County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety

313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

MFD RMS # 23-0012446 AND RMS # 23-0012492

Type of Fire: Wildfire
Location: Lahaina, HI 96761
Date of Loss: 8/8/2023
Time Reported: (1st 911 call) 0634 hours
Exposures: Multiple
Owners: Multiple
Investigator:
Assistant Investigators: , , ,
.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Maui Fire Department (MFD) investigators invited the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) to assist MFD in determining the origin and cause of the
August 8, 2023 Lahaina Fire. MFD and ATF collaborated and shared all information and
data relevant to this investigation, with the exception of electrical data from Maui
Electric Company (MECO). MECO provided this information to ATF pursuant to a non-
disclosure and confidentiality agreement; MFD was not provided access to this data. ATF
produced a summary of findings and conclusions, which has been incorporated into this
report as Appendix A - ATF Lahaina Summary of Findings and Conclusions.
2. The August 8, 2024, Lahaina fire was determined to be one fire with a morning phase
and afternoon phase, arising from a single origin and cause. The fire began at 0634
hours. Following the morning phase of the fire, all available indications showed the fire
fully contained and extinguished—no flames, no smoke, and no perceptibly combusting
material had been observed for hours. Despite the extraordinary diligence of personnel
and the significant number of resources at the scene, undetected smoldering material
from the morning phase of the fire initiated the afternoon phase of the fire in a gully
adjacent to the existing fire area at 1452 hours.
3. The origin of the fire was the overgrown vegetation at and surrounding utility pole 25
off of Lahainaluna Road.
4. The cause of the fire was the re-energization of broken utility lines which caused the
ejection of molten metallic material (sparks) to fall to the base of pole 25, igniting the
unmaintained vegetation below. Additionally the arcing and severing of the energized
overhead power line between pole 25 and 24 resulted in that line falling to the ground,
subsequently igniting vegetation below. The continuation of the fire via rekindle was
due to a hidden piece of smoldering material that made its way at an undetermined
time via undetermined means to a susceptible fuel package in the gully just to the east
and south of the existing burn area
5. The classification of this fire is Accidental. Page 1 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

SUMMARY OF FIRE INVESTIGATION ASSIGNMENTS

Between 8/7/2023 and 8/8/2023, the Maui Fire Department (MFD) responded to multiple
wildfires throughout the island of Maui. Fire Investigators under the MFD Fire Prevention
Bureau (FPB) were assigned to investigate.

On 8/8/2023 at 0622 hours, was notified by dispatch to investigate a brush fire at

12231 Haleakala Highway RMS 23-0012431 (Olinda Fire). and
responded to this fire with the MFD Investigation Truck at 0832 hours. At 1642 hours
and responded to investigate a brush fire at Kualono Place RMS 23-0012467
(Kula Fire).

At approximately 0819 hours and were assigned by to

investigate a brush fire near the intersection of Lahainaluna Road and Ho’okahua Street RMS
23-00012446 (Lahaina Fire). At approximately 0819 hours radio transmissions indicated that
the Lahaina fire was 90% contained. spoke to about the brush fire, and
found out they were currently beginning mop-up operations. Per , the fire was
witnessed with no reported damages at that time, so and were stood
down.

At 1539 hours and were assigned to investigate the origin and cause of the
wildfire off of Lahinaluna Road. While en route to the investigation, and
were informed the scene was unsafe for an investigation, so investigators were stood down.

At night, and assisted with spotting the progress of RMS 23-0012527

(Pulehu-Kihei Fire).

On 8/9/2023, assigned to investigate and document the structure fires

at RMS 23-0012431 (Olinda Fire) and RMS 23-0012467 (Kula Fire). From 8/9/2023 to
8/11/2023, investigated and documented the structure fires at RMS 23-0012431
(Olinda Fire) and RMS 23-0012467 (Kula Fire). Other investigators were assigned to staff the
Emergency Operations Center and MFD Incident Management Team.

On 8/12/2023, assigned to investigate the fire in Lahaina the following

day.

Page 2 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

On 8/13/2023, and investigated the Brush, Vehicle, and Structure Fires at

RMS 23-0012446 and 23-0012492 (Lahaina Fire).

On 8/14/2023. investigated the Brush Fire at RMS 23-0012527 (Pulehu-Kihei Fire).

On 8/15/2023, MFD requested technical assistance from ATF, which responded by activating
the National Response Team (NRT).

On 8/17/2023, ATF NRT members arrived to assist with investigating multiple fires across the
island of Maui and were inbriefed. ATF and MFD fire investigators investigated the fires at
Olinda RMS 23-0012431, Lahaina RMS 23-0012446 and 23-0012492 Kula RMS 23-0012467,
Pulehu-Kihei RMS 23-0012527, and Pu'ukoli'i-Kaanapali Fire RMS 23-0012809 from 8/18/2023
to 8/30/2023.

WITNESS STATEMENTS
Refer to Appendix A - ATF Lahaina Summary of Findings and Conclusions and Appendix B –
MFD Fire Investigation Witness Statements.

FIRE SCENE INVESTIGATION SCOPE

This investigation utilized the scientific method of inquiry as a systematic approach to gather
information and to document the fire scene to determine an area of origin, identify an ignition
source and first materials ignited, and describe the act or action that brought these factors
together. The purpose of this investigation is to determine the origin and cause of the
wildfire(s) and identify the first ignited structure(s).

WEATHER
All National Weather Service (NWS) statements in this section reference the leeward portions
of all Hawaiian Islands. On 8/8/2023 the NWS stated that a Red Flag Warning remains in effect
until 600 hours Wednesday. Various news reports, witness statements, and social media
reported unusually strong winds, in the downslope and southwest direction.

Refer to Appendix A - ATF Lahaina Summary of Findings and Conclusion and Appendix C –
Sources for more details.

Page 3 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

ON-SCENE INVESTIGATION
8/13/2023
Fire and Operations Phase
and were dispatched to Lahaina to document an origin
and cause. Upon arrival, firefighters were in a mop-up stage of operations in coordination
with multiple agencies in multiple areas in Lahaina.

Weather Observation at the Time of Investigation

A kestrel device was used on 8/13/2023 at 1115 hours. Weather conditions were sunny with
seven-mph winds from the southwest. The temperature was 85° F with a relative humidity of
56%. The highest relative humidity was 89%.

Scene Security
The area around utility pole 25 on Lahainaluna Road was already under examination by Fire
Cause Analysis (FCA). FCA stated that they were under contract by MECO to document and
retain physical evidence as an independent third party. MECO joined Hawaiian Electric
Company (HECO) in 19681, but on Maui, it is still commonly referred to as MECO.

Access to damaged/destroyed structures in Lahaina was guarded by Military and Police units
at various checkpoints. Access to West Maui was restricted from the rest of the island.2

Utilities
Utility lines and poles were under repair by HECO.

Refer to Appendix A - ATF Summary of Findings.

Investigative Participants
An investigation was performed in conjunction with:

ATF NATIONAL RESPONSE TEAM

• ATF Supervisory Special Agent/NRT Team Supervisor (SSA/CFI)
• ATF Senior Special Agent/Certified Fire Investigator (SSA/CFI)
• ATF Special Agent/Certified Fire Investigator (SA/CFI)
• ATF Electrical Engineer (EE)
• ATF Special Agent/Certified Fire Investigator (SA/Lead CFI)

1
https://www.hawaiianelectric.com/about-us/our-history/maui-electric-history
2
https://www.mauicounty.gov/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=12639

Page 4 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

ATF SEATTLE FIELD DIVISION

• ATF Supervisory Special Agent/Certified Fire Investigator (SSA/CFI)
• ATF Resident Agent in Charge (RAC)
• ATF Special Agent/Certified Fire Investigator Candidate (SA/CFIC)
• ATF Special Agent (SA)
• ATF Special Agent (SA)
• ATF Special Agent (SA)

ATF SEATTLE FIELD DIVISION

• ATF Special Agent/Certified Fire Investigator (SA/CFI)

Page 5 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

WILDFIRE EXAM
Property Description
Homes built in the wildland-urban interface (WUI) 3 have a high risk of wildfire. “Based on an
analysis in 2020, 94.4% of the homes in Hawaiʻi were found to be vulnerable because they are
built within the wildland-urban interface compared with 42.3% of structures in the
conterminous U.S.” 4

In the 1940s, Lahainaluna Road, east of Pioneer Mill, was bordered by sugar cane fields, various
trees,5 and single-family homes. In 1999, the Pioneer Mill sugar plantation closed, 6 leaving
former plantation lands to become filled with guinea grass, buffel grass, and koa haole, known
locally as haole koa.

On Lahainaluna Road near utility pole 25 to the southwest are single-family homes and empty
lots along Kuialua and Ho’okahua Streets, to the south are undeveloped grassland and utility
poles, and to the north are single-family homes along Niheu Place and Lahainaluna
Intermediate School.

Photo 1 – 3/3/2017 - Kuialua and Ho’okahua Streets 7

3
https://www.fs.usda.gov/nrs/pubs/jrnl/2022/nrs_2022_carlson_001.pdf
4
https://naisma.org/2023/10/10/the-tragedy-in-lahaina-how-invasive-grasses-and-shrubs-are-fueling-the-wildfire-
crisis-in-hawai%CA%BBi/
5
https://www.lahainarestoration.org/Maps/LahainaGeneralAreaCMap.pdf
6
https://www.lahainarestoration.org/smokestack.html
7
Images in this report may have been modified and/or annotated. Original images are available and preserved.

Page 6 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

Behind Kuialua and Ho’okahua Streets (and Ho’okahua Place), a 30-foot wide firebreak was
ordered on 11/26/2019 (Notice of Warning RFS #20-000507 and #20-000508), for TMKs
246018003 and 246016032 by FIWS 8 001. FIWS 001 stated that this firebreak was ordered on
these TMKs behind homes southeast of Lahainaluna Road. Once addressed, the corrected
condition of the firebreak shall be maintained at all times. 9 ROI 10 025 stated that after the
grasses in this area burned, it looked like a gravel road. On 8/8/2023, based on witness
statements and photos, the firebreak was not maintained in accordance with this order.

Photo 2 - IMG_6741.jpg – ROI 010

8
Fire Investigation Witness Statement - Refer to Appendix B – MFD Fire Investigation Witness Statements
9
Maui County Code – Section 16.04C.210 Subsection 10.14.10 amended
10
Report of Investigation – refer to Appendix A – ATF Lahaina Summary of Findings and Conclusion

Page 7 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

Photo 3 shows equipment breakage prior to re-energization. Photo 4 shows equipment

breakage on pole 25.

Photo 3 - IMG_8577 - Pole 7A at 0512 hours by MFD

Page 8 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

Photo 4 - IMG_5872 - Pole 25 at 0753 hours by MFD

Page 9 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

Photo 5 - 8/4/2020 - Kuialua and Ho’okahua Streets Firebreak ordered 11/26/2019

Photo 6 - 8/26/2021 - Kuialua and Ho’okahua Streets Unmaintained Firebreak

Page 10 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

Photo 7 - 8/13/2023 - Kuialua and Ho’okahua Streets Firebreak after 8/8/2023

Fuels
“Areas are dominated by highly invasive, fire-prone grasses introduced by Europeans since at
least the nineteenth century such as guinea grass, fountain grass, molasses grass, and buffel
grass. These species form continuous, nearly monotypic fuel beds, ignite easily, attain
extremely high fine fuel loads, and are capable of resprouting and/or establishing from seed
more vigorously in the postfire environment than is the majority of native vegetation.” 11

Grass in Lahaina was “mostly composed of two African pasture grasses, buffel and guinea
grasses, which are the dominant grasses seen on dry, leeward hillsides today.” 12

ROI 038 stated that this area in Lahaina consisted of kiawe trees and koa haole shrubs within
continuous non-native grasses, specifically guinea grass and buffel grasses. ROI 038 stated
that these non-native grasses form duff and that koa haole produce seed pods, both of which
can ignite, be carried by the wind, and create spot fires far ahead of the main fire.

11
https://www.fs.usda.gov/research/treesearch/49792
12
https://www.hawaii.edu/news/2023/10/13/newly-discovered-grasses-across-hawaii/

Page 11 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

Guinea grass (megathyrsus maximus) can grow to 9 feet tall, forms dense stands in unmanaged
areas 13, and has a high fire risk rating. 14

Buffel grass (cenchrus ciliaris) can grow 3 feet tall, and forms continuous cover in arid
habitats15, and has a high fire risk rating. 16

Koa haole (leucaena leucocephala) can grow to 30 feet tall, forms dense thickets in lowlands
and lower mountain slopes, 17 and has a high fire risk rating.18

Kiawe (prosopis pallida) can grow to over 85 feet tall 19, survive in arid habitats, and have a high
fire risk rating. 20 ROI 038 stated that kiawe are usually resistant to ignition, but they would
burn slowly and hot once ignited.

13
https://dlnr.hawaii.gov/hisc/info/invasive-species-profiles/guinea-grass/
14
https://pacificfireexchange.org/weed-fire-risk-assessments/factsheets/Megathyrsus-maximus.pdf
15
https://dlnr.hawaii.gov/hisc/info/invasive-species-profiles/buffelgrass/
16
https://pacificfireexchange.org/weed-fire-risk-assessments/factsheets/Cenchrus-ciliaris.pdf
17
https://www.ctahr.hawaii.edu/gsp/doc/Forestry/Little_Skolmen_CFT/CFT_Leucaena_leucocephala.pdf
18
https://pacificfireexchange.org/weed-fire-risk-assessments/factsheets/Leucaena-leucocephala.pdf
19
https://www.srs.fs.usda.gov/pubs/misc/ag_654/volume_2/prosopis/pallida.htm
20
https://pacificfireexchange.org/weed-fire-risk-assessments/factsheets/Prosopis-pallida.pdf

Page 12 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

Area Affected by Fire

Photo 8 - Extent of Morning Phase (Magenta)

From the Fire Officer's statements, the fire extent in the morning is approximately 130,000
square feet.

The final fire extent area is approximately 2,170 acres (including 2,207 structures damaged or
destroyed). 21

21
https://www.mauicounty.gov/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=12683

Page 13 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

Photo 9 - Lahaina Fire Final Extent 2223

22
https://disasteraware.pdc.org/
23
Additional areas shaded: Hookahua neighborhood and Lahaina Bypass near 921 N Hakau Place

Page 14 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

The fire spread from Kuialua Street area to the Lahaina Bypass. From the Lahaina Bypass, the
fire spread in the wind direction along Lahainaluna Road. The fire spread to both sides of
Lahainaluna Road, igniting grass and brush. Vacant landowners affected include (but are not
limited to) the following:
Bishop Estate – TMK 246018003
State of Hawaii – Lahaina Bypass
State of Hawaii/County of Maui – TMKs 245031001 and 245034046
County of Maui – TMKs 245034047 and 245034043

Refer to Identified First Ignited Structures section for a map of fire spread.
Condition of Fuels
Fuels consisted of dry, combustible vegetation of varied densities
Morning phase: The area next to Lahainaluna Road, between utility poles 24 and 25 consisted
of short, dry grass. The area near utility pole 25 had a mix of taller brush and grass.

Afternoon phase: The area near utility poles 1A and 1B is a gully with a mix of brush, grass, and
short trees. A utility pole stump remnant was next to utility poles 1A and 1B.
Topography
Topography consists of a general downslope from east to west on the lee side of Pu’u Kukui
Mountain. A gully is located southeast of Ho’okahua Street.

Photo 10 – Morning Phase Topography

Other Items in Brush

Remnants of vehicle body and frame, utility pole(s), utility pole stump, vape(s), firework(s), and
large culvert pipe(s) (metal and concrete).

Page 15 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

FIRE SCENE OBSERVATIONS

On 8/13/2023, on Lahainaluna Road across from 804 Niheu Street, power lines that were
reportedly down were no longer present on Lahainaluna Road. FCA stated they were securing
these lines and other items and would provide access in a secure area. (MFD and ATF were
provided access during the investigation).

Photo 11 - 8.13.2023 IMG_002.JPG - Lahainaluna Road by Lahaina Intermediate School

Photo 12 - 8.13.2023 IMG_0013.JPG - Firebreak behind 754 Kuialua Street

Photo 13 - 8.13.2023 IMG_0014.JPG - Firebreak behind 754 Kuialua Street

Page 16 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

Photo 14 - 8.13.2023 IMG_0023.JPG - Kiawe and Pole 1A and 1B from Firebreak

Photo 15 - 8.13.2023 IMG_0016.JPG - Firebreak behind 754 Kuialua Street

Photo 16 - 8.13.2023 IMG_0018.JPG - Pole 25 from Firebreak

Page 17 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

Photo 17 - 8.13.2023 IMG_0024.JPG - Kiawe and Pole 3-25

and documented locations at Hookaua and Kuialua Street.

Photo 18 - 8.13.2023 IMG_0028.JPG - Shed Fire Ho’okahua Place

Photo 19 - 8.13.2023 IMG_0031.JPG - Ho’okahua Place

Page 18 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

Photo 20 - 8.13.2023 IMG_0051.JPG - Kalena and Kaakolu Street

Photo 21 - 8.13.2023 IMG_0052.JPG - Kaakolu Street

Photo 22 - 8.13.2023 IMG_0059.JPG - Kalena Street and Lahainaluna Road – Wildland 3

Page 19 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

Photo 23 - 8.13.2023 IMG_0070.JPG - Pole 14 and Lahainaluna Road

Photo 24 - 8.13.2023 IMG_0098.JPG - Rear of Kaalo Place and Kelawea Mauka Makai Park

Photo 25 - 8.13.2023 IMG_0101.JPG - Rear of Kaalo Place

Page 20 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

Photo 26 - 8.13.2023 IMG_0111.JPG - Kaakolu Street

Further documented locations were at Lahainaluna Road to Front Street while on cleared roads.
Except for the exterior of 540 Lahainaluna Road, no fire-damaged/destroyed properties were
entered in these areas.

On Kalena Street, the destroyed Wildland 3 apparatus was documented. From Lahainaluna
Road and Pauoa Street intersection, the destroyed Engine 1 apparatus was documented.

Documentation continued north along Front Street to the intersection with Papalua Street,
then on Papalua Street to Honoapiilani Highway, then North on Honoapiilani Highway until
approximately Kahoma Village.

On 8/18/2023, , , , and ATF returned to Lahainaluna Road

and Kuialua Street area to continue the investigation by interviewing witnesses and
documenting observations. Damage was documented on top of the electronic speed limit sign
alongside Lahainaluna Road.

TIMELINE
Lahaina Fire Origin and Cause Timeline
For the sequence of events leading to first structures ignited refer to Maui Fire Department/ATF
Lahaina Fire Origin and Cause Timeline in Appendix A - ATF Lahaina Summary of Findings and
Conclusion.

Page 21 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

IDENTIFIED FIRST IGNITED STRUCTURES

Photo 27 – Lahaina Bypass. Fire spread based on fire officer statements.

Photo 28 - First Structures Ignited Timestamps based on radio transmissions. Fire spread based on fire officer statements.

Page 22 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

AREA OF ORIGIN
MFD investigators agree with those from the ATF that the area of origin for the Lahaina
Wildfire was overgrown vegetation at or surrounding utility pole 25 on Lahainaluna Road. This
was conclusively established through multiple witness statements, photographic and
videographic evidence, as well as scene examination showing clear signs of ignition all pointing
to the same specific origin area and multiple identified ignition areas within. Refer to
Appendix A - ATF Lahaina Summary of Findings and Conclusion for a more detailed
analysis.

CAUSE
MFD investigators agree with those from the ATF that the cause of the Lahaina
Wildfire was the re-energization of broken utility lines which caused the ejection of
molten metallic material (sparks) to fall to the base of pole 25, igniting the unmaintained
vegetation below. Additionally the arcing and severing of the energized overhead power
line between pole 25 and 24 resulted in that line falling to the ground, subsequently
igniting vegetation below. The continuation of the fire via rekindle was due to a hidden
piece of smoldering material that made its way at an undetermined time via
undetermined means to a susceptible fuel package in the gully just to the east and south
of the existing burn area24. Refer to Appendix A - ATF Lahaina Summary of Findings and
Conclusion for a more detailed analysis.

Hypotheses
The following is a summary of hypotheses considered by investigators. Refer to Appendix A -
ATF Lahaina Summary of Findings and Conclusion for more details.

Morning Phase
Lightning
Excluded – No lightning strikes were reported.
Fireworks
Excluded – There were no competent reports of fireworks use in the general origin area.
Weathered and aged fireworks were found outside of the general origin area.

Equipment Use
Excluded – Heavy equipment was not in use until after the ignition and spread of the fire.
24
Based on witness statements, visual imagery, and scene examinations.

Page 23 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

Vaping Devices
Excluded – No competent vaping device was found in the general origin area.

Intentional Human Act

Excluded – No persons were observed in the general origin area by witnesses and by
examining visual imagery.
Vehicle Causation
Excluded – An abandoned truck body was located in tall grass and excluded by ATF.
Powerlines (Electric Utility Equipment)
Included - Molten metallic material (sparks) was ejected following re-energization of failed
utility equipment, along with arcing and severing of the energized overhead power line
which subsequently ignited the unmaintained vegetation in the area of origin.

Afternoon Phase
Smoking Materials
Excluded – No persons were observed in the gully by witnesses and no smoking materials
were found in the gully.
Fireworks
Excluded – There were no competent reports of fireworks use in the gully.

Equipment Use
Excluded – Heavy equipment was not in use until after the ignition and spread of the fire.

Powerlines (Electric Utility Equipment)

Excluded – Overhead power lines in gully were not damaged. ATF analysis of data provided
by HECO to ATF (though NOT to MFD), indicated that overhead lines in the area
were not energized at the time of the rekindle.

Intentional Human Act

Excluded – No persons were observed in the gully by witnesses and by examining visual
imagery.

Page 24 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

Rekindle
Included – We are unable to exclude the hypothesis that a hidden piece of smoldering
material made its way to a susceptible fuel package in the gully, which is the
general origin area of the rekindle. The following rekindle hypotheses were
considered and remain included:

Transportation of Firebrand by Wind – Strong and inconsistent winds could very

well have transported a firebrand from the fire area to the gully.

Exposure of Previously Subsurface Fuels – Given the presence of trees and shrubs,
as well as the observation of charred roots in the general origin area, the
possibility that the smoldering material that ignited in the gully had lain hidden
below the surface cannot be eliminated.

Inadvertent Movement of Smoldering Material – Unable to exclude the possibility

that heavy equipment moved smoldering material from the fire area to the gully.

CLASSIFICATION
MFD investigators agree with those from the ATF that the proper classification of the Lahaina
Wildfire is Accidental. Refer to Appendix A – ATF Lahaina Summary of Findings and Conclusion.

CONCLUSION
After extensive collection and analysis of available data from witness statements, visual
imagery, and scene examinations, the development of plausible hypotheses, and the
testing of those hypotheses via deduction based on established scientific principles, we
conclude that the fire that destroyed so much of Lahaina on August 8th, 2023 resulted from
sparking utility equipment following re-energization at utility pole 25 on Lahainaluna Road at
approximately 0634 hours, which ignited overgrown brush at the base of pole 25 and moved
into an unmaintained firebreak. While to all appearances this fire was extinguished by MFD
personnel, a rekindle occurred at approximately 1452 hours in the gully just east and south of
the existing burn area. Fed by extreme winds, the fire quickly grew out of control, jumped the
bypass, and resulted in the subsequent conflagration from which our island community is still
recovering.

Page 25 of 26
 County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
313 Manea Street, Wailuku, HI 96793

Origin and Cause Report

FI 23-0012446 – Wildfire – Lahaina, HI 96761 – 8/8/2023

ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
Multiple Parties including, but not limited to:
1. Hawaii State Attorney General – Underwriters Laboratories’ Fire Safety Research
Institute Maui Wildfires Analysis 25
2. Maui County Department of Fire and Public Safety - Western Fire Chiefs Association After-
Action Report on the August 2023 Maui Wildfires 26
3. Maui County Police Department – Preliminary After-Action Report 27
Estimated Value of Damage
5.52 Billion Dollars28

Personal Injuries
• 102 confirmed Fatalities and 2 Missing as of 6/25/202429 30 31
• Multiple injuries.
• MFD members hospitalized
o Fire Captain

This report is based on observations and information obtained to date. The conclusions and opinions herein are
subject to changes that may be justified by additional valued information acquired after this report.

10/1/2024
_ _________Date____________

Fire Investigator - Maui Fire Department

10/1/2024
__ __________Date____________

Supervisor - Maui Fire Department

25
https://ag.hawaii.gov/maui-wildfire-investigation-resources-page/
26
https://www.mauicounty.gov/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=13371
27
https://www.mauipolice.com/
28
https://www.mauicounty.gov/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=12683
29
https://www.mauinews.com/news/local-news/2024/02/police-confirm-identity-of-victim-101-of-the-fire/
30
https://www.mauipolice.com/mpdfbi-credible-list-of-unaccounted-for-individuals.html
31
https://mauinow.com/2024/06/24/maui-police-confirm-another-fatality-from-lahaina-wildfire-bringing-total-to-
102/

Page 26 of 26
 U.S. Department of Justice

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

Firearms and Explosives

National Response Team

Fire & Arson Investigation Branch

www.atf.gov

752420:ATF-1
3510

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief

Fire & Arson Enforcement Branch

THRU: Team Supervisor, East Team

National Response Team

FROM: ATF-1 , SSA/CFI

National Response Team

SUBJECT: Fire Scene Examination – ATF NRT Response to and

Assessment of the Maui Wildfires, Specifically the Lahaina
Fire

This memorandum serves to issue to the attached ATF Summary of Findings and
Conclusions for the Fire Scene Examination – ATF NRT Response to and Assessment for the
Lahaina, HI Wildfire.

This report is intended to document and summarize those investigative efforts and the origin
and cause analysis. Additional information may be available from the participating agencies
involved in the investigation of the incident.

Assessment and identification of parties having possible civil and/or criminal

responsibility/liability for the fire/explosion incident is beyond the scope of the analysis
contained in this report.
ATTACHMENTS:

ATF Summary of Findings and Conclusion

ATF Electrical Examination Report
Maui Fire Department/ATF Lahaina Fire Origin and Cause Timeline

ATF-1
SSA/CFI Signature/Date

ATF-2
NRT Team Supervisor Signature/Date
 U.S. Department of Justice

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

Firearms and Explosives

National Response Team

Fire & Arson Investigation Branch

www.atf.gov

September 19, 2024

Reference: Maui Fires

ATF Case Number: 787025-23-0030

Please be advised that by providing your agency with unredacted copies of these documents,
ATF is not waiving any potential privileges that may restrict further disclosure of the
materials. Accordingly, unredacted versions of materials may not be disclosed to any entity
(individual or otherwise) outside your agency without express prior authorization from ATF.
This prohibition extends to governmental, non-governmental, and judicial entities. ATF must
be notified as soon as possible and in no event later than two (2) business days of any request
or demand (including a subpoena or judicial order) for production of unredacted materials, so
that we may evaluate whether disclosure is appropriate and, if so, whether to pursue
redactions and/or a protective order. Unredacted versions of these documents and a copy of
this letter may be released without further authorization to a prosecuting attorney in
furtherance of any related criminal prosecutions or investigations.

Please note that ATF will post on its website for access by the general public a version of the
report with certain Personally Identifiable Information and proprietary information redacted.

Any and all inquires related to this incident should be directed to ATF Seattle Field
Division at 206-204-3205.

ATF-2 ATF NRT Team Supervisor

 ATTACHMENTS
• ELECTRICAL EXAMINATION REPORT, FIRE RESEARCH LABORATOY
ENGINEERING SCENE EXAMINATION REPORT NUMBER 2023-F-000051S(2),
PREPARED BY ELECTRICAL ENGINEER ATF-5 , PE

• LAHAINA FIRE ORIGIN AND CAUSE TIMELINE

4
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Between August 7 and 8, 2023, the Maui Fire Department (MFD) responded to multiple
wildfires fires throughout the island of Maui, Hawaii, with the most severe occurring in the area
surrounding Lahaina Town in West Maui. The fires referenced within this report are identified as
The Morning Fire and The Afternoon Fire for clarity purposes.. This report was prepared at the
request of the MFD and is intended as an attachment to MFD’s Origin and Cause Report (23-
0012446 and RMS #23-0012492).
The scenes for both the Morning Fire and the Afternoon Fire were not secured from the time
the fire occurred until the arrival of ATF. Furthermore, MFD investigators as well as various
investigators from private investigative services accessed and examined locations prior to ATF’s
arrival. ATF’s analysis of the events is based on how the scene presented to investigators on
August 18 – 19, 2023, and on subsequent return trips.
At the time of the scene examination on August 18, 2023, the fire scene was ten days old.
While the Lahaina area was under lockdown by authorities and off limits to non-residents, the
overall fire area was not secure in the typical sense. Residents were allowed to return to their
homes and based on items located in the scene (cut branches and spoiled food), it appeared that
unknown individuals had in fact been in the areas that were identified as potential areas of
interest. In addition, all suppression operations in this area ceased during the Afternoon Fire due
to the magnitude of the fire that spread into Lahaina Town.
In addition, the electric company, private evidence collection companies and private fire
investigation companies had access to and moved freely throughout the overall fire scene. Maui
Electric Company (MECO), also referred to Hawaii Electric Company (HECO) replaced
damaged electrical equipment in the overall fire area. Fire Cause Analysis (FCA) had already
come in and collected all the electrical utility distribution and transmission equipment as well as
other items of evidentiary value in the area. While these items were examined by investigators
later, they were not examined in situ.
For purposes of this report, investigators referenced both the 2024 Edition of NFPA 921 –
Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigation (NFPA 921) and the 2016 Edition of the National
Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) – Guide to Wildland Fire Origin and Cause
Determination (PMS 412). Portions of each document were utilized to aid investigators in their
analysis of these events.
Investigators relied on their overall observations of the scene(s) obtained during the scene
examinations, and utilized data in the form of eyewitness statements, witness photos, witness
videos, and an ATF Electrical Engineer (EE) examination. These processes formed the basis for
the conclusions in this report.

5
 After conducting an examination of the fire scene, conducting interviews, reviewing
interviews, and reviewing video and photos of the fire in its early stages, investigators
determined the Morning Fire was caused by a broken overhead powerline contacting the ground,
while still energized. Investigators were further able to identify several smaller ignition areas
within the specific origin area that were caused by the broken overhead powerline “slapping” the
ground based on a review of videos and photographs provided by witnesses. This contact
resulted in the ignition of vegetation that was growing on the boulevard space located between
the street and the sidewalk along Lahainaluna Road.
A separate fire occurred at the same time at the base of Utility Pole 25. Strong winds
affected Utility Pole 25 and other, nearby, utility poles. This fire was a result of molten material
being ejected and falling into vegetation below due to an electrical event occurring at the top of
Utility Pole 25.
Investigators determined the Afternoon Fire was a rekindle from the Morning Fire in that the
fire occurred at or very near the boundary or containment line made during the Morning Fire. An
undetected firebrand or the inadvertent movement of smoldering materials into the gully or dry
creek bed during suppression activities resulted in a delayed ignition of vegetation, which
became known as the Afternoon Fire. For purposes of this report, the terms “gully”, “dry creek
bed” and “creek bed” are used interchangeably.
It should also be noted ATF investigators returned to the scene of the fire(s) from April 30
through May 6, 2024, June 24 through 28, 2024, and July 31 through August 2, 2024, to continue
their investigation, to conduct additional interviews and gather more data related to the Morning
Fire and the Afternoon Fire.

6
 OVERALL TIMELINE AND TIMELINE ANALYSIS
As part of the investigation, a timeline was created from information available to
investigators through a review of reports, MFD dispatch records, a review of witness
statements, witness photographs, and witness videos. This information was utilized to
assist in determining the sequence of events related to both the Morning Fire and the
Afternoon Fire. Several witnesses provided statements that were accompanied by video
and/or photographs. These statements will be discussed in greater detail later in this
report.

August 8, 2023

0317 hours Red Flag Warning was issued for leeward areas due to strong
winds and low humidity. The Red Flag Warning remained in effect
until 6 am HST (Wednesday).

0318 hours High Wind Watch with strong and gusty winds through early
Wednesday (6:00 am) East winds of 30 to 45 MPH with localized
gusts to around 60 MPH. Impacts: Damaging winds may blow
down trees and power lines and damage roofs. Power outages are
possible.

0400 hours Fire Weather Planning Forecast. Discussion: Very dry fuels
(KDBI around 600) combined with strong and gusty easterly winds
and low humidity’s below 45 percent will produce critical fire
weather conditions through tonight.

0634 hours Fire reported to 911 by W-1 , who heard a “boom”,

observed sparks and saw fire at the base of Utility Pole 25.

0635 hours Fire reported to 911 by W-3 .

0636 hours MFD dispatched to a brush fire on Lahainaluna Road across from
the Lahaina Intermediate School.

0636 hours W-3 recorded video of a fire on the ground at Utility

Pole 25. Three videos taken from 0636 hours, 0637 hours, and
0638 hours. (Images from videos below)

9
0643 hours Screenshot of video from W-3 showing MFD Engine
3 suppressing the fire at the base of Utility Pole 25. (Image below)

10
0643 hours W-7 took a photograph showing fire spreading
downhill from Utility Pole 25.
0645 hours W-4 recorded a video of fire on the ground between Utility
Poles 24 and 25 and fire at the base of Utility Pole 25.
(Screenshots from Facebook video)
0820 hours Morning Fire reported to be 90 percent contained per MFD-6
.
0852 hours Morning Fire reported by MFD-6 to be 100% contained.
0900 – 1230 hours Multiple reports of broken utility poles in the area.
0926 hours NWS social media. Update: High Wind & Fire Weather Alerts.
High Wind: 30-45 MPH winds, gusts up to 60 MPH.
0927 hours NWS social medial. 30-45 MPH winds, gusts up to 60 MPH. Red
Flag: High fire danger with rapid spread.
1418 hours MFD units returning to quarters. E3 affirmed to dispatch the
Morning Fire was extinguished. Last MFD unit cleared the scene.
11
1500 hours MFD E11 is the first unit on scene and reported a 20’x100’ brush
fire loated where the ealier fire was that day. Fire was in a gully
running west toward the bypass at a rapid pace ( MFD-7 ).
1522 hours The fire hopped the bypass per E11.
1538 hours Area Forecast Discussion. SYNOPSIS: Strong and potentially
damaging easterly winds along with very dry conditions will
persist tonight and Wednesday as Hurricane Dora passes far to the
south. Dangerous fire weather conditions will persist through
Wednesday afternoon. A return of a more typical trade wind
pattern is anticipated later in the week through the weekend.

13
 Overall Scene Information
1. On August 8, 2023, MFD investigators were assigned to investigate the cause of the
Morning Fire. While enroute to begin the investigation for the Morning Fire, MFD
investigators were informed “mop-up” operations were continuing so investigators stood
down.

2. Later in the day on August 8, 2023, MFD investigators were assigned to investigate the
cause of the Afternoon Fire. While enroute to begin the investigation, MFD investigators
were informed the scene was unsafe for an investigation to occur, so investigators stood
down. On August 13, 2023, MFD-10 and MFD-9
conducted an initial scene examination of the Morning and Afternoon Fires.

3. On August 13 through 14, 2023, Fire Cause Analysis (FCA), a private fire investigation
firm, was retained as a third party by MECO. FCA was tasked with collecting and
securing electrical artifacts or other items of evidentiary value related to the fire. FCA
documented the scene and collected evidence. As part of their investigation, ATF
examined the evidence collected by FCA. ATF Electrical Engineer ATF-5
examined exhibits collected by FCA and authored a report as to his findings;
refer to ATF Electrical Examination Report for details. FCA also provided copies of their
documentation process related to the collection of evidence, which included photographs
reviewed by investigators.

4. On August 17, 2023, private fire investigators documented the fire scene. On August 18
and 19, 2023, the MFD, members of ATF’s National Response Team (NRT), and ATF’s
Seattle Field Division investigators examined the fire scene.

5. ATF Investigators returned to Maui from April 30 through May 6, 2024, and then again
June 24 through 28, 2024, to continue their investigation. From July 31 through August
2, 2024, Special Agent/Certified Fire Investigator (SA/CFI) ATF-1 and Supervisory
Special Agent/Certified Fire Investigator ATF-6 returned to the Lahaina area
to continue the investigation. All the investigator’s findings and observations from these
separate trips are incorporated into this report.

6. The 2024 Edition of the NFPA 921 (NFPA 921) – Guide for Fire and Explosion
Investigations provides guidance on using data previously collected by others to
successfully analyze an incident. Section 4.4.3.3 of the Basic Methodology section states
in part

14
 “While it is preferable that all subsequent investigators have the opportunity to conduct
an independent examination of the incident scene, in practice, not every scene is
available at the time of the assignment. The use of previously collected data from a
properly documented scene can be used successfully in an analysis of the incident to
reach valid conclusions through the appropriate use of the scientific method. Thus, the
reliance on previously collected data and scene documentation should not be inherently
considered a limitation in the ability to successfully investigate the incident.”

7. Investigators gathered data from several early fire witnesses during the investigation.
Investigators determined the Morning Fire was observed in its early stage and was
verified with video and photographic submissions that corroborated witness statements
regarding the specific origin area for the Morning Fire. In addition to the above-
mentioned video and photographic evidence as it relates to the start of the Morning Fire,
ATF-5 collected utility data that corroborated witness statements as well as
the video and photographic evidence that was obtained. As for the Afternoon Fire, early
witness observations and corroborating videos aided investigators with the location where
smoke was first observed prior to the Afternoon Fire advancing towards and entering
Lahaina.

8. As part of the scene examination and in support of the observations made and
examinations conducted by investigators, investigators utilized NFPA 921 as well as PMS
412. The origin area of a wildfire is broken down into the following components: 1
Overall Fire Area, General Origin Area, Specific Origin Area, and Ignition Area. The
general origin area is the area of the fire that the wildfire investigator can narrow down
based on macroscale indicators, witness statements and the behavior of the fire. Within
the general origin area is the specific origin area and contained within the specific origin
area is the ignition area. The ignition area is the smallest location in which an
investigator can define where a heat source and fuel interacted with each other resulted in
a fire. The Point of Origin is the exact physical location within the ignition area where a
heat source and the fuel interacted, resulting in a fire.

1 2016 Edition of PMS 412, Page 119.

15
 LAND DESCRIPTION

9. The area where both the Morning and Afternoon Fires occurred, is a Wildland and Urban
Interface (WUI) area. The WUI is known as the zone where human-made improvements
intermix with wildland fuels. 2 The vegetation in this area consisted mostly of koa haole
shrubs within thick and unkempt non-native grasses, specifically Guinea grass and
possibly Buffelgrass. 3

2 NWCG S-130, Firefighter Training, 2021.

3 ATF Report of Investigation (ROI), Report 039: Interview of W-19 .
16
17
10. This WUI consisted of a residential sub-division separated from undeveloped land by a
chain link fence which formed a border along the backside or east and south sides of the
residential structures. In 2019 a firebreak was ordered to be cut behind the sub-division
to create a barrier between the undeveloped land and the sub-division. An aerial image
18
 taken on August 4, 2020, shows the firebreak. 4 Aerial images collected after August 4,
2020, show the firebreak overgrown with vegetation, and based on the aerial imagery, the
firebreak had not been maintained as evidenced by overgrown vegetation at the time of
the fires. 5 The fuel load was substantial in part because of a regional drought in the area
where the fires occurred. The fuel load present provided an ample of amount of fuel to
sustain the fires.

11. The land where the Afternoon Fire originated is owned and managed by Kamehameha
Schools and was previously controlled by Bishop Estates. Bishop Estates was created in
1884 by the will of Bernice Pauahi Bishop and was formed to preserve the Hawaiian
heritage through a private school system known as the Kamehameha Schools.

12. The land where the fires occurred is part of a tract of land measuring approximately 800
plus acres. The land around where the fires originated was originally utilized as a sugar
cane field and once the sugar cane fields were retired, the land became overrun with
invasive vegetation, such as Buffel grasses. A gully in the area extended from
Lahainaluna Road towards the west/southwest. The gully measured approximately 30-
feet wide and 25-feet deep at its largest point which was just south of Lahainaluna Road.

4 Maui Fire Department, Origin and Cause Report.

5 Table 3: Lahaina Historical Imagery, created by ATF Senior IRS ATF-13
19
20
13. As you moved to the southwest and west through the gully from Lahainaluna Road, it
narrowed and measured approximately six to ten feet just east of Utility Poles 1B and 1A.
The base of the gully consisted of sporadic boulders with shrubs and grasses interspersed
amongst the boulders. The gully eventually became a drainage ditch, which during the
wet season, allowed water to move from the higher elevations to a couple of
holding/retention ponds on the south side of the Lahaina Bypass.

14. After the Morning and Afternoon Fires, the Kamehameha Schools built a road along the
west side of the gully/dry creek bed and on the east side of the sub-division. The road
can be accessed at several points via secured gates and was built as a means of escape in
the event of an emergency.

21
 The Morning Fire
SUMMARY OF EVENT:

15. On August 8, 2023, at approximately 0635 hours, the Morning Fire ignited in an area
located near the intersection of Ho’okahua Street and Lahainaluna Road, to the south and
west of the Lahaina Intermediate School in Lahaina, Hawaii.

NARRATIVE:

16. The Morning Fire was reported by multiple parties, with multiple 911 calls being
received at approximately 0635 hours on August 8, 2023. Each of the initial 911 callers
reported a fire that originated near what was later identified as Utility Poles 24 and 25.

17. The fire split around a cul-de-sac forming two areas of fire advancement. One area of
advancing fire was located to the west and southwest of the start location for the fire,
with Kuialua Street to the west and Ho’okahua Street to the south containing the spread
of the fire.
22
 18. A second advancing area was directly behind the residential sub-division and this fire
traveled to the south/southwest with a chain link fence serving as the western edge of
containment and the east flank of the fire was believed to have been contained by a
firebreak that was cut with heavy equipment along the gully.

19. According to the MFD, the Morning Fire was reported to be 90 percent contained at
approximately 0820 hours, 100 percent contained at 0852 hours and, at 1418 hours, the
MFD informed the Maui Police Department (MPD) Dispatch the fire was extinguished. 6
7

6 Maui Police Department, Preliminary After-Action Report, Page 31 and Page 33.
7 MFD/ATF Lahaina Fire Origin and Cause Timeline.
23
 or fire associated with Utility Pole 7A. W-2 also noted the streetlight on Utility Pole 25
across the street that was normally illuminated was dark.

27. W-2 told investigators he took photographs of Utility Pole 7A later that morning.

26
27
29. W-3 stated she called 911 and reported the fire. W-3 showed her
cellphone call log to investigators, which revealed she placed the call at 0635 hours.

30. W-2 attempted to leave for work that morning but returned home around 1230
hours due to ongoing fire department and utility company activity, which prevented him
from leaving the area. Neither W-2 , nor W-3 , reported seeing any fire or smoke
along Lahainaluna Road or the field and homes to the south at that time. W-2 and
W-3 both noted the overhead powerline between Utility Pole 25 and Utility Pole 24
was still down and laying on a speed limit street sign.

31. W-3 captured video footage of the fire while facing east from her residence,
which overlooked Lahainaluna Road. The video showed fire moving south from Utility
Pole 25. The date and timestamp associated with W-3 ’s video was August 8, 2023, at
0636:14 hours.

29
 approximately three feet tall. According to W-4 , a fire occurred once the overhead
powerline contacted the grass.

34. Continuing August 8, 2023, at approximately 0645 hours, W-4 posted a video on his
Facebook page. The screenshots below were extracted from that video.

35. W-4 stated that he witnessed fire spread along the fence line of the neighborhood south
of Lahainaluna Road. At approximately 0700 hours, he observed that the utility pole east
of S. Niheu Street was broken in the middle and hanging by the overhead powerline
(Utility Pole 7A).

32
 representative from the utility company respond.

54. Firefighters assigned to Engine 3 watched the overhead powerline associated with Utility
Pole 7A for several minutes and did not see any sparking, smoke or flames. However,
they did note the overhead powerlines were low hanging.

55. At approximately 0635 hours, MFD dispatch was notified of a brush fire across the road
from Lahaina Intermediate School. MFD-1 and Engine 3 firefighters responded
to the call and encountered a brush fire that he estimated measured 100-feet by 100-feet.
According to MFD-1 , winds were consistent and approximately 40 miles per
hour (MPH).

56. MFD-1 noted an overhead powerline had fallen atop a speed limit sign between
Utility Poles 24 and 25 on the south side of Lahainaluna Road. MFD-1 described
a lot of debris, identified by investigators as scrap metal, which included an abandoned
vehicle in the vicinity of Utility Pole 25. According to MFD-1 , the utility
company had not yet arrived.

57. MFD-1 told investigators that sometime between 0830 hours and 0900 hours, A-
Watch personnel arrived to relieve B-Watch personnel. According to MFD-1 , A-
Watch personnel remained on scene to “mop-up.” Fire damage had not extended to the
kiawe tree that was located south of Utility Pole 25 on the north side of the gully below
the unmaintained firebreak.

58. Investigators provided MFD-1 with an aerial map of the area where he and
Engine 3 firefighters responded to the brush fire. MFD-1 drew on the map and
identified approximate locations of fire or fire related damage that corresponded to two
different points in time on August 8, 2023.

40
 88. Air 2 arrived and landed nearby once assignments were given to Company-1
operators. Air 2 was tasked with spotting fires only due to wind speeds of 40 MPH and
overhead powerlines in the area.

89. Engine 6 arrived and was assigned to assist Ladder 3 with wet line work off a dirt access
road that was uphill of the Lahaina Bypass.

90. MFD-6 stated the fire had been knocked down at that point, which included no more
fire growth. Efforts to improve the firebreak by bulldozer remained underway.
According to MFD-6 , water was applied liberally to the fire area and that water
conservation was not an issue due to multiple hydrants in the neighborhood.

ADDITIONAL WITNESS INFORMATION:

W-9 21

91. W-9 , who resided at address , Lahaina, Hawaii, told investigators

that on August 8, 2023, he was awake before 0500 hours. According to W-9 , he was
logged-in to a Zoom meeting. W-9 stated electrical service to his house went out at
0500 hours and came back on at 0830 hours.

W-10 22

92. W-10 , who resided at address , in Lahaina, Hawaii, told

investigators that on August 8, 2023, he woke-up at 0300 hours and noticed the electricity
at his house was not working and went back to bed. W-10 stated he woke-up again at
0500 hours and noted the electricity was still not working. At approximately 0545 hours,
he and his wife smelled smoke, went outside and did not see any fire. At approximately
0648 hours, he saw fire at the property across Lahainaluna Road from his house.
W-10 stated the fire appeared to be contained and there was no smoke between 1300
hours and 1400 hours.

21 ATF Report of Investigation (ROI), Report 008: Interview of W-9 .

22 MFD, Interview of W-10 , FIWS 019.
49
 Heavy Equipment – Company-1
96. W-15 was identified as owner of Company-1 , a company that provided heavy
equipment services to include clearing and digging, demolition, hauling, and draining
systems. On August 19, 2023, ATF and the MFD conducted a joint interview of W-15 .
From May 9, 2024, through May 14, 2024, investigators from ATF returned to Lahaina to
continue the investigation. During this timeframe, ATF made attempts both directly and

52
 SCENE EXAMINATION AND OBSERVATIONS
THE MORNING FIRE
100. During the examinations of the location of the Morning Fire, the scene was
documented with photographs. Based on the witness statements which clearly identified
the fire in its earliest stage, the examination began around Utility Pole 25. While Utility
Pole 25 would normally indicate a single utility pole, in this case, it involved two utility
poles, both of which were marked Utility Pole 25. The taller pole, identified as Utility
Pole 25 for purposes of this investigation, had overhead powerlines and transmission
lines. The shorter pole was also labeled Utility Pole 25, but it had telecommunications
lines only. Both poles were spaced approximately two feet from each other.

101. The area directly below Utility Pole 25 contained various sized rocks and the
remains of some shrubs. The trunks of the shrubs measured up to approximately 2 inches
in diameter. Evidence of a lower intensity backing fire was present to the east of Utility
Pole 25 in the form of fallen grass stems and other vegetation that was not affected by the
fire. The overall lack of complete consumption of vegetation in this area was also
consistent with a lower intensity fire backing into this area. The undeveloped area to the
54
 east of Utility Pole 25 also showed signs of a low intensity fire backing or spreading
laterally into this area. Although the foliage was no longer present on the shrubs, the
shrubs were still intact and most of the burning was located at the base of the shrubs.

102. This low burning to the base of the shrubs, coupled with the spotty patches of
grass that remained post-fire is also consistent with a low intensity fire moving into this
area from the area of Utility Pole 25. Based on the reported weather conditions at the
time of the Morning Fire, a fire extending into this area from the vicinity of Utility Pole
25 would have spread against the prevailing winds, which were out of the east/northeast.

103. Additional fire indicators to the south of Utility Pole 25 were no longer present or
had been altered due to heavy equipment usage. A fire hydrant and photovoltaic speed
sign were located on the south side of Lahainaluna Road, both of which were
approximately 50-feet from Utility Pole 25. Lastly, five small trees with foliage and
browned flowers were located between the sidewalk and Lahainaluna Road. Based on a
review of pre-fire images and a post-fire examination, evidence of shrubs and taller
grasses was noted at the base of Utility Pole 25.

55
 104. Moving to the west of Utility Pole 25, investigators located fulgurites along the
grassy area below the overhead powerline. Fulgurites 27 generally take place in soils with
a sandy composition. They can be created by both electrical discharges during a
lightning strike or through contact between an energized electrical conductor and the
ground or rock. The heat created from the strike heats the sandy particles and fuses the
soil or rock at the location the strike discharges to the ground. When a powerline
discharges to the ground, the shape and size of the fulgurites created by powerlines will
typically be solid and on or very near the surface of the soil and may include glass bubble
looking formations on the surface. 28

27 2016 Edition of NWCG PMS 412, Page 200.

28 2016 Edition of NWCG PMS 412, Page 251.
56
 link fence. Much of the grass on the east side of the dirt and rock mound that was south
of Utility Pole 25 and close to the firebreak did not burn. Fire from the dirt and rock
mound advanced west through the fence and into vacant lots that were overgrown with
dry grasses. Fire consumed most of the grass in this area until it encountered paved roads
on the south, west, and north sides during the Morning Fire.

109. As reported previously in an interview with W-15 of Company-1 , a firebreak

was cut along what was the eastern edge of the Morning Fire. This firebreak was
bordered by a chain link fence on the west side and an area of grasses, shrubs, rocks, and
a small gully along the east side. Within this gully appeared to be a dry creek bed or
drainage area. Rocks, shrubs and grasses made up this drainage area. Based on the
statements of firefighters, the original Morning Fire did not appear to cause any active or
discernable burning in this gully area.

110. Investigators documented the area where the firebreak was cut with photographs
and made note of what appeared to be some freshly cut branches that had been thrown
across the firebreak and into an area that burned during the Afternoon Fire. Based on the
condition of these branches, investigators believe unknown individuals accessed this area
to dispose of branches cut from an unknown location after the fires had occurred and
prior to the investigator’s arrival.

59
 MORNING FIRE CAUSE HYPOTHESES

111. According to NFPA 921, “In some instances, a single item, such as an irrefutable
article of physical evidence or a credible eyewitness to the ignition, or a video recording,
may be the basis for a determination of origin.” 29

112. For the Morning Fire, the general origin area was identified through witness
statements, a review of photographs and video, and a scene examination. Using the same
information to identify the general origin area, investigators were able to narrow this area
down to a specific origin area and an ignition area. Based on the discovery of fulgurites
within the hypothesized ignition area, the argument could be made that even more
defined point of origin were identified, while a separate specific origin area was
identified directly below Utility Pole 25.

113. PMS 412 and NFPA 921 identify common causes of wildfires. Several cause
factors identified in PMS 412 and NFPA 921 were considered and excluded as causes for
the fire. These cause factors were excluded after cognitively examining each of them as a
hypothesized cause of the fire in light of all other data. Additionally, if there was no
affirmative data or supporting evidence to support a specific cause category for the fire,
the cause was excluded.

114. Many of the hypothesized causes were excluded based on the same set of facts
available to investigators. Witness statements, witness videos, witness photographs,
ATF-5

’s examination, and fire scene examination, all supported a cause of the fire
being a broken energized overhead powerline contacting the ground and igniting the
grasses in various locations.

115. Even with investigators having corroborated information that supported a

hypothesis of a broken energized overhead powerline contacting the ground and starting
the fire, investigators still explored some of the more common hypotheses related to
wildfires. The following hypotheses were considered and evaluated:
Lightning
116. There were no reported or recorded lightning strikes in or within 200 kilometers
(km) of the island of Maui according to the Worldwide Lightning Network (WWLN)
prior to the fire; refer to ATF Electrical Examination Report for details. Based on the
above information, this cause hypothesis was excluded.

29 NFPA 921 (2024), Chapter 18, Section 18.2.1.2.

60
Fireworks
117. There were no reports of fireworks in the area the morning of or day before the
fire. Investigators located and examined a small empty cardboard tube that measured
approximately four inches by one inch that was consistent with an aerial firework. The
cardboard tube was located outside of the specific origin area and ignition area. The
thought of a shower of sparks raining down from an aerial firework was hypothesized,
however the tube was covered in dirt and the colored stripes on the tube were weathered,
which indicated it had been discarded for some time prior to the fire.

118. A witness to the south heard a noise who said it was not “fireworks.” The
reported noise came from the direction of Utility Pole 25, which was also described in a
separate interview as Utility Pole 24. The witness observed a shower of white sparks
from the top of the utility pole that fell to the ground around its base. According to the
witness, a vegetation fire immediately ensued.

119. FCA recovered firework related exhibits from the Princess Nāhiʻenaʻena School,
all of which were documented, photographed and examined by ATF-5 ; refer to ATF
Electrical Examination Report for details. The exhibits were identified as two “ground
flower” type fireworks and one small aerial shell type firework. The three fireworks
recovered from the school were eliminated based on the distance (approximately 0.19
miles) from Utility Pole 25. In addition, the firework examined in the unburned area east
of Utility Pole 25 was also eliminated based on its size and condition. Based on the
above information, this hypothesis was excluded.
Equipment Use
120. The only reported and documented use of heavy equipment in the area occurred
after the ignition and spread of the fire. The heavy equipment was used to “water down”
the fire and another piece of heavy equipment was used to cut a firebreak along the east
boundary of the fire. The heavy equipment use will be further discussed in the Afternoon
Fire section of this report. Based on the above information, this cause hypothesis was
excluded as it related to the Morning Fire.
Vaping Devices
121. Investigators observed three vaping devices on the south side of Lahainaluna
Road, east of Utility Pole 25 and across from Lahaina Intermediate School. Two of the
three were undamaged. The plastic casing on the third was melted on one end but
showed no damage indicative of an internal battery fire or evidence of venting during
thermal runaway. Additionally, each of these devices were located outside of the
identified specific origin area. Refer to ATF Electrical Examination Report for details
Based on the above information, this hypothesis was excluded.
61
Intentional Human Act

122. An open flame from a lighter, match or incendiary device is a competent ignition
source for the first fuels that were ignited. Investigators considered if a person or persons
might have intentionally started the fire. No persons were observed in the area prior to or
after the fire was first observed.

123. Investigators reviewed surveillance video from Lahaina Intermediate School

between 0000 hours until electrical service stopped working at 0502 hours. The video
provided a southern view that included the gate, Lahainaluna Road and Utility Pole 26.
Two vehicles traveled up the road during those five hours, both of which were identified
as being associated with Lahaina High School, which was farther east on Lahainaluna
Road. Neither vehicle slowed nor changed course of travel around Utility Pole 26, which
was one pole east of Utility Pole 25. No pedestrians or other persons were observed on
the video along Lahainaluna Road around Utility Pole 26 approximately 90 minutes
before the fire.

124. Video evidence of an energized overhead powerline contacting the ground and the
presence of fulgurites, were inconsistent with an intentional act caused by humans.
Based on the above information, this hypothesis was excluded.
Vehicle Causation
125. Despite the evidence previously mentioned of a broken energized overhead
powerline contacting the ground and starting the fire, the proximity of Lahainaluna Road
to the specific origin area led investigators to examine a potential cause for the fire being
a vehicle. Investigators considered that a vehicle caused the fire(s) via a roadside
ignition. Fire causation from vehicles along roadways in receptive fuel conditions can
involve, but are not limited to, ejected carbon from an exhaust system, ejection of hot
pieces of a catalytic converter, overheated brakes that fail or cause sparks or similar
sparks from dragging chains or other metallic vehicle parts contacting the roadway being
heated by friction.

126. An abandoned truck body and frame was located in tall grass and south of Utility
Pole 25. It was determined the abandoned truck had been in that location since at least
2008 based on a review of satellite imagery. No ignition sources specific to the
abandoned vehicle were located. Witness statements and a review of surveillance video
from Lahaina Intermediate School did not support a hypothesized cause of a vehicle
starting the Morning Fire. Based on the above information, this cause hypothesis was
excluded.

62
 Powerlines (Electric Utility Equipment)
127. Per PMS 412, Chapter 6, the category of powerlines includes all electrical
equipment associated with the production, transmission, and use of electricity. 30 PMS
412 lists Powerline Ignition Factors which in part state “The ignition of a powerline fire
often occurs due to high winds, contact with vegetation, equipment failure, or human or
animal contact”. PMS 412 continues, “Fires from powerlines can start as a result of
conductor contact with standing vegetation due to inadequate clearances or with
wildland fuels on the ground when electrical equipment, such as a conductor, falls to the
ground and comes into contact with dry fuels. Sparks or molten metal from conductors
or transformers can fall to the ground and ignite fires”.

128. NFPA 921, Chapter 27 Wildfire Investigations, Section 27.10.1.8 - Electricity

describes similar ignition scenarios as those described above from Chapter 6 of the PMS
412.

129. Early video, witness statements, and the scene examination identified multiple
ignition areas in the short grass between the sidewalk and Lahainaluna Road and an
immediate fire in the tall grass and shrubs below Utility Pole 25. The fire below Utility
Pole 25 moved south/southwest along a fence line. Witnesses and video from the north
side of Lahainaluna Road stated that the fire beneath Utility Pole 25, as well as the
smaller fires between the sidewalk and Lahainaluna Road, were associated with an
energized overhead powerline laying on the ground.

30 2016 Edition of NWCG PMS 412, Page 245.

63
130. The first fire witness told investigators that she heard a “boom” or loud noise that
startled her. The noise caused her to look towards Utility Pole 25, which she referred to
as Utility Pole 24 in another interview and described seeing a cascade of white sparks
from the top of the pole to the ground below. The cascade of sparks caused the grass at
the base of the utility pole to ignited immediately and catch fire.

131. The perspective of the witness was approximately one block southwest looking
across an unmaintained grass lot up the hill towards Utility Pole 24 and Utility Pole 25.
Early witnesses stated the fire was located around the south side of the base of Utility
Pole 25 in the tall grasses and on the ground in between the two utility poles.

132. Photographs of the specific origin area taken by first witnesses, to include video
from the witness on the north side of the street across from Utility Pole 24, show that the
south overhead powerline at the top of the utility poles along Lahainaluna Road was
laying atop the speed limit sign and dropped to the ground. The witnesses reported that
this powerline was sparking on the ground, which indicated it was still energized, as
64
 observed on the video. Investigators observed evidence of arc melting on the metal speed
sign frame that was consistent with an energized overhead powerline contacting the sign.

133. As mentioned previously, the presence of fulgurites corroborates the witness

statements, witness video and witness photographs. Although fulgurites can also be
caused by a lightning strike, the hypothesis of a lightning strike causing the fire was
excluded.

134. The events and information described in this report, to include ATF’s Electrical
Examination Report and Conclusions, support that this fire was associated with utility
equipment at and around Utility Pole 25. More specifically, the fire was caused by a
failure at Utility Pole 25 and a downed overhead powerline that was energized connected
to Utility Pole 24. Based on the information available to fire investigators at the time of
this report, this cause hypothesis could not be excluded.

MORNING FIRE CONCLUSION

135. Investigators used the Scientific Method according to the NFPA 921 and PMS 412
to determine the Morning Fire originated at Utility Pole 25, which was located on
Lahainaluna Road and included the grass between the roadway and sidewalk from north
to south and the space between Utility Pole 25 and Utility Pole 24 from east to west. The
ignition of dried and overgrown vegetation below Utility Pole 25 was caused by the
ejection of molten metallic material that was ejected during the failure of the utility
equipment and resulted in arcing and severing of the energized overhead powerline. The
failure of the utility equipment at the top of Utility Pole 25, which resulted in “sparks”
cascading down to the vegetation below, could have been due to the strain, displacement
of conductors, and movement due to wind put on Utility Pole 25 and its equipment by the
breaking of Utility Pole 7A that was located approximately 85-feet to the north of Utility
Pole 25. Severing of the energized overhead powerline resulted in the ignition of
vegetation, in the form of short grass between Utility Poles 25 and 24. Refer to ATF
Electrical Examination Report for a more detailed explanation. The fire was classified as
Accidental.

65
 The Afternoon Fire
SUMMARY OF EVENT:

136. On August 8, 2023, at approximately 1452 hours, what is being referred to as the
Afternoon Fire ignited in an area located near the end of the cul-de-sac of Kuialua Street.
The fire was behind a residential subdivision in a gully/creek bed area that had previously
been the east and southern border of the Morning Fire.

NARRATIVE:

137. The Afternoon Fire was reported by multiple parties, with multiple 911 calls being
received at approximately 1452 hours on August 8, 2023. The callers each described a
fire burning behind their residences, in a gully/creek bed. This gully/creek bed was
located south of Utility Pole 25, which was the origin for the Morning Fire.

138. The fire quickly grew and aided by strong winds, advanced towards the south and
west. Firebrands carried by wind led to spot fires ahead of the advancing front of the fire.
This wildfire spread rapidly due to the strong winds associated with strong high-pressure
system situated northwest of the State. The fire burned over 2,000 acres, advancing into
Lahaina Town, and destroyed most of the structures resulting in 102 confirmed fatalities,
to date. According to the Pacific Disaster Center and FEMA, damage assessments
related to the Lahaina Fire resulted in approximately 2,719 structures exposed; 2,207
structures damaged or destroyed; and 2,170 acres burned. Eighty-six percent of the
structures exposed to fire were residential. Financial losses were estimated at
approximately $6 billion.

139. A review of the MFD CAD showed Engine 11 leaving the scene of the Morning
Fire at 1418 hours. At 1430 hours and then again at 1448 hours, MFD Engine 11 drove
on the Lahaina Bypass and reported nothing showing from the scene.

WITNESS ACCOUNTS FOR AFTERNOON FIRE

140. Some of the interviewed witnesses observed both the Morning and Afternoon
Fires. Subsequently, their statements were reviewed for information pertinent to the first
observations of the Afternoon Fire. Refer to report matrix in Table 1 below for reports
specific to each witness statement.

66
 W-18 – 911 Caller ( W-17 ) 35
154. W-18 stated he was working as a line crew employee for MECO on August
8, 2023. At approximately 1455 hours, he was working with W-17 near Kuialua
Street. He and W-17 were parked along Lahainaluna Road for approximately 15 to
30 minutes before seeing smoke coming from the south of their location. W-17
reportedly called 911. W-18 did not see any people in that area and made some video
recordings on his phone. W-18 stated wind conditions consisted of heavy gusts with
directional shifting.

155. W-18 stated he exited their vehicle and walked towards Utility Pole 25 and then
down towards Utility Pole 6, which was south of Utility Pole 25. W-18 did not see any
flames. However, when he continued walking down the hill toward Utility Pole 6, he
saw flames approximately three feet in height above the north edge of the gully. The
north edge of the gully was west of where he initially saw smoke.

156. According to W-18 , smoke and fire were located within the gully and
approximately below and to the west of the only kiawe tree in the area. W-18 noted
smoke and fire moved rapidly west, in the direction of Utility Poles 1A and 1B. W-18
repeatedly said the wind was blowing hard with stronger gusts that kept changing
directions.
WITNESS INTERVIEWS:
W-1 36

157. W-1 stated that approximately one hour after MFD left her
neighborhood, she observed smoke behind the W-7 & W-8 , which was located at
address . W-1 described the initial smoke as “light in color” and later
“thick like a cloud.”

158. W-1 prepared to return to her cousin’s house down the hill after seeing the
change in smoke density. According to W-1 , it took her ten to fifteen minutes to
evacuate and drive away when she noticed the fire had progressed down the hill to the
Lahaina Bypass.

35 ATF Report of Investigation (ROI), Report 036: Interview of W-18 .

36 ATF Report of Investigation (ROI), Report 007: Interview of W-1 .
73
FIRE SUPPRESSION:

Engine 3

MFD-2 38

160. MFD-2 , who was assigned to Engine 3 told investigators he thought he and
firefighters who worked the Morning Fire departed the scene at approximately 1420
hours. The CAD report documented MFD-2 ’s departure at 1418 hours. According
to MFD-2 , they returned to Station 3 for a few minutes before getting dispatched to
the Afternoon Fire.

161. MFD-2 told investigators the wind increased with “violence” and
conditions worsened throughout the day. He also noted the wind direction changed
frequently, but was primarily out of the east, northeast.

162. According to MFD-2 , Engine 11 was first at scene for the Afternoon Fire.
MFD-2 , who was assigned to Engine 3, decided to drive up the dirt road below the
fire to get in front of it due to the wind. Investigators found this area to be consistent
with the location where Company-1 created a firebreak during the Morning Fire.

38 ATF Report of Investigation (ROI), Report 025: Interview of MFD-2 .

75
163. MFD-2 set-up to attack the head of the fire, but there were no active flames.
There was, however, thick smoke from above and smoldering within vegetation above
the head of the fire. MFD-2 left Wildland 3 and two firefighters on the dirt road
south of the mango tree, which was along the unmaintained firebreak west of the W-7 & W-8
residence. Firefighters assigned to Wildland 3 were tasked with preventing the fire from
crossing the dirt road.

164. MFD-2 then ran up the south side of the gully with MFD-3 and Tanker
3 being driven behind them. There was no longer visible fire in that area other than to the
east, which he was moving towards with the goal of extinguishment. For reference, the
visible fire was east of the kiawe tree that was visible on the aerial map.

165. Tanker 3 was parked south of the kiawe tree on the opposite side of the gully from
the Morning Fire. MFD-2 pulled a handline from the truck and climbed over the
rocks and into the gully. According to MFD-2 , he pulled the handline because he
did not want his firefighters under overhead powerlines because the lines were whipping
back and forth and was unsure if they were energized.

166. MFD-2 told investigators it was impossible to attack the fire with the
bumper turret on Tanker 3 because rocks blocked access and wind blew water sideways.
He originally applied water to the kiawe tree and its surrounding brush when Engine 11
called on the radio and advised the fire crossed the highway. A review of radio
transcripts indicated this occurred at 1522 hours. Tanker 3 overheated and was unable to
move for a few minutes.

167. MFD-2 ran down the hill in an attempt to reach Wildland 3, which had
repositioned below for structure protection. MFD-2 rode in a civilian passenger
vehicle to get to Wildland 3 and help them while Tanker 3 was unable to move.

168. Tanker 3 joined back with MFD-2 a few minutes later and helped fight the
fire that was encroaching on the first structures. Wildland 3 needed a pumper truck to
help with suppression at the first house they encountered. Conditions were reportedly
very bad with low visibility due to smoke. Multiple houses were on fire by the time
firefighters were set-up for structural firefighting. MFD-2 noted their egress was
cut off by a downed overhead powerline behind them. MFD-2 stated they
nevertheless drove over the downed overhead powerline to evacuate.

76
 182. MFD-6 recalled dispatch advised that a shed between two houses at
Ho’okahua Place was on fire and impacting nearby houses. Therefore, Engine 3, which
had a single operator, repositioned to Ho’okahua Place and used its line to address the
burning shed and affected houses. The remainder of Engine 3’s crew remained on the
dirt access road with Wildland 3 and Tanker 3.

183. MFD-6 requested air support but was denied due to wind conditions.
MFD-6

also requested additional apparatus and received Engine 1 and Engine 6 in

response. MFD-6 then drove down Lahainaluna Road for a better view. He noticed
the grass along the lower part of Kelawea Mauka Park was on fire and impacting houses
on Kaakolu Street and Kaalo Place.

184. MFD-6 directed all units to reposition to Kaakolu Street and Kalena Street to
make a stand along Kaakolu Street. He also directed Tanker 3 come down Lahainaluna
Road and use its bumper turret to take energy from the fire while the other units were
getting in position. However, Tanker 3 was unable to respond due to a mechanical issue.

MFD-7 42

185. MFD-7 , who was assigned to Engine 11, stated that on August 8, 2023,
winds increased prior to the Afternoon Fire. Engine 11 was sent to the Lahaina area and
passed the area where the Morning Fire occurred. Engine 11 was cancelled from its call
and redirected while on Hokiokio Place, around 1440 hours.

186. MFD-7 stated Engine 11 passed the scene of the Morning Fire once
again but did not see any smoke or fire. Radio transmission records indicated this
occurred at 1448 hours.

187. At 1455 hours, Engine 11, Engine 3 and Tanker 3 were dispatched to a call for
smoke and fire at Kuialua Street. Engine 11 turned around at Foodland Lahaina and
proceeded to Kuialua Street. Radio transmission records indicated this occurred at 1456
hours.

188. At 1500 hours, MFD-7 and Engine 11 arrived at scene of a 20-foot by

100-foot brush fire located where the fire occurred earlier that morning. The Afternoon
Fire was in a ravine (gully) and moving west at a high rate of speed.

42 MFD, Interview of Captain MFD-7 , FIWS 026.

80
 189. MFD-7 established Lahaina Command and moved communications to
channel FD2. Engine 11 and Mini 11 started a direct attack with a 200-foot, 1 ½ inch
pre-connected handline as well as two Gnass Packs, which totaled approximately 600-
feet of hose. Firefighters progressed around the rear of and Ho’okahua Place
with the handlines. Engine 3 and Tanker 3 arrived and directed down to the utility road
below the subdivision from Lahainaluna Road where Tanker 3 worked earlier. Engine 3
and Tanker 3 were to start attacking from that point to prevent fire from passing beyond
them. Wildland 3 arrived and positioned with Engine 3 and Tanker 3.

190. MFD-6 arrived at scene and assumed incident command. MFD-7

recalled dispatch notification regarding a shed fire on Ho’okahua Place. Ladder 3 and
Relief Engine 11 were dispatched to assist with the shed fire.

191. A gust of wind carried a shower of embers through the area and over their heads.
The driver of Engine 11 was knocked down by this gust. The fire moved rapidly down
the ravine (to the east in the gully), jumped over a new firebreak from the Morning Fire
and passed Engine 3, Tanker 3 and Wildland 3. Fire passed Wildland 3 along the fence at
the firebreak behind , and Ho’okahua Place. The fire then jumped the
Lahaina Bypass and through the basin of the Lahainaluna cutoff. Radio transmission
records indicated this occurred at 1522 hours.

ADDITIONAL WITNESS INFORMATION:

W-10 43

192. W-10 stated that on August 8, 2023, between 1300 and 1400 hours, the
Morning Fire appeared to be contained. W-10 stated there was no visible smoke in
the area either. At approximately 1430 hours, W-10 observed smoke across the street
by two utility poles (Utility Poles 1A and 1B), both of which were in the vicinity of the
Morning Fire. CAD records indicated the fire was reported at 1452 hours. Citizens and
firefighters assigned to Engine 11 reported seeing no smoke to the east or west prior to
1452 hours.

43 MFD, Interview of W-10 , FIWS 019.

81
 W-15 44

193. W-15 stated that on August 8, 2023, at 1400 hours, he received a text message
that reported a fire restarted. W-15 stated he returned to the subdivision with his tanker
to help fight the fire. W-15 and his crew assisted with extinguishing fires they
encountered along the Lahaina Bypass as they made their way back to the subdivision.
According to W-15 , they arrived at the subdivision between 1600 and 1630 hours;
however, the fire had already advanced toward Lahaina Town.

SCENE EXAMINATION AND OBSERVATIONS

THE AFTERNOON FIRE

194. During the examinations of the location of the Afternoon Fire, the scene was
documented with photographs. Investigators determined the area where the Afternoon
Fire was first observed was within the gully and approximately 65-feet east/northeast
from Utility Pole 1B. This information was obtained through witness statements, and by
reconstructing the scene using satellite imagery. This reconstruction was based on
witness statements and landmarks they used to describe where they first saw smoke.

195. From July 31 through August 2, 2024, SA/CFI examined the scene of the
ATF-1

Afternoon Fire. As part of the examination, SA/CFI stood on the same lanai that
ATF-1

W-16 stood on the day she first observed smoke for the Afternoon Fire. SA/CFI
compared the image previously taken of W-16 ’s perspective and marked with
ATF-1

flags the approximate location W-16 previously described. After marking the
location, SA/CFI measured the distance from the approximate location to Utility
ATF-1

Pole 1B, which measured 65-feet. SA/CFI plotted this approximate location on a
ATF-1

Google Earth map to provide some perspective on the first observed smoke location and
the larger scene.

196. The firebreak present during investigator’s initial scene examination measured
approximately 50-feet wide and began at Lahainaluna Road as referenced above. The
firebreak ran adjacent to fencing to the east, south and southwest sides of the houses
along Ho’okahua Street, Kuialua Street and Ho’okahua Place.

197. The investigation revealed the firebreak was covered with dense and dry grasses
(fuel load) that were not maintained prior to the Morning Fire. Investigators also learned
that shrubs and small trees had grown within the chain-link fence that separated houses

44 ATF Report of Investigation (ROI), Report 029: Interview of W-15 .

82
from the north side of the firebreak. The Morning Fire consumed vegetation that covered
the firebreak.

83
198. A gully with a dry creek bed at its bottom existed on the east side of the firebreak.
As described previously in the Land Description section of this report, the gully had
varying depths and widths, and was wider to the north/northeast and narrower to the
west/southwest. The dry creek bed also varied in depth. Investigators learned the dry
creek bed contained a large amount of vegetation, which consisted of dense grasses
interspersed with haole koa shrubs, and large boulders.

199. The north edge of the gully, which abutted the east boundary of the firebreak, was
lined with large rocks that acted as a border between the firebreak and gully. A kiawe
tree was located to the east/northeast of Utility Poles 1A and 1B and was growing out of
the south aspect of the gully wall. The kiawe tree that was visible to the east/northeast of
the first visible smoke was lying on the ground as the base of the tree had burned away.
The distal ends of these branches exhibited varying degrees of damage with intact leaves
and bark remaining on some branches. Witnesses stated the tree was undamaged during
the Morning Fire.

200. Utility Pole 1A and Utility Pole 1B, as well as a utility pole stump in between
them, were located approximately 65-feet south of where smoke was first reported.
Utility Poles 1A and 1B were located within the gully/dry creek bed and Utility Pole 1B
was located to the north of Utility Pole 1A.

84
204. When reviewing these combined images, it was noted the fire that was entering
the left part of the picture or moving from the area of Utility Pole 1B towards Utility Pole
1A did not have the same flame heights as the fire that was noted extending to the
west/southwest of Utility Pole 1A. This lower intensity burning, or shorter flame heights
was consistent with the survivability of the foliage documented on scene. As the fire
continued to advance past Utility Pole 1A, the flame heights grew dramatically and
became the head of the fire.

86
89
209. SA/CFI reviewed videos of the heavy equipment working during the
ATF-1

Morning Fire and reviewed photos and videos of what the area of the firebreak looked
like after the Morning Fire. The west edge of the gully narrowed as it approached Utility
Poles 1A and 1B and as a result, the firebreak that was cut in this area appeared to be
close to the north edge of the gully. This narrowing resulted in the heavy equipment
having to take a sharp turn to the west to follow the topography of the gully. This sharp
turn resulted in a build-up of rocks and other vegetation on the outside edge of the blade
and may have led to the heavy equipment displacing undetected smoldering debris into
the gully or very near the north edge of the gully. The approximate location where the
heavy equipment made this turn was near the location where smoke was first observed by
90
 W-8 and W-16 . Based on the scene examination and incorporating
the witness observations into the scene examination, investigators believe the smoke and
ensuing fire originated approximately 65-feet east/northeast of Utility Pole 1B.

AFTERNOON FIRE CAUSE HYPOTHESIS

210. The area where smoke and fire were first observed was identified through witness
statements, a review of photographs and video, and a scene examination. This rekindle of
the Morning Fire became known as the Afternoon Fire and was reported at approximately
1452 hours. The first witnesses and videos show smoke east of the area burned during
the Morning Fire. Smoke quickly transitioned to an uncontrolled fire that broke
containment efforts set by the MFD at approximately 1518 hours. Fire rapidly moved in
a west/southwest direction and “jumped” the Lahaina Bypass at approximately 1522
hours. The first residential structure lost to the Afternoon Fire, located at
Lahainaluna Road was reported on fire at 1528 hours.

211. Taking a closer look at the location where the rekindle was first observed and
subsequently named the Afternoon Fire, investigators reviewed images, videos, and the
statements provided by witnesses. Two independent witnesses both put the first observed
smoke in the same approximate location, which was approximately 65-feet east/northeast
of Utility Pole 1B. Additional information was provided by MECO employees
monitoring the scene of the Morning Fire. Videos clearly show smoke coming from the
area of the gully located to the east of the housing subdivision. The kiawe tree located in
the videos and captured in still frames from the video, is not involved in fire and the
smoke appears to be further to the west/southwest as the smoke is obscuring the lower
portion of Utility Pole 1B, which would place the source of the smoke east/northeast of
Utility Pole 1B and south of the kiawe tree.

212. When plotted on a Google Earth aerial image, the area where their vantage points
overlap is also in the area described previously by W-8 and W-16
where they first observed smoke prior to seeing flames.

91
213. NFPA 921 and PMS 412 identify common causes of wildfires. Although the
Afternoon Fire was determined to be a rekindle of the Morning Fire, investigators
cognitively analyzed several hypotheses to refute the hypothesis of the Afternoon Fire
being a rekindle from the Morning Fire.

214. Several cause factors that were previously identified and discussed in the Morning
Fire section of this report were excluded as a cause of the Afternoon Fire based on the
same fact pattern laid out in the Morning Fire section. Additionally, if there was no
affirmative data or supporting evidence to support a specific cause category for the fire,
the cause was excluded as a cause of the fire.

215. The cause hypotheses that were analyzed included the following:

• Smoking Materials
• Fireworks
• Intentional Human Act
• Equipment Use
• Electrical Utility Equipment
• Rekindle

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Smoking Materials
216. Under ideal conditions, carelessly discarded smoking materials can be a
competent ignition source for receptive fuels. No persons present during the suppression
of the Morning Fire were reported to be in the gully or dry creek bed where smoke was
first observed during the Afternoon Fire. Investigators determined the general origin area
for the Afternoon Fire had not been burned during the Morning Fire based on witnesses
and video. The gully was overgrown with thick vegetation and the steep and rocky
footing made access difficult.

217. No persons were observed after witnesses first observed smoke from the
Afternoon Fire in the general origin area, specifically down in the gully or dry creek bed,
prior to the fire being reported. Fire personnel had departed approximately 34 minutes
prior to the Afternoon Fire and reported no other persons present near the general origin
area when they departed, other than MECO employees. MECO personnel who were on
or at the roadway near Utility Pole 25 were there to make repairs. The known location of
MECO personnel was approximately 270-feet from where smoke from the fire was
observed. The MECO personnel did not report seeing persons in the area where the
smoke originated from. MECO produced asset GPS data, which was examined by
investigators and was found to support the description of their locations.

218. Residents who reported the fire were present when firefighters departed after
1400 hours. They did not report any persons in or near the area of or within the gully,
other than firefighters who were above the gully along the firebreak. A homeowner
witness stated he was actively outside checking his property and fence line prior to
observing smoke within the gully to the east. Based on the above information that no
individuals were down in the general origin area, this hypothesis was excluded.
Fireworks
219. There were no reports of fireworks in the hours leading up to the Afternoon Fire.
Fire department personnel had departed the area approximately 34 minutes prior to the
fire being reported. MECO personnel were on scene above the east side of the general
area of origin when fire personnel cleared the scene. W-8 , who reported the start
of the Afternoon Fire, was outside on the south side of his home. W-8 had an
unobstructed view of the area where smoke was first observed and did not report hearing
or seeing fireworks after fire personnel left, nor did they see other persons in the area.

220. No expended fireworks or identifiable items associated with fireworks were

observed in the gully. Based on the above information, this hypothesis was excluded.
Equipment Use
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221. NWCG 921 and PMS 412 list Equipment Use and/or Vehicles as a potential cause
for a wildfire. In each of these guides, fires caused by equipment use and/or vehicles are
discussed in terms of a failure occurring with the equipment itself or the overheating of
equipment resulting in a fire via radiant or conductive heat transfer.

222. After firefighters arrived to suppress the Morning Fire, Company-1 assisted
with a bulldozer, front end loader, and a water tanker. The equipment was used along the
firebreak to the north of the gully to assist MFD suppression efforts and to aid in the
containment of the Morning Fire. Video produced by Company-1 , showed at
approximately 0900 hours that morning, no fire was visible but burned vegetation and
displaced soil to the west side of the kiawe tree along the edge of the gully.

223. In the videos, grasses along the firebreak were moved by strong winds blowing
towards the gully area where the general origin area was identified. The video also
reveals the firebreak was cut close to the northern edge of the gully leaving little terrain
between the firebreak and the gully. Excavation equipment departed at approximately
1200 hours with MFD firefighters remaining on scene for another two plus hours.

224. It was reported that at 1527 hours, Tanker 3 overheated during suppression efforts
for the Afternoon Fire. Approximately 35 minutes had passed from the initial report of
this fire since overheating was reported. Tanker 3 was not witnessed to have started a
fire at any time while in operation during the Morning or Afternoon Fire and there were
no reports of mechanical problems (such as overheating) during the Morning Fire. Based
on the above information, a hypothesis involving the mechanical failure of this
equipment or vehicle was excluded.

225. Although a mechanical failure of the equipment was excluded as a cause for the
Afternoon Fire, the close proximity of the freshly cut firebreak to the edge of the gully
does not afford the investigators the ability to rule out the possibility that while cutting
the firebreak, the equipment moved still burning debris or smoldering vegetation into the
gully along with rocks, where it would have remained undetected until the still burning
debris or smoldering vegetation produced enough energy to ignite additional grasses or
other vegetation.

226. Based on conditions captured in the videos provided by Company-1 , the

strong and inconsistent winds could have transported a firebrand from the area of the
Morning Fire to the general origin area of the Afternoon Fire where it would have
remained undetected until the still burning vegetation produced enough energy to ignite
additional grasses or other vegetation. After the start and spread of the Afternoon Fire, it
was reported that embers being carried by the winds were causing spot fires in front of
the advancing fire. Based on the above information, a hypothesis of an equipment
95
 causing the fire due to a failure occurring with the equipment itself or the overheating of
equipment resulting in a fire via radiant or conductive heat transfer was excluded.

227. Although equipment use was excluded as a cause of the fire, the equipment used
during the Morning Fire may have aided in the spread of undetected embers or
smoldering debris during the containment of the Morning Fire.
Powerlines (Electric Utility Equipment)
228. Based on early witness statements and video, smoke from the Afternoon Fire was
first observed in the gully between the kiawe tree to the east and Utility Poles 1A and 1B
to the west. ATF-5 conducted an examination of the overhead powerlines in this
area and no visible damage was noted. In fact, these overhead powerlines were still
intact at the time of the Afternoon Fire. ATF-5 determined that at the time smoke
from the Afternoon Fire was first observed, the overhead powerlines in this area were not
energized based on data produced by the utility company, see ATF Electrical Examination
Report for details.

229. Based on the findings in the conclusion section of the Afternoon Fire, if the
Afternoon Fire was a rekindle of the Morning Fire, the utility equipment that caused the
Morning Fire caused the Afternoon Fire.
Intentional Human Action

230. Investigators considered if a person or persons might have intentionally started

this fire. The fire department departed approximately 34 minutes prior to the Afternoon
Fire was reported and there was no person(s) in or around the gully at that time. Engine
11 twice drove by on the Lahaina Bypass below this area within approximately 20
minutes before the Afternoon Fire was reported. They said there was no visible smoke,
fire, or persons in the area as seen looking uphill (to the east). The residents, some of
whom were witnesses, who lived at the cul-de-sac to the north of Utility Pole 1A and
Utility Pole 1B at the west side of the area, and observed smoke for the Afternoon Fire
had a very good view of the area from an elevated position and did not observe anyone in
the area. One of these witnesses ( W-16 ) was outside prior to observing flames
from the Afternoon Fire on the east side of the home with an unobstructed view to the
north/east, and south along the firebreak that was now clear of vegetation after the
Morning Fire. The witness did not observe any persons or activity in this area prior to
observing the smoke and then fire.

231. The two MECO employees who were interviewed were located with MECO
equipment on Lahainaluna Road to the north of the east side of the gully below the kiawe
tree and approximately around Utility Pole 25. The MECO employees were reported to
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 be present in their parked vehicles along the road when fire personnel departed after the
Morning Fire. The presence of their vehicles in this location was confirmed by utility
GPS data provided to investigators. These employees noticed and reported the smoke
within the gully for the Afternoon Fire. The position where they were parked was also
elevated when looking slightly downwards at the east end of the gully. Based on the
witness observations as well as early video of the fire, investigators developed a general
origin area in the gully that was below the rocks at the south edge of the previously
burned area from the Morning Fire. These witnesses, at both the east and west end of the
area of origin, did not observe any person(s) present in or around the general origin area
for the Afternoon Fire prior to or after observing smoke. Witnesses who lived to the
north, such as W-1 and W-2 & W-3 did not observe any person leaving the area on
foot around the time the smoke was discovered.

232. The first responding firefighters did not observe any persons in the area, nor did
Engine 11 observe persons present as viewed from the highway looking uphill to the east
while driving by enroute to other assignments prior to this fire being reported.
Furthermore, the gully where the Afternoon Fire started was overgrown with unkempt
vegetation, steep banks with loose soil and large rocks making access on foot very
difficult. If a person had been present, given the rapid development of the fire described
by witnesses and observed on the videos they produced, such a person should have been
observed by witnesses leaving the area in any direction. As a result, investigators
excluded this as a cause of the Afternoon Fire.
Rekindle of the Morning Fire
233. Due to the relatively short amount of time between the declaration of the Morning
Fire being extinguished and the start of the Afternoon Fire, a hypothesis of the Afternoon
Fire being a rekindle of the Morning Fire cannot be excluded. The following times are
relevant to both the Morning Fire and the Afternoon Fire:

• 0635 hours – 911 calls placed regarding the Morning Fire

• 0819 hours – MFD declares the fire 90 percent contained
• 0852 hours – MFD declares the fire 100 percent contained
• 1418 hours – MFD declares the fire “out”
• 1418 hours – MFD (E-11) leaves the scene of the Morning Fire
• 1430 hours – MFD (E-11) drives by the scene and reports no problems
• 1448 hours – MFD (E-11) drives by the scene and reports no problems.

234. The Afternoon Fire was reported at 1452 hours and located below and to the south
of the area that burned during the Morning Fire. The Morning Fire had burned along
Lahainaluna Road and along the firebreak to the south and west between the chain-link
97
 fence that divided the properties to the west and the gully to the east. MFD personnel,
Company-1 personnel, and residents all placed the Morning Fire in approximately
the same area as evidenced by diagrams contained within each of their witness
statements. They further described that the Morning Fire consumed the unkempt grass
along the firebreak between the gully and the fence, which created the appearance of a
“road.” The road appearance was enhanced by Company-1 cutting a tactical
firebreak in this area with heavy equipment. Witnesses and firefighters all said they
never observed fire down in the gully or dry creek bed during the Morning Fire, but fire
had been observed around some of large rocks/boulders at the north edge of the gully
with the deepest penetration of fire into the gully and rocks located to the northeast of
Utility Pole 1A and Utility Pole 1B.

235. Fire personnel and other witnesses stated the fire from the Morning Fire was
contained with no additional fire growth or flames observed at approximately 0852 hours.
However, smoldering conditions continued after this time with varied reports from both
firefighters and other witnesses as to when the smoldering was no longer observed.
Firefighters who arrived to replace the initial crews remained on scene for approximately
six hours, using water tankers to flow water along the rocks above the gully due to
concerns about unseen smoldering or fire around or under these rocks. Firefighters
cleared the scene at 1418 hours after informing dispatch the fire was extinguished.
Investigators met with firefighters at the scene regarding both fires and they confirmed
that the furthest visible penetration of fire from the Morning Fire along the firebreak was
into the rocks above Utility Pole 1A, Utility Pole 1B, and the pole stump, but they never
observed flames, smoke, or smoldering in the dense undergrowth down in the gully at
any time while they were present.

236. Firefighters drew outlines on maps showing the extent of burned area for the
Morning Fire. The videos provided by a Company-1 employee, timestamped at
approximately 0900 hours, did not show active fire, or burned vegetation northeast or
west of the uphill kiawe tree or within the gully within the general origin area of the
Afternoon Fire. They confirmed that firefighters, with their assistance, had continued to
water down the rocks above the gully as this was the area they were most concerned with
after the Morning Fire. Firefighters said they wanted to get water under and in between
these boulders and rocks above the gully as this was the area most likely to hold a
smolder or hidden fire.

237. After the Afternoon Fire rekindled and began moving west/southwest the high
school principal, athletic director, intermediate school principal and other witnesses said
the Afternoon Fire continued to slowly back up the gully and field to the east uphill, but

98
 against the wind, throughout the afternoon until approximately 2000 hours. The backing
fire was stopped by the gravel access road for the MECO Lahainaluna substation .

238. This movement of the fire into the winds was possible in-part based on the slight
downward slope of the gully from the area of the MECO Lahainaluna substation to
Utility Poles 1A and 1B. The rate of spread of a fire moving uphill is increased because
the flames are closer to the fuels resulting in a faster dehydrating, preheating, and igniting
of the fuels. Upslope fires can also create a draft, which would also increase the rate of
spread of the fire. This movement of the fire upslope and extending to the east allowed
for previously uninvolved fuels to ignite and allow the fire to spread against the wind.
This was corroborated by video(s) provided by W-10 showing active fire and embers
moving east around Utility Pole 24 in the grass between the street and sidewalk. This
occurred well after fire had already entered Lahaina Town.

239. High winds continued throughout the day and pushed fires downhill until they ran
into previously burned areas having no remaining fuels, which can be referred to as
reburn. These secondary burns were corroborated by the burned-out areas of vegetation
just below the MECO Lahainaluna substation uphill to the east of the Afternoon Fire, as
well as consumed vegetation along the road east and south of Utility Pole 25 that was not
burned when firefighters left the Afternoon Fire to try and stop the fire from advancing
towards Lahaina Town. Due to this, investigators were unable to determine if observed
fire damage to the vegetation within and around the general origin area was associated
with the start of the Afternoon Fire or the subsequent fire that likely impacted the general
origin area throughout the afternoon and early evening.

240. Investigators watched numerous videos that showed fire behavior in vegetative
fuels on that date in and around Lahaina, specifically within the grasses and shrubs. Due
to the extreme wind conditions and other factors related to wildfire risks, grass fuels were
observed to burn very rapidly with long flame lengths. These grasses are a lightweight or
short-duration fuel above the ground surface.

241. Investigators further considered if the Morning Fire could have led to the
undetected burning of subsurface fuels such as tree or shrub roots. These subsurface fires
can be difficult to extinguish and may burn underground along a root jut to surface at
another location. 45 Investigators observed charred roots that were exposed above the
ground during the scene examination, as well as limbs or trunks between the rocks.
Furthermore, the general origin area was overgrown with shrubs and bushes of varying
sizes, which created a risk of a smoldering event going undetected.

45 NWCG S-190: Introduction to Wildland Fire Behavior.

99
242. Investigators reviewed video provided by W-15 of Company-1 (obtained by
MFD) that was reported to have been made around 0900 hours. This video was made
from inside the bulldozer, and it showed a bucket loader pushing dirt uphill from the west
to the east near the kiawe tree. This loose soil, to include burned vegetation from the
firebreak, was piled at the edge of the gully on the west side of the kiawe tree. As
discussed earlier, the close proximity of the freshly cut firebreak to the western edge of
the gully does not afford the investigators the ability to rule out the possibility that while
cutting the firebreak, the operator unknowingly moved still burning vegetation or
smoldering debris into the gully along with rocks, where it would have remained
undetected until the still burning vegetation produced enough energy to ignite additional
grasses or other vegetation.

243. Given the initial fire description for the Afternoon Fire, as well as the video(s) and
the described winds, the more likely general origin area was east/northeast of Utility
Poles 1A and 1B, within the gully. Each of the four initial fire witnesses placed smoke
and ultimately fire within this general origin area. Video provided by three of these four
witnesses corroborated their statements.

244. The two MECO employees located above this area did not initially observe
flames, but both described heavy smoke coming from within the gully approximately
below the kiawe tree and above the gully moving to the west. The video provided by the
MECO employees of the smoke corroborated the hypothesis that the smoldering event
that was producing the smoke was to the east of Utility Pole 1A as it was obscured by the
smoke in the video. This is also consistent with the early observation of the resident
witnesses to the west above the power poles who described initial smoke to the
east/northeast of Utility Poles 1A and 1B, followed quickly by advancing flames as
observed on the video they provided.

245. The Morning Fire was reported to be “contained” at approximately 0852 hours.
In a wildfire situation, containment is the status of a wildfire suppression action
signifying that a control line has been completed around the fire, and any associated spot
fires, which can reasonably be expected to stop the fire's spread. Although the
advancement of the Morning Fire was halted, some of the burned areas from the Morning
Fire continued to smolder for some time as firefighters continued to wet these areas down
until no smolders were observed prior to their departure.

246. Given the footprint (burned area) of the Morning Fire, the possible extension of
fire into the large rocks and unkempt vegetation dividing the firebreak, along with the
high sustained windspeeds, gusts, and reported changes in wind direction per witnesses
100
 and firefighters at the scene, investigators considered the possibility of an undetected
smoldering fire resulting from a firebrand or the inadvertent movement of materials in to
the gully as a possible source of the Afternoon Fire. Investigators could not rule out that
the Afternoon Fire was a rekindle of the Morning Fire. Therefore, this hypothesis was
not excluded.

AFTERNOON FIRE CONCLUSION

247. Investigators used the Scientific Method according to the NFPA 921 and PMS 412
to determine the Afternoon Fire was the result of an undetected smoldering event
(rekindle) from the Morning Fire occurring in the gully/creek bed east of Utility Pole 1B
and west of the kiawe tree. This smoldering event could have been the result of a
firebrand landing in this area due to the strong and erratic winds blowing at the time of
the fire. This smoldering event could have also been the result of some still burning
debris being inadvertently pushed into the gully/creek bed area by heavy equipment
during the haste of cutting a firebreak during the Morning Fire. These smoldering fuels
remained undetected until they produced enough energy to ignite additional grasses or
other vegetation at which time smoke would become visible to witnesses. The cause was
determined to be a rekindle of the Morning Fire and as such is classified as Accidental.

101
 WEATHER INFORMATION AND
ALERTS (NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE)
248. The Weather factored into the ignition and subsequent spread of the Morning Fire
and the Afternoon Fire. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
Global Modeling and Assimilation Office (GMAO) prepared a report titled
“Meteorologic Analysis of the August 2023 Maui Wildfires”. 46 The report went on to
explain the unusually high regional winds in the area of Lahaina fires were caused by an
anomalously strong high-pressure system for the time of year which shifted the wind
direction to due easterly. This induced efficient, katabatic winds down the west side of
Pu’u Kukui Mountain in western Maui, accelerating through gaps in the terrain of the
area. Although Hurricane Dora is referenced in National Weather Service reports, the
GMAO did not assert Hurricane Dora played a vital role in the ignition and spread of the
wildfires.

249. The following weather data was obtained from the Fire Safety Research Institute,
Lahaina Fire Comprehensive Timeline Report, Appendix 6.2 National Weather Service
(NWS) Products Released (Communications).

• 8/8/2023 at 3:17 am – a Red Flag Warning was issued for leeward areas due to
strong winds and low humidity. The Red Flag Warning remained in effect until 6
am HST (Wednesday).
• 8/8/2023 at 3:18 am – High Wind Watch with strong and gusty winds through
early Wednesday (6:00 am) East winds of 30 to 45 MPH with localized gusts to
around 60 MPH. Impacts: Damaging winds may blow down trees and power
lines and damage roofs. Power outages are possible.
• 8/8/2023 at 4:00 am – Fire Weather Planning Forecast. Discussion: Very dry
fuels (KDBI around 600) combined with strong and gusty easterly winds and low
humidities below 45 percent will produce critical fire weather conditions through
tonight.
• 8/8/2023 at 9:26 am – NWS social media. Update: High Wind & Fire Weather
Alerts. High Wind: 30-45 MPH winds, gusts up to 60 MPH.
• 8/8/2023 at 9:27 am – NWS social medial. 30-45 MPH winds, gusts up to 60
MPH. Red Flag: High fire danger with rapid spread.
• 8/8/2023 at 3:38 pm – Area Forecast Discussion. SYNOPSIS: Strong and
potentially damaging easterly winds along with very dry conditions will persist

46
NASA, Global Modeling Assimilation Office, Meteorologic Analysis of the August 2023 Wildfires (GMAO -
Global Modeling and Assimilation Office Research Site (nasa.gov)
102
tonight and Wednesday as Hurricane Dora passes far to the south. Dangerous fire
weather conditions will persist through Wednesday afternoon. A return of a more
typical trade wind pattern is anticipated later in the week through the weekend.

103
LAHAINA, HI HISTORICAL IMAGERY

110
ATTACHMENTS
To: Special Agent ATF-1 Date of Report: August 7, 2024
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Lab Number: 2023-F-000051S(2)
Firearms and Explosives Reference: 787025-23-0030
National Center for Explosives Title of Investigation: Maui Fires (08.08.2023)
Training and Research (Lahaina Fire)
3750 Corporal Road Type of Exam: Engineering – Scene Examination
Huntsville, AL 35898

SCENE SUPPORT REQUEST

The Fire Research Laboratory responded to an activation of the National Response Team (NRT),
on August 15, 2023, to assist with examining the scene of a wildland fire on the Island of Maui
in the State of Hawaii.

DESCRIPTION OF SCENE SUPPORT

Electrical Engineer ATF-5 provided scene support from August 18, 2023, to
August 30, 2023. Field notes and photographs were taken.

The initial area of involvement of the Lahaina wildland fire, as identified by the Maui Fire
Department (MFD), was examined. This area was near the intersection of Lahainaluna Road and
the dirt alley known as Ho’okahua Street (Figure 1).

The electric utility retained Fire Cause Analysis (FCA) to document, collect and preserve utility
involved equipment from the scene of the Lahaina fire as evidence before this scene examination
was conducted. The evidence was stored at a warehouse in the Wailuku area of Maui (Figures 2
through 4). The evidence was examined at the warehouse from August 28, 2023, to August 30,
2023.

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EXAMINATION/ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

According to the State of Hawaii Public Utilities Commission, each of Hawaii’s six main islands
has its own electrical grid, not connected to any other island. Collectively, HECO, MECO and
HELCO are known as the “HECO Companies” and serve about 95% of the State’s population
[1].

For the purposes of this report, utility produced documents by the Hawaiian Electric Company
(HECO) are referred to as data produced by the Maui Electric Company (MECO).

Data for analysis was obtained from several sources, including but not limited to:

x MFD Record Management System (RMS) and Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD)
Narratives

x Interviews, photographs, and videos documented via ATF Reports of Investigation (ROI)

x MECO produced Bates numbered data in the form of:

o Single-line diagrams
o Geographic Information System (GIS) maps reflecting circuit routing, pole
locations, and substations
o Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system event data
o Relay data and oscillography
o Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) system event data
o Utility Vehicle (Asset) Global Positioning System (GPS) location data
o Communications reporting outages and other incidents
o FCA evidence collection and inventory documentation including photographs,
video, and LiDAR scan data

x Whisker Labs produced time stamped fault data associated with Ting sensor device
locations on the Island of Maui. Whisker Labs provides “…sensor
technology…monitoring the resiliency…of the…electrical grid” utilizing
“electromagnetic and atmospheric sensor expertise combined with AI to detect electrical
faults in the home and on the grid [2].”

x ATF National Geospatial Intelligence Branch produced time-based location maps for
analysis of data for the following:
o MECO Calls (Figures 5 and 6)
o MECO Vehicle GPS Data (Figures 7 and 8)
o Whisker Labs Ting Sensor Fault Detection (Figure 9)

x Lightning strike data from the Worldwide Lightning Location Network (WWLLN)

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Figure 1. Fire Locations, 187721_763791

Figure 2. 187721_738773 – FCA Evidence Warehouse

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Figure 3. 187721_738774 – FCA Evidence Warehouse

Figure 4. 187721_738775 – FCA Evidence Warehouse

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Figure 5. ATF GIS MECO Customer Calls Overall

Figure 6. ATF GIS MECO Customer Calls - Lahaina

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Figure 9. ATF GIS Whisker Labs Ting Sensor Faults

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EXAMINATION

Lighting strike data was obtained from Professor-1 , Director of the Worldwide
Lightning Location Network (WWLLN) based out of the University of Washington (Figure 10).
There were no detected strokes between 18:00 hours on August 7, 2023 through 23:59 hours on
August 8, 2023 within a 200 km radius of the Island of Maui.

Figure 10. Lightning3000km_fromMauiAug7-8_2023, 187721_763724

Based on MFD RMS information, the Lahaina morning fire was reported on August 8, 2023, at
approximately 06:34 hours and initially involved an area South of the intersection of
Lahainaluna Road and the dirt alley identified as Ho’okahua Street. The afternoon fire was
reported at approximately 14:52 hours and initially involved an area in the gully to the East of
Kuialua Street. Figures 11 shows the overall Lahaina fire extents. Figure 12 is zoomed into the
initially involved area.

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Figure 11. Lahaina whole Screenshot 2024-06-04 135259, 187721_763660 - Overall

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Figure 12. Lahaina Mid Screenshot 2024-06-04 140050, 187721_763657 - Zoomed

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The morning fire coincides with 12.47 kV Overhead Distribution Circuit routed between
Utility Poles 23, 24, 25, 26, and 7A. Distribution Circuit provides electrical service to areas
that include Lahainaluna Road, Niheu Street, and Kuialua Street.

The afternoon fire was identified in the gully located in the area beneath overhead 69 kV
Puukolii (Lahaina #2) and 69 kV Lahaina (Lahaina-Lahainaluna) transmission lines routed
between Utility Poles 1A/1B, 6/3-25, and 4-25/2T.

The utility provided SCADA data and AMI metering data provided information regarding
electrical grid events that occurred on August 8, 2023.

A comprehensive timeline of all electrical events analyzed during the Lahaina fire is attached in
the Appendix.

MECO provided communications, including phone calls and emails, were analyzed and
indicated numerous electrical events and outages that were reported to the utility.

A sequence of events that summarizes the incident and electrical timelines is as follows:

x On August 8, 2023, beginning at 00:03 hours until 02:44 hours, the electric meter for
Lahaina Intermediate School began experiencing Phase A and Phase C sagging voltage.

x This coincides with observed intermittent outages of illumination provided by the Utility
Pole mounted light on the South side of Lahainaluna Road. The school surveillance
camera identified as camera “6 Front Gate and Sign” recorded several outage events for
the light from 00:00 until the camera system goes offline at 05:00 hours (Figures 17 and
18) [3].

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Figure 17. Intermediate School Screenshot 1, 187721_764382 – Playback time 00:07

Figure 18. Intermediate School Screenshot 2, 187721_764383 – Playback time 02:44

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Figure 21. W-3 _063614 Screenshot 2 (Playback time 00:03), 187721_763293

Figure 22. W-3 _063830 Screenshot 1 (Playback time 00:06), 187721_763295

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This area was documented during a scene examination. Although repairs to the involved
electrical system in this area had been completed at the time of the examination, the conditions
reflect the pre-fire configuration for reference.

Figure 31 shows the area of Utility Pole 25 looking West and shows a speed sign and trees
located in the grassy area between Lahainaluna Road and the sidewalk as well as overhead
conductors for Distribution Circuit towards Utility Poles 24 and 23 (located on the North
side of Lahainaluna Road.

Figure 32 is looking East and shows Utility Pole 25, the four-way intersection of overhead
conductors for Distribution Circuit , and overhead conductors toward Utility Pole 26.

Figure 33 is looking South and shows Utility Pole 25, the four-way intersection of overhead
conductors for Distribution Circuit , overhead conductors for Distribution Circuit
towards toward Utility Poles 1-25 and 2-25. It also shows the 69 kV overhead Puukolii
(Lahaina#2) transmission line running between Utility Pole 25 and Utility Pole 6.

Figure 34 is looking at the speed sign near Utility Pole 25 and the four-way intersection of
overhead conductors for Distribution Circuit . It also shows the 69kV overhead Puukolii
(Lahaina#2) transmission line running South and North from Utility Pole 25.

Figure 35 is looking South and shows Utility Pole 7A located in the dirt alley known as
Ho’okahua Street, and overhead conductors for Distribution Circuit running from Utility
Pole 7A towards Utility Pole 25.

Figures 36 and 37 show the grassy area located between Lahainaluna Road and the sidewalk
between Utility Pole 24 and Utility Pole 25 that contains the speed sign and trees.

Figures 38 through 43 shows the location of fulgurites and re-solidified metallic material along
the grassy area located between Lahainaluna Road and the sidewalk between Utility Pole 24 and
Utility Pole 25.

Figures 44 shows the overall location of fulgurites and re-solidified metallic material marked
with green flags in the grassy area located between Lahainaluna Road and the sidewalk between
Utility Pole 24 and Utility Pole 25.

Figures 45 and 46 show arc melting on the speed sign observed during the scene exam.

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Figure 39. Lahaina, 187721_744754 – Fulgurites and molten metallic material between Utility
Pole 24 and 25

Figure 40. Lahaina, 187721_744759 – Fulgurites and molten metallic material between Utility
Pole 24 and 25

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Figure 41. Lahaina, 187721_744760 – Fulgurites and molten metallic material between Utility
Pole 24 and 25

Figure 42. Lahaina, 187721_744762 – Fulgurites and molten metallic material between Utility
Pole 24 and 25

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Figure 45. IMG_1812, 187721_765748 – Speed sign arc melting

Figure 46. IMG_1816, 187721_765749 – Speed sign arc melting

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Three vaping devices (vapes) were identified along Lahainaluna Road outside the area of interest
for the morning and afternoon fire. All three were identified as disposable type vapes with
rechargeable lithium-ion batteries.

The first was a SWFT vape that was undamaged (Figure 47). The second was a Lost Mary vape
that was undamaged (Figure 48). The third was an Elf Bar Model BC5000 vape that was
damaged by fire impingement (Figure 49).

Figure 47. 187721_764459 – Lahaina SWFT vape

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Figure 48. 187721_764626 – Lahaina Lost Mary vape

Figure 49. 187721_764637 – Lahaina Elf Bar Model BC5000 vape

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FCA documented and collected utility involved equipment from the scene prior to the arrival of
ATF investigators.

A list of the FCA collected evidence items and descriptions associated with the Lahaina fire
available at the time of the examination is included below. Evidence items with notable
observations and associated photographs are summarized in the table below. A reference
diagram for evidence numbers associated with Overhead Distribution Circuit is depicted in
Figure 50.

Figure 50. Exam Diagram, 187721_763730

The broken South phase conductor between Utility Poles 24 and 25 consists of evidence items
DB#1, DB Loose Components, and DB#7

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Table 1: Lahaina Evidence Items

EVIDENCE NO. DESCRIPTION FIGURES

DB#1 Conductor between Utility Poles 24 and 25 (South Figures 51 - 61

phase)
Observations:
x Segment 1 is approximately 104’ 4” in length with arc severed ends and arc melting at
a location about 2’ 6” from one end.
x Segment 2 is approximately 43’ in length with one arc severed end and one cut end.
x Segment 3 is approximately 13’ 6” in length with one arc severed end and one cut end.
x Segment 4 is approximately 19’ in length with arc severed ends.
x Total length is approximately 179’ 10”

Loose Components - 5 Segments Figures 62 - 69

Observations:
x Segment 1 is approximately 11” in length with one arc severed end and one cut end.
x Segment 2 is approximately 36” in length with arc severed ends.
x Segment 3 is approximately 39” in length with one arc severed end and one cut end.
x Segment 4 is approximately 51” in length with one arc severed end and one cut end.
x Segment 5 is approximately 70” in length with one arc severed end and one cut end.
x Total length is approximately 17’ 3”

DB#1A Conductor remains

DB#2 Conductor between Utility Poles 25 and 26 (South
phase)
Observations:
x Cut at both ends with white tape. Single white tape end is East.
x Total length is approximately 244’ 9”

DB#2A Conductor between Utility Poles 25 and 26 (South

phase)
Observations:
x Segment created due to damage during collection and handling.
x Cut at both ends with blue tape and lashing segment attached to single tape end. Single
blue tape is East.
x Total length is approximately 38’ 6”

DB#3 Conductor between Utility Poles 25 and 26 (North

phase)
Observations:
x Cut at both ends with red tape and lashing segment attached to single tape end. Single
red tape end is East.
x Total length is approximately 271’ 9”

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DB#4 Conductor between Utility Poles 25 and 26 (mid

phase)
Observations:
x Cut at both ends with white tape. Single white tape end is East.
x Total length is approximately 273’ 2”

DB#5 Conductor between Utility Poles 24 and 25 (North Figure 70

phase)
Observations:
x Cut at both ends with red tape. Single red tape end is East.
x Total length is approximately 242’ 7”
x Wire measuring gauge indicating a solid copper conductor of 4 AWG (typical)

DB#6 Conductor between Utility Poles 24 and 25 (mid

phase)
Observations:
x Cut at one end with white tape. Single white tape end is East.
x Total length is approximately 244’ 4”

DB#7 Conductor between Utility Poles 24 and 25 (South Figure 71

phase)
Observations:
x Cut at double blue tape end. Arc severed at single blue tape end. Single blue tape end is
East.
x Total length is approximately 27’ 8”
x Attached/Cut end noted as attached to Utility Pole 24 and arc severed end hanging in
tree.

DB#8 Disconnect blade from Utility Pole 23 (North phase)

DB#9 Disconnect blade (middle phase)
DB#10 Disconnect blade from Utility Pole 23 (South Phase)
DB#11 Ground strap found in street near Utility Pole 24
DB#12 Conductor between Utility Poles 23 and 24 (North Figures 72 - 75
phase)
Observations:
x Cut at both ends with red tape. Single red tape end is East.
x Two lashing segments approximately 2’ 4” in length
x Total length is approximately 217’ 3”
x Arc melting at approximately 32’, 152’, and 192’ feet from the East end.

DB#13 Conductor between Utility Poles 23 and 24 (mid Figures 78 - 81

phase)
Observations:
x Cut at both ends with white tape. Single white tape end is East.
x One lashing segment approximately 2’ 4” in length.
x One lashing segment approximately 2’ 9” in length.

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x Total length is approximately 215’ 9”

x Arc melting at approximately 152’ and 192’ feet from the East end.
DB#14 Conductor between Utility Poles 23 and 24 (South
phase)
Observations:
x Cut at one end with blue tape. Single blue tape end is East.
x One lashing segment approximately 1’ 10” in length.
x One lashing segment approximately 2’ in length.
x One lashing segment approximately 2’ 6” in length.
x Total length is approximately 240’

DB#15 Neutral between Utility Poles 25 and 26

Observations:
x Cut at both ends.
x Total length is approximately 240’
x One lashing segment approximately 2’ 8” in length.

DB#15A Neutral between Utility Poles 25 and 26

Observations:
x Cut at both ends with double black tape on West end.
x Total length is approximately 35’

DB#16 Neutral between Utility Poles 24 and 25

Observations:
x Cut at both ends with double black tape on West end.
x Total length is approximately 240’

DB#17 Fuse from Utility Pole 7a (Middle phase)

Observations:
x ABB, 27kV, 07/12/18, 100 Amps. Cont., 8,000A IC w/ Solid Cap
x Fuse observed OPEN.

DB#18 Branch Remains at base of Utility Pole 24 Figure 82

Observations:
x Charring and abrasion marks

DB#19 Top section of Utility Pole 7a with 2 fuses Figure 83

Guy wire roll
Bag of devices
Guy wire and fault detectors from DB#19
Observations:
x No fuse in middle phase
x Outer two phases present and intact.
ABB, 27kV, 07/12/18, 100 Amps. Cont., 8,000A IC w/ Solid Cap

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DB#19a Middle section of Utility Pole 7a

DB#19b Bottom section of Utility Pole 7a
DB#20 Section remains of Utility Pole 25
DB#20a Utility Pole 6a, subterranean section
DB#20b Utility Pole 6e, bottom section
DB#20c Utility Pole 6e, middle section
DB#20d Utility Pole 6e, top section
DB#21 Remains at approx. 12’ from base of Utility Pole 25 Figures 84 - 86
Observations:
x Arc melting

DB#22 Conductor between Utility Poles 7a and 25 Figure 87

Observations:
x Discoloration

DB#23 Conductor remains between Utility Poles 7a and 25

DB#24 Conductor between Utility Poles 7a and 25
DB#25 Conductor between Utility Poles 7a and 25 about 4’ Figure 88
6” length (curved)
Observations:
x Mechanical damage
x Discoloration

DB#26 Conductor remains from top of Utility Pole 24

DB#27 Jumper remains
DB#28 Jumper remains about 3’ in length Figures 89 - 90
Observations:
x Arc melting at end of copper fragment.

DB#29 Dead end remains about 11’ 8” Figure 91

Observations:
x Discoloration and melting

DB#30 Dead end remains about 4’ wide loop Figures 92 - 94

Observations:
x Discoloration
x Arc Melting

DB#31 Guide bolt

DB#32 Anchor
DB#33 Utility pole remains from area of Utility Pole 8
Bag with insulator remains from area of Utility Pole
8
DB#34 Utility pole base remains from area of Utility Pole 8
DB#35 Utility pole remains from area of Utility Pole 8 w/
metal arms

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DB#36 Utility pole section from area of Utility Pole 8 with

section of cross member
DB#37 Utility pole remains from area of Utility Pole 8 w/ID
343614#8
DB#38 Metallic like object near Utility Pole 2
DB#39 Possible remains of ground cable from South of Figure 95
Utility Pole 25, North of Utility Pole 24
Observations:
x Arc melting

DB#40 Misc. Utility Pole components from near Utility

Pole 8
DB#41 Fuse holder/insulator from near Utility Pole 8
DB#42 Fuse found near Utility Pole 8
Observations:
x ABB, 27kV, 04/XX/XX (damaged label), 100 Amps. Cont., 8,000A IC w/ Solid Cap
x Fuse intact via continuity check with digital multimeter.

DB#43 Fuse found in debris near Utility Pole 8

Observations:
x ABB, 27kV, 04/16/15, 100 Amps. Cont., 8,000A IC w/ Solid Cap
x Fuse intact via continuity check with digital multimeter.

DB#44 Small cross members section found near Utility Pole

8
DB#45 Pole section from area of Utility Pole 8
DB#46 Pole remains found near Utility Pole 8
DB#47 Pole remains from area of Utility Pole 8
DB#48 Pole remains from area of Utility Pole 8
DB#49 Pole remains from area of Utility Pole 8
DB#50 Pole remains from area of Utility Pole 8
DB#51 Remains of fireworks from parking area of Princess
Nahienaena School
DB#52 Pole remains from area of Utility Pole 8
DB#53 Pole remains from area of Utility Pole 8
DB#54 Cross member remains found near Utility Pole 8
DB#54a Cross member remains from near Utility Pole 8
DB#55 Firework remains from Princess Nahienaena School
DB#56 Firework remains from Princess Nahienaena School
DB#57 Fuse from ground debris near Utility Pole 8
DB#58 Fuse found in debris pile near Utility Pole 8
DB#59 Crossmember remains
DB#60 Cross member remains from ground debris near
Utility Pole 8
DB#61 Insulator with ground strap to cross member piece
DB#62 Fuse holder with insulator and ground wire

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DB#63 Fuse mount with cross member section

DB#64 Remains of cross member from near Utility Pole 8
DB#65 Insulator found near Utility Pole 8
DB#66 Insulator with conductor
DB#67 Insulator with conductor
DB#68 Insulator with conductor
DB#69 Insulator remains
DB#70 Insulator remains
DB#71 Insulator remains
DB#72 Insulator remains
DB#73 Insulator remains
DB#74 East side guy wire
DB#75 Insulator remains
DB#76 Ground rod
DB#77 Ground rod
DB#78 Insulator found near Utility Pole 8
DB#79 Remains of Utility Pole 9 (top)
DB#79A Metal cross member section from Utility Pole 9
DB#80 Remains of Utility Pole 9 (bottom)
DB#81 Insulator found near Utility Pole 9
DB#82 Insulator found near Utility Pole 9
DB#83 Insulator found near Utility Pole 9, lowest arm
JS#1 Battery, removed during examination
Observations:
x Power Sonic Model PS-12350B 12V 35AH Rechargeable Sealed
Lead-Acid Battery
x Measured approximately 12.73 VDC via Digital Multi-meter.

JS#2 Battery, removed during examination

Observations:
x Power Sonic Model PS-12350B 12V 35AH Rechargeable Sealed
Lead-Acid Battery
x Measured approximately 8.73 VDC via Digital Multi-meter.

JS#3 Solar Radar Sign Figures 96 - 98

Observations:
x Arc melting on top cross brace
x Arc melting on base of both support posts
x Intact and undamaged solar panel, batteries, and connections.

JS#4 Utility pole stump between 1A-1B Figure 99

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Figure 51. 187721_738778 – Lahaina DB#1

Figure 52. 187721_738833 – Lahaina DB#1 Segment 1

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Figure 53. 187721_738856 – Lahaina DB#1 Segment 1

Figure 54. 187721_738858 – Lahaina DB#1 Segment 1

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Figure 55. 187721_738860 – Lahaina DB#1 Segment 1

Figure 56. 187721_738870 – Lahaina DB#1 Segment 1

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Figure 57. 187721_738898 – Lahaina DB#1 Segment 2

Figure 58. 187721_738933 – Lahaina DB#1 Segment 3

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Figure 59. 187721_738946 – Lahaina DB#1 Segment 4

Figure 60. 187721_738948 – Lahaina DB#1 Segment 4

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Figure 61. 187721_738951 – Lahaina DB#1 Segment 4

Figure 62. 187721_739500 – Lahaina DB#1 Loose Components

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Figure 63. 187721_739558 – Lahaina DB#1 Loose Components

Figure 64. 187721_739515 – Lahaina DB#1 Loose Components

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Figure 65. 187721_739516 – Lahaina DB#1 Loose Components

Figure 66. 187721_739527 – Lahaina DB#1 Loose Components

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Figure 67. 187721_739528 – Lahaina DB#1 Loose Components

Figure 68. 187721_739537 – Lahaina DB#1 Loose Components

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Figure 69. 187721_739553 – Lahaina DB#1 Loose Components

Figure 70. 187721_739623 – Lahaina DB#5

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Figure 71. 187721_739963 – Lahaina DB#7

Figure 72. 187721_740014 – Lahaina DB#12

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Figure 73. 187721_740023 – Lahaina DB#12

Figure 74. 187721_740058 – Lahaina DB#12

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Figure 75. 187721_740063 – Lahaina DB#12

Figure 76. 187721_740068 – Lahaina DB#12

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Figure 77. 187721_740073 – Lahaina DB#12

Figure 78. 187721_740282 – Lahaina DB#13

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Figure 79. 187721_740290 – Lahaina DB#13

Figure 80. 187721_740294 – Lahaina DB#13

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Figure 81. 187721_740296 – Lahaina DB#13

Figure 82. 187721_742764 – Lahaina DB#18

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Figure 83. 187721_743716 – Lahaina DB#19

Figure 84. 187721_741175 – Lahaina DB#21

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Figure 85. 187721_741182 – Lahaina DB#21

Figure 86. 187721_741194 – Lahaina DB#21

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Figure 87. 187721_741239 – Lahaina DB#22

Figure 88. 187721_741402 – Lahaina DB#25

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Figure 89. 187721_741362 – Lahaina DB#28

Figure 90. 187721_741382 – Lahaina DB#28

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Figure 91. 187721_741490 – Lahaina DB#29

Figure 92. 187721_741439 – Lahaina DB#30

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Figure 93. 187721_741442 – Lahaina DB#30

Figure 94. 187721_741457 – Lahaina DB#30

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Figure 95. 187721_741649 – Lahaina DB#39

Figure 96. 187721_744069 – Lahaina JS#3

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Figure 97. 187721_744114 – Lahaina JS#3

Figure 98. 187721_744120 – Lahaina JS#3

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Figure 99. 187721_744659 – Lahaina JS#4

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DISCUSSION

Based on analysis of utility electrical event data, witnessed and reported events, and co-
incidental events from witness memory at estimated times:

x The 04:59 hours flash towards the Lahaina High School observed and reported to 911 by
W-20 , and the flash observed by W-12 at approximately 05:00 hours (based on
recollection) towards the mountain, coincide with the MECO electrical events that
occurred at 05:00 hours which resulted in a loss of power to the area, including address
( W-2 ).

x The 911 call resulted in the dispatch of E3 to investigate a call in the area of 980
Lahainaluna Road (Lahaina High School). E3 reports no fire in that area at 05:11 hours
but reports broken Utility Pole 7A to dispatch at 05:14 hours, who then notify MECO at
05:29 hours.

x This is followed by MECO Asset travelling through the area of Lahainaluna Road and
Ho’okahua Street between 05:39 hours and 05:47 hours. This vehicle is likely the vehicle
with flashing lights described by W-2 after waking up to no power in the area
(based on no power at his residence and the streetlight being off across the street). Per the
utility, MECO Asset (also known as truck ) is equipped with an amber warning
light) and was operated by a troubleman in response to the 05:00 hour faults indicated on
the Lahaina-Lahainaluna transmission line. This transmission line runs between the
Lahainaluna Substation and the Lahaina Substation and serves Distribution Circuit .
The utility described the troubleman’s primary responsibility during this response was to
visually inspect the transmission line located in the field to the South of the intersection
of Lahainaluna Road and the dirt alley known as Ho’okahua Street where Utility Pole 7A
was located. Upon completion of this survey, the Troubleman did not report any observed
down transmission or distribution equipment to the control center.

x The sequence of electrical events at 05:00 and subsequent witness events are likely
associated with Utility Pole 7A breaking.

The “crackling” broken power line observed along the grassy area between the sidewalk and the
street indicate it was still energized after the initial electrical events and morning fire was
reported. The arcing and creation of fulgurites continued until a sufficient fault occurred at 06:39
hours on the utility provided electrical data which resulted in a circuit breaker tripping.

Arcing on bare distribution circuit conductors can be caused by the flow of fault current due to
inadequate separation (distance) or direct contact between energized conductors or components.

Fault current can flow during contact between energized utility components at different voltage
potentials. This can include contact between energized phase conductors, neutral conductors,
grounding conductors, grounded metallic objects, the ground itself or vegetation, such as the
Golden Shower (Cassia Fistula) trees located on the grassy area between the roadway and
sidewalk.

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CONCLUSION

The fulgurites and re-solidified metallic material in the grassy area located between Lahainaluna
Road and the sidewalk between Utility Pole 24 and Utility Pole 25 and corresponding arc
melting observed on multiple points of the South Phase Conductor of Overhead Distribution
Circuit are consistent with arcing that occurred before the morning fire was reported at
approximately 06:34 hours on August 8, 2023.

Utility Pole 25 contains a four-way intersection for Overhead Distribution Circuit with
jumpers allowing for transition between the Northern portion of the circuit routed towards Utility
Pole 7A, Southern portion of the circuit routed towards pole 25-1, Eastern portion of the circuit
routed towards Utility Pole 26, and Western portion of the circuit routed towards Utility Pole 24.

Contact between overhead circuit components, including connection points, conductors, jumpers,
the speed sign, and trees in the area between Utility Pole 24 and Utility Pole 25 due to wind
related movement and tension and displacement created by the broken upper portion of Utility
Pole 7A can result in arcing and the production of ejected molten metallic material in the form of
sparks after the circuit was re-energized.

When the afternoon fire was reported at approximately 14:53 hours, the overhead lines
associated with Distribution Circuit and the Lahaina, Puukolii, KWP1, KWP2, and
Maalaea transmission lines were de-energized. There was no evidence of a local back-feed to the
Lahaina and Puukolii transmission lines over the gully through distribution side connected
generators, photovoltaic systems, battery storage systems, or other sources of electricity through
Distribution Circuit Breaker which remained opened after 06:41 hours.

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REFERENCES

[1] “Hawaii Public Utilities Commission – Energy” Retrieved from

https://puc.hawaii.gov/energy/ on July 10, 2024

[2] “About Us”, Whisker Labs, Retrieved from https://www.whiskerlabs.com/about-us/ on July

10, 2024

[3] ATF-3 , Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives Report of Investigation
(ROI 34), ATF IN# 787025-23-0030, June 4, 2024

[4] ATF-6 , Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives Report of

Investigation (ROI 15), ATF IN# 787025-23-0030, August 24, 2023

[5] ATF-5 , Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives Report of Investigation
(ROI 8), ATF IN# 787025-23-0030, August 23, 2023

[6] ATF-8 , Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives Report of Investigation
(ROI 5), ATF IN# 787025-23-0030, August 23, 2023

[7] ATF-5 , Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives Report of Investigation
(ROI 6), ATF IN# 787025-23-0030, August 23, 2023

[8] ATF-8 , Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives Report of Investigation
(ROI 23), ATF IN# 787025-23-0030, August 25, 2023

[9] ATF-2 , Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives Report of Investigation
(ROI 33), ATF IN# 787025-23-0030, April 3, 2024

[10] ATF-4 , Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives Report of Investigation
(ROI 16), ATF IN# 787025-23-0030, August 24, 2023

[11] ATF-7 , Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives Report of Investigation
(ROI 27), ATF IN# 787025-23-0030, August 25, 2023

[12] ATF-6 , Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives Report of

Investigation (ROI 7), ATF IN# 787025-23-0030, August 25, 2023

ATF-FRL-F-121
Form Date: 1/3/2022 Page 77 of 83
2023-F-000051S(2)

PHOTOGRAPHS, IMAGES, OR VIDEO

Photographs, radiographic (X-ray) images, or video taken during the examination are stored in
the FRL’s data retrieval system, FireTOSS.

Examiner:

ATF-5
Electrical Engineer
ATF Fire Research Laboratory

Technical Reviewer: Administrative Reviewer:

ATF-14 ATF-15
Chief, Engineering Section Chief
ATF Fire Research Laboratory ATF Fire Research Laboratory

ATF-FRL-F-121
Form Date: 1/3/2022 Page 78 of 83
 Maui Fire Department/ATF
Lahaina Fire Origin and Cause Timeline

EVENT TIME TYPE EVENT SOURCE

01 00:03 – HARD LAHAINA INTERMEDIETE SCHOOL MECO
02:44 METER SAGGING VOLTAGE

02 00:03 – SOFT STREETLIGHT ON UTILITY POLE 26 LAHAINA INTERMEDIATE

05:00 DIMMING ON/OFF/ON/OFF… SCHOOL VIDEO, ROI 34

03 02:44 HARD LAHAINA LN LAHA-KWP2 BU 69KV MECO

TRIP
04 03:00 SOFT RESIDENT AT address MFD REPORT FIWS 019
( W-10 ) SAYS POWER IS OUT
AT 0300

05 03:03 – SOFT address - POWER GOES OUT ROI 006

04:00 PER W-3 / W-2
*REFER TO ATF ELECTRICAL
EXAMINATION REPORT FOR
CLARIFICATION

06 03:30 HARD LAHAINA LN LAHA-KWP1 BU 69KV MECO

TRIP
07 03:37 HARD CIRCUIT BREAKER AND MECO
OPEN.

08 03:44 – HARD VARIOUS OVERLOAD ALARMS ON MECO

04:03 THE 69 KV LAHAINA AND 69 KV
PUUKOLII TRANSMISSION LINE.

09 04:00 SOFT W-2 & W-3 ( address ) LOOKS ROI 006

OUT WINDOW SEES YELLOW
FLASHING LIGHTS OF WHAT HE
ASSUMES IS A MECO VEHICLE

*REFER TO ATF ELECTRICAL

EXAMINATION REPORT FOR
CLARIFICATION

10 04:02 HARD 911 CALL - SECURITY REPORTS A CAD RMS 23-0012437

LOUD EXPLOSION FROM IPU WAI

Page 1 of 13
 Maui Fire Department/ATF
Lahaina Fire Origin and Cause Timeline

LN – FIRE RESPONDS AND DOES

NOT FIND ANYTHING IN THE AREA –
THEY ARE LOCATED TO THE SOUTH
OF ORIGIN TO THE WEST OF
HIGHWAY

11 04:04 HARD ELECTRIC METER FOR S. NIHEU MECO

STREET VOLTAGE SAGGING

12 04:59 HARD 911 CALL W-20 - CAD RMS 23-0012439,

CALLER ADVISES THEY SEE ROI 015
“FLAMES” IN DISTANCE TOWARD
HIGH SCHOOL FROM HER
BEDROOM WINDOW ON .
( ). E3
RESPONDS TO INVESTIGTATE.

13 05:00 HARD CIRCUIT BREAKER AND MECO

OPEN. THE LAHAINA INTERMEDIATE
SCHOOL CAMERA SYSTEM GOES
OFFLINE. A FAULT ON THE 69 KV
LAHAINA (LAHAINA-LAHAINALUNA)
TRANSMISSION LINE RESULTS IN A
TRIP AND AN OPEN CIRCUIT.
METERS GO OFFLINE FOR:
 LAHAINA HIGH SCHOOL
 S. NIHEU STREET
 LAHAINA INTERMEDIATE
SCHOOL
 S. NIHEU STREET
 S. NIHEU STREET
 KUIALUA STREET

14 05:00 HARD BASED ON SCHOOL VIDEO THE ROI 016

POWER DROPS IN THE AREA –
LAHAINA INTERMEDIATE SCHOOL
PRINCIPAL

15 05:00 SOFT address - POWER GOES OUT ROI 008

PER RESIDENT ( W-9 )

Page 2 of 13
 Maui Fire Department/ATF
Lahaina Fire Origin and Cause Timeline

16 05:00 SOFT address – W-12 ROI 005

SEES A FLASH – HER
BEDROOM FACES TOWARDS THE
MOUNTAIN – ALSO SAYS POWER
WENT OUT BECAUSE LIGHTS WENT
OUT IN HOUSE

17 05:01 HARD MFD E3 DISPATCHED TO CAD RMS 23-0012439

INVESTIGATE AN ODOR OF SMOKE
IN THE AREA OF 980 LAHAINALUNA
ROAD.

18 05:05 SOFT W-6 (INTERMEDIATE ROI 017; MFD FIWS 011

SCHOOL CUSTODIAN) ON WAY TO
WORK AT INTERMEDIATE SCHOOL
SAYS POWER LINES AT TOP OF POLE
ABOVE BUS STOP ON LAHAINALUNA
RD AND KUIALUA ST WERE
SPARKING AT POLE 21B

19 05:10 HARD CIRCUIT BREAKER OPENS. MECO

20 05:11 HARD E3 ADVISES DISPATCH THAT THEY RT 2023-AUG-08

CONTACTED CALLER AND NO FIRE 05_11_44 CH=FD 1.WAV

21 05:14 HARD MFD E3 SELF-REPORT TO DISPATCH CAD RMS 23-0012441,

FOR SNAPPED POWER POLE ACROSS ROI 23, ROI 37
FROM POLE 25 (7A) BELOW HIGH RT 05_13_54 CH=FD 1
SCHOOL – MFD-1

22 05:29 HARD MPD DISPATCH CONTACTS MECO POLE 25 LLUNA

ADVISING THAT POWER POLE 25 RD080823.WAV
(ACTUALLY 7A) AT LAHAINALUNA CAD RMS 23-0012441
RD AND KUIALUA ST. ROI 37

23 05:35 HARD CIRCUIT BREAKER IS OPENED. MECO

24 05:39 HARD MECO ASSET HEADED NEE UP MECO ASSET GPS DATA
LAHAINALUNA RD, JUST WEST OF SPREADSHEET/ROI 33

Page 3 of 13
 Maui Fire Department/ATF
Lahaina Fire Origin and Cause Timeline

INTERSECTION OF LAHAINALUNA
RD AND KUIALUA ST
LAHAINALUNA RD)

25 05:39 – HARD MECO ASSET PROCEEDS UP MECO ASSET GPS DATA

05:42 LAHAINALUNA RD PAST AREA OF SPREADSHEET/ROI 33
POLE 25 AND ALLEY CONTAINS POLE
7A (HOOKAHUA ST)

26 05:42 – HARD MECO ASSET APPEARS TO TURN MECO ASSET GPS DATA
05:45 AROUND IN INTERMEDIATE SCHOOL SPREADSHEET/ROI 33
PARKING LOT LAHAINALUNA
RD

27 05:45 – HARD MECO ASSET PROCEEDS DOWN MECO ASSET GPS DATA
05:47 LAHAINALUNA RD PAST AREA OF SPREADSHEET/ROI 33
POLE 25 AND ALLEY CONTAINING
POLE 7A (HOOKAHUA ST)

28 06:00 HARD CIRCUIT BREAKER IS CLOSED. MECO

29 06:00 SOFT PRINCIPAL W-5 ROI 016

ARRIVES AT SCHOOL – POWER IS ON

30 06:01 HARD CIRCUIT BREAKER IS CLOSED. MECO

31 06:04 HARD CIRCUIT BREAKER IS CLOSED. MECO

32 06:05 HARD CIRCUIT BREAKER IS OPENED. MECO

33 06:07 HARD CIRCUIT BREAKER IS CLOSED. MECO

34 06:07 HARD ELECTRIC METERS GO ONLINE FOR: MECO

o LAHAINA HIGH SCHOOL

o S. NIHEU STREET
o LAHAINA INTERMEDIATE
SCHOOL
o S. NIHEU STREET
S. NIHEU STREET

Page 4 of 13
 Maui Fire Department/ATF
Lahaina Fire Origin and Cause Timeline

o KUIALUA STREET

35 06:09 HARD THE ELECTRIC METER FOR LAHAINA MECO

INTERMEDIATE SCHOOL BEGAN
EXPERIENCING PHASE A, PHASE B,
AND PHASE C VOLTAGE SAGGING.

36 06:10 – SOFT LAHAINA HIGH SCHOOL FOOD ROI 027

06:20 SERVICE MANAGER W-11
REPORTS WALK-IN
FREEZER FANS INSIDE THE UNIT
RUNNING AT ½ SPEED. NORMALLY
THEY ARE OFF OR RUNNING AT
FULL SPEED.

37 06:15 – SOFT W-3 / W-2 (804 S. ROI 006

06:36 NIHEU ST.) TAKES PICTURE OF TOP W-2 & W-3 PHOTOS
OF POLE 7A DURING SUNLIGHT. PONG8109, SBZI4059
W-2 & W-3 OBSERVED A FIRE AT THE
BASE OF THE UTILITY POLE ACROSS
THE STREET (LATER IDENTIFIED AS
UTILITY POLE 25). HE DESCRIBED
THE 2-3 FT. TALL GRASS AROUND
THE BASE ON FIRE. HE STATED THAT
A POWER LINE RUNNING FROM
THIS POLE TO THE NEXT POLE TO
THE WEST (LATER IDENTIFIED AS
UTILITY POLE 24) WAS BROKEN AND
“CRACKLING LIKE FIREWORKS”
ALONG THE GRASS BETWEEN THE
SIDEWALK AND THE STREET

38 06:33 HARD ELECTRIC METERS FLUCTUATE FOR: MECO

o S. NIHEU STREET
o LAHAINA INTERMEDIATE
SCHOOL
o S. NIHEU STREET
o S. NIHEU STREET
o KUIALUA STREET

Page 5 of 13
 Maui Fire Department/ATF
Lahaina Fire Origin and Cause Timeline

39 06:34 HARD FIRE REPORTED TO 911 BY CAD RMS 23-0012446,

( ROI 007
Address
W-1
) HEARS A BOOM, 2023-AUG-08 06_34_45
OBSERVES SPARKS, SEE FIRE AT THE CH=CFT1-911.WAV
BASE OF POLE 24

MORNING FIRE REPORTED

40 06:35 HARD FIRE REPORTED TO 911 BY W-3 2023-AUG-08 06_35_16
( address ) CH=CFT1-911.WAV
ROI 006
41 06:36 HARD E3, T3 DISPATCHED TO BRUSH FIRE CAD RMS 23-0012446, RT
ON LAHAINALUNA RD ACROSS 06_36_30 CH=FD 1
FROM INTERMEDIATE SCHOOL

42 06:36 HARD VIDEO FROM W-3 ROI 006

( address ) OF THE FIRE ON
THE GROUND AT POLE 25– 3
VIDEOS FROM 0636, 0637, AND
00638

43 06:39 HARD o CIRCUIT BREAKER AND MECO

OPEN.
o A FAULT ON THE 69 KV LAHAINA
(LAHAINA-LAHAINALUNA)
TRANSMISSION LINE RESULTS IN
A TRIP AND AN OPEN CIRCUIT
o METERS GO OFFLINE FOR:
 LAHAINA HIGH SCHOOL
 S. NIHEU STREET
 LAHAINA INTERMEDIATE
SCHOOL
 S. NIHEU STREET
 S. NIHEU STREET
 KUIALUA STREET

44 06:40 SOFT W-5 / W-6 ROI 016, ROI 017

ATTEMPT TO FIGHT FIRE FROM MFD FIWS 010, 011
LAHAINA INTERMEDIATE SCHOOL

Page 6 of 13
 Maui Fire Department/ATF
Lahaina Fire Origin and Cause Timeline

USING WATER HOSE BY TEMP

CLASSROOM UNIT (P8)

45 06:41 HARD CIRCUIT BREAKER IS OPENED. MECO

46 06:42 HARD FIRST UNIT ON SCENE (ENGINE 3)– CAD RMS 23-0012446
CAD – 500’X 500’ ACRE WINDS
BLOWING 30/NORTH
APPROACHING HOUSES / HITTING
TOP SIDE AND DEFEND THE HOMES

47 06:42 HARD E3 ARRIVES AT POLE 25; MFD-1 ROI 023

DESCRIBES 100’X100’
BRUSH FIRE OPP. OF SCHOOL

48 06:43 HARD PHOTO FROM W-7 ROI 010

( address ) LOOKING NE
SHOWING FIRE TRAVELLING
DOWNHILL FROM UTILITY POLE 25

49 06:43 HARD VIDEO FROM W-3 ROI 006

( address ) – ENGINE 3 IS
FLOWING WATER AND HOSES OUT
AT POLE 25 AND IT SHOWS THE
GRASS ON FIRE TO THE EAST INSIDE
THE FENCE NEAR AND
HO’OKAHUA ST.

50 06:45 SOFT FACEBOOK LIVE VIDEOS - MFD REPORT FIWS 020

W-4 ( address ) SHOWING
THE FIRE ALONG ROAD BETWEEN
POLES 25 AND 24 – VIDEO SHOWS
Company-1
CONSTRUCTION TANKER ON SCENE

51 06:48 HARD VIDEO FROM W-10 MFD REPORT FIWS 019

( address ) SHOWING THE ATF HD IMG_5226
FIRE ALONG THE ROAD AT THE
DOWNED POWER LINE

Page 7 of 13
 Maui Fire Department/ATF
Lahaina Fire Origin and Cause Timeline

52 07:00 SOFT W-7 & W-8FAMILY ( address ROI 010

) EVACUATES AND SEES FIRE
APPARATUS IN CUL DE SAC AND
ABOVE THEM – RADIANT HEAT ON
THEIR DRIVEWAY FROM FIRE
ALONG THE FENCE LINE TO THE
SOUTH

53 07:48 HARD CIRCUIT BREAKER IS OPENED. MECO

54 08:19 HARD MFD-6 CAD RMS 23-0012446

E3/E11/TANKER 3 – 08:20 HRS FIRE
REPORTED 90% CONTAINED

55 08:29 HARD W-8 ( address ROI 26

) – HAS 2 VIDEOS AND PHOTOS
OF THE FIRE – ALL OF THEM
SHOWING THE FIRE IS SMOLDERING
ALONG THE FENCE LINE AND
ALONG ROCKS ABOVE THE GULLY –
VEGETATION STILL VISIBLE SHOWS
Company-1 ON SMALL
DOZER IN THE SCENE

56 08:52 HARD MFD-6 ROI 024

REPORTED TO

) AT THE EOC VIA

THE MAUI FIRE DEPARTMENT
WHATSAPP FIRE GROUP CHAT
THAT THE LAHAINA FIRE WAS
100% CONTAINED.

MORNING FIRE DECLARED 100% CONTAINED

57 09:00 SOFT W-4 ( address ) MFD REPORT FIWS 020
REPORTS POLE BROKEN IN BACK
ALLEY NEAR PRINCESS NAHIENAENA
SCHOOL

Page 8 of 13
 Maui Fire Department/ATF
Lahaina Fire Origin and Cause Timeline

58 11:24 HARD PHOTO FROM W-22 MFD REPORT FIWS 034

(ATHLETIC DIRECTOR AT HIGH
SCHOOL) SHOWING WINDSPEED
SUSTAINED OF 44.5MPH FROM THE
HIGH SCHOOL FROM HIS KESTREL
(ANEMOMETER)

59 12:26 HARD PER E3 MULTIPLE POLES (4) BROKEN RT 2023-AUG-08

IN DIRT ALLEY OF HO’OKAHUA ST. 12_26_36 CH=FD 1
NEW BROKEN POLES WITH LINES
DOWN ACROSS HOUSES.

60 12:30 SOFT W-2 & W-3 ( address ) ROI 006

OBSERVE THE POWER LINE IS STILL
ON GROUND ON LAHAINALUNA RD.
– THERE IS NO FIRE OR SMOKE
VISIBLE ANYWHERE

61 14:18 HARD DISPATCH RADIO TRAFFIC – E3: CAD RMS 23-0012446

CENTRAL FROM E3, MECO RT 2023-AUG-08
WORKING ON POWERLINE 14_17_58 CH=FD 1
SITUATION ON NIHEU ST AND THE
FIRE IS OUT. E3 LEAVING SCENE,
TANKER 3, WILDLAND 3 RETURNING
TO QUARTERS.
DISPATCHER ASKS IF KU’IALUA AND
HO’OKAHUA IS EXTINGUISHED. E3
RESPONDS AFFIMATIVE. (FIRE
EXTINGUISHED)
LAST APPARATUS CLEAR

MORNING FIRE DECLARED EXTINGUISHED

62 14:30 SOFT E11 DRIVES PAST THE INCIDENT (E11 MFD-7
FIRE SCENE ALONG THE BYPASS WRITTEN STMT) MFD
HEADING S WHILE BEING REPORT FIWS 026
REASSIGNED FROM THE NAPILI TO
KAHULUI AND REPORTS NOTHING
SHOWING

Page 9 of 13
 Maui Fire Department/ATF
Lahaina Fire Origin and Cause Timeline

63 14:40 HARD W-8 ( address ROI 26

) HAS VIDEO SHOWING NO FIRE
OR SMOKE IN AREA

64 14:48 HARD E11 TRAVELLING FROM HOKIOKIO E11 MFD-7

TO LAHAINA WRITTEN STMT), MFD
REPORT FIWS 026
E11 DRIVES PAST FIRE SCENE AGAIN RT 2023-AUG-08
HEADING N AFTER BEING 14_48_55 CH=FD 1.WAV
CANCELLED AND REPORTS
NOTHING SHOWING

65 14:52 HARD W-16 CALLS 911 2023-AUG-08 14_52_40

ADVISING OF BRUSH FIRE BEHIND CH=CST1-911.WAV
HO’OKAHUA ST. ( address
)

AFTERNOON FIRE REPORTED

66 14:56 HARD E3/T3/BC5 DISPATCHED BACK TO CAD RMS 23-0012492
SCENE FOR FIRE AT RT 2023-AUG-08
KU’IALUA/HO’OKAHUA 14_56_07 CH=FD 1.WAV

67 14:57 HARD FROM ( ROI 010

address
W-7
) THE FIRE HAS
STARTED AND IS GROWING RAPIDLY
INSIDE THE CREEK BED TO THE
SOUTH OF THEIR HOUSE. OBSERVED
WEST END OF GENERAL ORIGIN
AREA

68 14:57 HARD VIDEO FROM W-17 AND ROI 019

W-18 (MECO EMPLOYEES)
OF VISIBLE SMOKE AROUND THE
KIAWE TREE. OBSERVED EAST END
OF GENERAL ORIGIN AREA.

69 15:00 HARD E11 FIRST UNIT ON SCENE CAD RMS 23-0012492

REPORTING 20’X100’ BRUSH FIRE, RT 2023-AUG-08
LOCATED WHERE THE EARLIER FIRE 15_00_37

Page 10 of 13
 Maui Fire Department/ATF
Lahaina Fire Origin and Cause Timeline

WAS THAT DAY. FIRE WAS IN THE CH=FD 1.WAV

GULLY RUNNING WEST TOWARD
THE BYPASS AT A RAPID PACE.
( MFD-7 )

70 15:07 HARD MPD OFFICERS RESPOND TO SHED RT 2023-AUG-08

FIRE ON HOOKAHUA ST REPORTING 15_07_30
A SHED ON FIRE AND ARE CH=FD 2.WAV
ATTEMPTING TO EXTINGUISH WITH
GARDEN HOSE. PROPANE AT
LOCATION.

71 15:09 HARD E11 REPORTS A SHED ON FIRE RT 2023-AUG-08

(SHED THAT MPD IS ATTEMPTING 15_09_12 CH=FD 2.WAV
TO EXTINGUISH)

72 15:13 HARD RE11 - RESPONDING KUIALUA AND RT 2023-AUG-08

HOOKAHUA CUL-DE-SAC FOR SMALL 15_13_10 CH=FD 2.WAV
SHED FIRE. E3 - WL3 IS ON BOTTOM
(BACKSIDE OF HOMES ALONG
HOOKAHUA PL) TO CONTAIN
DOWNWIND SIDE, T3 ATTEMPTING
TO HIT TREE AREA WITH
UNINTERRUPTED BRUSH.

73 15:18 HARD E11 – FIRE MOVING TOWARDS 2023-AUG-08 15_18_41

BYPASS QUICKLY CH=FD 2.WAV
RE11 ATTEMPTS TO STOP FIRE
FROM JUMPING THE BYPASS FROM
THE FIREBREAK. L3 ARRIVES ON
SCENE AT THE BYPASS

74 15:22 HARD E11 – FIRE HOPPED BYPASS CAD RMS 23-0012492

RT 2023-AUG-08
15_21_55 CH=FD 2.WAV
75 15:23 HARD BC5 TELLS L3 TO COME TO RT 2023-AUG-08
KELAWEA MAUKA PARK THAT FIRE 15_23_41 CH=FD 2.WAV
HAS JUMPED LAHAINALUNA ROAD
AND IS BURNING TOWARD THE

Page 11 of 13
 Maui Fire Department/ATF
Lahaina Fire Origin and Cause Timeline

CARS IN THE PARK AREA. “FIRE IS

WHIPPING QUICK”

76 15:26 HARD COMM – EXTREME FIRE CAD RMS 23-0012492

CONDITIONS … SOUTH OF KELAWEA RT 2023-AUG-08
MAUKA PARK – POLICE NEED TO 15_25_36 CH=FD
EVACUATE THE RESIDENTS 2.WAV

77 15:26 HARD COMM – ALL RESIDENTS NEED TO CAD RMS 23-0012492

EVACUATE

78 15:27 HARD COMM – ALL RESIDENTS BELOW CAD RMS 23-0012492

THE BYPASS

79 15:27 HARD T3 TELLS COMM THAT T3 IS RT 2023-AUG-08

INOPERABLE 15_27_34 CH=FD 2

80 15:28 HARD L3 – WE HAVE A STRUCTURE ON CAD RMS 23-0012492

FIRE (ADDRESS LAHAINALUNA RT 2023-AUG-08
RD – L3 AO K. HO 15_28_25
CH=FD 2.WAV
81 15:29 HARD E3 - ATTEMPTING TO GET RT 2023-AUG-08
LOCATION OF WL3. WL3 - MAUKA 15_29_48 CH=FD 2.WAV
PARK LOCATION ATTEMPTING TO
PROTECT HOUSE.
RE11 - TWO STRUCTURE ON FIRE
LAHAINALUNA RD,
KALENA)

82 15:31 HARD RE11 – FIRE AT KAAKOLU ST RT 2023-AUG-08

15_31_13 CH=FD 2.WAV
83 15:32 HARD T3 BACK UP AND RUNNING RT 2023-AUG-08
15_32_51 CH=FD 2.WAV
84 15:33 HARD E11 - LINES BROKE READY TO RT 2023-AUG-08
REDEPLOY 15_33_43 CH=FD 2.WAV

85 15:34 HARD L3 - SOMEONE IN BURNING HOUSE RT 2023-AUG-08

NORTH OF L3 POSITION (POSSIBLY 15_34_15 CH=FD 2.WAV
KALENA)

Page 12 of 13
 Maui Fire Department/ATF
Lahaina Fire Origin and Cause Timeline

86 15:34 HARD DISPATCH - TRAPPED PERSON RT 2023-AUG-08

LAHAINALUNA RD. E11 DIRECTED 15_34_35 CH=FD 2.WAV
TO RESCUE.

87 15:35 HARD L3 - TWO ADDITIONAL STRUCTURES RT 2023-AUG-08

ON FIRE WITH POSSIBLY TWO 15_35_52 CH=FD 2.WAV
PEOPLE INSIDE

88 15:36 HARD L3 (STATED E3) - STRUCTURE WITH RT 2023-AUG-08

TWO PEOPLE IS LAHAINALUNA 15_36_51 CH=FD 2.WAV
RD.

89 15:37 HARD RE11 - LOCATED KAALO PL RT 2023-AUG-08

STRUCTURES ON FIRE. (IN FIWS 013, 15_37_34 CH=FD 2.WAV,
STATED AND KAALO PL) E3 AG 3552, FIWS 013
- STRUCTURE FIRE KAAKOLU.
POSSIBLY MORE ON FIRE. (IN FIWS
026, E11 STATED THAT , ,
AND KAAKOLU STREET WERE
ON FIRE)

90 15:44 HARD CIRCUIT BREAKER IS OPENED MECO

FIRE TRANSITIONS INTO LAHAINATOWN

Page 13 of 13
 Appendix B – MFD Fire Investigation Witness Statement

FIWS # Witness Name Fire Location

1 Lahaina
2 HECO Joint Interview Lahaina
3 Lahaina
4 Lahaina
5 Lahaina
6 Lahaina
7 Lahaina
8 Kula
9 Kula
10 Lahaina
11 Lahaina
12 and Pulehu
13 Lahaina
14 Pulehu
15 Lahaina
16 Lahaina
17 Lahaina
18 Lahaina
19 Lahaina
20 Lahaina
21 Kula
22 Kula
23 Lahaina
24 Lahaina
25 Lahaina
26 Lahaina
27 Olinda
28 Olinda
29 Olinda
30 Olinda
31 Olinda
32 Olinda
33 Olinda
34 Lahaina
35 Lahaina

Prepared by: Title: Signature:

Lieutenant

Reviewed by: Title: Signatur

Lieutenant
 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012446 001

Summary of Interview:

09/11/2023, MFD, phone text interview with ,

Ph# .

Narrative:

Confirmed with that a series of 30 feet firebreaks (TMKs 246018003 and 246018032)
were ordered on November 26, 2019, behind homes along Lahainaluna Road (and smaller roads).
This includes homes behind Kuialua Street and Hookahua Place.

Prepared by: Title: Signature:

Lieutenant

Reviewed by: Title: Signature:

Lieutenant

Page 1 of 1 FIWS v1.0

 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012492 002

Summary of Interview:

5/02/2024, MFD, ATF Senior Special Agent (SSA)/Certified Fire Investigator (CFI)
, ATF Special Agent (SA) , in person interview with HECO employees
, and .
HECO counsel and were also present.

Narrative:

Initially saw smoke and no flames, took video near old truck/rocks. Smoke was placed between kiawe tree
along the dry creek bed/gully and above poles approximately southeast of (investigators
identified poles as pole 1A and pole 1B).
Walked down farther west from pole 6 area. Smoke was blocking view past pole 1A and pole 1B.

Initially saw smoke and no flames, took video near pole 25. Smoke was placed between kiawe tree along
the dry creek bed/gully and above poles 1A and 1B.
Walked down near pole 6. estimated 3 feet of flame was visible above the rocks.
Stated that not enough emphasis placed on how crazy the wind was that day. Wind was moving in all
directions.

Drove East on Lahainaluna Road, passing and on route to Lahainaluna Substation and did not
observe any fire.
When positioned outside the drive gate entrance of Lahainaluna Substation, noticed smoke to the West. Had
distant view of smoke. description of view of smoke was west approximately in line with pole 1A and
pole 1B over the dry creek bed/gully.

A map was provided that drew on with guidance from and to place their locations
relative to pole 6. Pole numbers were identified by investigators.

Prepared by: Title: Signatur

Lieutenant

Reviewed by: Title: Signature:

Lieutenant

Page 1 of 1 FIWS v1.0

 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012446 003

Summary of Interview:

8/18/2023, MFD, ATF EE , in person interview with and ,

residents of . Ph#
Ph#

Narrative:

On 8/08/2023, was woken up by heavy wind throughout the early morning hours.
stated that between 3:30 – 4:00 am, lights were out and noticed a flashing light from a utility
vehicle outside. No street lights were on.
Around 6:15 – 6:30 am, saw fire crackling on ground across Lahainaluna Road behind their house.
Wind was blowing strong in the direction of downhill along Lahainaluna Road. Have not seen poles
snap in the thirty years he has lived there.
agreed with statements.
provided videos at 6:36am, 6:37 am, and 6:43 am.

Pole behind home (Mauka side pole at small dirt road) was not repaired at time of morning fire.

Prepared by: Title: Signature:

Lieutenant

Reviewed by: Title: Signature:

Lieutenant

Page 1 of 1 FIWS v1.0

 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012446 004

Summary of Interview:

8/13/2023, MFD, in person interview with , resident of

Ph#
Alternative number:

Narrative:

On 8/08/2023, 6:35am (central dispatch). 911 call made by Prior to this, heard loud boom
towards Lahainaluna School. Looked uphill facing driveway and saw sparks and fire at base of
pole (later identified by as pole 25 on Lahainaluna Road.) Evacuated shortly later.
10:00am. Returned home. Noticed that fire had blackened area in front of house across the street.
Did not see any fire.
Before 3:00pm. Saw flames by cul-de-sac by . Evacuated and did not return home
that day.

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 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012446 005

Summary of Interview:

8/19/2023, , ATF EE , in person interview with , resident of

. Ph#

Narrative:

On 8/08/2023, was awake prior to 5:00 am for online church service. Power turned off at 5:00
am. Power came back at 8:30 am.
Large pole behind house came down at 10:00 am. Pole appeared damaged prior to this.
Between 1:30 pm and 2:30 pm saw white smoke towards Kuialua.
Media provided

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 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012446 006

Summary of Interview:

8/19/2023, MFD, in person interview with , , from

Lahaina Station. Ph# . Refer to ATF ROI 009 for further details.
5/02/2024, MFD, ATF Senior Special Agent (SSA)/Certified Fire Investigator (CFI)
and ATF Special Agent (SA) .

Narrative:

• Coming on to relieve Engine 3 watch.

• Arrived on the scene with his crew at approximately 0730-0745 hrs to switch out with watch
Engine 3.
• MECO was not on the scene when they arrived.
When they arrived, he noticed that the electric pole behind was broken and
hanging.
• There was also an electrical line that was broken and down on the ground at Lahainaluna road.
• He got reassigned to Wildland 3 for the day. He wasn’t the driver but the firefighter.
• He helped mop up the fire from Engine 3 when it was located on Hookaua Street.
• They were responsible to mop up from the cul-de-sac all the way up to Lahaianaluna Road.
• They mopped up the area until about 1400 hrs.
• There were no hot spots or smoking areas in the contained area when they left.
• They left at about 1400 hrs and headed back to Lahaina station for lunch. About 20 minutes
later, they got called back out to a fire in the same area.
• He was assigned to Wildland 3.
• They arrived on the scene and drove on a dirt road below the subdivision where they were earlier
to position themselves in front of the fire (Position 1).
• They saw fire along a rock pile and tried to extinguish the fire. The wind was really strong and
was affecting their water stream. He had to get close to put out the fire. Smoke conditions were
heavy and blowing into his face. He tried to put out any hot spots that started burning behind
them.

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 Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012446 006

• They moved Wildland 3 closer to the homes to put out other areas that were on fire near the
homes. After they knocked down the fire near the homes, they repositioned to an area near the
entrance (position 2).
• The fire started to move faster and started spot fires down toward the homes.
5/02/2024

• WL3 positioned facing south/southeast behind . pulled a line off

WL3. Did not see flames south of their position due to heavy smoke and blowing embers
reducing visibility.
• Was attempting to extinguish fire at fence line behind homes along Hookahua Place.
• Fire passed WL3.
• When redirected to Mauka Park, observed fire on both sides of Lahainaluna Road.
• A map was provided that drew on.

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 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012446 007

Summary of Interview:

8/19/2023 , MFD, ATF Special Agent (SA) , in person interview with

, resident of . Ph#: .

Narrative:

Timeline: 0501 receives a text from about a bright flash outside window,
facing toward Lahaina Intermediate. Daughter’s bedroom is located on the second story, Southeast
corner of the house. The power went out at this time. The children went into their parents’ room to
sleep.
Approximately 0600 says the power is back on, but shortly goes off again, she is unsure of the
time. She later notices a fire outside her living room window. She wakes up her husband calls
911, and takes a picture of the fire from her back window. (picture timestamped at 8/8/23 0643.) She gets
the children and evacuates just before her husband. As she drives away she notices Fire Personnel at the
cul-de-sacs above and below their house.
At approximately 815 – 830 she returned home.
Before 02:52 pm states she is alerted by her husband about a fire starting up again on
the South side of their house. She calls 911 at 1452, and takes a video shot of the fire from her living
room. (video time stamped 8/823 1457.) Fire department arrives as they are evacuating. They stop at the
park area on Lahainaluna Road. near the by-pass on ramp and see that the fire has already crossed the
by-pass road. They went to Kahena Street to wait out the fire, and eventually returned home at
approximately 1700. They left again at approximately 1730 and did not return.

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 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012446 10

Summary of Interview:

8/18/2023, MFD, ATF Senior Special Agent (SSA)/Certified Fire Investigator (CFI)
, in person interview with , of Lahaina Intermediate School, 871
Lahainaluna Road, Lahaina HI 96767, Residence at . Ph#

Follow up interview done on campus with ATF on 8/22/23.

Narrative:

Timeline: stated the power at her home went out at approximately 0500. She went to Lahainaluna
Intermediate campus to determine if school was going to be canceled due to the high winds in the area.
She arrives on campus before 0600. At approximately 0630, receives a call from ,
, that there is a fire at classroom P-8, located near the Southwest corner of the campus. She
moves to the area of P-8 and she and see that there is a brush fire across Lahainaluna Road from
the intermediate school (South side of Lahainaluna Road.) She calls 911 on her way to the area to report
the fire. The fire is in the area of electrical poles. Pole identified as pole #25. School security cameras
went offline at 0500, most likely from power outage in the area.

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 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012446 011

Summary of Interview:

8/19/2023, MFD, ATF Special Agent (SA) , ATF Resident Agent in Charge
(RAC) , ATF Certified Fire Investigator (CFI) , ATF Senior Special Agent
(SSA)/Certified Fire Investigator (CFI) , interview with , for Lahaina
Intermediate School 871 Lahainaluna Road, Lahaina HI 96767, resident of
Interview was conducted over phone.

Narrative:

Timeline: stated that at approximately 0500 while on his way to work at Lahaina Intermediate,
he noticed some sparking of high voltage lines near the area of the bus stop on Lahainaluna Road near
the intersection of Kuialaua Street. He arrived on campus and began his work day. At approximately
0630 he sees smoke in the area of classroom P-8, near the Southwest corner of the campus. calls
to report the fire. They both make their way to P-8 and find a brush fire located
across Lahainaluna Road from the school, on the South side of the roadway. The fire looks to be around
the base of an electrical pole in the area. Pole later identified as pole #25.

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 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012492 013

Summary of Interview:

5/01/2024, MFD, ATF Senior Special Agent (SSA)/Certified Fire Investigator (CFI)
, ATF Special Agent (SA) , in person interview with , for
Relief Engine 11 from Napili Station.

Narrative:

RE11 staging at Napili Station, dispatched to afternoon fire. Directed to Kuialua Street, then redirected to
Lahainaluna Road behind homes along Hookahua Street to stop fire spread. Fire passed RE11 before hoses
could be set up.
Fire jumped bypass and RE11 cut lines. Directed to park for structure protection. Fire ran down
Lahainaluna Road. Wind was moving down Lahainaluna and also pushing towards Northwest. Passed L3 at
Kalena and Lahainaluna, observed and on fire.

Relocated to for structure protection. was observed to catch on fire.

Multiple vehicles and structures were observed to be on fire. Forced to abandon Kaalo Place due to extreme
fire conditions.

A map was provided that and drew on.

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 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012446 015

Summary of Interview:

8/19/2023 , MFD, in person interview with , resident of

. Ph#

Narrative:

Timeline: 0500 daughter sees bright flash outside her window, facing toward Lahaina
Intermediate. He looked out the window and heard and saw what he thought was a fire truck in the area.
He is later woken up by his wife who alerts him to a fire behind their house at approximately 0630 –
0645. They get their kids and his wife evacuates with them while he gets their dog on the South side of
the house and can feel the heat from the fire. He evacuates the area. He returns home approximately
0800. He has his garden hose putting out hot spots along his fence line through the morning. Fire
personnel are still in the area working the fire. He says there is still brush in the area South of the morning
fire.

Afternoon: states he notices smoke and flames in unburned area of the “gulch” near an
“upright” rock South of the morning brush fire. He alerts his wife, who calls 911. They
evacuate as Fire department arrives on scene. They stop at the park area on Lahainaluna Road. near the
by-pass on ramp and see that the fire has already crossed the by-pass road. They went to Kahena Street to
wait out the fire, and eventually returned home at approximately 1700.

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 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012446 016

Summary of Interview:

8/19/2023, MFD, ATF Special Agent/Certified Fire Investigator Candidate (SA/CFIC)

in person interview with , owner of . Ph# 1

Narrative:

• of
• At approximately 0630 hrs, he received a call from a friend telling him that there was a fire near
his parent's home. His parents live in the subdivision where the fire was reported.
• At approximately 0700-0730 hrs, he brought up construction equipment to help fight the fire. His
crew brought up a dozer and a water tanker. The dozer cut a fire break around the neighborhood
while the tanker helped the fire department extinguish the fire in the neighborhood. His water
tanker continued helping the fire department's water tanker wet down the area.
• At approximately 1200 hrs, the fire looked like it was contained. They didn’t see anything
burning or smoking. They left the scene, and the fire department remained on the scene.
• At approximately 1400 hrs, he got a text stating that the fire was starting up again. He headed
back to the subdivision with his tanker to help fight the fire. They were putting out fires on the
way back to the subdivision that was on the bypass road. He arrived back at the subdivision at
approximately 1600-1630 hrs. The fire had already advanced down toward Lahaina town.

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 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012446 017

Summary of Interview:

MFD, phone interview with , resident of

Ph#
was interviewed by ATF on ROI 015 separately.

Narrative:

2:00 to 3:00 am, 4:45 am. Wind woke up.

5:00 am. Looked out second floor window at and saw a fire. window
faces uphill towards Lahainaluna School. Small fire was observed below the “L” and solar farm.
Was still dark except for fire.
Called 911 and was told later by fire dept that fire was out. (RMS 23-0012439).

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 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012446 018

Summary of Interview:

10/18/2023, MFD receives via email, fire officer questioner from ,

Battalion

Narrative:

Morning: Fire Officer Actions Taken (initial attack, entry, staging, assignment):
arrived on scene and took over command from E3. On my arrival, E3, T3, L3, and WL3 were on
scene and engaged as noted in the respective narratives. Air 1 was unavailable so Air 2 was dispatched
to assist. E6 also dispatched.

E11 arrived and was assigned to the Kuialua cul-de-sac with WL3 to strengthen Makai perimeter and
work Mauka to tie in with E3. Private dozer, tanker, and loader ( ) were on scene around
this time and assigned to start cutting a dozer line around fire perimeter. Private tanker directed to
extinguish fire in the vacant lots of Kuialua and Hookahua Street.

Air 2 arrived and landed nearby. Due to the high winds (40 mph) and multiple power lines in the area
the helicopter was going to be used for spot fires only.

E6 arrived and assigned to assist L3 with wet line working off of dirt access road Mauka of bypass.

Fire had been knocked down at this point and fire growth halted.

Efforts to improve fire perimeter by dozer, tankers and handlines were underway. Water was applied
liberally to the fire area as conserving water was a non-issue due to multiple hydrants in the
neighborhood.

There was a shift change in the morning when oncoming watch personnel were relieving off going
watch personnel. remained on duty as oncoming went to the Kula fire to assist. E11A
drove RE11 and MN11 to Kuialua to swap apparatus with E11B personnel. E3A and T3A personnel drove
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 Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012446 018

UT3 to Kuialua to swap apparatus with E3B and T3B personnel. L3 no longer needed, they were cleared
from scene and returned to STN3 to change shift. E3B and T3B returned to STN3 in UT3 and went off
duty. Command asked E11B personnel if they could work a 12 hour shift staffing RE11 as a callback crew
to provide an extra resource to the west side in anticipation of high call volume due to the strong winds
and dry conditions, which they agreed to.

E6 and Air 2 were cleared from scene by Command around this time and they returned to quarters.

On scene; , E3, T3, E11, RE11, private dozer, tanker, loader.

Soon after the shift change there was a smoke call in the Kahana area. Command assigned E3, E11, T3
to respond. RE11 with private dozer, tanker, loader remained at Kuialua to continue improving fire
perimeter and mop-up. Kahana smoke call was a false alarm. Command had E11 continue to STN11 to
cover district and E3 and T3 returned to Kuialua. Once on scene at Kuialua, command did a face to face
command transfer with E3. Objective of extinguishing any still smoking or smoldering areas was
discussed and confirmed while keeping firefighter safety paramount due to the overhead power lines
and strong winds.

left scene and returned to STN3. E3 (command), T3, RE11, private resources remained at Kuialua.

Upon return to STN3, began coordinating rehab for west side resources to include meals and drinks.

Afternoon:

Initial response package to brushfire at 755 Kuialua Street was E3, T3, and advising E11 was
returning from a canceled assignment and was on Keawe Street at the time. I advised them to respond.
Soon after that I requested RE11 and L3 respond as well. E11 was first on scene at Kuialua Street and
established command. arrived after E3, WL3 and T3. They were on the dirt access road running
parallel to the bypass. I arrived in the cul-de-sac where E11 was and took over command. The fire was
still inside the dirt access road perimeter on the Makai side at this point where WL3 and T3 were. I had
incoming RE11 position themselves on the downwind side along dirt access road to strengthen the
Makai flank. Dispatch then reported a shed between two houses at was burning
and impacting houses. Command had E3 with single operator come up to Hookahua Place and use the
redline to address the shed and impacted houses as the rest of E3 crew was on the dirt access road with
WL3 and T3. I had requested Air Support, but due to extreme winds they were unable to fly. Also
requested additional units, E1 and E6 were sent. I then drove down Lahainaluna Road for better view.
The grass along the lower part of Kelawea Mauka Park was on fire and impacting multiple homes on
Kaakolu Street and Kaalo Place simultaneously. I had all units reposition down to Kaakolu Street and
Kalena Street to make a stand along Kaakolu Street. I requested T3 come down Lahainaluna Road and
use the bumper turret to take the energy from the fire from the park direction while the other units
were getting in position. T3 was unable to respond due to a mechanical issue.

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 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012446 019

Summary of Interview:

8/19/2023, MFD, in person interview with , resident of

. Ph#

Narrative:

• He woke up at 3 am and noticed that the electricity was off. He went back to bed and woke up at
5 am, and the electricity was still off.
• 5:45 am, he and his wife smelled smoke. They went outside and didn’t see any fires.
• At 6:48 am, the property across the street on Lahainaluna Road was on fire.
• He was home for the entire day.
• Between 1 and 2 o’clock, the fire looked contained. There was no smoke.
• At around 2:30 pm, he sees smoke across the street near two electrical poles near the old burned
area.
• Video was sent to MFD, for documentation.

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Page 1 of 1 FIWS v1.0

 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012446 020

Summary of Interview:

8/19/2023 , , MFD, in person interview with resident of

. Ph#.

Narrative:

• At approximately 0500 hrs., there is no power in his home. So, he goes outside to check on his
roof. Due to the high winds, some of the shingles were blown off of his roof. He goes on his roof
and starts fixing what he can.
• At approximately 0600 hrs., he sees that his fence along Lahainaluna Road needs to be fixed. He
starts fixing his fence. As he’s fixing his fence, he hears a power line snap. This is at
approximately 0630 hrs. He sees the electrical line lying on the ground on the dirt median on
the other side of the street. The line is sparking and creating spot fires along Lahainaluna Road.
The power line broke between poles 24 and 25. The power line touched the hill with grass near
pole 25 and caused a fire. The grass was about 3 ft tall.
• The fire spread along the fence line of the neighborhood across the street.
• At approximately 0700 hrs., he saw the pole behind 804 S. Niheu Street was broken and hanging
by the electrical wires. The Pole broke mid-pole.
• At approximately 0900 hrs., he saw an electrical pole break at the entrance to Princess
Nahienaena Elementary School. He was outside standing in the cul-de-sac.
• At around 1300 or 1330 hrs., he went to work. He didn’t notice if fire crews were still on the
scene. He didn’t see if there were any hotspots from the original fire as he was heading to work.
• He took a video of the first fire, but it was on Facebook Live. It was not captured on his phone.

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 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012446 023

Summary of Interview:

8/18/2023, MFD, in person interview with , Driver of Tanker 3 from

Lahaina Station watch Ph#

Narrative:

came in early and was on duty before 6:30 hrs. Responded to brush fire call on Lahainaluna
Road. Stayed on scene for most of the day. Filled tank at least three times during mop-up. Was
operating on firebreak during later stages of mop-up. Stated that did not want personnel
operating outside of truck near firebreak to the south, due to extreme wind and power lines overhead.
Stated that a private water tanker was also spraying water. (RMS TIME 14:18 left scene.) Arrived at
station 3
14:30. Brush fire call to the same location at 14:55 hrs.
Responded with E11, E3, L3. Along the way to call, noticed more power line poles were down than
during earlier return trip to station 3. Had to go around poles by routing through parking lots such as
Lahaina Cannery parking lot. Wind was constantly blowing and increasing throughout day.
On scene, was assigned to chase heel uphill in field. T3 overheated and had to run to
wildland truck once radio communication indicated fire jumped highway.
Stated that foam system and at least one window did not work on Tanker 3.
Asked about dry creek bed area with two power poles and a power pole stump. Stated that during
morning mop up operations, that area was unburned with visible foliage and grass not burned
For any additional actions, refer to RMS report narratives.

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 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012446 024

Summary of Interview:

8/19/2023, MFD, in person interview with for Ladder 3 watch from

Lahaina Station. Ph#

Narrative:

was for Ladder 3. Prior to 1330, L3 had at least 8 calls. Response to 1455 hrs brush
fire call was via Keawe Road to the Bypass. L3 turned downhill on Lahainaluna Road as the fire had already
jumped the bypass and threatened homes.
L3 announced first Structure Fire on 1528 hrs at the home at 540 Lahainaluna Road. L3 deploys lines in
attempt to contain structure fire. From L3 perspective, wind was moving straight down Lahainaluna Road.
Structure protection not successful due to high wind. Multiple structures were observed on fire further down
the road. Multiple people were evacuated from the surrounding area.
L3 moved further down Lahainaluna Road redeployed for structure protection. Evacuees were transferred to
available police units. Structure protection not successful due to high wind and further spot fires observed
throughout area.
L3 moved to Lui Street and Komo Mai Street for structure protection. Five (5) structures at the intersection
were protected intact ( Komo Mai Street, Liu Street). Additional structure protection
not sustainable as water pressure was lost at Fire Hydrants. A downed power pole was cut in order to
evacuate to Keawe Street.
Observations
Fire length was observed to be double the building height (in the direction of wind). Ladder 3 swinging
Doors were extremely difficult to close. Extreme fire condition

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 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012492 025

Summary of Interview:

8/25/2023, MFD, phone interview with , resident of

Ph#

Narrative:

Stated that on 8/8, was done work around 4:00pm and traveling southbound on Honapiilani Hwy in heavy
traffic. Just south of the intersection of Honoapiilani Hwy and road to Lahaina Fire Station (Mile marker 23),
multiple poles broke and fell onto the highway. No sparks were observed. Video was taken at 4:01pm by
showing pole 47 laying across highway and pole to the south partially snapped. Stated that three
poles total snapped/fell over in rapid succession prior to 4:01pm video.
later arrived at Lahainaluna Intermediate and connected multiple garden hoses together. There he
used the water hoses to extinguish fire close to the Lahainaluna Road.
(Note pole 47 and mile marker 23 were identified using Google Maps street view.)

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Page 1 of 1 FIWS v1.0

 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012492 026

Summary of Interview:

8/21/2023, MFD, phone call with , of Engine 11 from Napili fire

station. Ph# . provided a witness statement of events.

5/02/2024, MFD, ATF Senior Special Agent (SSA)/Certified Fire Investigator (CFI)
ATF Special Agent (SA) , in person interview followup.

Narrative:

8/8/23
E11 Timeline

At 1455hrs, E11, E3, T3 was dispatched to Smoke and Flame seen at 755 Kuialua Street.
E11 was returning from being relocated to town to cover district and responded from Keawe Street.
1500 E11 on-scene of a 20'x100' brush fire, located where the earlier fire was that day. Fire was in the
ravine running west, or Makai, at a rapid pace.
E11 established Lahaina Command and took comms to FD2.
E11 and MN11 started our direct attack on Kuialua Street in the cul-de-sac with 200' - 1.5" connected
line as well as 2-gnass packs, approximately 600' total feet of hose.
E3 and T3 arrived on-scene and was assigned by command to head down to the Utility road below the
subdivision off of Lahainaluna Road where T3 was working earlier, and start attack from that point to
prevent the fire from passing that point.
E3, T3, and WL3 positioned there.
PD asked if needed to evacuated. Command said yes, evacuate all properties Makai of this fire.
arrived on-scene and assumed command.
Dispatch notifies command of possible shed on fire on Ho'okahua
L3 and RE11 was dispatched to assist at this fire.
Fire moved swiftly down the ravine, jumped over newly cut fire break lines from the earlier fire and
passed the location of E3, T3, and WL3.

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 Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012492 026

Fire then jumped the road (Bypass), headed straight through the curved basin of the Lahainaluna cut-
off.
L3 was making their way through the cut-off at that point.
Dispatch notifies command that the fire has reached the park and is affected 1 structure.
2nd report of another structure being impacted off Lahainaluna Road.
L3 is assigned to structure protection of the first home off Lahainaluna Road. Believed to be
Lahainaluna Road.
E11 then cut and left lines off Kuialua Street to assist with structure fire protection off Lahainaluna Road.
E11 turn on Kalena Street and engage in fire protection.
E11 stretched a line for fire protection on Ka'akolu Street.
During that operation, Kaakolu Street started to be impacted as well.
Kalena Street was approximately 50% involved on arrival also.
E11 then repositioned around and up Ka'akolu Street to connect to another water source, to attack fires
on and Ka'akolu Street.
Upon arrival, Ka'akolu Street was fully involved. E11 established a water supply and used Deck Gun
and Bumper turret to attack fire.
To no avail on gaining control, Command gave the evacuate and abandon order for Lahainaluna.
E11 exited via Ka'akepa Street, up Kahako Street, left on Kanakea Loop, left on Kahena Street, and right
on Kalena Street, left on Lui Street, and exited via Komo Mai Street.
Upon exit, E11 noticed houses on Komo Mai Street was already involved.
E11 exited and then was reassigned.

5/02/2024 Interview

• Steady increasing winds observed prior to afternoon fire.

E11 was sent out of Lahaina area, passed morning fire and canceled assignment out of Lahaina.
Turned around at Hokiokio Place at approximately 1440. (Radio transmissions indicate this was
at 1448). Passed morning fire again. Both times did not see smoke or flames.
• When E11 was dispatched to afternoon fire, turned around approximately at Foodland
Lahaina.(Radio transmissions indicate this was at 1456).
• From Kuialua Street cul-de-sac, pulled lines to rear of and Hookahua Place.
• WL3 was further west of E11 position.
• Huge gust of wind with ember shower. Knocked his driver down. Fire passed E11 and WL3.
(Radio transmissions indicate this was at 1518).
• Fire was observed passing WL3 and along fence behind homes at Hookahua Street
• E11 cut lines and observed Lahainaluna Road on fire with L3
• Rear of Kalena Street and Kaakolu Street on fire while attempting structure protection
of Kaakolu Street.
• Repositioned to Kaakolu Street, established water supply.
• Kupuohi Street – multifamily structure roof was on fire approximately between 8:00 and
9:00 pm. No water supply was available. Later observed that building had slowly burned from
roof to at least the third floor of structure.
• A map was provided that drew on.

Page 2 of 2 FIWS v1.0

 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012446 034

Summary of Interview:

8/18/2023, MFD, in person interview with , for Lahainaluna

High School. Ph.

Narrative:

Met with at Lahainaluna High School. stated that he measured the wind speed at 44
MPH from the football field. He stated that was the constant speed at that time. A photo of the
wind speed taken at that time was provided to investigator.

Additionally, stated in the late afternoon, saw fire progressing uphill from the Kuialua neighborhood
towards Lahainaluna High School.

Prepared by: Title: Signatur

Lieutenant

Reviewed by: Title: Signature:

Lieutenant

Page 1 of 1 FIWS v1.0

 Fire Investigation Witness Statement
Maui Fire Department
Fire Prevention Bureau
County of Maui
Fire Location RMS Number FIWS Number
Lahaina Fire 8.8.2023 23-0012446 035

Summary of Interview:

On 7/18/2024 at 1028 hours, MFD, phone interview with . DOB: .

, Lahaina, HI 96761. Phone:

Several videos and one picture was provided to MFD.

Narrative:

stated that on the morning of 8/8/2023, he was on the balcony of his residence at
which faces south and is located on Lahainaluna Road. While on the balcony, he
witnessed smoke from the morning fire located “behind” or to the south of the home located at 817
Ho’okahua Street. He stated that he watched as MFD responded to and extinguished this fire.

then stated that in the afternoon, he saw smoke again and went to the balcony. This time,
he witnessed smoke and flames in the “back” of the 817 Ho’okahua residence. The “back” was
described as the area east and uphill of the structure. To the best of his recollection, fire apparatus
responded on scene within 10 minutes, in which time the fire had started moving quickly in the downhill
direction due to high winds. did not evacuate his home for the duration of the fire progressing
through Lahaina town and has video from various times in the evening from his point of view. He stated
that the first dark black smoke he remembered came from the Kelawea Mauka Makai Park area located
to the north of the Honoapiilani Highway Bypass/Lahainaluna Road intersection. The dark smoke in
that area began around 1445-1500hrs according to Perge. To his recollection, water started to go out at
his home around 1700hrs. When asked if he witnessed any people in the immediate area preceding
the morning or afternoon fires, stated that he did not see anyone and that nobody was outside
because of the high winds.

Prepared by: Title: Signature:

Lieutenant

Reviewed by: Title: Signature:

Lieutenant

Page 1 of 1 FIWS v1.0

 Appendix C – Sources

Weather
with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provided Iowa State
University links with timestamped National Weather Service information.

1. 8/1/2023 8:22 PM – National Weather Service (NWS) Area Forecast Discussion (AFD)
Latest forecast from the National Hurricane Center in Miami, Florida indicates that
Hurricane Dora will cross 140W in the central Pacific late this weekend. Thereafter, Dora
is expected to move on a path that would generally keep it well S of the islands early
next week. This scenario would bring an increase in trade wind speeds Monday and
Tuesday. As a deep-layer high to the NE builds westward, winds could become strong as
the trade wind flow becomes quite dry. With KBDI (Keetch-Byram Drought Index) values
potentially exceeding 600 for the first time this summer by that time, Red Flag conditions
could be met.
https://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/wx/afos/p.php?pil=AFDHFO&e=202308020622

2. 8/3/2023 3:55 PM – NWS AFD

.FIRE WEATHER...Breezy and rather dry weather have produced near critical fireweather
conditions today, and a couple of fires have started onOahu. Trade winds will ease this
evening and hold at moderatestrength Friday through the weekend.Potential is rising for
critical fire weather conditions early next week. Dry, stable, and breezy to locally windy
trades are looking increasingly likely as deep high pressure to the north moves in tandem
Hurricane Dora, which is forecast to pass south ofthe islands. The Keetch Byram Drought
Index (KBDI) is expected toreach the critical 600 mark by Tuesday, and it is worth noting
that MOS guidance is showing leeward relative humidity falling below 45 percent on
Tuesday and Wednesday. We will also have to monitor conditions for Monday as drier
conditions move in with building trades.
https://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/wx/afos/p.php?pil=AFDHFO&e=202308040155

3. 8/6/2023 3:33 AM – NWS Fire Weather Message

The National Weather Service in Honolulu has issued a Fire Weather Watch, which is in
effect from Monday morning through late Tuesday night. * AFFECTED AREA...Leeward
portions of all Hawaiian Islands.* WIND...East winds 20 to 30 kt with higher gusts.*
HUMIDITY...40 to 45 percent during afternoons and evening.* IMPACTS...any fires that
develop will likely spread rapidly. Outdoor burning is not recommended.
https://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/wx/afos/p.php?pil=RFWHFO&e=202308061333

4. 8/6/2023 3:33 AM – NWS Weather Message

...HIGH WIND WATCH IN EFFECT FROM MONDAY MORNING THROUGH LATE TUESDAY
NIGHT...* WHAT...East winds 20 to 50 mph with localized gusts over 60 mph possible.*
WHERE...Portions of Lanai, Maui and the Big Island.* WHEN...From Monday morning
through late Tuesday night.* IMPACTS...Damaging winds could blow down trees and

Page 1 of 4
 power lines. Widespread power outages are possible. Travel could be difficult, especially
for high profile vehicles.
https://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/wx/afos/p.php?pil=NPWHFO&e=202308061333

5. 8/7/2023 3:15 AM – NWS Fire Weather Message

...HIGH WIND WARNING IN EFFECT FROM 6 AM THIS MORNING TO 6 AM HST
WEDNESDAY...* WHAT...East winds 30 to 45 mph with gusts over 65 mph expected.*
WHERE...Portions of Kauai, Oahu, Molokai, Lanai, Kahoolawe, Maui, and the Big Island.
* WHEN...Through 6 AM HST Wednesday.* IMPACTS...Damaging winds may blow down
trees and power lines and damage roofs. Power outages are possible. Travel will be
difficult, especially for high profile vehicles.
The National Weather Service in Honolulu has issued a Red Flag Warning, which is in
effect through 6 AM HST Wednesday. * AFFECTED AREA...Leeward portions of all
Hawaiian Islands.* WIND...East winds 30 to 45 mph with gusts over 65 mph expected.*
HUMIDITY...40 to 45 percent during afternoons and evenings.* IMPACTS...any fires that
develop will likely spread rapidly. Outdoor burning is not recommended.
https://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/wx/afos/p.php?pil=RFWHFO&e=202308071315

6. 8/8/2023 3:17 AM – NWS Fire Weather Message

...RED FLAG WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT UNTIL 6 AM HST WEDNESDAYFOR STRONG
WINDS AND LOW HUMIDITY...* AFFECTED AREA...Leeward portions of all Hawaiian
Islands.* WIND...East winds 30 to 45 mph with gusts to around 60 mph.* HUMIDITY...35
to 45 percent through the afternoon hours.* IMPACTS...Any fires that develop will likely
spread rapidly. Outdoor burning is not recommended.
https://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/api/1/nwstext/202308081317-PHFO-WWHW80-
RFWHFO

7. 8/8/2023 3:30 AM – NWS Fire Weather Planning Forecast for Hawaii

https://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/wx/afos/p.php?pil=FWFHFO&e=202308071330

8. 8/8/2023 – Hawaiinewsnow.com weather report 30-45 mph with gusts over 65 mph.
https://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/video/2023/08/08/hawaii-news-now-sunrise-
weather-report-tuesday-august-8-2023/

9. 8/8/2023 – Weather.gov peak wind gusts (recorded) 58 mph 11:05 AM Kula, gusts at
other stations varied from 45 mph to 82 mph.
https://www.weather.gov/hfo/windSummary20230809

10. 8/8/2023 11:24 AM – Lahainaluna Football field. 45 mph NE – refer to the photo
provided by of the kestrel device reading.

11. Lightning – No witness reports of lightning strikes.

Page 2 of 4
 12. NASA Weather Report with satellite images. https://appliedsciences.nasa.gov/what-we-
do/disasters/disasters-activations/hawaii-wildfires-aug-2023

13. NASA signature of the fire(s) at 10:25 p.m. local time on August 8, 2023, as observed by
the Operational Land Imager (OLI) on the Landsat 8 satellite. Lahaina, Pulehu, Kualono,
and Olinda fires are visible.
https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/151688/devastation-in-maui
Direct link to image:
https://eoimages.gsfc.nasa.gov/images/imagerecords/151000/151688/mauiswir_oli_20
23221_lrg.jpg
14. Fire and Rain: The Legacy of Hurricane Lane in Hawaiʻi
https://journals.ametsoc.org/view/journals/bams/101/6/BAMS-D-19-
0104.1.xml#d15709396e327

15. Hurricane Dora Map

https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/refresh/graphics_cp2+shtml/204922.shtml?gm_track

16. Unusually strong winds, drought, and invasive species teamed up to drive a compound
catastrophe. https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2023/08/what-caused-the-deadly-
hawaii-wildfires/

Fuel and Topography

1. “Based on an analysis in 2020, 94.4% of the homes in Hawaiʻi were found to be
vulnerable because they are built within the wildland-urban interface compared with
42.3% of structures in the conterminous U.S.”
https://naisma.org/2023/10/10/the-tragedy-in-lahaina-how-invasive-grasses-and-
shrubs-are-fueling-the-wildfire-crisis-in-hawai%CA%BBi/

2. Wildland-urban interface (WUI)

https://www.fs.usda.gov/nrs/pubs/jrnl/2022/nrs_2022_carlson_001.pdf

3. 1940 era Lahaina map

https://www.lahainarestoration.org/index.html
https://www.lahainarestoration.org/Maps/LahainaGeneralAreaCMap.pdf

4. Pioneer Mill
https://www2.hawaii.edu/~speccoll/p_pioneer.html

5. PhD student states that grass in Lahaina was “mostly composed of two African pasture
grasses, buffel and guinea grasses, which are the dominant grasses seen on dry, leeward
hillsides today.”

Page 3 of 4
 https://www.hawaii.edu/news/2023/10/13/newly-discovered-grasses-across-hawaii/

6. DLNR grass
https://dlnr.hawaii.gov/hisc/info/species/invasive-grasses-in-hawaii-and-their-impacts/

7. Pacific Fire Exchange

https://pacificfireexchange.org/weed-fire-risk-assessments/

8. Brush fire 2010

https://www.lahainanews.com/opinion/editorial/2010/05/13/the-browning-of-west-
maui/

9. USDA.gov
https://www.fs.usda.gov/research/treesearch/49792

10. Impact of grazing on fine fuels and potential wildfire behaviour in a non-native tropical
grassland
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277013693_Impact_of_grazing_on_fine_fue
ls_and_potential_wildfire_behaviour_in_a_non-native_tropical_grassland

11. Wildfire Ignition density map

https://pacificfireexchange.org/wp-
content/uploads/2022/07/WildfireIgnitionDensitiesForHawaii.pdf

12. An Assessment of Prescribed Burns in Hawai‘i to Identify Training Opportunities and

Limitations to Mitigating Long-Term Damage of Wildfires to Communities and
Ecosystem
https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/items/578d3818-7e0a-4a2c-a117-
bf7d8a5b0507

13. “Pohakuokala Gulch. The region used to be one of Maui’s most diverse ecosystems,
covered in koa and other native trees. But years of deforestation and the introduction of
invasive species such as black wattle and eucalyptus radically changed the area around
the gulch.”
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2024/02/07/maui-fires-kula-hawaii-cleanup/

14. https://explorer.eagleview.com/index.php

15. https://disasteraware.pdc.org/

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