seeks to illustrate trafficking
patterns in Central Asia through analysis of existing data, conversations
with women’s rights activists, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs),
international organizations in Central Asia, and personal observations in
the field.
Given the complex nature of trafficking, it is not surprising that there
are many debates as to its definition. The IOM, a Geneva-based intergov-
ernmental organization, defines trafficking as occurring when: “a migrant
is illicitly engaged (recruited, kidnapped, sold, etc.) and/or moved, either
within national or across international borders; Intermediaries (traffick-
ers) during any part of this process obtain economic or other profit by
means of deception, coercion and/or other forms of exploitation under
conditions that violate the fundamental human rights of migrants.”48 A
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially
Women and Children supplementing the UN Convention against Transna-
tional Organized Crime of 2000, offers a more comprehensive definition
of trafficking.49
Political, economic and social changes, which took place after the
Soviet Union collapsed, resulted in poverty and unemployment, and cre-
ated a pool of women from which traffickers could recruit. Thousands of
women are lured into prostitution under false pretenses of high paying
jobs abroad as waitresses, dancers, models and au pairs. Impoverished
women of Central Asia are an easy target for traffickers, who take advan-
tage of the high level of unemployment among women, their poverty and
the lack of a stable future.
384 SULAIMANOVA
Trafficking in human beings is a multifaceted problem and it takes

various forms—sweat shop labor, domestic servitude, begging, trafficking
of boys to be used as camel jockeys, and sexual exploitation. Trafficking in
women for the purposes of sexual exploitation is a more dangerous form
of trafficking in humans compared to others because victims are exposed
to serious health risks, including sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and
HIV/AIDS. Trafficking in children and men also occurs, but the majority
of victims are women. In Central Asia, the trafficking of women is a new
phenomenon. Prior to 1992 virtually no cases of trafficking in women
were reported from this region to the West; since the break-up of the So-
viet Union, the phenomenon has reached epidemic proportions.
It is difficult to determine how many women have been trafficked
abroad from the former Soviet Union. The trafficking “business” keeps
a low profile, victims are threatened by the traffickers to remain silent,
and no official statistics are available. Estimates of how many people are
trafficked worldwide vary significantly. The U.S. Government estimates
that approximately 800,000 to 900,000 persons are trafficked each year.50
Other reports state that up to four million people are trafficked around the
world annually.51 The estimates of the number of persons trafficked into
the United States annually vary from 18,00052 to 50,000.53 Other sources
estimate that up to 175,000 persons are trafficked from Central and East-
ern Europe and the CIS annually.54 In the case of Central Asia, the IOM
estimates that approximately 4,000 women from Kyrgyzstan, about 5,000
from Kazakhstan,55 and 1,000 from Tajikistan are trafficked abroad each
year. There are no estimates on the scale of trafficking from the other Cen-
tral Asian republics, but the U.S. Government deems Uzbekistan to have a
significant number of trafficking cases.56
Most of the research on trafficking has been conducted in the tra-
ditional sending and receiving countries by the IOM, NGOs, and inde-
pendent researchers. In light of the changes in the post-Cold War era,
IOM has conducted studies in the newly independent states of the former
Soviet Union (Ukraine, Moldova, the Kyrgyz Republic, Armenia, Georgia
and Tajikistan) that have become a major source of trafficked women.
These studies identify the scope of trafficking in human beings, trafficking
routes, common destination countries, methods of recruitment, traffick-
ing networks, profile of victims and estimates of the number of trafficked
women.
Nature of the Problem

One of the first writings on sexual exploitation of women from a
feminist and human rights perspective was undertaken by Kathleen Barry
in the 1970s. Her Female Sexual Slavery was ground-breaking research on
forced prostitution and trafficking in women, at a time when there was a
belief that “women are not forced into prostitution; sexual violence is sim-
ply part of their work, and further, that some women are made for that.”57
Most of the prior research on prostitution looked at female motivation
rather than the circumstances that got them onto the streets. Barry came
up with the concept of female sexual slavery and defines it as follows:
Female sexual slavery is present in all situations where women or girls
cannot change the immediate conditions of their existence; where
regardless of how they got into those conditions they cannot get out;
and where they are subject to sexual violence and exploitation.58
Barry’s definition of female sexual slavery reflects the situation in
which many trafficking victims find themselves. The majority of trafficked
women are kept in squalid conditions in a state of virtual house arrest
and are transported only to and from work. Even when women have rela-
tive freedom of movement, their illegal immigration status, inability to
speak the local language, lack of documents, and fear of being arrested,
mistreated, or deported, keeps them from seeking help from local law
enforcement authorities.59
Human trafficking is often viewed from the perspective of interna-
tional migration. As Paul J. Smith points out, international migration is
often explained by a basic “push” and “pull” model: “economic depriva-
tion, high fertility, and unemployment (push factors) in lesser-developed
countries work in concert with such elements as family reunification,
higher wages, and increased demand for labor (pull factors) in industrial-
ized countries, to create an influx of immigrants.”60 This model holds true
for the trafficking phenomenon as well. Poverty, unemployment and lack
of future perspectives are among the push factors; demand for “services”
and potentially higher wages are the pull factors in receiving countries, for
women taking the risk of going abroad and getting trafficked.
Bolstering the pull factors are “stories of better opportunities over-
seas,” which are often naive and unrealistic. During a study of trafficking
from the CIS, one respondent said she knew she would have to engage
in prostitution, but she thought it would be similar to the film Pretty
Woman, where one man would support her.61 One could argue that this is
an extreme level of naiveté, but considering that the former Soviet coun-
386 SULAIMANOVA
tries were totally isolated from the rest of the world for almost 70 years,
these kinds of illusions are not surprising. Ideas of the lifestyle in Western
countries, and especially the United States, are drawn mainly from the
movies and soap operas televised on a daily basis. Women watching “Santa
Barbara” and “Dallas” expect to have the kind of life they see in the mov-
ies once they get to the West. They do not anticipate being manipulated,
deceived, or physically abused, and believe nothing bad could happen to
them in wealthy countries.
Though limited, existing literature provides some insight into the
links between human trafficking and organized criminal groups. In most
cases, trafficking is carried out by organized criminal groups with exten-
sive international links.62 These criminal groups intimidate the trafficked
women and threaten retaliation against family members at home if the
women do not obey them.63 In the same vein, Sietske Altink of the Dutch
anti-trafficking NGO STV writes:
As the traffickers are highly organized, most of their victims dare
not speak out. Ana from the Dominican Republic said, ‘They were
like a mafia. I couldn’t even discuss my situation with other girls.
Whenever I told someone my story, the next day the traffickers knew
that I had talked. The man who kept me prisoner explicitly forbade
me to speak to other girls. If these criminals have the address of your
parents’ home, they can keep you a prisoner. They say you endanger
your father and mother when you don’t obey them. That’s how the
traffickers subdue us.64
Root Causes of Trafficking

In general, women get trafficked because of poverty, unemployment,
the low social status of women in their home countries, lack of opportuni-
ties and prospects for the future, and in many cases, because of an idealis-
tic view of the Western world and the wealthier countries in general. All of
these rationales can be found in Central Asia. Poverty in Central Asia has
reached unprecedented levels: 51 percent of the Kyrgyz population lives
below the national poverty line, as do 34.6 percent of Kazakh citizens and
26.5 percent of the Uzbeks. Forty four percent of Turkmen live on less than
$2 a day.65 The population groups most affected by poverty are women,
children, and the elderly. Women are the first ones to lose their jobs due
to downsizing and economic shifts.66 The National Statistics Committee of
Kyrgyzstan reports that 70 percent of women in Kyrgyzstan are suffering
from financial difficulties.67 The unemployment rate is very high, and even
those who are employed, make an average of $28 per month.68 As the 2000
IOM survey of trafficking victims in Kyrgyzstan reports:
Seventy nine percent of the respondents said that unemployment
drove them to look for work abroad. The main reasons they were
working as commercial sex workers abroad were said to be related to
their lack of money and hopes for a better future. The lack of alter-
native opportunities encourages them to take risks. In focus groups
discussions the women said that they want more for themselves and
their families than to just earn enough money to feed themselves.
They want a better life.69
Even when women are employed, they often face job discrimination
and sexual harassment at work. In many businesses throughout the CIS,
it is not uncommon for a male boss to demand that his female subordi-
nate engage in sexual relations with him.70 Newspaper job advertisements
targeting women often mention “no hang-ups,” as one of the qualifica-
tions required for the job.71 Not surprisingly, when women are promised
payment of $60,000 a year to work abroad,72 an amount they could never
dream of at home, it is not very difficult for them to be enticed by such
lucrative “job offers.”
The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted not only in poverty and
unemployment but also in the drastic deterioration of the system of social
protection. Many of the social services taken for granted under the Soviet
system are no longer offered. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, day
care for children, education at all levels, and medical services were pro-
vided by the government. Now many day care centers have closed and the
remaining ones are unaffordable to most parents. Health care and educa-
tion systems also are closed or deteriorating, due to lack of funding.73
The social status of women in Central Asia has been on the decline
in the last decade as well. As the economic situation continues to worsen,
more and more men lose their jobs, often plunging them into a spiral of
alcoholism and abuse of the family at home. Increasingly, women have
become the victims of domestic violence, while local law enforcement
officials refuse to take this offense seriously.74 Domestic violence is one of
the major reasons why children run away from home. Street children, in
turn, are especially vulnerable to being recruited by traffickers. Further,
young girls from households where domestic violence is the norm, grow
up “seeing women as inferior beings that men can use and abuse as they
please.”75 The mistreatment or abuse they receive in trafficking situations
only confirms their worst fears.
388 SULAIMANOVA
In addition, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian
nations have witnessed a revival of “national traditions,” which often come
into conflict with Soviet policies that promoted women’s equality. Not long
after independence, politicians began advocating a return to “traditional
roles” for women, which is interpreted by many as an attempt to “drive
women out of the labor force and higher education and back into the
home.”76 The Parliament in Kyrgyzstan has discussed seriously legalizing
polygamy, and ultimately, rejected the proposal by only a small margin.77
Unofficially, polygamy is not uncommon in Central Asian republics.78 The
deteriorating economic situation, high unemployment among women,
religious and traditional sentiments, as well as the consequences of the
civil war (in Tajikistan) are cited as some of the reasons why polygamy is
spreading across Central Asia;79 traditional male chauvinism is another.
This dramatic decline in women’s social status has created a situation fa-
vorable for traffickers.
Recruitment of Women in the Countries of Origin

Traffickers use the following methods to recruit victims:
■ Advertisements in newspapers;
■ Marriage agencies or mail-order-bride agencies;
■ Friends, relatives, or acquaintances;
■ The “Second Wave” (trafficked women returning to recruit other
women);
■ False marriages (women marrying a false groom who is, in fact, a
trafficker);80
■ Kidnapping.
Advertisements in newspapers are the most popular recruitment

method because traffickers can reach a wide pool of potential victims.
Such advertisements usually offer young women highly paid work abroad
as waitresses, dancers, or shopkeepers.81 When a woman responds to an
advertisement, the traffickers sometimes sign a “contract” with her that
promises high earnings, but also stipulates that travel expenses as well as
room and board will be deducted. Room and board often can eat up over
half of their daily earnings. Women also are bound to pay back the travel
expenses that are “calculated” at rates often exceeding the real cost of
transportation by as much as three to five times. According to the Global
Survival Network, an NGO based in Washington, trafficking networks in
Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS) charge women anywhere
from $1,500 to $30,000 for their “services” in facilitating documentation,
jobs, and transportation.82 This leaves victims with a huge debt that takes
months, if not years, to pay off. The women often are deprived of all their
earnings until this “debt” is paid in full, which makes them, in fact, inden-
tured servants.
Mail-order-bride and marriage agencies via the Internet have become
increasingly popular among women who want to marry a foreigner. Their
hope is to improve their economic situation and/or escape their native
country, where they see no prospects for the future. Most of these women
are somewhat naively searching for happiness, and often become victims
of men who “order” them only to sell them to pimps.83 The paramount
problem is that mail-order-bride agencies do not conduct any screening of
their male clients, some of whom may have a history of violence or criminal
background. As a result, mail-order brides may become victims of abuse.
In a recent case, a 20 year old mail-order-bride, Anastasia Solovieva-King
from Kyrgyzstan, was murdered by her American husband, Indle King. He
had been married twice before, both times through matchmaking agen-
cies. Within a month of marrying Anastasia, the man was writing to other
prospective mail-order-brides. Two years later, as his marriage to Anas-
tasia started falling apart, he wrote to more women and began planning
to marry another mail-order-bride.84 Following the murder of Anastasia
King, the U.S. Congress proposed a bill in 2003, that would allow foreign
mail order brides to check the criminal background (including protective
orders issued because of domestic violence allegations) of their potential
grooms. If such legislation had been in place, Anastasia Soloeiva may have
learned that her prospective husband’s first wife had obtained a protective
order against him in 1995.85
Some victims of trafficking have indicated that they have been re-
cruited by friends, relatives or acquaintances. These people gained the
woman’s confidence, then offered them highly paid work abroad, often
sharing their alleged “experience” and showing off newly purchased goods
or property.86 “Second wave” recruitment occurs when trafficked women
return home to recruit other women. For some women this is the only way
they can return home—a common ploy for pimps is to pose a condition
that the trafficked woman find someone else to replace her. Other women
become recruiters voluntarily, making a profit from other women’s victim-
ization. One woman who had been trafficked from Kyrgyzstan expressed
her intention to become a trafficker: “In the future I want to become an
agent myself. I think I could be very successful. I could recruit girls to
send to Kazakhstan, there’s money to be made there too. I can earn more
working for just three months abroad, than I can earn in five years here. A
390 SULAIMANOVA
pimp earns at least $5,000 from each woman he takes on.”87 The cycle can
be self-perpetuating. There are also cases of women who have not been
recruited being kidnapped off the streets.88
Transportation to Destination Countries and

Involvement of Government Officials
In most cases traffickers arrange for a woman’s travel documents,
visas and airline tickets. Occupations typically listed on a victim’s visa ap-
plications include dancer, entertainer, student or au pair. Tour firms are
found to assist in the trafficking of women and girls abroad, claiming they
are “shop-tourists” who buy goods abroad to resell them in their home
countries.89 Having entered the country with fake passports, women usu-
ally overstay their visas, which makes them even more vulnerable because
they are viewed by the local police as illegal immigrants.
Almost every trafficking network in Central Asia has a contact who
makes it possible for them to obtain genuine state issued passports at the
passport issuing department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.90 This
indicates that corrupt local law enforcement officials are an integral part
of the trafficking chain. If a woman does not have a passport, or is under-
age, a fraudulent passport is arranged for a bribe, ranging from $10091
to $800.92 Corrupt law enforcement officials have a monetary motive for
facilitating the trafficking of women—salaries at the government agencies
are very low, and corruption is a way to supplement their income. Another
reason why government officials are reluctant to intervene in human traf-
ficking is due to fear of reprisals by organized criminal groups.93
It also has been reported that law enforcement officials in some re-
ceiving countries are involved in trafficking. For example, women under
the age of 31 are not allowed to enter the United Arab Emirates, which
is a major destination for women trafficked from Central Asia, unless
accompanied by male relatives. When 15 and 16 year-old girls enter the
U.A.E with passports that indicate they are over 31, traffickers bribe the
immigration officials at the airport to let the girls pass through immigra-
tion control.94 Trafficking victims interviewed by the IOM in the Kyrgyz
Republic, reported that 73 percent of them were harassed by the customs
and law enforcement officers upon return. As one of the women recounts,
“When I got to Almaty, the customs officials took $500 cash off me, they
also took my jewelry. They said, ‘We know what you are. It’s written all
over your face.’ Then the cops stopped us and said ‘We know what you’ve
been doing.’95
The Role of Organized Criminal Groups in Trafficking

The former Soviet republics are experiencing an organized crime
epidemic. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) es-
timates that some 8,000 criminal gangs operate throughout the NIS.96
About 200 are now global conglomerates and operate in 58 countries of
the world.97 Twenty six of them have established a presence in the United
States.98 Overall, organized criminal groups from the CIS are involved in
all types of criminal activities, including, but not limited to: money-laun-
dering, drug-trafficking, gambling, prostitution, trafficking in women and
children, child pornography, contract killings, racketeering, banking and
insurance fraud, extortion and kidnapping for ransom.99 The trafficking
networks are controlled by criminal gangs that provide security, logistical
support, liaison with brothel owners in many countries, and false docu-
ments. According to Marco Gramegna of IOM, there are large-, medium-
and small-scale networks of trafficking women.100 Large-scale networks
recruit women in a seemingly legal way, as language students or au pairs,
which leads to the conclusion that these networks have extensive interna-
tional contacts. The medium-scale networks usually traffic women from
one country, while the small-scale networks traffic a few women at a time
when a brothel owner places an “order.”101 In many cases, trafficking is car-
ried out by organized criminal groups with foreign connections.102
The fact that organized criminal groups in various states of the
former Soviet Union have links with each other allows them to organize
illegal trafficking effectively. For example, Russian and Ukrainian women
are trafficked through Georgia to Turkey and the Mediterranean.103 Tajik
women are trafficked to the UAE, Russia, Turkey and other countries
transiting through NIS states.104 Women from Kyrgyzstan are trafficked to
the UAE, Turkey and European countries through Kazakhstan and directly
from Kyrgyzstan.105 According to Louise Shelley, “While the links among
the States have declined since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the orga-
nized criminals still manage to function effectively together. And in the
Russian Far East you see links with Korean and Japanese organized crime
groups that are facilitating the trafficking of women.”106
Methods Used by Traffickers to Control Women

The Dutch NGO working against trafficking in women, Stichting
Tegen Vrouwenhandel (STV), reports that organized criminal groups in-
volved in trafficking are extremely violent and use every kind of threat
to intimidate women. The so-called “red mafia” are said to have made a
392 SULAIMANOVA
woman dig her own grave and have taken women’s family members hos-
tage in order to force them to comply or keep silent.107 As Shelley points
out, “many of the women refuse to cooperate with the authorities because
there is little or no protection, and they face deportation and threats
against their families if they cooperate with foreign law enforcement.”108
Once a woman is in trafficker’s hands, the latter uses any and all
means to control her: violence, including sexual assault, threats to the vic-
tim’s family, drugs, and threats to turn the woman over to unsympathetic
local authorities. Traffickers take away women’s passports immediately
upon arrival in the receiving country, either by force or by claiming that
they need to extend the visas. Passports then are kept hostage to control
the victims. According to Human Rights Watch, the most common form
of coercion is debt bondage.109 Women are told they must work with-
out wages until they repay their purchase price and/or travel expenses.
Employers also maintain their power to “resell” indebted women into
renewed levels of debt. In some cases, women find that their debts only
increase and can never be fully repaid.110 It also seems that pimps/traffick-
ers let some women keep just enough of their earnings to take back home
to attract other potential victims.
Trafficked women who do not obey the rules are treated severely. The
corpses of several hundred trafficked women, strangled, shot or beaten to
a pulp, are found in Europe every year.111 Europol believes that many more
bodies are never discovered. The Russian organized criminal groups are
especially known for their cruelty. As Friedman puts it, “Russian mobsters,
in the United States, simply don’t play by the unwritten rules of the accept-
able uses of gang-land violence.”112 And IOM reports that, “The organized
gangs of traffickers who lure and smuggle young women into prostitution
are ruthless.”113 One trafficked victim from Kyrgyzstan testified, “Russian
pimps, unlike most European ones, are also hardened criminals. It’s no
big deal for them to kill someone. They’re the greediest, cruelest people in
the world. They warned me, ‘If you try to go to the police, we’ll kill you.’ I
believed them.”114
What is Being Done to Fight Trafficking?

The U.S. Government passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
in 2000 to combat trafficking in persons. Among other provisions, this
federal law provides for punishment of traffickers, protection of traffick-
ing victims and monitoring of other countries’ efforts to fight trafficking.
The law also requires the State Department to submit an annual report to
Congress on the status of trafficking worldwide. This report rates coun-
tries’ efforts in combating human trafficking by placing them in “tiers.”

Tier 1 countries are those whose governments “fully comply with the Act’s
minimum standards.” Minimum standards for the governments include
prohibiting and punishing trafficking, as well as making serious efforts to
eliminate trafficking.115 Governments of countries in Tier 2 do not fully
comply with the minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to
do so. Tier 3 countries do not comply with the minimum standards and
are not making significant efforts to comply with those standards.
Four Central Asian countries have been reported in the State Depart-
ment’s 2003 trafficking report. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been placed
in Tier 2, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have been placed in Tier 3.116
Governments that are not making significant efforts to combat human
trafficking might be subject to sanctions from the United States, includ-
ing withdrawal of certain types of U.S. aid. Uzbekistan, until recently, did
not even recognize trafficking as a problem. One of the limited preventive
measures taken by the government of Uzbekistan is denying exit visas
to young women.117 Despite numerous known cases of trafficking from
Kazakhstan, and many reported investigations, the Kazakhs have not con-
victed any of the traffickers.118 However, new anti-trafficking legislation
was passed by the lower houses of the Parliament both in Kazakhstan and
Tajikistan in the spring of 2003.119 Kyrgyzstan is reported to be making
“significant efforts” to combat trafficking and has introduced draft anti-
trafficking legislation to the Parliament.120 It is interesting to note that
both Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan, U.S. allies in the war against terrorism, were
moved up from their rankings as Tier 3 countries in 2002 to Tier 2 in 2003,
raising the question of whether this was done for political reasons.
Conclusions and Recommendations

Trafficking in women is a fundamental human rights violation that
needs to be combated at the national and international levels. The con-
sequences of trafficking are grave, both to the women and the countries
involved. According to Marco Gramegna of the IOM, the consequences of
trafficking are a threat to legal migration and growth in clandestine im-
migration.121 Both of these problems could have substantial implications
for political, economic and diplomatic affairs of the sending and receiving
countries. At the human level, victims of trafficking face intolerable situ-
ations, including sexual and physical abuse, and deprivation of their basic
human rights and dignity.
There is a glaring need for comprehensive trafficking research in
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Such research is essential to
394 SULAIMANOVA
thoroughly assess the scope of trafficking from these countries, identify

the main destination countries, study how people are trafficked, and who
the traffickers are. Based on the results of such studies, the respective
governments should be able to design and implement strategies to fight
trafficking.
Trafficking is driven by poverty and unemployment of women, as
well as by demand in the receiving states. To solve the problem by tack-
ling its root causes would be the optimal solution, which, unfortunately,
is an enormously complex and multidimensional task. Such a solution,
however, cannot wait until the local economies recover and all women are
employed. The international community must confront this issue and take
aggressive steps to stop the trafficking of women and children.
The following steps might be carried out in “sending” countries, in-
cluding the five Central Asian states, to help alleviate the problem:
■ Foster creation of job opportunities for young women;
■ Improve law enforcement efforts to prevent and punish trafficking
of women;
■ Crack down on official complicity in trafficking of women (includ-
ing stricter control over issuing passports) and combat corruption
which fuels organized crime;
■ Carry out information campaigns in the media and on TV about
the nature, realities and risks of “lucrative” job offers;
■ Provide legal, medical and psychological assistance to victims of
trafficking;
■ Guarantee safety to victims who testify against the traffickers
through witness protection programs.
The following actions should be considered by “receiving”
countries:
■ Amend laws, including immigration law, to exempt victims of traf-
ficking and/or servitude from being prosecuted for illegal status
that have resulted directly from these practices. Deportation may
be appropriate, but punitive measures, including detention, should
be waived;
■ Prosecute traffickers and enable victims to bring lawsuits against
traffickers by granting temporary residence permits for the duration
of the case;
■ Impose tougher penalties for trafficking. The United States has al-
ready taken such measures with the adoption of the Victim Protec-
tion Act of 2000;
■ Protect safety of victims of trafficking through strong witness pro-

tection programs;
■ Ensure that victims of trafficking have access to essential social ser-
vices, including shelter and medical care;
■ Distribute information brochures at the receiving countries’ Embas-
sies abroad with each visa issued to a woman, on the realities and
risks of being trafficked and what to do if she finds herself trafficked
and abused abroad.
Trafficking in persons is an acute problem in Central Asia and is
likely to increase as the economies continue to worsen, unless the region's
governments and the international community take serious measures
to fight this phenomenon. Organized criminal groups in both sending
and receiving countries are actively involved in trafficking. All countries
involved, sending, receiving and transit, should continue their efforts to
crack down on organized crime. International cooperation and coordina-
tion between law enforcement agencies is crucial for combating trafficking
in women. When available, the information needed to prosecute the traf-
fickers and protect the victims should be made available to all parties.
Trafficking occurs because women are poor and desperate, do not
have any prospects for improvement in their lives at home, and possess
illusions and unrealistic expectations about what awaits them abroad.
Traffickers take advantage of these circumstances and exploit them. How-
ever, trafficking would not be so profitable if there was no demand in the
wealthier countries. It is obvious that the government authorities in send-
ing countries are involved in the trafficking process at various levels, but
are the authorities in the receiving countries also looking away from the
problem? How aggressively governments combat this problem in the next
few years will determine if the international community is going to elimi-
nate this modern form of slavery in the twenty-first century.
Notes
1 Rafis Abazov, “Economic Migration in Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Case of Kyrgyzstan,”
Post-Communist Economies 11, no. 2 (1999), 237.

2 Paul Kolstoe, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press), 219.
3 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Central Asia on the Move.” Refugees Maga-
zine, May 1, 1996; Internet available from <www.unhcr.ch>; accessed September 25, 2003.
4 For example, 1,500,000 Russians had moved to Turkmenistan by 1917. More Russian immi-
grants arrived in Central Asia after 1918, seeking to escape hunger and civil war.
396 SULAIMANOVA
5 See Yuriy Kulchik, et al., Central Asia After the Empire (Chicago, IL: Pluto Press,1996), 3; Rafis
Abazov, “Economic Migration in Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Case of Kyrgyzstan,” Post-Communist
Economies 11, no. 2 (1999), 240.
6 International Organization for Migration, 2001, “Internal Migration in the Kyrgyz Republic,”
3.
7 Yuriy Kulchik, et al., 4.
8 Ibid.
9 Zhanna Zaionchkovskaya, “Migration Patterns in the Former Soviet Union,” in the Confer-
ence Report Cooperation and Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Migration, RAND,
1996, 15; Internet available from <http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF130/>, accessed Septem-
ber 19, 2003.
10 Ibid., 18.
11 Galina S. Vitkovskaya, “Relocation to Russia from the States of Central Asia: Understand-
ing the Decision to Migrate” in the Conference Report Cooperation and Conflict in the Former Soviet
Union: Implications for Migration, RAND, 1996, 113; Internet available from <http://www.rand.org/
publications/CF/CF130>/, accessed September 19, 2003.
12 Tim Heleniak, “The Changing Nationality Composition of the Central Asian and Transcau-
casian States,” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 38, no. 6: 373.

13 “The Russians Say Goodbye to All That,” The Economist 328, no. 7827 (Sept 4, 1993), 38.
14 International Organization for Migration, 2001, “Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan: A
Study of Trafficking in Women and Children,” 10.

15 “The Russians Say Goodbye to All That.”
16 Tim Heleniak.,no. 6: 375.
17 Ibid.
18 Russian, Ukrainian, Belarus, Polish, and German nationalities.
19 Peter Sinnott, “Population Politics in Kazakhstan,” Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 2
(Spring 2003), 105.

20 Rafis Abazov, “Economic Migration in Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Case of Kyrgyzstan,”
Post-Communist Economies 11, no. 2 (1999), 247.

21 International Organization for Migration. 2001. “Internal Migration in the Kyrgyz Republic,”
11.
22 Tim Heleniak, no. 6: 374.
23 “Flight From Ashgabat,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting (Central Asia), no. 220, July
25, 2003.
24 Population changes due to natural increase/decrease as well as emigration/immigration.
Source: Tim Heleniak, no. 6: 357-378.

25 “Ethnic motives” are concerns about “ethnic policy,” including seizure of power by the titular
ethnic group and intent to create a monoethnic state; “ethnic discrimination,” including non-titular
ethnic groups becoming second-class citizens and experiencing civil rights infringements, employ-
ment discrimination, unequal access to higher education, etc.; popular nationalism, including experi-
ences with harassment, hostility; “language barrier,” including lack of schooling in Russian, lack of
information in Russian, unofficial status of the Russian languages, etc.; “other ethnic-based reasons
for discomfort,” including local cultural traditions, communication difficulties, desire to live among
people of the same nationality, ethnic barriers to family creation, etc. (Source: Galina S. Vitkovskaya,
“Relocation to Russia from the States of Central Asia: Understanding the Decision to Migrate” in the
Conference Report Cooperation and Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Migration,
RAND, 1996: 126; Internet; available from http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF130/, accessed
September 19, 2003.
26 Galina S. Vitkovskaya, “Relocation to Russia from the States of Central Asia: Understand-
ing the Decision to Migrate” in the Conference Report Cooperation and Conflict in the Former Soviet
Union: Implications for Migration, RAND, 1996, 126; Internet available from <http://www.rand.org/
publications/CF/CF130>/, accessed September 19, 2003.
27 International Organization for Migration, 2001, “Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan: A

Study of Trafficking in Women and Children,” 11.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Official estimate is 6,000-7,000.
31 Unofficial estimate.
32 “Poverty Fuels Labour Migration in the South. Poverty is Rife in Some Parts of South-
ern Kyrgyzstan.” Gazeta.kg, August 15, 2003; Internet available from <http://www.gazeta.kg/view.
php?i=1852>, accessed on September 30, 2003. Also see Labor Migration Project documents, Inter-
national Organization for Migration; Internet available from <http://www.iom.elcat.kg/labourmigra-
tion.html>, accessed September 30, 2003.
33 Personal communication with a Kyrgyz labor migrant, September 19, 2003.
34 “Internal Migration in the Kyrgyz Republic,” 4.
35 Over 50,000 persons from this area were displaced to Uzbekistan, 30,000 to Kazakhstan and
13,000 to other CIS states.

36 “Unable to Cope: Out-Migration from Karakalpakstan,” Medicines Sans Frontieres: 24; In-
ternet; available from http://www.msf.org/source/countries/asia/aralsea/2003/karakalpakstan/unable.

pdf; accessed September 25, 2003. Also see United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Central
Asia on the Move.” Refugees Magazine, May 1, 1996; Internet’ available from www.unhcr.ch; accessed
September 25, 2003.
37 45,000 persons relocated elsewhere in Kazakhstan, and 116,000 persons moved to other CIS
countries.
38 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Central Asia on the Move.” Refugees
Magazine, May 1, 1996; Internet’ available from www.unhcr.ch; accessed September 25, 2003.
39 “Internal Migration in the Kyrgyz Republic,” 16.
40 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Central Asia on the Move,” Refugees
Magazine, May 1, 1996; Internet available from <www.unhcr.ch>, accessed September 25, 2003.
41 International Organization for Migration.,“Geopolitical Factors Shaping Migration in Cen-
tral Asia,.” Internet available from <http://www.iom.int/austria/tcc/>, accessed September 25, 2003.
42 International Organization for Migration, “Compilation of Recent Migration Information
from Eastern Europe and Central Asia”; Internet available from <http://www.iom.int/austria/tcc/>,
accessed September 25, 2003.
43 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Central Asia on the Move,” Refugees
Magazine, May 1, 1996: Internet available from <www.unhcr.ch>, accessed September 25, 2003.
44 Ibid.
45 “Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan: A Study of Trafficking in Women and Children,” 11.
46 Donna Hughes, “The ‘Natasha’ Trade—The Transnational Shadow Market of Trafficking in
Women,” Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 2 (Spring 2000), 625.

47 Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie R. Hochschild, eds., “Introduction,” Global Woman: Nannies,
Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2003), 3.
48 International Organization for Migration (IOM). 1999. “Trafficking in Migrants, IOM
Policy and Responses,” Working Paper (March).

49 The Protocol defines trafficking as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or
receipt of persons, by the threat or use of force, by abduction, fraud, deception or coercion or the abuse
of power or by the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation; exploitation shall include, at a minimum,
the exploitation of the prostitution or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services,
slavery or practices similar to slavery, the removal of organs for illicit purposes or servitude.”
50 U.S. Department of State, 2003. Trafficking in Persons Report, Washington, D.C.; Internet
available from <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2003/>, accessed September 12, 2003.

51 Amy O’Neill Richard, “International Trafficking in Women to the United States: A Contem-
porary Manifestation of Slavery and Organized Crime,” U.S. State Department, November 1999, 3.
398 SULAIMANOVA
52 U.S. Department of State, 2003. Trafficking in Persons Report.

53 Amy O’Neill Richard, 3.
54 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Proposed Action Plan 2000 for Activi-
ties to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,
Warsaw, November 1999.
55 International Organization for Migration, “Trafficking in Migrants,” no. 23 (April 2001);
Internet available from <http://www.iom.int//documents/publication/en/tm_23.pdf>, accessed Sep-

tember 12, 2003.
56 U.S. Department of State. 2003, Trafficking in Persons Report.
57 Kathleen Barry, Female Sexual Slavery (New York: Prentice Hall, 1979), vii.
58 Ibid., xi.
59International Organization for Migration (IOM). 2000. “Trafficking in Women and Children
from the Kyrgyz Republic.”

60 Ibid., 13.
61 Cited in Donna Hughes, 636.
62 Testimony of Louise Shelley at the Hearing before the Commission on Security and Coop-
eration in Europe on “The Sex Trade: Trafficking of Women and Children in Europe and the United
States,” June 28, 1999, 19.
63 Ibid.
64 S. Altink, Stolen Lives: Trading Women into Sex and Slavery (London: Scarlet Press, 1995),
vii.
65 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2002. Internet avail-
able from <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002/en>, accessed September 12, 2003.

66 Gillian Caldwell, Steven Galster, and Nadia Steinzor, “Crime & Servitude: An Exposé of the
Traffic in Women for Prostitution from the Newly Independent States,” (Washington, D.C.: Global
Survival Network, 1997), 11.
67 International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2000, “Trafficking in Women and Children
from the Kyrgyz Republic,”11.

68 Cited in Kyrgyzstan Development Gateway <http://eng.gateway.kg>, last accessed on July
6, 2003.
69 “Trafficking in Women and Children from the Kyrgyz Republic,”11.
70 Ibid., 12.
71 Donna Hughes, “Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation: The Case of the Russian Federation,”
International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2002.

72 “Slaves of Chicago: International Sex Trafficking is Becoming Big Business,” These Times,
January 8, 2001.
73 “Trafficking in Women and Children from the Kyrgyz Republic,”12.
74 Human Rights Watch 2001, “Sacrificing Women to Save the Family? Domestic Violence in
Uzbekistan,” 3.
75 Cited in Donna Hughes, “Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation: The Case of the Russian Fed-
eration,” International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2002.

76 “Sacrificing Women to Save the Family?,” 7. Also see the UN Press Release “Since Becoming
Sovereign State, Kyrgyzstan Committed to Integrating Women into National Programmes of Ac-
tion, Anti-Discrimination Committee Told,” Internet available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/1999/19990122.wom1081.html>, accessed July 6, 2003.
77 “The Stolen Brides of Kyrgyzstan,” The Economist 341, no. 7993, Nov 23, 1996.
78 See “Sacrificing Women to Save the Family?” Also see “Central Asia: Increase in Polygamy
Attributed To Economic Hardship, Return To Tradition,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October
16, 2002, available from <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/10/16102002163911.asp>, Internet
accessed July 6, 2003.
79 “Central Asia: Increase in Polygamy.”
80 “Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan: A Study of Trafficking in Women and Children,”15.

81 International Organization for Migration (IOM). 2000. “Trafficking in Women and Children
from the Kyrgyz Republic,”13.
82 Gillian Caldwell, Steven Galster, and Nadia Steinzor, 1997. �Crime & Servitude: An Exposé of
the Traffic in Women for Prostitution from the Newly Independent States.� Washington, D.C.: Global
Survival Network, 14.
83 Donna Hughes, “The ‘Natasha’ Trade—The Transnational Shadow Market of Trafficking in
Women.” Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 2 (Spring 2000), 635.

84 Jim Haley, “King Case Coming to End,” The Daily Herald, February 21, 2002. www.heraldnet.
com.
85 “Abuse of Mail-Order Foreign Brides Prompts Effort to Oversee Fast-Growing Industry,”
Associated Press, July 5, 2003.

86 International Organization for Migration 2001, “Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan: A Study
of Trafficking in Women and Children,” 15.

87 “Trafficking in Women and Children from the Kyrgyz Republic,” 52.
88 “Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan: A Study of Trafficking in Women and Children,”15; also
see “Trafficking in Women and Children from the Kyrgyz Republic,” 14-15.
89 “Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan: A Study of Trafficking in Women and Children,” 14.
90 “Trafficking in Women and Children from the Kyrgyz Republic,” 29-30.
91 Ibid., 16.
92 Gillian Caldwell, Steven Galster, and Nadia Steinzor, 1997, 9.
93 Donna Hughes, “Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation: The Case of the Russian Federation.,
International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2002, 5.

95 Ibid., 45-46.
96 Global Organized Crime Project, Russian Organized Crime (Washington, D.C.: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 1997), 2.

97 Global Organized Crime Project, Russian Organized Crime and Corruption: Putin’s Challenge
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), 7.

98 Russian Organized Crime, 2-3.
99 See Russian Organized Crime; also see Robert I. Friedman, Red Mafiya: How the Russian Mob
Has Invaded America (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 2000).

100 Cited in Andrea Bertone, “International Political Economy and the Politics of Sex,” Gender
Issues, 18, no.1 (2000), 4-22.

101 Ibid.
States,” June 28, 1999.
103 Ibid.
104“Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan: A Study of Trafficking in Women and Children,” 18
States,” June 28, 1999, 18.
107 S. Altink, 1995. Stolen Lives: Trading Women into Sex and Slavery. London: Scarlet Press,
125.
States,” June 28, 1999, 17.
109 Human Rights Watch/Asia, Owed Justice: Thai Women Trafficked into Debt Bondage in Japan
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 2000), 86.

400 SULAIMANOVA
110 Ralph Regan, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. “International
Trafficking of Women and Children,” Washington, D.C., February 22, 2000. Found online at <http://
secretary.state.gov/www/picw/trafficking/tralph.html>.
111 “In the Shadows,” The Economist, 356, no. 8185 (August 26, 2000), 38-39.
112 Robert I. Friedman, xvii.
114 Ibid., 27, 47.
115 U.S. Department of State. 2003. Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington, D.C, Internet
available from <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2003/>, accessed September 12, 2003.

116 Turkmenistan is not included in the report as no information on trafficking was available.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
121 Cited in Andrea Bertone, “International Political Economy and the Politics of Sex.” Gender
Issues, 18, no.1 (2000), 4-22.

CHINA'S RE-EMERGENCE 401
Chapter 19
Beyond the Battle of Talas:

China’s Re-emergence in
Central Asia 1
Matthew Oresman
I
n October 2002, China held its first military exercise in decades with
another nation: the Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan. Aimed at
training border forces on both sides to respond to a terrorist insur-
gency, this event highlighted the growing importance of Central Asia to
China. Moreover, this exercise took place with a country that already had
American and Russian forces deployed just outside of the Kyrgyz capital
of Bishkek. Today U.S.-led counterterrorism coalition forces are located
at Manas Airbase, and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Orga-
nization (CSTO) Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) are at Kant Airbase.
The presence in one Central Asian nation of Chinese, Russian, and U.S.
military and security forces underscores the convergence of Great Power
interests in Central Asia.
While Russia has maintained a strong presence in the region for
more than a century, China and the United States are relative newcomers.
Over the past 12 years, Central Asia has moved from a strategic to a vital
interest of the United States, particularly given the events of September
11, 2001 and subsequent operations in the region. Since the breakup of
the Soviet Union, the newly independent states of Central Asia—Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—have become
increasingly important on the global strategic landscape. In the wake of
World Trade Center and Pentagon terrorist attacks against the United
States, the countries of Central Asia have become integral allies in the war
against terrorism with ongoing operations in Afghanistan and throughout
Central Asia to stabilize the region and clean up the remnants of al Qaeda
and other hostile groups.
401
402 ORESMAN
While U.S. and Russian involvement in Central Asia is not surpris-

ing, one of the more intriguing developments in the region over the past
decade has been China’s diplomacy. China’s interest in building relations
with Central Asia is not startling, given the country’s long history in the
region dating back to the foundations of the “Silk Road.” Included in this
history are such revolutionary events as the Battle of Talas in 751 and the
Chinese conquest of Xinjiang beginning in 1757.2 The agility and creativity
China has exercised in orchestrating its “re”-emergence has taken many by
surprise though. China has moved rapidly from the difficult task of delin-
eating and disarming its borders with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan to building a multilateral organization and growing economic
and security ties, all while working to alleviate traditional suspicions
among Central Asian states about the true intentions of its government.
The prominence of China in Central Asia will grow over the next
decade, particularly if the Russian position continues to wane and the
strategic attention of the United States is drawn elsewhere. On the basis
of geography and economic realities alone, China appears well placed to
expand its influence in the region over the long run. Central Asian states
will continue to seek robust engagement with China as their transporta-
tion infrastructure and developing economies become more intertwined.
China likely will continue to exercise a light touch with its diplomacy to
assure stable, productive relations along its interior frontiers, while dispel-
ling fears that it is seeking regional hegemony.
Over the near- to medium-term, increasing activity by China in Cen-
tral Asia does not present a pressing challenge to American interests in the
region. Beijing appears to be attuned to U.S. sensitivities in this region in
the post-September 11 environment and likely will try to avoid percep-
tions of a “rising China” as a regional hegemon. Instead, Beijing will seek
a productive and cooperative relationship with Washington in this part of
the world, as elsewhere around its periphery. At present the United States
and China share similar goals in Central Asia, particularly with regard to
combating terrorist activity emanating from the region. Even as the United
States has moved counterterrorism forces close to China’s border—a
fact that has not altered Beijing’s overall Central Asia policy—China has
responded with restraint, seeing the current circumstances as an opportu-
nity to improve its overall relationship with the United States. Beijing rec-
ognizes that its national priorities require benign engagement in Central
Asia and will eschew balance-of-power games.
However, looking further ahead, Washington and Beijing could find
themselves competing for influence in this region, as their regional priori-
ties move beyond immediate security concerns to encompass such funda-

mental questions as Great Power influence, political change, and reform
in Central Asia, as well as economic development and energy extraction.
Moreover, China maintains a long-standing concern with “strategic en-
circlement” by the United States, and Washington remains wary of China’s
long-term rise and its implications for U.S. interests.
China’s emergence in Central Asia has implications that go beyond
bilateral U.S.-China relations. How the outside powers coordinate their
policies in Central Asia and whether there is a common agreement as to
the best method to combat regional security issues, which extend beyond
terrorism to such factors as drug trafficking, political unrest, HIV/AIDS,
and border security, will be a central determinant for the future of dip-
lomatic relations between the United States, China and Russia, as well as
the stability of the region. In addition, China’s continued emergence in
Central Asia will impact the ongoing efforts to rebuild Afghanistan; the
success of Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the role of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) in the region; the development and export of
Caspian energy resources; and the future of U.S. relations with the coun-
tries of the region.
Overall, China, aided by the convergence of vital interest with Rus-
sia and the United States, has been extremely pragmatic in its approach
to Central Asia. Over the next decade, it can be expected that China’s
influence in Central Asia will rise. This does not have to be a threat to
the United States’ global position, but it is critical to recognize China’s
interests and priorities now, in order to prepare for such an eventuality,
and begin to initiate policies that will decrease future tension, before they
adversely affect Sino-U.S. and Sino-Russian relations.
China’s Interests and Policies in Central Asia

Understanding the immediate and long-term goals of China in Cen-
tral Asia is the key to understanding its actions and intentions there, as
well as how it plans to interact in the region with Russia and the United
States. China has four principal sets of interests and policies in the region.
First, China’s strategic and diplomatic goals in Central Asia, and how they
play out vis-à-vis Sino-U.S. and Sino-Russian relations, are key aspects in
China’s overall foreign policy. Second, and most pressing, China’s interests
in Central Asia revolve around issues of national security, specifically the
cutting of external support for separatists in Xinjiang, and ensuring radi-
cal forces in Central Asia do not destabilize friendly governments in the
region. A third key interest for China has been the demarcation, demili-
404 ORESMAN
tarization, and stabilization of its borders with Central Asian nations, a

goal that has been largely achieved, but will remain important to Beijing
in the years ahead. Finally, Chinese economic and trade interests in the
region, including the development of energy resources, are of growing
importance.
Strategic Positioning
In its relations with Central Asia, China seeks to achieve key strategic
and diplomatic interests on three fronts. First, at the broadest level, China’s
approach to Central Asia helps promote its overall diplomatic strategy of
establishing a more peaceful and constructive external environment, while
fostering an image of China as a responsible power. The Shanghai Cooper-
ation Organization (SCO)3 is a concrete manifestation of this overall for-
eign policy effort, giving substance to China’s widely-touted “new security
concept” and its emphasis on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.4
The SCO also assists China in promoting other key principles of its foreign
policy. For example, it provides Beijing an opportunity to demonstrate the
value of a multilateral, consultative process versus unilateral or alliance-
based approaches to regional security. The SCO also provides a prominent
platform from which Beijing can voice, and in some cases act, on foreign
policy on a range of issues, such as opposition to the “three evils” of ter-
rorism, separatism and extremism. Moreover, in establishing and shaping
the agenda for the SCO, Beijing has demonstrated its regional leadership
and determination to contribute constructively to alleviating tensions and
promoting mutual benefit.
Second, China’s relations with Central Asia help Beijing meet broader
strategic and diplomatic interests such as establishing stable and produc-
tive relationships with foreign partners and especially those on its closest
periphery, so that it can focus on pressing domestic and external chal-
lenges elsewhere. The specifics of China’s bilateral relations with Central
Asian states will be discussed shortly; however, by and large Beijing’s ap-
proach to the region has succeeded in establishing a stable and productive
security environment, as well as political and economic ties that are likely
to endure.
Third, China’s policies in Central Asia assist Beijing in managing
its bilateral relationships with the other two major powers in the region,
Russia and the United States. On one hand, China seeks to use common
interests in Central Asia to strengthen its relationship with Russia, the
traditional “big brother” to the region, and foster a strategic environment
that matches both their worldviews. On the other hand, China’s bonds
with Central Asia provide a certain strategic leverage in dealing with the
U.S. presence in the region. As to Russia-China relations, the Shanghai Co-
operation Organization represents both the cooperative and competitive
nature of that relationship. The advent of the SCO demonstrated Russian
self-understanding that it can no longer single-handedly maintain Central
Asian stability and that China has a positive role to play in the region.
It also provides Russia a mechanism by which to monitor and restrain
Chinese activity in Central Asia. In addition, SCO-related security activi-
ties may give China the opportunity to provide a potential alternative to
the Russian dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),
which serves as the collective defense arm for several of the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS).5
China also carries out its policies in Central Asia with an eye on
managing and influencing Sino-U.S. relations. Beijing’s concerns over a
growing American presence in Central Asia—beginning with NATO PfP
initiatives in the early-1990s, the 1997 U.S.-led CENTRAZBAT military
exercises in the region (which transported elements of the 82nd Airborne
Division non-stop from Ft. Bragg, North Carolina to the middle of Ka-
zakhstan), and the post-September 11 U.S. deployments to Central Asia,
which now include a military presence in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uz-
bekistan—underscore its longer-term interests in establishing stronger ties
with its Central Asian neighbors and countering a potentially antagonistic
American presence on China’s western doorstep. However, in the post-
September 11 environment, Beijing’s tactics have changed. Throughout
the late 1990s and prior to the fall of 2001, China often would beat the
“anti-hegemon drum” within the SCO, without taking on the United
States directly. By using the SCO to call for a “new security concept” and a
more just and fair international order, Beijing held up its foreign and secu-
rity policy as a preferable alternative to the U.S.-led security order. Today,
however, China has toned down this rhetoric in general, and within the
SCO in particular, as it seeks a “constructive and cooperative” relationship
with the United States.
By and large, Beijing has been successful in leveraging its relations in
Central Asia and within the SCO to achieve these three key strategic and
diplomatic interests. However, Beijing’s interests and policies in Central
Asia still face challenges. First, to date, the SCO has been mostly a “talking
shop,” with few substantive mechanisms putting words into practice. That
may change since the SCO has become a “full-fledged” international or-
ganization in 2004, including a secretariat in Beijing, a budgetary mecha-
nism, and an operating counterterrorism center in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.6
406 ORESMAN
Second, it should be noted that China has not entirely given up all of its
heavy-handed ways and has used its size, power, and economic might to
gain advantage in negotiations, particularly in discussions over border
demarcation and security assistance to monitor the Uyghur diaspora in
Central Asia. Central Asians continue to harbor concerns as to China’s
long-range intentions in the region, which may ultimately limit Beijing’s
room to maneuver. Most important, though, is the understanding that
while China may offer great potential for economic and security coopera-
tion in Central Asia, the United States and Russia will continue to offer
more in the way of concrete security and economic benefits over the near-
to medium-term.
National Security
While China’s broad strategic and diplomatic interests provide lon-
ger-term direction to its Central Asian policies, national security concerns
present the most pressing and immediate factors shaping China’s approach
in the region. These challenges include what Beijing terms “the three evils”
of terrorism, separatism and extremism, and involve developments within
and beyond Chinese borders. These national security concerns include
separatist-minded Uyghur groups in China’s Xinjiang province, instabil-
ity arising in Central Asian states, and elicit transborder activities, such as
trafficking in drugs, guns and people. By strengthening its relationships
with the Central Asian states and within the SCO, Beijing hopes to combat
these pressing problems.
China’s northwestern province of Xinjiang, known officially as the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, presents a unique problem for Bei-
jing.7 It is a province of roughly 12 million Uyghurs, a predominantly Mus-
lim Turkic people, who were conquered by China in the mid-eighteenth
century but not brought under full Chinese dominion until the Commu-
nists came to power in 1949. Over the last 50 years, China has exercised a
policy of internal colonization, manifested in a three-pronged approach.
China exercises political control under the nominal title of autonomy by
tightly controlling many elements of politically active or organized civil
society, especially religion. It supports investment, development, and Han
migration to Xinjiang in order to both serve the needs of the entire na-
tion (particularly with its large energy reserves)8 and strengthen the bonds
between Xinjiang and the rest of China. It also exerts total control on the
region by the constant presence and use of the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA), People’s Armed Police (PAP), and the paramilitary Xinjiang Pro-
duction and Construction Corp (XPCC), or Bingtuan. For their part, the
Uyghur people have not welcomed Han rule of Xinjiang and many would
like to see an end to Beijing control or, at the very least, a greater measure
of autonomy in their own affairs. While there is no unified Uyghur resis-
tance movement, several small groups do exist, though coordination is
poor. Still, Uyghur terrorists do, in fact, pose a legitimate security threat to
the Chinese government.9
The central fear of Beijing regarding the Uyghur resistance is the or-
ganizing ability of Islam, and mosques in particular. This fear underscores
the lengths China has gone to prevent Muslim community groups from
interacting with each other and operating beyond the most local level.
Islam in Xinjiang, though much less conservative than that practiced in
the Middle East, is still the biggest threat for China’s control of the region.
China’s nightmare—one actually shared by many Uyghur leaders—is that
radical Islamic groups, such as those who moved from the Middle East
to Central Asia throughout the 1990s, will infiltrate Xinjiang and provide
aid to the Uyghurs. Thus China’s primary goal in Central Asia is to cut off
external support to its own internal problem.
To this end, China has sought common cause with Central Asian
governments to counter Uyghur separatism and terrorist threats. The
Central Asian states have large Uyghur populations of their own, the vast
majority of whom are relatively peaceful and productive members of soci-
ety. However, some groups maintain ties to militant Uyghurs in Xinjiang
and to Pan-Turkic or Pan-Islamic radicals operating throughout Central
Asia, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb-ut-
Tahrir (HT), though the full nature of these ties is still unclear. China also
is interested in ensuring these Pan-Turkic or Pan-Islamic groups do not
destabilize the leadership of Central Asian states, and, in doing so, threaten
Chinese interests in the region. If these nations cannot maintain their own
sovereignty, the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, refugees, drugs, and
terrorism would be devastating for the region.
The threat of Islamic radicals and militants is thought to be perva-
sive in the region, despite the widespread practice of more moderate and
liberal forms of Islam throughout Central Asia. Though U.S. forces have
dispersed al Qaeda and Taliban forces, many elements of these groups re-
main and are reconstituting. Moreover, recent reports indicate that Turkic
groups, such as the IMU and HT, are gaining new strength across Central
Asia. HT, an ostensibly non-violent political group that seeks to establish a
theocratic caliphate across the Muslim world, has several thousand mem-
bers throughout Central Asia, where it is proscribed by the ruling regimes,
as well as in Russia and Europe. While there is no evidence that HT has
408 ORESMAN
committed any terrorist activities, it is supportive of these activities and

has reportedly agreed to be a partner with the IMU if either came to power
in Uzbekistan.10 The goal of the IMU, based primarily in the Ferghana
Valley, is the overthrow of the Uzbek government, though it is not as radi-
cal in its practice of Islam as HT. The IMU, which launched insurgencies
against the Karimov regime in 1999 and 2000, has taken on a much stron-
ger pan-Turkic identity, and has increased its operations in Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan, including a bombing in Bishkek on May 24, 2003, that killed
eight and injured more than 20. The IMU has also recently turned its at-
tention against Western targets, such as U.S. government installations and
travelers.11
Of particular significance to China have been reports that the IMU,
al Qaeda, and other radical groups have ties to Uyghur separatists, includ-
ing the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). ETIM recently was
placed on the U.S. Department of State Foreign Terrorist Organization list,
as well as on the UN terrorist organization list. Although ETIM primar-
ily operates in Central Asia, it appears that the IMU also has ties to some
groups within Xinjiang itself. Moreover, between 300 and 700 Uyghurs
were detained in Afghanistan during the U.S.-led war and occupation to
oust the Taliban regime, some of whom were transported to Guantanamo
Bay for further questioning.12 This should not be seen as surprising, or as
an Uyghur affinity for the politics of al Qaeda, but as the result of Chinese
policies that leave little opportunity for peaceful resistance in Xinjiang,
and diplomacy that has cut off support for the Uyghurs in neighboring
Central Asia.
To stop cross-border cooperation between the Uyghurs in Xinjiang
and those outside the country, as well as between pan-Turkic or pan-Is-
lamic groups in Central Asia, China has developed bilateral and multi-
lateral approaches to combating these terrorist threats, aimed to bolster
both the Central Asian regimes and Beijing’s rule in Xinjiang. Through the
SCO, China has pushed for the establishment of a counterterrorism center
in Tashkent. It is unclear whether the center will be primarily an informa-
tion exchange hub such as Interpol, or if it will have some sort of rapid
response mechanism. Since the 1999 Bishkek summit when first proposed,
the idea of using the SCO to fight terrorism and other regional security
threats has become a centerpiece of the organization, and the most salient
factor in building practical cooperation and moving the SCO beyond
being a discussion forum. The SCO also has announced new initiatives to
address security issues beyond terrorism. Plans are underway to cooperate
on emergency response activities, drug trafficking, and law enforcement.
Perhaps most significantly, the nations of the SCO, except Uzbekistan as

of now, hosted a major, multi-day exercise in early August 2003 simulating
responses to various counterterrorism scenarios in Kazakhstan and China.
This exercise, held in eastern Kazakhstan and Xinjiang, included over
1000 troops, many of them special operations forces, and was much more
prominent in scope, size, duration, and media coverage then the October
2002 exercise held between only Kyrgyzstan and China.
Much of China’s bilateral aid to Central Asia consists of security as-
sistance, particularly in the area of border control, military aid, and intel-
ligence sharing. China recently donated 40 prefabricated border outposts
to Kyrgyzstan. In addition, China is assisting Tajikistan to take over more
responsibility for guarding its own border from the Russian 201st Motor-
ized Division. In 2000, when Uzbek forces faced an IMU flare-up, China
was the first to provide Uzbekistan with emergency military equipment,
including flak jackets, night vision equipment, and sniper rifles. China
gave 10 million Yuan (U.S. $1.2 million) worth of military-technical as-
sistance to Kyrgyzstan in 2002, including firearms and telecom systems to
combat terrorism, and, in February 2003, China donated police facilities
to the Internal Affairs Ministry of Kazakhstan. In addition to this mate-
rial aid, China has provided training for various Central Asian militaries.
There is also intelligence sharing between the Central Asian republics and
China, most of which is focused on counterterrorism.
Among the most notable developments for China-Central Asia secu-
rity cooperation was the October 2002 joint border exercise held between
China and Kyrgyzstan. The exercise—simulating an operation against
terrorist cells within the mountainous region which forms the countries’
shared border—was relatively small in size and scope: it involved about
100 soldiers from each side, operating at high elevations and using light
weapons, such as anti-tank guns, helicopters, and armored personnel ve-
hicles. The exercises took place in southern Kyrgyzstan near the Irkeshtam
border crossing with China, and involved military and border troops from
China’s Xinjiang Military Region and the Kyrgyz military, as well as some
observers from the other four SCO member states.13 Most intriguing,
this exercise marked the first peacetime joint military exercise China is
known to have conducted. It signals a significant change in the way China
understands the role of force, intervention, and international military co-
operation in the face of transnational threats; it also marks an important
advance in Chinese-Central Asian relations.
It is important to be reminded that currently Chinese aid to Central
Asia in no way compares to the amount being provided by Russia and
410 ORESMAN
the Unites States. Russian forces have historically operated throughout

the region and continue to be present in Tajikistan. The United States has
become vital to Central Asia. Not only has the U.S. military campaign
struck a devastating blow against many of the groups challenging regional
security in Afghanistan, but material and economic assistance provided
by the United States has been a huge windfall for the Central Asian states.
The U.S. military maintains a presence in several Central Asian nations,14
all of which bring these areas millions of U.S. dollars in the form of build-
ing and local spending. This is in addition to official U.S. assistance to the
Central Asian states, which is substantial. Totaling almost $600 million
in fiscal year (FY) 2002 (up from $230 million in FY2001), the Central
Asian nations have begun to rely on this money heavily, as well as on the
material support, in terms of food, medicine, security training, and more.
While this overall amount will decrease in 2003 and 2004, pledged security
assistance in 2004 will increase.
Finally, it is important to understand how the Uyghur diaspora living
in Central Asia plays into Chinese diplomacy in the region. The diaspora
is predominantly concentrated in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, with 50,000
and 180,000 Uyghurs respectively, many of whom are entrepreneurs
whohave achieved middle class status. Most Uyghurs in Central Asia are
not politically active, but those who are make up a vocal minority, often
petitioning the government to protect their rights in the face of Chinese
pressures. Many also provide aid to groups operating within Xinjiang it-
self, with most interaction occurring along very active shuttle trade routes.
The Central Asian states are loath to offend China and have been proactive
in appeasing Chinese worries about the Uyghur populations living in their
countries. As one analyst put it, China is having the Central Asians do its
“dirty work” in the region.15 During the lead up to the first Shanghai Five
summit in 1996, the Kyrgyz Justice Ministry prohibited one Uyghur group,
Ittipak (Unity), from political activism for three months for failing to curb
its “separatist activities,” sighting the public association provision of the
constitution and the non-interference clause of its 1992 communiqué with
China.16 This has been a balancing act between domestic and international
pressures though, with the Central Asian regimes not wanting to appear to
be suppressing a fellow Turkic people. Uyghur gangs operating in Central
Asia, particularly Kyrgyzstan, also have been involved in sensational mur-
ders and robberies of both Han Chinese and Uyghur peoples, including
prominent businessmen and diplomats, keeping this issue center stage for
the Chinese and Central Asian authorities.
Stability Along the Border

A third important set of goals and policies shaping China’s active
Central Asian diplomacy concerns the settlement of border disputes.
Reaching settlements on disputed borders, which had been sources of ten-
sion during the Cold War, was important for Beijing both in order to move
forward on its cooperative agenda with Central Asia and so that it could
devote more attention to greater post-Cold War strategic challenges. De-
marcating and demilitarizing the borders with its Central Asian neighbors
(including Russia) was a priority issue for China in the early 1990s, and be-
came the foundation on which Sino-Central Asian relations were built. In
retrospect, settling border disputes and reducing military personnel along
these borders has been a major accomplishment of Chinese-Central Asian
diplomacy. It has given China and its Central Asian neighbors a measure
of peace and security, allowing them to expend their energy on more criti-
cal and worrisome issues, such as internal development and diplomatic
crises, while setting out a model for cooperative security relations among
former adversaries. The Shanghai Five played a critical role in legitimizing
and institutionalizing these agreements and continues to do so.
The most significant accomplishment of the group is its package
of military confidence building measures, including a pullback of some
troops and equipment to 100 kilometers (km) off the common borders,
verification procedures along the border, and pre-notification of exercises
and other military activities. These steps largely were achieved by the mid
to late 1990s, as border talks eventually led to the 1996 Shanghai Five
“Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field Along the Border
Areas” and the 1997 “Agreement on Reducing Each Other’s Military Forces
along the Border Regions.” The 1996 agreement stipulates that: military
forces in the border regions will not be used to attack one another, military
exercises will not be aimed at one another and will be limited in frequency
and scale, major military exercises within 100 km of the border require
notification and invitation to the neighboring Shanghai Five states to send
observers, and friendly military-to-military exchanges will be established.
The 1997 agreement took steps to implement these measures more fully.
By the July 2000 Shanghai Five summit, the five parties announced that
implementation of the 1996 and 1997 agreements had “helped build for
the first time, in the border belt of more than 7,000 km, a region of trust
and transparency where military activities are predictable and monitor-
able.”17 The SCO continues to focus on border settlement issues, including
a meeting as recently as April 2003 to expand border CBMs.
412 ORESMAN
However, not all border differences have been settled, or settled to

all parties’ satisfaction. Negotiations continue on a bilateral basis between
China and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. China’s border negotia-
tions with Kyrgyzstan have caused many domestic political problems for
the tiny republic. In March 2002, protests erupted in the Asky region of
Kyrgyzstan in response to the signing of a border treaty with China. The
demonstrators, calling for the resignation of President Akaev, claimed that
he had ceded too much to China and had sacrificed Kyrgyz sovereignty.
In response to these protests, police tried to quash the demonstration;
six persons were killed and 60 injured in the melee. This event eventually
led to the resignation of the Kyrgyz Prime Minister and a government
investigation.
Still, the way China has handled its border negotiations with the
Central Asians has been remarkable, both for its deftness and for its ef-
ficiency. While China often has received the better bargain, due to its size
and power, rarely has it been seen as heavy handed or offensive, helping
to allay fears held by many Central Asian elites of China’s true regional
intentions. With border demarcation and demilitarization between China
and its Central Asian neighbors virtually complete, remaining border se-
curity issues can be placed on the “cooperative security” column of their
relationships.
Energy and Trade

China has important economic goals behind its growing interest
and presence in Central Asia. During the visit by then-Premier Li Peng to
Kazakhstan in 1994, he called for the construction of a new “Silk Road,”
connecting Central Asia with China and acting as a conduit for trade be-
tween Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. To date, this plan is still in the
developmental phase. Nevertheless, many analysts see significant promise
in economic and financial relations between China and Central Asia over
the medium- to long-term, especially in the development of the region’s
enormous energy resources to fuel China’s anticipated economic growth
and burgeoning energy demands.
In 2015, China’s projected oil needs will be 7.4 million bb/d (up from
3.4 million bb/d is 2002), 50 percent of which will be made up by imports.
Natural gas, which is not yet imported, will also be a much-needed foreign
produced commodity in the years ahead. In order to diversify its sources
of supply and increase its energy security, China wants to establish Central
Asia, particularly Kazakhstan and to some degree Turkmenistan, as guar-
anteed sources of oil and gas. In addition, Central Asia offers a potential
market for China’s export driven economy. This is particularly true as

China aims to develop its vast, remote western regions, which would find
a natural outlet for exports further west to Central Asia.
Chinese firms have made some investments in Central Asia. But such
financial arrangements have been limited by the risky, cumbersome and,
given the heavy-handed presence of gangs and mafia-like extortion rack-
ets, even hostile investment environment in Central Asia. Current Chinese
investment includes: a processing factory in Tekeli, Kazakhstan; a major
stake in the Kyrgyz cloth market; an investment in the primary mine at
Batken, Kyrgyzstan; a hotel in Taldy-Korgan, Kazakhstan; and cardboard
box and noodle factories in Kyrgyzstan. In Kazakhstan, according to of-
ficial sources, there are now more than 20 accredited Chinese companies
and some 600 joint ventures.18
The most significant area of economic cooperation has been China’s
investment in the Kazakh energy sector. As mentioned above, Chinese
future energy demands will be enormous. To help meet that demand, the
China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) invested $4.3 billion in the
Kazakh state oil company Aktyubinskneft in June 1997, entitling China to
a 60 percent (now 63 percent) stake in three fields with a total estimated
oil reserve of one billion barrels. Also as part of this agreement, China
and Kazakhstan agreed to build a 3,000 km pipeline from the Caspian Sea
area to Xinjiang. This project is expected to cost over $3 billion and, at
this point, has been deemed by most experts as uneconomical. Its current
status is in limbo, though construction on some segments has begun and
there is strong political pressure to make this pipeline a reality, especially
as it fits into other plans to build a pipeline bringing oil and gas from
Xinjiang’s Tarim Basin to China’s East Coast (a plan whose own future is
also uncertain). At the same time, China and Russia have begun forging
serious energy ties, including a pipeline from Angarsk to Daqing. If these
plans fully materialize, Russian oil and gas may become more important
to China than its Central Asian investments.19
While these projects are still taking shape, Kazakhstan is exporting
small amounts of oil to China. In 2002, China imported nearly 19,600
barrels a day of crude oil, representing 1.4 percent of its total imports.
This oil, imported primarily by rail, underscores the importance of build-
ing more transportation links between China and Central Asia. Projects
to achieve this goal include a new rail link being built between Xinjiang
and Uzbekistan, which will pass through Kyrgyzstan and possibly another
that will include Tajikistan. This connects with the $250 million European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) sponsored Transport
414 ORESMAN
Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA) project to build the new Silk
Road from China to Europe. Additional infrastructure projects include
the already completed Urumqi-Almaty rail line and a new 360 km road
between Lake Issyk-Kul in Kyrgyzstan and Aksu in Xinjiang, to be built by
China at a cost of $15 million.20
Overall, China’s trade with Central Asia has been a boon to the re-
gion, and while the amounts are relatively low, the potential for growth
is enormous. China’s dynamic economy could be a powerful engine for
Central Asian development, and its close proximity could provide Cen-
tral Asian states with an export route to the burgeoning markets of the
Pacific.
The Future of the SCO

China’s future successes and failures in Central Asia will be deter-
mined, in large part, by the viability of the SCO. To date, the SCO has been
little more than a discussion forum, but that appears to be changing with
the formalization of the SCO as a “full-fledged” international organization
in 2004. This includes an actual budgetary mechanism, a permanent secre-
tariat to be located in Beijing (led by Zhang Deguang, the former Chinese
Ambassador to Russia), and a counterterrorism center to be located in
Uzbekistan. Still, many doubts remain. The member nations will have to
commit even more resources, energy, and political capital to make this
organization viable, a first in the history of Central Asian multilateral or-
ganizations. The political will seems to be there, but it remains to be seen if
Russia and China actually will commit their scarce resources to this effort,
though recent Russian actions and statements stressing the importance of
the SCO and the newly reconstituted CSTO appear promising.
Three early tests will help determine the future of the SCO. The first
is the formation of the Tashkent counterterrorism center. To be effective,
this center will have to be able to coordinate responses to new terrorist
threats, with special attention to de-conflicting the roles of China, Russia,
and the United States. This center should not be expected to house a new
rapid reaction force, but it has to be more than an information clearing-
house if the SCO expects to be a respected player on regional security
issues. Second, the establishment of a permanent secretariat and budget
mechanism will demonstrate the political and material commitment that
members are willing to provide. A functioning budget and empowered
bureaucracy are central to the success of any international organization,
particularly one bringing together such diverse players. Finally, the SCO
must prove that it can accomplish limited economic cooperation, a point
stressed with unusual frequency and detail at the last SCO summit in May
2003. If the SCO can commit to a transportation pact by next year’s sum-
mit, it will have proven that it is more than a “talk shop” and can assist in
practical economic integration in a troubled region.
Though it is clear that the problems of Central Asia are region-
wide and cannot be solved by any state alone, Central Asian states seem
reluctant to embrace the promise of multilateral collaboration. The May
2003 SCO summit offered some hope that the region can pursue concrete
and practical cooperative projects, an important step toward tempering
interstate conflict, great power rivalries, and nationalist tendencies. In the
short to medium-term the SCO represents China and Russia’s cooperative
nature, as well as Russia’s understanding that it can no longer single-hand-
edly maintain Central Asia stability. China also has a positive role to play
in the region, particularly in funding security endeavors. However, with a
new Russian push to establish the CSTO RDF to be stationed at Kant Air-
base in Kyrgyzstan, tension between Russian and Chinese regional interest
will become more apparent. Yet much of the future success of the SCO
will be determined not by the outside powers, but by the cooperation of
the Central Asian states, particularly Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, a mighty
feat that is currently nowhere near to being achieved.
Bilateral Relationships
As previously discussed, Beijing has established a coherent regional
strategy in Central Asia, best illustrated by Chinese leadership in the SCO.
However, each Central Asian nation has its own set of circumstances, and
Chinese policy faces different challenges in dealing with each of them.
Moreover, the future of Central Asia’s relations with external powers will
be determined in large measure by the dynamic between the various Cen-
tral Asian states.
Kazakhstan
The China-Kazakh border stretches some 1,533 km, the longest
frontier between China and the five Central Asian states. China’s rela-
tionship with Kazakhstan is probably its strongest in the region and best
represents China’s most basic interests. Though Kazakhstan and Russia
enjoy an extremely close relationship, Kazakh exports to China reached
nearly $1 billion in 2001 (with a goal of $2 billion in 2003). With total of-
ficial Central Asian exports to China equaling about $1.3 billion in 2001,
Kazakh exports represented some 77 percent of that figure, further indi-
cating the importance of China-Kazakh ties in the overall China-Central
416 ORESMAN
Asia relationship. Moreover, Chinese President Hu Jintao’s June 2003 trip

to Kazakhstan, only his third abroad as president, after Russia and the G8
summit in France, indicates the high priority China places on its relation-
ship with Kazakhstan. This relationship, which includes security and intel-
ligence cooperation, as well as educational and cultural exchanges, likely
will continue to grow in the coming years. Much of this growth will be
fueled by increased Chinese investment in Kazakh energy and gas, as well
as the long-expected construction of a pipeline between the two countries.
Also, with roughly one million ethnic Kazakhs living in Xinjiang, in addi-
tion to the 180,000 Uyghurs living in Kazakhstan, Astana takes a particular
interest in developments in China’s west, especially as the two populations
make up a large segment of the shuttle traders.
Kyrgyzstan
Hosting military and security personnel from multiple outside pow-
ers, Kyrgyzstan stands out among Central Asian countries. With the U.S.-
run base at Manas and Russian-led forces at the CSTO Rapid Deployment
Force base at Kant Airbase, not to mention a shared 858-km border, China
has focused much of its strategic attention on Kyrgyzstan. China’s first
external military exercise in decades was held with Kyrgyz border forces,
and China likely will post some security-related personnel to Tashkent to
take part in the new SCO counterterrorism center. In addition, Kyrgyzstan
is one of the main transit routes for Chinese goods and a key recipient of
Chinese infrastructure investment, including new rail and road links. It is
also a source of concern for China on issues including drugs, organized
crime, Islamic radicalism, Uyghur sympathizers, and perhaps most-worri-
some in the long-run, the presence of U.S. forces just over the border. Kyr-
gyzstan sees China as a potential engine for economic growth and a source
of foreign aid. China was one of the few countries that would engage in
barter trade with the Central Asian nations after independence, winning
their early gratitude. Kyrgyzstan takes its relationship with China very se-
riously, and, despite some tensions over the Uyghur diaspora and border
negotiations, sees China as a strong and important partner. Its Beijing em-
bassy is equal in size to that of the United States, and Muratbek Imanaliev,
Kyrgyzstan’s two time former Foreign Minister and current ambassador to
China, speaks fluent Chinese and is a central player in building relations
between all of Central Asia and China.
Tajikistan
Having suffered through a long civil war and still relying heavily on
Russian forces to help stabilize its borders, Tajikistan does not yet have
the ability to forge a more balanced foreign policy. It is possible that the
presence of “gas-and-go” U.S. air operations in Tajikistan signals some
closer ties to Washington. However, Tajikistan is in dire need of assistance
from all quarters, and accepts aid from countries such as Iran as well as
China. With a 434-km shared border, China has provided Tajikistan with
significant security assistance, as well as limited economic aid, including
a recent $3 million aid package. According to first-hand accounts, China’s
defense attaché office in Dushanbe is one of the most active of its Central
Asian missions. Economically, Tajikistan has little to offer China beyond
a limited marketplace, but Beijing is keenly interested in making sure
Tajikistan’s black market—including the massive trade in drugs—does
not penetrate China. And while China has a theoretically historic claim to
nearly one-third of Tajikistan’s territory, China has managed to negotiate
its remaining border issues with Tajikistan in a constructive way. Overall,
Tajikistan’s vital ties to Russia dictate much of the relationship, but China
still maintains active diplomacy there, with an eye on the future and its
own security needs.
Uzbekistan
Among Central Asian states, Uzbekistan has charted a fairly dis-
tinctive course in its foreign policy, clearly moving away from Russia
and aligning itself more closely with the United States. As the only SCO
member not sharing a border with China, its relationship with China has
evolved much differently from the others. With a very active embassy in
Tashkent, China has enjoyed fairly good security ties with Uzbekistan,
highlighted by the aid provided to Uzbekistan during the 2000 IMU flare-
up. However, there have been reports that this aspect of the relationship
has soured in the last years due to a Chinese sale of mortars and side arms
to Uzbekistan that performed poorly, as well as the rise of significant U.S.
security aid to the country. In economic terms, Uzbekistan’s harshly pro-
tectionist trade policy has blocked many Chinese exports to the region and
the Tashkent government has increased its complaints about shuttle trad-
ers bringing cheap Chinese goods into the country. Uzbekistan’s self-ap-
pointed expectations to become the premier regional power may put it at
odds with Chinese interests, particularly its obstinacy in committing more
fully to the cooperative security agenda of the SCO. However, the two have
418 ORESMAN
succeeded in establishing a practical relationship built on individual needs

and pragmatic gains.
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan also does not share a border with China, and is even
further west from China than is Uzbekistan. In addition, Turkmenistan’s
adherence to a policy of “positive neutrality” has kept it out of the SCO
along with many other international organizations. It appears Beijing will
keep Turkmenistan and its leader, Turkmenbashi, at arms length. China
has invested moderately in Turkmenistan’s oil and gas sector, but has lim-
ited its ties overall. Turkmenistan has little to offer China. Export routes
for its oil and gas are not conducive to shipment to China and, politically
and diplomatically, it is very difficult to deal with. China likely will only
seek engagement with Ashkabat if it fits into its overall regional plans.
China and Other External Powers in the Region
The presence of other external powers, particularly the United States
and Russia, provide China both partners and competitors for its goals in
Central Asia. While China does not yet rank near the United States or Rus-
sia in terms of influence, its presence is growing. Because all three nations
share the same vital interest in Central Asia—the elimination of the terror-
ist and radical Islamic threat—balance of power activities are limited. Still,
China’s fear of “strategic encirclement” by the United States persists. China
can count on Russia to resist a long-term U.S. military presence in the re-
gion, although China and Russia should not be mistaken as true allies. In
fact, the two countries are becoming increasingly competitive for influence
in the region. Russia’s deployment at Kant and its reinvigoration of the
CSTO are primarily seen as countering a mounting U.S. and NATO pres-
ence in Central Asia, though it also can be viewed as solidifying Moscow’s
ties to Central Asia in the face of growing Chinese influence via the SCO.
China also must take other important regional players into account
for their growing influence in Central Asia. These players include Europe,
India, Pakistan, Turkey and Iran. Europe’s presence is felt through the
European Union, as well as NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), and the EBRD. European projects in Central
Asia are specific and aimed at building stability. They include developing
transportation infrastructure, combating drug trafficking, and making
limited investments, in addition to Caspian energy operations. By and
large, however, Central Asia does not “identify” with Europe. Similarly,
ties with India and Pakistan are principally economic, though there is an
Islamic link to Pakistan and growing military and counterterrorism ties to

India. As long as Central Asia can avoid getting entangled in the Kashmir
problem, this relationship should continue to widen. Iran and Turkey
share deeper cultural ties with Central Asia, but the prospects of close ties
after the collapse of the Soviet Union have floundered. Turkey was unable
to provide the material aid the Central Asians had hoped for, and many
leaders felt that Turkey treated them as inferiors. Similarly, Iran has pro-
vided little to Central Asia, though this is also a reflection of U.S. policy
towards Iran. In addition, Central Asian regimes are fearful of Iran-style
Islamic fundamentalism. Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan are members along
with all five Central Asian republics of the Economic Cooperation Orga-
nization (ECO), which has not developed much beyond the discussion
phase. For most of the Central Asian states, relations with China probably
hold out more promise than with any other external powers, excepting
Russia and the United States.
In both its regional and bilateral policies in Central Asia, China is
committed to steadily expanding its presence and has taken a long-range
approach to its engagement in the region. Central Asians at the official
level generally welcome China’s involvement, though there are some lin-
gering suspicions of China as a hegemon-in-waiting. There are also con-
cerns, not without reason, about Chinese migration to their nations, much
as their Russian neighbors have. On the other hand, all Central Asian states
are too much in need of assistance to say no to such an important and
growing regional power as China, and see their large neighbor as a future
driver of economic growth.
Nevertheless, China’s long-term interests in the region will meet with
a number of obstacles in the coming years, not the least of which is compe-
tition within Central Asia itself. These regional rivalries—including unfair
trade practices, harsh border regulations, sovereignty disputes, and a fail-
ure thus far to truly institutionalize cooperative action—do not bode well
for any enduring external presence, let alone a Chinese one. Attempting
to exercise influence through the SCO has its challenges as well: the past
decade has demonstrated that multilateral organizations have achieved
few concrete gains, as self-serving national interests have trumped collec-
tive endeavors. China’s main regional entry point, the SCO, may very well
fail, in which case China will have to continue its bilateral relationships
individually with the Central Asian states or through another forum, if it
hopes to achieve its regional goals.
China’s relations with Central Asia, in and of themselves, are not
major foreign policy priorities for Beijing. For the foreseeable future,
420 ORESMAN
Beijing’s Central Asian diplomacy and strategy is more of a means to other

ends, including: the promotion of its “new security concept” and construc-
tive regional and international image, management of Sino-American and
Sino-Russian relations, continued domestic economic development, and
dealing with security concerns in Xinjiang. By and large, China pays close
attention to Central Asia so it does not become a problem. On the other
side of the coin, Central Asian nations, at present, have more to gain from
the United States and Russia than from China, making their ties with
China a lower priority for them as well.
Taking these points together, it seems unlikely that China will be able
to exert anywhere close to as much influence in the near- to medium-term
as Russia or the Unites States. Beijing appears well aware of this, and is
proceeding in a cautious and balanced way: on the one hand highlight-
ing shared interests in the region with Washington and Moscow, while on
the other avoiding the appearance of trying to “oust” either from Central
Asia. Over the longer-term, China is likely to promote its interests and
polices in Central Asia and its prominence will increase, especially as the
U.S. presence diminishes and the Russians continue to focus their energies
internally and toward the West. In this context, it is critical for the United
States to understand and respond to China’s continuing emergence in
Central Asia.
Issues on the Horizon
At this early stage, Chinese leaders and strategists appear to have
been quite successful in identifying and pursuing their interests in Central
Asia. However, several issues on the horizon will present some difficult
challenges for China in Central Asia in the years ahead, particularly HIV/
AIDS, drugs and organized crime, and water.
HIV/AIDS cases are growing at an ever-increasing rate on both sides
of the China-Central Asia border, especially in Xinjiang, which is China’s
second-most infected region. Both Central Asia and Russia also face a
looming problem with HIV/AIDS that will likely affect cross-border trade,
security, and stability in the coming years.
China, Russia, and Central Asia all have problems with narco-traf-
ficking and the terrorist activities it often funds. The majority of the drug
trade follows two separate routes, one from Central Asia west to Russia
and Europe, and one from South East Asia up through China. There are
indications of new collaboration between these groups, particularly where
organized crime is involved, and reports that Chinese Triads are now op-
erating in Kyrgyzstan.
Water is one of the scarcest resources in both Central Asia and

western China and will likely be an increasing source of tension as sup-
plies diminish and downstream demand increases, particularly from the
growing industrial and agricultural centers of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan,
and Xinjiang. Currently, China has plans to siphon up to 1.5 billion cubic
meters of water per year from the Ili and Irtysh Rivers for oilfield develop-
ment regions in Xinjiang. Both rivers originate in China and the Ili flows
through Kazakhstan and terminates in Lake Balkhash, a body of water al-
ready devastated by decreasing water levels and increasing pollution from
agriculture run-off. This issue alone has the potential to sour relations
between China and Central Asia.
Conclusions
China’s emergence in Central Asia will continue to grow, and likely
will have a more natural and longer-term fit relative to that of the United
States, based on a long history of interaction and clearly defined interests.
China has rediscovered its place in the region and is developing pragmatic
channels to achieve its interests there. Successes are growing, particularly
in the fields of security and natural resources extraction, and a future of
intense interaction looks more certain. Still, China’s priority in Central
Asia is maintaining stability along its borders, so that it can focus on more
pressing matters elsewhere. Its objective is strategic denial; act to deny the
rise of elements that will challenge China’s internal security, deny the use
of Central Asia by the United States to contain China, and deny a Russian
monopoly of influence on its border.
China will most likely give significant attention only to those prob-
lems that directly affect its vital interests, such as counterterrorism and
other border security questions. Central to this will be the attention paid
to the role of the Uyghurs and Xinjiang in China-Central Asia relations. It
is also clear that China’s goal is to foster regional cooperation only to the
point that it fits into its own national interest. If China can achieve its aims
bilaterally and not through the SCO, it will, though the SCO provides a
very useful vehicle to address transnational threats. Moreover, continuing
problems in Central Asia and the region’s inability to use collective action
will minimize China’s region-wide reach, leaving open the likelihood that
Beijing will have considerable influence in some states, such as Kyrgyz-
stan and Kazakhstan, but considerably less in others. China’s region-wide
presence will be most affected, though, by the action of the United States
and Russia. The United States is the most important near-term ally of
the Central Asian states and can dictate the future shape of the regional
422 ORESMAN
security situation to a significant degree. Russia, too, has enduring impor-

tance to the region and can undermine many of China’s goals if Moscow
so chooses.
In sum, China is on the rise in Central Asia and the United States will
have to deal with a more comprehensive Chinese presence in the region
in the years ahead. Diplomatic and strategic hedging by external powers
has already begun, and Central Asia has become an important piece on
the global chessboard. All sides are using it to advance their international
agendas. This is not a return to the “Great Game” of the nineteenth cen-
tury, however. China, Russia, and the United States are too integrated with
each other to threaten a clash over what is still a second-tier priority when
compared to more pressing issues like North Korea, Iraq, and the prolifer-
ation of WMD. However, given the intermingling of Great Power interests
in this region, increased tension is possible. There is room for cooperation
in Central Asia and no need for restrictive alliances. In the best scenarios,
the United States, China and Russia will recognize their convergence of
interests, and work together to shape a more secure, prosperous and stable
Central Asia.
Notes
1 This chapter is drawn from a larger monograph published in August 2003 by the Freeman
Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies entitled, China’s New
Journey to the West: China’s Emergence in Central Asia and Implications for U.S. Interests.
2 In the late 740s, the expansionist Tang spread its influence as far westward as Kabul and
Kashmir, eventually coming into direct conflict with the Muslim people of greater Turkestan. At Talas
River, in 751, a predominantly Muslim army of Arab, Tibetan and Uyghur forces defeated Chinese
troops led by Kao Hsien-chih. The ramifications were significant. The Arabs were able to extend their
Islamic influence throughout Central Asia and the major trading routes. Tang expansionary tendencies
were halted, beginning a trend of military decline. Thus, the Battle of Talas became a demarcation line
between the Muslim–Turkic and Chinese worlds and remains an important touchstone for China-
Central Asia relations today. The area know as the Uyghur Kingdom of East Turkestan, created by the
migration of Uyghurs from Mongolia and Central Asia during the first millennium, was invaded by
the Manchus in 1757 but was not brought under the control of the Qing Emperor until 1877 when
it was named Xinjiang (meaning “New Territory”). Even then, resistance against Chinese dominion
continued until 1949, including the establishment of an independent Uyghur State on two occasions,
most notably from 1944-1949.
3 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization—made up of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—is a Chinese-initiated international forum that evolved from the
border demarcation and demilitarization process, known as “the Shanghai Five” and not including Uz-
bekistan, begun after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The SCO became a “full-fledged” international
organization in January 2004 with a secretariat in Beijing and a regional counterterrorism center in
Tashkent.
4 Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual nonaggression; mutual non-
interference in their respective domestic affairs; mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence
5 The CSTO was recently reformed in 2002 from the ashes of the Collective Security Treaty
(CST), the near-defunct collective security apparatus of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
While the CST has some enduring success in the maintenance of a region-wide extended air defense,
it has largely failed to materialize as a collective-defense organization, and the overall military capa-
bilities of the members have decreased. The CSTO is another attempt to pull together these disparate
militaries, this time by focusing on practical and specific tasks, particularly counterterrorism and rapid
crisis response.
6 This center was originally to be located in Bishkek, but it was announced in September 2003
that it would be built in Tashkent. It is reported that Uzbekistan, a relatively apathetic member of the
SCO, demanded the presence of the center in exchange for continued involvement.
7 For a more detailed description of the Xinjiang issue, see the forthcoming Xinjiang Project
book being published by the Central Asian-Caucasus Institute, School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Fall 2003.
8 Encapsulated as the “Go West: campaign,” Beijing has encouraged the migration of Han
Chinese to Xinjiang and the development of the western economies to benefit both the develop-
ment of China’s interior and the continuing east coast boom. Beyond the eastern seaboard, Xinjiang
represents the most developed and dynamic economy in the nation. It has become a center of trade
and industry for both China’s west and Central Asia. Xinjiang’s greatest potential for growth lies in its
natural resources. In particular, while estimates vary, nearly all experts agree that the Tarim Basin holds
enormous potential as a source of energy resources. A 2000 study from the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) states the Tarim Basin holds at least three billion tons of oil
in proven reserves and possibly 510 billion cubic meters of natural gas, all thus far untapped. Bring-
ing Xinjiang’s potential wealth east will be critical to developing China’s interior and spreading the
benefits of economic growth across the country.
9 In response to Beijing’s repressive policies in Xinjiang, including several violent crackdowns
that, according to some reports, left hundreds dead and thousands imprisoned, and emboldened by
the independence achieved by its Central Asian neighbors in the early- to mid-1990s, the Uyghur
separatist movement took a more aggressive and violent direction. On February 27, 1997, three
bombs were set off in the Xinjiang capital of Urumqi, killing nine people. Two weeks later, on March
7, a bomb exploded in Beijing, the seat of Chinese authority, killing 30. In September 1997, Chinese
authorities disclosed that approximately 40 small uprising occurred, with Uyghur activists occupying
a half dozen government buildings across China. The forced evictions left 80 dead and 200 injured.
Eight hundred Uyghurs were arrested. Fifteen bomb attacks occurred over a five-month period in 1998
and seven attacks in the first six weeks of 1999, but it is unclear if these were Uyghur actions or just
another challenge to the government from some other group, possibly laid-off workers. According to
Justin Rudelson, author of Oasis Identity, there have been more than 200 militant actions over the past
decade, resulting in 162 deaths. These include attacks on police stations, communications and electric
power infrastructure, the bombings of buses, movie theaters, department stores, hotels, markets, and
trains, assassinations of judges, and strikes against military bases. In taking these actions, it appears
elements of the Uyghur separatist movement have shifted to more blatant and violent expressions of
protest and the expansion of targets from government infrastructure and instruments of their control
to include innocent civilians.
10 Interviews with Central Asian security officials on background.
11 “Islamists Staged Explosion, Kyrgyz Says,” UPI, May 25, 2003; “Kyrgyz Republic Public
Announcement,” U.S. Department of State, May 6, 2003; “Uzbekistan Public Announcement,” U.S.
Department of State, April 5, 2003; Alexei Igushev, “Hizb ut-Tahrir Remains Active in Central Asia,”
Eurasianet, February 5, 2003.
12 Thomas Sanderson, “China’s War on Terrorism,” presented at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, March 5, 2003.

13 Description of this exercise drawn from “China Ends War Games with Kyrgyzstan,” Associ-
ated Press, October 11, 2002; “China, Kyrgyzstan Hold Joint Anti-terror Military eEise,” Xinhuanet, Oc-
tober 12, 2002; “Joint War Games Boost Terror Fight,” South China Morning Post, October 12, 2002.
424 ORESMAN
14 Two airbases in Uzbekistan in Khanabad and Kokaida, two “gas and go” operations in Tajiki-
stan in Dushanbe and Kyulyab, and one major base in Kyrgyzstan at Manas outside of Bishkek, with a
possible new locale at Shymkent Airport in Kazakhstan.
15 Off the record conference.
16 “Temporary Ban on Uyghur Society in Kyrgyzstan,” OMRI Daily Digest, April 9, 1996.
17 In July 1998, China and Kazakhstan reached a final agreement resolving remaining border
disputes along their 1,700 km border; the first full border dispute resolution between China and one
of its “Shanghai Five” partners. “China: Jiang Zemin on Nuclear Arms Race, Sino-Kazakh Border Pact,”
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-98-187, July 6, 1998. The July
2000 quote is drawn from “Xinhua: ‘Full Text’ of Dushanbe Statement of ‘Shanghai Five.’”
18 “Chinese Business Interests in Central Asia: A Quest for Dominance,” Central Asian-Caucasus
Analyst, June 18, 2003; “Chinese Leader Hu Jintao Visits Astana,” RFE/RL, June 07 2003; and infor-
mation provided by Fred Starr, Chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at the School for
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.
19 Wu Kang, “China’s Quest for Energy Security and the Role of Central Asia,” presented at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 22, 2003.

20 “Chinese President Urges SCO Economic Cooperation,” People’s Daily, Friday, May 30,
2003.
REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION 425
Chapter 20
Regional Security
Cooperation and Foreign
Policies in Central Asia: A
21st Century “Great Game”?
Robert Brannon
A
t least three entities are engaged in crafting and implementing se-
curity policies in Central Asia—the United States, Russia and the
Central Asian states themselves—each with its own set of perceived
interests and threats. The United States is engaged in the Global War on
Terrorism and views the region in terms of strategic access and resources.
Russia still sees its relationship with the regional states in paternal terms,
including perceived inherent rights of influence. Meanwhile, the Central
Asian states are anything but monolithic in terms of foreign policy. While
other international entities are certainly at play in the region, including
China and the European Union (EU), this chapter focuses on the com-
plexities of the U.S./Russian/Central Asian triangle and the national secu-
rity issues at stake for all three players.
During the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in
Prague on November 20, 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush said:
Russia does not require a buffer zone. Instead, it needs to be sur-
rounded by friends and neighbors. Russia is part of Europe and
strong security in Europe is good for Russia. NATO enlargement does
not threaten Russia because Russia has a special role in NATO, one
that will strengthen the already strong ties between our two nations.1
Although the President was speaking about Russia and NATO en-
largement, he might well have been thinking of Central Asia when he
mentioned buffer zones. Russia has long seen this region as a safety zone
against threats to its security both real and perceived. The United States
425
426 BRANNON
thinks this is no longer necessary, arguing that collective security might be

better achieved through closer alliances throughout the region.
What are Russia’s interests in Central Asia and how does Russia view
U.S. security cooperation with the Central Asian states? While President
Vladimir Putin appears to have been able to marshal support within his
government to tolerate a short-term American presence in Central Asia,
what are the implications for a longer-term presence? What, exactly, are
Russia’s ultimate goals in the region? This chapter examines regional secu-
rity cooperation from the standpoint of U.S. and Russian foreign policies
in Central Asia. Within this context, it focuses on Russian tolerance for
U.S. initiatives in the post September 11 strategic environment.
Before and After September 11

On June 28, 2000, barely six months into his term of office, President
Putin issued a new foreign policy concept, asserting, “Today our foreign
policy resources are relatively limited, and they must be concentrated in
areas that are vital to Russia’s interests.”2 Although the concept was based
on work begun during President Boris Yeltsin’s administration and put
forth in Russia’s new strategic concept and military doctrine published in
1999, the policy statements nonetheless reflected Putin’s pragmatism with
regard to optimizing Russia’s position in world affairs, regardless of its
faded superpower status. This foreign policy concept was again updated
in October 2003.3
Described by Russia’s Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov as a pragmatic ef-
fort to help the country solve its domestic problems,4 the June 2000 docu-
ment offered a restrained but critical view of NATO and the West, high-
lighting the importance of Russia’s ties to the Group of Eight (G8) and
the EU. Along with criticizing the United States for pursuing a uni-polar
foreign policy instead of adopting a more stable (in Russian eyes) multi-
polar view of the world, the statement also took a swipe at U.S. plans to
deploy a limited national missile defense system. Yet Putin appears to rec-
ognize the complexities of international relations for Russia as well as the
United States and has thus far maneuvered adeptly. He told an interviewer
in January 2001 that Russia “must get rid of imperial ambitions on the one
hand, and on the other clearly understand where our national interests are
and fight for them.”5 Putin further put his own stamp on Russia’s foreign
policy for the future by declaring that Russia would be much better off
“with” the West than “without.”
Russian foreign policy in Central Asia is still in transition. Deeply
embedded in the Russian psyche is the notion that Central Asian states
are simply “nashi,” the Russian word for “ours.” In both Tsarist and Soviet
times, Moscow controlled the region by force and by altering traditional
demographic boundaries almost capriciously along the way. With the
break up of the Soviet Union and subsequent independence of the Central
Asian states, the relationship has been slowly shifting away from a paternal
one. Many in Moscow never really expected these new nations to be able
to exist without considerable aid and assistance, which helped lead to the
creation of spheres of influence, represented to an extent by the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS). As the dynamics within the region
change so does Russian policy, which might be best described as tolerant
in varying degrees.
Thus, even now, it is difficult to think of Russia’s policy toward the
Central Asian states as “foreign.” After the break-up of the Soviet Union,
most Russian analysts insisted that close ties with Central Asia were criti-
cal to national security interests. Many believed that geographic location;
shared history; common production systems, infrastructure, and institu-
tions; and old dependences on Soviet financial subsidies and the Moscow
markets would guarantee a continued interest in extensive cooperation
with Russia.6 They also believed that a shared sense of national identity,
derived from a long history of cohabitation, had survived the dissolution
of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, these assumptions proved wrong.
While it was true that Central Asian leaders initially were reluctant
to leave the Soviet Union, they soon realized that Russia had little role to
play in their search for national identity and values. Throughout the early
1990s, Russia’s often erratic behavior also served to distance the Central
Asian states from Russia politically. This feeling was expressed by Kazakh
President Nursultan Nazarbaev, Russia’s closest ally among Central Asian
leaders, who spoke out in early 1997 about his disappointment with Rus-
sian policy.7 What had once been shared values among the Soviet republics
were replaced by new or “national” identities, suspicions about Russia’s
intentions, and pragmatic calculations about what Russia actually could
provide. Instead of a security community including Central Asian states
grouped around Russia, a web of bilateral agreements developed with
strongly expressed sensitivities about issues of sovereignty.
Russia watched with concern as along its southern border indepen-
dently-minded states began to shift their orientation in other directions.
Of the CIS members, Uzbekistan became the most outspoken critic of
Russia and the most eager to enter into cooperation with the United States.
Turkmenistan limited its military cooperation with Russia on the grounds
of its declared policy of “permanent neutrality.” As Russia saw its influence
427
428 BRANNON
in Central Asia decline, fears arose that its position in the region might
be supplanted by other external powers. The reality of the September 11
terrorist attacks caused Russia to re-evaluate its own policies and consider
opportunities for exploiting new U.S. views on terrorism.
In the immediate aftermath of September 11, President Putin was
the first world leader to place a telephone call to President Bush. In doing
this, Putin ignored the objections of many Kremlin advisors and cemented
his relationship, and personal bond, with Bush. Putin’s actions in this case
symbolize his policy of support for, and integration with, the West and in
particular the United States. In spite of opposition from inside his own
government, he made a decision to show Russia’s support immediately,
without waiting to build a consensus in his own government.
In the weeks that followed September 11, as it became apparent that
America would court the Central Asian states for access to military facili-
ties, rhetoric heated up in Russia as to what Russia’s policy should be. In
spite of President Putin’s support for the United States, many of his clos-
est advisors voiced strong concerns that America might exploit the new
war on terrorism to gain a foothold in territories that had, until just 10
years before, been part of the Soviet Union. On September 18, 2001, U.S.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the United States
would seek approval from several states in Central Asia and support from
Russia to deploy military assets in the region to support the war on ter-
rorism. Rumsfeld’s statement seemed to imply that operations planned for
Afghanistan might be launched from bases in nearby Central Asia. Russian
Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov responded by saying there was no basis
for U.S. claims to a requirement for access to military bases in Central
Asia.8 Several other key government officials also issued statements de-
nouncing U.S. initiatives in the region. Shortly thereafter, to Ivanov’s ap-
parent surprise and perhaps consternation, Putin held a press conference
to declare Russian support for the U.S. request.9
During his remarks at Harvard’s Kennedy School in February 2002,
Russian Duma Deputy Grigory Yavlinsky told an anecdote about Putin’s
decision to side with the United States in the war on terrorism. According
to Yavlinsky, out of 21 people present in a September 24 advisory meeting
Putin had called, only two voted to support the United States. One person
voted to support the Taliban, and 18 said Russia should remain neutral.
Shortly after the meeting, Putin announced “unconditional and immedi-
ate” support for the United States, including access to military facilities in
the CIS.10 All of these statements sent confusing signals to the governments
of Central Asian states. Yet despite his decision, Putin continues to oper-
ate in a political atmosphere that has not been particularly positive about
cooperation with the West in general, and the United States in particular.
In Russia, some wrongly believe the United States wants to see Russia fail
in its foreign policy and security objectives so that it can “clean up” in the
aftermath to its own advantage.
Russia’s Interests in Central Asia

As Lena Johnson, Senior Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of
International Affairs and noted regional scholar, has argued:
Russia’s interests in Central Asia since the break-up of the Soviet
Union are mainly related to strategic and security concerns. The stra-
tegic interests are two-fold: first to integrate Central Asian states in
the CIS sphere and make them into close allies of Russia; and, second,
to deny external powers strategic access to Central Asia. 11
First and foremost, Russia regards Central Asia as a buffer zone of
strategic importance to its national defense. By the end of the 1990s, events
in the region had increased fears about Islamic extremism and terrorism.
This atmosphere gave Putin a convenient platform from which to suggest
closer cooperation in the area of military security, as well as a renewed
effort to reorient the Central Asian states toward Russia. The events of
September 11 changed this dynamic. Early Russian opposition to the sta-
tioning of American military forces close to its borders for operations in
Afghanistan did not play well in the Central Asian states. However, as Rus-
sia changed its position and received credit for a new cooperative policy
in its dealings with the United States, Central Asian attitudes changed as
well. Russia’s interest in the fall of the Taliban regime, and in expanding
economic ties with the United States, overcame concerns about Central
Asian states accepting American military bases in the region.
To allay Russian concerns, American military and civilian officials
stressed the short-term nature of the American military presence in Cen-
tral Asia and emphasized that troops would be withdrawn once military
operations were over. However, as was sharply articulated in the press by
anti-American hard liners such as General Colonel Leonid Ivashov,12 Rus-
sia was well aware of the probability that America might try to exploit the
opportunities created by the war on terrorism and remain in the region
long after meeting announced military objectives.
Russia had to balance this concern against its fears that the rising tide
of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia could evoke increased unrest in
the region and cause instability that could threaten Russia directly. Many
430 BRANNON
Russians believe that their greatest security risks are associated with the
country’s southern flank. Related to this is the concern that Chechen sepa-
ratists are being funded by the same terrorist organizations at war with
the United States. Osama Bin Laden did nothing to allay this fear when he
pronounced that no country that supported and aided America in their
war would be safe.13 In the wake of the horrific hostage siege at Moscow’s
“Nord Ost” theater during the week of October 22, 2002, Putin referred to
Bin Laden’s statement and concluded that there was a direct link between
his decision to support America and the attack at the theater (by then at-
tributed to Chechen terrorists).14
President Putin quickly became adept at interpreting the new Ameri-
can National Security Strategy in ways that supported Russian goals and
objectives in its own “war on terrorism” in Chechnya. After the United
States released its new National Security Strategy in October 2002,15 Putin
hailed it as a landmark document for its sharp focus on the threat of ter-
rorism, not only to the United States, but also to the world. By December,
Putin gave indications he would revise Russia’s National Security Doctrine
along similar lines.16 Specifically, the aim was to identify terrorism more
sharply as the primary threat to Russian interests. Since then, despite
some acute frustration in his attempts to wield the ax of military reform
against an intransigent General Staff, Putin and his Defense Minister, Ser-
gei Ivanov, have achieved some progress in refocusing military doctrine.
Recently, specific reforms have been aimed at further trimming the army’s
forces and implementing plans to move away from conscripts as the pri-
mary source of manpower toward an all-volunteer force similar to what is
the norm in most Western countries. These positive steps might not have
been possible absent the forward looking security environment that exists
in the wake of September 11.
The American Point of View

The United States needs access to Central Asian infrastructure in
order to more effectively and efficiently fight the Global War on Terror-
ism. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks against the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, America focused on striking al
Qaeda at the heart of its operations in Afghanistan. Sustained support for
such a military campaign required logistics bases in Central Asia and al-
most immediately, the United States began to work to make arrangements
in the region. According to Eugene Rumer, senior fellow at the Institute
for National Strategic Studies, “After 10 years of working to maintain its
distance from Central Asia, the United States has landed squarely in the
middle of it.”17
Initially, the United States secured an airbase in Uzbekistan and the
right to use a similar facility in Kyrgyzstan. Although Kazakhstan initially
turned down a U.S. request for an airbase in that country, subsequent ar-
rangements allowed for such use if needed. Kazakhstan did grant the U.S.
over-flight and emergency landing rights, and also received support for
humanitarian efforts from Turkmenistan. In return for these concessions,
the U.S. budget for assistance to the five Central Asian states has more
than doubled from fiscal year 2001—literally, from $230 to $595 million.18
In response to the perceived rising threat of radical Islam in Central Asia,
the United States is emphasizing security assistance and engagement with
regional governments. Rumer states:
Since September 11, the United States has emerged as the principal
power in Central Asian affairs. With the troop presence in Kyrgyz-
stan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, the defeat of the Taliban government
in Afghanistan, and all signs pointing to a long-term U.S. military
presence in the region, the United States has become Central Asia’s
security manager.19
Even though human rights groups have charged that Central Asian
states have stepped up repression since the September 11 terrorist attacks,
U.S. officials remain convinced that a positive engagement strategy can
succeed in encouraging regional governments to embrace gradual liberal
democratization. In an article for The Eurasianet in November 2002, Dr.
Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation cited an unnamed U.S. National
Security Council official who claims that the Bush administration views
the foreign policy challenge in Central Asia as a balancing act between
internal reform, security, and energy: “The focus on security is overriding,
but not exclusive.”20
The upcoming years will prove critical to the United States as it
further refines its policies with Central Asia. Meeting growing national
security concerns must reflect a balanced view—not only for the United
States but also for the Central Asian nations themselves.
Kyrgyzstan and Other Regional Deployments

When American forces were first deployed to Central Asia in Octo-
ber 2001, Washington stated they were there for a limited time and would
be withdrawn once the mission was completed. The deployment was not
welcomed by Russia, though President Putin chose not to oppose it. Since
432 BRANNON
then, in Russian eyes, the U.S. build-up in the region has been out of
proportion with stated intentions. More recently, leading American repre-
sentatives have stated publicly that the U.S. presence in Central Asia would
not only be long-term, but might even expand.21
Given the deteriorating relations between the United States and
Russia in the aftermath of U.S. military intervention in Iraq, the situation
in Central Asia has the potential to become a destabilizing factor. Late in
2002, Russian aircraft redeployed to Kant Air Base in Kyrgyzstan, ostensi-
bly to support the war on terrorism.22 Some observers, however, believed
the return of Russian troops to Kyrgyzstan might be a sign that a new
rivalry was developing between Moscow and Washington in Central Asia ,
with the ultimate aim of establishing political and economic control over
the region. This symbolic Russian presence is apparently the vanguard of
a force that might ultimately include more than 20 Russian aircraft and
about 700 troops, thus becoming the most significant military deployment
outside Russia’s borders since the Soviet collapse. Russian aircraft will
form the core of the air unit.23 According to RIA Novostii, the official Rus-
sian news agency, Russia plans to deploy five SU-25 attack jets, five SU-27
fighters, two AN-26 transports, two IL-76 transports, five IL-39 training
jets, and two MI-8 helicopters.
During a brief stopover in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital, on Decem-
ber 4, 2002, President Putin endorsed the recent Russian deployment of
fighter jets, bombers and other aircraft in Kyrgyzstan.24 Speaking to jour-
nalists, Putin said that Russia’s new military presence was very important
and brought “a new quality” to security arrangements in the region. Kyr-
gyz President Askar Akaev has urged Russia to become a “main strategic
cornerstone of Central Asia.”25 At the same time, officials also signed a
defense protocol called the Bishkek Declaration, pledging closer security
and economic ties between the two countries. While some believe the
move may be designed to reassert Russia’s military influence in a region
where the United States now has its own semi-permanent military pres-
ence, Putin reassured the press that the agreement is not directed against
any third country. Both presidents emphasized that the new relationship
is multi-faceted, including a deal to write off some $40 million of Kyrgyz
debt to Moscow. Along with Putin, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov
also visited Kyrgyzstan to inspect the new facilities. He announced that the
Russian task force would provide air support for a contingent of ground
forces. Known as a rapid reaction force, this group could eventually total
more than 5,000 troops from Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajiki-
stan, as members of an alliance of former Soviet republics known as the

Collective Security Treaty Organization.26
The Russian deployment to Kant Air Base now means that Kyrgyzstan
is host to two foreign air bases, the other being the U.S. facility at Manas,
a Bishkek suburb. The U.S. base, which was established in the aftermath of
September 11, is designed to provide air support for regional operations
by the anti-terrorism coalition in Afghanistan. Some 2,000 American per-
sonnel now occupy Manas, and up to 5,000 coalition soldiers (including
the original 2,000 U.S. troops) are expected to be based there eventually.27
Although this force may help Kyrgyz authorities deal with terrorist threats,
coalition troops are unlikely to back the government in disputes with
political opposition forces, without additional security protocols. On one
hand, the security deal between Moscow and Bishkek could indicate that
the United States has failed to provide sufficient commitment to the Akaev
administration in terms of security needs and domestic political problems.
Therefore, Akaev is now turning to Russian backing in military, political
and financial spheres. On the other hand, the new arrangements with Rus-
sia may be the harbinger of re-emerging Russian interests in a sphere of
influence and a desire for enhanced credibility.
Russia and Kyrgyzstan have long maintained close political and
military ties. Akaev has tended to support the Kremlin’s policies in the re-
gion; in response, Moscow has backed Akaev’s regime and warned against
interference in Kyrgyz internal affairs. However, Moscow has been careful
to deny that the Russian deployment in Kyrgyzstan is related in any way to
the American presence. Almost tauntingly, RIA Novostii commented that
nobody was going to push the Americans from Central Asia. The same
RIA Novostii article added that since the United States has been unable to
rid the region of terrorists despite more than two years of concerted effort,
it is possible that Russian troops eventually could help defend the Ameri-
cans in the event of some undefined “worst-case scenarios.”28
Following his trip to Kyrgyzstan, Putin traveled to China and India
where speculation re-surfaced about the three countries “ganging up” to
form a China-India-Russia “strategic triangle,” in an effort to help balance
the regional dominance of the United States. Despite the rumors, Russian
sources concede that such a relationship would be unlikely since Russia,
China, and India all are keen to strengthen good relations with Washing-
ton, and have backed the U.S. war on terrorism. 29 Both China and India
have distanced themselves from the idea of an China-India-Russia strate-
gic axis. However, foreign ministers of the three countries later met on the
sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly session in New York for
434 BRANNON
informal talks, with the understanding that such meetings might be held
on a regular basis. Although the “strategic triangle” concept still has some
supporters in Moscow, Putin’s Asian tour came in the wake of improved
relations with the United States. Therefore, pursuing a strategic alliance
between Russia, India and China is unlikely to become Russia’s primary
goal at this stage, and merely indicates that Moscow wants partners in both
the East and West.
Yet, perhaps coincidentally, soon after Putin returned from his trip to
China and India, Tajik President Imomali Rakhmonov met with President
Bush in Washington December 9, 2002. Media reports speculated that
creation of a permanent U.S. military base in Tajikistan was among the
main issues discussed at this meeting. Following an interview in December
2002 with Professor Aleksei Malashenko, of Moscow’s Institute for Inter-
national Relations (MGIMO), journalist Zamira Eshanova claims Putin’s
visit to Kyrgyzstan and Rakhmonov’s reception at the White House were
at least indirectly connected. Malashenko apparently believes the process
of the military reapportionment of Central Asia is under way, with the
United States and Russia as the main players, and has said:
I think that these visits and these cross-negotiations and cross-actions
in the direction of creating military bases in Central Asia do not mean
that the Russian military presence in Central Asia is simply being re-
placed by an American one. It means that there are attempts to adjust
or provide political stability from the outside.30
Although the United States has given no signs that it may be prepar-
ing to court the government of Tajikistan in pursuit of any specific secu-
rity related goals or objectives, there is reason to believe the Tajiks may be
taken more seriously in Washington in the future.
Elsewhere in the region, Uzbekistan is already hosting some 3,000
American troops on its territory in support of operations in Afghanistan.
Kazakhstan has offered an airport in the southern city of Shimkent to
U.S.-led coalition forces. Thus, of the five Central Asian states, only Turk-
menistan, which declared its permanent neutrality after independence,
has remained apart from military developments related to the war on
terrorism.
U.S. and Russian National Interests Coincide

As time passes, radical Islam has become an increasingly potent force
in Central Asia. Ahmed Rashid, the Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia
correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review and the Daily Tele-
graph, London, has written extensively on the region for the last 20years
and argues that the Hizb-ut-Tahrir al Islami (HT) or the Party of Islamic
Liberation and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) are both seri-
ous threats to the region. Followers of these movements derive inspiration
from the Taliban and the extreme Wahhabi doctrine of Saudi Arabia, and
were trained at militant madrassas in Pakistan. In his book Jihad: The Rise
of Militant Islam in Central Asia, Rashid documents a September 2000
meeting to discuss future cooperation between al Qaeda leader Osama Bin
Laden and representatives from the IMU, the HT, and Chechen separatists
in Kabul, Afghanistan.31 The potential for increasing linkages between ter-
rorist organizations makes such threats transnational and sets the stage for
growing international cooperation.
In Russia, President Putin appears to be exploiting anti-terrorism
sentiment to his advantage and has succeeded in linking Russia’s war in
Chechnya with America’s war on terrorism. On November 11, 2002, at
a post EU meeting press conference in Brussels, Putin unleashed an es-
pecially strong invective against a reporter from the Paris newspaper Le
Monde. Responding to a question about the potential unintended con-
sequences of using land mines in Chechnya and specifically whether this
tactic was causing too many civilian casualties, Putin cited widespread
aggression against Russia as far back as 1999 in Dagestan. Putin alleged
this aggression stemmed from Islamic sources and was directed at Russia
because these same forces would never be willing to coexist peacefully on
Russia’s southern flank. He went on to point out that France must surely
feel the same dangers since it, too, was an ally of the United States in the
war on terrorism.32
Thus, despite 50 years of regional confrontation and tensions over
the deployment of U.S. troops to Central Asia, the United States and Rus-
sia appear to be ready to cooperate in Central Asia in the war on terrorism.
Neither side seems to be willing, or even able, to “go it alone.” Each has
much to gain from cooperating with the other, and each also stands to lose
much if cooperation sours. Russian foreign policy under Putin has evolved
over the duration of his presidency. Pragmatic and forceful, his ability to
exploit opportunities for gain has steadily improved. Accordingly, Russia
may be willing to tolerate, if not openly encourage, a long-term presence
of U.S. security forces in Central Asia if it means the United States will
assist Russia in dealing with the threat of terrorism. From the American
perspective, the United States has an opportunity now to create a more
positive relationship with Russia, with significant benefits for both sides.
Russia’s leadership wants integration with the United States, not only in
436 BRANNON
the war against terrorism, but also in areas such as trade and energy. Both
sides have a unique chance to exploit the current situation to craft foreign
policy that will overcome old antagonisms and distrust.
The Future
Both Russia and the United States have recognized the importance
of Central Asia. Their current competition for regional influence has been
compared to the historical contest of Russia and Britain, referred to by
Peter Hopkirk and others as “The Great Game.”33 In the current context,
there is compelling evidence that the security of Central Asia has similarly
high stakes for all concerned. One way to think about this is from the
perspective of alternative futures. Peter Schwartz, in his research on devel-
oping a scenario planning model for business, begins with a set of visions
that attempt to look 10 years into the future.34 To frame such possibilities,
it is useful to begin with two contrasting alternative futures, from among
the many that are conceivable. In adapting scenario planning to interna-
tional relations, especially in the context of regional security cooperation
in Central Asia, alternative futures in the U.S.-Russian relationship might
resemble one of the following “tales.”35 Although hypothetical, it is not
difficult to imagine the plausibility of each. These narratives highlight the
interconnectedness and interdependence of the participants in a regional
relationship that could be described as a new great game. As each unfolds,
it is useful to consider what it might take to make them real.
A Tale of Two Possible Future Worlds
First, the nightmare scenario: The year is 2011 and the United States
has been at war against terrorism since September 11, 2001. Things have
gone badly for the United States since it has emerged as the sole nation
fighting the war. Russia has pulled out of the coalition and decided to go
its own way. Mission creep has led to pursuing objectives beyond simply
crushing terrorism as a threat, including nation-building throughout the
Middle East and into Central and South Asia. The conflict has become
global. After Russia split from the coalition and abandoned any further
attempts at integration with the West, Russian military forces rallied in
support of the Communist Party. This led to a more independent minded
senior military leadership, less inclined to accept guidance from civilians
in government. Russian military bases in Central Asia exist side by side
with those of the United States, often with resultant skirmishes as each
side seeks to defend its territory. Political regimes in Central Asian states
generally have become even more repressive and authoritarian. The Rus-
sian economy is a shambles and corruption is deeply entrenched at every

level. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is widespread
throughout the region. Large stockpiles of dangerous weapons continue
to disappear from controlled areas and show up in various theaters of war.
In sum, the world is at war and Central Asia has become an exceptionally
dangerous and highly unstable powder keg.
Next, an alternative, arm-in-arm scenario: The year is 2011 and the
global war on terrorism has been over for several years. The United States
and its coalition allies, including Russia and all the Central Asian states, were
victorious. Terrorist organizations—state-sponsored and otherwise—have
been beaten back into marginal threats that are easily tracked through the
advent of highly developed regional security cooperation. Russia is fully
integrated with the west. NATO has changed its name to the Euro-Atlantic
Security Treaty Organization and Russia is a candidate for joining the alli-
ance as a full partner. The Russian military, firmly under civilian control,
is reforming along NATO-standard lines, leaner and more efficient. Cen-
tral Asian military bases are jointly occupied by Russian, American and
indigenous forces. Regional economies are stable and highly productive.
The post war strategic environment has led to stability for oil pipelines
and export of natural resources from Central Asian reserves. Membership
in the World Trade Organization, debt restructuring, and debt forgiveness
have given new strength to Russia’s burgeoning market capitalism. Russian
leadership and influence in Central Asia are welcomed and encouraged by
the United States. Corruption and proliferation of WMD are rare, as most
of the reasons for black markets have been eliminated. In sum, the world
is at peace and Central Asia has become model region of stability with U.S.
and Russian forces cooperating side-by-side.
Getting Back to the Future
Considering the respective national interests of Russia and the
United States in Central Asia, and in view of strategic security objectives
that have been established by both, it is possible to see a degree of conver-
gence in comparing these two entirely hypothetical scenarios. Regional
stability, from the perspective of Russia’s national interests, depends on
support for authoritarian political regimes committed to maintaining the
status quo. The same regional stability so critical to Russia is also impor-
tant for the national interests of the United States. In order to limit threats
to its own security forces in the region, America needs Russian coopera-
tion to prevent instability and its subsequent insecurities. Therefore, close
cooperation between Russia and the United States in the war on terrorism
438 BRANNON
translates directly to support for current political regimes in Central Asia

that seek to restrict sources of instability.
American and Russian national interests in Central Asia coincide
more often than they do not. Absent close cooperation with Russia and the
Central Asian states, the United States would be forced to operate at sig-
nificant disadvantages in Afghanistan. Similarly, if Russia has to conduct
operations against terrorists in Chechnya without cutting off support for
terrorists from Central Asia, the disadvantages are legion. Even after the
war on terrorism is over, the peace that follows will be influenced for all
concerned by the lines of cooperation established during the war. Close
cooperation in wartime will doubtless lead to closer ties in peace. These
partnerships could reap benefits in areas beyond security cooperation. Al-
though scenario planning helps to imagine the possibilities in hypothetical
terms, current events also are instructive.
Putin’s Real World

President Putin’s initiative to make Russia’s foreign policy more pro-
Western has not been well received by his country’s political and military
elite. To some, the absence of widespread support among these groups
has led to speculation about Putin’s credibility, sincerity, commitment to
democratization and his ability to bring his nation along with him. Opin-
ions have been divided. The most important question is whether Putin’s
initiative really represents a true change in Russian foreign policy or just
a political experiment. According to Dmitri Trenin of the Moscow Carn-
egie Center,36 Russia’s decision to support the United States in the war on
terrorism was based on fundamental Russian interests. It is, however, still
not clear whether other key elements of the Russian government share the
President’s view of precisely what those interests are.
The changes in Russia’s foreign policy following September 11 are
often interpreted as a personal achievement for President Putin, despite
Russian public opinion.37 His policy of supporting the United States in the
fight against terrorism and Russia’s active participation in the antiterrorist
coalition, as well as the warming of Russia’s relations with America and
NATO, appears outwardly to be an extraordinary act of political courage.
However, some political and social analysts38 have observed that deeply
rooted anti-Americanism (a legacy of the Cold War), and the sometimes
open hostility toward the United States as a world leader, are stronger than
feelings of sympathy for the victims of the terrorist acts of September 11.
A sense that the Russian and American peoples are in some way united in
suffering from international terrorism is also lacking.
The risks associated with those political factors driving Russian

behavior in the war on terrorism center on President Putin’s ability to
deliver on what he promises. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, it cannot
be assumed that senior military leadership simply will fall in line behind
Putin’s assurances to the United States about close cooperation in the war
on terrorism. Retired General Leonid Ivashov, for one, is well known for
his eagerness to warn Russian leaders of the perils of moving too close to
the United States. Following a press conference in December 2000 at which
President Putin announced that military cooperation with NATO would
resume, General Ivashov emphasized the risks of closer cooperation.39 Not
yet retired at that time, Ivashov called attention to aspects of the president’s
policy that were of great concern to the senior officers of Russia’s armed
forces. Nor is this example isolated; others in the government have spoken
out in similar fashion. Despite some recently positive trends, it is not yet
clear whether President Putin’s initiatives in support of broad integration
with the United States ultimately will succeed.
Conclusion
Most Russians have accepted that they cannot dictate security terms
to Central Asian states simply by fiat. The Russian government is not
financially capable of providing the region with the same measure of sup-
port it can hope to garner from the United States. In view of Russian fears
that without hard line governments in Central Asia, the ground might be
fertile for rising Islamic fundamentalism, it is clearly in Russia’s interests to
support security solutions that favor the status quo, enhancing long-term
stability. Toward this end, there are, and will continue to be, opportunities
for Russia to supplement American initiatives in the region.
For their part, Central Asian governments remain suspicious of Rus-
sian intentions and motives. Most fear that any move to shore up relations
with Russia alone might result in a loss of independence. Instead, these
governments see the advantages of close ties with both Russia and the
United States. If security cooperation with America is tolerated by Russia,
then this is indeed the better path. Central Asia needs stability, for with
stability and regional security will come improved financial and economic
outlooks. Russian interests are similar, but are complicated by the war in
Chechnya.
Perhaps Putin sees U.S. involvement in an even more pragmatic way
than might have been suspected in the aftermath of September 11. It may
be that Putin believes a U.S. presence in Central Asia will provide the nec-
essary stability in the region, thus paving the way for increased domestic
440 BRANNON
security for Russia at American expense. If this is the case, then it appears
likely that Russia will tolerate U.S. military cooperation in Central Asia
as long as it remains politically manageable. Russia’s position could be
strengthened by further deployments, such as the one to Kyrgyzstan, call-
ing attention to Russian capabilities. Putin’s 2000 presidential campaign
emphasized his commitment to end the war in Chechnya. Now that he has
linked international terrorism to this issue, it is even more important that
he bring Russia’s security policies in line with its foreign policy.
Finally, it is certainly in the best interests of the Central Asian states
to embrace security cooperation with Russia and the United States to
the extent that it supports (or, in some cases, even guarantees) their own
political stability and national security. Valuable resources in the region
are much more likely to be unlocked and converted into positive means
for national wealth if there is a stable environment that encourages com-
mercial interests. Oil extraction and marketing need strong state security
guarantees in order to be safe from terrorist attacks. Even those states with
limited natural resources have strategic assets, such as airfields or other
defense related infrastructure, which could be useful to both Russia and
the United States during the upcoming months or years in what increas-
ingly appears to be a protracted war on terrorism. Airports may be the
only marketable resource available in Kyrgyzstan, but these are important
assets, on which all players seem willing to capitalize. Recent events show
that Central Asia may be witnessing a new great game, with its fate in this
latest round being decided not only by foreign interests, but also by its
own policies. Regional security cooperation in Central Asia could be the
key to success for all sides with prudently managed, security cooperation
delivering enormous benefits to Russia, the United States and the Central
Asian states themselves. Squandered, the negative implications are dispro-
portionately worse. Now, more than ever, the next moves must be carefully
considered. Even as one plays chess, strategic players think many moves
ahead. Russians are traditionally superb at this game, and the United States
should be aware of all the options and potential impacts before entering
into agreements or implementing policies that might have far reaching
consequences.
Notes
1 White House press release, November 20, 2002.
2 Igor Ivanov, Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, (Moscow: Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, June 28, 2000).
3 Victor Litovkin, Security is Best Achieved Through Coalition: Russia’s New Military Doctrine
Highlights Community of Goals with the World” (Moscow: RIA Novosti, October 2, 2003), <www.cdi.
org/russia/276-6.cfm>.
4 Dale R. Herspring, Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain (Oxford, UK: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2002), 231.

5 Ibid.
6 Roy Allison and Lena Johnson, The Changing Security Policy Challenges in Central Asia: The
New International Context (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 96.
7 Interview with Nazarbayev in the Russian language newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January
16, 1997.
8 “Bush was asked about comments made by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov that there
is ‘no basis,’ as he put it, for Central Asian states bordering Afghanistan to offer their territory to the
U.S. or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to launch strikes against Afghanistan,” <http://www.
cdi.org/russia/172-pr.html##5>, Washington, September 20, 2001 (RFE/RL) “Russia: Support For U.S.
May Be Self-Serving.”
9 “In an abrupt change of policy and heart, Russia’s President Vladimir V. Putin said this week
that the United States could use Russian airspace to carry out strikes against Afghanistan. Putin, who
until then had been eager to put more and more distance between himself and Washington, also
withdrew his objections to a U.S. military presence in the former Soviet republics Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan,.” <http://www.cdi.org/russia/173-pr.html##7>, Baltimore Sun, September 27, 2001 “In
Russia, doubts, skepticism” (quoting from recent Russian press: Novaya Gazeta, Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
Izvestiya, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Kommersant).
10 Grigory Yavlinsky, Russian State Duma Member (Yabloko Party), “Russia and the United
States: New Challenges, New Strategies,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA),
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, February 6, 2002.
11 Roy Allison and Lena Johnson, Central Asian Security: The New International Context
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 97-101.

12 General Colonel Leonid Ivashov, recently retired from his post at the helm of International
Military Cooperation for the Russian Ministry of Defense, gave an interview to Vladimir Mukhin, a
journalist with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, appearing in The Russia Journal (December 17, 2001). In the in-
terview, Ivashov said he thinks there is a lot wrong with President Putin’s new policy of moving Russia
toward increased cooperation with the United States. Ivashov apparently believes Russia would be well
served by maintaining a healthy distance from all things western.
13 In an audiotape released to Arabic television station Al Jazeera on November 11, 2002,
Osama Bin Laden issued his first statement in many months. In a voice that intelligence analysts agree
is probably authentic, Bin Laden indicts America for unjust war against Islam and specifically threat-
ens to engulf in its vengeance any other nation that allies itself with the United States.
14 Gregory Feifer, “Russia: Moscow’s Vow to Fight Terrorism Criticized Amid Theater-Raid
Fallout,” RLE/RL, Moscow, Russia, October 30, 2002, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/229-2.cfm>. Using

rhetoric strikingly similar to that of U.S. President George W. Bush after September 11, 2001, Putin
said Russia would take the initiative in combating threats to its national security. “Russia will respond
with measures appropriate to the threats wherever there are terrorists, organizations of these criminals,
or their ideological or financial sponsors.”
15 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, October
2002.
16 Interfax News Agency, Moscow, Russia, January 30, 2003, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/242-
3.cfm>. According to the First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council’s Defense and Security
Committee, Colonel General (ret) Valeriy Manilov, “A new edition of the Russian national security
concept will take into consideration every threat the international community has encountered.”
17 Eugene B. Rumer, “Flashman’s Revenge: Central Asia after September 11,” Institute for Na-
tional Strategic Studies, Strategic Forum, no. 195, December 2002.

442 BRANNON
18 Ariel Cohen, “US Officials Relying on Engagement Strategy to Promote Change in Central
Asia,” Eurasianet, November 14, 2002.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Hooman Peimani, “Military Buildup Ends US-Russian Honeymoon,” Asia Times, August 28,
2002, and “US Presence in Central Asia Antagonizes Russia,” published in the Jamestown Foundation’s
CDI Russia Weekly, Issue no. 228, Item no.11, October 23, 2002. Dr. Hooman Peimani works as an
independent consultant with international organizations in Geneva and does research in International
Relations. Peimani attributes the claim that U.S. military presence in Central Asia would not only
likely be long-term, but might also be growing, to General Tommy Franks in his meetings with senior
government officials in many Central Asian states during negotiations in the run-up to operations in
Afghanistan.
22 On December 2, 2002, two Russian SU-25 attack jets and two IL-76 military transport planes
(along with 70 troops to establish air traffic control systems and provide security) arrived from neigh-
boring Tajikistan and landed at a military airfield in Kant, about 20 kilometers east of Bishkek. Two
days later, three SU-27 fighter jets arrived from the Lipetsk base in Central Russia. According to Sergei
Blagov, writing for the Asian Times on December 5, 2002, Russian pilots had dubbed one specific
aircraft the “presidential plane” because Putin had used it to fly over Chechnya in an unprecedented
public relations exercise two years before (supporting the conclusion that these aircraft were front line
equipment in good working order). According to Blagov, official government statements revealed that
the three SU-27 fighter jets were scheduled to return to Lipetsk soon, with the two SU-25s to remain
in Kyrgyzstan indefinitely.
23 (AFP) “Russia’s Putin in Kyrgyzstan to boost waning influence in Central Asia,” December 5,
2002, < http://www.cdi.org/russia/234-3.cfm>.

24Ibid.
25 Sanobar Shermatova, “Russia’s Motives in Kyrgyzstan: Russia’s intent in building an air base
in Kyrgyzstan is clearly to counterbalance U.S. forces stationed in that region,” Moscow News, Decem-
ber 25-31, 2002, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/237-13.cfm>.
26 Valeriy Volkov and Nikolai Khorunzhii, “Sharing Central Asia With America: Russia Main-
tains its Presence in Central Asia,” Izvestia, December 5, 2002 (from WPS Monitoring Agency, < www.
wps.ru/e_index.html>).
27 Zamira Eshanova, “Central Asia: Diplomatic Visits Highlight U.S.-Russian Cooperation,”
(RFE/RL) JRL, December 4, 2002, no. 18, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6585.cfm>. Note: This

figure is widely disputed but seems to have the strength of popular credibility in press reports. Because
of this, it is suspected that the data may represent “circular reporting” and is thus misleading.
28 Sergei Blagov, “U.S. and Russia Marching On Central Asia,” article published in the Asia
Times, December 5, 2002, quotes RIA Novostii sources, December 6, 2002. <http://www.cdi.org/rus-
sia/johnson/6591-11.cfm>.
29 Sergei Rogov, Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Canada and U.S.A.
Studies in Moscow, speaking at the Center for Naval Analyses in Washington, DC, September 25,
2002.
30 Zamira Eshanova.
31 Ahmen Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2001).
32 According to James Schumaker, Special Assistant to U.S. Ambassador Sandy Vershbow, in
a newsletter from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow November 19, 2002: Working up his anger to a still
higher level, all directed at the same hapless French reporter whose bad luck seemed to catch the Rus-
sian President in the mood for a good fight, Putin challenged the fellow to come to Moscow and “be
circumcised in such a way as to be irrevocably identified with this Muslim horde.”
33 Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (Kodansha Interna-
tional, Reprint edition, April 1994).

34 Peter Schwartz, “Appendix: Steps to Developing Scenarios,” Art of the Long View (Doubleday,
1996), 241-248, and Kees van der Heijden, “Dealing With Uncertainty,” “Scenario Development,” Sce-
narios: The Art of the Strategic Conversation, John Wiley (1996), 83-106, 183-237.
35 Robert Brannon, U.S.-Russian Relations in the War on Terrorism, (under commitment for
publication by the Naval War College Review, Newport RI, 2004). Adapted to illustrate the application
of scenario planning to regional security in Central Asia.
36 Alexander Mineev, Opinion Editorial, Russian language newspaper Novaya Gazeta, January
21, 2002.
37 William Zimmerman, The Russian People and Foreign Policy (Princeton, New Jersy: Princeton
University Press, 2002), 89-102. Actual figures, cited on page 91 of Zimmerman’s book, reveal that 62
percent of elites and 68 percent of the mass population see the United States as a threat to Russian
security.
38 Michael Kochkin, “Russia and the United States Post September 11: What do the Russians
Think?” Jamestown Foundation, Russia and Eurasia Review 1, Issue 11 (November 5, 2002). Mr.
Kochkin works for the non-governmental organization “Eurocontact” in Volgograd and is occasionally
published in English language by CDI Russia Weekly (in this case, 230, no. 12).
39 Annual briefing for foreign military attaches, December 2000, author’s personal notes,
American Embassy, Moscow, Russia.

444 BRANNON
DEFINING U.S. INTERESTS 445
Chapter 21
Friends Like These: Defining

U.S. Interests in Central Asia 1
Olga Oliker
I
t is clear the United States will stay involved in Central Asia. It is less
clear to what extent and in what ways. At a time when U.S. forces are
deployed to this region in comparatively large numbers, it is worth re-
membering that if Central Asia is new to most of the soldiers and airmen
who find themselves there, it is not new to the U.S. military as a whole.
Amercian forces have provided training assistance to several Central Asian
states over the past 10 years, and the U.S. government has built ties with
the leaderships of these countries since they first gained independence.
This is not to say, however, that the present U.S. involvement in the
region is a direct outgrowth of past activities. In fact, it is not. Past U.S. ef-
forts in Central Asia were very limited and contacts with the leaderships of
these countries were best described as “stop and go,” due to concerns about
the reliability, human rights records, and various foreign and domestic
policies of these regimes—as well as, quite simply, fairly limited perceived
U.S. interests in the region.
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) created a more immediate need
for U.S. military involvement, and the U.S. government did a masterful
and precedential job of attaining access to several remote locations where
American forces had never been before. At these sites, they set up facili-
ties and promptly began successful operations. The extent to which prior
contacts helped make this happen, as some have argued they did, is un-
clear. Doubtless, it was useful to know whom to talk to in Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan, countries where the United States had built military contacts
in prior years. However, such contacts had not been built to anywhere
near the same extent with, for example, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, and
both of those states also were willing to provide access to U.S. forces. If
anything, prior contacts influenced U.S. decisions to ask for access more
than they did regional states’ willingness to grant it. This willingness had
445
446 OLIKER
more to do with regional powers’ support for the U.S. effort to defeat the
Taliban in Afghanistan and the hopes that U.S. presence would translate
into tangible benefits for the country and the regime.
This experience has implications both for U.S. policy on access re-
lated issues2 and for short and long term U.S. policy towards Central Asia.
Beyond OEF, U.S. interests in this region are amorphous and predomi-
nantly non-military. Caspian energy, often touted as a justification for
closer U.S. ties with Central Asia’s often unsavory regimes, is largely a mat-
ter of oil that will be sold on the global market (and not so much of that
as to significantly affect prices and thus engender particularly strong U.S.
interest), and gas that will be sold locally, thus having no particular impact
on the United States. Other economic interests are minimal. America has
little trade with these countries and few reasons to expect this to change in
the foreseeable future. In terms of security concerns, the United States has
few traditional strategic reasons to build and maintain closer ties with the
five Central Asian states. Those who argue for stronger relationships say
that U.S. ties could help stem Russian, Chinese, or Iranian influence in the
region. Even the greatest proponents of close relations had, before OEF,
tended to see Central Asia as low on U.S. priority lists, arguing that other
allies, such as Turkey, could advance U.S. interests just as well. Finally, the
dismal human rights records of many of these regimes continue to cre-
ate difficulties in justifying with the U.S. Congress and general public the
contacts that do exist.
This is not to say, however, that the United States has no interests
in Central Asia. In fact, the experience of OEF has demonstrated not
only that the United States can access this region, but also that the region
is critical for battling a broader, more complicated set of threats. The
region’s porous borders and proximity to Afghanistan have made it a key
transit route for the narcotics trade and other criminal activities including
human, weapons and other illegal goods trafficking. These problems must
now be understood as part of a larger family of transnational threats to
which global terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) belong. As the United States and others learn how to combat these
threats, Central Asia may become a key battleground for it is an epicenter
(unfortunately one of several) for these problems. The way to fight in this
realm, however, may not be by means of military influence, but rather
through a range of economic development and security assistance; not
through competition with other great powers, but via cooperation with
them to achieve common ends; and not by finding quick solutions, but
by committing to long-term involvement and engagement. This would, of
course, require a qualitatively different approach in Central Asia than the

United States has taken in the past.
Background
Prior to September 11, U.S. interests in Central Asia were limited. The
relatively low level of energy resources assessed by most estimates meant
that although U.S. firms were involved, and the U.S. government was fairly
vocal in its support of “multiple pipelines” for Caspian oil, Caspian energy
was not a top priority for Washington. Strategically, the region appeared
to be of little significance. Thus, U.S. interests in Central Asia were second-
ary economic concerns; interests derivative of the goals of others, such as
concern about Russian imperialism or support for Turkish efforts to build
influence in the region; and ideological goals such as democratization.
This did not mean, however, that the United States was not involved
in Central Asia. As America sought to define national interests in the
seemingly non-threatening global environment of the 1990s, it sought to
prevent threats from emerging and to pursue ideological and humanitar-
ian goals it felt it could afford. These included global peacemaking efforts,
as well as the pursuit of democratization in a variety of regions.3 To a lesser
extent, in part because solutions were difficult to define or implement, the
Unites States sought to mitigate the non-immediate but dangerous threats
of WMD proliferation, terrorism and international crime.
Thus, the United States built military and political relations with the
Central Asian states, seeking to influence regional governments in a vari-
ety of strategic and ideological directions. U.S. policy focused first on the
elimination of nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan, which were seen as the
most significant security threat in the region. It then sought to build low-
level military-to-military contacts with the Central Asian states, both on a
bilateral basis and through NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.
It provided democratization and economic assistance and sought to sup-
port U.S. firms, particularly energy companies, that were investing in the
region. These activities also were intended to limit the capacity of Russia
to strong-arm the Central Asian states, without directly confronting Rus-
sia in the region, by steering clear of promising security guarantees to the
local regimes. 4
Military cooperation in the period leading up to 2001 focused par-
ticularly on Special Forces joint training with Uzbek, Kazakh and Kyrgyz
armed forces, as well as providing non-lethal military equipment.5 After
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) incursions in 1999 and 2000, the
United States provided some support to Kyrgyzstan to enable it to better
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respond to such threats. Assistance was also provided by Turkey, Russia,

and Uzbekistan at this time.6 The United States built a significant program
of military cooperation with Kazakhstan, which began with Cooperative
Threat Reduction assistance to eliminate the Soviet legacy of WMD and
evolved into a more general program of cooperation with International
Military Education and Training (IMET), export and border controls,
and so forth.7 Such cooperation was limited in the wake of revelations
of Kazakh arms sales to North Korea.8 Cooperation with Tajikistan was
restricted significantly first by its Civil War, which lasted through much of
the mid 1990s, and then by the limited capacity of the new government
to support such programs. Turkmenistan in its increasing isolationism
was also a difficult partner, with the result that few contacts and activities
emerged.
The regional states welcomed or rejected U.S. involvement and co-
operation for a variety of reasons. Tajikistan’s civil war left it, in essence, a
Russia protectorate and prevented much discussion of further ties with the
United States. Turkmenistan rejected U.S. aid, as it did cooperation with
other states. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan all welcomed U.S. as-
sistance, although for different reasons. Kazakhstan felt its interests were
best served by maintaining good relations with both the United States and
Russia as well as, insofar as possible, China, Iran, and others, and it had
little interest in playing one off against another. U.S. support for multiple
pipeline routes for its oil and gas aided Kazakhstan’s goal of ensuring
economic independence from Russia, but Russia’s proximity and a large
ethnic Russian population made complete estrangement from Moscow
impossible. Kyrgyzstan, too, sought friendship and assistance from a va-
riety of countries, although where Kazakhstan was motivated by wealth,
Kyrgyzstan, being small and economically and militarily weak, could not
afford to alienate any of its neighbors or other interested parties. Uzbeki-
stan, however, took a very different tack. President Islam Karimov made it
a central facet of his foreign policy to turn away from Russia and to dem-
onstrate Uzbekistan’s independence from Moscow’s control. He hoped in
part to do this through closer ties with the United States, an effort that
was limited by U.S. concerns about Karimov’s human rights record and
Uzbekistan’s relatively low value to Washington at the time.
The OEF Experience and Subsequent Bilateral Ties

After the September 11 attacks, Washington moved quickly to expand
its options in Central Asia. It rapidly secured permission from the states
of the region to overfly their territories for humanitarian missions in Af-
ghanistan. Some also granted overflight permission for combat missions,

although of the Central Asian states, only Kyrgyzstan did so openly. The
United States set up substantial bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan after
looking at facilities there as well as in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. It also set
up a refueling mission in Turkmenistan. As it had in the past, Washington
did not make any security commitments to these states, but it did sign an
agreement with Uzbekistan that pledged Washington to “regard with grave
concern any external threat” to Uzbekistan.9
In exchange for access, the United States promised, and delivered,
a variety of assistance.10 Uzbekistan rapidly moved to the top ranks of
U.S. aid recipients, picking up both economic and military aid packages.
Among the things Uzbekistan either received or expects to receive are:
patrol boats to be used on the Amu Darya River, language training, radios
for communications, helicopter upgrades, Non-Commissioned Officer
(NCO) training support, a military modeling and simulation center, psy-
op training, airport navigation system upgrades, and reportedly, joint
construction of Il-114 aircraft.11
Kyrgyzstan, too, has received military communications equipment
worth over $1.4 million and a variety of other systems, such as night vi-
sion devices. The Kyrgyz Foreign Minister has praised this aid, saying it
is “extremely useful for the Army in guarding the country’s borders.” The
cooperation program between the United States and Kyrgyzstan calls for
continued military-technical cooperation and high level visits, such as
that of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in November 2002.12
Kyrgyzstan also is receiving military medical assistance, education slots at
the Marshall Center, and help in training NCOs. A joint exercise, Balanced
Knife, had Kyrgyz forces and U.S. troops affiliated with OEF practicing
mountain fighting and combat medicine in March 2003.13 Plans in 2004
call for more joint exercises for special troops, rapid reaction forces and
peacekeepers, as well as assistance with counterterrorism training and
military reform.14 Both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan also have received as-
sistance in the form of upgrades to the facilities that U.S. forces are using
in those countries. Kyrgyzstan receives fees for each take off and landing
by coalition aircraft at Manas. Informal joint exercises take place at Karshi-
Khanabad between U.S. forces and Uzbek Air Force personnel as well.15
From a U.S. perspective, the experience in both of these states, which
have provided the bulk of the access and basing support, has been worth-
while, although it remains frustrating and difficult to “get things done” in
these post-Soviet republics. Negotiating for the use of Karshi-Khanabad
was a painful process. Uzbek authorities wanted to negotiate a new Status
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of Forces Agreement (instead of using the one in place for Partnership for
Peace activities), and wanted the U.S. base to have as low a profile as pos-
sible (hence the choice of Karshi-Khanabad, which is relatively isolated).
The Uzbeks also were concerned about ensuring the security of U.S. forces,
another argument in favor of the Khanabad base. The base does, indeed,
appear quite secure, with multiple rings of Uzbek and U.S. security forces
encircling it.16
With regards to the current assistance program, U.S. personnel are
concerned that Uzbek officials are seeking flashier equipment and as-
sistance, rather than more effective or needed materiel and training, and
report consistent difficulties with the lack of decision authority on the
part of their interlocutors in the Uzbek Defense Ministry. However, the
bases continue to be useful for the OEF mission, and to a large extent, the
assistance packages, which fall far short of any long-term commitment or
statement of strategic alignment, are perceived as “payment” for access.17
The United States also has developed its military relationship with
Kazakhstan in the wake of OEF. While Kazakhstan was willing to provide
base access to U.S. forces, their bases were not used. The offer itself, how-
ever, set more than one precedent. The base offered, Lugovoi, was one
which Kazakh officials had refused to allow U.S. personnel access to in the
past. An agreement that the United States could use Kazakh facilities in an
emergency never resulted in any actual activity. However, permission to
overfly Kazakhstan was appreciated by OEF planners, and the willingness
of Astana to support the mission was noted. The United States continues
to provide assistance with border security and the relationship with Ka-
zakhstan has to some extent been reinvigorated.18 For example, U.S. ex-
perts have been working with the Kazakhs to develop an elite peacekeeping
battalion.19 It is worth noting that in Kazakhstan, as well, U.S. personnel
report frustration with interlocutors who remain very much products of
the Soviet military system. Secrecy, bureaucracy and incompetence con-
tinue to be problems in the Kazakh military.20
Tajikistan also offered its bases to the United States and coalition
forces for use in OEF. While some members of the coalition have report-
edly used Tajik facilities, U.S. forces did not conduct any major operations
from that country. The OEF experience did, however, pave the way for the
beginnings of a cooperation program with Dushanbe. Although less ambi-
tious than the assistance programs underway with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
or Uzbekistan, the United States is providing a variety of assistance, much
of it humanitarian, to the Tajiks, and has offered to help the Tajiks and
the Kyrgyz improve their permanent communications so that they can
better pass on warnings. There were complaints from Kyrgyz authorities

that during the 1999 and 2000 IMU incursions, Tajikistan did not provide
timely and effective warning.21
Turkmenistan, which provided facilities but has been leery of ac-
cepting aid, has presented a different set of circumstances. Based on past
experience, the United States did not initially expect much in the way of
Turkmen support for OEF. It hoped overflights would be allowed, and that
Turkmenistan would cooperate in the seizing of al Qaeda assets. It also
was hoped that there might be some support for humanitarian assistance.
In fact, Turkmenistan agreed to host U.S. forces for a refueling mission
for humanitarian support purposes and President Niyazov appointed his
national security advisor and intelligence chief as the primary liaison with
America in regards to OEF relief operations.
However, even with this high-level support, problems remained.
Turkmenistan did not want to negotiate a Status-of-Forces Agreement,
arguing that this would violate its neutrality.22 Defining contractual re-
lationships with civil aviation personnel was another hurdle, and despite
clear language defining what the United States does and does not pay for,
the Turkmen authorities have tried to bill the United States for items on
the “not subject to billing” list.23
Unlike its neighbors, Turkmenistan has expressed little interest in
building on the current situation to develop closer relations or to receive
assistance from the United States. Although the payments associated with
refueling operations are no doubt welcome, the government has remained
leery of closer ties. Over time, it has become more difficult to work with
the Turkmen government. The official initially responsible for negotiating
with the United States has been purged, making it far more difficult to ad-
dress problems that crop up, and to ensure continued smooth functioning
of the refueling effort.24
U.S. Interests in Context

The bases and facilities set up in Central Asia in support of OEF
have proven tremendously useful to the United States, and worth the cost
of additional aid and payments. They are not, however, in and of them-
selves a reason for continued close relations with the Central Asian states
beyond the present mission. Given other U.S. commitments, the current
force posture in these countries is increasingly unsustainable. Refuelings
in Turkmenistan have dwindled, as have supply flights through the other
countries. Moreover, the OEF experience has demonstrated that, if neces-
sary, the United States can set up shop in this part of the world with relative
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speed, if not ease. Thus, the continued presence beyond the needs of the
OEF mission does not seem justified by possible future missions, although
some sort of relationship to ease the way for such needs is advisable.
Energy interests are also not a compelling reason for a continued U.S.
military presence in Central Asia. Although in March 2003, the Kazakh
foreign ministry cited the situation in the Middle East as a reason for in-
creased U.S. interests in Kazakh energy projects, the estimates for Caspian
oil vary widely.25 Even at the high end the projections are that the region
will produce perhaps one tenth of the world’s oil. Low end estimates sug-
gest that even one-third of that is optimistic. Moreover, even if the most
positive assessments turn out to be accurate, it will be some time before
this oil is accessed.
Beyond energy, however, the United States has very few economic
interests in Central Asia. Due to the legal and bureaucratic constraints
on investors in Uzbekistan, foreign businesses which thought the country
presented some real opportunities in the mid-1990s have been cutting
their losses and leaving. Turkmenistan never presented a friendly environ-
ment for Western investors; Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have had little to
offer; and Kazakhstan’s foreign investment is overwhelmingly tied to the
energy sector. In fact, recent changes in the Kazakh government’s attitude
towards business, which have made it more difficult for investors to oper-
ate and have involved efforts to renegotiate some existing contracts in the
oil sector, may lead investors to have second thoughts about their involve-
ment in this country. Without massive reforms, it is unlikely much U.S.
investment will occur in this part of the world, and such reforms appear
increasingly unlikely, as Uzbek and Kazakh laws and practices become
worse rather than better.
Despite the lack of potential economic gain, the United States has
other interests in Central Asia. In the aftermath of September 11, U.S. na-
tional security agenda issues that had long been on the list of concerns, but
had received little attention because they seemed insoluble rose to the top.
Afghanistan presented a clear-cut illustration of the dangers of how state
failure can create transnational threats, which when unchecked have the
capacity to terrorize governments and populaces worldwide. Central Asia,
with its combination of increasingly authoritarian regimes, limited central
control, popular dissatisfaction, high levels of corruption, and criminal
activity is both a waystation for and a source of these threats.
The solutions to these problems, however, are difficult to identify
and implement. One thing that seems clear is that these problems cannot
be solved through force alone. While security personnel and organizations
have a role in controlling borders, most of the security tasks are domestic,
police tasks and many of the long-term solutions must be political and
economic, rather than military. Perhaps somewhat ironically, after years
of debate about whether the pursuit of democratization and human rights
was a worthwhile U.S. security policy goal, it now appears that such efforts
are, indeed, critical to “hard” security goals—even as the task of advancing
them appears even more difficult than before.
Interests, Goals and Pitfalls

It is imperative for the United States to remain involved in Central
Asia. However, Washington has neither a clear-cut approach for how to do
this, nor the tools in place to make an effective start. While some might
argue that the U.S. military presence helps support stability and provides
incentives for regional regimes to democratize, it is unclear that the exist-
ing evidence supports these assertions. Although U.S. policy statements do
continue to pressure Tashkent on political and economic reforms, some in
Uzbekistan report that the U.S. presence actually has made the Karimov
regime feel more empowered to crack down on opposition.26 Similarly,
some have argued that Tajik President Imomali Rakhmonov has used the
Global War on Terrorism as justification for limiting the activities of the
Islamic Renaissance Party, the main opposition force in that country.27
The goals of the regional states themselves, and their own approaches
to the United States, must also be considered in this context. In many ways,
these have changed little from what they were prior to 2001. However, in
the context of a greater U.S. interest, it is critical to understand exactly
why Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan
have been willing to grant access and pursue ties, and what they hope to
gain from this cooperation. It is critical as well for U.S. policy planners to
be aware of how these interests differ from those of the United States, and
what the expectations of regional regimes are regarding U.S. behavior.
The example of Uzbekistan is apt, and perhaps the most telling in
this regard. As already noted, the Karimov regime had long hoped for
closer ties with the United States as a counterweight to Russia. In addi-
tion to Tashkent’s long-standing effort to distance itself from Moscow,
it is important to note Uzbekistan’s role in Central Asia, where it has the
most capable military of the five states and is viewed as a fairly dangerous
neighbor by Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Indeed, as part of its
campaign against the IMU, the Uzbek government has pursued suspected
insurgents into neighboring states’ territories and laid landmines both on
their shared borders with them and on the territory of the other states.
454 OLIKER
This, combined with its refusal to provide landmine maps to Kyrgyz and
Tajik officials, has contributed to the deaths of numerous civilians.
The U.S. decision to place a substantial military force in Uzbekistan
was taken by many in the Uzbek government as a clear demonstration of
U.S. support. The Karimov regime sought to build on this by formalizing
relations with new written agreements. While it wanted a low profile for
the U.S. forces in Uzbekistan itself, it also wanted its neighbors and Russia
to be aware of this new “partnership.” Uzbekistan also sought U.S. friend-
ship by supporting the war in Iraq, even to the point of Uzbek experts tell-
ing television audiences that they had “ample” (if not actually presented)
proof that Baghdad possessed WMD and had links to terrorism.28 The
heavily censored Uzbek press reportedly had been instructed to present
the war from a “pro-U.S.” perspective.29
Yet, it also seems likely that the Karimov regime has been disap-
pointed in the actual benefits of the relationship with the United States to
date. Although there have been real material gains in terms of defense and
other assistance, America has clearly stopped short of any alliance-type
commitments to Uzbekistan. Moreover, the U.S. government has been un-
able to deliver foreign investment while Uzbekistan continues to make the
investment climate so hostile.30
Repercussions from Uzbek economic and social policies can be seen
in a sharp increase in disaffection on the part of segments of the popula-
tion. Anecdotal reports that “everyone” in Uzbekistan knows someone
who has had unpleasant run-ins with the Uzbek security forces creates
worrisome parallels with Stalin’s Soviet Union or revolutionary Iran. With
opposition political parties banned, the fastest growing unofficial move-
ment is probably the Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which advocates the overthrow of
secular regimes worldwide and the establishment of a global Caliphate.
Moreover, while the Karimov regime’s oppression is not new, the effects of
its economic policies, which have sharply curtailed trade with neighboring
states, have recently become felt. Prices have risen throughout Uzbekistan,
and disaffection in cities such as Tashkent continues to grow along with
them. Protests against officials at a wide range of levels, including on
rural farms, are increasingly common as people find themselves trying to
survive on what is left of their earnings after leaders at various levels have
taken their share through punitive taxes and corruption.31
In a country where the potential for significant unrest is on the rise,
and with few mechanisms available for peaceful resolution of conflict, it
is likely that if a given situation escalates, bloodshed will result. Moreover,
with an autocratic regime so centered around President Islam Karimov, his
departure from the scene could well lead to potentially violent competi-
tion among those now in his inner circle, as well as those outside it, over
who will take his place. Thus, with or without Karimov, Uzbekistan has a
high potential for future trouble.
For its part, the United States may find itself in the difficult position
of being perceived as supporting a failing and increasingly unpopular
regime. This situation is exacerbated by Karimov’s interest in tying the
United States into such support, through public statements, assistance,
and, insofar as possible, legal documents. The United States has wisely
steered clear of the latter, but it must also be aware of the symbolic effects
of the former two. Moreover, the potential for instability makes it particu-
larly critical that the United States remain involved at some level and seek
to find ways to improve the situation.
The other countries of the region are not in as critical a situation
as Uzbekistan and are thus less worrisome in the near-term. Neither the
Kyrgyz nor the Kazakh leadership seek U.S. assistance as a counterweight
to other forces in the region, per se. Rather, they feel that the better their
relations are with all powerful parties, the better their chances of survival
and success. That said, the regimes in these two countries have become
increasingly authoritarian and there is reason to believe that popular
disaffection may be growing there as well. In Kyrgyzstan, in particular,
the Hizb ut-Tahrir is said to be making inroads, and a series of popular
protests with roots in both political activism and inter-clan conflict have
occurred, resulting in a dangerous and complex situation. In Kazakhstan,
increased difficulties for U.S. investors (albeit not to the extent of those in
Uzbekistan) may yet lead the U.S. government to be increasingly at odds
with Astana.
One point of note in Kyrgyzstan is the possible attitude of opposition
forces in that country to the U.S. presence. On one hand, local complaints
have surfaced about noise caused by takeoffs and landings at Manas and a
traffic accident involving a U.S. servicemember, which reportedly injured
two local women. On the other hand, some opposition leaders have spo-
ken about the U.S. military presence as the solution to all of Kyrgyzstan’s
security problems, eliminating the need for cooperation with Russia.32
Both sides create concerns for U.S. interests.
If Uzbekistan is seeking strategic gain and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz-
stan hope for strategic parity, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan perhaps come
closest to having provided the assistance for OEF purely out of support for
the operation itself. Like Uzbekistan, both countries felt a significant threat
456 OLIKER
was posed by the Taliban’s proximity, so much so that Turkmenistan had

sought a “separate peace” with the Taliban prior to September 2001.
Notwithstanding the perceived threat, Turkmenistan has largely
refused U.S. offers of assistance, before and after OEF. While specific or-
ganizations, such as the airport that receives a fee for each refueling and
the hotel where U.S. airmen stay, appreciate the influx of funds, there is
no clear sense that the Turkmen government as a whole sees a benefit
from the effort. According to U.S. personnel involved in negotiating and
implementing the refueling operation, the Turkmen Ministry of Defense
has gained nothing as a result of the refueling operation, while the top
priority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to ensure that the operation
remains low-profile. The Turkmen have continued to turn down offers
of military contacts, have not used the Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
funds allocated them in five years, and have cut back on their participation
in IMET.
Nor has Turkmenistan done anything that suggests a general warm-
ing towards the United States in other areas. In August 2003, it took steps
to evict the U.S. Embassy’s public affairs section from its building near
the embassy grounds.33 While President Niyazov told the new U.S. Am-
bassador, Tracey Ann Jacobsen, that his country would like to see more
cooperation with the United States in energy and natural resources, there
is no sign that the government plans to relax the rules governing business
and investment so as to support such cooperation.34
In short, the last two years of cooperation do not appear to have
effected Turkmenistan’s attitudes towards the United States. Nor has the
United States pushed particularly hard to affect changes, perhaps realizing
its very limited leverage with this country. Thus, despite Turkmenistan’s
atrocious human rights record and recent moves to deny joint citizen-
ship with Russia to long-standing citizens of Russian origin, as well as
the imposition of an exit-visa requirement on Turkmen residents seeking
to travel abroad, the U.S. State Department assured Turkmenistan that it
would not lose its Jackson-Vanik exemption in 2003.35
Tajikistan, too, appears to have a fairly limited view of what coopera-
tion with the United States can bring. The new relationship did result in
a state visit by the Tajik President to the United States, and the Tajiks have
been far more willing to accept aid and assistance than have the Turkmen.
However, like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan has been careful not
to allow its relationship with Washington to be perceived as a counterpoint
to its close ties to Russia. This has not, however, prevented speculation
to that effect in Tajikistan’s more pluralistic press. Reports have repeat-
edly appeared in the media suggesting the United States would take over
Russia’s role in guarding Tajikistan’s borders or that the delays in negotiat-
ing a Tajik-Russian base agreement were due to a payoff from the United
States to Tajikistan to prevent that agreement from being signed.36 Despite
repeated denials from both U.S. and Tajik officials, such rumors continue.
Thus, as in Kyrgyzstan, the United States faces the danger of having the
bilateral relationship become a pawn of domestic politics. Moreover, be-
cause the interplay between the United States and Russia is the focus of
these rumors, this domestic game has international repercussions.
The Russian perspective here is critical. Because Central Asia has long
been under Russian rule, and because it remains one of few areas where
Moscow retains real influence, Russia throughout the 1990s tended to per-
ceive U.S. efforts in Central Asia and the Caucasus as hostile encroachment
and an attempt to woo Russia’s last natural allies away from it. Combined
with increasing tension between Moscow and Washington on other issues,
such as intervention in Yugoslavia and missile defense, U.S. involvement in
Central Asia seemed to many in Moscow to be part of a concerted effort
by the United States to lessen Russia’s influence.
For the United States, the posturing of Russia and Central Asian
regimes vis à vis each other has been difficult to follow, as leaders such
as Uzbekistan’s Karimov alternated between calling Russia a partner and
berating Moscow for exaggerating the Islamic fundamentalist threat to
justify Russian bases in the region. But in times of stress, even Karimov has
sought Russian assistance. In part, this is because these leaders recognized
that they needed some outside support to deal with the threats near and
within their borders, and Russia, with its strong interests in the region, re-
mains the most viable partner available. Russia has both offered and pro-
vided assistance, including joint training efforts, cooperative planning and
border police. Russia’s 201st Motor Rifle Division remains on the ground
in Tajikistan as do thousands of Russian-commanded border guards de-
ployed along the frontier with Afghanistan. Russia also views the radical
Islamic threat in the same way the Central Asian governments have tended
to see it—as a significant danger that justifies police crackdowns and less
than liberal policies. Russia is also much less critical of human rights
abuses and corrupt practices than the United States has tended to be.
At the start of OEF, it appeared to observers in Central Asia and
elsewhere, that the United States could become the key security partner
to the Central Asian states, with Russia’s acceptance. Russian President
Vladimir Putin’s statement that U.S. deployments in Central Asia were
“not a tragedy” was historic, and followed even more historic decisions by
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Central Asian leaders to allow U.S. basing—decisions taken, in most cases,

without consultations with Moscow. These events marked a sea-change in
Moscow’s relations with the Central Asian regimes, and with the Untied
States.
From Russia’s perspective, not protesting the U.S. presence had real
advantages. For one thing, stopping it was all but impossible. For another,
it soon became clear that the United States was solving a problem that
Russia had struggled with for a decade—successfully driving the Taliban
from power in Afghanistan. Certainly, such action was in Russia’s interests
as well as the Central Asian states’. However, Russia’s feelings about the
U.S. presence remain mixed, and various actors in Russian politics have
very different views about what should be acceptable to Moscow. Russia
is therefore watching the U.S. presence in Central Asia with a good bit of
concern and making much of statements that this presence is temporary.
Increased tension between the United States and Russia over both
countries’ activities and interests in Central Asia have the potential to cre-
ate, to paraphrase Vladimir Putin, a real “tragedy.” First, the fact remains
that Russia has a stronger and more immediate interest in Central Asia
than does the United States. While U.S. interests in preventing instability
and helping develop successful states are clear, they are no more critical
than U.S. interests in doing the same elsewhere in the world. For Russia,
Central Asia is the first line of defense—for the United States, it may not
even be the third or fourth. Furthermore, for a wide range of reasons,
which include the same transnational threats, as well as arms control and
other global policy interests, the U.S.-Russian relationship is more impor-
tant to the United States than are its relationships with the Central Asian
regimes, together or separately.
When it comes to Central Asia, Russia and the United States are not
the only interested parties. Turkey, India, China, Iran and various Euro-
pean states also are involved to different extents, and have a broad range
of interests in the region. Many, if not all, of these states are critical to U.S.
national security interests in their own right, over and above their interests
in Central Asia. For these states, the primary goals are economic and focus
on the energy resources of the region. For all of them, the development
of economic ties with the Central Asian countries depends on stability
and functioning governments. Several of these states also have other se-
curity concerns. India is concerned about extremism and the potential for
Central Asian unrest to impact its ongoing conflict with Pakistan. China
fears spillover to its ethnic Turkic minority, the Uighurs, in northwestern
China. Thus, all of these states share American, Russian and Central Asian
interests in stability.
All are also, to varying extents, willing to let others ensure that sta-
bility if possible, even as they want to remain both involved and aware
of developments. Turkey generally has been willing to take the U.S. lead,
although officials complain that the United States is not sharing informa-
tion about its activities and goals sufficiently to enable Ankara to coor-
dinate its own policy with Washington’s. China, while steering clear of
antagonizing Russia, is seeking to build its own strategic relations with the
Central Asian states, both on a bilateral basis, particularly with Kyrgyzstan,
and through the multilateral Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),
which, despite its lack of activity to date, does have some real ambitions in
regards to both counterterrorism cooperation and development of trade.
India, for its part, has been developing security ties with Tajikistan since
its years of support for the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, and now has
a limited military presence on Tajik soil.
For the United States, this means numerous potential partners for
its efforts to promote stability and development in the region. However,
as with Russia, cooperation would require a level of coordination and
transparency that the United States has yet to achieve with Turkey, much
less any of the other countries with an interest in Central Asia. Moreover,
the interests of the surrounding countries in Central Asia, albeit quite real,
pale in comparison with Russia’s and are of secondary concern.
Toward an Effective Policy

In principle, cooperation between the United States, Russia and
other interested parties to attain the broad range of shared goals in Cen-
tral Asia should be the answer to this dilemma. Indeed, it is unlikely that
much progress will be made in this part of the world without Russian
participation. Its proximity, its political and economic ties to the region,
and its more immediate concerns about these problems are all parts of the
equation. Russia is on the receiving end of transnational threats such as
narcotics trafficking, weapons smuggling, transnational crime, and poten-
tially terrorism that come from or through Central Asia, and in some cases
is the source of other such threats. Resolving these problems with Russian
cooperation will be far easier and more effective than attempting to resolve
them without it. Involving others who share the same goals would help
spread the burden, as well as ensure a greater stake on their part in the
success of the endeavor.
460 OLIKER
However, in spite of significant discussions about the need for such

cooperation, it has not been forthcoming as of yet. Several reasons are
behind this, most having to do with the critical bilateral relationship be-
tween the United States and Russia. The first roadblock is the continued
perception on the part of some—in Russia, the United States, and Central
Asia—that influence and involvement in Central Asia is, in fact, a zero-
sum game. This viewpoint holds that the United States and Russia are
competing for influence, and the Central Asian states are prizes to be won
by one side or the other. This attitude could easily be dismissed as persist-
ing only among those who have difficulty letting go of Cold War patterns
were it not for its popularity in both governments. While in their public
statements Presidents Bush and Putin appear committed to cooperation,
both have advisors who feel there is no real alternative to antagonism, and
who view gain by one country as a loss for the other.
In Central Asia, the perception of a zero-sum game has been more
common in Uzbekistan than elsewhere, although it is also evident in state-
ments and media reports from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. A microcosm of
this belief can be found in the U.S. and Russian military presence at Manas
and Kant Airbases, respectively, in Kyrgyzstan. These are seen by some as
reflective of U.S. and Russian efforts to exert influence, even as Kyrgyzstan
tries to balance between the two great powers. In fact, the U.S. deployment
was driven first and foremost by the requirements of OEF. Russia’s deci-
sion to place a base so near the U.S. base can be seen both as a statement of
Russia’s continued interest and as a marker that regardless of what the U.S.
does, Russia still has a role to play that will continue long after the United
States and other coalition members have gone. For Kyrgyzstan’s part, it
has sought to maintain good relations with both countries, and it stands
to gain, economically and in terms of security, from doing so.
If this is, in fact, Kyrgyzstan’s attitude, as it also appears to be
Kazakhstan’s and Tajikistan’s, it is a remarkably rational one. These coun-
tries stand to gain much from cooperation with the United States, Russia
China, and even, potentially, each other. A good deal also may be lost by
playing into the notion of competition in the region. As noted, energy
interests in Central Asia are not sufficient to drive U.S. policy, and true
U.S. security interests suggest that from the U.S. perspective, the Central
Asian states are not a prize to be won but a problem to be managed. It is in
Central Asia’s interests, as well as in America’s, Russia’s and others, that the
countries of Central Asia eventually graduate to managing their problems
on their own. In the meantime, however, they will need assistance from a
wide range of sources.37
In order for the Central Asian states to acquire this assistance and to
move forward effectively, Russia and the United States also must do their
part to eliminate the zero-sum game perception. From the U.S. perspec-
tive, many reasons exist to do this. It is not in the U.S. interest to be seen
as a bulwark against Russia by any of these states. This will needlessly
antagonize Russia and give the impression of unconditional support for
increasingly unsavory regimes. Moreover, even if it wanted to, the United
States does not have the resources or interests to be the primary partner to
any Central Asian state. The less the perception of competition, moreover,
the greater likelihood that other states will seek to become involved, with-
out fear of being caught in the middle of a U.S.-Russian rivalry.
The experience of Afghanistan demonstrates that even limited Rus-
sian-U.S. cooperation towards common goals can be extremely fruitful.
However, both countries have, to a large extent, failed to recognize that
benefits can be gleaned from such cooperation. There seems to be little in-
terest at the working levels in building better ties and little understanding
of the repercussions of failing to do so. Indeed, some U.S. officials view the
U.S. military presence in Central Asia as countering Russian neo-imperi-
alism, while some Russian officials see it as critical to Russian interests to
reassert not just influence, but control over Central Asia.
The keys to moving forward are cooperation, multilateralism, tan-
gible goals and small steps. If the problems are transnational in nature,
the solutions must be as well; solutions that do not involve all of the states
concerned can only be partial solutions at best. Certainly, there are limits
to what is possible. Turkmenistan, for example, will remain very difficult
to engage as long as Niyazov is President, and possibly longer. However,
insofar as Russia, the United States and all of its neighbors share an inter-
est in reform in that country, their cooperative efforts likely would stand a
better chance of success than sporadic and uncertain individual efforts.
Tangible goals are also critical. It is important to identify areas of co-
operation where real benefits to all concerned can be easily achieved. Even
during the Cold War, the United States and Russia were able to develop
dialogues and reach cooperative decisions when it was in the interests of
both nations to do so.38 More recently, the cooperation between the U.S.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Russian Emer-
gency Ministry present another example of how effective coordination can
be if it is perceived as necessary by both sides. A good first step in this case
might be discussions of common use of the airspace over Kyrgyzstan, now
that both an OEF coalition base and a Russian base are in place near Bish-
kek. This also qualifies as a small step in that its implementation would
462 OLIKER
require little effort. Still, these building blocks of cooperation build trust
while accomplishing mutual goals, and this is critical to moving on to the
larger areas where cooperation is needed.
The other key component of success must be multilateralism. It is
true that the Central Asian states themselves have been loath to cooperate
too closely with one another. However, there is precedent for their doing
so. The solution may be, in part, to involve a variety of other players,
including the United States, Russia, India, China, European powers and
others as viable. This will create strong incentives for most Central Asian
states not to remain on the sidelines at the risk of missing out on the
potential to build ties with a range of possible partners.39 This approach
can be effective in both economic and security settings and can serve as
a stepping stone towards easing some of the tensions between the states
of the region, as well as helping to facilitate solutions to the transnational
threats that plague them and their neighbors. The SCO was founded in
part on such principles, and the United States might consider seeking
observer status in that organization, so as to demonstrate its support for
the efforts of others.
U.S. interests in Central Asia all but guarantee some level of involve-
ment in the region for the foreseeable future. But its military presence
should be reduced, just as other areas of involvement should grow. The
challenge for America will be to manage this in a way that leaves neither it
nor the region worse off than before the United States got involved. Good
relations with Russia are one component of this. Transparency and coor-
dination with other current or prospective partners are another. No less
critical, however, will be avoiding stronger than needed commitments to
existing Central Asian regimes, even while maintaining cooperation with
them. In the end, it will be a balancing act. But the alternative may be a
very dangerous fall.
Notes
1 The author thanks RAND, and specifically Project Air Force within RAND, for providing sup-
port for research from which this paper is drawn. She also wishes to emphasize that the views reflected
here are her own and do not reflect the views, attitudes, or policies of RAND, Project Air Force or the
United States Air Force.
2 For a discussion of the access issue more broadly, see David Shlapak, et. al, A Global Access
Strategy for the U.S. Air Force (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003).
3 While proponents of democratization have traditionally argued that it advances strategic goals
due to a postulated lower propensity among democracies to fight wars (or, according to some, fight
wars with one another), the literature is, in fact, inconclusive on this. Moreover, regardless of whether
democracies are more or less war-prone, democratizing states are, according to some data, more likely
to face conflict. Many of the key arguments in these debates can be found in Michael E. Brown, Sean
M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
The MIT Press, 1996). In addition to the papers in that volume, see also Carol R. Ember, Melvin Ember
and Bruce Russett, “Peace Between Participatory Polities,” World Politics (July 1992); Michael W. Doyle,
“Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review (December, 1986).
4 See Oliker in Faultlines.
5 “Central Asia: Fault Lines in the New Security Map.”
6 Vladimir Socor, “Cheek by Jowl in Kyrgyzstan,” The Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2003.
7 Similar activities were also underway with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
8 A deal to supply North Korea with Kazakh MiG fighter aircraft was discovered in 1999.
Over twenty aircraft were delivered before the deal was discovered and deliveries halted. The Kazakh
government’s investigation report concluded that, although government officials were involved in the
deal, they were acting independently. Defense Minister Mukhtar Altynbayev was removed from his
post as a result of the deal (although he resumed it in December 2002). The United States sanctioned
the firms involved and waived sanctions against the country of Kazakhstan as a whole. (“The High
Price of Kazakhstan’s MiG Affair,” Stratfor.com, Update Weekly Analysis, November 18, 1999, reprinted
by Asia Times, November 19, 1999; James P. Rubin, U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing No.
142, November 22, 1999, 1:20 pm; Kazakhstan, Government and NGO Descriptions, NIS Nuclear
and Missile Database, Nuclear Threat Initiative website, <www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/kazakst/govt/gov-
ernme.html>, downloaded December 29, 2003.)
9 “U.S., Uzbekistan Sign Military Cooperation Agreement,” RFE/RL Newsline, 6, no. 14, Part I,
January 23, 2002.

10 Dana Milbank, “Uzbekistan Thanked for Role in War,” The Washington Post, March 13, 2002,
A23; “U.S., Uzbekistan Sign Military Cooperation Agreement,” RFE/RL Newsline, 6, no. 14, Part I,
January 23, 2002.
11 Interviews with and information provided by U.S. government officials, summer 2003; “U.S.
to Help Finance Uzbek Aircraft Production,” RFE/RL Newsline, 7, no. 156, Part I, August 18, 2003.
12 “Kyrgyzstan, U.S. Sign Military Cooperation Agreement,” RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 6, no. 213,
Part I, November 13, 2002.

13 This also reportedly involved a medical team from South Korea. Marina Kozlova, “Analysis:
Kyrgyzstan Dances with US, China,” UPI, October 10, 2002; “Kyrgyzstan, U.S. Sign Military Coopera-
tion Agreement,” RFE/RL Newsline, 6, no. 213, Part I, November 13, 2002; FBIS November 18, 2002;
“Joint U.S.-Kyrgyz Military Exercises Held Near Bishkek,” RFE/RL Newsline, Vol.7, no. 51, Part I,
March 18, 2003; Sultan Jumagulov, “Superpowers Compete in Kyrgyzstan,” IWPR’s Reporting Central
Asia, no. 200, April 28, 2003.
14 Vladimir Socor, “Cheek by Jowl in Kyrgyzstan,” The Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2003.
15 Interviews with U.S. personnel at Karshi-Khanabad, May 2003.
16 Interviews with U.S. officials, personnel, Summer and Fall 2003; visit to Karshi-Khanabad,
May 2003.
17 Interviews with U.S. officials, personnel, Summer and Fall 2003.
18 Interviews with U.S. officials, summer 2003.
19 “Turkey, U.S. Assist Kazakh Military,” RFE/RL Newsline, 6, no. 204, Part I, October 29, 2002.
20 Interviews with U.S. officials, Summer 2003.
21 There were complaints from Kyrgyz authorities that during the 1999 and 2000 IMU incur-
sions, Tajikistan did not provide timely and effective warning. “Official: Danger of Extremist Incur-
sions into Kyrgyzstan Still Exists,” RFE/RL Newsline, 7, no.50, Part I, March 17, 2003.
22 This problem was solved with an exchange of diplomatic notes.
23 Interviews with U.S. officials, Spring, Summer 2003.
24 Interviews with U.S. officials, Spring, Summer 2003.
25 “Kazakh Foreign Ministry Sees Increased U.S. Interest in Kazakh Oil,” RFE/RL Newsline, 7,
no. 60, Part I, March 28, 2003.

26 Interviews in Uzbekistan, May 2003.
464 OLIKER
27 Antoine Blua, “Tajikistan: Government to Vet Islamic Clerics,” RFE/RL, August 7, 2002; In-
ternational Crisis Group, “Central Asia: Islam and the State,” July 10, 2003.
28 “Five Degrees of Separation: The Central Asia States’ Positions Towards War in Iraq,” RFE/RL
Central Asia Report, 3, no. 12, March 21, 2003.

29 “Unofficial Censorship on War Reporting Instituted in Uzbekistan,” RFE/RL Newsline, 7, no.
53, Part I, March 20, 2003.

30 It should be noted, of course, that Uzbekistan also had a good deal to gain from the elimina-
tion of the Taliban and that it had been working, with Russia, India, Tajikistan, and Iran, in a loose
coalition that supported the Northern Alliance for many years.
31 Discussions in Uzbekistan, May 2003.
32 “Kyrgyz Opposition Party Official Questions Russian Base,” RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, no. 72,
Part I, April 15, 2003.

33 “U.S. Embassy in Turkmenistan Protests Eviction of Public Affairs Section,’” RFE/RL News-
line, 7, no. 159, Part I, August 21, 2003.

34 “Turkmen President Wants More U.S. Technology,’” RFE/RL Newsline, 7, no. 163, Part I,
August 27, 2003.

35 The Jackson-Vanik amendment denies unconditional normal trade relations to countries
with non-market economies and restrictive emigration policies.

36 “U.S. Will Not Help Protect Tajik Border,” RFE/RL Newsline, 6, no. 217, Part I, November 19,
2002; Yana Amelina, “Moscow Considers Tajikistan Options,” Rosbalt, July 23, 2003; “Defense Minister
Says Tajikistan Still Wants Russian Base,” RFE/RL Newsline, 7, no. 141, Part I, July 28, 2003.
37 Recent Uzbek warming to Moscow, in contrast to its past antagonism, suggests that Tashkent
may also be coming around to such an approach.

38 The Incidents at Sea talks and nuclear arms control are examples.
39 This approach may be of little appeal to Turkmenistan under its current regime, but it may
be an effective way to, for example, bring Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan both to the table, a historically
challenging task.
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS 465
About the Contributors

Daniel L. Burghart (co-editor) is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Tech-
nology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University.
A specialist in Russian, Commonwealth of Independant States (CIS) and
Central European Affairs, he served for 30 years as an Army Foreign Area
Officer before retiring as a Colonel in June 2003. Dr. Burghart has been
a professor at the National War College, Senior National Security Policy
Advisor at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, U.S. Defense and Army
Attaché to Kazakhstan, and a Mission Commander at the On Site Inspec-
tion Agency, where he led arms control inspections in the republics of
the Former Soviet Union. He also has been the Senior Russian Military
Analyst and Eurasian Branch Chief on the Army Staff, Professor of Rus-
sian and East European Studies at the Military Academy at West Point, and
Director of Area Studies at the U. S. Army Russian Institute. In addition
to a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Illinois, Dr. Burghart
has a dual Masters in Political Science and Russian Area Studies from the
University of Wisconsin and a Ph.D.. in Russian and International Studies
from the University of Surrey. He has published articles in defense and
civilian journals and is the author of the book Red Microchip: Technology
Transfer, Export Control and Economic Restructuring in the Soviet Union.
Theresa Sabonis-Helf (co-editor) is a Professor of National Security

Strategy at the National War College in Washington, DC. She was previ-
ously Energy and Environment Policy Advisor for a Harvard Institute for
International Development project, based in Central Asia. She received her
Ph.D.. in Political Science from Emory University, her M.P.A. in Interna-
tional Relations from Princeton University, and her B.A. in Literature from
Emory University. She has worked as a policy analyst, and as a visiting
fellow at the U.S. Agency for International Development. Dr. Sabonis-Helf
is a specialist in Environment Policy; Energy Policy and Energy Security;
Climate Change Policy; and International Political Economy. She has lived
and worked in seven countries of the former USSR, and has published
articles on post-Soviet energy and environmental issues, as well as on post-
Soviet culture and contemporary history.
465
466
Sylvia Woody Babus is a Professor of Behavioral Sciences in the Depart-

ment of Leadership and Information Strategy at the Industrial College of
the Armed Forces at National Defense University. She is a graduate of the
University of Chicago, and earned M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in International
Relations and Sino-Soviet studies from Columbia University. Dr. Babus
has taught political science and international relations at the University
of Manitoba in Winnipeg, Canada, and at Goucher College in Towson,
Maryland. During 10 years at the State Department’s Foreign Service In-
stitute, she supervised training for Foreign Service Officers in negotiation,
multilateral diplomacy, executive-congressional relations, arms control,
and political military issues. Her assignments at State included tours in
Belgium and Kyrgyzstan, as well as two years as a Foreign Service Officer
in Uzbekistan. From 1998 to 2001, she managed democracy-building as-
sistance programs in Ukraine and Belarus as a Civil Society Advisor for the
U.S. Agency for International Development Mission in Kyiv. Her publica-
tions include an undergraduate text on current affairs, as well as works
on Soviet-Third World Relations, Gorbachev, Soviet ideology and foreign
policy, Central Asian security issues, and training of U.S. Government of-
ficials for interagency work.
Robert Brannon has served for 30 years in the U.S. Navy. During three
years in Russia as the U.S. Naval Attaché, he was present for the economic
crash of August 1998, the post NATO intervention in Kosovo armed
riots at the embassy, and the submarine Kursk disaster. He has an M.A.
in International Relations and is a Ph.D. Canididate in World Politics at
The Catholic University of America, where he is currently working on a
dissertation in Post-Soviet Russian civil-military relations. Following a
year at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government as the senior
national security research fellow, Captain Brannon now is an instructor in
the Department of National Security Studies at the National War College,
where he holds the Chief of Naval Operations Chair.
Emily Ewell Daughtry will join the Office of the Legal Advisor at the U.S.
Department of State in September 2004. Previously, she worked for six
years at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey
Institute of International Studies, where she specialized in issues concern-
ing Central Asia, export controls, and nuclear smuggling. From 1998 to
1999, Ms. Daughtry founded and served as Co-Director of the CNS office
in Almaty, Kazakhstan. She holds a J.D. from the University of Califor-
nia, Los Angeles and a B.A. in Russian and East European Studies from
Middlebury College.
Gregory Gleason is Professor of Political Science and Public Administra-

tion at the University of New Mexico. He is the author of Federalism and
Nationalism: the Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR (1991),
Central Asian States: Discovering Independence (1996), and Markets
and Politics in Central Asia (2003) as well as scholarly articles in Eu-
rope-Asia Studies, Problems of Post-Communism, Asian Perspective,
Comparative Strategy and other journals. Dr. Gleason has had research
sponsored by the National Science Foundation, the National Council on
Eurasian and East European Research, and the U.S. Institute of Peace and
also has conducted research under the auspices of the Academies of Science
of the USSR, the Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajiki-
stan. In addition, he has worked as a consultant to the United States In-
formation Service, Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National
Laboratory. Dr. Gleason has worked in various capacities on market and
political reform projects sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International
Development and the Asian Development Bank. He currently focuses on
the politics of Eurasian integration.
Genevieve Grabman is a public health lawyer with expertise in Central

Asia. She has a Master of Public Health from Johns Hopkins University
and a Juris Doctor from Georgetown University. From 1996 to 1998, she
served as a U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer in Kyrgyzstan where she worked at
the United Nations Children’s Fund in health and human rights program-
ming. Following her Peace Corps service, Ms. Grabman was the Kyrgyz-
stan program manager for a health sector reform project supported by the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the
World Bank. She later was a consultant with the POLICY Project, a USAID
reproductive health and HIV/AIDS initiative, where she helped integrate
human rights law in developing countries’ health policies. Currently, Ms.
Grabman is a legislative and policy associate at the Center for Health and
Gender Equity.
Kevin D. Jones previously worked in Central Asia for the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) as the Private Sector
Advisor, Kyrgyzstan Country Office. In this position he oversaw the
implementation of the enterprise development, fiscal reform and regional
468
energy portfolio for Kyrgyzstan. He was directly involved in the land

privatization process as an advisor to the host countries policy makers,
land reform development projects, and U.S. government officials. Prior
to USAID, he was a Sustainable Economic Development Peace Corps
Volunteer in Kyrgyzstan, providing private farmers with business and
economic assistance. Jones is currently pursuing a Ph.D.. in International
Economic and Security Policy from the University of Maryland,
Roger D. Kangas is a specialist on Central Asia and the Caspian Sea

basin at the George C. Marshall Center in Germany. Prior to joining the
Marshall Center in 1999, Dr. Kangas was Deputy Director of the Central
Asian and Caucasus Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced In-
ternational Studies (SAIS) and a Fellow of the Johns Hopkins University
Foreign Policy Institute in Washington, DC. Dr. Kangas also served as a
Research Analyst on Central Asian Affairs for the Open Media Research
Institute (OMRI), and was an Assistant Professor of Political Science at
the University of Mississippi, and an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown
University. Since 1992, Dr. Kangas has worked with and advised a number
of U.S. government departments and agencies, as well as private-sector
firms and non-governmental organizations on issues relating to Central
Asia, Russia, and the Southern Caucasus. Dr. Kangas graduated from the
School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and earned his Ph.D..
in Political Science at Indiana University. Dr. Kangas has written numer-
ous articles and book chapters on Central Asian politics and society.
Nancy Lubin is President of JNA Associates, Inc., a research/ consulting

firm dealing with issues of the newly independent states (NIS), especially
Central Asia and the Caucasus. She has lived, worked and traveled through-
out this region for 30 years–as a Congressional staffer, university Profes-
sor, and now for JNA–and consults for international donors, the media,
private foundations, the U.S. government, and corporations ranging from
Fortune 500 to smaller, start up companies. She has been a Fellow at the
U.S. Institute of Peace, the Woodrow Wilson Center, and elsewhere, and
holds a Ph.D. from Oxford University, a B.A., Magna Cum Laude, from
Harvard University, has studied at the Universities of Moscow and Len-
ingrad, and was one of the first Westerners to conduct doctoral research
for one year in Uzbekistan (1978-79). She is a member of the Council on
Foreign Relations, the Board of Trustees/Advisors of the Eurasia Founda-
tion, the Board of Advisors of the Open Society Institute, Central Eurasia
Project, and other organizations.
David S. McCauley is an environmental economist and policy expert with

long experience in Asia. A frequent consultant and advisor to international
assistance agencies and Asian governments, he is Adjunct Senior Fellow at
the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii and Affiliate Graduate Faculty
Member at the University of Hawaii, Department of Natural Resources
and Environmental Management. His paper is based, in part, on an analy-
sis commissioned by the Asian Development Bank, but the views and posi-
tions expressed are his own. Dr. McCauley’s undergraduate training was in
the environmental sciences, and he holds a Ph.D. in Resource Economics
from the University of Hawaii.
Daene C. McKinney is a Professor of Environmental Engineering at the

University of Texas at Austin. He received his Ph.D.. and M.S. degrees in
Civil and Environmental Engineering from Cornell University, and a B.S.
in Environmental Resources Engineering from Humboldt State University.
Dr. McKinney concentrates on research related to transboundary water
and environmental issues, especially related to U.S.-Mexico border issues
in the Rio Grande basin and countries of Central Europe and the former
Soviet Union. He has completed various technical assignments in Russia,
Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus that address the natural
resources management legacy of the Soviet Union and the relationship
between economic restructuring and environmental protection. Dr. McK-
inney has served as an environmental engineer for the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency and spent a two-year leave from UT Austin in Almaty,
Kazakhstan as Chief of Party for the five-country U.S. Agency for Inter-
national Development Environmental Policy and Institutions for Central
Asia Program.
E. Wayne Merry is a Senior Associate of the American Foreign Policy

Council in Washington. He was previously Director of the Program on
European Societies in Transition at the Atlantic Council of the United
States. During 26 years in the United States Foreign Service, he served
twice in the Political Section of the Moscow Embassy, as a specialist on
domestic Soviet and Russian politics. He also served in East Berlin, Ath-
ens, New York, and Tunis, while his Washington assignments included the
State Department, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, the Office of the
470
Secretary of Defense (as Regional Director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eur-
asia), and the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
An Oklahoma native, he is a graduate of the University of Wisconsin, the
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University,
and the U.S. Army Russian Institute. Since retiring from the government
in 1998, his writings have appeared in a variety of American and European
publications.
Jennifer D.P. Moroney is Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation

where she manages and supports projects for the U.S. Departments of
Defense, Homeland Security, Energy, and the National Security Council.
Prior to joining RAND, Dr. Moroney worked for DFI Government Ser-
vices, where she managed security-related projects for the Department
of Defense. In 2000, Dr. Moroney worked in OSD/NATO Policy where
she was responsible for the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Russia portfolios.
Dr. Moroney has co-edited several books on security issues in the former
Soviet Union, including Security Dynamics in the Former Soviet Bloc (Cur-
zon/Routledge, 2003), Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy: Theoretical
and Comparative Perspectives (Praeger, 2002). She also has published sev-
eral book chapters, journal articles, and policy briefs on Ukraine, Central
Asia, the South Caucasus, and NATO enlargement. Dr. Moroney received
her Ph.D.. in International Relations from the University of Kent at Can-
terbury, United Kingdom, an M.A. in European Integration from the Uni-
versity of Limerick, Ireland, and a B.A. from Frostburg State University,
Maryland.
Michael Ochs has been a Professional Staff Advisor at the Commission on

Security and Cooperation in Europe [Helsinki Commission], U.S. Con-
gress since 1987. He also has been a member of the U.S. Delegation to vari-
ous OSCE meetings. Dr. Ochs specializes in the Caucasus and Central Asia,
where he has traveled extensively. He has published numerous articles on
politics and human rights in these countries. He also has observed and
analyzed elections in virtually all of the former Soviet republics, and in
fall 1995, headed the OSCE election observation mission for parliamen-
tary elections in Azerbaijan. Dr. Ochs has been a member of the Advisory
Board of the Central Eurasia Project of the Open Society Institute of the
Soros Foundation, which runs foundations in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ta-
jikistan, and Uzbekistan. Dr. Ochs holds a Ph.D.. in Russian History from
Harvard University.
Olga Oliker is an international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation.

Her research focuses primarily on security and defense issues, as they relate
to U.S. interests in the states of the former Soviet Union. She also writes
on U.S. foreign policy and military diplomacy, and, most recently on U.S.
military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Before coming to RAND, Ms.
Oliker worked as an independent consultant and held positions in the
U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy. Her recent publications include
Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and South Caucasus (RAND 2003),
co-edited with Thomas S. Szayna.
Matthew Oresman is the Director of the China-Eurasia Forum and serves

as Editor of the CEF Monthly. Previously, he was a researcher with the
Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies (CSIS), and coordinator for the Freeman Chair’s project on
China’s Emergence in Central Asia. As such, He was the principal author
of China’s New Journey to the West: Report on China’s Emergence in Central
Asia and Implications for U.S. Interests (CSIS Press, August 2003). He re-
ceived a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Pennsylva-
nia and has studied in China at both Tsinghua and Fudan Universities.
Tiffany Petros is a Senior Analyst at DFI Government Services where

her work focuses on regional security issues in Europe and Eurasia. DFI
provides tailored research, analysis, and consulting services to senior deci-
sion-makers in the U.S. national security community. Prior to joining DFI,
Dr. Petros served as a consultant to the World Bank on Central Asia and
the Caucasus. She taught politics courses at the American University of
Armenia, Yerevan and in the Czech Republic at Palacký University and the
Anglo-American College. Dr. Petros is currently a Research Associate with
The George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and
Eurasian Studies. She received her Ph.D.. from Miami University, Ohio.
Alma Raissova is a Regional Deputy Development Director of the Edu-

cational Network (EdNet) project, sponsored by USAID and CARANA
Corporation, Almaty, Kazakhstan. Prior to EdNet, she was an Energy and
Environment Policy Specialist for a Harvard Institute of International De-
velopment project based in Central Asia. She is a Candidate of Sciences in
Economy (Ukrainian Scientific and Research Institute, 1991). Her special-
ization is in economic aspects of Energy and Environment Policy, Micro-
472
loans, and Securities Market. She has published several articles regarding
Environmental, Microloan and Privatization issues.
Aliya Sartbayeva-Peleo is a lecturer in the Department of Economics

of the Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and Strategic
Research, under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Almaty,
where she teaches Macroeconomics, Environmental Economics, Natural
Resource Economics, and Energy Economics. She received a Master of
Arts in International Development from the International University of
Japan in Niigata as an Asian Development Bank scholar. Prior to that,
she worked for four years in the U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment financed environmental projects in Central Asia led by CH2M Hill
International, International Resources Group and the Harvard Institute
for International Development. Her area of specialization is economics of
development and transition in Asian and former Soviet Union countries,
environmental economics and policy, as well as the issues of efficient al-
location and management of natural resources in developing countries.
She recently co-authored the Country Environmental Analysis (CEA) for
Kazakhstan for the Asian Development Bank.
Saltanat Sulaimanova is a Ph.D.. candidate at American University in

Washington, DC, researching human trafficking and international migra-
tion. She has worked for the International Organization for Migration,
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations
Development Program, and the World Bank in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan,
Austria and the United States. Ms. Sulaimanova is also an international
consultant on human trafficking issues, working with such institutions as
the Protection Project of the Johns Hopkins University and the Interna-
tional Research and Exchanges Board (IREX).
Kalkaman Suleimenov is Head of Section on Perspective Development,

Department of Development of the Kazakh Company on Electricity Net-
work Management. He worked previously with the Ministry of Energy
and Mineral Resources of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and was Head of
Department of the Kazakh Energy Research Institute (the Sh. Ch. Chokin
Institute). He is a Doctor of Technical Science with a specialization in ther-
mal energy. Dr. Suleimenov holds six patents, and has published over 50
articles and monographs. His research themes have focused on develop-
ment of heating processes, and gasification of low quality fossil fuels.
ABBREVIATIONS 473
Abbreviations
and Key Terms
ADB Asian Development Bank
Agenda XXI UN plan for sustainable development
BTC Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline
BVOs Basin Water Management Organizations on the Syr Darya and Amu
Darya rivers (established in Soviet times, still functioning)
CACO The Central Asian Cooperation Organization, est. 2002, under
Uzbek leadership, includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan. Intended to be the successor to CAEC.
CAEC Central Asian Economic Community (regional coordinating
mechanism for economic, security and water issues)
CAMIN Central Asian Mountain Information Network
CARs Central Asian Republics
CBMs confidence-building measures
CENTRASBAT (Also Centrazbat) Central Asia Battalion (founded in 1995, regional
peacekeeping unit)
CFE Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia
(proposed as Asian variant of OSCE)
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CNPC China National Petroleum Company
CPC Caspian Pipeline Consortium
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CRDF Collective Rapid Deployment Force includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Russia and Tajikistan. Component of CSTO
CST/ CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization (as of 14 May 2002) formerly
CST Collective Security Treaty (est. 1992, includes Russia, Belarus,
Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan)
CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction, US program in the region
473
474
DCA Drug Control Agency of Tajikistan

DEA Drug Enforcement Agency (of the United States)
DHS Demographic and Health Survey (conducted in Kyrgyzstan,
supported by U.S. assistance)
DMC Developing Member Country of the Asian Development Bank
DOD Department of Defense (USA)
DOTS Directly Observed Treatment, Short Course (a swift TB detection and
treatment strategy)
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ETIM East Turkestan Islamic Movement, radical group with ties to Uyghur
separatists
EU European Union
EXBS Export Control and Related Border Security (U.S. program in Central
Asia)
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency (of the United States)
FGPs Family Medicine Practice Groups (health care system established with
U.S. assistance)
FMF Foreign Military Financing (U.S. program)
FPS Federal Border Service (Russian Program securing the Tajik border)
FSU Former Soviet Union
G8 Group of Eight (G-7 plus Russia)
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEF Global Environment Facility
GM Global Mechanism of the UNCCD
GNI Gross National Income (New World Bank indicator, replaces GDP)
GUAM/ GUUAM Georgia, Ukraine, (Uzbekistan), Armenia and Moldova. Was
originally established as GUUAM, as a non-aligned group, but
Uzbekistan withdrew in later years. The organization is now GUAM
GWP Global Water Partnership
HIV/AIDS human immunodeficiency virus/ acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome
ABBREVIATIONS 475
HT Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Party of Liberation (Islamist organization in Central

Asia). Present in all five Central Asian states, illegal in several, but
with a tendency to be non-violent.
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency (of the United Nations)
ICIMOD International Center for Integrated Mountain Development
ICSD Interstate Commission for Sustainable Development
ICWC Interstate Commission for Water Coordination
IDPs internationally displaced persons
IDUs injecting drug users
IFAS International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea
IFIs International Financial Institutions
IMET International Military Education and Training (U.S. program)
IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Banned political party, with a
tendency towards violence
IOM International Organization for Migration (Geneva-based
International Organization)
IPP Individual Partnership Plan (from within the PfP program, partners
construct such a plan)
IRP Islamic Renaissance Party
ISI import-substituting industry
KEGOC Kazakhstan Electricity Network Company
KGB Committee for State Security (Soviet era)
KOGG Commission for the Protection of the State Border (Tajikistan)
kV Kilo-volts
kWh kilowatt-hours
LARK Legal Assistance to Rural Citizens in Kyrgyzstan, established with
Swiss support in 2000
LoS Law of the Sea Treaty
MAP Membership Action Plan (for NATO membership candidate)
MAWR Uzbek Ministry of Agriculture and Water Management
476
MDR-TB multi-drug resistant tuberculosis

MEAs multilateral environmental agreements
MGIMO Moscow’s Institute for International Relations
MHIF mandatory health insurance fund (in Kyrgyzstan)
MOU memorandum of understanding
MPC&A Material control and accounting and physical protection (of nuclear
materials)
NAP National Action Program under UNCCD
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEAP National Environmental Action Plans in the United Nations
NGO non-governmental organization
NIS Newly Independent States
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NTB National Bank of Tajikistan
ODS ozone-depleting substances
OEF “Operation Enduring Freedom,” the U.S. military operations in
Afghanistan
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAP People’s Armed Police (of China)
PARP Planning and Review Process within PfP
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the European Union.
PfP Partnership for Peace, a NATO program
PLA People’s Liberation Army (of China)
PRC People’s Republic of China
PREGA Promotion of Renewable Energy, Energy Efficiency and Greenhouse
Gas Abatement Projects, a project of ADB
POP persistent organic pollutant
PPTA Project Preparation Technical Assistance
PWP Partnership Work Plan (Annual NATO drafted plan of activities
under PfP)
ABBREVIATIONS 477
RATC CIS Regional Anti-Terrorist Center, first based in Bishkek in 2001,

now based in Tashkent.
RCLAR Republican Center for Land and Agrarian Reform established in
Kyrgyzstan in 1995
RDF Rapid Deployment Forces of the CSTO
REAP Regional Environmental Action Plan
REC Regional Environment Center
RECs regional electricity companies in Kazakhstan
RETA Regional Technical Assistance under ADB
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization, est. 2000 (formerly “Shanghai
Five,” est.1996)
SES sanitary epidemiological service (Soviet era. Also called Sanepid)
SIC Scientific Information Center
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)
STI sexually transmitted infection
STV Stichting Tegen Vrouwenhandel, Dutch NGO working against
trafficking in women
SUB small rural hospital (selskaya uchaskovaya bolnitsia)
TA Technical Assistance
TACIS Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States,
European Union assistance program
TB tuberculosis
TDCA The Tajik Drug Control Agency
TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (est. 1993, aims to bring
together trade and transport ministers from the five Central Asian
republics and three Caucasian republics to develop a transport
corridor from Europe to Central Asia across the Black Sea.)
UES Unified Energy System of Kazakhstan
UNCCD United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and Drought
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
478
UNDP United Nations Development Program

UNEP United Nations Environment Program
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID United States Agency for International Development
UTO United Tajikistan Opposition
VAT value-added-tax
WB World Bank
WHO World Health Organization
WMD weapons of mass destruction (Chemical, Nuclear, Biological)
WTO World Trade Organization
XPCC Xinjiang Production and Construction Corporation, a paramilitary
organization in China also known as Bingtuan

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In the Tracks

edited by Dan Burghart

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without further permis-

Library of Congress Cataloging-in Publication Data

Includes bibliographical references.

First Printing, July 2004

To the heroes working for reform in Central Asia,

In the Tracks of Tamerlane:

Part I—Political Changes

The Politics of Central Asia:

Political Reform Strategies:

Legal Reform in Central Asia:

Human Rights in Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Democracy-Building in Central Asia

Islam in Central Asia:

Part II—Economic Concerns

The Rise of the Post-Soviet Petro-States:

Central Asian Public Health:

From Rio to Johannesburg: Comparing

Land Privatization and Conflict in

The Future of Electrical Power

Part III—Security Issues

Forging Relationships, Preventing Proliferation:

Building Security in Central Asia:

Who’s Watching the Watchdogs?:

Migration Trends in Central Asia

Beyond the Battle of Talas:

Regional Security Cooperation

Friends Like These: Defining

About the Contributors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .465

Abbreviations and Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .473

Many events can be pointed to as affecting the status of the region;

staff of the NDU Library provided research assistance throughout the

Dr. Daniel L. Burghart Dr. Theresa Sabonis-Helf

In the Tracks of Tamerlane:

Today finds the countries of Central Asia in a period of rebirth, not

Picking up the Trail

mineral wealth in addition to the already mentioned supplies of gas and

seventeenth century, external influences began to make their presence felt.

Independence – Old Wine in New Bottles?

mental problems stemming from the exploitation of these resources under

indicated that conditions there were worse then those in Kazakhstan.11 In

Domestically, Kyrgyzstan suffers the same problems as the other

same outcome will come to pass in Uzbekistan is yet to be determined;

The Security Situation Post-September 11

Some Thoughts for the Future

threats it perceives, without creating a force that is perceived as a threat by

a strategic necessity, but ultimately resulted in catastrophic consequences

co.uk,Vol. 11, no. 3, Winter 2002.

listings in Shoemaker, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States 2002.

for International Peace, 2002), 3.

The Politics of Central Asia:

The Imperial Legacy in the Heart of Eurasia

the southern frontier of Western Turkestan, an identity reinforced by the

The Enduring Mentality of Empire

additional factor of ideology, which, however much cynicism may have