Power system dynamics
Prof.dr.ing. Lucian Toma
Faculty of Energy Engineering
Department of Electrical Power Systems
Office: EI-113
Tel.: 0724711661
Email: lucian.toma@upb.ro 1
Activities
50 p – laboratory works
50 p - exam
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Power system dynamics
Chapter 1
Basic concepts and classifications of stability
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ENTSO-E families of codes
https://electricity.network-codes.eu/network_codes/
2003 – anul marilor avarii
Blackout SUA-Canada 2003
Source: 7 Paris 2004
Session CIGRE
Blackout SUA-Canada 2003
Some observations
USA+Canada
• Lack of coordination between operators to avoid
perturbation spreading;
• Loss of “software” control and alarms in the system
• Bad vegetation management
• Insufficient training of the system operators for
emergency situations
GRTN statement – Italian TSO (actual TERNA)
“The risk in Italy is tiny, Italy's network is more modern
than the U.S. one, and European nations have tighter
protocols on assistance and interconnections with
other countries' power supplies.”
GRTN - Gestore della rete di trasmissione nazionale
Italy, 28 September 2003
Italy in dark
http://www.rae.gr/old/cases/C13/italy/UCTE_rept.pdf
GRTN statement – Italian TSO (after blackout):
“Our system is more secure than the American
one, but it is also more vulnerable.”
The Major grid blackout of the Italian power system, on 28 September 2003
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The Major grid blackout of the Italian power system, on 28 September 2003
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Some observations
Italy
• Energetic dependence of the interconnected power
systems
• Bad influence of protections to disconnections
• Bad coordination between system operators
• Lack of observability on the boundary interconnection
lines
Interconnection of power systems
UCTE -> ENTSO-E since 2009
Interconnection of power systems
Generation Load
Solidarity Trust Common objectives
THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF FREQUENCY CONTROL
P gen = Pcons
(includes import from (includes loses and export
neighbor EPSs) to neighbor EPSs)
Pgen Pload f 50 Hz
Pgen Pload f 50 Hz
Centralized and distributed generation
Centralized generation Distributed generation
• Conventional generation • Rooftop solar panels
• Coal plants • Connected to the distribution
• Gas plants network
• Hydro plants
• Nuclear plants
• Renewable generation
• Wind farms
• Solar farms
• Connected to the transmission
network
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ECHILIBRAREA PUTERILOR ACTIVE
Loads Power sources
Stationary Rotating
Steam/gas turbine Hydro turbine Wind turbine
High speed Small speed Low/No speed
Strong Medium Weak
TYPES OF SYNCHRONOUS MACHINES
Turbo-generator Hydro-generator Synchronous condenser
Small diameter Large diameter
No diving system
High rotational speed Small rotational speed
Small inertia constant
High Torque Small Torque
High inertia constant Small inertia constant
H = 3 ÷ 9 MWs/MVA H = 2 ÷ 4 MWs/MVA H = 1 ÷ 1.25 MWs/MVA
nuclear
without-condensation
TYPES OF SYNCHRONOUS MACHINES
DFIG – Doubly Fed Induction Generator (Mașina Asincronă cu Dublă Conexiune)
G
earb
ox Ge
nera
tor
1:50 1
500rpm
PMSG – Permanent Magnet Synchronous Generator
Generator
30 rpm Generator sincron
cu magneţi Diodă
Reţea electrică
Partea de reţea
permanenţi redresor Booster a convertorului
PWM-
VSC
Controlul tensiunii
Turbină legăturii la c.c.
eoliană
Control
generator
ENTSO-E network splitting
4 November 2006
Line disconnected to let the
ship pass safely
ENTSO-E network splitting
4 November 2006
https://eepublicdownloads.entsoe.eu/clean-documents/pre2015/publications/ce/otherreports/Final-Report-20070130.pdf
ENTSO-E network splitting
8 January 2021
https://www.entsoe.eu/news/2021/01/15/system-separation-in-the-continental-europe-synchronous-area-on-8-january-2021-update/
ENTSO-E network splitting
8 January 2021
https://www.entsoe.eu/news/2021/01/26/system-separation-in-the-continental-
europe-synchronous-area-on-8-january-2021-2nd-update/
https://www.entsoe.eu/data/map/
HVDC
400 kV
220 kV
330 kV
750 kV
Worldwide interconnections
North-American interconnections
North-American interconnections
Image result for wecc map
The analogy between the phenomenon of electromechanical oscillations
and those in a mechanical system
• Stable operation state
Ce
A
Cm
The ball = the operating point of a network
user, operating synchronously or • Disturbed state
asynchronously; C Instable
= the set of Ce state quantities (power, B
voltage, angle ...) Stable
A
Cm
Security of an electrical energy system
The security of an electrical system refers to the ability of the
system to withstand disturbances without affecting the
electricity supply service of consumers.
Types of disturbances in power systems
There are a multitude of disturbances that can occur in an
electrical energy system
• Rapid change in consumption
• Disconnecting a generator
• Equipment failure
• Disconnecting a power line
• Changing the power grid configuration
Definition of security states
NORMAL
RESTORATIVE ALERT
IN EXTREMIS EMERGENCY
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Definition of security states
➢ The system is in a normal state when all the loads in the
system are supplied and all system variables are within
normal range
➢ The system is in alert state when all the loads in the system
are supplied and all system variables are within normal
range, but any additional contingency can cause limits to be
violated
➢ The system is in emergency state when all the loads in the
system are supplied and one or more constraints are violated
➢ The in-extremis state (extreme emergency) is characterized
by cascading outages and possible shut down of a major
portion of the system by automatic actions
➢ The restorative state represents a condition in which control
actions are being taken to reconnect all the facilities and to
restore
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system load
Security
Outage of line, tie-
line, DC link,
The mechanism of a blackout
Level transformer, generator,
busbar Time
N and N-1 security
N-2 lines, a total
Initial
are OK
state N-1 substation, a total
power plant, a tower NORMAL
with 2 two lines
N security is OK
N-1 is not OK
N=N-1
New
ALERT
state
N-2
Appropriate restorative
actions are taken
N and N-1security
are not OK but
manual actions
N-1 protocols Immediate effects New
are possible
are activated Change in power flow – state
overloadings – tripping EMERGENCY
Apply voltage
of branches
control actions
Change in network Inappropriate or delayed
Deploy active topology actions are taken
power reserve
AUTOMATIC
are not OK and no
N and N-1security
Restrict the use of
remedial action
if required
ACTIONS
cam be taken
active and/or reactive Cascading tripping or
power sources lines
Redispatch Frequency instability
active power Active and/or reactive Cascading tripping of
to redirect the powers unbalance generation/load Voltage instability
power flows
35 Frequency and voltage Severe power swinging Angular instability
drops and oscillations
Transfer capacity limits
The ability of the interconnected transmission grid to ensure the
safe transfer of power:
Stability Voltage Thermal
limit limit limit
TTC (Total Transfer Capacity) is the maximum power that can
be transferred between two zones compatible from the
operational standards viewpoint
TTC = min {Thermal limit, Voltage limit, Stability limit}
Limitele capacității de transfer
The ability of the interconnected transmission grid to ensure the
safe transfer of power:
Stability Voltage Thermal
limit limit limit
From the point The voltage must The line rating must
of view of the fall within a band not be exceeded
transferred around the nominal
power, a limit value
can be
established
beyond which
undamped power
oscillations
begin to occur
Transient state
Steady state Steady state
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Are the power systems vulnerable?
Vulnerability: limit in the ability to endure threats and
survive accidental events originated from within
and outside the system’s boundaries
Robustness: ability to endure threats and survive accidental
events originated from within and outside the
system’s boundaries and, if disturbed, to return to
a normal operating state
Reliability: ability to perform the mission for a given time
under given environmental and operational
conditions
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Are the power systems vulnerable?
Causes of increasing the vulnerability of the
interconnected power systems:
❑ Load increase
❑ Power systems are increasingly being pushed harder with
higher levels of power transfers over longer distances
❑ Reducing the security margins
❑ Increase of complexity
❑ Insufficient investments in the generation, transmission and
distribution infrastructures
❑ Increased interdependence with others critical infrastructures
❑ Insufficient diversity of the primary energy
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Are the power systems vulnerable?
Causes of increasing the vulnerability of the
interconnected power systems:
❑ Insufficient technological evolution
❑ Decentralization of the decisional levels
❑ Gaming in electricity markets
❑ Defective activities in forecasting, management and
control
❑ Changes in the social context
❑ Inadequate operator training
❑ Inadequate vegetation maintenance
❑ etc.
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Are the power systems vulnerable?
... it is
WO
inoffensiv
W
e ...
The power system is not totally observable
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