Champs Nocember 24
Champs Nocember 24
Nov/Dec 2024
Public Forum Brief
Speech and Debate provides a meaningful and educational experience to all who are involved.
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These seven statements, while simple, represent the complex notion of what it means to
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Letter from the Editor Nov/Dec 2024
This debate topic offers a unique opportunity for students to engage with some of the
most pressing geopolitical and security challenges of our time. While it may seem daunting,
tackling a resolution with such complex implications provides students with a chance to deepen
their understanding of U.S. foreign policy in East Asia, specifically the intricate relationship
between the U.S., Taiwan, and China. Rather than oversimplifying the dynamics at play, this
topic encourages students to explore the broader context, including economic ties, diplomatic
efforts, and regional security alliances, all of which are vital for a comprehensive understanding
of the issue.
The phrase "substantially reduce" invites debaters to consider a range of potential
scenarios, from shifts in military aid to changes in strategic partnerships. This flexibility
empowers students to analyze and interpret what constitutes a substantial reduction, fostering
critical thinking and encouraging them to define and defend their positions with clarity.
However, I caution debaters to prepare for the possibility of needing to adjust mid-debate to
these potential scenarios. Does “substantially reduce” mean a complete withdrawal of military
support, a reduction in arms sales, or simply fewer joint military exercises? Without
parameters, the debate could become muddled, with both sides arguing different versions of
what "substantial reduction" actually means.
Moreover, by researching U.S.-Taiwan relations against the backdrop of rising tensions
with China, students are exposed to real-world geopolitical strategies, including the role Taiwan
plays in global trade and technology, particularly in the production of semiconductors. These
aspects of the debate offer rich material for students to explore how security, economics, and
diplomacy are interconnected in shaping U.S. strategic interests.
Finally, the topic challenges students to navigate the moral and political dilemmas
involved in global diplomacy, such as balancing the protection of an ally with the risks of
escalation. This allows debaters to refine their argumentation skills while grappling with the
nuanced consequences of foreign policy decisions, ultimately preparing them to engage with
complex issues in future academic and professional settings.
Yair Fraifeld
Editor-in-Chief
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Table of Contents Nov/Dec 2024
Table of Contents
Topic Analyses................................................................................... 11
Topic Analysis By Yair Fraifeld................................................................................................... 12
Topic Analysis By Rachel Mauchline ......................................................................................... 17
Topic Analysis By Thadeus Smith .............................................................................................. 25
General Information.......................................................................... 31
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Table of Contents Nov/Dec 2024
Champion Briefs 9
Table of Contents Nov/Dec 2024
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Champion Briefs
Nov/Dec 2024
Public Forum Brief
Topic Analyses
Topic Analysis by Yair Fraifeld Nov/Dec 2024
Resolved: The United States should substantially reduce its military support of Taiwan.
Introduction
The Nov/Dec debate topic touches on a crucial and highly sensitive issue in international
relations. U.S. military support for Taiwan has been a cornerstone of the delicate balance in
East Asia, particularly in managing tensions with China. This resolution asks debaters to explore
whether the U.S. should back away from this support and what the implications of such a move
might be. Taiwan plays a significant role in the geopolitical landscape, both as a strategic
location in the Pacific and as a symbol of democracy amidst the rise of authoritarian regimes,
particularly China. For years, the U.S. has offered military aid to Taiwan in an effort to deter
Chinese aggression. However, with rising tensions between the U.S. and China, the future of
this relationship is in question, making this topic relevant and timely for high school debaters.
Strategic Considerations
When debating whether the U.S. should substantially reduce its military support of
Taiwan, it’s important to consider several key factors. First, both the affirmative and negative
sides need to define what "substantially reduce" means. Does it mean a reduction in arms sales,
fewer joint military exercises, or the removal of troops from the region? How much reduction is
"substantial"? Clarifying this early on will help guide the debate and will be vital for strategic
purposes.
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Topic Analysis by Yair Fraifeld Nov/Dec 2024
Next, debaters need to understand the larger context of U.S.-China relations. This
debate is not just about Taiwan but also about how the U.S. interacts with China, its largest
competitor on the global stage. Any move regarding Taiwan could affect everything from trade
relations. The U.S. has long used its military might to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-
Pacific region. Reducing military support for Taiwan could destabilize this balance. However,
continuing to arm Taiwan might also provoke China and lead to further conflict. This delicate
semiconductor manufacturing, and any disruption in its security could impact global supply
chains, especially for technology. Both sides should consider the economic consequences of
Affirmative Arguments
The affirmative side argues that the U.S. should substantially reduce its military support
for Taiwan for several reasons. First, avoiding potential conflict with China. One of the strongest
arguments for reducing military support is to avoid provoking China. Beijing views Taiwan as a
breakaway province and has consistently warned the U.S. against supporting its military. The
affirmative can argue that continuing to supply arms or engage in military exercises with Taiwan
increases the risk of direct conflict with China. By reducing military support, the U.S. would de-
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Topic Analysis by Yair Fraifeld Nov/Dec 2024
Another argument to make is that the U.S. may be shifting its focus to domestic issues.
Another affirmative argument is that the U.S. should prioritize its domestic issues over foreign
conflicts. Military aid is expensive, and the resources allocated to supporting Taiwan could be
better used for domestic programs like healthcare, education, or infrastructure. The affirmative
might argue that the U.S. has been overly involved in foreign military operations and needs to
Next, a reduction in military support could push Taiwan to invest more in its own
defense. Instead of relying on the U.S., Taiwan might strengthen its military capabilities and
seek other alliances in the region. This could lead to a more balanced power dynamic in East
Asia, where regional players like Japan or South Korea could step up and share the burden of
maintaining security.
Finally, improving U.S.-China relations. Reducing military support for Taiwan could
improve U.S.-China relations. As China rises as a global superpower, the U.S. will need to
manage this relationship carefully. Reducing military support for Taiwan might signal to China
that the U.S. is willing to negotiate and find peaceful solutions, which could lead to better trade
Negative Arguments
The negative side argues that the U.S. should continue its military support for Taiwan
and resist any reduction. One of the core arguments for maintaining military support is
deterrence. The U.S. military presence in Taiwan serves as a warning to China that any attempt
to invade or coerce Taiwan will be met with force. The negative can argue that reducing military
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Topic Analysis by Yair Fraifeld Nov/Dec 2024
support would embolden China to take more aggressive actions against Taiwan, possibly
leading to an invasion. Taiwan's sovereignty and democracy are at stake, and the U.S. has a
Another argument critical argument is that U.S. military support for Taiwan helps
maintain stability in the entire Asia-Pacific region. Taiwan is located in a strategically important
position, and any disruption in its security could have ripple effects across the region. The U.S.
presence in Taiwan deters not only Chinese aggression but also ensures that other countries in
the region, like Japan and South Korea, feel secure. If the U.S. reduces its military support, it
could lead to regional instability, affecting trade, alliances, and security partnerships.
Next is protecting global supply chains. Taiwan is the world leader in semiconductor
computers, and even military equipment. The negative can argue that reducing U.S. military
support risks the security of Taiwan's semiconductor industry, which could disrupt global supply
chains. This would have severe economic consequences for the U.S. and its allies.
Finally, reducing military support for Taiwan may damage U.S. credibility on the world
stage. The U.S. has long presented itself as a defender of democracy and a reliable ally. If it
reduces military support for Taiwan, other countries might question the U.S.'s commitment to
its allies, weakening its influence globally. This could also encourage adversaries like Russia or
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Topic Analysis by Yair Fraifeld Nov/Dec 2024
Conclusion
The debate over whether the U.S. should substantially reduce its military support for
Taiwan is complex, involving national security, international relations, economic interests, and
diplomatic strategy. The affirmative side highlights the risks of provoking China, the need to
focus on domestic issues, and the potential benefits of a more self-reliant Taiwan. On the other
hand, the negative side emphasizes the importance of deterring Chinese aggression,
maintaining stability in the Asia-Pacific region, protecting global technology supply chains, and
preserving U.S. credibility. As debaters tackle this issue, they will need to weigh the risks and
benefits of U.S. military support and consider the broader implications for global security and
diplomacy. Both sides will need to articulate clear strategies and outcomes to persuade the
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Topic Analysis by Rachel Mauchline Nov/Dec 2024
Resolved: The United States should substantially reduce its military support of Taiwan.
Introduction
By the very nature of Public Forum as an event, the topic for November/December is
focused on a constantly changing geopolitical situation. While the original reading suggests that
international relations and the history of the topic. Upon a quick Google search of the
contemporary context. I would highly encourage individuals to read this as a primer to any
argument brainstorming. This sets the stage for a topic that has many layers to understand. This
topic analysis, along with the remainder of the brief, provides some key topic understanding
that debaters will need to have to understand how the action of the resolution will influence
the international scope. Investing time in doing the research and creating an understanding of
the literature helps prevent awkward moments in cross-examination when you are asked about
the basic historical context of the topic and fail to know the answer.
Therefore, this topic, having received a majority of the coach and student vote, creates
an opportunity for individuals to learn more about how the United States interacts with other
areas of the world from an international perspective. I personally think a more international
relations-leaning topic for November/December is easier for first-year students competing than
having that topic in September/October like last year. It is important to note that this topic,
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Topic Analysis by Rachel Mauchline Nov/Dec 2024
their arguments based on the changing events. Of course, this can sometimes be challenging,
especially around a time of year with holiday breaks, other commitments, and end-of-semester
engagements. Students who are debating on this topic will need to constantly be updating their
arguments – not just the uniqueness of the original arguments - throughout the duration of the
topic. I would recommend that students consider this when selecting the tournaments that
Strategy Considerations
As I've mentioned in previous topic analysis, the first step to understanding when
considering any topic is to define the words in the resolution itself. This provides a foundational
understanding that shapes the topic analysis and research stage of preparation. Transparently,
though, this resolution is structured in a way that it is a particular phrase that will shape how
the debates play out. That phrase is "substantially reduce its military support.” This phrase is
what most debates will focus on. Pro teams will defend that a substantial reduction in military
support is good for X reason. Con teams will defend that a substantial reduction in military
support is bad, fails, or does nothing. That is the most simplistic way to look at the topic at face
value without delving into specific arguments. Analyzing those keywords within that phrase will
aid in understanding the closest framer's interpretation of what the resolution means.
The first of those words is “substantially”. This word appears to be occurring in more
and more resolutions. By general nature, substantially means just significantly or to a great
extent. Therefore, the reduction that pro teams are defending can't just be like a 0.00001%
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Topic Analysis by Rachel Mauchline Nov/Dec 2024
difference. I would be cautious about getting into a percent debate about what equates
substantial in the context of this resolution. There are more important components of the
debate to focus on beyond the scale of impact. The second word to focus on is "reduce." This is
number. Therefore, the action of the resolution is one in which the military support, as
determined by the debate, is being reduced by a pro ballot at the end of the round.
The phrase “military support" isn't the simplest Google search. Transparently, when I
took this step when conducting this research, the best definition actually came from an AP US
History resource named Fiveable. They define that the phrase “military support refers to the
assistance provided by armed forces to enhance the capabilities of allied nations or groups
during conflicts or crises. This can include direct intervention, logistical assistance, training, and
intelligence sharing, all aimed at bolstering the effectiveness of military operations and
ensuring strategic objectives are met." Of course, this isn't the most scholarly source, so I
would encourage teams to actually define military support in the context of the topic literature
and the actors themselves. Al Jazeera released an article in September titled “U.S. approves
$567m in military support for Taiwan" which focuses on the military support coming in the form
of funding for military endeavors and projects. Of course, this is still generic in nature. There are
opportunities for teams to find specific projects, actions, and programs that have been
historically within the United States-Taiwan military relationship. It's important to define this
term clearly as a key action that a team is either supporting or opposing in each debate.
countries is important to consider. The United States has had a non-official defense relationship
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Topic Analysis by Rachel Mauchline Nov/Dec 2024
with Taiwan since 1979 with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). This allows the United States to
have unofficial relationships with Taiwan, especially in the wake of the understanding of Beijing
as the legal sole government of China. Over time, different administrations have had different
priorities and focus on both sides regarding what the United States-Taiwan relationship looks
like, but there has continued to be an unofficial relationship over the last four decades. There is
a vast amount of research that teams can look into to understand the intricacies of this
relationship rather than this quick summary for this topic analysis. Therefore, the question that
individuals will most likely ask upon reading this topic is simply: why is there a need to make a
change now? There are a couple of specific reasons as to why this topic is being debated at this
time.
First, the presidential election in November in the United States raises the question of
future United States relationships with both China and Taiwan. Both candidates for President
have different perspectives on this specific issue. There is an understanding that Vice President
Kamala Harris will continue the stance that President Joe Biden has taken by publicly supporting
Taiwan. However, there is also an understanding that Former President Trump will continue the
stance that he upheld while in office, which focused on countering Chinese aggression with
hard-line military support for Taiwan with increased arms sales. Brookings has a great article
(which was only just released on October 3rd) that is comparative of how the outcome of the
2024 election is important for the signaling of the future of the United States-Taiwan
relationship. Therefore, it is important that the question of our policy actions be questioned
with this resolution within the scope of the election. I think this goes back to the analysis I
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Topic Analysis by Rachel Mauchline Nov/Dec 2024
made earlier in this topic brief about the importance of keeping arguments up to date based on
The second area as to why this topic is timely in nature for discussion is the change of
leadership within Taiwan. President Lai, the candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP), was elected in January with the inauguration in May. With a change in leadership from
Former President Tsai Ing-wen, who had been in power since 2016, now is the moment in
which foreign policy shifts have a higher likelihood to occur. The Center for Strategic and
International Studies states that President Lai “has signaled clearly and strongly that he seeks
peace and predictability in his relationship with the United States, with China, and with the
global community." It is important to consider that now, a few months into the term, it will be
interesting to see if this original statement will remain true or if the military support currently in
place is in the best interests of the United States and Taiwan going forward. There are more
timely articles coming out on this topic quite frequently. I would encourage teams to rely on
finding sources that consider the current stance both countries have on the relationship and
The third reason why this topic is current to debate as we end 2024 is the rising tensions
between the Taiwan and China. Brookings (yes they have released a lot of great articles on this
specific topic) just three weeks ago released an article analyzing why the U.S. security
partnership is important with the growing tensions between Taiwan and China. There are many
questions that both sides will need to consider the answers to when looking at their arguments
on this topic.
1. What will a reduction in United States military support to Taiwan signal to China?
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Topic Analysis by Rachel Mauchline Nov/Dec 2024
2. Should the United States support Taiwan in a potential war with China?
3. If yes, how can they do this without funneling consistent money into conflict?
4. If not, what does that mean for the relationship between Taiwan and the United States
in the future?.
5.
These are just some of the questions to consider strategically. I believe that the arguments
being discussed in the debate should consider the real-world implications that can occur. It's
important that teams consider these questions and the many others that can be asked when
crafting their positions on this topic in general. Often, the strategy of winning a debate comes
first in a competitive setting, but it's also important to consider the truth and the implications
Affirmative Arguments
The affirmative in this debate has to focus on a change from the status quo regarding
the United States military's stance on Taiwan. The central thesis of the affirmative, no matter
what the specific arguments are being read, is that a change is needed. There are many
arguments that affirmative teams could choose to present, but I'll highlight the most stock
arguments that can shape the affirmative core positions on this topic. It is important for the
the end of September, highlighted that China has increased military activities and that the
threat of war is growing. There is even more recent evidence about this that teams can
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Topic Analysis by Rachel Mauchline Nov/Dec 2024
The first stock argument, therefore, is that reducing military support is critical to reduce
the risk of escalation. The Council of Foreign Relations reports that there is a heightened risk of
conflict now – which could draw in the United States with its involvement with Taiwan.
Therefore, a reduction in military support could signal to China that the United States will not
be drawn into a potential conflict if a situation occurs between China and the United States.
The impact of this could be related to what this aggression could mean for the people of each
The second stock argument that I would consider as the pro would be the stretch that
the military of the United States is already under. As more and more situations occur
throughout the world that the United States feels obligated to respond to, there will become a
breaking point. This breaking point can be financial in nature or just general resources or
bandwidth. There are different impact scenarios that can come from this argument about the
budget, but also the prioritization of possibly other programs that are domestic in nature. I
believe it's a question of what the priority should be. I believe the pro teams can identify
specific focus areas that are needed to handle X issues in the country.
Negative Arguments
The negative team on this topic has to defend why the status quo is good or how a
change to military support is uniquely bad. I believe there are different ways. I think the thesis
on the negative positions in this debate needs to be focused on how the Taiwan-United States
relationship is important and leads to unique benefits. I think specific con arguments can be
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Topic Analysis by Rachel Mauchline Nov/Dec 2024
region.
The first argument that I'd focus on is deterring China in the region. As China continues
to become more of a threat to the region, which can be discussed at the uniqueness level of the
debate, there needs to be some type of checkback against this aggression. The United States
Department of Defense highlights the importance of providing military support to the region in
order to deter threats in the region. While this may be from the perspective of the United
States themselves and be a bit more outdated, there are many articles that can shape why this
action could potentially cause more consequences. I think the deterrence angle is an interesting
angle for these debates, and it has some good impacts on how history proves the benefits of
The second argument that con teams should consider for their positions is that of cyber
warfare. The DefensePost from just October 7th illustrates that China's threats indicate a time-
sensitive situation of a possible invasion of Taiwan. There is specific evidence that China could
easily utilize cyber-attacks to freeze infrastructure or cause impacts on specific industries. Con
teams can argue that it is important for the United States to provide military support to Taiwan
to help them funnel funding into cybersecurity operations. If this is the predicted vulnerability,
con teams will say that this can provide vital support to protect from grid collapse and other
industries failing.
Overall, hopefully, this will give a preview of the topic, but the remaining topic analysis
literature and the brief itself will present a more in-depth analysis to help teams with the last
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Topic Analysis by Thadeus Smith Nov/Dec 2024
Resolved: The United States should substantially reduce its military support of Taiwan.
Introduction
This topic is what I would describe as an “evergreen” topic, meaning that it has been a
subject of debate for many years. Taiwan DAs have appeared in Policy and Lincoln-Douglas
debate for many years, as have arguments in Public Forum saying that some other policy will
trade off with aid to Taiwan. In fact, the Cross Examination Debate Association debated the US-
Taiwan relationship almost twenty years ago, in 2005. Despite the topic being evergreen, it’s
also constantly shifting – It was just a month ago when the White House released over half a
The evergreen nature of this topic has benefits and downsides for students. While
teams will benefit from the wide range of topic literature and pre-written arguments accessible
on Open Caselist, they may also struggle to gain the historical and ideological understandings
necessary to properly debate the topic. Coaches should expect to do some learning alongside
their students! Teams should also consider that their first tournament on this topic may
coincide with the 2024 Presidential Election, an event that could have serious ramifications for
US-Taiwan relations. Which candidate is elected (be it Harris, Trump, or long-shot Oliver) and
which party gains control of the Senate and House could change the balance of power and shift
conventional wisdom on the issue. Teams should be prepared to update their arguments, at
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Topic Analysis by Thadeus Smith Nov/Dec 2024
Strategy Considerations
This topic is a very straightforward one, with only two real parts that teams will need to
define. This section will start with those definitions before providing some more detail on the
2024 Presidential Election and some recommended sources for teams to start their research.
There are two parts to the resolution that teams will need to define. First is the idea of
particularly helpful, with Oxford defining it as an adjective used to describe something “of
considerable importance, size, and worth.” This is not much help, so I recommend teams think
about this more generally. Common sense should tell you that for something to be substantial,
it needs to be large. Realistically, most teams are not going to defend a reduction that the
average person would consider small – That is, it’s not a winning strategy to say, "We'll take a
few bucks off every year." Teams should avoid delving into specifics and focus more on the big
picture, which is that this topic focuses on a general reduction of aid. Arguing about semantics,
especially in front of lay judges, will cause more frustration than it's worth.
The second definition teams need to consider is what exactly “military support” means.
The United States provides two specific types of military support to Taiwan. The first is arms
sales – These are generally performed by private companies, with the US government granting
final approval. These could be considered a form of government support because the
government is granting a tacit form of approval by allowing the sale to take place. These arms
sales have been significant for many years, with Taiwan purchasing more than $50 billion in
weapons from the United States between 1950 and 2022. The other form of support the United
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Topic Analysis by Thadeus Smith Nov/Dec 2024
States has given to Taiwan is direct military aid from the government. This was prominent
during the Cold War but quickly fell off. However, legislation in 2022 allowed the government
to give Taiwan weapons directly from the US military’s own stockpiles. The only other country
The second big thing teams should understand is the political landscape of the United
States. Currently, support for Taiwan aid has broad bipartisan support – The most recent aid
packet passed the Senate with 79 votes in favor and 18 against. Republicans are more likely to
oppose aid but generally support it as a way to hedge against China’s influence in the region.
Even in the current election, both Trump and Harris will likely continue to support Taiwan.
During Trump’s presidency, he approved billions in arms sales to Taiwan, while Harris will likely
continue Biden’s public support for Taiwan. Something that might make things difficult,
however, is the United States’ continued support for Israel’s invasion of Gaza. Regardless of
where you stand on this issue, American support for Israel is increasingly becoming a point of
contention. Military aid for Taiwan is often directly linked to aid for other countries – If Taiwan
aid stays linked to aid for Israel, it could become a political liability.
The third big thing teams should consider is their sourcing. Some think tanks should be
avoided, with Heritage being an obvious example – Their connections to the highly
controversial “Project 2025” make for an easy indict. Some good, non-partisan think tanks for
background and ideas on this topic include Brookings, Carnegie, and Lowy. These organizations
are based in the United States and generally support the continuation of US aid to Taiwan.
Taiwanese-centered organizations include the Global Taiwan Institute and the Taiwan Center
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Topic Analysis by Thadeus Smith Nov/Dec 2024
for Security Studies. For a more critical lens, teams may start their research with Cato and the
Affirmative Arguments
military aid to Taiwan. There are a couple main arguments here that teams should consider.
The first argument has to do with preventing escalation with China and the second argument
The first argument is about Chinese escalation. The basic link chain here is very simple –
Any sort of American military presence in Taiwan, even a purely symbolic one, poses a threat to
China's control of the region. The more heightened tensions are with China, the more likely
there is a risk for miscalculation or eventual war. Teams may also argue that America would be
obligated to defend Taiwan if it were invaded, which could quickly spiral into regional or
nuclear war. This basic link chain has room for a wide range of impact scenarios, evidence for
which you will find in this brief. Something extremely important for teams to consider,
however, is why reducing our support lowers the chance of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. At
first glance, this may seem counter-intuitive – After all, why would a country that wants to
invade another step back if they see that country unsupported? The answer here has to do with
Chinese domestic politics. The affirmative can essentially argue that Taiwan is more valuable to
China as an aspirational goal rather than an actual territory. Reducing military support to
Taiwan might give China an internal "win" and give them the opportunity to say that they have
successfully countered American influence. Without a present "American threat," there would
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Topic Analysis by Thadeus Smith Nov/Dec 2024
The second main argument has to do with political tradeoffs. As I said earlier, military
aid is often bundled together, but aid to Taiwan is given in a very specific way – It is drawn from
military stockpiles, just like our aid to Ukraine. If we continue granting aid to Taiwan, it could
pose a threat to our aid to Ukraine as well. Affirmative teams could argue that military aid to
Taiwan is less important than aid to Ukraine, especially because Ukraine is currently in an active
conflict with another country while Taiwan is in something closer to a cold war.
Negative Arguments
The negative side of this debate has the specific burden to defend the status quo –
Importantly, they do not need to defend an increase in aid, just a militainment of our current
level of support for Taiwan. Again, there are two main stock arguments I see on this topic. The
first has to do with (you guessed it) preventing Chinese escalation, while the second has to do
The first argument is about Chinese escalation. This is essentially the opposite link chain
of the affirmative argument – It says that China wants to invade now but will not do so as long
as the United States has a presence. That's because China does not want to risk engaging in war
with the United States. While this is the most basic form of the link chain, there are several
unique options the negative could pursue. For example, abandoning an American ally like
Taiwan could cause our other allies in the region to overreact, potentially sparking an arms
race. Japan and South Korea are two countries that could feel abandoned if the United States
were to withdraw from the region. There are obviously significant impacts to war, but there are
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Topic Analysis by Thadeus Smith Nov/Dec 2024
The second argument has to do with intelligence sharing. Part of military support is
intelligence, where we provide information to Taiwan in exchange for information from them.
Taiwan is situated extremely close to China, making it ideal for intelligence on Chinese troop
movements and internal politics. If we were to withdraw, that could be the end of our
intelligence sharing and mean that we are in the dark about China. That has impacts that
extend far beyond just the United States – We engage in a variety of intelligence treaties, such
as Five Eyes, meaning that if we lose intelligence, the rest of the world loses intelligence as well.
Hopefully this overview is helpful as you start your research! Make sure to read the rest
of the brief for some more insights and for starter evidence on these arguments (and so many
more) – We look forward to seeing y’all win tournaments in the near future!
Thadeus is a speech & debate teacher at the American Heritage School in Plantation, FL, where
he has coached state and national champions in multiple events. He holds an MA in Theory &
Practice of Human Rights from the University of Essex, where he competed internationally in
British Parliamentary Debate. He competed in a variety of events for Kingston High School in
Washington and placed tenth in World Schools Debate at NSDA Nationals in 2019.
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Champion Briefs
Nov/Dec 2024
Public Forum Brief
General
Information
General Information Nov/Dec 2024
General Information
Resolved: The United States should substantially reduce its military support of Taiwan.
Foreword: We at Champion Briefs feel that having deep knowledge about a topic is just as
valuable as formulating the right arguments. Having general background knowledge about the
topic area helps debaters form more coherent arguments from their breadth of knowledge. As
such, we have compiled general information on the key concepts and general areas that we feel
will best suit you for in- and out-of-round use. Any strong strategy or argument must be built
from a strong foundation of information; we hope that you will utilize this section to help build
that foundation.
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General Information Nov/Dec 2024
China is intensifying its military, economic, and diplomatic coercion of Taiwan, which it
considers a piece of lost territory that must be returned, by force if necessary. While a war
between China and the United States over Taiwan is neither imminent nor inevitable, rising
tensions raise important first-order questions that need to be addressed: Why does Taiwan
matter and why should Americans care about its fate? How would Chinese aggression against
Taiwan impact the United States? What, if anything, can and should be done to protect U.S.
interests?
While the United States is thousands of miles from Taiwan, the island’s fate will have major
implications for U.S. security and prosperity. What happens in the Taiwan Strait will also bear
on fundamental questions of international order and the future of democracy. Our recent
Council on Foreign Relations-sponsored Independent Task Force Report, U.S.-Taiwan Relations
in a New Era: Responding to a More Assertive China, explains that the United States has vital
strategic interests at stake in the Taiwan Strait and examines how the United States should
protect these interests.
Taiwan sits in an important position in the world’s most economically consequential region. As
Assistant Secretary of Defense Ely Ratner noted, “Taiwan is located at a critical node within the
first island chain, anchoring a network of U.S. allies and partners—stretching from the Japanese
archipelago down to the Philippines and into the South China Sea—that is critical to the
region’s security and critical to the defense of vital U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific.”.
Taiwan’s inherent military value cannot be wished away. Instead, its location dictates that its
fate will in large part determine the balance of power in the region. With Taiwan outside of its
control and U.S. allies and partners arrayed throughout the first island chain, China’s military
will struggle to project power far beyond China’s shores. However, if China were to annex
Taiwan and base military assets, such as underwater surveillance devices, submarines, and air
defense units on the island, it would be able to limit the U.S. military’s operations in the region
Champion Briefs 33
General Information Nov/Dec 2024
and, subsequently, its ability to defend its Asian allies. With Taiwan under China’s control, it
would be far more difficult for the United States to maintain a balance of power in the Indo-
Pacific or prevent a Chinese bid for regional dominance.
What happens in the Taiwan Strait will have enormous implications for the future of U.S.
alliances in the region, which constitute Washington’s most important asymmetric advantage
over Beijing. If the United States chose to stand aside in the face of Chinese aggression against
Taiwan and China successfully annexed the island, it would be only seventy miles from Japanese
territory and 120 miles from the Philippines. U.S. allies would come to question whether the
United States would or even could come to their defense. Having lost confidence in the U.S.
commitment to their security, allies would contemplate either accommodating China or
hedging against it by growing their militaries or even developing nuclear weapons. Either
outcome would result in diminished U.S. influence and increased regional and global instability.
Champion Briefs 34
General Information Nov/Dec 2024
The word "should" signals a call to action, indicating that this resolution is about whether the
U.S. is obligated or justified in reducing its military support for Taiwan. It implies that there is an
option or responsibility to change the current course of action, which will be debated.
Champion Briefs 35
General Information Nov/Dec 2024
"Substantially" indicates that the reduction in military support would be significant or large in
scale. It’s important to define what “substantial” means within the context of the debate. Does
it refer to cutting arms sales, reducing troop deployments, or scaling back military training
programs? Clarifying what constitutes a "substantial" reduction will be key for debaters to
argue their points.
The word "reduce" means to lessen or decrease. In this case, it refers to lowering the level of
U.S. military support provided to Taiwan. The nature of the reduction could vary—it could
mean fewer weapons sales, a decrease in military presence, or reduced involvement in defense
strategies. Debaters must establish how this reduction might be implemented and what the
consequences of such a reduction would be.
Champion Briefs 36
General Information Nov/Dec 2024
Military support refers to the assistance that one country provides another in terms of defense
and security. In the case of Taiwan, U.S. military support includes arms sales, intelligence
sharing, military training, joint exercises, and defense-related diplomatic backing. The U.S. has
long provided Taiwan with defensive weapons and support to help it deter aggression,
particularly from China. This support is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), which
mandates that the U.S. supply Taiwan with arms to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
Champion Briefs 37
General Information Nov/Dec 2024
Why is Taiwan significant and what historical context is important for this resolution?.
The history of U.S. military support for Taiwan is rooted in the post-World War II and Cold War
periods. After World War II, Taiwan, then known as Formosa, was placed under the governance
of the Republic of China (ROC), led by Chiang Kai-shek. However, in 1949, the Chinese Civil War
resulted in the victory of the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong, forcing the ROC
government to retreat to Taiwan. Mainland China became the People's Republic of China (PRC),
while Taiwan remained under the control of the ROC.
For decades, the U.S. recognized the ROC as the legitimate government of China and provided
support to Taiwan as a key ally in East Asia, countering the spread of communism. However, in
1979, the U.S. formally recognized the PRC and established diplomatic relations with Beijing,
shifting its stance on Taiwan. Despite this, the U.S. passed the Taiwan Relations Act that same
year, ensuring continued military support for Taiwan's self-defense.
Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. committed to selling defensive arms to Taiwan and
helping the island maintain the ability to defend itself, without directly committing to military
intervention in the event of a conflict with China. The Act has been pivotal in maintaining peace
and stability in the Taiwan Strait by serving as a deterrent to Chinese aggression while
maintaining a balance that avoids provoking direct conflict.
China considers Taiwan a breakaway province and has made it clear that it seeks reunification,
by force if necessary. The "One China" policy, which is supported by the PRC, asserts that there
is only one China, and Taiwan is part of it. Beijing has long opposed any form of U.S. military
involvement with Taiwan, viewing it as interference in its internal affairs.
The U.S. military has played a crucial role in Taiwan's security through the sale of advanced
weapons systems, military training, and regular joint military exercises. These efforts help
Taiwan build its defense capabilities, but they also serve as a signal to China that any aggression
Champion Briefs 38
General Information Nov/Dec 2024
against Taiwan would have serious consequences. The U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region,
with its allies like Japan and South Korea, further bolsters Taiwan's security position.
In recent years, tensions between the U.S. and China have increased, particularly over Taiwan.
The Trump and Biden administrations have both increased arms sales to Taiwan, including
advanced missile systems, fighter jets, and other military equipment. At the same time, China
has increased its military activities in the Taiwan Strait, sending aircraft into Taiwan’s air
defense zone and conducting naval exercises. The ongoing tensions between the U.S. and
China, combined with Taiwan’s role as a leading manufacturer of semiconductors, have made
this issue even more critical. A significant reduction in U.S. military support for Taiwan could
shift the balance of power in the region, embolden China, and raise questions about the U.S.'s
commitments to its allies and global stability.
Champion Briefs 39
General Information Nov/Dec 2024
Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China (ROC), is an island separated from China by
the Taiwan Strait. It has been governed independently from mainland China, officially the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), since 1949. The PRC views the island as a renegade province
and vows to eventually “unify” Taiwan with the mainland. In Taiwan, which has its own
democratically elected government and is home to twenty-three million people, political
leaders have differing views on the island’s status and relations with the mainland.
Cross-strait tensions have escalated since the election of former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-
wen in 2016. Tsai refused to accept a formula that her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, endorsed to
allow for increased cross-strait ties. Meanwhile, Beijing has taken increasingly aggressive
actions, which includes flying fighter jets near the island. Some analysts fear a Chinese attack on
Taiwan has the potential to draw the United States into a war with China.
Beijing asserts that there is only “one China” and that Taiwan is part of it. It views the PRC as
the only legitimate government of China, an approach it calls the One China principle, and seeks
Taiwan’s eventual “unification” with the mainland.
Beijing claims that Taiwan is bound by an understanding known as the 1992 Consensus, which
was reached between representatives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the
Kuomintang (KMT) party that then ruled Taiwan. However, the two sides don’t agree on the
content of this so-called consensus, and it was never intended to address the question of
Taiwan’s legal status. For the PRC, as Chinese President Xi Jinping has stated, the 1992
Consensus reflects an agreement that “the two sides of the strait belong to one China and
would work together to seek national reunification.” For the KMT, it means “one China,
different interpretations,” with the ROC standing as the “one China.”
Taiwan’s KMT-drafted constitution continues to recognize China, Mongolia, Taiwan, Tibet, and
the South China Sea as part of the ROC. The KMT does not support Taiwan’s independence and
has consistently called for closer ties with Beijing.
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General Information Nov/Dec 2024
The KMT’s chief rival party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has never endorsed the
understanding laid out in the 1992 Consensus. Former President Tsai refused to explicitly
accept the consensus. Instead, she has attempted to find another formulation that would be
acceptable to Beijing. In Tsai’s 2016 inaugural address, she noted she was “elected president in
accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of China,” which is a One China document,
and said she would “safeguard the sovereignty and territory of the Republic of China.”
However, Beijing rejected this formulation and cut off official contacts with Taiwan. Tsai’s
successor, current DPP leader and Taiwanese Vice President Lai Ching-te, called for reopening
dialogue with China to “replace confrontation” during his 2024 presidential election victory
speech and pledged to maintain the “cross-strait status quo,” aligned with his party. But
experts are skeptical that China will be willing to engage in cross-strait dialogue.
Champion Briefs 41
General Information Nov/Dec 2024
Works Cited.
Champion Briefs 42
Champion Briefs
Nov/Dec 2024
Public Forum Brief
Pro Arguments
Pro Arguments Nov/Dec 2024
Sobczak, Aaron. “Fewer Americans Willing To Fight And Die For Other Countries.”
Responsible Statecraft, August 21, 2024, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/america-
polling-interventionism/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
A July poll shows that a majority of the American public does not support sending U.S.
troops to defend Taiwan or Ukraine, sentiment that lines up with findings from other
recent surveys on these heated subjects, which suggests that Americans appear to be
warming to restraint and non-interventionism in international affairs. Indeed, another
poll, conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in February found that a majority
of Americans (56%) do not believe that the United States should pick a side in Israel’s war
on Gaza. And a more recent survey from Council this month found that just four in ten
support the United States sending troops to defend Israel if attacked by its neighbors.
Warrant: More Americans want to avoid war with China than support Taiwan’s autonomy.
Sobczak, Aaron. “Fewer Americans Willing To Fight And Die For Other Countries.”
Responsible Statecraft, August 21, 2024, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/america-
polling-interventionism/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
The Defense Priorities poll also found that just 22% of those surveyed support the United
States defending Ukraine. Forty-six percent opposed while 32% were neutral. Thirty
percent said they support America militarily defending Taiwan against China, while 37%
Champion Briefs 44
Pro Arguments Nov/Dec 2024
opposed and 33% were neutral. Additionally, a plurality of Americans surveyed, 44%,
agreed that avoiding war with China is more important than Taiwan’s autonomy.
“Decline in US Public Support for Defense of Taiwan.” Politics Today, November 15, 2023,
https://politicstoday.org/decline-in-us-public-support-for-defense-of-taiwan/.
Accessed October 10, 2024.
With President Biden at the helm, the United States has seen a shift in public opinion
regarding foreign military support, especially concerning Taiwan. Biden has affirmed
defense support for Taiwan on multiple occasions, a stance seemingly at odds with recent
trends in American public opinion. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs has conducted
polls that reveal a decline in support for the use of troops to defend Taiwan, from 52%
in 2021 to a lower 44% in 2022, and further down to 38% in a 2023 Reuters poll.
It helps meet regulations and requirements. Many programs, laws and rules require some
level of public participation. It adheres to democratic principles. U.S. culture and society
embrace the notion that people have the right to influence what affects them. Paying
attention to the public's ideas, values and issues results in more responsive and
democratic governance. It can create more substantive decisions and outcomes. Better
results occur when decision-makers have access to: More information. Public
involvement brings more information to the decision, including scientific or technical
knowledge, knowledge about the context where decisions are implemented, institutions
Champion Briefs 45
Pro Arguments Nov/Dec 2024
involved, history and personalities. More information can make the difference between a
good and poor decision.
Loomis, James. “Would the American Public Really Defend Taiwan?” Stimson Center,
January 19, 2021, https://www.stimson.org/2021/would-the-american-public-
really-defend-taiwan/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Any sustained military action taken to defend Taiwan will require the domestic support
of the American public. The doctrine of “strategic ambiguity” and absence of a legally
binding security guarantee effectively makes strong domestic support the de facto
backbone upholding the credibility of America’s defense of Taiwan. This support is
critical both to preventing and winning war. China knows that an attack on Japan is
tantamount to an attack on the U.S. by virtue of America’s security guarantee; this formal
treaty is thus a fixed and immovable pillar of our deterrent credibility. The lack of such a
firm defense commitment to Taiwan conversely makes our deterrent posture more fluid
than fixed, susceptible to the ebbs and flows of domestic political considerations and
shifting public support. Whichever American President is misfortunate enough to
govern during a Chinese invasion of Taiwan will have little formal basis upon which
justify American military intervention; instead, he or she will have to rely on the
public’s willingness to commit troops and expend resources over an unknown period of
time.
Explanation: This argument states that the American public opposes military aid to Taiwan.
Teams could focus on the specific opposition to existing aid or the fact that Americans might
oppose an actual military intervention, which we could be obligated to do if China were to
invade. For impacts and weighing, teams could describe the various benefits of listening to
public opinion or look at politics, as it is possible that reducing support for Taiwan could have
external impacts on Biden’s political capital.
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Pro Arguments Nov/Dec 2024
Argument: Military support of Taiwan risks escalation in the South China Sea.
China has launched major military drills around Taiwan, simulating a full-scale attack on
the island - just days after the new president William Lai was sworn in. The exercises
reinforce what is at the heart of the issue: China's claim over self-governed Taiwan.
Beijing sees the island as a breakaway province that will, eventually, be part of the
country, and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve this. But many Taiwanese
consider themselves to be part of a separate nation - although most are in favour of
maintaining the status quo where Taiwan neither declares independence from China nor
unites with it.
Pao, Jeff. “Chinese warn of Taiwan crisis from US military aid.” Asia Times, April 23, 2024,
https://asiatimes.com/2024/04/chinese-warn-of-taiwan-crisis-from-us-military-
aid/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
“The US insists on passing and signing a bill containing negative content related to
Taiwan, seriously interfering in China’s internal affairs and seriously violating the one-
China principle and the provisions of the three Sino-US joint communiques,” Chen
Binhua, spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, said Monday. “We
express strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition to this.” Chen also said the
Champion Briefs 47
Pro Arguments Nov/Dec 2024
Democratic Progressive Party, the ruling party in Taiwan, is trying to rely on the US and
use force to seek independence but such an attempt is doomed to failure. “By providing
military aid to Taiwan, the US is trying to stir up a crisis and confrontation in the Taiwan
Strait and related region,” Li Haidong, a professor at the Institute of International
Relations of China Foreign Affairs University, told the Global Times in an interview. “The
US will then use the chaos and conflicts it creates to make countries in East Asia and
Western Pacific regions lean to its side and form an alliance.”.
As the United States intensifies its efforts to support Taiwan, it risks further damaging
the relationship with China and hamstringing its ability to advance U.S. interests on a
wide range of other issues from arms control to climate change. There is also the danger
that an increased U.S. military presence in Taiwan could trigger Chinese responses in
the form of increased economic warfare and military exercises that would create
additional headaches and costs for Taiwan. Combined with Speaker McCarthy’s expected
visit to Taiwan in the spring, these moves may lead to another unnecessary
confrontation. Insofar as they are perceived as further eroding U.S. commitments to a
One China policy, these actions could make the overall situation less stable rather than
more.
Impact: Preventing a Chinese invasion is crucial because it could spillover into other Southeast
Asian countries.
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Pro Arguments Nov/Dec 2024
Bing, Ngeow Chow. “How Southeast Asia Might React in a Potential Military Conflict Over
Taiwan.” Carnegie Endowment, June 17, 2024,
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/06/how-southeast-asia-might-
react-in-a-potential-military-conflict-over-taiwan?lang=en¢er=china. Accessed
October 10, 2024.
These Southeast Asian claimant states may also fear that if they do not join the fight
against China, and China later prevails over the United States and Taiwan, they would
be the next victims of Chinese hegemony. As Asian security expert Drew Thompson
argues, “it would be disingenuous and delusional for those states to ignore the
precedent set by a cross-Strait conflict initiated by Beijing since they would eventually
also be subject to Chinese military coercion over their own disputes.” Based on this
logic, it could be better for claimant states to seize the opportunity afforded by a
Taiwan conflict to push back against China in the South China Sea once and for all, and
seek to ensure that the U.S.-led coalition prevailed over China. This argument might be
met with a warm reception in the Philippines, but would be considered a risky strategy in
the rest of Southeast Asia.
Nan, Hao. “US-China tensions risk igniting nuclear arms race in East Asia.” South China
Morning Post, September 19, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-
opinion/article/3278834/us-china-tensions-risk-igniting-nuclear-arms-race-east-
asia. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Amid a deterioration in US-China relations, the risks of a nuclear arms race in East Asia
are growing alarmingly. The recent US-China diplomatic battles over nuclear arms
control are a continuation of earlier unsuccessful attempts at dialogue. Both countries
have attempted to resume the long-stalled nuclear arms control talks. On November 6,
Champion Briefs 49
Pro Arguments Nov/Dec 2024
the first official nuclear arms control dialogue since 2018 was convened in the lead-up to
Biden’s talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping on November 15, 2023, on the sidelines of
the Apec summit. However, these talks produced no concrete results, and no specific
date for follow-up discussions was announced. Semi-official channels were also explored,
such as a track two nuclear arms dialogue in March – the first since 2019. The trajectory
of nuclear developments in East Asia, driven by US-China rivalry, threatens to
destabilise the region and spark a chain reaction of nuclear deterrence efforts. It is
imperative for global security that the US and China resume meaningful arms control
dialogue to prevent a cascading series of escalatory measures that could have
catastrophic consequences.
Explanation: This argument is very straightforward, arguing that the presence of American
support in Taiwan could cause unnecessary escalation with China. Teams should consider
describing the ideological reasons China is opposed to American involvement, especially the
fact that China views Taiwan as essentially a territory. Teams should also emphasize the
likelihood of other countries intervening in the conflict.
Champion Briefs 50
Pro Arguments Nov/Dec 2024
China has launched major military drills around Taiwan, simulating a full-scale attack on
the island - just days after the new president William Lai was sworn in. The exercises
reinforce what is at the heart of the issue: China's claim over self-governed Taiwan.
Beijing sees the island as a breakaway province that will, eventually, be part of the
country, and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve this. But many Taiwanese
consider themselves to be part of a separate nation - although most are in favour of
maintaining the status quo where Taiwan neither declares independence from China nor
unites with it.
Pao, Jeff. “Chinese warn of Taiwan crisis from US military aid.” Asia Times, April 23, 2024,
https://asiatimes.com/2024/04/chinese-warn-of-taiwan-crisis-from-us-military-
aid/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
“The US insists on passing and signing a bill containing negative content related to
Taiwan, seriously interfering in China’s internal affairs and seriously violating the one-
China principle and the provisions of the three Sino-US joint communiques,” Chen
Binhua, spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, said Monday. “We
express strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition to this.” Chen also said the
Champion Briefs 51
Pro Arguments Nov/Dec 2024
Democratic Progressive Party, the ruling party in Taiwan, is trying to rely on the US and
use force to seek independence but such an attempt is doomed to failure. “By providing
military aid to Taiwan, the US is trying to stir up a crisis and confrontation in the Taiwan
Strait and related region,” Li Haidong, a professor at the Institute of International
Relations of China Foreign Affairs University, told the Global Times in an interview. “The
US will then use the chaos and conflicts it creates to make countries in East Asia and
Western Pacific regions lean to its side and form an alliance.”.
China is building its military and nuclear arsenal on a scale not seen since World War II
and all signs suggest it’s sticking to ambitions to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, a
top US admiral testified. Despite Beijing’s economic challenges, its official defense budget
has increased by 16% over recent years to more than $223 billion, Admiral John Aquilino,
the leader of the Indo-Pacific Command, told the US House Armed Services Committee in
prepared testimony on Wednesday. In the three years since he took command, he said
the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, has added more than 400 fighter aircraft, along
with more than 20 major warships. It’s also doubled its inventory of ballistic and cruise
missiles since 2020, he said.
Impact: An invasion of Taiwan could involve preemptive strikes on American bases outside of
China’s sphere of influence.
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Pro Arguments Nov/Dec 2024
“Will China Invade Taiwan? A Potential Timeline for Conflict.” Global Guardian, February
8, 2024, https://www.globalguardian.com/global-digest/will-china-invade-taiwan.
Accessed October 10, 2024.
Tan, Huileng. “The world’s top chipmakers can flip a ‘kill switch’ should China invade
Taiwan, Bloomberg reports.” Business Insider,
https://www.businessinsider.com/asml-tsmc-semiconductor-chip-equipment-kill-
switch-china-invade-taiwan-2024-5. Accessed October 10, 2024.
The news of a forced shutdown, or a "kill switch," on ASML's chipmaking gear comes
amid intensifying rivalry between Washington and Beijing and mounting concerns over
a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its own territory. Taiwan
is the world's epicenter for semiconductor chips, the ubiquitous parts that are used in
products from data centers to smartphones. A war in the region would have major
consequences for the global economy. The US, citing national security concerns, imposed
restrictions on China under the Advanced Computing Chips Rule in November. The
restrictions make it harder for the East Asian giant to import advanced AI chips from
American manufacturers. The US has also pressured the Netherlands to block some ASML
Champion Briefs 53
Pro Arguments Nov/Dec 2024
exports to China to limit the country's ability to manufacture advanced chips. The Dutch
company has also said it will stop servicing some equipment previously exported to
China. But US concerns over a Chinese invasion of Taiwan remain, and Washington has
expressed them to Dutch and Taiwanese officials, Bloomberg reported. ASML assured
Dutch officials about the option to push the "kill switch" when they met with the
company, per the media outlet.
Explanation: This argument contains a similar link chain to other AFF arguments, stating that
the presence of American aid could escalate conflict with China. This argument focuses on a
unique impact scenario which states that a ground invasion of Taiwan would be devastating for
the country. While teams could focus on lives impacts, discussing the economic ramifications of
losing access to semiconductors may make for easier weighing.
Champion Briefs 54
Pro Arguments Nov/Dec 2024
China has launched major military drills around Taiwan, simulating a full-scale attack on
the island - just days after the new president William Lai was sworn in. The exercises
reinforce what is at the heart of the issue: China's claim over self-governed Taiwan.
Beijing sees the island as a breakaway province that will, eventually, be part of the
country, and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve this. But many Taiwanese
consider themselves to be part of a separate nation - although most are in favour of
maintaining the status quo where Taiwan neither declares independence from China nor
unites with it.
Warrant: Taiwan’s personal military readiness is not great in the status quo.
Campbell, Caitlin. “Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues.” Congressional Research Service,
August 15, 2024, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12481.
Accessed October 10, 2024.
Taiwan also faces defense challenges at home. Civil-military relations are strained for
historical, political, and bureaucratic reasons. The archipelago’s energy, food, water,
internet, and other critical infrastructure systems are vulnerable to external disruption.
According to some observers, Taiwan’s civil defense preparedness is insufficient, and its
military struggles to recruit, retain, and train personnel. At a societal level, it is not clear
Champion Briefs 55
Pro Arguments Nov/Dec 2024
what costs—in terms of economic security, physical safety and security, and lives—
Taiwan’s people would be willing or able to bear in the face of PRC armed aggression.
Warrant: Taiwan is overly reliant on the US and does not take its own defense seriously.
Fukuyama, Francis and Shuren Koo. “Fukuyama: Taiwan doesn’t take its self-defense
seriously enough.” Commonwealth Magazine, January 12, 2022,
https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=3159. Accessed October 10,
2024.
There's a really important point I would like to get across to your Taiwanese readers. I've
been following Taiwanese defense policy for twenty years. I've had graduate students
write dissertations about it. And I do not believe Taiwan has taken its own self-defense
seriously enough. They have under-invested, and in the wrong kinds of weapons
systems. Too often there is a desire to buy the most sophisticated kinds of fighters,
rather than military equipment that will actually be useful. The biggest mistake Taiwan
has made was to abolish the draft.
Warrant: Absent US interaction, Taiwan becomes more self-sufficient than the status quo.
These voices all miss the root of the problem: the lack of U.S. political commitment to
Taiwan’s security and survival. Until that issue is resolved, Taipei will always concentrate
on the question of whether the United States will show up to a fight, rather than how
they can best fight together. Taiwan faces a difficult operational and political tradeoff
Champion Briefs 56
Pro Arguments Nov/Dec 2024
Impact: Preventing a Chinese invasion is crucial because it could spillover into other Southeast
Asian countries.
Bing, Ngeow Chow. “How Southeast Asia Might React in a Potential Military Conflict Over
Taiwan.” Carnegie Endowment, June 17, 2024,
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/06/how-southeast-asia-might-
react-in-a-potential-military-conflict-over-taiwan?lang=en¢er=china. Accessed
October 10, 2024.
These Southeast Asian claimant states may also fear that if they do not join the fight
against China, and China later prevails over the United States and Taiwan, they would
be the next victims of Chinese hegemony. As Asian security expert Drew Thompson
argues, “it would be disingenuous and delusional for those states to ignore the
precedent set by a cross-Strait conflict initiated by Beijing since they would eventually
also be subject to Chinese military coercion over their own disputes.” Based on this
logic, it could be better for claimant states to seize the opportunity afforded by a
Taiwan conflict to push back against China in the South China Sea once and for all, and
seek to ensure that the U.S.-led coalition prevailed over China. This argument might be
met with a warm reception in the Philippines, but would be considered a risky strategy in
the rest of Southeast Asia.
Impact: That’s important because China could be willing to use nuclear weapons in Taiwan.
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Anderson, James. “The Next Taiwan Crisis Will (Almost) Certainly Involve Nuclear
Threats.” U.S. Naval Institute, March 2024,
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/march/next-taiwan-crisis-will-
almost-certainly-involve-nuclear-threats. Accessed October 10, 2024.
China’s NFU policy is one reason nuclear threats in Taiwan invasion scenarios have not
received adequate scrutiny. For decades, China has declared it will never be the first to
use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. It would be a mistake, however, to take
China’s NFU policy at face value. For starters, predicting China’s behavior in crisis
situations is far from an exact science. As Center for a New American Security analyst
Jacob Stokes argues, “Decisions with such grand strategic importance are likely to be
informed by the worldview of China’s leadership—especially Xi [Jinping] himself for the
foreseeable future—in ways that supersede official doctrine or other strategic analysis
written by military bureaucracies or analysts.”4 At the very least, a Chinese invasion of
Taiwan would provide a major stress test of its NFU policy if the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) struggled to subdue the island with conventional force. Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) leaders might even consider failure an existential threat. As defense analyst
Mike Sweeney at Defense Priorities put it: Any battle over Taiwan will not just be a
question of territorial aggression but a fight over the core conception of modern
China’s soul. And for the leaders who launch such an endeavor, their political futures
will hinge on the outcome, as will, possibly, their physical safety and that of their
families in the event of failure. Under such circumstances, nuclear use might not be
palatable, but it could seem far more plausible if military defeat were to equate to loss
of domestic power and possible death anyway.
Explanation: This argument focuses on the current inability of Taiwan to support itself. Teams
should make sure to emphasize that removing US aid spurs Taiwan to further develop its own
defense industry. Teams should be prepared to provide reasons why the US would defend
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Taiwan regardless of providing aid or provide reasons why China would not invade Taiwan,
which could be practical or ideological.
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Pro Arguments Nov/Dec 2024
China has launched major military drills around Taiwan, simulating a full-scale attack on
the island - just days after the new president William Lai was sworn in. The exercises
reinforce what is at the heart of the issue: China's claim over self-governed Taiwan.
Beijing sees the island as a breakaway province that will, eventually, be part of the
country, and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve this. But many Taiwanese
consider themselves to be part of a separate nation - although most are in favour of
maintaining the status quo where Taiwan neither declares independence from China nor
unites with it.
Pao, Jeff. “Chinese warn of Taiwan crisis from US military aid.” Asia Times, April 23, 2024,
https://asiatimes.com/2024/04/chinese-warn-of-taiwan-crisis-from-us-military-
aid/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
“The US insists on passing and signing a bill containing negative content related to
Taiwan, seriously interfering in China’s internal affairs and seriously violating the one-
China principle and the provisions of the three Sino-US joint communiques,” Chen
Binhua, spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, said Monday. “We
express strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition to this.” Chen also said the
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Democratic Progressive Party, the ruling party in Taiwan, is trying to rely on the US and
use force to seek independence but such an attempt is doomed to failure. “By providing
military aid to Taiwan, the US is trying to stir up a crisis and confrontation in the Taiwan
Strait and related region,” Li Haidong, a professor at the Institute of International
Relations of China Foreign Affairs University, told the Global Times in an interview. “The
US will then use the chaos and conflicts it creates to make countries in East Asia and
Western Pacific regions lean to its side and form an alliance.”.
As the United States intensifies its efforts to support Taiwan, it risks further damaging
the relationship with China and hamstringing its ability to advance U.S. interests on a
wide range of other issues from arms control to climate change. There is also the danger
that an increased U.S. military presence in Taiwan could trigger Chinese responses in
the form of increased economic warfare and military exercises that would create
additional headaches and costs for Taiwan. Combined with Speaker McCarthy’s expected
visit to Taiwan in the spring, these moves may lead to another unnecessary
confrontation. Insofar as they are perceived as further eroding U.S. commitments to a
One China policy, these actions could make the overall situation less stable rather than
more.
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Anderson, James. “The Next Taiwan Crisis Will (Almost) Certainly Involve Nuclear
Threats.” U.S. Naval Institute, March 2024,
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/march/next-taiwan-crisis-will-
almost-certainly-involve-nuclear-threats. Accessed October 10, 2024.
China’s NFU policy is one reason nuclear threats in Taiwan invasion scenarios have not
received adequate scrutiny. For decades, China has declared it will never be the first to
use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. It would be a mistake, however, to take
China’s NFU policy at face value. For starters, predicting China’s behavior in crisis
situations is far from an exact science. As Center for a New American Security analyst
Jacob Stokes argues, “Decisions with such grand strategic importance are likely to be
informed by the worldview of China’s leadership—especially Xi [Jinping] himself for the
foreseeable future—in ways that supersede official doctrine or other strategic analysis
written by military bureaucracies or analysts.”4 At the very least, a Chinese invasion of
Taiwan would provide a major stress test of its NFU policy if the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) struggled to subdue the island with conventional force. Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) leaders might even consider failure an existential threat. As defense analyst
Mike Sweeney at Defense Priorities put it: Any battle over Taiwan will not just be a
question of territorial aggression but a fight over the core conception of modern
China’s soul. And for the leaders who launch such an endeavor, their political futures
will hinge on the outcome, as will, possibly, their physical safety and that of their
families in the event of failure. Under such circumstances, nuclear use might not be
palatable, but it could seem far more plausible if military defeat were to equate to loss
of domestic power and possible death anyway.
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Diaz-Maurin, Francois. “Nowhere to Hide.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 20,
2022, https://thebulletin.org/2022/10/nowhere-to-hide-how-a-nuclear-war-would-
kill-you-and-almost-everyone-else/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Explanation: This argument contains a similar link chain to other AFF arguments, stating that
the presence of American aid could escalate conflict with China. This argument focuses on a
unique impact scenario which states that any conflict with China would go nuclear. Teams
should emphasize the possibility of a nuclear arms race.
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Warrant: The US’s stance in Taiwan is causing China to develop stronger deterrent forces.
“DOD Releases 2023 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the
People's Republic of China” DOD, October 19, 2023
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3561549/. Accessed
October 10, 2024.
The PRC views a “strong strategic deterrent force system” as a set of advanced military
capabilities across various domains to maintain national security and play a strategic
deterrent role. Building this system consists of two parts: the development of traditional
nuclear deterrent force building and the construction of conventional strategic deterrent
forces in emerging fields and technologies. The PRC’s pursuit of a “strong strategic
deterrent force system” is probably driven by threat perceptions of the United States
and by specific concerns over Taiwan. Strategic deterrence is a core component of the
PRC’s objectives of securing its status as a great power, achieving “the great
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and developing a world class military by 2049.
Warrant: US actions are being viewed as interference that is harming strategic stability.
“DOD Releases 2023 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the
People's Republic of China” DOD, October 19, 2023
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3561549/. Accessed
October 10, 2024.
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O’Hanlon, Michael, et. al. “Should the United States change its policies toward Taiwan?”
The Brookings Institution, April 16, 2024,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/should-the-united-states-change-its-policies-
toward-taiwan/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
This political ambiguity has allowed a stable status quo in the Taiwan Strait—one of no
unification, no independence, and no use of force—and enabled Taiwan to exercise
considerable autonomy from Beijing despite Taipei having very few formal diplomatic
allies. It has been one of the most successfully durable and flexible U.S. foreign policies
in the modern era and it is still the best hope to forestall global catastrophe arising
from a conflict over Taiwan. U.S. de facto neutrality on the settlement of Taiwan’s
sovereignty has accomplished two things: first, it leaves open the door for the
sovereignty issue to be resolved in either side’s favor, therefore allowing all capitals to
kick the can down the road until circumstances most favor their preferred resolution;
second and relatedly, it keeps Taiwan’s status in the realm of a political, rather than a
military, dispute.
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Warrant: Focusing on a military solution doesn’t lower the preference for aggression.
Clark, Brian. “U.S. Deterrence Against China Is Not Working” foreignpolicy, September 5,
2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/05/us-military-china-deterrence-
taiwan-defense-war-east-asia-indo-pacific-strategy/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Luetkemeyer, Blaine. “Blaine's Bulletin: China's War On Taiwan And Our Economy”
luetkemeyer, April 12, 2024,
https://luetkemeyer.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=401079
. Accessed October 10, 2024.
An analysis from global financial firm GTS has estimated a short-term stock market
plummet of up to 34% after an invasion, as uncertainty about the U.S. response may lead
institutional investors and retail investors to quickly exit their equity positions while
market makers struggle to accurately price stocks in this volatile environment. The long-
term effects would be much greater. Bloomberg speculates that a military engagement
over Taiwan would cost roughly $10 trillion and reduce global GDP by 10%. This drop
would be almost twice what was observed in the aftermath of the global financial crisis
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and Covid pandemic, events which triggered peak to trough declines of 57% and 35% in
the S&P 500.
Anderson, James. “The Next Taiwan Crisis Will (Almost) Certainly Involve Nuclear
Threats” U.S Navel Institute, March 2024,
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/march/next-taiwan-crisis-
will-almost-certainly-involve-nuclear-threats. Accessed October 10, 2024.
China knows that Japan is the most important U.S. ally when it comes to Taiwan, because
Washington depends on Japan for military basing and diplomatic support. It should come
as no surprise that Chinese officials already have sanctioned a crude nuclear threat
against Tokyo. In July 2021, a video surfaced on a CCP-approved channel linked to the
PLA that declared, “We are warning Japan and informing the world that if Japan
interferes militarily in our domestic affairs—including the unification of Taiwan with
the mainland—nuclear weapons will surely be used against them.”.
Explanation: This argument can be used to show that because China already views the
supporting actions by the US as a preference for Taiwanese independence, military support
increases chances of a violent conflict.
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“Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait” International Crisis Group, October 27, 2023,
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/taiwan-strait-china/333-
preventing-war-taiwan-strait. Accessed October 10, 2024.
As with previous rounds of tensions, the current escalatory dynamic regarding the
Taiwan issue has emerged due to heightened anxieties among all the parties that one
of the others is no longer committed to the status quo. Unlike in earlier periods,
however, the parties are more intransigent and repair work is more difficult: China has
become stronger, Taiwanese sentiment continues to disassociate from the mainland and
Washington increasingly sees Beijing as a strategic rival. The result is lower trust
between Taiwan and China as well as between the U.S. and China.
Wonacott, Peter. “Costly Conflict: Here’s How China’s Military Options for Taiwan
Backfire” United States Institute of Peace, October 9, 2024,
https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/10/costly-conflict-heres-how-chinas-
military-options-taiwan-backfire. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Given the costs of conflict, there might be an opportunity for both sides to explore a
path to peaceful unification. How that might look in practice would need to be worked
out between China and Taiwan — and likely the U.S. In the wake of Putin’s grab for
Ukraine, and a bipartisan consensus in Washington on tough positions toward Beijing,
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such an outcome is difficult to envision. But given the risks of missteps, says Triolo at
Albright Stonebridge Group, it’s worth considering how all sides can reduce tensions,
such as scaling back the militarization of the Taiwan Strait. “That’s what needs to
happen,” says Triolo. “Otherwise, all roads lead to conflict.”.
Warrant: China claims they will increase aggression if the US continues support.
“US ties with Taiwan region harm China-US military relations: Defense Spokesperson”
China Military, October 28, 2021,
http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/10103136.html.
Accessed October 10, 2024.
"We have expressed serious concern and lodged solemn representations to the US
side, urging the US side to make clarifications to China," said Senior Colonel Tan Kefei,
a spokesperson for China's Ministry of National Defense. Tan mentioned that, for some
time, some Americans have violated the political commitment of the one-China
principle, constantly played the "Taiwan card", and sent extremely wrong signals to the
"Taiwan independence" secessionist forces,which has resulted in a seriously negative
impact on the relations between the two countries and two militaries, as well as the
peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. "If the US continues to stubbornly hold to
the illusion of making an issue out of Taiwan so as to contain China, and attempts to
substantially improve the military ties between the US and Taiwan region in the
"salami-slicing" approach, China will resolutely take countermeasures and fight back,"
Tan said.
Warrant: China views the arming of Taiwan as a opposing the One China solution.
Yadav, Navdeep. “Xi Jinping Tells Joe Biden To 'Stop Arming Taiwan' In 'Blunt' Talks:
'Reunification…Is Unstoppable'” Benzinga, November 15, 2023,
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https://www.benzinga.com/23/11/35819743/xi-jinping-tells-joe-biden-to-stop-
arming-taiwan-in-blunt-talks-reunification-is-unstoppable. Accessed October 10,
2024.
Xi appealed to the U.S. to cease arming Taiwan and endorse China’s peaceful
reunification, according to a statement from China’s foreign ministry. Xi also
underscored that the reunification of Taiwan with China is “inevitable.” “The US side
should … stop arming Taiwan, and support China’s peaceful reunification. China will
[realize] reunification, and this is unstoppable,” Xi told Biden. The two leaders agreed
to reinstate military communications “on the foundation of equality and respect,”
Chinese state media reported.
Impact: The steady increase of military support escalates the entire region.
Swaine, Michael and Park, James. “Paths to Crisis and Conflict Over Taiwan” Quincy
Institute, January 11, 2024, https://quincyinst.org/research/paths-to-crisis-and-
conflict-over-taiwan/#introduction. Accessed October 10, 2024.
This brief examines the many trends and variables behind these three sets of factors, and
in doing so shows that they would likely play an even more decisive role in a future Sino–
American conflict over Taiwan than any calculations regarding relative levels of military
capability and expressions of resolve. Indeed, a myopic focus on increasing levels of
military deterrence that ignores or downplays these factors is likely to increase the
possibility of a severe, escalating crisis. Some observers might argue that the U.S.
government fully appreciates the dangers listed above and is pursuing moderate policies
that effectively balance deterrence with credible levels of reassurance to maintain
stability across the Taiwan Strait. But, as shown below, this is clearly not the case. Many
factors operating in China, the United States, and Taiwan are greatly undermining such
stability, drawing us closer to a future crisis. The first section briefly describes the
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features and trends of the current Taiwan situation that are making it increasingly
susceptible to a future crisis, to the escalation of any such crisis to a military conflict,
and to the difficulty confronting de–escalation and crisis termination. The second
section lays out several possible pathways to a severe Taiwan crisis and an escalating
conflict, presented largely as a series of misperceptions, miscalculations, and deliberate
and unintentional actions flowing from the preceding features and trends. The
conclusion offers an overall assessment of the implications of the preceding analysis and
policy recommendations.
Shepherd, Christian and Chiang, Vic. “China begins military drills around Taiwan as
‘punishment’ for new president” Washington Post, May 23, 2024,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/05/22/china-taiwan-military-
drills-new-president/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
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Explanation: This argument can be used to show how increasing military support is in
opposition to peaceful alternatives, and causes a breakdown of communication and increased
escalation.
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Argument: Military support for Taiwan may cause them to overstep boundaries.
Carpenter, Ted. “Taiwan Could Overreach and Cause Disaster for Itself and America” Cato
Institute, February 26, 2019, https://www.cato.org/commentary/taiwan-could-
overreach-cause-disaster-itself-america#. Accessed October 10, 2024.
It is increasingly uncertain, though, how long that delicate fiction can continue. Until
now, worries have focused on Beijing’s possible actions towards Taiwan. Now a new
worry has arisen—that hardline, pro-independence militants on Taiwan may create a
political and military crisis. That fear is well-founded, because those factions are
pushing for a referendum on Taiwan officially becoming an independent country. It is
hard to imagine any Chinese government tolerating such a move. Even before this latest
development, Beijing and Taipei were on a possible collision course. The PRC’s patience
regarding Taiwan’s de facto independence was showing signs of wearing thin. Chinese
leaders no longer seemed content, as they did during Deng Xiaoping’s time, of letting the
ambiguous situation regarding the island’s status go on indefinitely. After the election of
the conciliatory Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan’s leader in 2008, Beijing pursued a strategy of
developing extensive cross-strait economic ties with the expectation that those links
would gradually make the Taiwanese people receptive to political unification with the
mainland.
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Green, Mark. “Majority in Taiwan No Longer Say They’re Chinese” Wilson Center, May 9,
2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/majority-taiwan-no-longer-say-
theyre-chinese. Accessed October 10, 2024.
However, the passage of time has naturally meant that more and more of those living on
the island have no memory of ever living in mainland China. In addition, the growing
economic and governance contrast between Beijing and Taipei has also gradually
fostered a sense of a distinctive identity. Decades ago, the percentages of people who
identified as Chinese—or even Taiwanese and Chinese—were significantly higher than
those who saw themselves as fully Taiwanese. But the balance appears to be shifting: a
recent poll found that 70-80 percent of people in Taiwan consider themselves
Taiwanese.
Gan, Nectar and Cheung, Eric. “‘Impossible’ for Communist China to become our
motherland as we’re older, Taiwan’s president argues” CNN, October 7, 2024,
https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/07/asia/taiwan-china-motherland-history-hnk-
intl/index.html. Accessed October 10, 2024.
On May 21, the Chinese Communist Party’s official People's Daily newspaper dedicated
its entire fourth page to strongly refuting Lai's approach to cross-Strait affairs. A
commentary titled “Taiwan independence worker’s empty rhetoric harms Taiwan”
accused Lai of deceitfully promoting a “two-state theory” and exacerbating cross-Strait
tensions. Mainland academics described the speech as sending a “very intense” signal to
Beijing with its “pro-independence” language. Zhou Zhihuai, former director of the
Institute of Taiwan at the Chinese Academy of Social Science, said Lai’s was the “most
pro-independence speech” ever given by a Taiwanese leader. China also used its military
to intimidate Taiwan after the speech. On May 23, China conducted two days of
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military exercises that encircled Taiwan. A spokesperson for the Chinese military’s
Eastern Theater Command, which is responsible for the drills and a potential Taiwan
contingency, called the exercise “a strong punishment for the separatist acts of Taiwan
independence forces and a serious warning against interference and provocation by
external forces.”.
“China's Xi says 'reunification' with Taiwan is inevitable” Reuters, December 31, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-calls-taiwan-president-
frontrunner-destroyer-peace-2023-12-31/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
China considers Taiwan to be its "sacred territory" and has never renounced the use of
force to bring it under Chinese control, though Xi made no mention of military threats in
his speech carried on state television. "The reunification of the motherland is a
historical inevitability," Xi said, though the official English translation of his remarks
published by the Xinhua news agency used a more simple phrase: "China will surely be
reunified". "Compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should be bound by a
common sense of purpose and share in the glory of the rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation," he added. The official English translation wrote "all Chinese" rather than
"compatriots". Last year, Xi said only that people on either side of the strait are
"members of one and the same family" and that he hoped people on both sides will
work together to "jointly foster lasting prosperity of the Chinese nation".
Ping, Xin. “Who is changing the status quo across the Taiwan Straits?” Embassy of the
Peoples Republic of China in the United States of America, March 11, 2024,
http://us.china-
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embassy.gov.cn/eng/zmgx/zxxx/202403/t20240316_11261528.htm. Accessed
October 10, 2024.
China views the US actions as pushing the change from the status quo the "Taiwan
independence" forces led by them will only become more and more reckless in their
unscrupulous moves toward separation. These actions are further attempts at slicing
the "sausage" and changing the "status quo" of cross-Straits relations. This is how it is
done: Politically, the US has repeatedly introduced Taiwan-related bills to enhance its
contact with Taiwan, encouraging frequent visits to Taiwan by more politicians. It has
also supported Taiwan in "expanding" its so-called "international space," such as
seeking membership in some international organizations. Militarily, the US has
increased arms sales to Taiwan and frequently sent warships to the Taiwan Straits. By
so doing, the US has continuously set negative "precedents" regarding the Taiwan
question. It has blurred, hollowed out and distorted the one-China principle and the
"prefix" and "suffix" of its own "one-China policy" have become increasingly
convoluted. It is the US that has kept trying to change the status quo across the Taiwan
Straits while falsely accusing China of doing the same. Under these tactics, the "status
quo" across the Taiwan Straits no longer refers to a peaceful state in which the two sides
live in peace and harmony, but a dangerous process in which the DPP authorities
continue to promote de-Sinicization and independence, aiming to haul the island further
away from the motherland.
Yu, Alan. Et. Al. “Taiwan’s Election: PRC Interference and Its Implications for the 2024
Election Landscape” American Progress, February 1, 2024,
https://www.americanprogress.org/article/taiwans-election-prc-interference-
and-its-implications-for-the-2024-election-landscape/. Accessed October 10,
2024.
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Explanation: This argument shows that by supporting Taiwan militarily, the US is fostering the
idea of independence for Taiwanese, which is driving aggressive behavior from China.
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Argument: Proper defense of Taiwan would require attacks of the Chinese mainland,
escalating any conflict.
Warrant: The US would have to attack Chinese mainland in order to defend Taiwan.
Bandow, Doug. “What Price Are Americans Prepared to Pay for Defending Taiwan?” Cato
Institute, August 29, 2024, https://www.cato.org/commentary/what-price-are-
americans-prepared-pay-defending-taiwan#. Accessed October 10, 2024.
First, the interest involved, control over Taiwan, is more important for the PRC than the
U.S. Even students otherwise critical of the Beijing government for its intrusive
censorship, laborious demands, and other oppressive controls insist that the island
republic is part of China. One reason is deeply emotional, the belief that reversing
Taiwan’s detachment by Japan in 1895 would complete the PRC’s recovery from the
“century of humiliation” at the hands of others. Another is security: no country,
including the U.S. (remember the Cuban Missile Crisis!) will tolerate its great rival
maintaining a military base but a few score miles offshore. For China more than the
U.S., failure would not be an option. Second, Beijing would enjoy a significant
geographic advantage, able to use mainland bases for operations against Taiwan and
surrounding waters. This would force Washington to target the Chinese homeland,
which the PRC would almost certainly see as an escalation requiring a response. The
latter could include attacks on U.S. facilities in Guam and the Commonwealth of
Mariana Islands, Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan, and even in Hawaii. It would be
difficult for Washington not to escalate in return. Perhaps good sense would prevail. Yet
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the American and Soviet peoples barely avoided catastrophe in the Cuban Missile Crisis,
when the U.S. played the role of China today. It would be foolish to tempt fate twice.
Tompkins, Joanne. “How U.S. Strategic Policy Is Changing China’s Nuclear Plans” Arms
Control Association, January 2003, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003-
01/features/how-us-strategic-policy-changing-chinas-nuclear-plans. Accessed
October 10, 2024.
Finally, the NPR is also forcing Chinese strategic thinkers to look at their response to
conventional attack on the Chinese mainland. Currently, the consensus in China is that
conventional attacks, no matter how destructive, would not trigger a nuclear response.
But a small community of experts, primarily located at universities and think tanks in
Shanghai, is beginning to argue that China must have more flexibility in the face of
overwhelming U.S. military power. Some argue that China should abandon its no-first-
use pledge if China’s national security is seriously threatened, no matter the means.
Whether China used nuclear weapons would depend on the nature of the U.S. attack.
According to a security analyst in Beijing, a conventional attack against Chinese cities
likely would not trigger a nuclear response, unless Beijing and Shanghai were attacked.
Those cities are critical to China’s security, and an overwhelming conventional attack
on either one might justify a nuclear response. Advocates of nuclear flexibility also hold
that any conventional attack against Chinese nuclear facilities or its command and
control capabilities could also invite nuclear retaliation. This extreme view has so far not
gained a large following, and many think it unlikely that the United States would ever
attack the mainland, even in a conflict over Taiwan, but the debate is underway.
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Warrant: A mainland strike is not off the table for the US.
Meyers, John. “Mainland Strikes and U.S. Military Strategy Towards China” RAND, July
2019,
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD400/RGS
D430/RAND_RGSD430.pdf. Accessed October 10, 2024.
The growth of Chinese military power has generated a far-ranging debate in the United
States about how the American military should adapt itself for the future. A key axis in
this debate concerns the willingness of a future U.S. president and his advisors to
recommend mainland strikes — conventional strikes on the Chinese mainland during
wartime. Some strategists believe that this course of action is likely, perhaps inevitable,
should war occur. Another group of strategists argues that an American president
would likely not authorize such a move against the homeland of another nuclear-
armed power. Both camps make different recommendations for American military force
planning based on their conflicting assumptions. This dissertation wades into the middle
of this debate. Careful theorizing and systematic research can help adjudicate the
arguments found in this disagreement. Towards that end, this dissertation presents three
complementary research approaches focused on investigating the willingness of an
American president and his advisors to authorize mainland strikes. First, historical
research complemented with material from presidential archives enabled this project
to investigate the parallels between the bombing campaigns in the Korean War and the
Vietnam War and a hypothetical U.S.-China war. Second, twenty interviews with
American national security elites analyzed the decision-making frameworks they
employed to assess the desirability of mainland strikes in potential conflicts. Finally, an
online scenario-based survey experiment with eighty-five national security elites tested
the effect of different scenario characteristics and respondent backgrounds on the
likelihood of mainland strikes in a Taiwan-related scenario. This research indicates that
mainland strikes are neither guaranteed nor off the table.
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Dangwal, Ashish. “‘Delay, Degrade & Deny’ – US To Arm Taiwan With Cutting-Edge
‘Asymmetrical Weapons’ To Fend Off China” Eurasian Times, September 16, 2022,
https://www.eurasiantimes.com/delay-degrade-deny-us-to-arm-taiwan-with-
cutting-edge/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
O’Hanlon, Michael, et. al. “Could the United States and China really go to war? Who
would win?” Brookings Institute, August 15, 2024,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/could-the-united-states-and-china-really-go-
to-war-who-would-win/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Military strategists in the United States consider China the nation’s main military
worry—with the distinct possibility of a major U.S.-China war in the years to come.
That is a terrifying prospect. The two countries are the world’s top two economic and
military powers, both armed with nuclear weapons, each contributing 15% to 20% to
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world gross domestic product, and each dependent on the other for its prosperity given
the depth and breadth of their economic relationships. Were they to go to war,
however, global prosperity might soon become the least of our concerns; World War III
could not be ruled out, and the survival of the human race might even be on the line.
Once China’s leaders commit to a political outcome they view as critical to the survival of
their regime, surprising them could alter the trajectory of the conflict in unpredictable
ways, nullifying past assumptions by prompting them to “take new risks even against
long odds.” According to Joshua Rovner, an associate professor of foreign policy at
American University, “it is not difficult to see how mainland strikes could cause Chinese
leaders to take enormous risks to avoid a humiliating and rapid defeat.” Aaron
Friedberg, a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University,
recounted Chinese analysts saying publicly that “in some instances,” the People’s
Liberation Army “might be prepared to use nuclear weapons in retaliation to
conventional attacks.”.
Explanation: This argument shows that in order to truly be able to defend Taiwan, we must be
willing to risk a very large conflict with China and possibly Nuclear war. This renders benefits
such as deterrence as unlikely because the consequences of defending Taiwan are so large.
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Shivaram, Deepa. “China's Xi Jinping urges a 'peaceful reunification' with Taiwan” NPR,
October 9, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/10/09/1044714406/xi-jinping-china-
taiwan-peaceful-reunification. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping says he prefers China take control of Taiwan through peaceful
methods rather than military means. His comments Saturday come as tensions
between China and Taiwan are at the highest in 40 years, according to one Taiwanese
official. Recently, a record number of Chinese fighter jets have been patrolling the air
space around Taiwan. China has, for a long time, promised to regain control of Taiwan
and the tension over the fighter jets has led many to think China's leaders would take a
more aggressive approach toward Taiwan. But Xi said Saturday that "peaceful
reunification" would best serve China's and Taiwan's interests.
Wonacott, Peter “Costly Conflict: Here’s How China’s Military Options for Taiwan
Backfire” United States Institute of Peace, October 9, 2024,
https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/10/costly-conflict-heres-how-chinas-
military-options-taiwan-backfire. Accessed October 10, 2024.
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Bloomberg Economics has estimated a war with Taiwan would cost a staggering $10
trillion, equivalent to 10% of global GDP — far outpacing the economic toll from
Ukraine’s war, the COVID pandemic and the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. China’s
GDP would suffer a 16.7% blow compared to 40% for what would be a devastated
Taiwanese economy. Bloomberg Economics also modeled the fallout from a military
blockade of the island, including retaliatory measures between China and the U.S. It
estimated a 12.2% hit to Taiwan’s economy, 8.9% for the Chinese mainland and 3.3%
for the U.S. Some experts say the economic damage from a China-Taiwan clash is steeper
if the final price tag includes the costs of foreign investors exiting the Chinese mainland
and neighboring island for safer but less-productive — and less-lucrative — locations.
Willasey-Wilsey, Tim. “Why Would China Not Invade Taiwan Now?” Army University
Press, June 4, 2020, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-
Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2020/Wilsey-The-
Question/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
This article does not argue that China will invade Taiwan. There are good reasons for the
Chinese not doing so. It would be a huge gamble for armed forces which have not been
employed in combat during the careers of even their most senior officers. The aircraft
carriers and amphibious landing ships are still relatively new. A lot could go wrong. A
very public military failure would be a humiliating and possibly career-threatening
experience for President Xi Jinping and for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Many
members of the leadership would doubtless argue for patience.
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Blumenthal, Dan and Kagan, Fred. “China doesn’t need to invade to achieve Taiwanese
unification” The Hill, May 13, 2024,
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4657439-china-doesnt-need-to-invade-
to-achieve-taiwanese-unification/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
China is more likely to pursue a “short of war coercion campaign,” as we call it,
centered on political and economic warfare accompanied by limited kinetic action than
an invasion of Taiwan for three main reasons: First, annexing Taiwan by means short of
war significantly limits possible damage to other Chinese grand strategic objectives. The
People’s Republic of China’s long-term strategic goals are to continue to build-up what it
calls its comprehensive national power and become the world’s leading power. It then
aims to decisively reshape international politics and place itself at the center. Although
Chinese leader Xi Jinping clearly believes that unifying Taiwan with the mainland is a key
component of this grand strategy, he may be loath to risk China’s march to geopolitical
dominance by starting a full scale and likely global war. Second, a short of war strategy
centered on political warfare and limited kinetic action could be successful. Taiwan’s
most recent elections highlighted deep domestic political divisions, coinciding with a
rise in skepticism of America’s support. These sentiments are further reinforced by the
fact that Taiwan remains internationally isolated. Taiwan status is sui generis in
international affairs: it is a fully functioning nation-state not recognized by the
international powers. This creates an opening for China’s manipulation of Taiwan’s
understandable fears of abandonment. Third, strategies short of war are consistent with
Chinese strategic thinking and previous behavior. A number of Chinese warfighting
concepts reference the utility of fighting wars using means beyond traditional
applications of kinetic force.
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Blanchette, Jude and Glaser, Bonnie. “Taiwan’s Most Pressing Challenge Is Strangulation,
Not Invasion” War on the Rocks, November 9, 2023,
https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/taiwans-most-pressing-challenge-is-
strangulation-not-invasion/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Yet while an invasion is the most consequential scenario, we do not think it is the most
probable, and treating it as if it is comes at the cost of distraction from the short- and
near-term challenges to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Beijing seeks to compel
Taipei to enter formal negotiations on “reunification,” and to achieve goal, it is pursuing
an increasingly aggressive “gray zone” campaign of political, psychological, economic,
and diplomatic coercion that is designed to make Taiwan’s citizens feel powerless,
divided, and isolated. If China can visibly undermine the credibility of American support
and security assistance while simultaneously demonstrating to the Taiwan people that
their government lacks the will or capability to respond to Chinese pressure, an
invasion won’t be needed.
“China blasts US military aid to Taiwan, saying the island is entering a ‘dangerous
situation’” The Associated Press, April 24, 2024,
https://apnews.com/article/china-taiwan-military-assistance-
e505267d2fc595be2d45b2e70d6d1ead. Accessed October 10, 2024.
China on Wednesday blasted the latest package of U.S. military assistance to Taiwan on
Wednesday, saying that such funding was pushing the self-governing island republic
into a “dangerous situation.” The U.S. Senate late Tuesday passed $95 billion in war aid
to Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan after months of delays and contentious debate over how
involved the United States should be in foreign wars. China claims the entire island of
Taiwan as its own territory and has threatened to take it by force if necessary. The
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mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Office said the aid “seriously violates” U.S. commitments to
China and “sends a wrong signal to the Taiwan independence separatist forces.” Office
spokesperson Zhu Fenglian added that Taiwan’s ruling pro-independence Democratic
Progressive Party, which won a third four-year presidential term in January, is willing to
“become a pawn for external forces to use Taiwan to contain China, bringing Taiwan into
a dangerous situation.”.
Explanation: This argument does two things, first it minimizes the impact of providing military
aid to Taiwan by showing other more likely strategies China will use to capture Taiwan, and that
military support of Taiwan could make Chinese aggression worse.
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Argument: Reducing military support of Taiwan would improve relations with China, leading to
the benefits of greater cooperation.
Warrant: Current US-Taiwan arms deals threaten cooperation across the board.
Chung, Lawrence. “Beijing Tells US to Cancel US$330 Million Taiwan Arms Deal.” South
China Morning Post, September 25, 2018,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2165609/us-announces-new-
taiwan-arms-deal-worth-us330-million. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Warrant: Good relations with China are key––non-proliferation efforts are on the brink of
failure.
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Carlson, John. “Is the NPT Still Relevant? – How to Progress the NPT’s Disarmament
Provisions.” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, May 9, 2019,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2019.1611187. Accessed
October 10, 2024.
Impact: China is the key player on preventing proliferation – a US concession on Taiwan is key
to unlock further cooperation.
Hiim, H.S. “Counterproliferation Bargaining with the United States: China and the Spread of
Nuclear Weapons,” Asian Security, August 10, 2017,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14799855.2017.1351951. Accessed
October 10, 2024.
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challenges are managed in arenas like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as in multilateral negotiations.
Beyond its institutional role, China has provided economic, diplomatic, and military
support to confirmed or suspected proliferators such as Pakistan, North Korea, and
Iran. Through these ties, China has a determining impact on whether international
efforts to curb proliferation fail or succeed. .
Impact: Arms sales are the single sticking point – hardline US policy ensures China will spoil
nonproliferation efforts.
Hiim, H.S. “Counterproliferation Bargaining with the United States: China and the Spread of
Nuclear Weapons,” Asian Security, August 10, 2017,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14799855.2017.1351951. Accessed
October 10, 2024.
Conclusion From the early 1990s, China started linking its nonproliferation policy –
particularly in the missile domain – to US policy in unrelated areas. China signaled
clearly that it expected US concessions on issues like Taiwan arms sales and missile
defense if it was to cooperate on preventing proliferation. In contrast to what other
analysts have argued, this article has demonstrated that issue linkage tactics is still very
much a feature of China’s approach to nonproliferation. Throughout the 2000s, China
has sought compensation from the US for its willingness to cooperate on issues like Iran
and North Korea. Moreover, it has retaliated by thwarting nonproliferation efforts
when the US has hurt Chinese interests in other, unrelated areas. China is not the only
state that uses assistance to nuclear proliferators as a bargaining tool visa-vis the
United States.
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Analysis: China has significant power on the global stage, making U.S.-China relations a critical
area of potential cooperation that could shape the future of vitally important interests
– particularly nonproliferation.
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Argument: Reducing military support of Taiwan would lead to strategic de-escalation with
China, limiting the potential for war in the Taiwan strait.
Nathan, Andrew. “What Exactly Is America’s China Policy?” Foreign Policy, April 14,
2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/14/us-china-biden-strategy-
geopolitics/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
To call the military threat regional, however, was not to treat it as trivial. Taiwan is the
most dangerous of the four military flash points. China needs to control the island if it
is to prevent the United States or any other hostile power from using it as a base to
threaten the mainland. The United States insists on the “peaceful resolution of the
Taiwan issue,” a policy that goes back to the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. Were
Washington to abandon its position, the credibility of its international commitments
would take a severe hit. Taiwan, of course, has compelling reasons to avoid coming
under the control of the increasingly repressive Chinese regime. There is obviously no
way to satisfy all three actors. Russia’s assault on Ukraine has increased anxiety over an
already tense situation. A war over Taiwan would likely draw in other powers, wreak
tragic destruction, present a risk of nuclear escalation, and spawn decades of disastrous
political consequences for all involved.
Warrant: Reducing military tensions deescalates tensions and builds strategic trust.
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Reducing distrust over Taiwan: Both sides want to work toward a peaceful resolution
of existing differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. U.S. weapons sales
to Taiwan are viewed in Washington and Taipei as a necessary ingredient for sustaining
the confidence of U.S. support in Taipei necessary for Taipei to continue to develop wide
ranging cross-Strait relations. Those same sales in Beijing are viewed as confirming
American arrogance and determination to interfere in China’s domestic affairs and to
prevent peaceful unification from occurring, thereby harming a clearly-articulated
Chinese core interest. Washington and Beijing should engage in serious discussion of
the overall security situation surrounding the Taiwan Strait. Lack of such discussion has
contributed to having each side make worst case assumptions in their acquisition and
deployment of military resources, enhancing mutual distrust and ultimately potentially
reducing the chances of maintaining the peace in the Taiwan Strait that both sides
desire.
Warrant: Ending arms sales is key---other options fail because China cares about Taiwan way
more than the US does.
Gomez, Eric. “Deep Accommodation: The Best Option for Preventing War in the Taiwan
Strait.” CSIS, August 6, 2015, http://cimsec.org/deep-accommodation-best-option-
preventing-war-taiwan-strait/18128. Accessed October 10, 2024.
The status quo in the Taiwan Strait will be unsustainable as China continues to
improve its military capabilities and adopt more aggressive military strategies. If the
U.S. wants to avert a war with China in the Taiwan Strait, it must start looking for an
alternative to the status quo. Taiwan’s strategy of economic accommodation with China
under the Ma Ying-jeou administration has brought about benefits. The U.S. should
encourage Taiwan to deepen its military and political accommodation with China. This
would be a difficult pill for Taiwan to swallow, but it could offer the most sustainable
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deterrent to armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait. For years, Taiwan’s de facto
independence from China has relied on a qualitatively superior, defense-focused
military that could prevent the landing of a large Chinese force on the island. The
growing power of the Chinese military, especially its naval and missile forces, has
begun eroding this qualitative advantage. Indeed, some observers have already
concluded that “the days when [Taiwan] forces had a quantitative and qualitative
advantage over [China] are over.” Taiwan still possesses a formidable military and could
inflict high costs on an attacking Chinese force, but ultimately American intervention
would likely be necessary to save Taiwan from a determined Chinese attack.
Gomez, Eric. “Deep Accommodation: The Best Option for Preventing War in the Taiwan
Strait.” CSIS, August 6, 2015, http://cimsec.org/deep-accommodation-best-option-
preventing-war-taiwan-strait/18128. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Military intervention by the U.S. on the behalf of Taiwan would be met with
formidable Chinese resistance. China’s anti-access/area denial [A2/AD] strategy
complicates the U.S.’s ability to project power in the Taiwan Strait. China’s latest
maritime strategy document, released in May of this year, states that China’s navy will
start shifting its focus further offshore to include open seas protection missions. Such a
shift implies an aspirational capability to keep intervening American forces away from
Taiwan. American political leaders have not given up on Taiwan, and the 2015 U.S.
National Military Strategy places a premium on reassuring allies of America’s
commitments. However, the fact that China’s improving military capabilities will make
an American military intervention on behalf of Taiwan more and more costly must not
be ignored. The best option for preventing a war in the Taiwan Strait is deepening the
strategy of accommodation that Beijing and Taipei have already started. According to
Baohui Zhang, accommodation “relies on expanding common interests,
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Analysis: China has been seeking ‘reunification’ with Taiwan for decades, the question of the
debate then becomes the best way to prevent that reunification. As the Lieberthal and Gomez
authors argue, in the wake of eroding U.S. power projection capabilities in the indo-pacific, only
accommodation has any possibility of preventing a war over Taiwan.
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Argument: Reducing military support of Taiwan would allow us to free up resources and
allocate them to more vital battlegrounds (Ukraine).
Warrant: Resources are finite and policymakers must make hard decisions about where to
allocate them.
The first step in wrestling with potential tradeoffs between bolstering resolve and
bolstering capabilities is to identify them. In a world of finite resources, policymakers
will have to make tough choices about what to allocate, where, and for how long.
These decisions will only grow more salient as the White House and Congress continue
to debate funding to Ukraine and how to deal with China and Taiwan. Ultimately,
however, policymakers should prioritize resolve. They should privilege the priceless
asset of reputation while spending what they can to improve capabilities, maintaining
the flow of aid to Ukraine despite the downsides.
Warrant: The beliefs of Xi are crucial in determining the best course of action in Taiwan.
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In May, two Republican foreign policy hands, Elbridge Colby and Alex Velez-Green,
wrote that the United States must focus its “resources on Taiwan’s defense against
China, by far the United States’ strongest rival, while relying primarily on European allies
to defend against a weakened Russia.” Both of these competing arguments touch on
dynamics relevant to deterrence. Whether Xi believes that the United States would
come to the defense of Taiwan, or at least provide it with the resources needed to
defend itself through requisite military assistance, is critical. At the same time, it also
matters whether Xi believes that the United States has the capacity to provide the
necessary resources. Both dynamics are about credibility—the credibility that one has
the will to act and the credibility that one can actually do so. In a world of finite
resources, policymakers must come to terms with painful tradeoffs between these
twin goals. Devoting scarce supplies to bolster resolve may reduce the capacity to
respond to crises elsewhere.
Warrant: Taiwan and Ukraine need the same kind of weapons––guarantees tradeoff.
As a Center for a New American Security report has noted, although there are important
differences between the kinds of weapons that the United States is providing to
Ukraine and the types of weapons that would be needed to stymie a Chinese invasion
of Taiwan, there is certainly some overlap. This is especially true in the case of air
defense systems of various kinds—capabilities that Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky has pleaded for.
Impact: Ukraine is losing the war now––only weapons deliveries, particularly in terms of missile
capacity, can turn the tide.
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“The war is going badly. Ukraine and its allies must change course.” The Economist,
September 26, 2024, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2024/09/26/the-war-is-
going-badly-ukraine-and-its-allies-must-change-course. Accessed October 10, 2024.
However much Mr Zelensky wants to drive Russia from all Ukraine, including Crimea, he
does not have the men or arms to do it. Neither he nor the West should recognise
Russia’s bogus claim to the occupied territories; rather, they should retain reunification
as an aspiration. In return for Mr Zelensky embracing this grim truth, Western leaders
need to make his overriding war aim credible by ensuring that Ukraine has the military
capacity and security guarantees it needs. If Ukraine can convincingly deny Russia any
prospect of advancing further on the battlefield, it will be able to demonstrate the
futility of further big offensives. Whether or not a formal peace deal is signed, that is
the only way to wind down the fighting and ensure the security on which Ukraine’s
prosperity and democracy will ultimately rest. This will require greater supplies of the
weaponry Mr Zelensky is asking for. Ukraine needs long-range missiles that can hit
military targets deep in Russia and air defences to protect its infrastructure.
Shalom, Stephen. “Ukraine and the Dangers of Nuclear War” New Politics, August 23, 2022,
https://newpol.org/ukraine-and-the-dangers-of-nuclear-war/. Accessed October 10,
2024.
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these governments (because, after all, one doesn’t want to risk nuclear war), the two
countries would have little option but to submit. But why stop there? If Russia then
demanded (with appropriate rhetoric and missile tests) that NATO troops be removed
from the Baltic states, would it be worth risking madman Putin escalating to nuclear
war? So best comply. And if it then further demanded that no NATO arms be provided
to these former components of the Soviet Union, again, why provoke the Bear? But at
some point, either Moscow or Washington will miscalculate – will NATO back down?
is Russia bluffing? — and we’ll be in the midst of a nuclear war.
Analysis: military aid and support is finite, and this argument can be particularly effective if it is
articulated as supporting an ally in an active conflict (Ukraine) versus preparing for a speculative
conflict (Taiwan).
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Warrant: The unprecedented growth of China makes policy-making in the region difficult.
Swaine, Michael. “The Deepening U.S.-China Crisis: Origins and Solutions” Carnegie
Endowment, February 21, 2019,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/21/deepening-u.s.-china-crisis-origins-and-
solutions-pub-78429. Accessed October 10, 2024.
The ugly dynamic of growing suspicion and worst-case assumptions is increasing the
likelihood of future U.S.-China political or military crises in Asia, crises that could in
turn eventually propel the two sides into a Cold War or worse. The deepening suspicion
and hostility in the relationship is occurring during, and (in part) as a result of, a shifting
balance of power in Asia within the First Island Chain. This negative turn also reflects a
general failure to resolve several contentious issues in the region, including the Korean
Peninsula; Taiwan; maritime disputes; and military-related intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance activities. I believe that China’s continued growth in military and
economic power and influence in Asia, and the resulting relative decline in U.S.
maritime predominance, will eventually create an unstable rough parity between
China and U.S./allied states within the First Island Chain along China’s maritime
periphery (within approximately 1,500 kilometers of the country’s coast).
Warrant: Absent accommodation, spirals over Taiwan will escalate into military conflict.
Swaine, Michael. “The Deepening U.S.-China Crisis: Origins and Solutions” Carnegie
Endowment, February 21, 2019,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/21/deepening-u.s.-china-crisis-origins-
and-solutions-pub-78429. Accessed October 10, 2024.
This could cause China to overestimate its leverage and ability to advance its interests
on contentious and provocative issues such as Taiwan and maritime sovereignty
disputes. At the same time, it could also cause the United States and Japan to
overreact to such behavior, partly to disabuse China and others of the notion that the
United States is losing its dominant position. Without adequate communication and a
clear sense of each other’s red lines, and without reassuring understandings on limits
and intentions, such miscalculations could easily escalate into tests of relative resolve,
with neither side willing to make accommodations to reach a middle ground. Although
Beijing and Washington could perhaps avoid letting such a crisis devolve into actual
military conflict, even a major nonviolent confrontation could severely, and perhaps
irreparably, damage U.S.-China relations well beyond anything seen thus far,
producing untold shocks to the global economy and both regional and global security.
Under present conditions, the issue of Taiwan is particularly concerning. Given the
current and worsening U.S. trend toward a zero-sum strategic competition with Beijing
in virtually all areas, it is quite possible that anti-China zealots in or around the U.S.
government could successfully argue that Washington should start regarding Taiwan as
a strategic asset that it should deny China. These sentiments are already found among
defense analysts in the United States and Japan. Needless to say, if such views became
policy, the U.S. One China policy would collapse, along with the original basis for
normalized relations with Beijing. The result could be a military conflict.
Impact: Reduced military support would show China that the U.S. does not have mal intent in
Taiwan, resulting in de-escalation and reduces the risk of miscalculation in the Taiwan strait.
Swaine, Michael. “The Deepening U.S.-China Crisis: Origins and Solutions” Carnegie
Endowment, February 21, 2019,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/21/deepening-u.s.-china-crisis-origins-and-
solutions-pub-78429. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Expanded official contacts with Taiwan will require consultations with Beijing; the
United States and its allies will have to refashion battle plans to exclude Taiwan;
Washington will have to support the new approach to cross-strait peace through its
public diplomacy; and U.S. intelligence agencies will have to be more careful about
scrutinizing technology transfers to the island because the prc's intelligence gathering
on Taiwan will inevitably expand. Most important, Washington will have to
significantly scale back its arms sales to Taipei. In 1982, the United States pledged to
China that it would reduce its arms sales to Taiwan - a promise that it has
conspicuously broken ever since. Today, as then, there is a golden opportunity to
demilitarize the conflict. The U.S. Congress is not particularly interested in pressing
President Barack Obama on the issue, and Taiwan's economic decline has moderated
Taipei's appetite for major arms purchases anyway. In the past, sales of fighter jets,
destroyers, tanks, and missiles to Taiwan were premised as much on the political
message they sent to Beijing as on their tactical value. In the new climate, .
Swaine, Michael. “The Deepening U.S.-China Crisis: Origins and Solutions” Carnegie
Endowment, February 21, 2019,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/21/deepening-u.s.-china-crisis-origins-and-
solutions-pub-78429. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Washington can reinforce the détente by holding back planned sales of items such as
Black Hawk helicopters, Patriot missiles, and additional fighter jets. The Pentagon
must view the shift not as simply a minor adjustment due to reduced cross-strait
tensions but as a wholesale rejection of the vision of Taiwan as a militarized base
within the U.S. strategic orbit. By signaling that Washington is finally respecting China's
territorial integrity, these reductions could, in turn, lead to verifiable force reductions
by China, as well as to an end to its Taiwan-focused military attack drills. Removing
Taiwan as a major player in the United States' Asian security strategy would have ripple
effects on U.S. strategy in the region as a whole. Indeed, it is likely that Asian-only
security organizations, such as the asean Regional Forum, would increasingly take the
lead in defining Asia's future security architecture. The arguments in favor of
Finlandization are stronger today than ever before: a Finlandized Taiwan would play a
much more transformative role in China itself, thus improving the chances of a
peacefully rising China. As was the case for Finland in its relations with the Soviet
Union, Taiwan could create a model for the peaceful resolution of China's many
resource, boundary, and military conflicts throughout Asia. More broadly, the Taiwan-
China détente is a test of liberal approaches to international relations - specifically, the
notion that a broad integration of domestic interests will pacify relations between states
far more than a militarized balance of power.
Analysis: Arm sales to Taiwan are heightening the risk of miscalculation in the Asia Pacific –
– which cannot be prevented through deterrence – making reduced military support a necessity
for the U.S.
Argument: U.S. Military support of Taiwan is structurally unsustainable, meaning it cannot keep
up with China’s power projection capabilities.
Heer, Paul. “Rethinking U.S. Primacy in East Asia.” National Interest, January 8, 2019,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/rethinking-us-primacy-east-asia-
40972?page=0%2C1. Accessed October 10, 2024.
U.S. primacy in the region itself is not sustainable, and trying to sustain it will probably
be counterproductive. For all intents and purposes, American primacy in East Asia—
depending on how it is defined—is arguably already a thing of the past. Since about a
decade ago, China has a larger share of East Asian regional trade than the United States,
and is now the biggest trading partner of most of its neighbors. If defined in military
terms, most net assessments suggest that the American advantage in power projection
forces within the region is eroding relative to Chinese capabilities; and it is not at all
clear in the wake of sequestration and competing budgetary priorities that the United
States could or will devote the resources necessary to arrest this trend. American
primacy in East Asia has often been characterized in terms of the United States serving
as the guarantor of regional security, protecting the “global commons” and providing
“public goods” there. The U.S. alliance network in the region certainly extends an
umbrella of protection to those countries with which Washington has defense pacts;
and its military freedom of navigation operations signal an intention to resist excessive
Chinese maritime claims.
Warrant: East Asian countries are concerned about America’s shifting priorities .
Heer, Paul. “Rethinking U.S. Primacy in East Asia.” National Interest, January 8, 2019,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/rethinking-us-primacy-east-asia-
40972?page=0%2C1. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Heer, Paul. “Rethinking U.S. Primacy in East Asia.” National Interest, January 8, 2019,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/rethinking-us-primacy-east-asia-
40972?page=0%2C1. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Moreover, policies and strategies aimed at upholding U.S. primacy in East Asia are
likely to be counterproductive because such an approach, probably more than anything
else, would reinforce Beijing’s belief that the United States seeks to contain China by
keeping it subordinate within its own region. This would increase the chances of
Beijing feeling compelled to adopt a more confrontational and aggressive posture.
Chinese pursuit of a more exclusive hostile hegemony could thus become a self-
fulfilling prophecy.
Impact: Voters want a country focused on domestic issues, not on maintaining empire or
preventing wars abroad.
Monck, Adrian. “The Choice Facing a Declining United States.” The Atlantic, August 28,
2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/08/americas-global-
influence-is-declining/568708/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
America’s global influence is certain to decline relatively in the years ahead; it is the
inevitable consequence of the return of the Middle Kingdom. As that happens, the U.S.
should be more deliberate about the policy choices it makes. It’s a lesson I’ve seen my
own country—which was once an empire, too—learn the hard way. On the way down
from global hegemony, Britain came around too slowly to investing in domestic welfare.
The U.S. should apply those lessons sooner. The time is ripe. Its 45th president swung to
power on the backs of voters [are] worn out by the burden of expensive wars, tired of
wartime austerity, and fed up with rising inequality. America has spent nearly $6
trillion on sustaining long-running conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Median wages
haven’t gone up in decades. Its health-care inequality is a byword in failure, infant
mortality barely better than that of developing countries, and some states’ death rates
are soaring because of “diseases of despair.” It’s clear that many voters gave up on the
American empire. When they voted in 2016, they didn’t care for the international
institutions the U.S. had so carefully constructed after World War II: nato; the United
Nations; the World Bank. They didn’t care for their country to protect the liberal world
order, to lead the “Free World.” Voters on the left and the right showed their readiness
for a policy turn inwards. They wanted a country focused on domestic policies.
Analysis: if these authors are correct in their assessment of U.S. capabilities in the Asia Pacific
– namely, that it is structurally unsustainable – there is no way for U.S. military support to
effectively deter or defend Taiwan against China. Thus, this argument provides a top-level
defensive narrative against NEG invasion scenarios.
Pro Responses to
Con Arguments
Pro Responses to Con Arguments Nov/Dec 2024
Warrant: The US has made it an initiative to produce more of its own semiconductors.
Chang, Alisa, Enrique Rivera, and Justin Kenin, “The new CHIPS and Science Act will bring
semiconductor chip manufacturing to the U.S.” NPR, August 9, 2022,
https://www.npr.org/2022/08/09/1116591031/the-new-chips-and-science-act-
will-bring-semiconductor-chip-manufacturing-to-the. Accessed October 9, 2024.
All right, stop for a moment and look around your car, your desk, your kitchen. How
many high-tech gadgets do you see? I mean, look - your laptop, your cell phone, your
TV, all of those things - they need semiconductor chips in order to function. And most
of those chips are not made in the U.S. Now, the Biden administration is determined
to change that. So today, the president signed the CHIPS and Science Act into law. It
allocates more than $50 billion to bring semiconductor chip manufacturing to the U.S.
and away from its current production hub in East Asia.
Ngo, Madeleine. “Billions in Chips Grants Are Expected to Fuel Industry Growth, Report
Finds.” The New York Times, May 8, 2024,
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/08/us/politics/chips-grants-fuel-industry-
growth.html. Accessed October 9, 2024.
Turn: The US is actually the problem; they are on record as saying they would destroy the
factories instead of letting them go to China.
Warrant: US intelligence officials said they would destroy semiconductor factories in the event
of a Taiwan invasion.
Nguyen, Britney. “US would destroy Taiwan’s semiconductor factories rather than
letting them fall into China’s hands, a former national security advisor says.”
Business Insider, March 14, 2023,
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/08/us/politics/chips-grants-fuel-industry-
growth.html. Accessed October 9, 2024.
A former national security advisor said the US would destroy Taiwan's semiconductor
factories if China seemed on the verge of controlling them after an invasion. Robert
O'Brien, who served as national security advisor in the Trump administration, told
Semafor the US "and its allies are never going to let those factories fall into Chinese
hands." Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company is the world's largest
chipmaker, making up an estimated 90% of the market for advanced processors. The
company produces chips for most devices and equipment like phones and cars that are
used every day. More advanced chips produced by the manufacturer are used in highly
advanced technology like machine learning and guided missiles. If China were to take
control of these factories, the country would be "like the new OPEC of silicon chips,"
O'Brien said, adding that China would be able to "control the world economy.".
Reuters. “Top US spy says Chinese invasion halting Taiwan chip production would be
'enormous' global economic blow.” Reuters, May 4, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/technology/top-us-spy-says-chinese-invasion-halting-
taiwan-chip-production-would-be-2023-05-04. Accessed October 9, 2024.
Warrant: China has yet to invade because they can’t afford semiconductor manufacturing to
stop.
Autarky Is Impossible. The conclusion – that is, the rational conclusion – is that the
military solution would not work for China. The Taiwanese dominance of the foundry
segment is a very important feature of the semiconductor industry and indeed of the
21st century digital economy. But it is not a standalone asset, viewed from a macro
perspective. It is part of a globalized eco-system that China cannot really escape from.
Nor is it, as shown, a turn-key-able asset, a fungible capability that could easily be
placed under “new management” in the event of a military takeover. The technological
and logistical complexity of this critical sector invalidate any theory of “semiconductor
autarky” or full self-sufficiency, certainly for China – and probably also for the U.S. (a
caveat for the CHIPS bill and other measures gestating in Congress right now).
Warrant: China has been gearing up even while the US has a presence.
The Chinese government is working to make its military stronger, more efficient, and
more technologically advanced to become a top-tier force within thirty years. With a
budget that has soared over the past decade, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) already
ranks among the world’s leading militaries in areas including artificial intelligence and
anti-ship ballistic missiles. Experts warn that as China’s military modernizes, it could
become more assertive in the Asia-Pacific region by intensifying pressure on Taiwan
and continuing to militarize disputed islands in the East and South China Seas. U.S.
President Donald J. Trump’s administration believes China is a great-power rival, though
the PLA still has a way to go before it can challenge the United States, experts say.
Warrant: They haven’t been afraid to be aggressive with the US in the region.
Feng, Emily and Connie Hanzhang Jin. “China is subtly increasing military pressure on
Taiwan. Here’s how.” NPR, December 18, 2023,
https://www.npr.org/2023/12/18/1216317476/china-military-taiwan-air-
defense. Accessed October 9, 2024.
TAIPEI, Taiwan — There is an ominous new normal in the Taiwan Strait, the narrow strip
of water between Taiwan and China. Beijing has long considered self-governed Taiwan
as part of China and has threatened to force it to "unify" with the mainland. But over
the past year, Beijing has been stepping up military pressure on Taiwan, while
stopping short of an outright invasion. China has been sending ships and planes to
encircle Taiwan and mounting more sophisticated military drills simulating a blockade
of the island. In September, Taiwan's defense ministry counted a record number of
Chinese fighter planes — 103 warplanes to be exact — flying in airspace around
Taiwan in just one day. Security experts call this "gray zone" tactics, a strategy of
intimidation and daily harassment designed to gradually wear Taiwan down, without
drawing the United States and its Asian allies, like Japan and South Korea, into a wider
conflict.
Warrant: The US is present, but Beijing is still on course for a 2027 invasion.
Stewart, Phil and Idrees Ali. “How the US is preparing for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.”
Reuters, January 31, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/logistics-war-
how-washington-is-preparing-chinese-invasion-taiwan-2024-01-31/. Accessed
October 9, 2024.
The U.S. has not formally said it would intervene if China were to attack Taiwan but
President Joe Biden has repeatedly suggested he would deploy U.S. troops to defend
the island. Xi has ordered his military to be ready to take Taiwan by 2027, U.S. officials
say. But many analysts see that as an attempt to galvanize his military rather than a
timeline for invasion. A senior U.S. military official, speaking on the condition of
anonymity, said supplies of ammunition are at the top of the list of priorities in the Indo-
Pacific, followed by fuel, food and spare parts for equipment. ".
Bandow, Doug. “What would a US war with China look like?” Responsible Statecraft,
October 24, 2022, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/10/24/what-would-a-
us-war-with-china-look-like/. Accessed October 9, 2024.
“If conflict does break out, U.S. officials should not be sanguine about how it would
end. Tamping or reversing Chinese aggression in the Western Pacific could require a
massive use of force. An authoritarian CCP, always mindful of its precarious domestic
legitimacy, would not want to concede defeat even if it failed to achieve its initial
objectives. And historically, modern wars between great powers have more typically
gone long than stayed short. All of this implies that a U.S.-China war could be
incredibly dangerous, offering few plausible off-ramps and severe pressures for
escalation.” The consequences of such a conflict would spread globally, with much
greater impact than the Russo-Ukraine war. Imagine Taiwanese industry devastated
from combat or conquest. Allied sanctions against Beijing and its trading partners.
Nations big and small pushed to choose sides. Both the U.S. and China interrupting if not
sweeping the other nations’ trade from the seas. At the end, defeat for the U.S. and its
allies would be possible if not likely. In recent years U.S. wargames have generally
shown Beijing as the victor. The best case, after a fashion, appears to be an indecisive
and thus lengthy war. Concluded one analysis: “The overarching takeaway from
participants in the war game: If China invades Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific region will
plunge into a broad, drawn-out war that could include direct attacks on the U.S.,
including Hawaii and potentially the continental United States.” .
Lendon, Brad and Oren Liebermann. “War game suggests Chinese invasion of Taiwan
would fail at a huge cost to US, Chinese and Taiwanese militaries.” CNN Politics,
January 9, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/09/politics/taiwan-invasion-
war-game-intl-hnk-ml/index.html. Accessed October 9, 2024.
The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of
service members. Such losses would damage the US global position for many years,” the
report said. In most scenarios, the US Navy lost two aircraft carriers and 10 to 20 large
surface combatants. Approximately 3,200 US troops would be killed in three weeks of
combat, nearly half of what the US lost in two decades of combat in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Analysis: There are several good responses here that respond to different parts of the original
argument. The strongest route to take is probably that the US presence doesn’t deter China and
makes the situation worse, which is a combination of the bottom three responses. The other
strong path is that protecting Taiwan is not in US interests which is a combination of response
one and four. You can really just pull the cards from whichever response you want; just be
careful when using them because a few responses are mutually exclusive.
Warrant: China has been gearing up even while the US has a presence.
The Chinese government is working to make its military stronger, more efficient, and
more technologically advanced to become a top-tier force within thirty years. With a
budget that has soared over the past decade, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) already
ranks among the world’s leading militaries in areas including artificial intelligence and
anti-ship ballistic missiles. Experts warn that as China’s military modernizes, it could
become more assertive in the Asia-Pacific region by intensifying pressure on Taiwan
and continuing to militarize disputed islands in the East and South China Seas. U.S.
President Donald J. Trump’s administration believes China is a great-power rival, though
the PLA still has a way to go before it can challenge the United States, experts say.
Warrant: They haven’t been afraid to be aggressive with the US in the region.
Feng, Emily and Connie Hanzhang Jin. “China is subtly increasing military pressure on
Taiwan. Here’s how.” NPR, December 18, 2023,
https://www.npr.org/2023/12/18/1216317476/china-military-taiwan-air-
defense. Accessed October 9, 2024.
There is an ominous new normal in the Taiwan Strait, the narrow strip of water between
Taiwan and China. Beijing has long considered self-governed Taiwan as part of China
and has threatened to force it to "unify" with the mainland. But over the past year,
Beijing has been stepping up military pressure on Taiwan, while stopping short of an
outright invasion. China has been sending ships and planes to encircle Taiwan and
mounting more sophisticated military drills simulating a blockade of the island. In
September, Taiwan's defense ministry counted a record number of Chinese fighter
planes — 103 warplanes to be exact — flying in airspace around Taiwan in just one
day. Security experts call this "gray zone" tactics, a strategy of intimidation and daily
harassment designed to gradually wear Taiwan down, without drawing the United
States and its Asian allies, like Japan and South Korea, into a wider conflict.
Warrant: The US is present, but Beijing is still on course for a 2027 invasion.
Stewart, Phil and Idrees Ali. “How the US is preparing for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.”
Reuters, January 31, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/logistics-war-
how-washington-is-preparing-chinese-invasion-taiwan-2024-01-31/. Accessed
October 9, 2024.
The U.S. has not formally said it would intervene if China were to attack Taiwan but
President Joe Biden has repeatedly suggested he would deploy U.S. troops to defend
the island. Xi has ordered his military to be ready to take Taiwan by 2027, U.S. officials
say. But many analysts see that as an attempt to galvanize his military rather than a
timeline for invasion. A senior U.S. military official, speaking on the condition of
anonymity, said supplies of ammunition are at the top of the list of priorities in the Indo-
Pacific, followed by fuel, food and spare parts for equipment. ".
Bandow, Doug. “What would a US war with China look like?” Responsible Statecraft,
October 24, 2022, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/10/24/what-would-a-
us-war-with-china-look-like/. Accessed October 9, 2024.
“If conflict does break out, U.S. officials should not be sanguine about how it would
end. Tamping or reversing Chinese aggression in the Western Pacific could require a
massive use of force. An authoritarian CCP, always mindful of its precarious domestic
legitimacy, would not want to concede defeat even if it failed to achieve its initial
objectives. And historically, modern wars between great powers have more typically
gone long than stayed short. All of this implies that a U.S.-China war could be
incredibly dangerous, offering few plausible off-ramps and severe pressures for
escalation.” The consequences of such a conflict would spread globally, with much
greater impact than the Russo-Ukraine war. Imagine Taiwanese industry devastated
from combat or conquest. Allied sanctions against Beijing and its trading partners.
Nations big and small pushed to choose sides. Both the U.S. and China interrupting if not
sweeping the other nations’ trade from the seas. At the end, defeat for the U.S. and its
allies would be possible if not likely. In recent years U.S. wargames have generally
shown Beijing as the victor. The best case, after a fashion, appears to be an indecisive
and thus lengthy war. Concluded one analysis: “The overarching takeaway from
participants in the war game: If China invades Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific region will
plunge into a broad, drawn-out war that could include direct attacks on the U.S.,
including Hawaii and potentially the continental United States.” .
Lendon, Brad and Oren Liebermann. “War game suggests Chinese invasion of Taiwan
would fail at a huge cost to US, Chinese and Taiwanese militaries.” CNN Politics,
January 9, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/09/politics/taiwan-invasion-
war-game-intl-hnk-ml/index.html. Accessed October 9, 2024.
The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of
service members. Such losses would damage the US global position for many years,” the
report said. In most scenarios, the US Navy lost two aircraft carriers and 10 to 20 large
surface combatants. Approximately 3,200 US troops would be killed in three weeks of
combat, nearly half of what the US lost in two decades of combat in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
The 20 countries using the euro were officially in recession over the winter, latest
statistics show. Revised data from the European statistics office, Eurostat, showed the
eurozone economy contracted 0.1% in the first three months of this year and the final
three months of 2022.The group of countries therefore met the definition of a technical
recession: two-quarters of negative economic growth. Not since the COVID pandemic
has there been a six-month period where the economy shrank. Previous estimates from
Eurostat had shown a stagnant economy but these have since been revised
downwards. The European Central Bank (ECB) was expecting no growth but did not
forecast contraction.
China is the EU’s second largest trading partner for goods after the United States, with
bilateral trade reaching €739 billion in 2023. This represents a decline of 14%
compared to 2022. China is the EU's third-largest partner for exports and the biggest
for imports. The EU-China trade balance has been persistently in favour of China. In
2023, the EU deficit amounted to €292 billion. EU exports to China amounted to €223.6
billion, whereas EU imports from China amounted to €515.9 billion, indicating year-on-
year decreases of 3.1% and 18% respectively.
“2022 Transatlantic Trends” The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2022,
https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2022-
09/Transatlantic%20Trends%202022.pdf. Accessed October 9, 2024.
Pluralities in France, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Spain, Türkiye, and the United
States say they want their country to only take diplomatic steps should China invade
Taiwan. By contrast, pluralities in Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom say they want their country to join others in imposing sanctions
against China. Across the 14 countries surveyed, 35% of respondents support only
diplomatic measures and 32% joint economic sanctions while very few support
sending arms (4%) or troops (2%) to Taiwan. And 12% want their country to take no
action. The clearest preferences for an exclusively diplomatic response to a Chinese
invasion of Taiwan are from Romanian and Turkish respondents (45%), followed by
Italian (44%) and Lithuanian and Portuguese (both 38%) ones. The strongest support
for imposing joint sanctions is in Portugal (40%) and Canada, Germany, and Sweden
(each 39%). There is a gender gap in many European countries, however. Men support
sanctions more than women do in the Netherlands (45% vs. 29%), Sweden (46% vs.
32%), Germany (45% vs. 33%), the United Kingdom (45% vs. 35%), and France (33% vs.
23%). Overall, there is very little appetite for involvement beyond diplomatic measures
and sanctions. The share of respondents who want their country to send arms or troops
to Taiwan is highest in the United States, but it is small (8% Send arms to Taiwan Send
troops to Taiwan and 7% respectively). Support for these measures is also very low
among the United States’ closest allies in Europe: in the United Kingdom (5% and 3%)
and France (3% and 2%). In other countries, less than 5% of respondents support the
deployment of troops, with the lowest shares of between 1% and 2% in Italy, Poland,
Türkiye, Spain, Romania, and Lithuania. Sending arms does not have much more
support, with the highest backing for this (5%) in Canada, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom.
Delink: US is already moving away from China in status quo, sanctioning China won’t kill the
economy.
Several years ago, when China was emerging as a global manufacturing center, labor
costs were very low; however, it is not the case anymore as labor costs in China have
been steadily increasing for years. Mexico's labor costs make it cheaper to
manufacture in Mexico than in China as a result. A recent study found Mexico's
average labor cost per hour to be $4.50, compared to China's $6.50, a 44% difference.
Companies in labor-intensive industries can benefit from this cost difference. In the past
decade, China has been shifting from a cheap labor driven economy to more matured,
service-oriented markets and industries. While the economy continues to grow, prices
and wages keep on increasing as well. - Statista Companies in Mexico can invest the
savings from manufacturing in innovation and features for their customers and products
without dealing with high labor costs.
Goodman, Peter. “Why Chinese Companies Are Investing Billions in Mexico.” The New
York Times, June 20, 2023,
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/03/business/china-mexico-trade.html.
Accessed October 9, 2024.
That same objective explains why scores of major Chinese companies are investing
aggressively in Mexico, taking advantage of an expansive North American trade deal.
Tracing a path forged by Japanese and South Korean companies, Chinese firms are
establishing factories that allow them to label their goods “Made in Mexico,” then
trucking their products into the United States duty-free. The interest of Chinese
manufacturers in Mexico is part of a broader trend known as nearshoring. International
companies are moving production closer to customers to limit their vulnerability to
shipping problems and geopolitical tensions. The participation of Chinese companies in
this shift attests to the deepening assumption that the breach dividing the United States
and China will be an enduring feature of the next phase of globalization. Yet it also
reveals something more fundamental: Whatever the political strains, the commercial
forces linking the United States and China are even more powerful. Chinese companies
have no intention of forsaking the American economy, still the largest on earth.
Instead, they are setting up operations inside the North American trading bloc as a
way to supply Americans with goods, from electronics to clothing to furniture.
Warrant: Mexico has become the USA's number one trading partner.
USAFacts Team. “Who are the US’s top trade partners?” USAFacts, September 4, 2024,
https://usafacts.org/articles/who-are-the-uss-top-trade-partners/. Accessed
October 9, 2024.
Combining imports and exports, the United States’s top trade partner in 2023 was Mexico,
with nearly $798 billion in goods and services exchanged between them. Following that were
Canada ($773 billion) and China ($575 billion). These nations have been the US’s top three
every annually at least 2009, accounting for 42% of all US trade in 2023.
Analysis: I think that all three responses give you a pretty clean response against this argument.
The first response really says that invasion and sanction will happen regardless of the US
presence. The second response says that the sanctions won’t be that bad because they won’t
be multilateral. The third says that China has already found a way around the sanctions through
Mexico. Basically, the argument is completely ripped to shreds on all levels.
Turn: The US being involved in the war would make the war worse.
Bandow, Doug. “What would a US war with China look like?” Responsible Statecraft,
October 24, 2022, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/10/24/what-would-a-
us-war-with-china-look-like/. Accessed October 9, 2024.
“If conflict does break out, U.S. officials should not be sanguine about how it would end.
Tamping or reversing Chinese aggression in the Western Pacific could require a massive use of
force. An authoritarian CCP, always mindful of its precarious domestic legitimacy, would not
want to concede defeat even if it failed to achieve its initial objectives. And historically,
modern wars between great powers have more typically gone long than stayed short. All of
this implies that a U.S.-China war could be incredibly dangerous, offering few plausible off-
ramps and severe pressures for escalation.” The consequences of such a conflict would spread
globally, with much greater impact than the Russo-Ukraine war. Imagine Taiwanese industry
devastated from combat or conquest. Allied sanctions against Beijing and its trading partners.
Nations big and small pushed to choose sides. Both the U.S. and China interrupting if not
sweeping the other nations’ trade from the seas. At the end, defeat for the U.S. and its allies
would be possible if not likely. In recent years U.S. wargames have generally shown Beijing as
the victor. The best case, after a fashion, appears to be an indecisive and thus lengthy war.
Concluded one analysis: “The overarching takeaway from participants in the war game: If
China invades Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific region will plunge into a broad, drawn-out war that
could include direct attacks on the U.S., including Hawaii and potentially the continental
United States.” .
Lendon, Brad and Oren Liebermann. “War game suggests Chinese invasion of Taiwan
would fail at a huge cost to US, Chinese and Taiwanese militaries.” CNN Politics,
January 9, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/09/politics/taiwan-invasion-
war-game-intl-hnk-ml/index.html. Accessed October 9, 2024.
The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of
service members. Such losses would damage the US global position for many years,” the
report said. In most scenarios, the US Navy lost two aircraft carriers and 10 to 20 large
surface combatants. Approximately 3,200 US troops would be killed in three weeks of
combat, nearly half of what the US lost in two decades of combat in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Delink: India will turn to the US no matter what because they are worried about China.
“India-China dispute: The border row explained in 400 words.” BBC, December 13, 2022,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53062484. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Relations between India and China have been worsening. The two world powers are facing off
against each other along their disputed border in the Himalayan region. Here's what you need
to know in 400 words. What's the source of tension? The root cause is an ill-defined, 3,440km
(2,100-mile)-long disputed border. Rivers, lakes and snowcaps along the frontier mean the line
can shift, bringing soldiers face to face at many points, sparking a confrontation. The two
nations are also competing to build infrastructure along the border, which is also known as
the Line of Actual Control. India's construction of a new road to a high-altitude air base is
seen as one of the main triggers for a deadly 2020 clash with Chinese troops.
Warrant: India has turned to the US for military training and weapons.
India and the United States have a multifaceted defence partnership that entails
significant trade and large-scale joint military exercises. There is also a growing
consensus that collaboration on emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI)
can promote common security interests. In March 2021, US Secretary of Defense Llyod
Austin discussed “the contours of sharing high-end technology” in defence with his
Indian counterpart, and the two countries also formed a “Critical and Emerging
Technology Working Group” as part of the Quad security dialogue along with Japan and
Australia. As India and the United States look to navigate the road ahead, their
bilateral collaboration in the area of AI applications for military logistics can be a
pragmatic way forward.
“Joint Statement from the United States and India.” The White House, June 22, 2023,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2023/06/22/joint-statement-from-the-united-states-and-india/.
Accessed October 10, 2024.
President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. and Prime Minister Narendra Modi today affirmed a vision of
the United States and India as among the closest partners in the world – a partnership of
democracies looking into the 21st century with hope, ambition, and confidence. The U.S.-
India Comprehensive Global and Strategic Partnership is anchored in a new level of trust and
mutual understanding and enriched by the warm bonds of family and friendship that
inextricably link our countries together. Together, we will build an even stronger, diverse U.S.-
India partnership that will advance the aspirations of our people for a bright and prosperous
future grounded in respect for human rights, and shared principles of democracy, freedom, and
the rule of law. Our cooperation will serve the global good as we work through a range of
multilateral and regional groupings – particularly the Quad– to contribute toward a free,
open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific. No corner of human enterprise is untouched by the
partnership between our two great countries, which spans the seas to the stars.
Schifrin, Nick and Dan Sagalyn. “Three experts on U.S. role and response options in
Taiwan-China conflict.” PBS News, December 15, 2021,
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/three-experts-on-u-s-role-and-response-
options-in-taiwan-china-conflict. Accessed October 8, 2024.
I think the ideal policy is a clearly conditional commitment, one that's clear that we will
protect Taiwan if it's attacked by China, an unprovoked attack, but, at the same time,
clear to Taiwan that we will not come to Taiwan's aid if Taiwan provokes the attack by
declaring independence or moving too close to China's red lines. But I'd like to return to
Richard's point about that — essentially, that if we break the commitment to Taiwan,
we're giving up in East Asia. And I think this greatly exaggerates the risk. We can
explain to Japan and other allies that Taiwan is very different than they are, from the
U.S. perspective, and, most importantly, from China's perspective. China does not
think Japan is part of China. Second, we can do many things to make clear that our
commitment to Japan and our other East Asian allies stands, including increasing our
defense spending, increasing the tightness of the alliances and so forth.
Warrant: The US is still regarded as the most powerful country in the world.
According to the 2023 survey, the United States is the world’s most powerful country.
The United States has the world’s largest economy, with a GDP of $25.5 trillion in 2022
and the most massive military budget of $778 billion in 2020. The U.S. defense
spending is higher than the next ten largest defense spenders (China, India, Russia, the
United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Germany, France, Japan, South Korea, and Italy)
combined. China and Russia are the second and third most powerful countries, known
for their military spending and vast physical expanse. China also has a large economy
with a GDP of $18 trillion as of 2022. Next on the list are Germany, the United Kingdom,
Japan, and France, all of which have large economies and distribute high amounts of
international aid.
Analysis: These responses are really strong because they basically prove that India will stay with
the US no matter what it does. You must make sure to stress to your judge how valuable India
sees the US as a military partner, especially as they both try to distance themselves from China.
If you can prove to the judge that disdain for China is a stronger bond than US unreliability, you
should be able to shut down the opposing team's argument.
Delink: The relationship between the US and Japan is too important for Japan to leave it
behind.
Warrant: Japan has been an ally of the US since the end of WW2.
Vergun, David. “U.S.-Japan Alliance Increasingly Strengthened Since End of WWII.” U.S.
Department of Defense, August 14, 2020.
https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/Story/Article/2306658/.
Accessed October 10, 2024.
After the official surrender of Japan to the Allies on Sept. 2, 1945, the United States
began the process of helping to bring Japan back into the international community by
strengthening military, political and economic ties, much as it was doing with former
foes Italy and Germany. The American military occupation of Japan lasted from 1945 to
1951. During that time, Japan categorically rejected militarism, embraced democracy,
eagerly sought economic prosperity and began to embrace the U.S. as an ally and equal
partner. However, the U.S. still occupied several island chains in the Western Pacific that
used to be part of Japan. That occupation ended when the U.S. returned the Bonin
Islands, including Iwo Jima, to Japan in 1968 and Okinawa and other Ryukyu Islands in
1972. A series of treaties followed the occupation of mainland Japan. First was the San
Francisco Peace Treaty, signed Sept. 8, 1951, that went into effect April 28, 1952. It
marked the end of the Allied occupation of the Japanese mainland. Japan's first
security agreements with the United States and with nations other than the Soviet
Union also were signed then. Bilateral talks on revising the 1952 security pact began in
1959, and the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed in
Washington, Jan. 19, 1960. Also, the status of forces agreement under that treaty came
into effect, setting the rules under which U.S. forces stationed in Japan would operate
with respect to Japanese domestic laws. In 1976, the U.S. and Japan established a
subcommittee for defense cooperation in the framework of a bilateral Security
Consultative Committee, provided for under the 1960 security treaty.
In Northeast Asia, the United States is in a historically powerful position. The U.S.-
Japan security alliance has always been the cornerstone of Washington's strategy in
the region, but today the two allies cooperate and coordinate on nearly every aspect
of their foreign policy and defense strategy. As a like-minded democratic power that
seeks a free and open Indo-Pacific, Tokyo is part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,
or Quad (alongside Australia, India, and the United States). In recent years, Japan has
carved out some wiggle room from Article 9 of its constitution to allow it to conduct
military operations farther away from Japanese shores, including joint patrols with the
U.S. Navy and other partners in the South China Sea. Japan consistently raises not only
concerns over North Korea, but also the need to maintain peace and stability in the
Taiwan Strait, which has greatly irked China as it considers Taiwan's status an internal
matter. Washington and Tokyo are further deepening their intelligence sharing against
these threats, and Japan is enhancing security cooperation with other U.S. allies and
partners, such as the Philippines, South Korea, India, and Vietnam.
Japan is one of the United States’ most important trade and investment partners. In
2022, bilateral U.S.-Japan trade in goods and services was worth $309 billion. Both
exports and imports increased over 2021, as the Covid-19 pandemic restrictions eased.
U.S. goods exports to Japan were about $80 billion, while services exports were
approximately $38 billion, for a total of $119.8 billion, up 7 percent from 2021.
“Japan public sentiment toward China worsens, Cabinet Office survey finds.” The Japan
Times, January 20, 2024,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/01/20/japan/society/japan-china-
public-sentiment. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Japanese public sentiment toward China worsened in 2023, a Cabinet Office survey has
shown, amid rows over the Fukushima wastewater release and other issues. According
to the survey released Friday, 86.7% of respondents felt unfriendly toward China, up
4.9 percentage points from the preceding year, while 12.7% felt friendly, down 5.1
points. The proportion of those that believe Japan-China ties are important to both
countries and the Asia-Pacific region dropped 5.3 points to a record low of 68.2%. The
mail survey, conducted from Sept. 7 through Oct. 15 last year, covered 3,000 people
aged 18 or older across Japan, of which 55% provided valid replies.
Jett, Jennifer and Megan Lebowitz. “The U.S. and Japan announce historic upgrade in
security ties to counter China.” NBC News, April 10, 2024, https://www.
nbcnews.com/news/world/us-japan-announce-historic-upgrade-security-ties-
china-threat-looms-rcna147133. Accessed October 10, 2024.
The U.S. and Japan announced a historic upgrade to their security alliance Wednesday,
as President Joe Biden hosts Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida for an official visit
that highlights Japan’s role in countering China in the Asia-Pacific. “Through our
partnership, we have strengthened the alliance. We have expanded our work
together. We’ve raised our shared ambitions,” Biden said in his opening remarks at a
joint news conference in the White House Rose Garden. “And now the U.S.-Japan
alliance is a beacon to the entire world.” The official visit, the first by a Japanese leader
in nine years, comes amid differences between the two countries over the proposed
acquisition of U.S. Steel by a Japanese company. Kishida addressed Biden’s opposition to
the deal at the news conference, saying he hoped “these discussions will unfold in
directions that would be positive for both sides,” according to the translation.
“Investment from Japan to the U.S. can only increase upwards in the months and
years to come,” Kishida said. “And we wish to cement this win-win relationship.”
Biden said he stands by his commitment to American workers: “I’m a man of my word.
I’m going to keep it.” On Tuesday, the Bidens welcomed Kishida and his wife at the
White House before they had dinner. The Biden-Kishida summit Wednesday was
followed by a formal state dinner featuring dry-aged rib-eye steak, cherry blossoms and
a performance by Paul Simon.
Schifrin, Nick and Dan Sagalyn. “Three experts on U.S. role and response options in
Taiwan-China conflict.” PBS News, December 15, 2021,
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/three-experts-on-u-s-role-and-response-
options-in-taiwan-china-conflict. Accessed October 8, 2024.
I think the ideal policy is a clearly conditional commitment, one that's clear that we will
protect Taiwan if it's attacked by China, an unprovoked attack, but, at the same time,
clear to Taiwan that we will not come to Taiwan's aid if Taiwan provokes the attack by
declaring independence or moving too close to China's red lines. But I'd like to return to
Richard's point about that — essentially, that if we break the commitment to Taiwan,
we're giving up in East Asia. And I think this greatly exaggerates the risk. We can
explain to Japan and other allies that Taiwan is very different than they are, from the
U.S. perspective, and, most importantly, from China's perspective. China does not
think Japan is part of China. Second, we can do many things to make clear that our
commitment to Japan and our other East Asian allies stands, including increasing our
defense spending, increasing the tightness of the alliances and so forth.
Warrant: The US is still regarded as the most powerful country in the world.
According to the 2023 survey, the United States is the world’s most powerful country.
The United States has the world’s largest economy, with a GDP of $25.5 trillion in 2022
and the most massive military budget of $778 billion in 2020. The U.S. defense
spending is higher than the next ten largest defense spenders (China, India, Russia, the
United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Germany, France, Japan, South Korea, and Italy)
combined. China and Russia are the second and third most powerful countries, known
for their military spending and vast physical expanse. China also has a large economy
with a GDP of $18 trillion as of 2022. Next on the list are Germany, the United Kingdom,
Japan, and France, all of which have large economies and distribute high amounts of
international aid.
Turn: The US being involved in the war would make the war worse.
Bandow, Doug. “What would a US war with China look like?” Responsible Statecraft,
October 24, 2022, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/10/24/what-would-a-
us-war-with-china-look-like/. Accessed October 9, 2024.
“If conflict does break out, U.S. officials should not be sanguine about how it would
end. Tamping or reversing Chinese aggression in the Western Pacific could require a
massive use of force. An authoritarian CCP, always mindful of its precarious domestic
legitimacy, would not want to concede defeat even if it failed to achieve its initial
objectives. And historically, modern wars between great powers have more typically
gone long than stayed short. All of this implies that a U.S.-China war could be
incredibly dangerous, offering few plausible off-ramps and severe pressures for
escalation.” The consequences of such a conflict would spread globally, with much
greater impact than the Russo-Ukraine war. Imagine Taiwanese industry devastated
from combat or conquest. Allied sanctions against Beijing and its trading partners.
Nations big and small pushed to choose sides. Both the U.S. and China interrupting if not
sweeping the other nations’ trade from the seas. At the end, defeat for the U.S. and its
allies would be possible if not likely. In recent years U.S. wargames have generally
shown Beijing as the victor. The best case, after a fashion, appears to be an indecisive
and thus lengthy war. Concluded one analysis: “The overarching takeaway from
participants in the war game: If China invades Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific region will
plunge into a broad, drawn-out war that could include direct attacks on the U.S.,
including Hawaii and potentially the continental United States.” .
Lendon, Brad and Oren Liebermann. “War game suggests Chinese invasion of Taiwan
would fail at a huge cost to US, Chinese and Taiwanese militaries.” CNN Politics,
January 9, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/09/politics/taiwan-invasion-
war-game-intl-hnk-ml/index.html. Accessed October 9, 2024.
The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of
service members. Such losses would damage the US global position for many years,” the
report said. In most scenarios, the US Navy lost two aircraft carriers and 10 to 20 large
surface combatants. Approximately 3,200 US troops would be killed in three weeks of
combat, nearly half of what the US lost in two decades of combat in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Analysis: These responses are really strong because they basically prove that Japan will stay
with the US no matter what it does. Japan and the US have a very special and close relationship
that is unlike the relationship that the US has with Taiwan. If you can make the judge see that
Japan understands how close this relationship is, you can definitely take down the opposing
teams arguments and maybe even gain offense off the turn from the last response.
Turn: The US’s vast nuclear arsenal makes nuclear war far more likely.
Sanger, Edward. “Biden Approved Secret Nuclear Weapons Strategy Focusing on China.”
The New York Times, August 20, 2024,
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/20/us/politics/biden-nuclear-china-
russia.html. Accessed October 10, 2024.
President Biden approved in March a highly classified nuclear strategic plan for the
United States that, for the first time, reorients America’s deterrent strategy to focus
on China’s rapid expansion in its nuclear arsenal. The shift comes as the Pentagon
believes China’s stockpiles will rival the size and diversity of the United States’ and
Russia’s over the next decade. The White House never announced that Mr. Biden had
approved the revised strategy, called the “Nuclear Employment Guidance,” which also
newly seeks to prepare the United States for possible coordinated nuclear challenges
from China, Russia and North Korea. The document, updated every four years or so, is
so highly classified that there are no electronic copies, only a small number of hard
copies distributed to a few national security officials and Pentagon commanders. But
in recent speeches, two senior administration officials were allowed to allude to the
change — in carefully constrained, single sentences — ahead of a more detailed,
unclassified notification to Congress expected before Mr. Biden leaves office. “The
president recently issued updated nuclear-weapons employment guidance to account
for multiple nuclear-armed adversaries,” Vipin Narang, an M.I.T. nuclear strategist who
served in the Pentagon, said earlier this month before returning to academia. “And in
particular,” he added, the weapons guidance accounted for “the significant increase in
the size and diversity” of China’s nuclear arsenal.
Turn: Taiwan would never develop nuclear weapons because of export controls.
Export controls are designed to restrict the export and communication of sensitive
technology or strategic goods, with the aim of preventing weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) proliferation and countering international threats such as
terrorism. The controls apply to the academic community (including researchers at the
University of Edinburgh) in the same way as any organisation. Export could include the
physical movement of goods or the transfer of software, data, technology or know how
by any means (including verbal or electronic transfer). Export of controlled items can
occur in a variety of activities such as academic and commercial collaborations,
teaching, consultancy and licensing activities and even travelling to a third country
overseas with a laptop which contains controlled items.
Taiwan does not possess nuclear weapons, although it historically possessed a nuclear
weapons program. Taiwan is not believed to have biological or chemical weapons
programs, but it has been accused of possessing such programs in the past. Because of
its unique status, Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations, and cannot participate
in nonproliferation regimes as an internationally-recognized state would. Taiwan asserts
that it maintains policies in accordance with widely followed export control regimes,
despite not being able to participate in them in an official capacity. Taiwan is not
legally considered a sovereign state by most countries or international organizations,
including the UN, thus it cannot participate in international nonproliferation treaties
or export control regimes. 1 Both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the
Republic of China (ROC) lay claim to the island of Taiwan, but it is under de facto
control of the government in Taipei. Taiwan does not possess nuclear weapons,
although it attempted to acquire them in the past. 2 Despite some suspicions of
offensive and defensive chemical and biological weapon programs, there is no
conclusive evidence that Taiwan developed or deployed either.
Havren, Sari. “China’s No First Use of Nuclear Weapons Policy: Change or False Alarm?”
Royal United Services Institute, October 13, 2023, https://www.rusi.org/explore-
our-research/publications/commentary/chinas-no-first-use-nuclear-weapons-
policy-change-or-false-alarm. Accessed October 10, 2024.
weapon states’. Nonetheless, a month later, China’s proposal for global governance
seems to have dropped this decades-old policy. Up until August 2023, China had
repeatedly reaffirmed its No First Use policy from 1964 onwards, although on some
occasions Beijing has stretched it to exclude other nuclear powers, especially the US.
The dual pledges of No First Use and No Threatening to Use nuclear weapons have
long been cornerstones of China’s nuclear strategy. The fact that China’s proposal on
global governance omits these commitments – while otherwise expressing China’s
positions in a detailed manner – could indicate a change in China’s position on nuclear
weapons, especially because China has never previously wavered or appeared
ambiguous about these commitments.
Turn: The US being involved in the war would make the war worse.
Bandow, Doug. “What would a US war with China look like?” Responsible Statecraft,
October 24, 2022, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/10/24/what-would-a-
us-war-with-china-look-like/. Accessed October 9, 2024.
“If conflict does break out, U.S. officials should not be sanguine about how it would
end. Tamping or reversing Chinese aggression in the Western Pacific could require a
massive use of force. An authoritarian CCP, always mindful of its precarious domestic
legitimacy, would not want to concede defeat even if it failed to achieve its initial
objectives. And historically, modern wars between great powers have more typically
gone long than stayed short. All of this implies that a U.S.-China war could be
incredibly dangerous, offering few plausible off-ramps and severe pressures for
escalation.” The consequences of such a conflict would spread globally, with much
greater impact than the Russo-Ukraine war. Imagine Taiwanese industry devastated
from combat or conquest. Allied sanctions against Beijing and its trading partners.
Nations big and small pushed to choose sides. Both the U.S. and China interrupting if not
sweeping the other nations’ trade from the seas. At the end, defeat for the U.S. and its
allies would be possible if not likely. In recent years U.S. wargames have generally
shown Beijing as the victor. The best case, after a fashion, appears to be an indecisive
and thus lengthy war. Concluded one analysis: “The overarching takeaway from
participants in the war game: If China invades Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific region will
plunge into a broad, drawn-out war that could include direct attacks on the U.S.,
including Hawaii and potentially the continental United States.” .
Lendon, Brad and Oren Liebermann. “War game suggests Chinese invasion of Taiwan
would fail at a huge cost to US, Chinese and Taiwanese militaries.” CNN Politics,
January 9, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/09/politics/taiwan-invasion-
war-game-intl-hnk-ml/index.html. Accessed October 9, 2024.
The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of
service members. Such losses would damage the US global position for many years,” the
report said. In most scenarios, the US Navy lost two aircraft carriers and 10 to 20 large
surface combatants. Approximately 3,200 US troops would be killed in three weeks of
combat, nearly half of what the US lost in two decades of combat in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Analysis: I think this is a strong response. Honestly, there’s risk of nuclear escalation in both
worlds; however, there’s probably a higher risk in a con world than a pro world. This is because
nuclear weapons are actually present on both sides in a con world, while the nuclear weapons
are just theoretical in the pro world. If you can explain this fact to your judge, you should be
able to win this argument.
Response: Strong relations with Taiwan make it harder for the US to maintain a balance of
power in the Indo-Pacific.
Turn: If China views the US position as firm, they will act militarily.
Mastro, Oriana Skylar. “This Is What America Is Getting Wrong About China and Taiwan.”
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, October 18, 2023,
https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/what-america-getting-wrong-about-china-and-
taiwan. Accessed October 12, 2024.
For now, lingering doubts over Chinese military capabilities and the specter of U.S. and
allied retaliation are enough to restrain Mr. Xi. But if he concludes that the United
States has broken, once and for all, from its previous position on Taiwan and is bent on
thwarting unification, he may feel that he must act militarily. The United States might
be able to build the necessary military power in the region to deter a Chinese war of
choice. But the level of dominance needed to stop Mr. Xi from launching a war he sees as
necessary might be impossible to achieve. Reassuring China would require Mr. Biden to
reiterate that the United States does not support Taiwanese independence or oppose
the island’s peaceful unification with China and that, ultimately, Taiwan’s fate is up to
Taipei and Beijing. It would mean moving away from attempts to create international
space for Taiwan and chastising Beijing when it pulls away Taipei’s diplomatic partners.
The White House would also need to use what leverage it has to discourage members of
Congress from visiting Taiwan and threaten to veto provocative legislation.
Ministry spokesman Wu Qian stressed that Washington’s actions send a wrong signal
to the separatist forces seeking Taiwan’s independence. He also accused the United
States of “stirring up tensions” and pushing Taiwan into a dangerous scenario of
conflict. He also stated that this measure seriously violates the “one China” principle
and the three joint statements between Beijing and Washington, which represents a
serious threat to stability. Wu urged the US to abandon its double talk regarding this
issue and to cease its military actions in the region to avoid further damage to relations
between the armed forces of both countries. The functionary stressed that the People’s
Liberation Army is prepared to thwart any separatist activity or external intervention,
and reaffirmed its commitment to defend China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
“What needs to be emphasized is that arming Taiwan is promoting ‘Taiwan’s
independence,’ ‘Taiwan’s independence’ means war, and using Taiwan to contain China
will only reap disastrous consequences,” the spokesman said.
Sheng, Yang and Liu Xuanzun. “US ‘keeps creating tension’ over Taiwan with new arms
funding.” Global Times China, August 31, 2023,
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202308/1297345.shtml. Accessed October 12,
2024.
The US intends to keep creating the tension of the Taiwan question to provoke China
rather than to ease the tension, analysts said on Thursday, as US President Joe Biden's
administration has approved a military transfer to the island of Taiwan under the
Foreign Military Financing, or FMF, which is normally used for sovereign states. A
notification sent to the US Congress, seen by Reuters, informed congressional
committees of the US State Department's intention to obligate up to $80 million of FMF
funds in support of Taiwan. "This violates the one-China principle and the stipulations
of the three China-US joint communiqués, especially the August 17 Communiqué,"
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said at a routine press conference
on Thursday. "It seriously violates international law and basic norms governing
international relations, undermines China's sovereignty and security interests, and
jeopardizes peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits, and sends a seriously wrong
signal to the separatist forces for 'Taiwan independence.' China firmly opposes and
sternly condemns this," Wang said.
Kristof, Nicholas. “What Worries Me About War With China After My Visit to Taiwan.”
The New York Times, January 27, 2024,
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/27/opinion/china-taiwan-war.html. Accessed
October 12, 2024.
There is a fine line between deterring China and provoking it. My take is that while we
should do significantly more to help Taiwan boost defenses and deter aggression, we
should do so quietly, without needlessly humiliating China. Sometimes Americans loudly
embrace Taiwan in ways that inflame tensions at times when we should be hoping to
lower them. Let me also make the case that we think too much in terms of an invasion —
when the greater risk may be China’s taking lesser nibbles to pressure Taiwan, leading to
the possibility of accidents and escalation that could drag us into an unintended world
war, as happened in 1914.
Explanation: A good starting place here is the answer that the US balance of power is
predicated on peace in the region and inflaming/provoking China (potentially triggering an
invasion) might be very unfavorable to that goal. Backing off on our military support to Taiwan
may be worth it if it reduces conflict escalation risk (wouldn’t it be better for Taiwan not to
need that military aid at all?).
Response: Support for Taiwan increases the likelihood of conflict, which harms allies.
Turn: Our allies specifically are calling for a peaceful solution, not a military none.
Liff, Adam. “How Japan and South Korea diverge on Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.”
Brookings Institute, February 22, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-
japan-and-south-korea-diverge-on-taiwan-and-the-taiwan-strait/. Accessed
October 12, 2024.
Over the past three years, concerns about a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait have
for the first time simultaneously emerged in Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) as a
topic of mainstream policy discussions. U.S. President Joe Biden’s historic joint
statements in spring 2021 emphasizing “the importance of peace and stability in the
Taiwan Strait” with then-Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and then-ROK President
Moon Jae-in, respectively, were key catalysts. Additional impetus came from Russia’s
February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and saber-rattling by the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), especially the unprecedented, large-scale military exercises around Taiwan in
August 2022 following then-U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.
Most notably, new leadership in Seoul and Tokyo agreed last summer to a trilateral
statement that “reaffirm[ed] the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan
Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity in the international
community” and called “for a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.”.
Warrant: America’s alliances in the Indo-pacific are extremely strong – No risk to them.
alliances-allies-geopolitics-balance-power-asia-india-taiwan-japan-south-korea-
quad-aukus/. Accessed October 12, 2024.
But as 2023 draws to a close, it is remarkable to observe that U.S. alliances and
partnerships in the Indo-Pacific are just about the deepest and most robust they have
been in all their history. Some of this is a testament to the exceptional durability of the
United States’ alliances and partnerships, given that they survived—and, in the case of
India and Japan, even thrived—in spite of Trump’s bullying and destructiveness. Indeed,
Washington has been cultivating and institutionalizing these friendship networks for
decades. Credit is also due to the Biden administration: Not only has it returned these
important relationships to their normal status quo following four years of disruption
under Trump, but it has also bolstered them to enhance deterrence against China and
North Korea, the two main threats in the region.
Delink: America’s allies in the region still support a One China policies.
Pak, James and Mike Mochizuki. “The U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Partnership:
Pursuing Regional Stability and Avoiding Military Escalation.” Quincy Institute for
Responsible Statecraft, April 22, 2024, https://quincyinst.org/research/the-u-s-
japan-south-korea-trilateral-partnership-pursuing-regional-stability-and-avoiding-
military-escalation/. Accessed October 12, 2024.
At the same time, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have in recent years become
more reluctant to endorse the original understandings they each reached with China
about Taiwan. For the sake of reassurance, the three countries together should clearly
confirm in official statements their One China policies and declare that they oppose
unilateral changes to the status quo by any side, do not support Taiwan independence,
and will accept any resolution of the Taiwan issue (including unification) achieved by
peaceful and non–coercive means. Each country’s respective relationship with Taiwan
should also remain strictly unofficial.
Non-Unique: Other countries in Asia are already forming their own alliances.
DePetris, Daniel. “Bridging the divide: the significance of the US-South Korea-Japan
trilateral.” Lowy Institute, August 17, 2023, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-
interpreter/bridging-divide-significance-us-south-korea-japan-trilateral. Accessed
October 12, 2024.
South Korea-Japan relations still aren’t rosy, but they are far better off today than they
were four or five years ago. Exhibit A: this week’s trilateral summit hosted by US
President Joe Biden at the Camp David presidential retreat. The administration has high
hopes for the session; as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told reporters on 15
August, the meeting is “historic” in-and-of-itself. “Strengthening our trilateral
cooperation is critical to delivering for our people, for the region, and for the world.” The
deliverables are still up in the air, but there are rumours that the three countries will
set up a hot-line for consultations during times of crisis, regularise trilateral military
exercises, hold trilateral leaders’ summits on an annual basis, and ensure that their
respective national security advisers are meeting at least twice a year. While this may
not sound revolutionary, one would be hard pressed to envision a similar set of
agreements even a year ago.
Explanation: This response reframes the state of US alliances in a few ways: 1) South Korea and
Japan both want the priority in Taiwan and the SCS to be peace (the best way to do that is
probably not to keep upsetting China). 2) they also have both heavily invested into this trilateral
relationship with the US and are not going to jump ship if we pull some military aid to Taiwan.
3) I suppose they still need us and we need them to collectively hedge against North Korea even
if everything went south and China forcibly took back Taiwan.
Delink: Soth Korea and Japan are engaging in mainstream policy discussions now.
Liff, Adam. “How Japan and South Korea diverge on Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.”
Brookings Institute, February 22, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-
japan-and-south-korea-diverge-on-taiwan-and-the-taiwan-strait/. Accessed
October 12, 2024.
Over the past three years, concerns about a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait have
for the first time simultaneously emerged in Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) as a
topic of mainstream policy discussions. U.S. President Joe Biden’s historic joint
statements in spring 2021 emphasizing “the importance of peace and stability in the
Taiwan Strait” with then-Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and then-ROK President
Moon Jae-in, respectively, were key catalysts. Additional impetus came from Russia’s
February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and saber-rattling by the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), especially the unprecedented, large-scale military exercises around Taiwan in
August 2022 following then-U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.
Most notably, new leadership in Seoul and Tokyo agreed last summer to a trilateral
statement that “reaffirm[ed] the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan
Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity in the international
community” and called “for a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.”.
alliances-allies-geopolitics-balance-power-asia-india-taiwan-japan-south-korea-
quad-aukus/. Accessed October 12, 2024.
But as 2023 draws to a close, it is remarkable to observe that U.S. alliances and
partnerships in the Indo-Pacific are just about the deepest and most robust they have
been in all their history. Some of this is a testament to the exceptional durability of the
United States’ alliances and partnerships, given that they survived—and, in the case of
India and Japan, even thrived—in spite of Trump’s bullying and destructiveness. Indeed,
Washington has been cultivating and institutionalizing these friendship networks for
decades. Credit is also due to the Biden administration: Not only has it returned these
important relationships to their normal status quo following four years of disruption
under Trump, but it has also bolstered them to enhance deterrence against China and
North Korea, the two main threats in the region.
Turn: The trilateral partnerships in the Indo-Pacific are strong but must stay unofficial to
succeed.
Park, James and Mike Mochizuki. “The U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Partnership:
Pursuing Regional Stability and Avoiding Military Escalation.” Quincy Institute for
Responsible Statecraft, April 22, 2024, https://quincyinst.org/research/the-u-s-
japan-south-korea-trilateral-partnership-pursuing-regional-stability-and-avoiding-
military-escalation/#h-executive-summary. Accessed October 12, 2024.
At the same time, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have in recent years become
more reluctant to endorse the original understandings they each reached with China
about Taiwan. For the sake of reassurance, the three countries together should clearly
confirm in official statements their One China policies and declare that they oppose
unilateral changes to the status quo by any side, do not support Taiwan independence,
and will accept any resolution of the Taiwan issue (including unification) achieved by
peaceful and non–coercive means. Each country’s respective relationship with Taiwan
should also remain strictly unofficial.
DePetris, Daniel. “Bridging the divide: The significance of the US-South Korea-Japan
trilateral. Lowy Institute, August 17, 2023, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-
interpreter/bridging-divide-significance-us-south-korea-japan-trilateral. Accessed
October 12, 2024.
The Philippines may be the oldest US treaty ally in Asia, but South Korea and Japan are
arguably the closest. The US-South Korea mutual defence treaty will turn 70 years old
this October, and both countries have spent the last several months implementing the
April 2023 Washington Declaration that reiterates Washington’s extended deterrence
commitment to Seoul in the face of North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile capability.
Japan, meanwhile, is undergoing its own defence transformation of sorts, planning a
doubling of its defence budget over the next five years and boosting the
interoperability of their forces with countries from the Philippines to Australia.
Explanation: The US is obviously heavily invested in the democracies in the region. Appeasing
China 1) keeps the peace, keeping Taiwan safe and 2) protects our ties with Japan and South
Korea, the two big democratic strongholds in the region.
A/2: Increasing military support deters China from using force for
reunification.
Mastro, Oriana. “This Is What America Is Getting Wrong About China and Taiwan.”
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, October 18, 2023,
https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/what-america-getting-wrong-about-china-and-
taiwan. Accessed October 12, 2024.
For now, lingering doubts over Chinese military capabilities and the specter of U.S. and
allied retaliation are enough to restrain Mr. Xi. But if he concludes that the United States
has broken, once and for all, from its previous position on Taiwan and is bent on
thwarting unification, he may feel that he must act militarily. The United States might
be able to build the necessary military power in the region to deter a Chinese war of
choice. But the level of dominance needed to stop Mr. Xi from launching a war he sees as
necessary might be impossible to achieve. Reassuring China would require Mr. Biden to
reiterate that the United States does not support Taiwanese independence or oppose
the island’s peaceful unification with China and that, ultimately, Taiwan’s fate is up to
Taipei and Beijing. It would mean moving away from attempts to create international
space for Taiwan and chastising Beijing when it pulls away Taipei’s diplomatic partners.
The White House would also need to use what leverage it has to discourage members of
Congress from visiting Taiwan and threaten to veto provocative legislation.
Ministry spokesman Wu Qian stressed that Washington’s actions send a wrong signal
to the separatist forces seeking Taiwan’s independence. He also accused the United
States of “stirring up tensions” and pushing Taiwan into a dangerous scenario of
conflict. He also stated that this measure seriously violates the “one China” principle
and the three joint statements between Beijing and Washington, which represents a
serious threat to stability. Wu urged the US to abandon its double talk regarding this
issue and to cease its military actions in the region to avoid further damage to relations
between the armed forces of both countries. The functionary stressed that the People’s
Liberation Army is prepared to thwart any separatist activity or external intervention,
and reaffirmed its commitment to defend China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
“What needs to be emphasized is that arming Taiwan is promoting ‘Taiwan’s
independence,’ ‘Taiwan’s independence’ means war, and using Taiwan to contain China
will only reap disastrous consequences,” the spokesman said.
Sheng, Yang and Liu Xuanzun. “US ‘keeps creating tension’ over Taiwan with new arms
funding.” Global Times China, August 31, 2023,
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202308/1297345.shtml. Accessed October 12,
2024.
The US intends to keep creating the tension of the Taiwan question to provoke China
rather than to ease the tension, analysts said on Thursday, as US President Joe Biden's
administration has approved a military transfer to the island of Taiwan under the
Foreign Military Financing, or FMF, which is normally used for sovereign states. A
notification sent to the US Congress, seen by Reuters, informed congressional
Kristof, Nicholas. “What Worries Me About War With China After My Visit to Taiwan.”
The New York Times, January 27, 2024,
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/27/opinion/china-taiwan-war.html. Accessed
October 12, 2024.
There is a fine line between deterring China and provoking it. My take is that while we
should do significantly more to help Taiwan boost defenses and deter aggression, we
should do so quietly, without needlessly humiliating China. Sometimes Americans loudly
embrace Taiwan in ways that inflame tensions at times when we should be hoping to
lower them. Let me also make the case that we think too much in terms of an invasion —
when the greater risk may be China’s taking lesser nibbles to pressure Taiwan, leading to
the possibility of accidents and escalation that could drag us into an unintended world
war, as happened in 1914.
Explanation: Again, a good starting place here is the answer that the US balance of power is
predicated on peace in the region and inflaming/provoking China (potentially triggering an
invasion) might be very unfavorable to that goal. Backing off on our military support to Taiwan
may be worth it if it reduces conflict escalation risk (wouldn’t it be better for Taiwan not to
need that military aid at all?).
Response: Taiwan is not necessary due to other countries in the Indo-Pac region.
Delink: The US has intelligence sharing agreements with South Korea and Japan.
Clark, Colin. “South Korea and Japan resume intel sharing agreement, but not all
problems are solved.” Breaking Defense News, April 17, 2023,
https://breakingdefense.com/2023/04/south-korea-and-japan-resume-intel-
sharing-agreement-but-not-all-problems-are-solved/. Accessed October 12, 2024.
Getting the deal signed was a big win for the Obama administration, but a trade dispute
and continuing tensions over the comfort women issue led South Korea to pause
participation in the deal in 2019. At least, the trade dispute was the nominal reason:
Relations between the two countries have been rocky for decades. Japan, Korea’s former
colonial master, has never directly apologized for its behavior during World War II, and
the issue of so-called comfort women, Koreans forced to sleep with Japanese soldiers,
still resonates. Since then, the governments in both countries have shifted, and in 2022
officials made clear there was interest in resuming GSOMIA. Following the March
summit, Yoon announced plans to “normalize” the agreement going forward.
Delink: Taiwan is not the only country that needs cooperation for intelligence sharing to
succeed.
Curtis, Lisa, Evan Wright, and Hannah Kelley. “Forging a New Era of U.S.-Japan-South
Korea Trilateral Cooperation.” Center for a New American Security, March 21,
2024, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/forging-a-new-era-of-u-s-japan-
south-korea-trilateral-cooperation. Accessed October 12, 2024.
Encourage trilateral cooperation beyond the Indo-Pacific. Japan and South Korea have
coordinated some diplomatic activities in response to the Israel-Hamas conflict. The
United States should take advantage of this progress and encourage trilateral
cooperation in other regional or functional areas of mutual interest, such as energy
security in the Middle East or Russia’s war in Ukraine. Increase trilateral intelligence
sharing to enhance collective maritime domain awareness. The three countries should
begin strengthening intelligence sharing beyond the North Korean missile threat by
strengthening cooperation on maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Delink: The US has a trilateral relationship with Japan and South Korea.
Park, James and Mike Mochizuki. “The U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Partnership:
Pursuing Regional Stability and Avoiding Military Escalation.” Quincy Institute for
Responsible Statecraft, April 22, 2024, https://quincyinst.org/research/the-u-s-
japan-south-korea-trilateral-partnership-pursuing-regional-stability-and-avoiding-
military-escalation/#h-executive-summary. Accessed October 12, 2024.
A trilateral partnership is emerging in northeast Asia. Building off last August’s Camp
David summit between the countries’ leaders, the United States, Japan, and South Korea
are now engaging militarily in an unprecedented fashion, shaping an alignment aimed
to counter North Korea and China.
Delink: Japan is open about intelligence sharing with the United States.
“The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,
2024, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html.
Accessed October 12, 2024.
Communications and Electronics: The two Governments will provide mutual support to
ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities. Intelligence
Activities: The two Governments will cooperate in intelligence activities in order to
ensure effective bilateral operations. This will include coordination of requirements,
collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence products. Each Government
will be responsible for the security of shared intelligence. Logistics Support Activities:
U.S. Forces and the Self-Defense Forces will conduct logistics support activities efficiently
and properly in accordance with appropriate bilateral arrangements.
Explanation: The place to start here is that we share intelligence with Japan and South Korea
already. Their argument is probably not that specific. Make them a) make a founded claim that
Taiwan would stop sharing intelligence if we reduce our military support, b) do the probability
work on that claim, and c) THEN point out what kind of shortfall we’d have on intelligence
about China considering we’d still have these two big allies in the reason sharing information
with us.
Response: Reducing military support for Taiwan could actually decrease tensions and promote
diplomatic solutions in the region.
Turn: Reducing military support for Taiwan could lead to improved U.S.-China relations and
regional stability.
Swaine, Michael. “Stabilizing the Growing Taiwan Crisis: New Messaging and
Understandings are Urgently Needed.” Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft,
https://quincyinst.org/research/stabilizing-the-growing-taiwan-crisis-new-
messaging-and-understandings-are-urgently-needed/#. Accessed October 11,
2024.
Turn: China's aggression is partly a response to perceived U.S. military threats in the region.
Mastro, Oriana Skylar. “The Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing Might Resort to Force.”
Foreign Affairs, June 31, 2021,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-06-03/china-taiwan-war-
temptation. Accessed October 11, 2024.
But China could decide to escalate much more rapidly if it concluded that the United
States was likely to intervene militarily regardless of whether Beijing moved swiftly or
gradually. Chinese military strategists believe that if they give the United States time to
mobilize and amass firepower in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait, China’s chances of
victory will decrease substantially. As a result, they could decide to preemptively hit
U.S. bases in the region, crippling Washington’s ability to respond. In other words, U.S.
deterrence—to the extent that it is based on a credible threat to intervene militarily to
protect Taiwan—could actually incentivize an attack on U.S. forces once Beijing has
decided to act. The more credible the American threat to intervene, the more likely
China would be to hit U.S. forces in the region in its opening salvo. But if China thought
the United States might stay out of the conflict, it would decline to attack U.S. forces in
the region, since doing so would inevitably bring the United States into the war.
Response: The United States can demonstrate its commitment to democracy in East Asia
through non-military means.
Delink: Economic and diplomatic support can be more effective in promoting democracy than
military aid.
O’Hanlon, Michael, “Should the United States change its policies toward Taiwan?”
Brookings, April 16, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/should-the-united-
states-change-its-policies-toward-taiwan/. Accessed October 11, 2024.
Raw military power still has a role to play in undergirding deterrence. But whatever the
utility of such a capability against a massive invasion attempt, it is less germane against
the much more likely scenario of limited aggression, to include a blockade of some
type. In situations where China had not necessarily caused large numbers of casualties
itself, the practicality or wisdom of a U.S. response that could quickly kill tens of
thousands is not obvious. The essence of a better and more credible strategy should
therefore be integrated, and asymmetric, deterrence. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin
has been rightly emphasizing the integrated element, just as I did in my 2019 book, “The
Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great-Power War over Small Stakes.” .
O’Hanlon, Michael, “Should the United States change its policies toward Taiwan?”
Brookings, April 16, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/should-the-united-
states-change-its-policies-toward-taiwan/. Accessed October 11, 2024.
Right now, of course, the Western world’s combined dependencies often are more than
25 to 50 percent, so we need to diversify and harden our economies. In other words, we
must imagine ourselves in an economic war with China and be sure that our economies
and peoples could survive that war (even if they face inevitable hardship in the process).
If the threat of economic pain and punishment is to be a cornerstone of our deterrent
against limited attacks in particular, the ability of the United States and allies to
persevere in the face of inevitable Chinese retaliation in kind must be ensured.
Delink: Military support can sometimes undermine democratic processes and institutions.
Explanation: This argument presents alternative methods for the United States to support
democracy in East Asia beyond military aid. It suggests that economic, diplomatic, and
multilateral approaches might be more effective and sustainable in promoting democratic
values.
Response: Reducing military support for Taiwan could lead to regional de-escalation and
cooperative security arrangements.
“De-Escalation and War Termination in Multi-Domain Wars.” Center for Global Security
Search, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 2021,
https://cgsr.llnl.gov/sites/cgsr/files/2024-08/DEWT_Workshop_Summary.pdf.
Accessed October 11, 2024.
Craig, Anthony and Valeriano, Brandon. “Conceptualising Cyber Arm Races.” 8th
International Conference on Cyber Conflict, 2016,
https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/Art-10-Conceptualising-Cyber-Arms-
Races.pdf. Accessed October 11, 2024.
Arms races have been the subject of much research in the field of international
relations as scholars have attempted to investigate their causes and consequences. In
its traditional conceptualisation, an arms race results from mutual insecurity and the
need to defend against an external threat. The build-up of arms is a core principle in
realist theory, which tells us that the anarchical and self-help nature of the international
system creates powerful incentives for countries to seek security through military
strength and deter potential aggressors in an environment where they can never trust
others’ intentions.
Explanation: This argument suggests that reducing military support for Taiwan could lead to a
more cooperative regional security environment, potentially avoiding an arms race. It
emphasizes the role of diplomacy, mutual security arrangements, and economic
interdependence in maintaining stability.
Response: Reducing military support for Taiwan could actually decrease the likelihood of
Chinese invasion by reducing cross-strait tensions.
The United States and its allies, on one side, and China, on the other, all perceive
themselves as defensively oriented. Each side perceives the other to be seeking enough
superiority to achieve (or retain) regional hegemony. China sees Taiwan as an internal
affair, as affirmed by the 1979 mutual recognition agreement between the United
States and China. Hence, China sees its acquisition of capabilities to prevent the
breaking away of Taiwan as defensive. The United States and its partners see China’s
increasing capabilities as intended to bring about forceful absorption of Taiwan and see
themselves to be defensively protecting Taiwan’s freedom. Similar differences in
perspective affect disputes over islands, reefs, and maritime resources in the South and
East China Seas, though these are less strategically fraught than Taiwan.
Turn: Diplomatic engagement and economic integration, rather than military deterrence, may
be more effective in preventing Chinese aggression towards Taiwan.
Another dimension of this strategy is economics. Integrating Taiwan more deeply into
the global economy serves multiple purposes. It not only bolsters Taiwan’s economic
resilience but also binds the interests of other countries with Taiwan’s stability. This
economic interdependence creates a web of shared interests that acts as a deterrent
against unilateral aggression by Beijing. The efficacy of this approach is evident.
Diplomatic engagement has enabled Taiwan to navigate through a landscape riddled with
threats in the past, maintaining its de facto independence without provoking direct
conflict. This success underscores the potency of diplomacy over military escalation.
Moreover, diplomatic engagement aligns with the global community’s broader goals. In
an era where challenges like climate change and global health crises demand
international cooperation, Taiwan’s involvement contributes significantly to these
global public goods. Its exclusion, driven by geopolitical rivalries, does a disservice to
the global community. Taiwan’s status quo is fragile. In a world shaped by heightened
US-China tensions, maintaining it requires a robust diplomatic effort. Only diplomacy can
provide credible assurances to China that no one is seeking unilateral changes to the
status quo.
Explanation: This argument suggests that reducing military support for Taiwan could actually
decrease the likelihood of Chinese invasion by addressing some of the root causes of tension. It
emphasizes the importance of economic ties and diplomatic engagement in maintaining
stability.
Response: An independent Taiwan means independent foreign policies among U.S. allies in the
region.
Delink: In response to military and economic competition between the United States and
China, Southeast Asian nations have developed greater strategic autonomy to insulate
themselves from any military or economic fallout.
Explanation: This argument suggests that reducing military support for Taiwan could lead to
more independent and balanced foreign policies among U.S. allies, rather than pushing them
towards other powers.
Con Arguments
Con Arguments Nov/Dec 2024
Semiconductors are very important for modern technology. They help power the
devices and technologies we use every day. Without them, our world would be very
different. These small electronic pieces are like Lego blocks. They help to build the
circuits inside our phones, computers, and other gadgets. This makes it possible to do
complex tasks. From processing information to storing data, semiconductors have
revolutionized the way we communicate, work, and entertain ourselves. From
smartphones to computers, from cars to medical equipment, semiconductors are the
unsung heroes that make it all possible. .
“Taiwan’s dominance of the chip industry makes it more important.” The Economist,
March 6, 2023, https://www.economist.com/special-
report/2023/03/06/taiwans-dominance-of-the-chip-industry-makes-it-more-
important. Accessed October 7, 2024.
They are the chips that power everything from mobile phones to electric cars—and they
make up 15% of Taiwan’s GDP. Taiwan produces over 60% of the world’s
semiconductors and over 90% of the most advanced ones. Most are manufactured by
a single company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC). Until
now, the most advanced have been made only in Taiwan. The semiconductor industry
is called Taiwan’s “silicon shield”, giving the world a big reason to defend the island.
Yet chips are the industry most affected by the split between America and China. Parts
of the shield are now moving abroad. In December TSMC held a ceremony to mark the
start of a chip plant (or “fab”) in Arizona. Joe Biden was there, as were Tim Cook from
Apple and TSMC’s founder, Morris Chang. Mr Chang said TSMC would triple its
investment in Arizona to $40bn, open a second fab in 2026 and make three-nanometre
chips, now the most advanced, in America. Mr Biden declared that “American
manufacturing is back, folks.” Mr Chang more morosely called globalisation and free
trade “almost dead”. The chip industry was built on globalisation, with every part of
the supply chain supporting it. TSMC’s fabs, based on efficiency and high-skilled, long-
hour labour, could make chips faster and more accurately than any rival. Experts agree
that replicating this supply chain elsewhere would be inefficient. Mr Chang told
reporters in November that the cost of making chips in America would be 55% higher.
He reportedly told Nancy Pelosi that American efforts to bring the business home were
“doomed to fail”. Yet the shift to local supply chains is happening, boosted by covid-19
and the war in Ukraine. Governments want critical tech made in safer places, closer to
home. And America and China are competing to control the most sophisticated chips
that may prove crucial to the next generation of advanced weapons.
Warrant: The United States specifically receives a lot of semiconductors from Taiwan.
Shepardson, David. “US official says Chinese seizure of TSMC in Taiwan would be
'absolutely devastating'.” Reuters, May 8, 2024,
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-official-says-chinese-seizure-tsmc-
taiwan-would-be-absolutely-devastating-2024-05-08. Accessed October 7, 2024.
U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo said Wednesday a Chinese invasion of Taiwan
and seizure of chips producer TSMC would be "absolutely devastating" to the American
economy. Asked at a U.S. House hearing about the impact, Raimondo said "it would
be absolutely devastating," declining to comment on how or if it will happen, adding:
"Right now, the United States buys 92% of its leading edge chips from TSMC in
Taiwan." TSMC declined to comment. Last month, Raimondo announced the Commerce
Department would award TSMC's U.S. unit a $6.6 billion subsidy for its most advanced
semiconductor production in Phoenix, Arizona and up to $5 billion in low-cost
government loans. TSMC agreed to expand its planned investment by $25 billion to $65
billion and to add a third Arizona fab by 2030, Commerce said in announcing the
preliminary award. The Taiwanese company will produce the world's most advanced 2
nanometer technology at its second Arizona fab expected to begin production in 2028,
the department said. TSMC, the world's largest contract chipmaker and a major supplier
to Apple and Nvidia had previously announced plans to invest $40 billion in Arizona.
TSMC expects to begin high-volume production in its first U.S. fab there by the first half
of 2025, Commerce said. Congress in 2022 approved the Chips and Science Act to boost
domestic semiconductor output with $52.7 billion in research and manufacturing
subsidies to wean the United States from reliance on Asia for chips. Lawmakers also
approved $75 billion in government loan authority. A 2023 U.S. government paper
estimated a major manufacturing disruption in Taiwan could lead to as high as a 59%
increase in the U.S. price of logic chips that domestic downstream producers would
have to pay.
Engel, Richard, Charlotte Gardiner, Jennifer Jett, and Alexander Smith. “Why war with
China over Taiwan could ruin the global economy.” NBC News, June 30, 2023,
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/taiwan-war-china-us-ruin-global-
economy-semiconductors-chips-rcna91321. Accessed October 7, 2024.
A military conflict over Taiwan would set the global economy back decades because of
the crippling disruption to the supply chain of crucial semiconductors, according to the
head of one of the island’s leading makers of microchips. Taiwan, a self-ruling
democracy about 100 miles off China, makes the world’s most advanced microchips —
the brains inside every piece of technology from smartphones and modern cars to
artificial intelligence and fighter jets. China claims Taiwan as its territory and has said it
would be prepared to use force to take control of the island, although it has not laid out
any timeline for doing so. Officially, the U.S. discourages conflict but takes a neutral
stance, although President Joe Biden has repeatedly suggested he would step in to
defend Taiwan. If the industry were to be disrupted by military conflict, the impact on
the global economy would be “huge,” said Miin Wu, the founder and chief executive
of the Taiwanese chipmaker Macronix. “My opinion is, you will be set back at least 20
years,” he told NBC News on Monday in the company’s showroom at Hsinchu Science
Park in northwestern Taiwan. The island is a microchip fabrication hotbed, producing
60% of the world’s semiconductors — and around 93% of the most advanced ones,
according to a 2021 report from the Boston Consulting Group. The U.S., South Korea and
China also produce semiconductors, but Taiwan dominates the market, which was
worth almost $600 billion last year.
Ismay, John, Edward Wong, and Pablo Robles. “A New Pacific Arsenal to Counter China.”
The New York Times, April 26, 2024,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/04/26/us/politics/us-china-military-
bases-weapons.html. Accessed October 7, 2024.
Taiwan’s foreign minister, Joseph Wu, said in an interview in Taipei that the
strengthened alliances and evolving military force postures were critical to deterring
China. “We are very happy to see that many countries in this region are coming to the
realization that they also have to be prepared for further expansions of the P.R.C.,” he
said, referring to the People’s Republic of China. To some Chinese military strategists,
the U.S. efforts are aimed at keeping China’s naval forces behind the “first island chain”
— islands close to mainland Asia that run from Okinawa in Japan to Taiwan to the
Philippines. U.S. military assets along these islands could prevent Chinese warships
from getting into the open Pacific waters farther east if conflict were to break out.
Leaders in China’s People’s Liberation Army also talk of establishing military
dominance of the “second island chain” — which is farther out in the Pacific and
includes Guam, Palau and West Papua.
Warrant: China would take control of semiconductor production if they controlled the island.
Taiwan sits in the so-called "first island chain", which includes a list of US-friendly
territories that are crucial to Washington's foreign policy in the region. China's
increasingly aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea has also made Taiwan more
significant to US calculations. Taiwan's economy is another factor. Much of the world's
electronics - from phones to electric cars - are powered by computer chips made in
Taiwan. By one measure, a single Taiwanese company - the Taiwan Semiconductor
Manufacturing Company or TSMC - has over half of the world's market. So if China
takes the island, it could be freer to project power in the western Pacific and rival the
US. Beijing would also have control over an industry that drive the global economy.
But China insists that its intentions are peaceful - and accuses the US of encircling it with
military bases that stretch from Australia in the south to Japan in the north.
Impact: Disruption of semiconductor production would cost a trillion dollars per year.
Reuters. “Top US spy says Chinese invasion halting Taiwan chip production would be
'enormous' global economic blow.” Reuters, May 4, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/technology/top-us-spy-says-chinese-invasion-halting-
taiwan-chip-production-would-be-2023-05-04. Accessed October 7, 2024.
A Chinese invasion of Taiwan could potentially halt production by the world's largest
advanced semiconductor chip maker, wiping out up to $1 trillion per year from the
global economy per year in the first few years, the top U.S. intelligence official said on
Thursday. U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines presented what she called a
"general estimate" during testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. She
noted that the advanced semiconductor chips produced by Taiwan Semiconductor
Manufacturing Company Ltd (TSMC) are used in 90 percent of "almost every category of
electronic device around the world." If a Chinese invasion stopped TSMC from producing
those chips, "it will have an enormous global financial impact that I think runs
somewhere between $600 billion to $1 trillion on an annual basis for the first few
years," she said.
Shepardson, David. “US official says Chinese seizure of TSMC in Taiwan would be
'absolutely devastating'.” Reuters, May 8, 2024,
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-official-says-chinese-seizure-tsmc-
taiwan-would-be-absolutely-devastating-2024-05-08. Accessed October 7, 2024.
Analysis: This argument is two-fold. The first part is that a Chinese invasion would significantly
hurt semiconductor production. The key to this part really relies on convincing the judge that
US military presence is an effective deterrence to a Chinese invasion. The second part is that a
reduced military presence would lead to China capturing the island and controlling
semiconductor chip production. The key to this part is proving that China would be bad to the
rest of the world if they seized production.
Argument: A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would lead to the global community sanctioning
China, disrupting the global supply chain and global economy. US deterrence prevents this
sanctioning and disruption from occurring.
Lunness, Jake. “China’s role in global trade and why it still matters.” Columbia
Threadneedle Investments, March 23, 2023,
https://www.columbiathreadneedle.co.uk/en/inst/insights/chinas-role-in-global-
trade-and-why-it-still-matters/. Accessed October 8, 2024.
China is a big deal: it singlehandedly accounts for more than 18% of the world’s GDP
(gross domestic product). Across the world’s 10 biggest economies it is the top trading
partner for eight and a top five partner for the remaining two. It has the world’s
largest trade surplus at $676 billion, which is roughly equivalent to the GDP of Poland.
And it is the leading import market for six out of 10 of the world’s largest economies
(Figure 1). Within the emerging Asian economies, China is the largest export market for
these nations, highlighting its importance regionally as well.
Swanson, Ana. “The Contentious U.S.-China Relationship, by the Numbers.” The New
York Times, July 7, 2023,
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/07/business/economy/us-china-
relationship-facts.html. Accessed October 8, 2024.
Despite the rising tensions, trade between the countries remains extremely strong.
China is America’s third-largest trading partner, after Canada and Mexico. U.S. imports
of goods and services from China hit a record $563.6 billion last year. But the share of
U.S. imports that come from China has been falling, a sign of how some businesses are
breaking off ties with China. China is also a major export market, with half of all
soybeans that the United States sends abroad going to China. The U.S.-China Business
Council estimated that U.S. exports to China supported nearly 1.1 million jobs in the
United States in 2021.
Warrant: China also does a lot of trading with America’s European allies.
China is the EU’s second largest trading partner for goods after the United States, with
bilateral trade reaching €739 billion in 2023. This represents a decline of 14% compared
to 2022. China is the EU's third-largest partner for exports and the biggest for imports.
The EU-China trade balance has been persistently in favour of China. In 2023, the EU
deficit amounted to €292 billion. EU exports to China amounted to €223.6 billion,
whereas EU imports from China amounted to €515.9 billion, indicating year-on-year
decreases of 3.1% and 18% respectively.
Vest, Charlie and Agatha Kratz. “Sanctioning China in a Taiwan crisis: Scenarios and
risks.” Atlantic Council, June 21, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-
research-reports/report/sanctioning-china-in-a-taiwan-crisis-scenarios-and-
risks/#Goals-of-economic-countermeasures. Accessed October 8, 2024.
A sense of heightened risk in the Taiwan Strait and the use of sanctions against Russia
has led decision-makers around the world to reflect on the potential use of economic
countermeasures against China in a Taiwan crisis. US lawmakers have already proposed
legislation mandating sanctions on China in the event of an invasion of Taiwan.
Surveys of European countries underline an increasing—if still minority—willingness
to sanction China if it were to take military action against Taiwan. Officials in Beijing
are asking these questions as well, with China’s State Council reportedly considering
the potential for Western sanctions in a Taiwan crisis. The economic fallout from
sanctions on Russia have also led business leaders and major banks to conduct
contingency planning exercises exploring their exposures to a cross-strait crisis,
including sanctions on China.
Warrant: America’s allies are likely to follow in the sanctioning because they share the same
values.
Economy, Elizabeth. “Is the US-China relationship the most consequential relationship
for America in the world?” The Brookings Institute, February 6, 2024,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-the-us-china-relationship-the-most-
consequential-relationship-for-america-in-the-world. Accessed October 8, 2024.
There are many ways to describe the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. For example, the
relationship is the world’s most complex, most challenging, or most competitive.
However, the relationship is not “the most consequential in the world for America.” Far
more consequential is the United States’ relationship with its network of allies and
partners in Asia, Europe, and North America. Unlike China, the United States’ allies
and close partners share the same values, norms, and strategic objectives. They are
the United States’ most important trade and investment partners. And state-to-state
and multilateral engagements are extensive. Most importantly, they play the most
consequential role in both advancing and constraining the United States’ ability to
realize its most important strategic ambitions.
Ismay, John, Edward Wong, and Pablo Robles. “A New Pacific Arsenal to Counter China.”
The New York Times, April 26, 2024,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/04/26/us/politics/us-china-military-
bases-weapons.html. Accessed October 7, 2024.
Taiwan’s foreign minister, Joseph Wu, said in an interview in Taipei that the
strengthened alliances and evolving military force postures were critical to deterring
China. “We are very happy to see that many countries in this region are coming to the
realization that they also have to be prepared for further expansions of the P.R.C.,” he
said, referring to the People’s Republic of China. To some Chinese military strategists,
the U.S. efforts are aimed at keeping China’s naval forces behind the “first island chain”
— islands close to mainland Asia that run from Okinawa in Japan to Taiwan to the
Philippines. U.S. military assets along these islands could prevent Chinese warships
from getting into the open Pacific waters farther east if conflict were to break out.
Leaders in China’s People’s Liberation Army also talk of establishing military
dominance of the “second island chain” — which is farther out in the Pacific and
includes Guam, Palau and West Papua.
Impact: Deterring this invasion is important because these sanctions would cost trillions.
Welch, Jennifer, Jenny Leonard, Maeva Cousin, Gerard DiPippo, and Tim Orlik. “Xi, Biden
and the $10 Trillion Dollar Cost of War Over Taiwan.” Bloomberg, January 8,
2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2024-01-09/if-china-invades-
taiwan-it-would-cost-world-economy-10-trillion. Accessed October 8, 2024.
War over Taiwan would have a cost in blood and treasure so vast that even those
unhappiest with the status quo have reason not to risk it. Bloomberg Economics
estimate the price tag at around $10 trillion, equal to about 10% of global GDP —
dwarfing the blow from the war in Ukraine, Covid pandemic and Global Financial
Crisis. China’s rising economic and military heft, Taiwan’s burgeoning sense of national
identity, and fractious relations between Beijing and Washington mean the conditions
for a crisis are in place. With cross-Strait relations on the ballot, Taiwan’s Jan. 13
election is a potential flashpoint.
Analysis: Given the nature of China’s manufacturing empire, it would be easy to prove that
sanctions against China would be devastating for the global economy thus making this a strong
argument. However, you need to make sure that you convince your judge of two things. First is
that the US presence is stopping a war and thus sanctions from happening, and second is that
countries would actually put in place these sanctions. If you can do that, it should be a good
path to the ballot just based on the massive economic fallout.
Argument: India looks at Taiwan for an example of how committed it is to its allies. If the US
pulls out, India will look towards other countries for protection.
Brunnstorm, David and Trevor Hunnicutt. “Biden says U.S. forces would defend Taiwan
in the event of a Chinese invasion.” Reuters, September 19, 2022,
https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-us-forces-would-defend-taiwan-
event-chinese-invasion-2022-09-18. Accessed October 8, 2024.
U.S. President Joe Biden said U.S forces would defend Taiwan in the event of a
Chinese invasion, his most explicit statement on the issue, drawing an angry response
from China that said it sent the wrong signal to those seeking an independent Taiwan.
Asked in a CBS 60 Minutes interview broadcast on Sunday whether U.S. forces would
defend the democratically governed island claimed by China, he replied: "Yes, if in
fact, there was an unprecedented attack." Asked to clarify if he meant that unlike in
Ukraine, U.S. forces - American men and women - would defend Taiwan in the event
of a Chinese invasion, Biden replied: "Yes." The CBS interview was just the latest time
that Biden has appeared to go beyond long-standing stated U.S. policy on Taiwan, but
his statement was clearer than previous ones about committing U.S. troops to the
defend the island. The United States has long stuck to a policy of "strategic ambiguity"
and not making clear whether it would respond militarily to an attack on Taiwan.
https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/a-roadmap-for-india-us-military-ai-
collaboration. Accessed October 8, 2024.
India and the United States have a multifaceted defence partnership that entails
significant trade and large-scale joint military exercises. There is also a growing
consensus that collaboration on emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI)
can promote common security interests. In March 2021, US Secretary of Defense Llyod
Austin discussed “the contours of sharing high-end technology” in defence with his
Indian counterpart, and the two countries also formed a “Critical and Emerging
Technology Working Group” as part of the Quad security dialogue along with Japan and
Australia. As India and the United States look to navigate the road ahead, their
bilateral collaboration in the area of AI applications for military logistics can be a
pragmatic way forward.
Warrant: India’s is already not that strong with the US to begin with.
Grossman, Derek. “U.S.-India Ties Remain Fundamentally Fragile.” RAND, April 7, 2024,
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/04/us-india-ties-remain-
fundamentally-fragile.html. Accessed October 8, 2024.
For the United States, foreign policy has always been a mix of securing interests and
promoting values, and India checks the box on multiple counts. Washington and New
Delhi routinely highlight that the world's oldest democracy, the United States, is
cooperating with the world's largest democracy, India. Partnering with India holds
immense promise for U.S. security interests as well, particularly Washington's strategy
to counter China. But despite widespread optimism about the future of the U.S.-India
partnership, relations are considerably more fragile than they might appear. Indeed,
the two countries continue to experience friction in several areas that, if left
unaddressed, could ultimately undermine or even derail future cooperation. On
democratic values, for instance, the United States holds deepening concerns that Prime
Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are
making India less tolerant of minorities, especially Muslims. In 2019, the Modi
government revoked the special semi-autonomous status—granted under Article 370 of
the Indian Constitution—of Jammu and Kashmir, a Muslim-majority region. Since then,
Kashmiris have suffered from repressive government policies that include curbs to
freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and other basic rights, according to Human
Rights Watch.
Warrant: If the US doesn’t protect Taiwan, India will move away from the US.
Schifrin, Nick and Dan Sagalyn. “Three experts on U.S. role and response options in
Taiwan-China conflict.” PBS News, December 15, 2021,
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/three-experts-on-u-s-role-and-response-
options-in-taiwan-china-conflict. Accessed October 8, 2024.
Nick Schifrin: Richard Haass, could the U.S. explain the difference between Japan and
Taiwan? Richard Haass: I think we're kidding ourselves. If China's allowed to take
Taiwan, and the United States does not respond, Japan, Australia, India and every
other country in that part of the world, including South Korea, will recalibrate their
dependence on the United States. It gives China tremendous geographic and strategic
advantages to pressure its neighbors.
Impact: Deepening India-US relations are important because it helps stop Chinese hegemony in
Asia.
Bajpaee, Chietigj. “Why the US–India relationship needs a healthy dose of realism.”
Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank, October 8, 2024,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/10/why-us-india-relationship-needs-
healthy-dose-realism. Accessed October 8, 2024.
“India-US trade: Unlocking a $500bn potential amid challenges.” Policy Circle, October 1,
2024, https://www.policycircle.org/economy/india-us-trade-challenges/.
Accessed October 8, 2024.
there is immense potential for India and the US to expand their economic partnership.
The next phase of growth could see trade volumes reach $500 billion, driven by
sectors like clean energy, technology, pharmaceuticals, and defence. Both countries
are already working to strengthen their strategic partnership, with recent dialogues
focusing on issues like carbon capture, energy security, and agricultural trade.
However, for this growth to materialise, several structural issues need to be addressed.
Lowering trade barriers, harmonising regulatory standards, and establishing frameworks
for digital and intellectual property trade will be essential. With the world’s two largest
democracies cooperating across sectors, the future of India-US trade looks promising—
poised to become a critical driver of global economic growth.
Analysis: This argument is good because it builds on the fundamental idea that America's
network of alliances all relies on other countries relying on America to uphold its promises
regarding these alliances. You can use the warranting in this argument to really build on the
idea that India is a very important partner for America. However, I think the better way to use
this argument is as a subpoint in a larger case about the importance of American alliances.
Argument: Japan looks at Taiwan for an example of how committed the US is to its allies. If the
US pulls out, Japan will look towards other countries for protection.
Brunnstorm, David and Trevor Hunnicutt. “Biden says U.S. forces would defend Taiwan
in the event of a Chinese invasion.” Reuters, September 19, 2022,
https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-us-forces-would-defend-taiwan-
event-chinese-invasion-2022-09-18. Accessed October 8, 2024.
U.S. President Joe Biden said U.S forces would defend Taiwan in the event of a
Chinese invasion, his most explicit statement on the issue, drawing an angry response
from China that said it sent the wrong signal to those seeking an independent Taiwan.
Asked in a CBS 60 Minutes interview broadcast on Sunday whether U.S. forces would
defend the democratically governed island claimed by China, he replied: "Yes, if in
fact, there was an unprecedented attack." Asked to clarify if he meant that unlike in
Ukraine, U.S. forces - American men and women - would defend Taiwan in the event
of a Chinese invasion, Biden replied: "Yes." The CBS interview was just the latest time
that Biden has appeared to go beyond long-standing stated U.S. policy on Taiwan, but
his statement was clearer than previous ones about committing U.S. troops to the
defend the island. The United States has long stuck to a policy of "strategic ambiguity"
and not making clear whether it would respond militarily to an attack on Taiwan.
Kelly, Tim. “Explainer: Why Japan is seeking military ties beyond its U.S. ally.” Reuters,
January 13, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/why-japan-is-seeking-
military-ties-beyond-its-us-ally-2023-01-13/. Accessed October 8, 2024.
At the top of Japan's threat list is China, which it worries could attack Taiwan or nearby
Japanese islands. Chinese military activity is intensifying around the East China Sea,
including joint air and sea drills with Russia. At the same time, North Korea has fired
missiles into the Sea of Japan, and in October lobbed an intermediate-range missile over
Japan for the first time since 2017. LONE ALLY For the past seven decades, Japan, which
gave up the right to wage war after its defeat in World War Two, has relied on the
United States for protection. In return for its promise to defend the country, the U.S.
gets bases that allow it to maintain a major military presence in East Asia. Japan hosts
54,000 American troops, hundreds of military aircraft, and dozens of warships led by
Washington's only forward-deployed aircraft carrier.
Colby, Elbridge. “The United States Should Defend Taiwan.” National Review, December
2, 2021, https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2021/12/20/the-united-
states-should-defend-taiwan. Accessed October 8, 2024.
This is because Taiwan’s loss would require compensation in two key respects.
Washington’s abandonment of Taiwan, even if deftly done (which cannot be
presumed), would inevitably cause alarm in other important capitals, such as Manila,
Seoul, and Tokyo, that they too would be on the chopping block if things got too hairy
for America. In order to allay these well-grounded fears, Washington would very likely
need to take dramatic steps to show its resolve and staying power, steps that might be
ill advised. Because of this, abandoning Taiwan might end up requiring a more
aggressive and dangerous approach than seeking to defend it.
Warrant: Abandoning Japan would mean abandoning an ally that has also signed up for war.
Kuhn, Anthony. “After Being Silent For Decades, Japan Now Speaks Up About Taiwan —
And Angers China.” NPR, August 2, 2021,
https://www.npr.org/2021/07/26/1020866539/japans-position-on-defending-
taiwan-has-taken-a-remarkable-shift. Accessed October 8, 2024.
Mainland China and Taiwan split during a civil war in 1949, and Beijing has vowed to
unify with the self-governing island — by force, if necessary. The Biden administration is
counting on help from its allies, especially Japan, to deter such a move. For decades,
Japan considered the Taiwan issue too politically sensitive to speak out about it publicly.
Japan's military is focused on defense of its own territory and has no expeditionary
forces to fight overseas. But in recent weeks, top Japanese officials have said that if
mainland China attacks the island, Japan should join the U.S. in defending it. "We have
to protect Taiwan, as a democratic country," Japan's deputy defense minister,
Yasuhide Nakayama, said in a conference in June. Japan's shift in thinking comes as
China has stepped up pressure on Taiwan, including sending fighter jets and warships
around the island. But the bolder talk could also be driven by further moves by China.
Schifrin, Nick and Dan Sagalyn. “Three experts on U.S. role and response options in
Taiwan-China conflict.” PBS News, December 15, 2021,
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/three-experts-on-u-s-role-and-response-
options-in-taiwan-china-conflict. Accessed October 8, 2024.
Nick Schifrin: Richard Haass, could the U.S. explain the difference between Japan and
Taiwan? Richard Haass: I think we're kidding ourselves. If China's allowed to take
Taiwan, and the United States does not respond, Japan, Australia, India and every
other country in that part of the world, including South Korea, will recalibrate their
dependence on the United States. It gives China tremendous geographic and strategic
advantages to pressure its neighbors.
With over $300 billion worth of goods and services exchanged each year, the United
States and Japan are top trading partners, and the U.S.-Japan bilateral economic
relationship is one of strongest in the world. Japan-affiliated firms employ or support
more than 948,100 jobs in the United States. The United States is Japan’s top source of
direct investment, and Japan is the top investor in the United States, with $644.7
billion invested in 2019 across all 50 states. Both countries acknowledge the important
role of women as drivers of economic progress in all sectors. The United States and
Japan are working closely via whole-of-government initiatives, bilateral partnerships,
cooperation with like-minded countries, and enhanced private-sector engagement to
assist countries in the Indo-Pacific and across the globe to catalyze investment in
infrastructure, energy, and the digital economy to promote connectivity and economic
growth.
Impact: A strong US-Japanese alliance is very important for the US’s military and social
interests.
The U.S.-Japan Alliance has served as the cornerstone of peace, security, and
prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and across the world for over six decades. We are
committed to working together on our shared challenges, including curbing the global
COVID-19 pandemic, combatting climate change, strengthening democracy and human
rights, promoting free and fair trade, and countering malign influences and PRC
provocations in Asia and around the world. The American and Japanese people share
deeply rooted values of defending freedom, championing economic and social
opportunity and inclusion, upholding human rights, respecting the rule of law, and
treating every person with dignity. The peoples of Japan and the United States support
each other in times of need. Japan was one of the first countries to offer assistance
following the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina, and Americans are proud to have
supported Japan in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake, ten years ago this
month, through Operation Tomodachi.
Analysis: This argument is good because it highlights the importance of the special connection
that the United States has with Japan. Considering that the US-Japanese alliance is between
two of the most important countries in the world, it is a really important alliance. Make sure
that you stress this point to your judge. You should also make sure that your judge understands
exactly why an American pull out of Taiwan would be bad for Japan.
Argument: Taiwan currently feels secure enough because of their substantial protection by the
US. If that were to go away, Taiwan would start to develop nuclear weapons to continue to feel
safe.
Menton, Jane and Andrew Reddle. “Taiwan Can’t Shake Its Nuclear Ghosts.” Foreign
Policy, March 14, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/14/taiwan-nuclear-
energy-weapons-policy-history. Accessed October 9, 2024.
In 1955, Taiwan and the United States reached an agreement for cooperation on the
peaceful uses of atomic energy that kick-started Taiwan’s nuclear program, allowing
the KMT government to obtain key technologies and send scientists and military
personnel abroad for training and education. Although Taipei officially renounced
nuclear weapons in exchange for Washington’s assistance with civilian projects, in
practice leaders hedged their bets, cultivating expertise that could be directed toward
other ends. Taiwan’s covert nuclear weapons program began in earnest following
China’s first successful nuclear test in 1964. The test shattered Taiwan’s sense of
security. Although the United States had committed itself to Taiwan in the 1955 Mutual
Defense Treaty, the KMT government feared abandonment, especially after the White
House rebuffed its calls to strike mainland Chinese nuclear facilities. Leaders also
worried that proliferation would bolster Beijing’s status in the international community
at Taipei’s expense. Once Beijing crossed this threshold, the KMT government doubled
down on its own nuclear weapons program. To spearhead these efforts, leaders
established the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research, which was closely linked to the
military—although the government publicly insisted that its activities were exclusively
civilian. In 1969, Taiwan purchased a natural uranium-fueled, heavy water-moderated
research reactor, known as the Taiwan Research Reactor, from Canada. (This kind of
reactor is conducive to the production of weapons-grade plutonium.) From there, the
government tried to acquire other critical technologies, including plutonium
reprocessing facilities, from foreign suppliers—although Washington, increasingly
suspicious of Taipei’s intentions, thwarted many of these sales. Nevertheless, Taiwan’s
weaponization research and indigenous capabilities progressed, albeit at a smaller scale
and slower pace than originally planned.
Mizokami, Kyle. “China's Greatest Fear Almost Came True: Taiwan Armed with Nuclear
Weapons.” The National Interest, February 26, 2024,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/chinas-greatest-fear-almost-came-true-
taiwan-armed-nuclear-weapons-209656. Accessed October 9, 2024.
Taiwan's nuclear weapons program, initiated in response to China's first nuclear test in
1964, aimed to balance military threats by developing its own nuclear arsenal. Despite
the potential for deterrence, the United States, fearing escalation with China, pressured
Taiwan to halt its efforts. The program, which began in earnest in 1967, sought to
develop either tactical or city-killing nuclear capabilities, with efforts including the
acquisition of a heavy-water reactor and attempts at plutonium stockpiling. However,
U.S. surveillance and diplomatic interventions, combined with IAEA inspections
revealing program discrepancies, led to repeated U.S. demands for Taiwan to cease its
nuclear ambitions. The program's definitive end came in 1988, following the defection
of a key Taiwanese scientist to the U.S., averting a major postwar crisis in Asia but also
closing a chapter on Taiwan's pursuit of a nuclear deterrent against China.
Warrant: Taiwan sees nuclear weapons as a way to protect itself from Chinese aggression.
Anderson, James. “The Next Taiwan Crisis Will (Almost) Certainly Involve Nuclear
Threats.” U.S. Naval Institute, March 2024,
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/march/next-taiwan-crisis-
will-almost-certainly-involve-nuclear-threats. Accessed October 9, 2024.
Mizokami, Kyle. “China's Greatest Fear Almost Came True: Taiwan Armed with Nuclear
Weapons.” The National Interest, February 26, 2024,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/chinas-greatest-fear-almost-came-true-
taiwan-armed-nuclear-weapons-209656. Accessed October 9, 2024.
Another, far worse possibility is that Taiwan could have developed a larger, city-killing
bomb. This could have been used to threaten Beijing directly, trading the destruction
of one government for another, and would have been a more useful deterrent. Still,
the 1,800-mile distance it would take to deliver a nuke on Beijing was at the time as
insurmountable as the Taiwan Strait itself. Not even Israel had the technology to assist
Impact: Nuclear war’s further impact would kill billions around the world.
Tegmark, Max. “Here's How Bad a Nuclear War Would Actually Be.” TIME, June 29,
2023, https://time.com/6290977/nuclear-war-impact-essay/. Accessed October
9, 2024.
This makes Earth freezing cold even during the summer, with farmland in Kansas cooling
by about 20 degrees centigrade (about 40 degrees Fahrenheit), and other regions
cooling almost twice as much. A recent scientific paper estimates that over 5 billion
people could starve to death, including around 99% of those in the US, Europe, Russia,
and China – because most black carbon smoke stays in the Northern hemisphere
where it’s produced, and because temperature drops harm agriculture more at high
latitudes.
Analysis: The sheer magnitude and scope of this argument make it a good argument. To be
honest, the key to winning this argument is the fact that the only option Taiwan will see for
protection without the US is nuclear weapons. If you can win that link, you’re basically set to
win the debate. Even if you aren’t fully winning on the probability debate (which you probably
won’t be), you can still win on the weighing debate by highlighting the devastation of the
impact of this argument.
Argument: Strong relations with Taiwan help the US maintain a balance of power in the Indo-
pacific.
Sacks, David. “Why is Taiwan Important to the United States?” Council on Foreign
Relations, June 20, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-taiwan-important-united-
states. Accessed October 12, 2024.
While the United States is thousands of miles from Taiwan, the island’s fate will have
major implications for U.S. security and prosperity. What happens in the Taiwan Strait
will also bear on fundamental questions of international order and the future of
democracy. Our recent Council on Foreign Relations-sponsored Independent Task Force
Report, U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era: Responding to a More Assertive China,
explains that the United States has vital strategic interests at stake in the Taiwan Strait
and examines how the United States should protect these interests. Taiwan sits in an
important position in the world’s most economically consequential region. As Assistant
Secretary of Defense Ely Ratner noted, “Taiwan is located at a critical node within the
first island chain, anchoring a network of U.S. allies and partners—stretching from the
Japanese archipelago down to the Philippines and into the South China Sea—that is
critical to the region’s security and critical to the defense of vital U.S. interests in the
Indo-Pacific.” Taiwan’s inherent military value cannot be wished away.
Warrant: Increased ties with Taiwan are key to preserving the international liberal order.
Lai, Christina. “US-Taiwan Relations and the Future of the Liberal Order.” Army War
College Publications, March 7, 2024,
https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/News/Display/Article/3706524/us-
taiwan-relations-and-the-future-of-the-liberal-order/. Accessed October 12, 2024.
Strengthening ties with Taiwan is the best chance the United States has to preserve the
liberal international order in Asia and improve its security relative to China. This study
offers a normative perspective on how Taiwan can contribute to US-led international
institutions and the Asian regional order and reduce conflict risk. It concludes with
recommendations for the United States and its partners to integrate Taiwan into
multilateral institutions in Asia. After World War II, the United States and its Western
allies set up international institutions characterized by liberal ideas (such as liberal
democracy, the free market, and the rule of law). This system is known as the liberal
international order. The US effort to uphold the LIO has encountered increasing
challenges from authoritarian countries such as China and Russia, who pick and choose
among the existing rules and exploit them. In the context of China-Taiwan relations, a
realist perspective might argue that China, with its rising capabilities, would try to take
control of Taiwan and exert greater influence in Asia in the near future.
Blanchette, Jude, Ryan Haas, and Lily McElwee. “Building International Support for
Taiwan.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 13, 2024,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-international-support-taiwan. Accessed
October 12, 2024.
It is widely accepted that much of the world’s economic growth and dynamism over the
coming decades will emanate from Asia. The region was projected to contribute roughly
70 percent of global growth in 2023 and is home to nearly two-thirds (60 percent) of the
world’s population.[9] In the coming years, Asia’s importance to global security and
prosperity will only grow. The region’s upward trajectory is predicated on stability and
the continued free flow of goods and services. And these factors are dependent upon the
maintenance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The more Taiwan comes to be
viewed as critical to regional stability on its own terms and, by extension, global
prosperity, the more invested other stakeholders will be in its security. Preservation of
peace and stability is the common interest that unites G7 advanced democracies with
developing economies and transcends every continent. If there is a conflict in the Taiwan
Strait, every leader on every continent would have to manage an external shock that
would be greater than the effects of the war in Ukraine and the Covid-19 pandemic
combined.
Chinoy, Sujan “The Taiwan Factor in the US’s Regional Posture.” Observer Research
Foundation, December 18, 2023, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-taiwan-
factor-in-the-us-s-regional-posture. Accessed October 12, 2024.
The US has long grappled with the Taiwan issue. So far, its policy of ‘strategic
ambiguity’ has deterred the use of force by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It is a
moot question if this policy can be sustained to counter the PRC’s assertive military
posture in the Taiwan Strait. The question before the US is whether it can deter an
invasion and avoid a war with the PRC, simultaneously. The PRC is determined to seek
reunification and has not ruled out the use of force. If force is used, the US will likely be
drawn into the conflict. On the other hand, if the US stands by and watches without
intervening as the Taiwan cookie crumbles, US presence, prestige, and power in the
region will never quite be the same again. Therefore, the US needs to inject clarity in its
positions, particularly whether it would militarily defend Taiwan. In light of the growing
Chinese threat to Taiwan, the real question is whether current US policy will be able to
deter an invasion and avoid a war in the Taiwan Strait simultaneously. It is instructive to
look back a little in history when the Republic of China (ROC) was a permanent member
of the UN Security Council and continued to be recognised as such even after the
Nationalists fled to Taiwan in 1949 and claimed to represent the whole of China as part of
the ROC, while enjoyed the US’s diplomatic recognition.
However, the Tsai administration has not officially taken a stance on this issue. In my
observation, Taiwan-U.S. relations have progressed in a more substantive direction.
Both Taipei and Washington have acknowledged the importance of their close
coordination in managing regional risks in recent years. Nevertheless, this does not
mean that there are no differences in views between Taiwan and the United States. In
fact, there is ongoing debate on the symbolic versus substantive dimensions of their
relationship, particularly concerning the complexities of risk management. Certain
perspectives argue that emphasizing symbolic improvements in Taiwan-U.S. relations
may result in heightened risks to regional stability due to China’s increasing
assertiveness. The United States, therefore, tends to consider progress in enhancing
Taiwan’s actual defense capabilities to be of substantive significance. Notably, Taiwan
does not adopt a diplomatic strategy that favors symbolism over substance in its
interactions with the United States. More than anything, leaders in the country
prioritize efforts to strengthen its defense preparations, its economy, and other crucial
aspects through meaningful cooperation with the United States.
Explanation: This argument includes strong groundwork for a link about the balance of power
in the Indo-Pac region and could be boosted with some analysis about Taiwan’s strategically
important location, the way they can act as an anchor for US values in Asia, and why this means
we should be invested in Taiwanese security. The final card in this argument has an interesting
narrative about substantive interaction with Taiwan being less likely than symbolic
improvements in relations to provoke China.
Argument: Support for Taiwan affirms US commitment to its allies and shores up faith in our
other alliances.
Chinoy, Sujan. “The Taiwan Factor in the US’s Regional Posture.” Observer Research
Foundation, December 18, 2023, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-taiwan-
factor-in-the-us-s-regional-posture. Accessed October 12, 2024.
From the point of view of the strategic balance of power in the Western Pacific, Taiwan's
fall would be a huge breach in the first island chain; it would pave the way for the
expansion and projection of Chinese naval power into the Pacific Ocean, both surface
and sub-surface. This, in turn, could threaten Guam, the US naval presence throughout
the Western Pacific, and commercial shipping and other sea lanes of communication in
Micronesia, Polynesia, and Melanesia, all the way down to Papua New Guinea and
Australia. Japan would be most traumatised by US inaction on Taiwan. In such an
eventuality, it would probably rush to acquire nuclear weapons and, over time, see
little value in a US security presence and security umbrella. It may be tempted to reach
a modus vivendi with the PRC, to buy peace backed by a nuclear deterrence of its own,
and perhaps even run the risk of being relegated to a second-class status in the region.
The economic interdependence for such a scenario already exists between the two
nations. If Japan goes nuclear, South Korea will not be far behind in seeking a nuclear
deterrence of its own against the independent threats posed by North Korea, the PRC,
and Japan in the long term. Equally, the fall of Taiwan, accompanied by US inaction,
could convince South Korea to abandon its new Indo-Pacific vision and revert to past
policies centred around the Korean peninsula and China. Australia, another country
heavily dependent on the PRC's market for its own prosperity, may also be tempted to
revert to the past when economic logic trumped all else.
Warrant: Bilateral security arrangements are specifically key to preventing this arms race.
Chinoy, Sujan. “The Taiwan Factor in the US’s Regional Posture.” Observer Research
Foundation, December 18, 2023, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-taiwan-
factor-in-the-us-s-regional-posture. Accessed October 12, 2024.
Not being able to live up to the expectations of the TRA, especially not being able to
prevent a forceful takeover of Taiwan, would be a huge body blow to US prestige and
credibility. US prevarication on this issue, on the grounds that it does not have a formal
treaty in place to defend Taiwan, would send the wrong message to Japan and South
Korea. Their faith in the bilateral security arrangements with the US would plummet.
US inaction could lead Japan and South Korea to seek their own nuclear deterrence
and, alongside, search for a new accommodation within a Chinese sphere of influence in
north-east Asia. A military takeover of Taiwan by the PRC could lead Japan, South Korea,
and many others to review the risks involved in hosting US bases and forces. The US
policy of strategic ambiguity does not lend itself easily to deterring a possible use of force
by the PRC in the Taiwan Strait. The US needs to inject clarity in its positions, particularly
whether it would intervene militarily to deter China or to defend Taiwan. It is a moot
point if the US and its allies are coalescing their positions to send a stronger signal to
deter the PRC. A peaceful reunification between China and Taiwan is a moot question.
However, if the people of Taiwan somehow become convinced that the US will not
come to their defence in the event of a military takeover by China, it could make them
more resigned to a potential fait accompli. It could make them more amenable to the
idea of reunification within a shorter timeframe. After all, contacts, and exchanges on
both sides of the Taiwan Strait have been burgeoning recently, and living standards are
more compatible now. If the Taiwan cookie crumbles, US posture, prestige, and power
in the region will never quite be the same again.
Sacks, David. “Why is Taiwan Important to the United States?” Council on Foreign
Relations, June 20, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-taiwan-important-united-
states. Accessed October 12, 2024.
What happens in the Taiwan Strait will have enormous implications for the future of
U.S. alliances in the region, which constitute Washington’s most important asymmetric
advantage over Beijing. If the United States chose to stand aside in the face of Chinese
aggression against Taiwan and China successfully annexed the island, it would be only
seventy miles from Japanese territory and 120 miles from the Philippines. U.S. allies
would come to question whether the United States would or even could come to their
defense. Having lost confidence in the U.S. commitment to their security, allies would
contemplate either accommodating China or hedging against it by growing their militaries
or even developing nuclear weapons. Either outcome would result in diminished U.S.
influence and increased regional and global instability.
Colby, Elbridge. “Why Protecting Taiwan Really Matters to the U.S.” Time, October 11,
2023, https://time.com/6221072/why-protecting-taiwan-really-matters-to-the-u-
s/. Accessed October 12, 2024.
In this context, America’s goal should be to prevent China from dominating Asia without
a war. That is the optimal aim: a decent peace without war. But the only prudent way to
achieve that goal is to be prepared to fight in a way that shows Beijing it just will not
gain if it starts a conflict. This is a cliché: if you want peace prepare for war. But the
reason it is so clichéd is that it is deeply rooted common sense. The key to achieving this
goal—of blocking China from dominating Asia—is a coalition. The need for this coalition
is not rooted in anything about “sacred” alliances or the rules-based international order.
It is practical reality necessary to achieve this aim. The U.S. needs a coalition because it is
neither realistic nor fair for Americans to take on the enormous task of blunting
Beijing’s ambitions alone. Fortunately, there are many countries in Asia that have the
will and the way to help stand up to China, like India, Japan, Australia, and Taiwan
itself. The key, though, is to make sure this coalition works—that it stands up and holds
together in the face of Chinese pressure and, if necessary, aggression. But we cannot take
that for granted. Countries in Asia are quite reasonably wondering whether it is prudent
to stand up to China. Most do not want to live under Beijing‘s thumb, but if the
alternative is disaster and exclusion from all the goods Beijing has to offer, they are much
more likely to cut a deal.
Blanchette, Jude, Ryan Haas, and Lily McElwee. “Building International Support for
Taiwan.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 13, 2024,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-international-support-taiwan. Accessed
October 12, 2024.
Asked in 2023 if they would back sending Australian military personnel, support is much
lower, at 42 percent, although it could be argued that this is relatively high compared
with other democratic and regional nations. In some ways, smaller democracies take
their political cues from the United States. After all, it is only the United States that can
offer credible military deterrence to a Chinese takeover of Taiwan. Therein lies both the
problem and the solution. Countries such as Australia not only have to deal with their
own public, but they also have to work with like-minded countries to influence debate in
the United States as well. And that is a steep mountain to climb.
Explanation: This argument says that decreasing military support to Taiwan convinces Taiwan
that the US will not defend it, making them more amenable to the idea of reunification. That’s
bad because reunification wipes out US power in the region, not only because we lose Taiwan
but because other US allies become more amenable to Chinese hegemony. Teams should read
this evidence and use the rhetoric from it more maximum narrative impact.
Blanchette, Jude, Ryan Hass, and Lily McElwee. “Building International Support for
Taiwan.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 13, 2024,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-international-support-taiwan. Accessed
October 12, 2024.
To counter this narrative, the United States should become bolder in explaining the logic
of its actions to preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. U.S. officials should
publicly rebut suggestions that the United States views Taiwan as a tool for use in
competition with China, or that the United States has designs on Taiwan’s ultimate status
in relation to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It should frame its goals around
preserving peace and keeping open space for leaders in Beijing and Taipei to ultimately
arrive at a peaceful resolution of their differences. This should reflect the will of the
people of Taiwan, who have democratic agency to express their preferences. Such an
eventual goal may seem remote or even impossible, given the political trajectory in China
under Xi Jinping, but in keeping open the prospect for some form of peaceful
reconciliation, U.S. officials can puncture Chinese efforts to paint the United States as the
destabilizing actor in the Taiwan Strait. Washington needs to present itself as not
seeking a fight with China over Taiwan, but rather as being credible, principled, and
firm in its defense of Taiwan’s security, prosperity, and democratic way of life.
Lai, Christina. “US-Taiwan Relations and the Future of the Liberal Order.” Army War
College Publication, March 7, 2024,
https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/News/Display/Article/3706524/us-
taiwan-relations-and-the-future-of-the-liberal-order/. Accessed October 12, 2024.
After World War II, the United States and its Western allies set up international
institutions characterized by liberal ideas (such as liberal democracy, the free market,
and the rule of law). This system is known as the liberal international order. The US
effort to uphold the LIO has encountered increasing challenges from authoritarian
countries such as China and Russia, who pick and choose among the existing rules and
exploit them. In the context of China-Taiwan relations, a realist perspective might argue
that China, with its rising capabilities, would try to take control of Taiwan and exert
greater influence in Asia in the near future. This scenario is certainly possible, given the
intense power competition between the United States and China. Although the LIO has
fostered unprecedented cooperation among states in Europe, East Asia, and North
America since 1945, this concept remains highly contested in international relations. This
article offers a common understanding of the LIO: states and non-state actors follow
rules, norms, and legal procedures in international affairs. The rules-based aspect is a
constitutive part of the Asian regional order. The future of Taiwan and the Asian regional
order also depends on the resilience of the LIO and other middle-power states in the
Asia-Pacific. While liberalists are confident that the LIO will remain strong even following
America’s recent decline, some have questioned whether the LIO was ever liberal at all.
Still others suggest that new forums or alternative institutional settings might emerge to
regulate economic affairs and global politics. Despite their contested meanings, this
article centers on the fundamental elements underpinning the current US-led LIO:
democracy, free trade, and international institutions. It also highlights how Taiwan can
significantly strengthen the LIO in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
Sacks, David. “Why is Taiwan Important to the United States?” Council on Foreign
Relations, June 20, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-taiwan-important-united-
states. Accessed October 12, 2024.
Taiwan’s fate also has implications for the most fundamental tenets of international
order. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, if China were to successfully absorb
Taiwan despite Taiwanese resistance, it would establish a pattern of authoritarian
countries using force to attack democratic neighbors and change borders. One of the
most basic pillars of international relations—that countries cannot use force to alter
borders—would be severely undermined. Politically, Taiwan is one of Asia’s few
democratic success stories and by some measures the region’s freest society. Its open
political system demonstrates to China’s citizens that there is an alternative path of
development for a majority ethnically Chinese society. If China were to take Taiwan by
force, Taiwan’s democracy would be extinguished, and its twenty-three million people
would see their rights severely curtailed. As this would come in the wake of China’s
crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong, the ramifications would be even greater.
Edwards, Lee. “U.S. Must Defend Taiwan’s Independence.” Heritage Foundation, October
21, 2021, https://internationalpolicy.org/publications/taiwan-tensions-with-china-
five-recommendations-for-us-policy/. Accessed October 12, 2024.
The looming Taiwan crisis presents the U.S. with the opportunity to follow a balanced
policy of idealism and realism. On the idealistic side, Taiwan warrants our backing
because it is a vibrant democracy. It was a stalwart ally during World War II, engaging an
estimated one million Japanese troops who otherwise would have defended Japan in the
event of a U.S. invasion. In addition, we should be concerned with the fate of the 24
Hass, Ryan and Jude Blanchette. “How the United States Can Support Taiwan’s
Democracy.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 15, 2023,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-united-states-can-support-taiwans-democracy.
Accessed October 12, 2024.
First, the United States’ overriding interest is in a healthy, resilient, and confident
Taiwan. A core pillar of this is its consistent and predictable democratic process, which
depends on a competitive multiparty system and most importantly, the free expression
of the will of the Taiwan electorate. The people of Taiwan have agency for their own
future through their democratic processes. The more that U.S. leaders elide Taiwan’s
own interests, the less influence the United States will have over Taiwan’s future choices.
As a foremost supporter of Taiwan’s democracy, U.S. leaders need to act with an
awareness of the importance of supporting Taiwan’s competitive multiparty system as a
whole and resist the temptation to favor a given party or candidate. Just as U.S. voters
and electoral candidates expect foreign leaders to remain out of our domestic politics,
U.S. officials should remain on the sidelines of Taiwan’s democratic process.
Explanation: This argument is premised on the idea that Taiwan is one of the freest countries in
the Indo-Pac region and that it is important to the millions of people in Taiwan that they
continue to be free. The US demonstrates it has a stake in the Taiwanese people by supporting
their security. If we do not continue militarily supporting Taiwan, there’s an ever-larger threat
of it coming under China’s authoritarian rule.
CON: Increasing military support deters China from using force for
reunification.
Argument: Military support for Taiwan deters China from using force for reunification.
Warrant: The US can use its power in Asia to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Lai, Christina. “US-Taiwan Relations and the Future of the Liberal Order.” Army War
College Publications, March 7, 2024,
https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/News/Display/Article/3706524/us-
taiwan-relations-and-the-future-of-the-liberal-order/. Accessed October 12, 2024.
Deterring a military conflict between China and Taiwan is certainly no easy task, given
the power shift toward China and geographical challenges in East Asia. Nevertheless, the
United States and its partners in Asia can still leverage their collective and technological
advantages to raise the cost of a possible Chinese attack amidst China’s continued
provocations. This article provides a roadmap for the United States and its allies on the
means and ends to stabilize regional order and secure Taiwan’s autonomy. These goals
will require real and sustained US support for Taiwan’s participation in multilateral
institutions, and US initiatives could gradually gain support from other like-minded
countries in Asia and beyond.
Chinoy, Sujan. “The Taiwan Factor in the US’s Regional Posture.” Observer Research
Foundation, December 18, 2023, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-taiwan-
factor-in-the-us-s-regional-posture. Accessed October 12, 2024.
Blanchette, Jude, Ryan Hass, and Lily McElwee. “Building International Support for
Taiwan.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 13, 2024,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-international-support-taiwan. Accessed
October 12, 2024.
If the United States is to meet Beijing’s growing threats to peace and stability in the
Taiwan Strait, it must build a strong coalition capable of meaningfully supporting
Taiwan and willing to send credible deterrent signals to China. Toward this end,
Washington needs a granular understanding of why Taiwan matters to key international
stakeholders, what tolerance for risk these partners are willing to bear, and what
strategic narratives on Taiwan resonate with their leaders and polities. Importantly, U.S.
leaders must also appreciate that their actions and statements can either strengthen or
undercut efforts to forge international unity behind preserving peace and stability in the
Taiwan Strait. Building such a coalition is key to deterring conflict and preserving
Taiwan’s space to grow as a prosperous and resilient democracy. The broader and
deeper the coalition of stakeholders, the more unmistakable the signal to Beijing that it
would pay a significant price for escalating pressure on Taiwan.
Blanchette, Jude, Ryan Hass, and Lily McElwee. “Building International Support for
Taiwan.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 13, 2024,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-international-support-taiwan. Accessed
October 12, 2024.
U.S. efforts to build greater cohesion among partners also reflect the reality that Taiwan
has become an issue of global consequence. The economic, financial, and supply chain
impacts of any instability in the Taiwan Strait would be felt in every country and
community that is connected to the global economy. Given the centrality of Taiwan’s
exports of semiconductors and intermediate goods, any type of crisis in the waters
surrounding Taiwan would bring global value chains to a grinding halt and cause a
seizing up of international trade. One recent estimate from Bloomberg finds that a
conflict in the Taiwan Strait might cost the global economy nearly $10 trillion.
Sacks, David. “Why is Taiwan Important to the United States?” Council on Foreign
Relations, June 20, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-taiwan-important-united-
states. Accessed October 12, 2024.
The stakes are clear, which is why the United States needs to redouble its efforts to
deter China from using force or coercion to achieve unification with Taiwan. While a
military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait is neither imminent nor inevitable, the chances
of one are increasing. U.S. policy toward Taiwan needs to evolve to contend with a
more capable, assertive, and risk-acceptant China that is increasingly dissatisfied with
the status quo.
Explanation: This is a fairly stock argument which says that a strong US-Taiwan relationship
deters any attempt at forcible reunification. This argument is stock because it’s strong and has a
lot of truth value, so teams should hammer in the fundamental principle that raising the costs
of an invasion for China makes it less likely that they will try that.
CON: Military support could lead to useful intelligence for the US.
Warrant: There is intelligence sharing between Taiwan and the US in the status quo.
Blanchard, Ben. “Relations between Taiwan and the United States.” Reuters, July 17,
2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/relations-between-taiwan-united-states-
2024-07-17/. Accessed October 12, 2024.
The U.S. does maintain some military personnel in Taiwan for training purposes, and
Taiwan sends its F-16 pilots to be trained at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona. Senior
Taiwan defence officials also visit the United States, and intelligence sharing takes
place too. The U.S. retains a large de facto embassy in Taipei called the American
Institute in Taiwan, staffed by diplomats. The Taipei Economic and Cultural
Representative Office is the name of Taiwan's de facto embassy in the United States.
Warrant: Taiwan’s military intelligence is growing through cooperation with the United States
and “Five Eyes”.
Hsiao, Russell. “Taiwan’s Military Intelligence Undergoing Reforms amid Growing Threats
from the PLA.” Global Taiwan Institute, August 9, 2023,
https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/08/taiwans-military-intelligence-undergoing-
reforms-amid-growing-threats-from-the-pla/. Accessed October 12, 2024.
Reflecting the enhanced intelligence cooperation between the two sides, Yang was also
reportedly invited to the CIA headquarters for an exchange. Since assuming office, Yang
is reported to have made at least two visits to the United States. It is perhaps
unsurprising that Yang’s ascendance to the head of the MIB came amid deepening
intelligence cooperation between the United States and Taiwan to respond to and
counter China’s growing military threats. Having served as deputy chief for intelligence,
Yang is well-positioned to coordinate the intelligence collection firepower of the MIB in
terms of targeting and aligning with joint objectives. Yang also has many years of
experience serving as a military attaché abroad that he can apply to his current job. As a
further sign of Taiwan’s expanding intelligence cooperation under Tsai, in April 2023
the new NSB Director-General Tsai revealed that Taiwan can now exchange real-time
intelligence with the “Five Eyes” alliance of the United States, Canada, Britain,
Australia, and New Zealand. “We can connect with the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance through a
confidential system,” Tsai reportedly stated.
The Financial Times (FT) revealed last week that plans are well underway in the US to
sell four MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones to Taiwan to provide intelligence on Chinese
naval movements, to be shared in real time with both the American and Japanese
militaries. The US Department of Defence approved the sale of the drones in May but has
not commented on the intelligence-sharing arrangement, reportedly disclosed to the FT
by four sources. The decision is a further step in integrating Taiwan into US war plans
against China and underscores the absurdity of US claims that it still upholds a “One
China” policy under which it de facto recognises Taiwan as part of China. Washington is
not only supplying military hardware, as it has done in the past, but drawing Taipei into
its framework of military alliances in the Indo-Pacific directed against China.
Chen, Liang-chih Evans. “Let Taiwan and the Quad Fight Side by Side: How Can the Quad
Incorporate Taiwan into Its Military Deterrence against China?” Air University
Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, April 1, 2022,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2979897/let-taiwan-and-
the-quad-fight-side-by-side-how-can-the-quad-incorporate-taiwan/. Accessed
October 12, 2024.
Because the PLA’s amphibious assaults would be launched from military bases and
positions on China’s coastline (most likely in Fujian, Zhejiang, and Guangdong), Taiwan
and the Quad would need to target these potential military facilities and bases. As the
PLA’s invasion of Taiwan and landing operations would rely heavily on naval vessels,
especially amphibious forces and transport docks, it is strongly recommended that
Taiwan and the Quad concentrate their fire on attacking the PLAN’s amphibious transport
docks, such as the Type 071 landing platform dock and Type 075 landing helicopter dock,
and later, the warships and facilities. Specifically, compared to its Chinese counterpart,
the Quad–Taiwan joint force should preserve their advantage of control of the air and
sea. Without amphibious transport docks, it is less likely that the PLA could conduct a
successful amphibious assault and landing operation. To achieve this strategic goal, the
Quad–Taiwan force’s surface-to-surface and antiship missile capability needs to be
bolstered. Additionally, the allies need to reinforce their surveillance capability and
intelligence sharing, particularly those related to any movements of the PLA’s
amphibious vessels and personnel. Similarly, the Chinese airborne troops are the target
as well, although they are not as significant as the PLAN’s amphibious ones at this
moment.
Explanation: This argument says that Taiwan is the source of a lot of the US’s intelligence about
China, so if our bilateral relationship deteriorates the US won’t be able to access this
information. This makes us less able to assess China as a security risk in any other aspect of
global relations. Teams should pay attention to the weighing here and pay special attention to
the Air University card, which is very information dense.
Argument: Reducing military support for Taiwan could embolden China to be more aggressive
in the region.
Warrant: China has been increasing its military activities near Taiwan in recent years.
Davidson, Helen. “China begins military drills around Taiwan after US speaker meeting.”
The Guardian, April 7, 2023,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/08/china-to-hold-military-drills-
around-taiwan-after-us-speaker-meeting. Accessed October 11, 2024.
China’s military has sent dozens of planes across the Taiwan Strait median line, just
hours after announcing three days of drills around Taiwan in response to the island’s
president, Tsai Ing-wen, visiting the US and meeting the House speaker. Tsai met the
speaker, Kevin McCarthy, while in Los Angeles in Wednesday, angering Beijing, which
claims Taiwan as a Chinese province it intends to annex. On Saturday morning, less than
24 hours after Tsai’s return home, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) said it would
hold “combat readiness patrols” and exercises in the Taiwan Strait and to the north,
south and east of Taiwan “as planned”. The exercises are focused on “testing the ability
to seize sea control, air control, and information control”, state media said. A few hours
later Taiwan’s defence ministry said it had detected 42 PLA fighter jets and eight
warships in Taiwan’s air defence identification zone (ADIZ), with up to 29 of the planes
crossing the median line – the de facto border in the Taiwan Strait. The PLA has sent
planes and ships into the ADIZ on a near daily basis in recent years and, since the drills
last August, has increased the frequency of median line crossings.
Warrant: U.S. military support has been a key factor in deterring Chinese aggression towards
Taiwan.
Mastro, Oriana Skyler. “This Is What America Is Getting Wrong About China and Taiwan.”
Stanford University, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Oct. 18,
2023, https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/what-america-getting-wrong-about-china-and-
taiwan. Accessed October 11, 2024.
For a half-century, America has avoided war with China over Taiwan largely through a
delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance. That equilibrium has been upset. China
is building up and flexing its military power; hostile rhetoric emanates from both Beijing
and Washington. War seems likelier each day. It’s not too late to restore the kind of
balance that helped to keep the peace for decades, but it will require taking steps to ease
China’s concerns. This will be difficult because of Chinese intransigence and the
overheated atmosphere prevailing in Washington. But it is worth the political risk if it
prevents war. Deterrence came in the form of the implied use of U.S. military force to
thwart a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Reassurance was provided by the understanding
that the United States would not intrude on decisions regarding Taiwan’s eventual
political status. The United States and its regional allies must continue to create a
robust military deterrence. But U.S. leaders and politicians also need to keep in mind the
power of reassurance, try to understand China’s deep sensitivities about Taiwan and
should recommit — clearly and unequivocally — to the idea that only China and Taiwan
can work out their political differences, a stance that remains official U.S. policy.
Warrant: Reducing military support could be seen as a green light for Chinese aggression.
Mastro, Oriana Skylar. “The Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing Might Resort to Force.”
Foreign Affairs, June 31, 2021,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-06-03/china-taiwan-war-
temptation. Accessed October 11, 2024.
U.S. policymakers may hope that Beijing will balk at the potential costs of such
aggression, but there are many reasons to think it might not. Support for armed
unification among the Chinese public and the military establishment is growing.
Concern for international norms is subsiding. Many in Beijing also doubt that the
United States has the military power to stop China from taking Taiwan—or the
international clout to rally an effective coalition against China in the wake of Donald
Trump’s presidency. Although a Chinese invasion of Taiwan may not be imminent, for the
first time in three decades, it is time to take seriously the possibility that China could
soon use force to end its almost century-long civil war.
Impact: Emboldening China could lead to increased regional instability and potential military
conflicts in East Asia, even nuclear war.
Zhao, Tong. “Political Drivers of China’s Changing Nuclear Policy: Implications for U.S.-
China Nuclear Relations and International Security.” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2024, https://carnegie-production-
assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Zhao_Political%20Drivers_final-2024.pdf.
Accessed October 11, 2024.
The increasingly realistic risk of a major military conflict over Taiwan has resulted in the
nuclear issue shifting from the periphery to a more prominent position in the U.S.-
China security relationship. Political factors are the primary source of rising tensions over
Taiwan. Foremost among these factors is Xi’s personal sense of mission to advance
unification and realize his Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. Portraying himself as
a key figure in Chinese contemporary history on par with Mao, Xi seems to harbor
aspirations of leaving a significant historical legacy. Having run the country for more
than ten years and removed constitutional term limits, he is the first paramount leader in
recent decades to serve a third term. But he will face an increasing challenge to justify a
fourth or even fifth term—leaving observers to wonder whether he will push for
progress in unifying Taiwan to fortify his domestic position. By contrast, the general
public and policy elites would like to see unification with Taiwan eventually but are not
pushing for a near-term resolution. For the most part, they have been following Xi’s lead.
Explanation: This argument is strong because it highlights the immediate and tangible
consequences of reducing U.S. military support for Taiwan. It effectively links U.S. policy to
regional stability and demonstrates how a change in U.S. stance could have far-reaching
implications. However, it may be challenged on the grounds that it assumes China's behavior is
solely dependent on U.S. actions.
Argument: Protecting Taiwan promotes the United States' commitment to democracy in East
Asia.
Taiwan’s vibrant and competitive democratic system has allowed for regular peaceful
transfers of power since 2000, and protections for civil liberties are generally robust.
Ongoing concerns include inadequate safeguards against the exploitation of migrant
workers and the Chinese government’s efforts to influence policymaking, media, and the
democratic infrastructure.
Warrant: U.S. support for Taiwan is seen as a commitment to democratic values in the region.
Sacks, David. “Why Is Taiwan Important to the United States?” Council on Foreign
Relations, June 20, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-taiwan-important-united-
states. Accessed October 11, 2024.
Politically, Taiwan is one of Asia’s few democratic success stories and by some
measures the region’s freest society. Its open political system demonstrates to China’s
citizens that there is an alternative path of development for a majority ethnically Chinese
society. If China were to take Taiwan by force, Taiwan’s democracy would be
extinguished, and its twenty-three million people would see their rights severely
curtailed. As this would come in the wake of China’s crackdown on democracy in Hong
Kong, the ramifications would be even greater. The stakes are clear, which is why the
United States needs to redouble its efforts to deter China from using force or coercion
to achieve unification with Taiwan. While a military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait is
neither imminent nor inevitable, the chances of one are increasing. U.S. policy toward
Taiwan needs to evolve to contend with a more capable, assertive, and risk-acceptant
China that is increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo.
Impact: Maintaining support for Taiwan reinforces the U.S. role as a defender of democracy
globally, strengthening its soft power and democratic influence.
“U.S. Soft Power Must Focus on Cooperation.” Global Americans, May 5, 2023,
https://globalamericans.org/u-s-soft-power-must-focus-on-cooperation/. Accessed
October 11, 2024.
Soft power has become a significant tool in modern international relations, allowing
nations to influence and attract other countries through non-coercive means. In Latin
America and the Caribbean, the United States has historically relied heavily on its
economic and military power to maintain influence. However, in recent years, the region
has undergone significant political and social transformations, and the traditional power
dynamics have shifted. Therefore, the United States needs to focus on strengthening its
soft power capabilities in the region through deepening cooperation. The White House’s
2022 National Security Strategy attempts to balance the need for more cooperation with
the clear challenges that have developed in the hemisphere over the last two decades.
The current state of U.S. soft power in Latin America and the Caribbean highlights the
need for further investment in specific initiatives to enhance cooperation and improve
diplomatic relations.
Explanation: This argument effectively ties U.S. support for Taiwan to broader American values
and foreign policy goals. It's particularly strong in a high school debate context as it appeals to
idealistic notions of promoting democracy. However, it may be vulnerable to counterarguments
that prioritize realpolitik over ideological considerations.
Argument: Failure to defend Taiwan could trigger a broader regional arms race as neighboring
countries bolster their defenses.
Warrant: Countries in the region are already increasing their defense spending due to concerns
about China's growing military power.
What explains growing military expenditures in the Indo-Pacific? Japan, for instance,
has approved a “record” defense expenditure of 5.34 trillion yen ($51.7 billion) for
2021. The approved budget saw a hike of 0.5 percent from the allocation for 2020.
Japan’s defense budget has risen for the past nine years, primarily on account of regional
threats including China and North Korea. China’s assertive behavior, especially in the
maritime domain, and North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats have been cited as
important rationales for the continued hike in defense spending. Tokyo has also
assigned funding for non-conventional military areas like outer space, cyber, and
electromagnetic warfare, all of which have been a focus of China’s People’s Liberation
Army, especially after the establishment of the PLA Strategic Support Force.
Warrant: The United States’s diplomatic and military presence has been a stabilizing factor in
the region, preventing an arms race.
Yeo, Andrew. “Cultivating America’s alliances and partners in the Indo-Pacific.” Brookings,
Sept. 16, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/cultivating-americas-alliances-
and-partners-in-the-indo-pacific/. Accessed October 11, 2024.
In the early 1950s, the United States established a series of bilateral security alliances in
Asia with the goal of deterring communist aggression and expansion in Asia. In contrast
to the collective defense arrangement established through the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) in Europe, the United States established a “hub-and-spokes”
alliance system that included signing treaty alliances with the Philippines (1951); Japan
(1951, revised in 1960); Australia and New Zealand (1951); South Korea (1953); and the
Republic of China or Taiwan (1954, ending in 1979). The network of U.S. alliances
remains an enduring feature of Asia’s security landscape today. However, Asia’s
regional architecture has evolved considerably since the end of the Cold War to respond
to new challenges including China’s rise, North Korea’s nuclear threat, and maritime
disputes in the East and South China Seas. During the past three-and-a-half years, U.S.
alliances and partnerships (i.e., security relations established without a mutual defense
treaty) in Asia have experienced a renewal characterized by strengthened bilateral ties,
new or revitalized mini-laterals (groupings with three or four partners), and expanded
cross-regional networks including cooperation between NATO and the “Indo-Pacific Four”
(Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand). In response to geopolitical shifts and
to some degree domestic leadership change in Asia, the Biden administration played a
significant role in strengthening U.S. alliances and cultivating Asia’s evolving regional
architecture.
Warrant: Reduced U.S. support for Taiwan could lead other countries to seek alternative
security arrangements.
Pikayev, Alexander. “East Asia and Missile Defenses: Right Militarily and Wrong
Politically?” Nautilus Institute, March 2001, https://nautilus.org/projects/nuclear-
policy-2nd-workshop/east-asia-and-missile-defenses-right-militarily-and-wrong-
politically/?view=pdf. Accessed October 11, 2024.
Gradual but steady changes in the regional balance accompanied by periodic tensions
across the Taiwan Strait is slowly eroding a system of the US led alliances in the East
Asia. The US security guarantees cannot provide the allies with a feeling of security like
the one enjoyed by the Europeans after the end of the Cold War. At the same time, there
is little prospect of establishing alternative security arrangements which would be
capable of adequately addressing the changing security environment in the region. An
absence of a truly integrated area in the Western Pacific, difficult political relations and
mutual suspicions between some of key regional players makes the continuing US
geopolitical presence there an extremely and increasingly important stabilizing factor.
There is a critically urgent need to halt further erosion of the US security guarantees,
and, hopefully, to reverse the process. In that context, anti-missile defenses are widely
considered not as a panacea, but a primary tool for preserving the US presence and, thus,
maintaining the fragile regional stability.
Impact: A regional arms race would increase tensions, reduce stability, and potentially lead to
violent conflicts in East Asia.
Garlauskas, Markus. “The United States and its allies must be ready to deter a two-front
war and nuclear attacks in East Asia.” Atlantic Council, Aug. 16, 2023,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-united-
states-and-its-allies-must-be-ready-to-deter-a-two-front-war-and-nuclear-attacks-
in-east-asia/. Accessed October 11, 2024.
The challenges to deterrence in East Asia have begun to change fundamentally in recent
years, putting them on track to present grave risks to US national security interests
over the coming decade. This report summarizes the results of a study focused on two of
these emerging and interrelated challenges to deterrence in East Asia. The first is the
potential for a conflict with either the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or North Korea
to escalate horizontally and become a simultaneous conflict with both. The other is the
possibility that either or both adversaries would choose to escalate vertically to a
limited nuclear attack—rather than concede defeat—in a major conflict. US thinking
about war in East Asia often neglects the possibility that the United States would have to
fight the PRC and North Korea simultaneously rather than separately. Furthermore,
conventional wisdom in the United States underestimates the risk that either the PRC or
North Korea would resort to a limited nuclear strike in the event of a conflict in the
region. However, the recent behavior of the United States’ adversaries in East Asia
suggests that this thinking may be off the mark; the PRC military has reorganized itself
to prepare to fight a two-front war, while both the PRC and North Korea continue to
develop the sophistication and size of their tactical nuclear arsenals.
Explanation: This argument effectively links U.S. policy on Taiwan to broader regional security
dynamics. It's particularly strong because it highlights the potential unintended consequences
of reducing support for Taiwan.
Argument: Reducing military support for Taiwan could lead to a Chinese invasion or
annexation.
Warrant: China has consistently maintained its intention to reunify with Taiwan, by force if
necessary.
Willasey-Wilsey, Tim. “US Policy on Taiwan and the Perils of ‘Strategic Ambiguity.” Rusi,
Sept. 26, 2022, https://rusi.org/explore-our-
research/publications/commentary/us-policy-taiwan-and-perils-strategic-
ambiguity. Accessed October 11, 2024.
Warrant: U.S. military support has been a key factor in deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Garlauskas, Markus. “The United States and its allies must be ready to deter a two-front
war and nuclear attacks in East Asia.” Atlantic Council, Aug. 16, 2023,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-united-
states-and-its-allies-must-be-ready-to-deter-a-two-front-war-and-nuclear-attacks-
in-east-asia/. Accessed October 11, 2024.
The challenges to deterrence in East Asia have begun to change fundamentally in recent
years, putting them on track to present grave risks to US national security interests
over the coming decade. This report summarizes the results of a study focused on two of
these emerging and interrelated challenges to deterrence in East Asia. The first is the
potential for a conflict with either the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or North Korea
to escalate horizontally and become a simultaneous conflict with both. The other is the
possibility that either or both adversaries would choose to escalate vertically to a
limited nuclear attack—rather than concede defeat—in a major conflict. US thinking
about war in East Asia often neglects the possibility that the United States would have to
fight the PRC and North Korea simultaneously rather than separately. Furthermore,
conventional wisdom in the United States underestimates the risk that either the PRC or
North Korea would resort to a limited nuclear strike in the event of a conflict in the
region. However, the recent behavior of the United States’ adversaries in East Asia
suggests that this thinking may be off the mark; the PRC military has reorganized itself
to prepare to fight a two-front war, while both the PRC and North Korea continue to
develop the sophistication and size of their tactical nuclear arsenals.
Warrant: A reduction in U.S. support could alter China's cost-benefit analysis regarding military
action against Taiwan.
Mastro, Oriana Skylar. “The Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing Might Resort to Force.”
Foreign Affairs, June 31, 2021,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-06-03/china-taiwan-war-
temptation. Accessed October 11, 2024.
U.S. policymakers may hope that Beijing will balk at the potential costs of such
aggression, but there are many reasons to think it might not. Support for armed
unification among the Chinese public and the military establishment is growing. Concern
for international norms is subsiding. Many in Beijing also doubt that the United States
has the military power to stop China from taking Taiwan—or the international clout to
rally an effective coalition against China in the wake of Donald Trump’s presidency.
Although a Chinese invasion of Taiwan may not be imminent, for the first time in three
decades, it is time to take seriously the possibility that China could soon use force to
end its almost century-long civil war.
Impact: A Chinese invasion or annexation of Taiwan would dramatically alter the geopolitical
landscape of East Asia and potentially trigger a larger international conflict.
“The Widening Schism across the Taiwan Strait.” International Crisis Group, Sept. 26,
2024, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/taiwan-strait-china/342-
widening-schism-across-taiwan-strait. Accessed October 11, 2024.
The dispute over Taiwan, a self-governing island that sits 160 km east of China, is a
simmering flashpoint that could bring the nuclear armed, economic giants China and
the U.S. directly into war. Such a conflict would upend global supply chains and trade.
One estimate puts the potential cost at a staggering $10 trillion, about 10 per cent of
global GDP. The cost of an all-out war between the U.S. and China that involved nuclear
weapons is incalculable.
Explanation: This argument presents a clear and direct consequence of reducing U.S. military
support for Taiwan. It's particularly strong because it ties into existing concerns about China's
intentions and the fragile status quo in the Taiwan Strait. It also speaks to the dire
consequences of a global conflict—possibly nuclear war—in the event of reunification by force.
Argument: Reducing military support for Taiwan will push the United States' allies toward the
influence of other global powers.
Warrant: U.S. allies in Asia closely monitor American commitment to regional security.
But as 2023 draws to a close, it is remarkable to observe that U.S. alliances and
partnerships in the Indo-Pacific are just about the deepest and most robust they have
been in all their history. Some of this is a testament to the exceptional durability of the
United States' alliances and partnerships, given that they survived—and, in the case of
India and Japan, even thrived—in spite of Trump's bullying and destructiveness. Indeed,
Washington has been cultivating and institutionalizing these friendship networks for
decades. Credit is also due to the Biden administration: Not only has it returned these
important relationships to their normal status quo following four years of disruption
under Trump, but it has also bolstered them to enhance deterrence against China and
North Korea, the two main threats in the region. The Biden team is also receiving a huge
assist from Beijing itself, whose relentless assertiveness is heightening anxiety among
its neighbors.
Warrant: Some U.S. allies are already hedging their bets by improving relations with China.
Zhu, Kaize. “Multilateralism and China’s Hedging Strategy.” The Diplomat, Feb. 7, 2024,
https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/multilateralism-and-chinas-hedging-strategy/.
Accessed October 11, 2024.
When countries find themselves tactically navigating the push and pull of larger global
forces, they master the art of hedging. From India to Indonesia, Turkey to South Africa,
Saudi Arabia to Brazil, nations constantly balance their economic ties with China
against their security alliances, predominantly with the United States. This balancing
act is becoming a daily reality as the world witnesses an evolving multipolarity and
intense geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China. This diplomatic
combination involves a blend of trade agreements, military alliances, and sometimes
strategic ambiguity, allowing these nations to harness benefits from all sides without
unwavering allegiance to any. Simultaneously, global powers like the United States and
China are not mere spectators but active players in this game of hedging. Even with their
formidable global stature, they employ hedging strategies to safeguard their national and
global interests while fostering stability in a world of growing unpredictability. The U.S.
strengthens its alliances across Europe and Asia while keeping the lines of communication
open with rivals like Russia and China, trying to collaborate with strategic competitors in
areas like climate change and counterterrorism. Meanwhile, China is expanding its
economic reach through ambitious initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and the
Three Global Initiatives, asserting its leadership in the Global South. At the same time,
China continues integrating itself within existing global institutions, endorsing the current
world order from which it benefits, and maintains ongoing dialogue with the United
States.
Impact: Weakened alliances risk exposing the United States to military attack and a weakened
position in the global economy.
O’Hanlon, Michael. “Could the United States and China really go to war? Who would
win?” Brookings, Aug. 15, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/could-the-
united-states-and-china-really-go-to-war-who-would-win/. Accessed October 11,
2024.
Here’s something most Americans may be surprised to hear: military strategists in the
United States consider China the nation’s main military worry—with the distinct
possibility of a major U.S.-China war in the years to come. That is a terrifying prospect.
The two countries are the world’s top two economic and military powers, both armed
with nuclear weapons, each contributing 15% to 20% to world gross domestic product,
and each dependent on the other for its prosperity given the depth and breadth of their
economic relationships. Were they to go to war, however, global prosperity might soon
become the least of our concerns; World War III could not be ruled out, and the survival
of the human race might even be on the line.
Explanation: This argument states that reducing America’s support for Taiwan will only push
Taiwan towards other global powers. Teams will need to make an aggressive and vocal case
that all other powers are a worse option for Taiwan for this argument to be successful.
Con Responses to
Pro Arguments
Con Responses to Pro Arguments Nov/Dec 2024
Smeltz, Dina and Craig Kafura. “For First Time, Half of Americans Favor Defending Taiwan
If China Invades.” August 2021, https://globalaffairs.org/sites/default/files/2021-
08/2021%20Taiwan%20Brief.pdf. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Mitigate: Almost half of Americans support providing specific military aid to Taiwan.
Smeltz, Dina and Craig Kafura. “For First Time, Half of Americans Favor Defending Taiwan
If China Invades.” August 2021, https://globalaffairs.org/sites/default/files/2021-
08/2021%20Taiwan%20Brief.pdf. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Republicans (60%) are more likely to support sending US troops to Taiwan’s defense than
Democrats (50%) or Independents (49%) – see appendix for more information on partisan
divides and Taiwan. At the same time, Americans are divided over whether the United
States should (50%) or should not (47%) sell arms and military equipment to Taiwan.
Delink: The most recent polls show that Americans support continued aid to Taiwan, including
weapons transfers.
Hiciano, Lery. “Most Americans support US helping Taiwan: poll.” Taipei Times, October
10, 2024,
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/10/10/2003825064.
Accessed October 10, 2024.
Fifty-one percent of respondents in the Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey said they
believe that the US should encourage Taiwan to maintain the “status quo,” rather than
move toward independence (36 percent) or unification (4 percent). The survey found
positive sentiment toward Taiwan from most Americans: 61 percent of respondents
said they supported recognizing Taiwan as an independent country, 59 percent support
Taiwan’s inclusion in international organizations and 74 percent support US weapons
transfers to Taiwan.
It helps meet regulations and requirements. Many programs, laws and rules require some
level of public participation. It adheres to democratic principles. U.S. culture and society
embrace the notion that people have the right to influence what affects them. Paying
attention to the public's ideas, values and issues results in more responsive and
democratic governance. It can create more substantive decisions and outcomes. Better
results occur when decision-makers have access to: More information. Public
involvement brings more information to the decision, including scientific or technical
knowledge, knowledge about the context where decisions are implemented, institutions
involved, history and personalities. More information can make the difference between a
good and poor decision.
Loomis, James. “Would the American Public Really Defend Taiwan?” Stimson Center,
January 19, 2021, https://www.stimson.org/2021/would-the-american-public-
really-defend-taiwan/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Any sustained military action taken to defend Taiwan will require the domestic support
of the American public. The doctrine of “strategic ambiguity” and absence of a legally
binding security guarantee effectively makes strong domestic support the de facto
backbone upholding the credibility of America’s defense of Taiwan. This support is
critical both to preventing and winning war. China knows that an attack on Japan is
tantamount to an attack on the U.S. by virtue of America’s security guarantee; this formal
treaty is thus a fixed and immovable pillar of our deterrent credibility. The lack of such a
firm defense commitment to Taiwan conversely makes our deterrent posture more fluid
than fixed, susceptible to the ebbs and flows of domestic political considerations and
shifting public support. Whichever American President is misfortunate enough to
govern during a Chinese invasion of Taiwan will have little formal basis upon which
justify American military intervention; instead, he or she will have to rely on the
public’s willingness to commit troops and expend resources over an unknown period of
time.
Explanation: This response is effective because it turns the AFF’s evidence against them. This
states that the AFF evidence about public support is inaccurate, which allows the NEG to utilize
the positive benefits of public opinion against the AFF.
Response: Reducing military support of Taiwan triggers escalation in the South China Sea.
China has launched major military drills around Taiwan, simulating a full-scale attack on
the island - just days after the new president William Lai was sworn in. The exercises
reinforce what is at the heart of the issue: China's claim over self-governed Taiwan.
Beijing sees the island as a breakaway province that will, eventually, be part of the
country, and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve this. But many Taiwanese
consider themselves to be part of a separate nation - although most are in favour of
maintaining the status quo where Taiwan neither declares independence from China nor
unites with it.
Sevastopulo, Demetri and Joe Leahy. “Xi Jinping claimed US wants China to attack
Taiwan.” Financial Times, June 15, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/7d6ca06c-
d098-4a48-818e-112b97a9497a. Accessed October 10, 2024.
China’s President Xi Jinping told European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen
that Washington was trying to goad Beijing into attacking Taiwan, according to people
familiar with the matter. The Chinese leader has also delivered the warning to domestic
officials in his own country, one person said. Xi issued the warning in a meeting with von
der Leyen in April 2023 that was described to the Financial Times by several people. He
said the US was trying to trick China into invading Taiwan, but that he would not take
the bait. Another person said he had issued similar warnings to his officials. The
comments provide a window into Xi’s thinking on Taiwan — the most thorny issue in
US-China relations.
Rogin, Josh. “The U.S. military plans a ‘Hellscape’ to deter China from attacking Taiwan.”
The Washington Post, June 10, 2024,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/06/10/taiwan-china-hellscape-
military-plan/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
The key to thwarting Xi’s assumed strategy is a U.S. strategy called “Hellscape,” Paparo
told me. The idea is that as soon as China’s invasion fleet begins moving across the 100-
mile waterway that separates China and Taiwan, the U.S. military would deploy
thousands of unmanned submarines, unmanned surface ships and aerial drones to
flood the area and give Taiwanese, U.S. and partner forces time to mount a full
response. “I want to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape using a number
of classified capabilities,” Paparo said. “So that I can make their lives utterly miserable for
a month, which buys me the time for the rest of everything.” “I can’t tell you what’s in it,”
he replied when pressed about details. “But it’s real and it’s deliverable.” There are some
public signs the Hellscape plan is making progress. In March, the Defense Department
announced it would spend $1 billion on a program called “Replicator” to build swarms
of unmanned surface ships and aerial drones for this very mission. Paparo said the
Replicator program shows that the United States is also learning lessons from the Russia-
Ukraine war, where Ukraine has innovated with drone technology.
Impact: Preventing a Chinese invasion is crucial because it could spillover into other Southeast
Asian countries.
Bing, Ngeow Chow. “How Southeast Asia Might React in a Potential Military Conflict Over
Taiwan.” Carnegie Endowment, June 17, 2024,
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/06/how-southeast-asia-might-
react-in-a-potential-military-conflict-over-taiwan?lang=en¢er=china. Accessed
October 10, 2024.
These Southeast Asian claimant states may also fear that if they do not join the fight
against China, and China later prevails over the United States and Taiwan, they would
be the next victims of Chinese hegemony. As Asian security expert Drew Thompson
argues, “it would be disingenuous and delusional for those states to ignore the
precedent set by a cross-Strait conflict initiated by Beijing since they would eventually
also be subject to Chinese military coercion over their own disputes.” Based on this
logic, it could be better for claimant states to seize the opportunity afforded by a
Taiwan conflict to push back against China in the South China Sea once and for all, and
seek to ensure that the U.S.-led coalition prevailed over China. This argument might be
met with a warm reception in the Philippines, but would be considered a risky strategy in
the rest of Southeast Asia.
Impact: That’s important because China could be willing to use nuclear weapons in Taiwan.
Anderson, James. “The Next Taiwan Crisis Will (Almost) Certainly Involve Nuclear
Threats.” U.S. Naval Institute, March 2024,
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/march/next-taiwan-crisis-will-
almost-certainly-involve-nuclear-threats. Accessed October 10, 2024.
China’s NFU policy is one reason nuclear threats in Taiwan invasion scenarios have not
received adequate scrutiny. For decades, China has declared it will never be the first to
use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. It would be a mistake, however, to take
China’s NFU policy at face value. For starters, predicting China’s behavior in crisis
situations is far from an exact science. As Center for a New American Security analyst
Jacob Stokes argues, “Decisions with such grand strategic importance are likely to be
informed by the worldview of China’s leadership—especially Xi [Jinping] himself for the
foreseeable future—in ways that supersede official doctrine or other strategic analysis
written by military bureaucracies or analysts.”4 At the very least, a Chinese invasion of
Taiwan would provide a major stress test of its NFU policy if the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) struggled to subdue the island with conventional force. Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) leaders might even consider failure an existential threat. As defense analyst
Mike Sweeney at Defense Priorities put it: Any battle over Taiwan will not just be a
question of territorial aggression but a fight over the core conception of modern
China’s soul. And for the leaders who launch such an endeavor, their political futures
will hinge on the outcome, as will, possibly, their physical safety and that of their
families in the event of failure. Under such circumstances, nuclear use might not be
palatable, but it could seem far more plausible if military defeat were to equate to loss
of domestic power and possible death anyway.
Explanation: This response is effective because it turns the AFF’s evidence against them. This
response states that military support is the only thing prevent China from invading in the status
quo, which means that the AFF impacts about a potential escalation in the South China Sea can
be turned against them.
China has launched major military drills around Taiwan, simulating a full-scale attack on
the island - just days after the new president William Lai was sworn in. The exercises
reinforce what is at the heart of the issue: China's claim over self-governed Taiwan.
Beijing sees the island as a breakaway province that will, eventually, be part of the
country, and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve this. But many Taiwanese
consider themselves to be part of a separate nation - although most are in favour of
maintaining the status quo where Taiwan neither declares independence from China nor
unites with it.
Sevastopulo, Demetri and Joe Leahy. “Xi Jinping claimed US wants China to attack
Taiwan.” Financial Times, June 15, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/7d6ca06c-
d098-4a48-818e-112b97a9497a. Accessed October 10, 2024.
China’s President Xi Jinping told European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen
that Washington was trying to goad Beijing into attacking Taiwan, according to people
familiar with the matter. The Chinese leader has also delivered the warning to domestic
officials in his own country, one person said. Xi issued the warning in a meeting with von
der Leyen in April 2023 that was described to the Financial Times by several people. He
said the US was trying to trick China into invading Taiwan, but that he would not take
the bait. Another person said he had issued similar warnings to his officials. The
comments provide a window into Xi’s thinking on Taiwan — the most thorny issue in
US-China relations.
China is building its military and nuclear arsenal on a scale not seen since World War II
and all signs suggest it’s sticking to ambitions to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, a
top US admiral testified. Despite Beijing’s economic challenges, its official defense budget
has increased by 16% over recent years to more than $223 billion, Admiral John Aquilino,
the leader of the Indo-Pacific Command, told the US House Armed Services Committee in
prepared testimony on Wednesday. In the three years since he took command, he said
the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, has added more than 400 fighter aircraft, along
with more than 20 major warships. It’s also doubled its inventory of ballistic and cruise
missiles since 2020, he said.
Impact: An invasion of Taiwan could involve preemptive strikes on American bases outside of
China’s sphere of influence.
“Will China Invade Taiwan? A Potential Timeline for Conflict.” Global Guardian, February
8, 2024, https://www.globalguardian.com/global-digest/will-china-invade-taiwan.
Accessed October 10, 2024.
Tan, Huileng. “The world’s top chipmakers can flip a ‘kill switch’ should China invade
Taiwan, Bloomberg reports.” Business Insider,
https://www.businessinsider.com/asml-tsmc-semiconductor-chip-equipment-kill-
switch-china-invade-taiwan-2024-5. Accessed October 10, 2024.
The news of a forced shutdown, or a "kill switch," on ASML's chipmaking gear comes
amid intensifying rivalry between Washington and Beijing and mounting concerns over
a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its own territory. Taiwan
is the world's epicenter for semiconductor chips, the ubiquitous parts that are used in
products from data centers to smartphones. A war in the region would have major
consequences for the global economy. The US, citing national security concerns, imposed
restrictions on China under the Advanced Computing Chips Rule in November. The
restrictions make it harder for the East Asian giant to import advanced AI chips from
American manufacturers. The US has also pressured the Netherlands to block some ASML
exports to China to limit the country's ability to manufacture advanced chips. The Dutch
company has also said it will stop servicing some equipment previously exported to
China. But US concerns over a Chinese invasion of Taiwan remain, and Washington has
expressed them to Dutch and Taiwanese officials, Bloomberg reported. ASML assured
Dutch officials about the option to push the "kill switch" when they met with the
company, per the media outlet.
Explanation: This response is effective because it turns the AFF’s evidence against them. This
response states that military support is the only thing prevent China from invading in the status
quo, which means that the AFF impacts about a ground invasion of Taiwan impacting the
semiconductor industry can be turned against them.
Loh, Matthew. “There is 'no situation' where Taiwan can defend itself against China the
way Ukraine has fought against Russia, says APAC security expert.” Business
Insider, April 17, 2023, https://www.businessinsider.com/taiwan-cant-defend-
against-china-without-direct-american-help-2023-4. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Kolipaka, Sharath. “Evaluating Taiwan’s ability to defend itself against China.” Cescube,
February 15, 2023, https://www.cescube.com/vp-evaluating-taiwan-s-ability-to-
defend-itself-against-china. Accessed October 10, 2024.
In conclusion, while Taiwan has made impressive strides in enhancing its military
capabilities, its ability to defend itself against a potential attack from China remains
limited. The geographical proximity of China and its military prowess pose a significant
challenge to Taiwan's defence strategy. Furthermore, any direct intervention by the
United States in response to an attack on Taiwan could lead to a dangerous escalation of
the conflict, potentially involving other major powers and even leading to the use of
nuclear weapons.
Turn: Taiwan’s self-defense improvements would be too little, too late – They need the USA.
Boot, Max. “Taiwan is finally beefing up its defenses. Will it be too little, too late?” The
Washington Post, January 9, 2023,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/09/taiwan-china-invasion-
defense-ukraine/. Accessed October 11, 2024.
Taiwan is responding to the growing danger by taking long overdue steps to build up its
defenses. The government, led by President Tsai Ing-wen, is raising the defense budget
for 2023 by 13.9 percent, expanding mandatory military service from four months to a
year, and buying from the United States advanced weapons systems such as Harpoon
anti-ship missiles, Stinger antiaircraft missiles and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems
(HIMARS). But Taiwan, which is much smaller in area and population than Ukraine, still
has a long way to go before it can credibly deter a military threat from an enemy that is
far more populous and powerful than Russia. While Taiwan’s defense budget is
growing, it is still only 2.4 percent of GDP — less than in the United States. And while
conscripts will soon be serving longer periods in the military, they will still spend less
time in uniform than draftees in Israel or South Korea.
Impact: The United States has explicitly said they will defend Taiwan,.
Brunnstrom, David and Trevor Hunnicutt. “Biden says U.S. forces would defend Taiwan in
the event of a Chinese invasion.” Reuters, September 19, 2022,
https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-us-forces-would-defend-taiwan-event-
chinese-invasion-2022-09-18/. Accessed October 11, 2024.
U.S. President Joe Biden said U.S forces would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese
invasion, his most explicit statement on the issue, drawing an angry response from
China that said it sent the wrong signal to those seeking an independent Taiwan. Asked in
a CBS 60 Minutes interview broadcast on Sunday whether U.S. forces would defend the
democratically governed island claimed by China, he replied: "Yes, if in fact, there was
an unprecedented attack." Asked to clarify if he meant that unlike in Ukraine, U.S. forces
- American men and women - would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion,
Biden replied: "Yes.".
Lendon, Brad and Oren Liebermann. “War game suggests Chinese invasion of Taiwan
would fail at a huge cost to US, Chinese, and Taiwanese militaries.” CNN, January 9,
2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/09/politics/taiwan-invasion-war-game-intl-
hnk-ml/index.html. Accessed October 11, 2024.
Explanation: This response is effective because it turns the AFF’s evidence against them. This
response states that the lack of Taiwan defense in the status quo makes it less likely that they
could defend themselves. The NEG has an advantage here because it will obviously take time
for Taiwan to develop a self-sufficient industry, leaving them open to attack in the meantime.
China has launched major military drills around Taiwan, simulating a full-scale attack on
the island - just days after the new president William Lai was sworn in. The exercises
reinforce what is at the heart of the issue: China's claim over self-governed Taiwan.
Beijing sees the island as a breakaway province that will, eventually, be part of the
country, and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve this. But many Taiwanese
consider themselves to be part of a separate nation - although most are in favour of
maintaining the status quo where Taiwan neither declares independence from China nor
unites with it.
Sevastopulo, Demetri and Joe Leahy. “Xi Jinping claimed US wants China to attack
Taiwan.” Financial Times, June 15, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/7d6ca06c-
d098-4a48-818e-112b97a9497a. Accessed October 10, 2024.
China’s President Xi Jinping told European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen
that Washington was trying to goad Beijing into attacking Taiwan, according to people
familiar with the matter. The Chinese leader has also delivered the warning to domestic
officials in his own country, one person said. Xi issued the warning in a meeting with von
der Leyen in April 2023 that was described to the Financial Times by several people. He
said the US was trying to trick China into invading Taiwan, but that he would not take
the bait. Another person said he had issued similar warnings to his officials. The
comments provide a window into Xi’s thinking on Taiwan — the most thorny issue in
US-China relations.
Turn: Preventing a Chinese invasion is crucial because it could spillover into other Southeast
Asian countries.
Bing, Ngeow Chow. “How Southeast Asia Might React in a Potential Military Conflict Over
Taiwan.” Carnegie Endowment, June 17, 2024,
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/06/how-southeast-asia-might-
react-in-a-potential-military-conflict-over-taiwan?lang=en¢er=china. Accessed
October 10, 2024.
These Southeast Asian claimant states may also fear that if they do not join the fight
against China, and China later prevails over the United States and Taiwan, they would
be the next victims of Chinese hegemony. As Asian security expert Drew Thompson
argues, “it would be disingenuous and delusional for those states to ignore the
precedent set by a cross-Strait conflict initiated by Beijing since they would eventually
also be subject to Chinese military coercion over their own disputes.” Based on this
logic, it could be better for claimant states to seize the opportunity afforded by a
Taiwan conflict to push back against China in the South China Sea once and for all, and
seek to ensure that the U.S.-led coalition prevailed over China. This argument might be
met with a warm reception in the Philippines, but would be considered a risky strategy in
the rest of Southeast Asia.
Nan, Hao. “US-China tensions risk igniting nuclear arms race in East Asia.” South China
Morning Post, September 19, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-
opinion/article/3278834/us-china-tensions-risk-igniting-nuclear-arms-race-east-
asia. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Amid a deterioration in US-China relations, the risks of a nuclear arms race in East Asia
are growing alarmingly. The recent US-China diplomatic battles over nuclear arms
control are a continuation of earlier unsuccessful attempts at dialogue. Both countries
have attempted to resume the long-stalled nuclear arms control talks. On November 6,
the first official nuclear arms control dialogue since 2018 was convened in the lead-up to
Biden’s talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping on November 15, 2023, on the sidelines of
the Apec summit. However, these talks produced no concrete results, and no specific
date for follow-up discussions was announced. Semi-official channels were also explored,
such as a track two nuclear arms dialogue in March – the first since 2019. The trajectory
of nuclear developments in East Asia, driven by US-China rivalry, threatens to
destabilise the region and spark a chain reaction of nuclear deterrence efforts. It is
imperative for global security that the US and China resume meaningful arms control
dialogue to prevent a cascading series of escalatory measures that could have
catastrophic consequences.
Impact: That’s important because China could be willing to use nuclear weapons in Taiwan.
Anderson, James. “The Next Taiwan Crisis Will (Almost) Certainly Involve Nuclear
Threats.” U.S. Naval Institute, March 2024,
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/march/next-taiwan-crisis-will-
almost-certainly-involve-nuclear-threats. Accessed October 10, 2024.
China’s NFU policy is one reason nuclear threats in Taiwan invasion scenarios have not
received adequate scrutiny. For decades, China has declared it will never be the first to
use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. It would be a mistake, however, to take
China’s NFU policy at face value. For starters, predicting China’s behavior in crisis
situations is far from an exact science. As Center for a New American Security analyst
Jacob Stokes argues, “Decisions with such grand strategic importance are likely to be
informed by the worldview of China’s leadership—especially Xi [Jinping] himself for the
foreseeable future—in ways that supersede official doctrine or other strategic analysis
written by military bureaucracies or analysts.”4 At the very least, a Chinese invasion of
Taiwan would provide a major stress test of its NFU policy if the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) struggled to subdue the island with conventional force. Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) leaders might even consider failure an existential threat. As defense analyst
Mike Sweeney at Defense Priorities put it: Any battle over Taiwan will not just be a
question of territorial aggression but a fight over the core conception of modern
China’s soul. And for the leaders who launch such an endeavor, their political futures
will hinge on the outcome, as will, possibly, their physical safety and that of their
families in the event of failure. Under such circumstances, nuclear use might not be
palatable, but it could seem far more plausible if military defeat were to equate to loss
of domestic power and possible death anyway.
Diaz-Maurin, Francois. “Nowhere to Hide.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 20,
2022, https://thebulletin.org/2022/10/nowhere-to-hide-how-a-nuclear-war-would-
kill-you-and-almost-everyone-else/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
the explosion site. In a nuclear war, hundreds or thousands of detonations would occur
within minutes of each other. Regional nuclear war between India and Pakistan that
involved about 100 15-kiloton nuclear weapons launched at urban areas would result in
27 million direct deaths.
Explanation: This response is effective because it turns the AFF’s evidence against them. This
response states that military support is the only thing prevent China from invading in the status
quo, which means that the AFF impacts about potential nuclear impacts can be turned against
them.
Tian, Yew and Chen, Laurie. “China drops 'peaceful reunification' reference to Taiwan”
Reuters, March 5, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-drops-
peaceful-reunification-reference-taiwan-raises-defence-spending-by-2024-03-
05/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
China will boost its defence spending by 7.2% this year, fuelling a military budget that has
more than doubled under President Xi Jinping's 11 years in office as Beijing hardens its
stance on Taiwan, according to official reports on Tuesday. The increase mirrors the rate
presented in last year's budget and again comes in well above the government's
economic growth forecast for this year. China also officially adopted tougher language
against Taiwan as it released the budget figures, dropping the mention of "peaceful
reunification" in a government report delivered by Premier Li Qiang at the opening of
the National People's Congress (NPC), China's rubber-stamp parliament, on Tuesday.
Nye, Joseph. “How to prevent a war over Taiwan” Diplomatic Courier, April 19, 2024,
https://www.diplomaticourier.com/posts/how-to-prevent-a-war-over-taiwan.
Accessed October 10, 2024.
For years, the U.S. policy was known as “strategic ambiguity,” but it could be better
described as “double deterrence.” The U.S. wanted to deter China from using force, but
also to deter Taiwan from provoking Beijing by declaring formal independence. That
meant providing Taiwan with weapons for its self–defense, but not issuing a formal
security guarantee, since that might tempt Taipei into declaring independence.
Sacks, David. “Taiwan Announced a Record Defense Budget: But Is It Enough to Deter
China?” Council on Forgein Relations, August 20, 2023,
https://www.cfr.org/blog/taiwan-announced-record-defense-budget-it-enough-
deter-china. Accessed October 10, 2024.
While Taiwan cannot be expected to match China’s military spending dollar for dollar,
it will need to both spend more and invest that money wisely to maintain deterrence.
In practice, this means procuring more anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, investing in
rapid mining capabilities, developing drones and unmanned underwater vehicles,
expanding domestic defense industrial capacity, and hardening critical infrastructure.
Given its limited resources, Taiwan will have to make difficult decisions and divest
some legacy platforms in favor of investing in a greater quantity of cheaper systems.
Cross-strait tensions have escalated since the election of former Taiwanese President
Tsai Ing-wen in 2016. Tsai refused to accept a formula that her predecessor, Ma Ying-
jeou, endorsed to allow for increased cross-strait ties. Meanwhile, Beijing has taken
increasingly aggressive actions, which includes flying fighter jets near the island. Some
analysts fear a Chinese attack on Taiwan has the potential to draw the United States into
a war with China.
Keegan, David. “Strengthening Dual Deterrence on Taiwan: The Key to US-China Strategic
Stability” Stimsons, July 6, 2021, https://www.stimson.org/2021/strengthening-
dual-deterrence-on-taiwan-the-key-to-us-china-strategic-stability/. Accessed
October 10, 2024.
In August 1982, the U.S. and China signed their third joint communique, which China
understood would lead to the end of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Instead, we have sold
Taiwan large numbers of F-16 combat aircraft, missiles of all sorts, and even main
battle tanks. If the U.S. were to make this retrenchment, China would conclude that the
U.S. was acting simply to disguise its weakness, confirming China’s judgment that the U.S.
is a declining power. China would 1) increase military pressure against the U.S. and its
allies across the region, including in the South and East China seas, and 2) suggest to
U.S. allies and partners that its interests would be better served by accommodating
China.
Explanation: This block attempts to separate US neutrality from China’s behavior by showing
that they are aggressive regardless of the stance the US takes on the issue. Additionally,
without proper deterrence and a hard stance, China is likely to increase their aggression
further.
Keegan, David. “Strengthening Dual Deterrence on Taiwan: The Key to US-China Strategic
Stability” Stimsons, July 6, 2021, https://www.stimson.org/2021/strengthening-
dual-deterrence-on-taiwan-the-key-to-us-china-strategic-stability/. Accessed
October 10, 2024.
The U.S. should instead update and strengthen its “dual deterrence,” quietly enhance
its military power, and actively improve Taiwan’s security in all dimensions, including
through progress toward a bilateral trade agreement. These efforts must be coupled
with quiet, authoritative assurances to Beijing, coordinated with Taipei, that we will
respect the commitments we have made to China since 1971.
Wonacott, Peter “Costly Conflict: Here’s How China’s Military Options for Taiwan
Backfire” United States Institute of Peace, October 9, 2024,
https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/10/costly-conflict-heres-how-chinas-
military-options-taiwan-backfire. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Bloomberg Economics has estimated a war with Taiwan would cost a staggering $10
trillion, equivalent to 10% of global GDP — far outpacing the economic toll from
Ukraine’s war, the COVID pandemic and the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. China’s
GDP would suffer a 16.7% blow compared to 40% for what would be a devastated
Taiwanese economy. Bloomberg Economics also modeled the fallout from a military
blockade of the island, including retaliatory measures between China and the U.S. It
estimated a 12.2% hit to Taiwan’s economy, 8.9% for the Chinese mainland and 3.3%
for the U.S. Some experts say the economic damage from a China-Taiwan clash is steeper
if the final price tag includes the costs of foreign investors exiting the Chinese mainland
and neighboring island for safer but less-productive — and less-lucrative — locations.
“China's Xi says 'reunification' with Taiwan is inevitable” Reuters, December 31, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-calls-taiwan-president-
frontrunner-destroyer-peace-2023-12-31/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
China's "reunification" with Taiwan is inevitable, President Xi Jinping said in his New
Year's address on Sunday, striking a stronger tone than he did last year with less than
two weeks to go before the Chinese-claimed island elects a new leader. The Jan. 13
presidential and parliamentary elections are happening at a time of fraught relations
between Beijing and Taipei. China has been ramping up military pressure to assert its
sovereignty claims over democratically governed Taiwan. China considers Taiwan to be
its "sacred territory" and has never renounced the use of force to bring it under
Chinese control, though Xi made no mention of military threats in his speech carried on
state television. "The reunification of the motherland is a historical inevitability," Xi
said, though the official English translation of his remarks published by the Xinhua news
agency used a more simple phrase: "China will surely be reunified".
Gangitano, Alex. “Biden tells Xi ‘One China’ policy toward Taiwan has not changed” The
Hill, November 14, 2022,
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/3734233-biden-tells-xi-one-china-
policy-toward-taiwan-has-not-changed/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
President Biden on Monday said he told Chinese President Xi Jinping that the U.S. policy
toward Taiwan has not changed, adding he doesn’t think there’s an imminent attempt
from China to invade the democratic island. “The One China policy, our One China
policy, has not changed, has not changed. We oppose unilateral change in the status
quo by either side and we’re committed to maintaining the peace and stability in the
Taiwan Straits,” Biden said in a press conference following his 3 1/2-hour bilateral
meeting with Xi in Bali.
Explanation: This argument works to reduce the perceived benefit of diplomacy, as all parties
involved know what they want and are unwilling to change. It also shows that deterrence can
be a useful tool when combined with diplomacy.
McCartney, Micah. “Sixty Percent in Taiwan Poll Want US Military Alliance to Counter
China” Newsweek, November 28, 2023, https://www.newsweek.com/poll-says-
most-taiwanese-favor-america-military-alliance-1847593. Accessed October 10,
2024.
The survey also asked for respondents' views on independence. China has said any
official declaration of independence by Taiwan would trigger war. Taiwan's President Tsai
Ing-wen has said Taiwan, which has its own democratic system of government, army and
diplomatic relations, is already independent. On the question: "Do you support Taiwan's
independence, maintenance of the status quo [across the Taiwan Strait] or reunification
with China?" 44.3 percent said they wanted to maintain the status quo forever, 35.8
percent said they wanted to maintain the status quo and work toward independence,
and 3.8 percent sought independence as soon as possible.
Mitigate: Military support of Taiwan is for defense, not attacking the mainland.
Cohen, Jerome. “The Taiwan Relations Act: Charting a Stable Course for the U.S. in Asia”
Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 8, 2019,
https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/04/the-taiwan-relations-act-charting-a-stable-
course-for-the-u-s-in-asia/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
In February 2019, Assistant Secretary of Defense Randall Schriver offered assurances that
the U.S. will continue to provide Taiwan with all the arms necessary to defend itself. That
is what the TRA says: for Taiwan to defend itself, not to attack the Mainland. Taiwan had
to give up that idea, which Chiang Kai-shek had endorsed, with the unrealistic hope that
he might renew the civil war with the communists and retake the Mainland. In the 1980s,
Beijing thought the arms sales problem would be settled rather quickly. In the “Third
Communiqué” issued by the U.S. and the PRC in 1982, the Reagan administration assured
Beijing that, as tensions relaxed across the Strait and as the situation improved, the U.S.
would gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan. But the end to arms sales that Beijing
hoped for has not happened. The U.S. formula for arms sales that has prevailed is not
the one Beijing believed it had secured after negotiations on several occasions, but,
rather, the Taiwan Relations Act’s formula. Under the TRA, the U.S. remains obligated to
continue to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such
quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability.” For Beijing, this is more than a thorn in its side.
Cunningham, Michael. “Should the USA Maintain Its Policy of Strategic Ambiguity
Towards Taiwan?” The Heritage Foundation, July 24, 2024,
https://www.heritage.org/china/commentary/should-the-usa-maintain-its-policy-
strategic-ambiguity-towards-taiwan. Accessed October 10, 2024.
The United States’ policy of “strategic ambiguity” has helped prevent conflict in the
Taiwan Strait for decades by creating dual deterrence: neither Beijing nor Taipei dares
provoke a war for fear that the United States would—or from Taiwan’s perspective
would not—intervene. Strategic ambiguity isn’t perfect, but it works. Proposals for
abandoning strategic ambiguity in favor of greater clarity about U.S. involvement in a
conflict over Taiwan are not without merit. For example, officially committing the U.S.
to intervene militarily if Taiwan is ever attacked would make it harder for a future
president to water down support for the island and ensure Beijing never believes it
could attack Taiwan without suffering excessive military losses. But a shift to strategic
clarity could create more problems than it solves.
“Taiwan tells China to 'back off' after official denies marine boundary” The Guardian,
September 22, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/22/taiwan-
tells-china-back-off-official-denies-marine-boundary. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Taiwan has demanded that China “back off” and accused it of threatening peace after a
Beijing official rejected the existence of a largely respected marine boundary following
recent incursions. The Taiwanese foreign minister, Joseph Wu, urged Beijing on Tuesday
to “return to the civilised international standards” after a Chinese foreign ministry
spokesman said there was no so-called median line in the Taiwan Strait “as Taiwan is an
inseparable part of Chinese territory”. Wu told reporters: “The median line has been a
symbol of preventing military conflicts and maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan
Strait for many years. The Chinese foreign ministry’s comment is equivalent of destroying
the status quo.” “I call on the international community to condemn the CCP [Chinese
Communist party] for its dangerous and provocative words and deeds threatening
peace ... China must back off,” he added in a tweet.
Cunningham, Michael. “Is Taiwan About To Declare Independence? Not Exactly” The
Heritage Foundation, March 18, 2024,
https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/taiwan-about-declare-
independence-not-exactly. Accessed October 10, 2024.
But any fear that Lai might cause a war by declaring formal independence is
overblown. He lacks both the will and the power to do so. Despite Lai's previous
rhetoric, on the campaign trail the vice president repeatedly renounced formal
independence, pledging instead to maintain his predecessor Tsai Ing-wen's moderate
approach to China and preserve the status quo. His selection of Taiwan's former
representative to the U.S., Hsiao Bi-khim—a noted moderate with deep ties to Tsai—as
his vice president and his restrained rhetoric since being elected indicate he intends to
keep this pledge.
Explanation: Because the desire by Taiwan and its people is to maintain the status quo, and
their defensive military stance, it’s unlikely that any actions they will take will aggravate China
further. Additionally, China is already taking aggressive action, regardless of the actions of
Taiwan.
Response: Taiwan and the US want to focus on a defensive strategy of deterrence, not
attacking China.
Meyers, John. “The Real Problem with Strikes on Mainland China” War on the Rocks,
August 4, 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/the-real-problem-with-
strikes-on-mainland-china/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Mitigate: The arms sales to Taiwan are only to support self defense.
Cohen, Jerome. “The Taiwan Relations Act: Charting a Stable Course for the U.S. in Asia”
Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 8, 2019,
https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/04/the-taiwan-relations-act-charting-a-stable-
course-for-the-u-s-in-asia/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
In February 2019, Assistant Secretary of Defense Randall Schriver offered assurances that
the U.S. will continue to provide Taiwan with all the arms necessary to defend itself. That
is what the TRA says: for Taiwan to defend itself, not to attack the Mainland. Taiwan had
to give up that idea, which Chiang Kai-shek had endorsed, with the unrealistic hope that
he might renew the civil war with the communists and retake the Mainland. In the 1980s,
Beijing thought the arms sales problem would be settled rather quickly. In the “Third
Communiqué” issued by the U.S. and the PRC in 1982, the Reagan administration assured
Beijing that, as tensions relaxed across the Strait and as the situation improved, the U.S.
would gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan. But the end to arms sales that Beijing
hoped for has not happened. The U.S. formula for arms sales that has prevailed is not the
one Beijing believed it had secured after negotiations on several occasions, but, rather, the
Taiwan Relations Act’s formula. Under the TRA, the U.S. remains obligated to continue to
“make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as
may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” For
Beijing, this is more than a thorn in its side.
Filkins, Dexter. “A Dangerous Game Over Taiwan” The New Yorker, November 14, 2022,
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/11/21/a-dangerous-game-over-
taiwan. Accessed October 10, 2024.
For years, Taiwan’s plan for its defense was to attack the mainland bases that would
support an invasion. “The strategy is to go to the origin,” Chang, the former deputy
commander of the Taiwanese Air Force, told me. The Taiwanese military maintains a
formidable conventional force, consisting of fighter bombers, cruise missiles, and anti-
ship missiles. But Taiwan’s strategy was designed in the years when its military was
closer to parity with China’s. Lee Hsi-Min, who served as chief of the general staff of
the Taiwanese military until he retired in 2019, told me that he had pushed for reform
without success. “The government didn’t listen to me,” he said. As China’s capabilities
have raced ahead, American officials have begun prodding Taiwan to rely instead on a
defensive “porcupine strategy,” which would aim to slow down an invading force using
sea mines, anti-ship missiles, and other inexpensive weapons.
“China blasts US report, reiterates ‘no 1st use’ nuke policy” The Associated Press,
December 6, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/taiwan-china-beijing-nuclear-
weapons-defense-policy-ed6faa3fbf16ed24637527d470849b86. Accessed
October 10, 2024.
China strictly adheres to its policy of no first use of nuclear weapons “at any time and
under any circumstances,” its Defense Ministry said Tuesday in a scathing response to a
U.S. report alleging a major buildup in Beijing’s nuclear capabilities. The Pentagon last
week released an annual China security report that warned Beijing would likely have
1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035, and that it has provided no clarity on how it plans to
use them. That report “distorts China’s national defense policy and military strategy,
makes groundless speculation about China’s military development and grossly
interferes in China’s internal affairs on the issue of Taiwan,” ministry spokesperson Tan
Kefei said in a statement.
Turn: Military support works as deterrence to prevent a conflict from happening at all.
U.S. officials do not believe conflict with China is inevitable, Ratner said. Part of this is
because deterrence works. "Deterrence across the strait today is real and strong, and
we are doing more than ever to keep it that way," he said. "Our budget request shows
that the department is focused on delivering cutting-edge capabilities for our military
right now, while investing in the capabilities we need to maintain deterrence well into
the future." Just as important, the United States is working to advance alliances and
partnerships in the region. "Over the past year, we have announced transformative
achievements with Japan, Australia and the Philippines, among others, that will make our
force posture across the Indo-Pacific increasingly distributed, mobile, resilient and
lethal," Ratner said.
Explanation: This block shows that Taiwan and the US are unlikely to attempt an attack on the
Chinese mainland because its too risky, they are deploying a defensive strategy, and the
military support provided to Taiwan acts as deterrence.
Taiwan has been governed independently of China since 1949, but Beijing views the
island as part of its territory. Beijing has vowed to eventually “unify” Taiwan with the
mainland, using force if necessary. Tensions are rising. The Democratic Progressive
Party, whose platform favors independence, won a third consecutive term in 2024,
while Beijing has ramped up political and military pressure on Taipei. Some analysts fear
the United States and China could go to war over Taiwan. U.S. House Speaker Nancy
Pelosi’s trip to the island in 2022 heightened tensions between the countries.
Henley, Lonnie. “Deterrence and Dissuasion in the Taiwan Strait” Foreign Policy Research
Institute, December 12, 2023, https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/12/deterrence-
and-dissuasion-in-the-taiwan-strait/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
These discussions have two unstated assumptions: that our ability to deter attack on
Taiwan is waning as China’s military and economic power grows, but that deterrence is
sufficient to avoid conflict if we employ the right combination of denial and punishment.
I take issue with both those premises. Deterrence is working in the Taiwan Strait, as it
has for seventy years. Clearly, Chinese forces would have seized Taiwan long ago if it
were easy and cheap. But it is not, and nothing on the horizon will change that. Today’s
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is vastly more capable than even a decade ago, and it
will continue improving. But invading Taiwan in the face of US military opposition
remains among the most daunting military operations any country has considered. The
risk of failure will remain high even with the next generation of PLA hardware, and the
one after that. (I have argued elsewhere that China can win despite a failed invasion, but
at a very high cost to all involved.).
Cogan, Mark. “Firmer, less peaceful language on Taiwan reunification” Asia Times, March
8, 2024, https://asiatimes.com/2024/03/firmer-less-peaceful-language-on-
taiwan-reunification/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
The New Year’s message posted to the office’s website had not-so-subtle wording, as
Song warned “the motherland will eventually be reunified, and it will inevitably be
reunified.” The message came less than two weeks before Taiwan held its presidential
and parliamentary elections and coincided with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s message
that reunification was an all but foregone conclusion. The thin rhetorical veneer of
peaceful reunification has been gradually but significantly replaced with language that is
more crisp in “advancing the cause of reunification.” This week, upon releasing budget
figures at the opening of the National People’s Congress, Premier Li Qiang dropped
mention of “peaceful reunification” in his government report, according to a Reuters
analysis of his speech.
Dress, Brad. “China will be ready for potential Taiwan invasion by 2027, US admiral
warns” The Hill, March 21, 2024, https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4547637-
china-potential-taiwan-invasion-2027-us-admiral-warns/. Accessed October 10,
2024.
U.S. Adm. John Aquilino, head of Indo-Pacific Command, said “all indications” point to
the Chinese military being ready for a potential invasion of Taiwan by 2027, the date
China’s leader Xi Jinping has set for a possible military operation. Aquilino testified in
front of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday that China’s People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) continues an “aggressive military buildup” and modernization
effort. All indications point to the PLA meeting President Xi Jinping’s directive to be ready
to invade Taiwan by 2027,” the admiral said in a statement released ahead of his
testimony. “Furthermore, the PLA’s actions indicate their ability to meet Xi’s preferred
timeline to unify Taiwan with mainland China by force if directed.” China increased its
defense budget by 7.2 percent this year, the third year in a row that Beijing has
boosted the budget, Aquilino told lawmakers during the Senate hearing.
Mitigate: China has already threatened other countries because of the Taiwan conflict.
Bryen, Stephen. “The reason why China threatens to “nuke Japan continuously”” Center
for Security Policy, July 22, 2021, https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/the-reason-
why-china-threatens-to-nuke-japan-continuously/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
In perhaps the most reckless threat ever made, China has threatened to “nuke Japan
continuously” if Japan supports the US in protecting Taiwan from a Chinese invasion. It
is the first time ever that any state with nuclear weapons openly threatened a non-
nuclear state with a nuclear attack –and not just any nuclear attack but a massive and
continuous one. The threat is in a video originally posted on a military comment
channel on the Chinese video site called Xigua. It was soon removed, but after two
weeks it has now reappeared on a Communist Party channel in Baoji, a major city in
China’s northern province of Shaanxi. suggesting the threat is not just from some ultra-
Chinese nationalist military people, but from the ruling Communist Party. .
Explanation: This block works to show that China is only being peaceful because of the
deterrence at play. We need to increase military support of Taiwan in order to maintain this
deterrence otherwise China’s aggressive tendencies will show.
Response: China will never cooperate with the U.S., regardless of our actions on Taiwan.
De-Link: Xi has conditioned his entire external image on nationalism and opposition to the U.S.,
hampering cooperation.
The centralization of power in the person of Xi Jinping has created new impediments
to cooperation. To justify his political dominance, Xi has fostered a personality cult
centered on the assertion that he is the man to fulfill the “Chinese Dream,” the vaguely
defined achievement of national rejuvenation. Propaganda within China portrays Xi as
the great defender of the Chinese nation, who will right the wrongs of the “century of
humiliation” and restore respect for China on the world stage. This narrative potentially
ties Xi’s hands in managing a flexible foreign policy, and almost compels him to take a
more aggressive and recalcitrant position in international affairs. Much of the “wolf
warrior” diplomacy is aimed at bolstering nationalist support for Xi’s regime, even as
it sours Beijing’s relations abroad. Many of China’s dealings with the United States are
marketed in state media as Chinese victories over disrespectful foreigners. For
instance, the recent settlement of the US Justice Department’s fraud case against
Huawei Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou was portrayed domestically as a
triumph of Chinese diplomacy over unfair US persecution, while Politburo member
Yang Jiechi was heralded as a national hero for lecturing his US counterparts at a 2021
De-link: China has conditioned cooperation on U.S. silence to human rights abuses––something
we will never do––making cooperation impossible.
Kim, Patricia. “Working toward responsible competition with China.” Brookings, October 8,
2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/10/08/working-
toward-responsible-competition-with-china/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Since coming into office, the Biden administration has proposed that the United States
will simultaneously confront and compete with China, while seeking cooperation in
areas of common interest. Beijing, however, has rejected this framework, making the
case that Washington should not expect China’s cooperation on issues like climate
change as long as it continues to challenge China’s policies elsewhere. Chinese leaders
have expressed that the “ball is in the U.S. court” to rectify its “misguided policies.” This
past July, Beijing presented U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman with “three
bottom lines” and “two lists.” Included in these are demands that the U.S. must refrain
from criticizing China’s domestic system and its policies toward Hong Kong, Xinjiang,
Tibet, and Taiwan, and that all sanctions, tariffs, and export restrictions imposed on
China be removed. This counterproposal harkens back to President Xi’s calls for a “new
type of major power relations,” which was first proposed to the Obama administration
in 2013 and urged the two sides commit to “no conflict and no confrontation,” “mutual
respect,” and “win-win” cooperation. At the time, the Obama administration resisted
this framework for several reasons, including concerns that Beijing would interpret U.S.
endorsement of the concept as blanket acceptance of China’s “core interests.” Today,
there is zero chance that such a proposition would be accepted in Washington given
heightened threat perceptions of China among policymakers and the general public.
Response: Appeasing China by reducing military support will do nothing to change their
decision-making calculus to cooperate. Only negotiating from a position of strength – by
maintaining arm sales – has any hope of fostering cooperation. .
Turn: Only negotiating from a position of strength – by maintaining arm sales – has any hope of
fostering cooperation. .
Bassler, Chris. “Negotiating from Strength: Washington, Beijing and Climate Change.”
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, August 30, 2021,
https://csbaonline.org/about/news/negotiating-from-strength-washington-beijing-
and-climate-change. Accessed October 10, 2024.
There is growing pressure for the Biden administration to de-escalate tensions with
China for the sake of climate cooperation. In a letter published on July 8, climate
organizations called on the United States to work on “environmental, human rights,
social, and governance standards” with China to avert a new Cold War. Enticing China to
act in support of the Biden administration’s effort to reduce global carbon dioxide
emissions will not succeed. China’s significance as the world’s greatest emitter of
pollution and Chinese policymakers’ own view of climate change negotiations will
render any cooperative strategy ineffective. As our primary strategic rival, China will
likely only respond to pressure on climate.
Explanation: China makes policy decisions based on its interests––only negotiating from a
position of strength has any hope of fostering cooperation with them.
Response: Reducing military support will signal weakness and an opportunity for China to
invade.
TURN: China will not invade Taiwan now – but reducing arms sales shows the CCP they have a
window to conquer the island, incentivizing military action.
Chen, Ping-Kuei. “Sitting Outside the Network: Reasuring the Stability of the Taiwan Strait
under the Trump Administration.” UNISCI, January 2018, http://www.unisci.es/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/UNISCIDP46-2Ping-Kuei.pdf. Accessed October 10, 2024.
instance, the US can help Taiwan acquire the necessary technology to build diesel
submarines.
TURN: Arm Sales are necessary to deterrence, both materially and in terms of US commitment
– the aff guarantees invasion.
Chen, Ping-Kuei. “A Farewell to Arms? US Security Relations with Taiwan and the Prospects
for Stability in the Taiwan Strait.” Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace, 2017,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.15?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_
contents. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Analysis: reducing military support would make it materially easier for China to capture
Taiwan––and signal that the U.S. would not intervene militarily to protect our ally.
Response: No trade-off, the U.S. can supply Taiwan and Ukraine at the same time.
De-link: Ukraine and Taiwan need different weapons, making resourcing both sustainable. .
Kavanagh, Jennifer and Cohen, Jordan. “The True Military Assistance Tradeoff Is Between
Israel and Taiwan.” War On the Rocks, November 21, 2023,
https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/the-true-military-assistance-tradeoff-is-
between-israel-and-taiwan/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
While there are important areas of overlap between the military needs of Taiwan and
Ukraine — especially when it comes to air defense and uncrewed aerial systems — their
many differences made resourcing both marginally sustainable. Ukraine’s highest-
priority needs include heavy artillery, ammunition, tanks, short-range missiles, and
mobile air defense, while Taiwan has much more need for anti-ship missiles, naval
mines, long-range missiles, and more advanced, longer-range air defense systems.
Adding aid to Israel changes this calculus. Israel’s needs overlap somewhat with
Ukraine’s but more extensively with Taiwan’s and those of other Indo-Pacific allies. This
means that a commitment to fully aiding Israel could leave Taiwan and other U.S. allies
and partners in the Indo-Pacific facing longer delays for systems they require and could
leave U.S. forces ill-equipped to counter China. To avoid putting Indo-Pacific allies in this
position, Washington should confront the resource constraints and necessary tradeoffs
it faces on military aid. The Indo-Pacific is America’s top defense priority, according to
Biden’s National Defense Strategy, and Washington faces greater medium to long-term
escalation risks there if it cannot effectively deter China. Moreover, the military threat
posed by China is substantially greater than that of Hizballah or Iran.
De-link: the U.S. has already prioritized arm sales to Ukraine over Taiwan––affirming doesn’t
change anything.
Velez-Green, Alex. “Managing Trade-offs Between Military Aid for Taiwan and Ukraine.”
Heritage Foundation, August 31, 2023,
https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/managing-trade-offs-between-military-
aid-taiwan-and-ukraine. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Finally, providing weapons to Taiwan is critical for deterrence, but it is only part of the
solution. Taiwan must also redouble efforts to strengthen its own defenses, including by
raising defense spending; prioritizing acquisition of the asymmetric defense capabilities
required to defeat a Chinese invasion; and accelerating defense reforms, such as
modernization of Taiwan’s reserve forces.9 If Taiwan does not do these things, it may
be very difficult or impossible for the United States to deny a Chinese invasion on its
own, and deterrence will suffer as a result. Taiwan bears first responsibility for its own
defense and must act accordingly, not least so it can put weapons sent by the United
States to the best possible use. Navigating Taiwan–Ukraine Trade-offs A key challenge
facing U.S. policymakers is that Taiwan and Ukraine require many of the same weapons
to defend themselves. Despite increasing risk of conflict in Asia, Washington has thus
far prioritized sending weapons to Ukraine. But this has significantly reduced U.S.
stockpiles and delayed the U.S. ability to provide arms to Taiwan. Such delays
undercut deterrence against China by preventing Taiwan from fielding weapons quickly
enough to keep pace with China’s military buildup. They also create risks for U.S. forces
who may be called to Taiwan’s defense. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs testified,
arming Taiwan reduces operational risk to U.S. forces in the region. Well-armed
Taiwanese defenders can neutralize Chinese forces, for instance, before they fire on
American servicemembers.
“Ukraine: The EU’s Unprecedented Provision of Lethal Aid is a Good First Step.” United
States Institute of Peace, October 27, 2022,
https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/10/ukraine-eus-unprecedented-provision-
lethal-aid-good-first-step. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Just three days after Russia began its war of aggression against Ukraine, the European
Union announced that it would provide weapons to Ukraine through a new financing
instrument, the European Peace Facility (EPF), marking the first time in EU history that
the bloc provided lethal weaponry. Over the past six months, the EU has provided €2.5
billion to Ukraine through the EPF for arms and equipment, signaling a more muscular
EU foreign policy featuring the unprecedented provision of direct military assistance.
While this represents an important step in aiding Ukrainians in their fight against
Russia’s aggression, more can be done to bolster Ukraine’s defenses and Europe’s
security. .
Explanation: if Ukraine and Taiwan can be resourced and defended at the same time – whether
it is by the U.S. or its allies – there is no trade-off, and thus no aff offense.
Impact Defense: Mutually Assured Destruction means that leaders will seek to defuse crises at
every turn and will never risk it––decades of empirics prove that miscalculation never occurs.
Brands, Hal. “If America and China go to war, it won’t be an accident.” American Enterprise
Institute, August 7, 2020, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/if-america-and-china-go-to-
war-it-wont-be-an-accident/. Accessed October 10, 2024.
A generation after that, Franklin Roosevelt may not have foreseen that slapping an oil
embargo on Japan would lead to the aerial assault on Pearl Harbor. But he certainly
understood that war was a distinct possibility once the U.S. began strangling the
economy of a country that was already pillaging Asia. Likewise, the Six Day War of 1967
is sometimes treated as an inadvertent conflict. But again, Egyptian leaders were hardly
blind to the danger of war when they mobilized forces in the Sinai Peninsula, blockaded
Israel’s port on the Red Sea and took other belligerent steps. The reality, as the
historian Marc Trachtenberg has shown, is that countries tend to avoid war when
neither really desires it. Yes, leaders do sometimes misjudge how wars will turn out and
how destructive they will be. Tensions can gradually ratchet up in a way that makes de-
escalation progressively harder. Yet there is no more monumental decision than to
initiate a major conflict. So when countries really do want to avert a showdown, they
are generally willing to tack or retreat, even at the cost of some embarrassment. During
the Cold War, there was plenty of superpower brinkmanship, and some hair-raising
incidents involving U.S. and Soviet military forces. There were several near misses in
the Cuban Missile Crisis alone. But in that case and every other case, the crisis was
defused and the superpowers drew back, precisely because they didn’t believe that
the stakes merited a nuclear bloodbath. Accidental war also seems unlikely today.
De-link: their assessment of U.S.–China tensions is dead wrong, and there is no risk of
“accidental war”.
Heath, Tim. “U.S.-China Tensions Are Unlikely to Lead to War.” National Interest, April 30,
2017, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-china-tensions-are-unlikely-lead-war-
20411?page=2. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Graham Allison's April 12 article, “How America and China Could Stumble to War,”
explores how misperceptions and bureaucratic dysfunction could accelerate a
militarized crisis involving the United States and China into an unwanted war. However,
the article fails to persuade because it neglects the key political and geostrategic
conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Without those conditions in place,
the risk that a crisis could accidentally escalate into war becomes far lower. The U.S.-
China relationship today may be trending towards greater tension, but the relative
stability and overall low level of hostility make the prospect of an accidental
escalation to war extremely unlikely. In a series of scenarios centered around the South
China Sea, Taiwan and the East China Sea, Allison explored how well-established
flashpoints involving China and the United States and its allies could spiral into
unwanted war. Allison’s article argues that given the context of strategic rivalry between
a rising power and a status-quo power, organizational and bureaucratic misjudgments
increase the likelihood of unintended escalation. According to Allison, “the underlying
stress created by China’s disruptive rise creates conditions in which accidental,
otherwise inconsequential events could trigger a large-scale conflict.” This argument
appears persuasive on its surface, in no small part because it evokes insights from some
of Allison’s groundbreaking work on the organizational pathologies that made the
Cuban Missile Crisis so dangerous. However, Allison ultimately fails to persuade because
he fails to specify the political and strategic conditions that make war plausible in the
first place. Allison’s analysis implies that the United States and China are in a situation
analogous to that of the Soviet Union and the United States in the early 1960s. In the
Cold War example, the two countries faced each other on a near-war footing and
engaged in a bitter geostrategic and ideological struggle for supremacy. The two
countries experienced a series of militarized crises and fought each other repeatedly
through proxy wars. It was this broader context that made issues of misjudgment so
dangerous in a crisis. By contrast, the U.S.-China relationship today operates at a much
lower level of hostility and threat. China and the United States may be experiencing
an increase in tensions, but the two countries remain far from the bitter, acrimonious
rivalry that defined the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the early 1960s. Neither Washington
nor Beijing regards the other as its principal enemy. Today’s rivals may view each other
warily as competitors and threats on some issues, but they also view each other as
important trade partners and partners on some shared concerns, such as North Korea,
as the recent summit between President Donald Trump and Chinese president Xi Jinping
illustrated.
Explanation: these responses fundamentally dispute the idea that US-China tensions could
escalate or lead to ‘accidental war’ or ‘miscalculation’ by highlighting the overwhelming
incentives policymakers face to deescalate at every turn.
Kroenig, Matthew. “The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy versus Autocracy from
the Ancient World to the U.S. and China.” The Return of Great Power Rivalry, pg. 205-
207. 2020,
https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Return_of_Great_Power_Rivalry.html?i
d=dXLKDwAAQBAJ&source=kp_book_description. Accessed October 10, 2024.
Indeed, the United States spends more on defense than the next nine countries
combined, and most of these countries are U.S. allies and partners. China is certainly
expanding its military capabilities, but it takes time (often a decade or more) to build
major military platforms. Even if Xi Jinping makes the decision to do so today, it would
take China until 2050 at the earliest to become a global military superpower.
Washington also has trust in its officer corps and strong civil-military relations. The
United States is comfortable delegating tactical decisions to commanders on the
ground. This provides a significant advantage over more sclerotic autocratic
competitors, especially in a messy, high-intensity fight. The United States also retains a
healthy lead in military applications of high technology and strategic forces. Washington
first deployed stealth technology in the late 1980s, for example. China has been working
on stealth technology since that time, and it is still not clear whether it has mastered it.
Washington is still the only great power that conducts regular nuclear deterrence
patrols with its submarine force; this is a strategic advantage that is sixty years old and
counting. Washington is also exploring new military technologies: hypersonic glide
vehicles, directed-energy lasers for missile defense, and other sci-fi-like capabilities. The
United States is already incorporating 3D printing into its defense acquisition process,
with the potential to produce better products while drastically lowering the defense
budget.13 China and Russia are also working in these areas, but history and theory,
from the Greek phalanx to thermonuclear weapons, suggest that an open society will
likely be the first to develop novel military technologies and the operational concepts to
put them to good use. Perhaps America’s greatest military strength, however, is the
simple fact that it can focus its defense strategy against foreign threats. Unlike its
autocratic foes, U.S. leaders do not worry that the American system of government
might fall tomorrow. As a result, they do not need to spend exorbitant amounts on
domestic security.
De-link: China will never surpass the United States — their authors mis-measure economic and
military power.
Beckley, Michael. “Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower.” Pg
1-2, 2018,
https://books.google.com/books/about/Unrivaled.html?id=qR1VDwAAQBAJ&source
=kp_book_description Accessed October 10, 2024.
following pages, I argue that the United States will remain the world’s sole superpower
for many decades, and probably throughout this century.