BILL OF ATTAINDER- EX POST FACTO LAW

BOCEA vs. Teves, G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011

FACTS:
On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law
R.A. No. 9335 which took effect on February 11, 2005. RA No. 9335 was enacted to
optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage
BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives
Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status. Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules
and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria
and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose
revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance
with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance
evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and
regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress. Petitioner Bureau of
Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) directly filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the SC to declare R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR unconstitutional.
Petitioner contended that R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder because it inflicts
punishment upon a particular group or class of officials and employees without trial.
This is evident from the fact that the law confers upon the Board the power to impose
the penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet their revenue targets; that
the same is without the benefit of hearing; and that the removal from service is
immediately executory.
ISSUE:
Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
No. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or
members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder
are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a
punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.
R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek
to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. It merely lays down the grounds for the
termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences
thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of
the concerned employee are amply protected.
 People Vs. Ferrer, G.R. Nos.L-32613-14, December 27, 1972
FACTS:
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-
Subversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac. The abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer and/or
ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal
organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of
force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of
establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government
under the control and domination of an alien power. Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970,
another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, sharing the respondent Nilo
Tayag and five others with subversion. Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the
trial court, under the decision of Hon. Simeon Ferrer in its resolution of September
15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that
it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the informations against the two accused.
The Government appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, R.A. No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law
a bill of attainder.
RULING:
No. A bill of attainder is the substitution of judicial determination to a
legislative determination of guilt. In the instant case, if Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of
attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law
alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable
fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to
prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt
acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with
specific intent to further its basic objective. The ingredient of specific intent to pursue
the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." This constitutes an
element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former
requires proof of direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the
latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives.
 Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217682, July 17, 2018
FACTS: The whistleblowers (Luy et. al.) executed a Pinagsamang Sinumpaang
Salaysay in which they revealed the details of the Pork Barrel Scam that involved the
misuse or illegal diversion by certain legislators of their Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) in connivance with Janet Lim Napoles. The NBI conducted
its investigation and resolved to file in the Ombudsman verified criminal complaints
against petitioners and other legislators. The Ombudsman then requested to the
Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) to conduct financial investigations of the
bank accounts od the petitioners and others. In the process of inquiring into
Estrada’s accounts, the AMLC filed a Supplemental Ex Parte Application for the
bank inquiry to be conducted on Estrada’s wife, which the Court of Appeals granted.
During Estrada’s bail hearings in the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution presented an
AMLC financial investigator who testified on the AMLC Inquiry Report, which Estrada
sought to suppress and was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 10167 is an ex post facto law.
RULING: No. Petitioners’ reliance on Republic v. Eugenio Jr., wherein the Supreme
Court declared that the proscription against ex post facto laws should be applied to
the interpretation of the original text of Section 11 of RA 9160 because the passage
of said law “striped another layer off the rule on absolute confidentiality that provided
a measure of lawful protection to the account holder.” Accordingly, the Supreme
Court held therein that the application for the bank inquiry order as the means od
inquiring onto record of transactions entered into prior to the passage of RA 9160
would be constitutionally infirm, offensive as is was to the ex post facto clause of the
Constitution. Petitioner’s reliance on the above-stated ruling is misplaced. Unlike the
passage of RA 9160 in order to allow an exception to the general rule on bank
secrecy, the amendment introduced by RA 10167 does away with the notice to the
account holder at the time when the bank inquiry order is applied for. The elimination
of the requirement of notice, by itself, is not a removal of nay lawful protection to the
account holder because the AMLC is only exercising its investigative powers at this
stage. Indeed, RA 10167, in recognition of the ex post facto clause of the
constitution, explicitly provides that the penal provisions shall not apply to acts done
prior to the effectivity of the AMLA on October 17, 2001. Furthermore, the AMLC's
inquiry and examination into bank accounts are not undertaken whimsically based on
its investigative discretion. The AMLC and the CA are respectively required to
ascertain the existence of probable cause before any bank inquiry order is issued.
Section 11 of R.A. 9160, even with the allowance of an ex parte application therefor,
cannot be categorized as authorizing the issuance of a general warrant. This is
because a search warrant or warrant of arrest contemplates a direct object but the
bank inquiry order does not involve the seizure of persons or property. The holder of
a bank account subject of a bank inquiry order issued ex parte is not without
recourse. He has the opportunity to question the issuance of the bank inquiry order
after a freeze order is issued against the account. He can then assail not only the
finding of probable cause for the issuance of the freeze order, but also the finding of
probable cause for the issuance of the bank inquiry order.
Roberto S. Benedicto vs. CA, G.R. No. 125359, September 04, 2001
FACTS:
Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653, in reenacting Section 34 of the old Central Act,
increased the penalty for violations of rules and regulations issued by the Monetary
Board. They claim that such increase in the penalty would give Republic Act No.
7653 an ex post facto application, violating the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653 an ex post facto legislation

RULING:
No. An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the
passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed; (3) changes
the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime
when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction
upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission
of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights, and remedies only, in effect
imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful;
and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he
has become entitled such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty. The test whether a penal law runs afoul of the ex post
facto clause of the Constitution is: Does the law sought to be applied retroactively
take "from an accused any right that was regarded at the time of the adoption of the
constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty and which he enjoyed at the
time of the commission of the offense charged against him?" The crucial words in the
test are "vital for the protection of life and liberty." The test inapplicable to the penal
clause of Republic Act No. 7653. Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in
nature, nonetheless have provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties for
their violation operate prospectively. Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect,
except when they are favorable to the accused. Nowhere in Republic Act No. 7653,
and in particular Section 36, is there any indication that the increased penalties
provided therein were intended to operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex
post facto law in this case.