Title: Fuertes vs. Senate of The Philippines Ponente: LEONEN, J.
Case: G.R. No. 208162 Decision Date: Jan 7, 2020
Facts:
Devie Ann Isaga Fuertes, one of the 46 accused in Criminal Case No. 2008-895 for violating the Anti-
Hazing Law, belonged to the Tau Gamma Sigma Sorority. Allegedly present during the initiation rites
where a neophyte, Chester Paolo Abracia, died, Fuertes filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme
Court. She challenged the constitutionality of Sections 5 and 14 of the Anti-Hazing Law, arguing that the
provision on prima facie evidence violated the presumption of innocence and constituted a bill of
attainder.
Issue:
Whether Section 14, Paragraph 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law, deeming an accused's presence during hazing
as prima facie evidence of participation, is constitutional and complies with the presumption of
innocence, while avoiding the characterization of a bill of attainder.
Ruling:
The Court rejected the contention that Section 14, Paragraph 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law was a bill of
attainder and stressed that “the mere filing of an Information against the petitioner and her fellow sorority
members is not a finding of their guilt of the crime charged. Contrary to her claim, petitioner is not being
charged merely because she is a member of the Tau Gamma Sigma Sorority, but because she is allegedly
a principal by direct participation in the hazing that led to Abracia’s death. As stated, these are matters for
the trial court to decide. The prosecution must still prove such offense, and the accused’s participation in
it, beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner, in turn, may present her defenses to the allegations.” It added that
the disputable presumption in the challenged law which provides “that the accused’s presence during a
hazing is a prima facie evidence of his or her participation, does not violate the constitutional presumption
of innocence. This disputable presumption is also not a bill of attainder.” It emphasized, “A bill of
attainder encroaches on the courts' power to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused and to
impose the corresponding penalty, violating the doctrine of separation of powers. For a law to be
considered a bill of attainder, it must be shown to contain all of the following: "a specification of certain
individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of
judicial trial." The most essential of these elements is the complete exclusion of the courts from the
determination of guilt and imposable penalty.”
Title: Bureau of Customs Employees Association vs. Teves Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR., J
Case: G.R. No. 181704 Decision Date: Dec 6, 2011
Facts:
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo endorsed Republic Act No. 9335, commonly referred to as
the Attrition Act of 2005, on January 25, 2005. This legislation is designed to enhance the revenue-
generating capacity and collection efficiency of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Bureau of
Customs (BOC) through the implementation of a system incorporating rewards and penalties.
The law institutes a Rewards and Incentives Fund, funded by surplus collections of the BIR and BOC
beyond their annual revenue targets. Additionally, it establishes a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board comprising various government officials and representatives from both the BIR and BOC.
The Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) contends that the revenue goals stipulated by
the law were unattainable due to government policies, natural disasters, and other economic variables.
Furthermore, BOCEA alleges that BOC personnel were pressured into signing Performance Contracts and
asserts that Commissioner Morales exerted undue influence on BOC officials in this regard. BOCEA also
claims that its officers faced harassment and intimidation threats of legal action. Which leads to
challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 as “a bill of attainder because it inflicts punishment
upon a particular group or class of officials and employees without trial. This is evident from the fact that
the law confers upon the Board the power to impose the penalty of removal upon employees who do not
meet their revenue targets; that the same is without the benefit of hearing; and that the removal from
service is immediately executory. Lastly, it disregards the presumption of regularity in the performance of
the official functions of a public officer.”
Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 9335 is a bill of attainder and therefore unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held against the petitioner, emphasizing that “R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the
elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. R.A. No.
9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and
provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional
rights of the concerned employee are amply protected.”
Title: Bureau of Customs Employees Association vs. Teves Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR., J
Case: G.R. No. 181704 Decision Date: Dec 6, 2011
Facts:
Rosario Nasi-Villar is contesting her conviction for illegal recruitment, stemming from an Information
filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Davao del Sur on October 5, 1998. This accusation
implicated Nasi-Villar and Dolores Placa in illegal recruitment activities purportedly occurring in January
1993 in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of Davao del Sur. The alleged offense involved the
recruitment of Nila Panilag for overseas employment, accompanied by a demand for and receipt of a
placement fee amounting to P6,500. Following a trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Nasi-Villar
guilty of illegal recruitment and imposed a penalty ranging from four to five years. Dissatisfied with this
verdict, Nasi-Villar appealed to the Court of Appeals, contesting the trial court's finding of guilt based on
the evidence presented by the prosecution.
The petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in not considering that R.A. No. 8042 cannot be
retroactively applied, and that the decision of the RTC violates the constitutional prohibition against ex
post facto laws. Since R.A. No. 8042 was not in effect at the time of the alleged crime in January 1993,
the petitioner argues that it cannot be used as the basis for the criminal action. The applicable law at the
time was the Labor Code, where the violation was penalized with imprisonment or a fine. Petitioner
contends that charging and convicting her under R.A. No. 8042, which imposes higher penalties,
constitutes a violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Issue:
Whether the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) violates the constitutional prohibition against ex
post facto laws by applying Republic Act No. 8042 retroactively.
Ruling:
The petitioner's claim of a violation of the prohibition against ex post facto law and retroactive
application of Republic Act No. 8042 is unfounded. The Court stated that “An ex post facto law is one
which, among others, aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed or changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed. Penal
laws and laws which, while not penal in nature, nonetheless have provisions defining offenses and
prescribing penalties for their violation operate prospectively. Penal laws cannot be given retroactive
effect, except when they are favorable to the accused.” An ex post facto law typically worsens the
punishment for a crime or alters legal consequences retroactively. However, penal laws and laws defining
offenses operate prospectively, except when they are favorable to the accused.
However, the Court further emphasized to the effect that, Republic Act No. 8042 amended specific
provisions of the Labor Code, introducing a new definition of illegal recruitment, and imposing higher
penalties has no indication that it should be retroactively applied. As long as a law operates prospectively,
affecting offenses committed after its enactment, it cannot be deemed ex post facto.
Both the trial court and the appellate court adjudicated the petitioner's case solely under the Labor Code,
without retroactively applying Republic Act No. 8042. Therefore, there was no violation of the
prohibition against ex post facto laws or retroactive application of Republic Act No. 8042 in the
proceedings.
Title: Salvador vs. Mapa, Jr. Ponente: NACHURA, J
Case: G.R. No. 135080 Decision Date: Nov 28, 2007
Facts:
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans filed a petition seeking to nullify the
dismissal of a criminal complaint against certain respondents on grounds of prescription. Additionally, the
Committee aimed to challenge the constitutionality of Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum
Order No. 61.
Administrative Order No. 13, issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos on October 8, 1992, established
the Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans. This committee was tasked with investigating
loans, guarantees, and financial accommodations granted by government-owned and controlled banks or
financial institutions at the behest of previous government officials.
The Committee's investigation included loan transactions between Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA),
now known as Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI), and the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP). Based on its findings, the Committee determined that these loans exhibited characteristics of
behest loans, which are loans granted to the detriment of the government and the Filipino people.
Subsequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, representing the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), lodged a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against the respondents for alleged
violation of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
However, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint, citing prescription as the reason and asserting that
the offenses charged had already prescribed. Furthermore, the Ombudsman declared that Administrative
Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 violated the prohibition against ex post facto law.
Issue:
Whether Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto laws.
Ruling:
The court maintains that Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 do not qualify as
ex post facto laws.
It further provides that “An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a) which makes an action done
before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed;
or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. 22 This Court
added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only
but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that which
deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as
the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.”
Additionally, the Court explained that “The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law
generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which
prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their
nature, and provide for their punishment.”
In the case at hand, the Court ruled that “The subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly do
not come within the shadow of this definition. Administrative Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It does not
mete out penalty for the act of granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame
of reference for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and
Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws.”
Therefore, the Ombudsman's ruling that these orders violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws
lacks a valid basis.
