Criminal Law Review 2022 - 2023

Part 3

Manaban v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 150723 11 July 2006 Defense of self, relatives, and

strangers

Keyword: ATM Machine; Self-defense

Doctrine: Under paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, the three requisites to prove self-
defense as a justifying circumstance which may exempt an accused from criminal liability are: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused or the person defending
himself. Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requisite of self-defense. Self-defense is founded on the
necessity on the part of the person being attacked to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. Thus,
without prior unlawful and unprovoked attack by the victim, there can be no complete or incomplete self-
defense.

Facts: Ramonito Manaban is a security guard of BPI Kalayaan Branch who was charged for the murder
of Joselito Bautista. While having had alcoholic drinks earlier, Bautista went to the said bank to make a
withdrawal in order to buy his daughter’s medicines. Upon arrival at the bank, Bautista proceeded to the
ATM booth but because he could not effectively withdraw money, he started kicking and pounding on the
machine. For said reason, the bank security guard, Ramonito Manaban, approached and asked him what
the problem was. After Manaban had checked the receipt, he informed Bautista that the Personal
Identification Number (PIN) entered was wrong and advised him to just return the next morning. This
angered Bautista all the more and resumed pounding on the machine. When Manaban could no longer
pacify him, he fired a warning shot. That diverted the attention of Bautista. Instead of venting his ire against
the machine, he confronted Manaban. After some exchange of words, a shot rang out fatally hitting
Bautista. Several police officers arrived at the crime scene where they saw Bautista lying on the ground,
still breathing but when he was brought to the hospital he died. Manaban argued after firing a warning shot
in the air, Bautista showed that he was armed. Bautista allegedly kept on moving toward Manaban, who
again warned Bautista not to come near him or he would be forced to shoot him. Bautista suddenly turned
his back and was allegedly about to draw his gun. Fearing that he would be shot first, Manaban pulled the
trigger and shot Bautista. RTC held that the defense failed to establish self-defense as a justifying
circumstance. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

Issue: Whether or not Manaban shooting Bautista can be considered as self-defense.

Held: NO. Under paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, the three requisites to prove self-
defense as a justifying circumstance which may exempt an accused from criminal liability are: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused or the person defending
himself. Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requisite of self-defense. Self-defense is founded on the
necessity on the part of the person being attacked to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. Thus,
without prior unlawful and unprovoked attack by the victim, there can be no complete or incomplete self-
defense. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or inflict physical
injury upon a person. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful aggression,
unless the threat is offensive and menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. There
must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, which puts the defendant's life
in real peril.

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In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. First, Bautista was shot at the back
as evidenced by the point of entry of the bullet. Second, when Bautista was shot, his gun was still inside a
locked holster and tucked in his right waist. Third, when Bautista turned his back at Manaban, Manaban
was already pointing his service firearm at Bautista. These circumstances clearly belie Manaban's claim
of unlawful aggression on Bautista's part.

Senoja v. People

GR 160341 19 October 2004 Defense of self, relatives, and

strangers

Keyword: attempted bolo hacking, then reconciled; aggressor from phase 1 is now the victim

Doctrine: When the accused offers the affirmative defense of self-defense, he thereby admits killing the
victim or inflicting injuries on him. The burden of evidence is shifted on the accused to prove, with clear
and convincing evidence, that he killed the victim or inflicted injuries on him to defend himself. The accused
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution because
if the evidence of the prosecution were weak, the accused can no longer be acquitted.

Facts: Petitioner Exequiel Senoja, Fidel Senoja, Jose Calica, and Miguel Lumasac were drinking gin on
April 16, 1997, in Crisanto Reguyal's hut in Barangay Zarah, San Luis, Aurora. Leon Lumasac, who was
upset, abruptly showed up at the said with a bolo in his right hand while looking for his brother Miguel.
Leon was calmed down by Jose and the petitioner. However, when the petitioner approached Leon, the
latter attempted to hack him; as a result, Jose hugged Leon and snatched his bolo. Then, Leon and the
talked things out and later reconciled

Leon then walked out of Crisanto's hut followed by petitioner. About ten meters from the hut, petitioner
suddenly stabbed Leon at the back. Leon turned around and faced the petitioner continued who stabbing
him until he fell to the ground. Then, the petitioner ran towards the barangay road and threw away the
"kolonial" knife he used in stabbing. Leon died on the spot.

Based on the medico-legal report Leon had multiple lesions in his body (including the buttocks) with five
fatal wounds on his chest.

For his defense, petioner Senoja admitted to killing the victim but invoked the affirmative defense of
self-defense.

The trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of homicide which was affirmed by
the CA. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Senoja should be acquitted based on self-defense.

Held: NO. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of CA as it found no justification for a reversal of the
findings of the trial court and its conclusions.

Article 11 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that anyone who acts in defense of his own person or
rights does not incur any criminal liability provided that the following elements concur: (1) unlawful

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aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

The self-defense argument might be complete or incomplete. It is complete when all three necessary
conditions are met; it is not complete if only the victim engaged in unlawful aggression and either of the
other two conditions were present. Unlawful violence on the part of the victim is a requirement sine qua
non for any type of self-defense. Whether the accused acted in self-defense or not is a factual issue. Like
alibi, the affirmative defense of self-defense is inherently weak because, as experience has demonstrated,
it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove.

The test whether a person defending himself is confronted by a real and imminent peril to his life or limb
is based on the following question: does the person invoking the defense believe, in due exercise of his
reason, his life or limb is in danger? The guilt of the accused must depend upon the circumstances as
they reasonably appear to him.

A genuine, sudden, unexpected attack—rather than merely a threatening or intimidating attitude—or the
imminent danger of one is required for aggression to be considered unlawful. As a result, the person
forming a defense does not have the right to kill or harm the former aggressor when an actual or unlawful
aggression ceases to exist. The right to self-defense expires as soon as the threat has passed.

In the case at bar, there were two separate but interrelated incidents that culminated in the petitioner's
stabbing and killing of the victim Leon Lumasac. The first episode inside the hut had been completed with
the protagonist, the victim, and the petitioner reconciled. The second episode commenced inside the hut
and continued outside, and ended with the petitioner stabbing the victim several times. While Leon
Lumasac had ceased being the aggressor after he left the hut to go home, accused Exequiel Senoja was
now the unlawful aggressor in this second phase of their confrontation.

Furthermore, the defense’s version was contradicted by several pieces of evidence. In the second phase,
the victim was not disposed, much less determined to assault the petitioner, contrary to Senoja’s testimony.
Tje petitioner claims that when he saw the victim emerged from the hut, the victim walked towards the
petitioner saying, "Kung hindi lang kita inaanak," but hit and hacked the latter on the left buttock. The
petitioner also claims that the victim warned him three times before leaving the hut, "May mangyayari sa
iyo, kung hindi ngayon, bukas." Despite of being aware of the obvious peril had the petitioner followed, he,
nevertheless, followed the victim and left the hut after the victim had gone barely ten meters. He should
have waited until after the victim had already gone far from the hut to avoid any untoward incident.

Moreover, based on the doctor who made the initial autopsy found that the self-defense plea is incredible
considering the number, nature and location of the wounds sustained by the victim particularly, a 2-inch
deep buttock wound. It bears stressing that the petitioner resolutely denied stabbing the victim at the
buttock and insisted that he stabbed the victim frontally. Note also that the petitioner threw away his knife
and failed to surrender it to the policemen; neither did he inform the policemen that he killed the victim in
self-defense.

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People v. Decena

GR 128359 6 December 2000 Defense of self, relatives, and

strangers

Keyword: Inasar siya sa basketball court so nung umuwi na yung umatake sakanya, pinatay niya kasi y
not
Doctrine: The basic requirement for self-defense, as a justifying circumstance, is that there was an
unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. It must be positively shown that there was a
previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the life of the accused in danger and forced him to
inflict more or less severe wounds upon his assailant, employing therefor reasonable means to resist said
attack.

Facts:
Prosecution’s Version:
Luzviminda Ballesteros a 14-year old daughter of the victim, was playing with her siblings at home. She
recalled being asked by her mother, Teresita, to fetch her father, Jaime Ballesteros, who was then watching
a game in the basketball court. On her way to the hardcourt, Luzviminda met her father walking home in
an intoxicated state. Suddenly, she saw appellant, George Decena, rushing towards her father with a long
bladed weapon, prompting Luzviminda to warn her father to run for safety by shouting in the vernacular
"Batik kila, Tatay!" Instead, Jaime simply raised his hand, thus allowing appellant to stab him on the right
chest just below the nipple. Appellant then fled from the crime scene, while the victim also managed to run
but stumbled and fell to the ground. Finding that her father was too heavy for her to carry, Luzviminda
called for her mother at their house, which was only fifteen meters away from the scene of the crime,
saying: "Mother, come! My father has been stabbed by George Decena." Her mother immediately called
for a tricycle and rushed Jaime to the Provincial Hospital where, however, the victim was declared dead
on arrival.

Accused’s Version:
Appellant was watching a basketball game. The victim, Jaime Ballesteros, went around the basketball
court, walking in a wobbly manner due to drunkenness. Jaime stopped near the place where appellant
was sitting and, for no apparent reason, held the latter by the neck with one arm and, at the same time,
poking a fork against it with the other arm. Barangay Tanod Romeo Decena who was also watching the
basketball game, intervened. He took the fork from Jaime and advised appellant to go home. The latter
left and was followed later by Jaime. Fernando Biala, an uncle of appellant, additionally testified that while
he was walking on the barangay road of Longos-Patalan, he chanced upon Jaime attacking appellant with
a balisong. Fortunately, he claims, appellant was able to parry the stabbing blow and a struggle ensued
between them. Appellant overpowered Jaime and succeeded in twisting the wrist of the victim and thrusting
the knife into the latter's body.

Appellant, invokes self-defense, thereby shifting the burden of evidence to him and the onus of which he
must satisfactorily discharged, otherwise conviction would follows from his admission that he killed the
victim.

Issue: Whether or not appellant acted in complete self-defense in killing Jaime Ballesteros, as claimed,
thus absolving him from criminal liability.

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Held: The basic requirement for self-defense, as a justifying circumstance, is that there was an unlawful
aggression against the person defending himself. It must be positively shown that there was a previous
unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the life of the accused in danger and forced him to inflict more
or less severe wounds upon his assailant, employing therefor reasonable means to resist said attack. Long
has it been accepted that for the right of defense to exist, it is necessary that one be assaulted or that he
be attacked, or at least that he be threatened with an attack in an immediate manner, as, for example,
brandishing a knife with which to stab him or pointing a gun to be discharged against him. So indispensable
is unlawful aggression in self-defense that, without it, there is no occasion to speak of the other two
requisites for such a defense because both circumstances presuppose an unlawful aggression.

The theory of the defense is that the unlawful aggression started in the basketball court, when the victim
tried to poke a fork on the neck of appellant, and continued thereafter. Even on the elementary rule that
when the aggressor leaves, the unlawful aggression ceases, it follows that when appellant and Jaime
heeded the advice of the barangay tanod for them to go home, the unlawful aggression no longer existed,
appellant had no right whatsoever to kill or even wound the former aggressor. The supposed continuation
of the unlawful aggression which could have justified self-defense would have been the circumstance that
Jaime persisted in his design to attack appellant while the latter was already in front of his house. This fact,
however, the defense ruefully failed to establish.

The case at bar calls to mind the scenario and logical view that when a person had inflicted slight physical
injuries on another, without any intention to inflict other injuries, and the latter attacked the former, the one
making the attack was an unlawful aggressor. The attack made was evidently a retaliation. And, we find
this an opportune occasion to emphasize that retaliation is different from an act of self-defense. In
retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased to exist when the accused
attacked him. In self-defense, the aggression was still existing when the aggressor was still existing when
the aggressor was injured or disabled by the person making a defense.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo is hereby MODIFIED by finding accused-
appellant George Decena y Rocaberte guilty of the crime of homicide, and imposing upon him an
indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In all other respects, the said judgment is hereby
AFFIRMED.

People v. Dela Cruz

GR 128359 6 December 2000 Defense of self, relatives, and

strangers

Keyword: *bangs door* COME OUT! COME OUT!

Doctrine: Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would presuppose an actual,

sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person – not a mere
threatening or intimidating attitude - but most importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken
against the aggressor.

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Facts: The victim Daniel Macapagal, a married man, had been a live-in partner of Ma. Luz Perla San
Antonio before San Antonio took appellant Roberto de la Cruz, widower, as lover and live-in partner. At
the time of the incident on May 27, 1996, appellant and San Antonio were living in a house.

At around 6:00 o’clock in the evening on May 27, 1996, San Antonio and appellant were resting in their
bedroom when they heard a car stop in front of their house and later knocks on their door. San Antonio
opened the front door and she was confronted by Macapagal who made his way inside the house holding
a gun in his hand, despite San Antonio’s refusal to let him in. He seemed to be looking for something or
somebody as Macapagal walked passed San Antonio and inspected the two opened bedrooms of the
house. He then went to the close bedroom where the appellant was and banged at the door with his gun
while yelling ‘Come out. Come out’. Appellant then opened the door but he was greeted by Macapagal’s
gun which was pointed at him. Appellant immediately closed the door while Macapagal continued banging
at it. When appellant again opened the door moments later, he was himself armed with a .38 caliber
revolver. The two at that instant immediately grappled for each other’s firearm. A few moments later shots
were heard. Macapagal fell dead on the floor.

"Appellant told San Antonio to call the police on the phone. After a few minutes police officers arrived at
the scene. They saw the dead body of Macapagal slumped on the floor holding a gun. Appellant told the
police that he shot Macapagal in self-defense and went with them to the police station.

Unmoved by the claim of self-defense invoked by the accused, the trial court pronounced a judgment of
guilt and handed a death sentence.

Issue: WON appellant’s claim of self-defense is tenable.

Held: NO. Self-defense requires that there be (1) an unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed
by the offender, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful
aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. All these
conditions must concur.

Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would presuppose an actual, sudden and
unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person – not a mere threatening or
intimidating attitude - but most importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken against the
aggressor. True, the victim barged into the house of accused-appellant and his live-in partner and, banging
at the master bedroom door with his firearm, he yelled, "come out." Accused-appellant, however, upon
opening the door and seeing the victim pointing a gun at him, was able to prevent at this stage harm to
himself by promptly closing the door. He could have stopped there. Instead, accused-appellant, taking his
.38 caliber revolver, again opened the bedroom door and, brandishing his own firearm, forthwith confronted
the victim. At this encounter, accused-appellant would be quite hardput to still claim self-defense.

The second element of self-defense would demand that the means employed to quell the unlawful
aggression were reasonable and necessary. The number of the wounds sustained by the deceased in this
case would negate the existence of this indispensable component of self-defense. The autopsy report
would show that the victim sustained four gunshot wounds.

It would be essential, finally, for self-defense to be aptly invoked that there be lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself. When accused-appellant, opening the bedroom door the
second time confronted, instead of merely taking precautionary measures against, the victim with his own
gun he had taken from the cabinet, accused-appellant could no longer correctly argue that there utterly
was no provocation on his part.

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People v. Jaurigue

GR 128359 6 December 2000 Defense of self, relatives, and

strangers

Keyword: Manyak na Manliligaw sinaksak sa loob ng simbahan

Doctrine: The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a state
of legitimate defense, inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if
not more, than her very existence; and it is evident that a woman who, thus imperiled, wounds nay kills
the offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability, since such killing cannot be considered
a crime from the moment it became the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great an
outrage.

Facts:

Both the defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue and the deceased Amado Capiña lived in the barrio
of Sta. Isabel, city of San Pablo, Province of Laguna; that for sometime prior to the stabbing of the
deceased by defendant and appellant, in the evening of September 20, 1942, the former had been
courting the latter in vain, and that on one occasion, about one month before that fatal night, Amado
snatched a handkerchief belonging to her, bearing her nickname "Aveling,: while it was being washed by
her cousin. When Amado confessed his love to her, she flatly refused and thereupon suddenly embraced
and kissed her and touched her breast, on account of which, she slapped him and gave him fist blows.
There was also an occasion when Amado climbed up the house of the defendant-appellant and
surreptitiously entered the room where she was sleeping. He felt her forehead, evidently with the
intention of abusing her. She immediately screamed for help, which awakened her parents and brought
her to their side. Amado then came out from where he had hidden under a bed in Avelina’s room and
kissed the hand of her father and beg of him for forgiveness.

There was also an occasion where Avelina received an information that Amado had been falsely
boasting in the neighborhood of having taken liberties with her person and that she asked him to elope
with her and that if he should not marry her, she would take poison. In the evening of the same day,
Avelina entered the chapel to attend religious services and sat on the bench next to the last one nearest
the door. Upon observing her presence, Amado who was also there, sat on her right side and without
saying a word, placed his right hand on the upper part of her right. On observing this highly improper and
offensive conduct of Amado Capiña, Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor,
pulled out with her right hand the fan knife marked Exhibit B, which she had in a pocket of her dress, with
the intention of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized Avelina's right hand, but she quickly
grabbed the knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck,
inflicting upon him a wound about 41/2 inches deep, which was necessarily mortal. Amado died from the
wound a few minutes later.

Barrio lieutenant Casimiro Lozada, who was also in the same chapel, approached Avelina and asked her
why she did that, and Avelina surrendered herself, saying: "Kayo na po and bahala sa aquin," meaning:
"I hope you will take care of me." or more correctly, "I place myself at your disposal." Fearing that
Amado's relatives might retaliate, barrio lieutenant Lozada advised Avelina’s father and Avelina to go
home immediately, to close their doors and windows and not to admit anybody into the house, unless
accompanied by him. Around 10pm of the same night, 3 policemen arrived in their house and to which
Avelina surrendered.

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Issues:

1. Was there unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased that would warrant Avelina Jaurige’s
exemption from criminal liability? No.

2. Can her surrender to the barrio lieutenant immediately after stabbing the deceased constitute as a
Mitigating Circumstance in her favor? Yes

3. Was the accused’s intention of merely inflicting a wound against the deceased but ended up killing him
be considered a mitigating circumstance? Yes.

4. Is the aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated to religious worship be
considered in this case? No.

Held:
1. The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a state of
legitimate defense, inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not
more, than her very existence; and it is evident that a woman who, thus imperiled, wounds nay kills the
offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability, since such killing cannot be considered a
crime from the moment it became the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great an
outrage.

When the deceased sat by the side of defendant and appellant on the same bench, near the door of the
barrio chapel and placed his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh, without her consent, the said
chapel was lighted with electric lights, and there were already several people, about ten of them, inside
the chapel, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant; there was and there could be no possibility
of her being raped. And when she gave A. C. a thrust at the base of the left side of his neck inflicting
upon him a mortal wound 4½ inches deep, causing his death a few moments later, the means employed
by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive. Held : That she cannot be legally declared
completely exempt from criminal liability.

2. The fact that defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered to the
barrio lieutenant, admitting having stabbed the deceased, and agreed to go to her house shortly
thereafter and to remain there subject to the order of the said barrio lieutenant, an agent of the authorities,
and the further fact that she had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against
her a few moments before, and upon such provocation as to produce passion and obfuscation, or
temporary loss of reason and self-control, should be considered as mitigating circumstances in her favor.

3. It appearing that defendant and appellantmerely wanted to punish the offending hand of the deceased
with her knife, as shown by the fact that she inflected upon him only one single wound, the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that actually committed should be
considered in her favor.

4. The aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated to religious worship, cannot
be legally considered, where there is no evidence to show that the defendant and appellant had murder
in her heart when she entered the chapel the fatal night.

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People v. Narvaez
(see also dissents of J. Abad Santos and J. Gutierrez, Jr.)

GR L-33466-67 20 April 1983 JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES

Defense of self, relatives, and
strangers

Keyword: Nap; Noise; Chiselling of wall; Defense of property.

Doctrine: In order for defense of one's person or rights be appreciated as a justifying circumstance under
Art. 11(1) of the RPC, the following requisites must occur:
(1) Unlawful aggression;
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Dissent of J. Abad Santos:

The self-defense of the RPC refers to unlawful aggression on persons, not property.

Dissent of J. Gutierrez, Jr.:

Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to life and defense of property can only be
invoked when it is coupled with some form of attack on the person of one entrusted with said property. The
defense of property, whether complete or incomplete, to be available in prosecutions for murder or
homicide must be coupled with an attack by the one getting the property on the person defending it.

Facts: Mamerto Narvaez was one of the settlers of a parcel of land whose ownership was in dispute.
During the pendency of the suit, Narvaex agreed to lease the area in order to avoid trouble until the
question of ownership of the land could be decided. Later, Davis Fleiseher wrote him a letter informing him
that because he failed to pay the rentals, he is given 6 months to remove his house thereon or else it will
be demolished. The 6-month period expired. One day, Narvaez, who was then taking a nap, was awakened
by some noise. Getting up and looking out of the window, he found that one of the laborers of Fleischer
was chiselling the wall of his house with a crowbar, while Rubia was nailing the barbed wire and Fleischer
was commanding his laborers. Thus, Narvaez talked to Rubia and the latter’s group saying “Pare, if
possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over what is good.” Fleischer, however,
answered: “No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.” Narvaez lost his equilibrium, got his gun, and shot Fleischer
and Rubia who both died as a result of the shooting. Narvaez admitted having shot them from the window
of his house with the shotgun which he surrendered to the police authorities. He claims, however, that he
did so in defense of his person and of his rights, and therefore he should be exempt from criminal liability.

Issue: WON Narvaez is exempt from criminal liability.

Held: NO. In order for defense of one's person or rights be appreciated as a justifying circumstance under
Art. 11(1) of the RPC, the following requisites must occur:
(1) Unlawful aggression;
➔ There was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleiseher was ordering, and Rubia was
actually participating in the fencing. This was indeed aggression, not on the person of
Narvaez, but on his property rights.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
➔ MISSING REQUISITE. When Narvaez fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two
victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

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➔ There was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of Narvaez who was defending his
property. There was no provocation at all on his part, since he was asleep at first and
was only awakened by the noise produced by the victims and their laborers. His plea for
Fleiseher, Rubia and their men to stop and talk things over with him was no provocation
at all.
Narvaez’s act in killing Fleiseher and Rubia was not justifiable, since not all the elements for justification
are present. Thus, he should therefore be held responsible for the death of his victims. Nevertheless, he
could be credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to paragraph
6, Article 13 of the RPC.

Dissent of J. Abad Santos:

The self-defense of the RPC refers to unlawful aggression on persons, not property.

Dissent of J. Gutierrez, Jr.:

Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to life and defense of property can only be
invoked when it is coupled with some form of attack on the person of one entrusted with said property. The
defense of property, whether complete or incomplete, to be available in prosecutions for murder or
homicide must be coupled with an attack by the one getting the property on the person defending it. — In
the case now before us, there is absolutely no evidence that an attack was attempted, much less made
upon the person of Narvaez.

Sabang v. People

March 9, 2007 Defense of self, relatives, and

strangers

Keyword: Drinking spree, “I will shoot you", spoiled brat

Doctrine: Unlawful aggression is a primary and indispensable requisite, without which, defense of
relative, whether complete or otherwise, cannot be validly invoked.

Facts: While on a drinking spree on the eve of January 17, 1997 during the fiesta in Liloan, Ormoc City,
a drunk Nicanor Butad murmured words such as "I will shoot you" to Randy Sabang, to the horror of
Randy Sabang's father, Nilo, and the other eyewitnesses. Moments later, Butad himself lay dead from
four gunshot wounds on his body by Nilo Sabang using Butad’s gun that was tucked in on his waist. Nilo
Sabang was charged and later convicted for homicide. He admitted to the killing of Butad but claimed
that the shooting was accidental and was done to defend his son. The defense of the prosecuting party
was supported by other witnesses during the time of the incident and claimed that on the night when the
crime happened, petitioner and Butad were drinking together with spouses Cruz and Andresa Villamor
outside the store of Melania Sombilon. Butad was a civilian agent with the Philippine National Police,
who was then armed with a .38-caliber revolver which was tucked in his holster. While they were
drinking, Randy Sabang suddenly and unexpectedly appeared before the group and triggered a negative
reaction from Butad, who then uttered the words “I will shoot you" to Randy Sabang. Because of the
evident threat, Butad afterwards lay dead from four gunshot wounds by Nilo Sabang. But Payud, another
witness, testified that petitioner reacted to Butad's statement saying, "Just try to shoot my child because
I’ll never fight for him because he is a spoiled brat."

Issue: Whether the petitioner's insistence on the justifying circumstance of defense of relative deserves
merit.

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Held: NO. In order to successfully claim that he acted in defense of a relative, the accused must prove
the concurrence of the following requisites:

(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed or injured;

(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) the
person defending the relative had no part in provoking the assailant, should any provocation been given
by the relative attacked.

Unlawful aggression is a primary and indispensable requisite without which defense of relative, whether
complete or otherwise, cannot be validly invoked. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that once an
accused has admitted that he inflicted the fatal injuries on the deceased, it is incumbent upon him in
order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him with clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence. He cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution but on the strength of his
own evidence, "for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak it could not be disbelieved after
the accused himself had admitted the killing." Thus, petitioner must establish with clear and convincing
evidence that the killing was justified, and that he incurred no criminal liability therefore. Unlawful
aggression must be clearly established by the evidence. In this case, there is a divergence in the
testimonies of the prosecution and defense witnesses as to whether Butad aimed a gun at petitioner's
son as he uttered the words "I will shoot you." With this conflict emerges the question of whether
petitioner sensed an imminent threat to his son's life. Payud unequivocally testified that petitioner even
dismissed Butad's utterance, saying, "Just try to shoot my child because I ll never fight for him because
he is a spoiled brat." This indicates to us that petitioner did not consider Butad's words a threat at all.
These circumstances led the trial court to conclude that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of
Butad which could have precipitated petitioner's actions.

Palaganas v. People

G.R. No. 165483 12 September 2006 Defense of self, relatives, and

strangers

Keyword: Tidbits Karaoke bar; Nambaril dahil sa kantang “My Way”

Doctrine: There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in actual or imminent
peril the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self defense. There must be actual physical force or
actual use of weapon. In order to constitute unlawful aggression, the person attacked must be confronted
by a real threat on his life and limb; and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not merely
imaginary.

Facts: January 16, 1998, 9:45pm, Manaoag, Pangasinan. The three brothers all surnamed Ferrer
decided to proceed to Tidbits Videoke bar located at the corner of Malvar and Rizal Streets,
Poblacion, Manaoag to continue their drinking spree and to sing.

10:30pm Jaime Palaganas arrived together with Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista. At that time,
only the Ferrer brothers were the customers in the bar. The two groups occupied separate tables. Later,
when Jaime Palaganas was singing, one of the Ferrer brothers sang along with him as he was familiar
with the song [My Way]. Jaime resented this and went near the table of the Ferrer brothers and struck
one of the Ferrers with a microphone hitting the back of his head.

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A rumble ensued between the Ferrer brothers and the Palaganases. Virgilio Bautista did not join the fray
as he left the place.

Servillano Ferrer noticed that his wristwatch was missing. Unable to locate the watch inside the bar, the
Ferrer brothers went outside. They saw Ferdinand Palaganas about 8 meters away. Ferdinand was
pointing at them and said to his companion, later identified as the accused Rujjeric Palaganas, “sila ‘yun,
barilin mo.” During the shootout, one of the Ferrer brothers retaliated by throwing stones at the accused.

Melton Ferrer was fatally hit in the head and Michael Ferrer was hit in the right shoulder. They were
rushed to Villaflor Hospital, Dagupan.

RTC of Pangasinan decided in 3 Criminal Cases finding the accused guilty of the crime of homicide and
two (2) counts of frustrated homicide of Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused appealed on the
ground of self-defense because when he fired his gun on that fateful night, he was then a victim of an
unlawful aggression perpetrated by the Ferrer brothers; that he, in fact, sustained an injury in his left leg
and left shoulder caused by the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers.

Issue: Whether the accused should be acquitted on the ground of lawful self-defense.

Held: NO. Article 11, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code provides for the elements and/or
requisites in order that a plea of self-defense may be validly considered in absolving a person from
criminal liability.

ART. 11. Justifying circumstances . — The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur;
First, Unlawful aggression;
Second, Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third, Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself…

The first element of self-defense, unlawful aggression, refers to an assault or attack, or a threat
thereof in an imminent and immediate manner, which places the defendant's life in actual peril. It is an
act positively strong showing the wrongful intent of the aggressor and not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude. It is also described as a sudden and unprovoked attack of immediate and imminent
kind to the life, safety or rights of the person attacked.

In this case, it is clear that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers that
justified the act of the petitioner in shooting them. There were no actual or imminent danger to the lives
of petitioner and Ferdinand when they proceeded and arrived at the videoke bar and saw thereat
the Ferrer brothers. It appears that the Ferrer brothers then were merely standing outside the videoke
bar and were not carrying any weapon when the petitioner arrived with his brother Ferdinand and started
firing his gun. The fact that petitioner sustained injuries in his left leg and left shoulder, allegedly caused
by the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers, does not signify that he was a victim of unlawful aggression
or that he acted in self-defense. The superficiality of the injuries sustained by the petitioner is no
indication that his life and limb were in actual peril. If the petitioner shot the Ferrer brothers just to
defend himself, it defies reason why he had to shoot the victims at the vital portions of their body, which
even led to the death of Melton who was shot at his head.

Without unlawful aggression, self defense will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance
cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are present.

The second element of self-defense requires that the means employed by the person defending himself
must be reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression of the victim. The
reasonableness of the means employed may take into account the weapons, the physical condition of

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the parties and other circumstances showing that there is a rational equivalence between the means of
attack and the defense.

The petitioner's act of shooting the Ferrer brothers was not a reasonable and necessary means of
repelling the aggression allegedly initiated by the Ferrer brothers. A gun was far deadlier than the stones
thrown by the Ferrer brothers.

The SC ruled that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers. The use of a gun
against the throwing of stones is not a reasonable necessity. There wasn’t any sufficient provocation
either.

People v. Ricohermoso (Padernal)

GR NOS. L-30527-28 29 March 1974 Avoidance of greater evil

Keyword: Stabbed in the neck, hacked in the back

Doctrine: The circumstances surrounding the killing of Geminiano de Leon alevosia or treachery. His
hands were raised and he was pleading for mercy with Severo Padernal, when Ricohermoso struck him
on the neck with a bolo. The fact that an exchange of words preceded the assault would not negate the
treacherous character of the attack. Juan Padernal's role of weakening the defense, by disabling Marianito
de Leon, was part and parcel of the means of execution deliberately resorted to by the assailants to insure
the assassination of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to themselves

Facts: This case is an appeal by Severo Padernal and Juan Padernal from the decision of the Circuit
Criminal Court at Lucena City, convicting them of murder.

Geminiano de Leon, together with his common-law wife, son Marianito de Leon and one Rizal Rosales,
chanced upon Pio Ricohermoso. Owning a parcel of land, which Ricohermoso cultivated as kaingin,
Geminiano asked about his share of palay harvest and added that she should be allowed to taste the palay
harvested from his land. Ricohermoso said Geminiano could collect the palay anytime.

Upon returning from his trip to Barrio Bagobasin, Geminiano dropped by Ricohermoso’s house and asked
him about the palay, to which the latter answered defiantly that he will not give him the palay, whatever
happens. Geminiano remonstrated and at that point , as if by prearrangement, Ricohermoso unsheathed
his bolo, while his father-in-law Severo Padernal got an axe, and attacked Geminiano. At the same time
and place, Ricohermoso’s brother-in-law Juan Padernal suddenly and allegedly embraced Marianito in
order to disable him as Marianito tried to shoot with his rifle while Geminiano was being assaulted. They
grappled and rolled down the hill, at which point Marianito passed out. When he regained consciousness,
he discovered that the rifle he carried beforehand was gone and that his father was mortally wounded.

It was found that Marianito sustained multiple abrasions on the neck and abdomen and a lacerated wound
on the left foot which would heal from 1-9 days even without medical treatment.

Issue: Whether appellant Juan Padernal can invoke the justifying circumstance of avoidance of a greater
evil or injury

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Held: NO. Juan Padernal’s reliance on the justifying circumstance is erroneous because his act in
preventing Marianito from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, the aggressors in this case, was
designed to insure the killing of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to the assailants and not an act to
prevent infliction of greater evil or injury. His intention was to forestall any interference in the assault.

Treachery was also appreciated in the case. The trial court convicted the appellants with lesiones leves,
from an attempted murder charge with respect to Marianito de Leon. Judgment as to Juan Padernal
affirmed.

People v. Norma Hernandez

CA-G.R. No. 22553-R 14 April 1959 Article 11, Section 4, RPCl

Keyword: backout marriage

Doctrine: Justifying Circumstances (Art. 11 par.4, RPC) Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or
injury, does not act which causes damage to another, provided that the following requisites are present;
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; Second. That the injury feared be greater than
that done to avoid it; Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

Facts:
Vivencio Lascano, and Maria Norma Hernandez have a boyfriend- girlfriend relationship. The two talked
about getting married. Vivencio’s parents went to the house of Norma to have a “pamamanhikan”. They
brought chickens and goats. The marriage was set on March 19, 1955. The preparation went on but on
the day of wedding, Norma did not show up, causing Vivencio and his family great shame and
humiliation. Norma Hernandez confessed that she was not really in love with him, and that she accepted
the proposal because she was convinced by her parents. That she decided to leave home as last
recourse to prevent the marriage. Norma’s parents also corroborated her testimony. RTC convicted her
of serious slander by deed because she purposely and deliberately fled to prevent celebration of
marriage. Thus, she appealed.

Issue: Whether or Not Norma should be convicted on the ground of serious slander by deed?

Held: NO, SC reversed the RTC judgment and acquitted the appellant. A party to an agreement to marry
who backs out cannot be held liable for the crime of slander by deed , for then that would be an inherent
way of compelling said party to go into a marriage without his or her free consent, and this would
contravene the principle in law that what could not be done directly could not be done indirectly; and said
party has the right to avoid to himself or herself the evil of going through a loveless marriage pursuant to
Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. One of the essential requisites of slander hasn’t been
proven. There is no malice in the act of the appellant changing her mind. She was merely exercising her
right not to give her consent to the marriage after mature consideration. Appellant had the right to avoid
to herself the evil of going through a loveless marriage. Justifying Circumstances (Art. 11 par.4, RPC)
Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does not act which causes damage to another,

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provided that the following requisites are present; First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; Third. That there be no other
practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

People v. Delima

GR 18660 22 December 1922 Fulfillment of duty

Keyword: tumakas si fugitive tas nabaril ni policeman and nadedz

Doctrine: That the policeman did not commit any crime, that the killing was done in the performance of a
duty, and, therefore, under article 8, No. 11, of the Penal Code, he must be acquitted.

Facts: Lorenzo Napilon had escapes from the jail where he was serving sentence. Some days afterwards
the policeman Felipe Delima, who was looking for him, found him in the house of Jorge Alegria, armed
with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance, and demanded his surrender. The fugitive
answered with a stroke of his lance. The policeman dodged it and to impose his authority fired his revolver,
but the bullet did not hit him. The criminal ran away, without parting with his weapon. The peace officer
went after him and fired again his revolver, this time hitting and killing him. The policeman was tried and
convicted for homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal and the accessory penalties. He appeals from
that judgment which must be reversed.

Issue: Whether or not Felipe Delima, as the police officer who shot Lorenzo Napilon committed homicide.

Held: NO. That killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under the obligation to
surrender, and had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience
with a weapon in the hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to such an extreme means, which
although it prove to be fatal, was justified by the circumstances. Article 8, No. 11, of the Penal code being
considered, Felipe Delima committed no crime, and he is hereby acquitted with the costs de oficio.

People v. Lagata

G.R. No. L-1940-42; 83 Phil. 150 24 March 1949 Fulfillment of duty

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Keyword: 6 prisoners; Gunshot; Mountain; Footprint

Doctrine: While custodians of prisoners should take care to avoid the latter's escape, only absolute
necessity would authorize them to fire against them. Theirs is the burden of proof as to such necessity.

Facts: Ignacio Lagata was a provincial jail guard in charge of 6 prisoners, namely Jesus Manoso, Ceferino
Tipace, Eusebio Abria, Eustaquio Galet, Mariano Ibanez, the witness, and Epifanio Labong, assigned to
work in the capitol plaza of Samar. He then ordered them to go to the nursery to pick up gabi (gulay). Not
long afterwards they were called to assemble when suddenly one of the prisoners (Labong) went missing,
hence he ordered the remaining 5 prisoners to look for him. When Abria told Lagata of the flattened grass
and that he was unable to look for Labong, Ignacio Lagata fired at him and he was hit on his left arm. Abria
told Lagata he was wounded and in turn, Lagata told them to assemble and started to wave around his
gun towards them. Others started running away afraid to be shot. Lagata shot Tipace and died. 3 gunshots
were heard that night. First was shot in the air to call the attention of the prisoners to go back, the second
shot hit Eusebio, and the third shot hit Tipace. Mariano said that when he saw Tipace was shot, he ran
away because he also could have been shot. Galet, another detainee, received good treatment from
Lagata though his testimony corroborated those of the other prisoners.

Pedro Mayuga, chief of Samar Provincial Hospital & Gilberto Rosales, Sanitary Division president, verified
the gunshot wound and that the death of Tipace resulted therein. Lagata was then charged with murder,
serious physicial injuries and evasion throuh negligence. In his defense, Lagata claimed that he fired his
gun because the prisoners were running far from him when he already ordered them to stop. He said that
he would be the one in jail if a prisoner escaped under his custody. Furthermore, he would be discharged
from duty like the others. He was hopeless already. Moreover, the picking up of gabi was not part of the
prisoner’s work. RTC found him guilty of the said charges.

Issue: Whether or not Lagata is entitled to the benefit of mitigating circumstance of incomplete justifying
circumstance.

Held: YES. It is clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason to fire at Tipace. Lagata could have fired at
him in self defense or if absolutely necessary to avoid his escape. The record does not show that Tipace
was bent on committing any act of aggression "he was running towards and then around me". Moreover,
even if appellant sincerely believed, although erroneously, that in firing the shots be acted in the
performance of his official duty the circumstances of the case show that there was no necessity for him to
fire directly against the prisoners so as seriously wound one of them and kill instantaneously another. While
custodians of prisoners should take care to avoid the latter's escape, only absolute necessity would
authorize them to fire against them. Theirs is the burden of proof as to such necessity. Hence, Lagata is
guilty of homicide but is entitled to the benefit if mitigating circumstance of incomplete justifying
circumstance under Art 11 par 5 of the RPC.

Mamangun v. People

GR 128359 6 December 2000 Fulfillment of duty

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Keyword: Robbery-holdup; 3 Policemen responded;“Hindi ako, hindi ako!”; Binaril sa rooftop

Doctrine: The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under paragraph 5, Article II, of the Revised
Penal Code may be invoked only after the defense successfully proves that: (1) the accused acted in the
performance of a duty; and (2) the injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary consequence of
the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty.

Facts: Petitioner, then a police officer, was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of Murder.
Policeman Rufino Mamangun was responding to a robbery-holdup call, with his fellow police officers, at
Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. A certain Liberty Contreras was heard shouting, which prompted
residents to respond and chase the suspect, who entered the yard and proceeded to the rooftop of Antonio
Abacan. Mamangun, with PO2 Diaz and Cruz, each armed with a drawn handgun, searched the rooftop
and saw a man who they thought was the robbery suspect. Mamangun, who was ahead of the group, fired
his gun once and hit the man, who turned out to be Gener Contreras (not the suspect) – Contreras died of
the gunshot wound.

According to the lone witness Crisanto Ayson, he accompanied the policemen to the lighted rooftop. He
was beside Mamangun when he (Ayson) recognized the deceased. According to Ayson, Mamangun
pointed his gun at the man, who instantly exclaimed “Hindi ako, hindi ako!” to which Mamangun replied,
“Anong hindi ako?” and shot him.

The defense rejects this testimony, alleging that they were the only ones at the dark rooftop when
Mamangun noticed a crouching man who suddenly continued to run. Mamangun shouted “Pulis, tigil!”
whereupon the person stopped and raised a steel pipe towards Mamangun’s head. This prompted
Mamangun to shoot the person. The three police claim that Contreras only said “Hindi ako, hindi ako” only
when they approached him. Mamangun then asked “Why did you go to the rooftop? You know there are
policemen here.” Mamangun reported the incident to the desk officer who directed investigator Hernando
Banez to investigate the incident. Banez later on found a steel pipe on the roof.

Issue: W/N the death of the victim was the necessary consequence of the petitioner’s fulfillment of his duty

Held: No. The Court denies the instant petition and affirms Sandiganbayan’s decision after finding the
petitioner’s testimony to be nothing but a concocted story designed to evade criminal liability. Per
Sandiganbayan’s observations, the defense was self-serving for the accused and biased with respect to
his co-policemen-witnesses because:

After supposed introductions and forewarnings uttered allegedly by Mamangun, it is contrary to human
experience for a man (who is not the suspect) to attack one of three policemen with drawn guns

Mamangun’s admission that he did not ask the victim “Why did you try to hit me, if you are not the one?”
clearly belies their claim. The location of the entry of bullet belies their claim because it appears that the
victim instinctively shielded himself instead

Additionally, petitioner’s pretense that Contreras struck him was not initially reported to the desk and was
only conveniently remembered when the investigator found a pipe in the crime scene.

Having admitted the fatal shooting of Contreras on the night of July 31, 1992, petitioner is charged with the
burden of adducing convincing evidence to show that the killing was done in the fulfillment of his duty as a
policeman.

The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under paragraph 5, Article II, of the Revised Penal Code
may be invoked only after the defense successfully proves that: (1) the accused acted in the performance

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of a duty; and (2) the injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due
performance or lawful exercise of such duty.

Self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated as a valid justifying circumstance in

this case. For, from the above admitted, uncontroverted or established facts, the most important element
of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim to justify a claim of self defense was absent. Lacking this
essential and primary element of unlawful aggression, petitioner’s plea of self-defense, complete or
incomplete, must have to fail.

To be sure, acts in the fulfillment of a duty, without more, do not completely justify the petitioner’s firing the
fatal gunshot at the victim. True, petitioner, as one of the policemen responding to a reported robbery then
in progress, was performing his duty as a police officer as well as when he was trying to effect the arrest
of the suspected robber and in the process, fatally shoot said suspect, albeit the wrong man. However, in
the absence of the equally necessary justifying circumstance that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty, there can only be incomplete justification, a
privileged mitigating circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the Revised Penal Code.

People v. Dagani

GR 153875 16 August 2006 Fulfillment of duty/Valid Self Defense

Keyword: PNR security officers, barilan sa canteen

Doctrine:
1. As held in People v. Ulep, the right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last
resort, and under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without
bloodshed. The law does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill.
It may be true that police officers sometimes find themselves in a dilemma when pressured by a situation
where an immediate and decisive, but legal, action is needed. However, it must be stressed that the
judgment and discretion of police officers in the performance of their duties must be exercised neither
capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear and legal provision
to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and within the spirit
and purpose of the law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy law enforcement officers who
indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons they are apprehending. They must always
bear in mind that although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom society must be
protected, these criminals are also human beings with human rights.

2. Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would presuppose an actual, sudden and
unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person — not a mere threatening or
intimidating attitude — but most importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken against the
aggressor. To invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked
attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the
assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.

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Facts: In the afternoon September 11, 1989, a group composed of Ernesto Javier (Javier), Lincoln Miran
(Miran), and two other individuals had been drinking at the canteen located inside the compound of the
Philippine National Railways (PNR) along C.M. Recto Avenue, Tondo, Manila. All of a sudden, accused-
appellants Ronaldo Dagani and Otello Santiano, who were security officers of the PNR and covered by
the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, entered the canteen and approached the group. Dagani shoved
Miran, causing the latter to fall from his chair. Dagani then held Javier while Santiano shot Javier twice at
his left side, killing the latter.

On the other hand, according to the accused-appellants, their desk officer directed them to investigate a
commotion at the canteen. When Santiano arrived, he told his co-accused, Dagani, to enter while he waited
outside. Dagani approached Javier who was striking a beer bottle on the table. Javier then pulled out a .22
caliber revolver and fired at Dagani, but the gun failed to go off. Then, while standing outside the canteen,
Santiano heard gunfire and saw Javier and Dagani squabbling over a.22 caliber gun that belonged to
Javier. The gun went off during the struggle, forcing Santiano to fire a warning shot. When he heard Javier's
gunfire again, he dashed into the canteen. Santiano then shot Javier from less than four meters away.

Accused-appellants invoked the justifying circumstances of self-defense and lawful performance

of official duty as PNR security officers. They also argued that the prosecution failed to establish
treachery and conspiracy.

The trial court found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. The CA also affirmed the findings of
the fact.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the Dagani and Santiano should be acquitted based on lawful performance of duty as
PNR security officers.

2. Whether or not the defense was able prove to the satisfaction of the Court that the elements of self-
defense were present, for them to avail of the extenuating circumstance,

Held:
1. The Supreme Court held that that Santiano is guilty of homicide while Dagani was acquitted. Article 11
of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office does not incur any criminal liability. Two requisites must concur before this
defense can prosper: 1) the accused must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed should have been the
necessary consequence of such lawful exercise.

In the case at bar, these elements are absent as to Santiano. The Supreme Court held that the fatal injuries that
appellant Santiano inflicted on the victim cannot be deemed to be necessary consequences of the performance
of his duty as a PNR security officer. This is in consideration of the following facts: that the imminent or actual
danger to the life of the accused-appellants had been neutralized when Dagani grappled with Javier and
restrained his hands; that Javier had been thrown off-balance; that Dagani had been specially trained for these
purposes; and that Javier had been drinking immediately prior to the scuffle.

2. No. Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would presuppose an actual, sudden and
unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person, not a mere threatening or
intimidating attitude, but most importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken against the
aggressor. To invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked
attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the
assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack. Self-defense requires that there be (1) an
unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed by the offender, (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself. All these conditions must concur.

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The defense was unable to prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Javier. They were unable to
present evidence that the victim actually fired his gun. No spent shells from the .22 caliber pistol were found and
no bullets were recovered from the scene of the incident. Javier also tested negative for gunpowder residue. In
sum, the defense presented a bare claim of self-defense without any proof of the existence of its requisites.

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People v. Beronilla

L-4445 28 February 1955 Obedience to a lawful order of a

superior

Keyword: Pina-execute niya yung pro-japanese mayor so sinentence tuloy siya ng murder awit.

Doctrine: Where the accused acted upon orders of superior officers that they, as military subordinates,
could not question, and obeyed in good faith, without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or
negligence on their part, the act is not accompanied by criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea — a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act
complained of be innocent.

Facts: Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco and Jacinto Adriatico filed an appeal from
the judgement of the Abra CFI, which convicted them of murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal, the
elected mayor of La, Paz, Abra (at the outbreak of war), which was found to be aiding the enemy.
Note: Arsenio Borjal is the Mayor during the Japanese occupation, and continued to serve as Mayor during
the Japanese occupation (so based lang dito, pro-Japanese siya kaya found to be aiding the enemy)

Borjal moved to Bangued because of death threats. Thereafter, Military Mayor Manuel Beronilla, who was
appointed by Lt. Col. Arbold, regimental commander of the 15th Infantry of the Phil. Army, operating as
guerilla unit in Abra. Simultaneously upon his appointment, Beronilla received a memorandum which
authorized him to appoint a jury of 12 bolo men to try persons accused of treason, espionage and aiding
or abetting the enemy (pro-Japanese). He also received from the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry a list
of all puppet government officials of the province of Abra (which included Arsenio Borjal, puppet mayor of
La Paz).

While the operations for the liberation of the province of Abra were in progress, the return of Borjal and his
family to Abra, to escape bombing in Bangued, Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions, was placed under
custody and tried and sentenced to death by the jury based on various complaints (charges of espionage,
aiding the enemy, and abuse of authority were filed) made by the residents. Beronilla reported this to Col.
Arnold who complimented him.

Two years thereafter, Beronilla, along with the executioner, digger and jury, were indicted for the murder
of Borjal. Soon after, President Manuel Roxas issued Executive Proclamation 8, which granted amnesty
to persons who committed acts in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the
war efforts of the enemy.

The rest of defendants applied and were granted amnesty, but Beronilla and others were convicted on the
grounds that the crime was made on purely personal motives and that the crime was committed after the
expiration of time limit for amnesty proclamation.

The CFI of Abra found the defendants Manuel Beronilla, Policarpo Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto
Adriatico as conspirator and co-principals of the crime of murder.

Issue: W/N the defendant-appellants’ actions are covered by justifying circumstances for obedience to
lawful order of superior

Held: Yes. The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that the arrest, prosecution and
trial of the late Arsenio Borjal were done pursuant to express orders of the 15th Infantry Headquarters. ,

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instructing all military mayors under its jurisdiction to gather evidence against puppet officials and to
appoint juries of at least 12 bolomen to try the accused and find them guilty by two thirds vote. It is to be
noted that Arsenio Borjal was specifically named in the list of civilian officials to be prosecuted.

The arrest and trial of Borjal were made upon express orders of the higher command; the appellants
allowed Borjal to be defended by counsel, one of them (attorney Jovito Barreras) chosen by Borjal's
sister; the trial lasted nineteen (19) days; it was suspended when doubts arose about its legality, and it
was not resumed until headquarters (then in Langangilang, Abra) authorized its resumption and sent an
observer (Esteban Cabanos, of the S-5) to the proceedings, and whose suggestions on procedure were
followed; and when the verdict of guilty was rendered and death sentence imposed, the records were
sent to Arnold's headquarters for review, and Borjal was not punished until the records were returned
eight days later with the statement of Arnold that "whatever disposition you make of the case is hereby
approved", which on its face was an assent to the verdict and the sentence. The lower Court, after
finding that the late Arsenio Borjal had really committed treasonable acts, (causing soldiers and civilians
to be tortured, and hidden American officers to be captured by the Japanese) expressly declared that
"the Court is convinced that it was not for political or personal reason that the accused decided to kill
Arsenio Borjal" .It appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and that the accused-
appellants acted upon orders, of a superior officers that they, as military subordinates, could not
question, and obeyed in good faith, without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence
on their part, we can not say that criminal intent has been established. Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit
rea.

"To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by
a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences, as, in law, is
equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea-a is not committed if the
mind of the person performing the act complained of be innocent."

For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellants are acquitted.

Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan

GR 103501-03 17 February 1997 Obedience to a lawful order of a

superior

Keyword: corruption; MIAA, 55 million (take note nangyari yung pagtransfer ng funds a month before
EDSA Revolution ****veryy fishyyyy)

Doctrine: Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of "Any person who acts in obedience
to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose." The subordinate-superior relationship between
Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And so too, is the lawfulness of the order contained in the MARCOS
Memorandum, as it has for its purpose partial payment of the liability of one government agency (MIAA)
to another (PNCC).

Facts: Tabuena and Peralta were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having malversed the total
amount of P55 Million of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) funds during their incumbency
as General Manager and Acting Finance Services Manager, respectively, of MIAA. There were three (3)
criminal cases filed since the total amount of P55 Million was taken on three (3) separate dates of January,
1986. Tabuena appears as the principal accused — he being charged in all three (3) cases.

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It stemmed from when President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the
president's office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC) to which Tabuena replied, "Yes, sir, I will do it." About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs.
Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum (MARCOS
Memorandum) reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction.

In obedience to President Marcos' verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Dabao
and Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals.

The first withdrawal was made for P25 Million, The P25 Million in cash were then placed in peerless boxes
and duffle bags, loaded on a PNB armored car and delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez
located at Aguado Street fronting Malacanang. Mrs. Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the money
received Similar circumstances surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another
P25 Million, made on January 16, 1986. The third and last withdrawal was made on January 31, 1986 for
P5 Million. It was only upon delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts
she received from Tabuena.

The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as described by Tabuena and Peralta themselves, "out of the
ordinary" and "not based on the normal procedure". Not only were there no vouchers prepared to support
the disbursement, the P55 Million was paid in cold cash. Also, no PNCC receipt for the P55 Million was
presented.

The position of the prosecution was that there were no outstanding obligations in favor of PNCC at the
time of the disbursement of the P55 Million. On the other hand, the defense of Tabuena and Peralta, in
short, was that they acted in good faith. Tabuena claimed that he was merely complying with the MARCOS
Memorandum which ordered him to forward immediately to the Office of the President P55 Million in cash
as partial payment of MIAA's obligations to PNCC, and that he (Tabuena) was of the belief that MIAA
indeed had liabilities to PNCC. Peralta for his part shared the same belief and so he heeded the request
of Tabuena, his superior, for him (Peralta) to help in the release of P5 Million.

Issue: WON the accused must be acquitted because they acted in good faith.

Held: YES. Going now to the defense of good faith, it is settled that this is a valid defense in a prosecution
for malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused. In so far as Tabuena is
concerned, with the due presentation in evidence of the MARCOS Memorandum we are swayed to give
credit to his claim of having caused the disbursement of the P55 Million solely by reason of such
memorandum.

First. Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS
Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the
presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier said than done. Marcos was undeniably
Tabuena's superior — the former being then the President of the Republic who unquestionably exercised
control over government agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC. In other words, Marcos had a say in
matters involving inter-government agency affairs and transactions, such as directing payment of liability
of one entity to another and the manner in which it should be carried out. And as a recipient of such kind
of a directive coming from the highest official of the land, good faith should be read on Tabuena's
compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS Memorandum.

Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of "Any person who acts in obedience to an
order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose." The subordinate-superior relationship between
Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And so too, is the lawfulness of the order contained in the MARCOS
Memorandum, as it has for its purpose partial payment of the liability of one government agency (MIAA)
to another (PNCC).

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Even assuming that the real and sole purpose behind the MARCOS Memorandum was to siphon-out public
money for the personal benefit of those then in power, still, no criminal liability can be imputed to Tabuena.
There is no showing that Tabuena had anything to do whatsoever with the execution of the MARCOS
Memorandum. Nor is there proof that he profited from the felonious scheme.

This is not a sheer case of blind and misguided obedience, but obedience in good faith of a duly executed
order. Indeed, compliance to a patently lawful order is rectitude far better than contumacious disobedience.
In the case at bench, the order emanated from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the
President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly
issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation
illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without
question. Obedientia est legis essentia.

People v. Taneo

GR L-37673 March 31, 1933 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Insanity

Keyword: Bardagulan sa paniginip pero nasaksak nya wife nya sa totoong buhay :(

Doctrine: The defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he is charged, were not
voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.

Facts:

Taneo lived with his wife in his parent's house in Ormoc, Leyte. OnJanuary 16, 1932, a fiesta was being
celebrated in the said barrio and visitors were entertained in the house. Among them were Tanner and
Malinao. Early that afternoon, Taneo, went to sleep and while sleeping,he suddenly got up, left the room
bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen. Taneo
attacked Tanner and Malinao and tried to attack his father after which he wounded himself. Taneo’s wife
who was then seven months pregnant, died five days later as a result of her wound, and also the foetus
which was asphyxiated in the mother's womb.

An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon conviction he was sentenced
by the trialcourt to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties, to indemnity the heirs of the deceased
in the sum of P500and to pay the costs. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.

It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the defendant had a quarrel
over a glass of "tuba" with Collantes and Abadilla, who invited him to come down to fight, and when he
was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the commission of the
crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early in the afternoon he had a severe
stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It was then when he fell asleep. The defendant
states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla
held his feet, by reason of whichhe got up; and as it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to
come down, he armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to
say to him that she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation

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wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply around him,he attacked everybody that came his
way.

Issue: Whether Taneo should be exempt from criminal liability having acted while in a dream?

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he
is charged, were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.

In arriving at this conclusion, the court took into consideration the fact that the apparent lack of a motive
for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply they are not
known to us, for we cannot probe into depths of one's conscience where they may be found, hidden away
and inaccessible to the court’s observation. We are also conscious of the fact that an extreme moral
perversion may lead a man commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. But
under the special circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the defendant's own wife whom he
dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that the defendant tried to attack also his father, in
whose house and under whose protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests,
whom he himself invited as may be inferred from the evidence presented, we find not only a lack of motives
for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of, but also motives for not committing said
acts.

Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor stated that
considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of
an hallucination and not inhis right mind.

The court have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the wound of the deceased was direct
result of the defendant's act performed in order to inflict it. Nevertheless the court may say further that the
evidence does not clearly show this to have been the case, but that it may have been caused accidentally.
Nobody saw how the wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he wounded his wife. He only
seemed to have heard her say that she was wounded. What the evidence shows is that the deceased,
who was in the sala, intercepted the defendant at the door of the room as he was coming out. The
defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his wife but he was defending himself from his enemies.
And so, believing that his wife was really wounded, in desperation, he stabbed himself.

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People v. Bonoan

GR L-45130 17 February 1937 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Insanity

Keyword: Arraignment; Psychopathic Hospital; Dementia praecox; Manic depressive psychosis.

Doctrine: The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime, but sanity is presumed, and when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the
defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him. In order to ascertain a
person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his
mind a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony is not required, nor are specific
acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. Mind can only be known by outward acts.
Thereby, we read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and come to determine whether his
acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. To prove insanity, therefore, circumstantial evidence,
if clear and convincing, suffice.

Facts: An information for murder was filed against Celestino Bonoan for attacking and assaulting Carlos
Guison on December 12, 1934 with a knife on different parts of his body which then caused the latter’s
death. When the case was called for arraignment, the defense counsel objected on the ground that Bonoan
was mentally deranged and was at the time confined in the Psychopathic Hospital. Dr. Toribio Joson
(doctor who examined Bonoan) and Dr. Jose Fernandez (assistant alienist of the hospital) both appeared
and reported before the court that Bonoan was not in a condition to defend himself. However, months later,
Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that Bonoan could be discharged from the hospital and appear for trial,
as he was "considered a recovered case." Dr. Fernandez testified Bonoan "had recovered from the
disease”. Consequently, Bonoan was arraigned and was found guilty by the lower court; it came to a
conclusion that Bonoan was not insane at the time of the commission of the act. Bonoan appealed, alleging
that he was insane at the time he killed Guison.

Issue: WON Bonoan was insane at the time of the commission of the crime.

Held: YES. The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime, but sanity is presumed, and when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the
defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him. In order to ascertain a
person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his
mind a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony is not required, nor are specific
acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. Mind can only be known by outward acts.
Thereby, we read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and come to determine whether his
acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. To prove insanity, therefore, circumstantial evidence,
if clear and convincing, suffice. In the case at bar, the court considered the following considerations:
(1) Bonoan was confined in the insane department of San Lazaro Hospital from April 11-26, 1922
and January 6-10, 1926 because of a disease called dementia praecox — long before the
commission of the crime but it tends to show the recurrence of the ailment.
(2) Persons suffering from dementia praecox are regarded as having a mental disease to a degree
that disqualifies them for legal responsibility for their actions. The symptoms of dementia praecox
are similar to those of manic depressive psychosis during which a person has no control
whatsoever of his acts.
(3) 4 days before the incident Bonoan had an insomnia attack which is one of the symptoms and
may lead to dementia praecox.

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(4) The day following the commission of the crime the police department sent Bonoan to the
Psychopathic Hospital — indicates that police authorities themselves doubted the mental
normalcy of Bonoan.
(5) According to Dr. Joson, Bonoan was suffering from manic depressive psychosis.
The court is of the opinion that Bonoan was demented at the time he perpetrated the crime. Consequently,
he is exempt from criminal liability.

People v. Dungo

G.R. No. 89420 31 July 1991 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Insanity

Keyword: knife from the envelope, stabbed several times, cure for cancer, stomach ache, DAR
procedure

Doctrine: Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence.

Facts: On March 16, 1987 between 2:00 and 3:00pm, the accused went to Mrs. Sigua's office at the
Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the
envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. After which he departed from the office
with blood stained clothes, carrying a bloodied bladed weapon.

Rodolfo Sigua, husband of the deceased, testified that sometime in February 1987, the accused
Rosalino Dungo inquired from him why his wife was requiring so many documents from him. Rodolfo
explained to him the procedure at the DAR. The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he
was insane at the time of the commission of the offense:

Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, Rosalino's wife noticed that he appears to be in deep thought
always, maltreating their children when he was not used to it before. There were also times that her
husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were not. On that fateful
day, Rosalino complained of stomachache but they didn't bother to buy medicine as the pain went away
immediately. Thereafter, he went back to the store. But when Andrea followed him to the store, he was
no longer there. Worried, she looked for him. On her way home, she heard people saying that a stabbing
occurred. She saw her husband in her parents-in-law's house with people milling around. She asked her
husband why he did the act, to which Rosalino answered, "That's the only cure for my ailment. I have
cancer of the heart. If I don't kill the deceased in a number of days, I would die.” That same day, the
accused went to Manila. Dr. Santiago and Dr. Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified
that the accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated Aug. 17, 1987.
Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino was psychotic or insane long before,
during and after the commission of the alleged crime and classified his insanity as an organic mental
disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke.

But Dr. Balatbat who treated the accused for ailments secondary to stroke, and Dr. Lim who testified that
the accused suffered dorm occlusive disease, concluded that Rosalino was somehow rehabilitated after
a series of medical treatment in their clinic.

Issue: Whether the accused was insane during the commission of the crime.

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Held: No. For insanity to relieve the person of criminal liability, it is necessary that there be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that he acts without the least discernment and that there
be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will.

Under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a definite test or criterion for insanity.
However, We can apply as test or criterion the definition of insanity under Section 1039 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which states that insanity is "a manifestation in language or conduct, of disease or
defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality,
functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by disordered function of the sensory
or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition." Insanity as defined above is evinced
by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in language or
conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.

In the case at bar, defense's expert witnesses, who are doctors of the National Center for Mental Health,
concluded that the accused was suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under organic mental
disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke before, during and after the commission of the
crime charged. However, Dr. Echavez disclosed that the manifestation or the symptoms of psychosis
may be treated with medication. Thus, although the defect of the brain is permanent, the manifestation of
insanity is curable.

If the Court would believe the contention of the defense, the accused was supposed to be mentally ill
during this confrontation. However, it is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified
person who may have wronged him. Be it noted that the accused was supposed to be suffering from
impairment of the memory, The Court infers from this confrontation that the accused was aware of his
acts. This event proves that the accused was not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid
intervals.

People v. Rafanan

GR 128359 6 December 2000 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Insanity

Keyword: Formigones case, “Baket Ines”

Doctrine: In People vs. Formigones that the Court elaborated on the required standards of legal insanity.
The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases. A linguistic or
grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that Formigones established two (2) distinguishable
tests: (a) the test of cognition—"complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act,” and
(b) the test of volition, "or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will.” But our caselaw shows
common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on a test relating to “freedom of the will;” examination
of our caselaw has failed to turn up any case where this Court has exempted an accused on the sole
ground that he was totally deprived of ''freedom of the will,” i.e., without an accompanying “complete
deprivation of intelligence.”

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Facts: On February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita Ronaya who was then only fourteen years old was
hired as a housekeeper by the mother of the accused, Ines Rafanan alias ‘Baket Ines’ with a salary of
P30.00 a month. The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same house
at Barangay San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was then married and had two children.

pulled the complainant inside the store and said, ‘Come. let us have sexual intercourse,’ to which Estelita
replied, ‘I do not like,’ and struggled to free herself and cried. The accused held a bolo measuring 1–1/2
feet including the handle which he pointed to the throat of the complainant threatening her with said bolo
should she resist. Then, he forced her to lie down on a bamboo bed, removed her pants and after
unfastening the zipper of his own pants, went on top of the complainant and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her despite her resistance and struggle. After the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned
the complainant not to report the matter to her mother or to anybody in the house, otherwise he would kill
her.

Because of fear, the complainant did not immediately report the matter and did not leave the house of the
accused that same evening. ln fact, she slept in the house of the accused that evening and the following
morning she scrubbed the floor and did her daily routine work in the house. She only left the house in the
evening of March 17, 1976.

When she finally went home, Estelita’s mother confronted her and asked her why she went home that
evening, the complainant could not answer but cried and cried. It was only the following morning on March
18, 1976 that the complainant told her mother that she was raped by the accused. Upon knowing what
happened to her daughter, the mother, Alejandra Ronaya, immediately accompanied her to the house of
a policeman in the Villasis Police Force.

At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who
suggested that appellant was sick one or two years before his admission into the hospital, in effect implying
that appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia when he raped complainant.

Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized by
inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions.
Formerly called dementia praecox, it is said to be the most common form of psychosis and usually
develops between the ages 15 and 30.

Issue: Whether or not Rafanan was exempted from criminal liability on the ground of insanity?

Held: No. Rafanan failed to show complete impairment or loss of intelligence as he was raping
Estelita. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of insanity. ln
previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting circumstance, it has mostly been
rejected by the Court. In each of these cases, the evidence presented tended to show that if there was
impairment of the mental faculties, such impairment was not so complete as to deprive the accused of
intelligence or the consciousness of his acts. The facts of the instant case exhibit much the same
situation.

Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately
before and during the sexual assault on Estelita when the appellant Rafanan threatened complainant
Estelita with death should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of
the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault.

In previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting circumstance,15 it has mostly
been rejected by the Court. In each of these cases, the evidence presented tended to show that if there
was impairment of the mental faculties, such impairment was not so complete as to deprive the accused
of intelligence or the consciousness of his acts.

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People v. Madarang

GR 132319 12 May 2000 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Insanity

Keyword: Parricide; stabbed his wife; cannot remember; schizophrenia

Doctrine: Insanity as an exempting circumstance, it is required that there must be a complete

deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i .e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without
the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a
total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.

As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind
can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires
opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, by a
witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own
perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.

The testimony or proof of the accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the
commission of the offense with which he is charged .

Facts: Province of Pangasinan, accused Fernando Madarang was charged with parricide for killing his
wife. Appellant put up insanity as his defense. The accused claimed that he had absolutely no
recollection of the stabbing incident. He could not remember where he was on that fateful day. He did not
know the whereabouts of his wife. It was only during one of the hearings when his mother-in-law showed
him a picture of his wife in a coffin that he learned about her death.

He was not aware of the cause of his wife’s demise. Appellant insisted that at the time he stabbed his
wife, he was completely deprived of intelligence, making his criminal act involuntary. He further
contended that the fact that he and his wife never engaged in a fight prior to that fateful day should be
considered. The marked change in his behavior when he uncharacteristically quarreled with his wife on
that day and suddenly turned violent on her confirmed that he was mentally disturbed when he
committed the crime.

The Court directed the transfer of the accused to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for
psychiatric evaluation to determine his fitness to stand trial. NCMH revealed that he was suffering from a
form of psychosis known as schizophrenia. The accused was detained at the hospital and was
administered medication for his illness for more than 2 years before he was recommitted to face the
charges against him. Madarang claimed that he did not know whether he suffered from any mental
illness and did not remember being confined at the NCMH for treatment.

Schizophrenia is a mental abnormality characterized by impaired fundamental reasoning, delusions,

hallucinations, preoccupation with one's thoughts, poor self-care, insight and judgment, and impaired
cognitive, social and occupational functions.

Dr. Wilson Tibayan of the NCMH confirmed that the schizophrenia of the accused may have begun even
prior to his admission and highly possible that he was already suffering from it prior to the commission of
the crime. The patient may be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong or know what he is doing. He
may become destructive or have a propensity to attack any one if his hallucinations were violent. A

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schizophrenic, however, may have lucid intervals during which he may be able to distinguish right from
wrong.

Issue: Whether the accused, invoking insanity, can claim exemption from liability for the crime he
committed.

Held: NO. The evidence adduced by the defense is insufficient to establish his claim of insanity at the
time he killed his wife. The appellant attributes his loss of sanity to the fact that he lost his business and
became totally dependent on his mother-in-law for support. This is purely speculative and unsupported
by record. There was no showing of any odd or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant after he lost
his fortune and prior to his commission of the crime that may be symptomatic of his mental illness. In
fact, the appellant's mother-in-law declared that during the time that she knew the appellant and while he
lived in her house, she did not notice anything irregular or abnormal in the appellant's behavior that could
have suggested that he was suffering from any mental illness.

In the Philippines, a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting is followed. It is required that
there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e. The accused is deprived of
reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability.

The testimony or proof of the accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the
commission of the offense with which he is charged.

In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was
committed to the NCMH months after he killed his wife. None of the witnesses presented by the
appellant declared that he exhibited any of the myriad symptoms associated with schizophrenia
immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing incident . The record is bereft of even a single
account of abnormal or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant prior to that fateful day. Although Dr.
Tibayan opined that there is a high possibility that the appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia
at the time of the stabbing, he also declared that schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they
are capable of distinguishing right from wrong.

Accused is convicted of the crime of parricide.

Note: In this long case, the SC discussed the historical development of how sanity as an exempting
circumstance is tested around the world. There is also a medical definition of Schizo and symptoms to
determine if a person is suffering from it. For brevity, I have not included these anymore.

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People v. Robios

GR NO. 138453 29 May 2002 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES:

Insanity

Keyword:Parricide with unintentional abortion; Exempting Circumstance: Insanity

Doctrine: When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from criminal responsibility, the evidence
must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. If the
evidence points to insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the accused cannot be acquitted.

Facts: Melencio Robios was found guilty with the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion
and was sentenced of death. May 31, 1995, he was accused of killing his pregnant wife. On March 25,
1995 Lorenzo Robios, son of Melencio heard his parents quarreling and saw Melencio stab Lorenza with
an 8-inch double bladed knife on the right shoulder. On the same day, Benjamin, brother of Lorenza,
reported that Melencio has also killed their uncle. Benjamin, knowing what Melencio did to her sister,
went to his sister’s house and when he was 150m away, saw Melencio and the latter shouted “It’s good
you would see how your sister would die.” Benjamin then sought the help of the police.

SPO1 Herbert Lugo saw Melecio embracing his wife, Lorenza, who was lying on her back and was no
longer breathing. She appeared to be dead. Appellant dropped the knife which was taken by SPO3 Martin.
Appellant tried to resist the people who held him but was overpowered. The police, with the help of the
barangay officials present, tied his hands and feet with a plastic rope. However, before he was pulled away
from the body of his wife and restrained by the police, appellant admitted to Rolando Valdez, a neighbor
of his and a barangay kagawad, that he had killed his wife, showing him the bloodstained knife.

Special report showed that Lorenza was 6 months pregnant. She suffered 41 stab wounds done by
appellant while he was under the influence of alcohol and who also stabbed himself.

Melencio admitted that he killed his wife but wished to be exempted from his criminal liability claiming the
defense of insanity. His son testified that Melencio saw someone in their house that wanted to kill him. A
nurse said that Melencio isolated himself. A detention prisoner witnessed the appellant usually refuses to
respond in the counting of prisoners. Sometimes, he would stay in his cell even if they were required to
fall in line in the plaza of the penal colony. Another prisoner said that the accused sometimes was lying
down, sitting, looking, or staring in space and without a companion, laughing and sometimes crying.

Melencio mentioned that he was not aware that he was charged with parricide with unintentional abortion.
He claimed that he could not remember being informed by his children that he killed his wife.

The RTC rejected the defense of insanity and rendered a decision imposing the penalty of death. It held
that there was no clear evidence that the accused was insane when he committed the crime.

Issue: Whether the exempting circumstance of insanity can be applied?

Held: NO. Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and
freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime. A defendant in a criminal case who relies on
the defense of mental incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact of insanity at the very moment
when the crime was committed. Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of

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the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered. Indeed, when
insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from criminal responsibility, the evidence must refer to the
time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. If the evidence points to
insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the accused cannot be acquitted.

Testimonies from both prosecution and defense witnesses show no substantial evidence that appellant
was completely deprived of reason or discernment when he perpetrated the brutal killing of his wife. The
fact that appellant admitted to responding law enforcers how he had just killed his wife may have been a
manifestation of repentance and remorse -- a natural sentiment of a husband who had realized the
wrongfulness of his act. His behavior at the time of the killing and immediately thereafter is inconsistent
with his claim that he had no knowledge of what he had just done and he was not insane during the
commission of the crime.

Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, the penalty to
be imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which is parricide and punishable with reclusion
perpetua to death. The crime of parricide is not a capital crime per se and it is not always punishable with
death. The law provides for the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death -- two indivisible penalties,
the application of either one of which depends on the presence or the absence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances.

Considering that neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances were established in this case, the
imposable penalty should only be reclusion perpetua.

People v. Opuran

GR 147674-75 17 March 2004 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Insanity

Keyword: killed 2 men in 1 night

Doctrine: The stringent standard established in People v. Formigones requires that there be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e.,the accused acted without the least discernment because
of a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of the will.

The Court analyzed the Formigones standard into two distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition — whether
there was a "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act" and (b) the test of volition —
whether there was a "total deprivation of freedom of the will." We observed that our case law shows common
reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on the test of volition, and has failed to turn up any case where an
accused is exempted on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of the freedom of the will, i.e.,without an
accompanying "complete deprivation of intelligence." This is expected, since a person's volition naturally reaches
out only towards that which is represented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased
or healthy.

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Facts:
Bambi stood up and looked through the open door. He saw appellant Anacito Opuran stab Allan on the chest
with a knife while the latter appeared to be trying to stand up from the bench. Although Allan had several stab
wounds on different parts of his body, he managed to stand up and run inside Bambi's house, with Anacito
chasing him. Bambi immediately locked the door from the inside to prevent Anacito from entering. But the latter
tried to force the door open by thrusting a knife at the door shutter. He also threw stones at the door. After a
short while, Anacito left.
With Anacito gone, Bambi went out to ask the aid of his neighbors so he could bring Allan to the hospital.
He saw Anacito's two brothers and asked for their assistance. But one of them merely said: "Never mind because
he [referring to Anacito] is mentally imbalanced."
At about 7:45 p.m. of the same day, prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, was in the house of Demetrio
Patrimonio, Sr.,seeking medical advice from the latter's wife. While there, Tomas heard a commotion outside.
He looked out from the balcony and saw people running. He learned that Anacito had stabbed somebody.
After about fifteen minutes, while Tomas was on his way home, he saw Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr. He
likewise noticed Anacito hiding in a dark place. When Demetrio Jr. reached the national highway, near the so-
called "lover's lane," Anacito emerged from his hiding place and stabbed Demetrio Jr. with a knife about three to
four times.
Tomas immediately ran to the house of the Demetrios to inform them of what he had just witnessed. He
then saw Demetrio Jr. running towards his parents' house, but the latter did not make it because he collapsed
near the fence. Tomas also caught sight of Anacito running towards the direction of the house of the Opurans.
Meanwhile, Demetrio Jr. was brought by his parents to the Samar Provincial Hospital, where he died the following
day.
The trial court found Anacito guilty of murder for the death of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr.,and homicide for
the death of Allan Dacles. Anacito contends that he was suffering from a psychotic disorder and was, therefore,
completely deprived of intelligence when he stabbed the victims|||
Issue: Whether the accused’s defense of psychotic disorder should be upheld?

Held: NO.
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness
who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based
on his own perception; or is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.
It must be stressed that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period
immediately before or at the precise moment of the commission of the act which is the subject of the inquiry. His
mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes of determining his
criminal liability.
Interestingly, Anacito failed to raise insanity at the earliest opportunity. He invoked it for the first time in
the year 2000 and only after he had already testified on his defenses of alibi and denial. It has been held that the
invocation of denial and alibi as defenses indicates that the accused was in full control of his mental faculties.
Additionally, the trial judge observed that, during the hearings, Anacito was attentive, well-behaved, and
responsive to the questions propounded to him. Thus, the shift in theory from denial and alibi to a plea of insanity,
made apparently after the appellant realized the futility of his earlier defenses, is a clear indication that insanity
is a mere concoction or an afterthought. In any event, Anacito failed to establish by convincing evidence his
alleged insanity at the time he killed Demetrio Jr. and Allan Dacles. He is thus presumed sane, and we are
constrained to affirm his conviction.

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Verdadero v. People

GR 216021 2 March 2016 Exempting Circumstance that affect

criminal liability (insanity)

Keyword: schizophrenic nakasaksak

Doctrine: In People v. Isla, the Court elucidated that insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding
or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which the accused is charged. Otherwise, he must
be adjudged guilty for the said offense. In short, in order for the accused to be exempted from criminal
liability under a plea of insanity, he must categorically demonstrate that:

(1) he was completely deprived of intelligence because of his mental condition or illness; and
(2) such complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or immediately before the
commission of the offense.

An exempting circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the accused is
freed from the criminal liability.

Facts: In an Information, 4 dated September 9, 2009, Verdadero was charged with the crime of murder
for killing Romeo B. Plata (Romeo). On March 12, 2009, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Maynard
Plata and his father Romeo were at the Baggao Police Station. Together with Ronnie Elaydo, they went
there to report that Verdadero had stolen the fan belt of their irrigation pump.

After a confrontation with Verdadero at the police station, the three men made their way home on a tricycle
but stopped at a drugstore as Maynard intended to buy some baby supplies. Romeo proceeded towards
a store near the drugstore while Ronnie stayed inside the tricycle. From the drug store, Maynard saw
Verdadero stabbing Romeo, after he was alerted by the shouts of Ronnie.

Verdadero stabbed Romeo on the left side of the latter's upper back with the use of a Rambo knife. He
again struck Romeo's upper back, just below the right shoulder. Maynard tried to help his father but
Verdadero attempted to attack him as well. He defended himself using a small stool, which he used to hit
Verdadero in the chest.

Meanwhile, Ronnie ran towards the police station to seek assistance. The responding police officers
arrested Verdadero, while Maynard and Ronnie brought Romeo to a clinic but were advised to bring him
to the Cagayan Valley Medical Center (CVMC). Romeo, however, died upon arrival at the CVMC. Based
on the Post-Mortem Examination Report, his cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to
severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds and hack wounds.

On July 21, 2003, Verdadero was diagnosed with schizophrenia and was given medications to address
his mental illness. Verdadero would irregularly consult with his doctors as he had a lifelong chronic disease.
Then, in 2009, he was again confined for the fourth (4th) time at CVMC due to a relapse.

Issue: Whether the CA gravely erred in affirming the petitioner’s conviction despite the fact that his insanity
at the time of the incident was established by clear and convincing evidence.

Held: To completely evade culpability, Verdadero raises insanity as a defense claiming that he had
suffered a relapse of his schizophrenia. Under Article 12 of the RPC, an imbecile or an insane person is

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exempt from criminal liability, unless the latter had acted during a lucid interval. The defense of insanity or
imbecility must be clearly proved for there is a presumption that the acts penalized by law are voluntary.

In the case at bench, it is undisputed that (1) as early as 1999, Verdadero was brought to the Psychiatric
Department of CVMC for treatment; (2) he was diagnosed with depression in 2001; (3) he was diagnosed
with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003; (4) he was confined in the psychiatric ward sometime in 2009 due to
a relapse; (5) he was in and out of psychiatric care from the time of his first confinement in 1999 until the
stabbing incident; and (6) he was diagnosed to have suffered a relapse on March 20, 2009.

Thus, it is without question that he was suffering from schizophrenia and the only thing left to be
ascertained is whether he should be absolved from responsibility in killing Romeo because of his mental
state.

In exonerating Verdadero on the ground of insanity, the Court does not totally free him from the
responsibilities and consequences of his acts. Article 12 (1) of the RPC expressly states that "[w]hen an
insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony, the court shall order his confinement
in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to
leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court." Instead of incarceration, Verdadero is to be
confined in an institution where his mental condition may be addressed so that he may again function as
a member of society. He shall remain confined therein until his attending physicians give a favorable
recommendation for his release.

In appreciating insanity in favor of Verdadero, the Court absolves him from criminal responsibility. He is,
nevertheless, responsible to indemnify the heirs of Romeo for the latter's death.

People v. Genosa

341 SCRA 493, 419 SCRA 537 15 January 2004 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Insanity

Keyword: Parricide; Battered Wife Syndrome

Doctrine: Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.

Facts: Marivic and Ben Genosa got married and for a time, they lived with the family of Ben. In the year
1995, they decided to rent a house owned by Steban with their two children, John and Earl. On
November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their salary, and drank
beer before heading home. Upon arriving home, he found out that Marivic had gone looking for him
around. Ben went inside the house, while Arturo went to a store across from it. Arturo did not see Marivic
arrive, but on his way home passing Genosa’s rented house, he heard Marivic threatening to kill Ben.
That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. A day after, Marivic asked her close friend/neighbor to look
after her pig as she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy check up. Marivic even asked her friend to sell
her motorcycle. On the same day, Marivic was seen leaving the house with her children to ride a bus
going to Ormoc. On November 18, the neighbors told Steban about a foul odor emanating from the
Genosa’s rented house. He went inside to find out the cause but it was locked. He forced open the gate
and there he found Ben lifeless lying on his bed covered with a blanket and with injuries at the back of
his head. After the postmortem examination, the doctor quoted parricide in the Information.

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Marivic admitted killing Ben saying that he nagged her for following him that night when Ben went home
late and drunk. Ben even challenged her to a fight. Marivic immediately packed her clothes as she planned
to leave after seeing Ben who was about to attack her. In Ben’s angered state, Marivic was able to smash
Ben’s arm with a pipe, trying to stay away from the blade Ben was holding. Marivic, however, insisted that
she ended Ben’s life by shooting him. Marivic was convicted of the crime of parricide. Expert witnesses
stated that Marivic fits the profile of a Battered Woman Syndrome, since at the time she killed her husband,
her mental condition was not good. Marivic was re-experiencing the trauma, together with the imprint of all
the abuses she had experienced in the past. RTC ruled that self-defense is untenable; agreed to the
prosecution evidence that Ben was killed while he was in bed sleeping, thus, she is guilty of parricide with
treachery for killing Ben defenseless (lying in Bed asleep, while Marivic smashed his head with a pipe)

Issue: Whether or not Marivic acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus (invoking Battered
Woman Syndrome)

Held: YES. The Court held that in order to invoke self-defense arising from the Battered Woman
Syndrome, the following elements must be established:
(a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two
battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner.
(b) The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the
battered person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life.
(c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable — not necessarily immediate
and actual — grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the
former against the latter.

In the case at bar, not all of these were duly established. In this case, there was a sufficient time interval
between the unlawful aggression of Ben and Marivic’s fatal attack upon him. In fact, Marivic had already
been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape the room. The attack had apparently ceased
and the reality or even imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. Ben was no longer in
a position that presented an actual threat on Marivic’s life or safety. The Court held that she is guilty of
parricide = two (2) mitigating; no aggravating; penalty reduced to prison mayor as minimum to reclusion
temporal as maximum

● 2 mitigating arising from BWS, and benefits of ISLaw

○ Severe beating repeatedly inflicted on Marivic constituted a from of cumulative
provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-control.
○ The “Psychological paralysis” she suffered diminished her will power → entitling her
to mitigating factor under RPC

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Maria Diory F. Rabajante, The Privilege of Being Insane: An Examination of, and a Saner Alternative to
the Insane Rule on Insanity Defense

49 San Beda L.J. 1 March 2012 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Insanity

Summary:

Under the Philippine law, an insane person is exempt from criminal liability. The concept of insanity
as used in the RPC does not include imbecility. While an imbecile is always exempt from criminal liability,
an insane is exempt only when he did not act during lucid interval. The distinction between an imbecile
and an insane is indicative of the view that insanity is not concerned with abnormality in menta;
development.

In People vs Formigones, the SC explained the standard of insanity: “in order that this exempting
circumstances may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no
responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be a complete
absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will.”

Mere abnormality in the mental faculties of an accused is not sufficient to exempt him. It does not amount
to insanity because it does not necessarily imply a complete deprivation of intelligence. At most, it may
only mitigate criminal liability.

The Problem with the Complete Deprivation Standard

The Philippine courts used a more stringent standard in determining insanity. A careful
examination of the standard used would show that the standard is not as rigid as it seems. In fact, it is
even more problematic than the tests that were employed in the United States. The phrase “complete
deprivation” is ambiguous. Even the SC noted in People vs Dungo, that there has been no case that lays
down a definite test or criterion for insanity in this jurisdiction.

Sir Matthew Hale has adopted the same standard but his total deprivation of reason test was
declared outdated in Hadfield’s case. This all or nothing approach to insanity provides a standard even
the most debilitated asylum inmate could not meet. There is no such thing as complete deprivation of
intelligence or complete deprivation of freedom of the will. It would be very difficult to imagine a person
completely devoid of reason to have the capacity to perpetrate a criminal act. A contrary view would create
an absurdity wherein a person totally deprived of intelligence is capable of committing an act. A person
must have reason or intelligence, disease or not, before he acts in a certain manner. Hence, when a
person acts in a manner contrary to norms, it does not mean that he lacks intelligence; it means that his
intelligence is impaired.

Absence of Definite Test

Jurisprudence is not entirely lacking in test for insanity other than the complete deprivation
standard stated in Dungo. Subsequent to Dungo, the Court provided the tests of cognition and volition.
However, these tests are mere reiterations of the complete deprivation standard, thereby affirming the
statement in Dungo that there is no case law that provides for a definite test of insanity.

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A Saner Alternative-The Mens Rea Model

Features:

1.) Modification of Article 12 (1) of the RPC to indicate that an insane person is exempted from liability
only when his insanity deprives him of mens rea;

2.) Deletion of Article 13 (9) of the RPC which mitigates the liability of the offender whose will power has
diminished, and placing such offender in the same footing as other mentally ill offenders;

3.) Adoption of the Guilty but Mentally Ill verdict;

4.) Confinement in an asylum or hospital of the offenders falling under Article 12 (1) and offenders who
are found Guilty but Mentally Ill;

5.) Acceptance of proof of insanity not as an affirmative defense to prove exemption from liability but as
evidence of absence of mens rea.

Under this model, the defendant who alleges insanity will not be acquitted by reason of insanity. However,
he may adduce evidence of insanity to prove the absence of mens rea in committing the criminal act. In
the event that he fails to prove the absence of mens rea, a GBMI verdict will be rendered. Thereafter, his
confinement to an asylum or hospital similar to the 2nd par. Of Art 12 (1) of the RPC will be ordered, with
the additional condition that the total period of confinement and service of sentence would not exceed the
period he has to serve in prison if he were an ordinary offender.

This model likewise provides for the confinement of a person who under the prevailing doctrine is
criminally liable but is subjected to reduced liability pursuant to Art 13 (9) of the RPC. Under the said
provision, a diminution in the exercise of will power, without an accompanying deprivation of
consciousness of acts, would result in the mitigation of liability. This model provides the confinement of
both a.) the person afflicted with a disease which diminishes will power, and b.) the person whose
intelligence is diminished , but is not to be considered as legally insane if a literal interpretation of complete
deprivation standard is made.

Because the proposed model places the offenders who are currently falling under Art 13 (9) of the PRC
in the same footing with the insane offenders who have mens rea, there will be uniformity in rulings
considering that there is no significant difference between these two categories of offenders insofar as
the presence of mens rea is concerned. Thus, courts will no longer have to undergo the difficulty of
ascertaining the presence of complete deprivation of intelligence or will because a mere proof of defective
mentality of the defendant would suffice to establish that the defendant is GBMI. The phrase “mentally ill”
in the proposed model merely requires a medical finding of mental defect because the GBMI verdict is
significant only in providing hospital confinement and not in exempting the defendant from liability.

The alternative model is not only consistent with the theory that penalties are corrective or reformative in
character. It is also consistent with the principle that penalties are intended to bring out retributive justice.
The present rule would acquit a person who is found insane at the time of the offense but would not order
his confinement if his insanity ceased to exist at the time of trial and rendition of judgment. He would then
be free despite the questionability if his insanity deprived him of mens rea at the time of the commission
of the crime. The proposed model would convict such person unless it is proved that his insanity has
deprived him of mens rea.

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People v. Doqueña

GR 46539 27 September 1939 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Minority

Keyword: Minor sinaksak ang kalarong mas malaki sa kanya

Doctrine: The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a
minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental
capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and
should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the
records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said
minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial. (US
v. Maralit)

Facts: The accused-appellant Valentin Doqueña is a minor. He was a 7th grade pupil in the intermediate
school of the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was one of the brightest in said
school and was a captain of a company of the cadet corps thereof, and during the time he was studying
therein he always obtained excellent marks. During the commission of the crime, was prosecuted for
homicide for having killed Jan Ragojos by stabbing him in the breast with a knife on November 19, 1938.

In the yard of the intermediate school, Juan Ragojos and Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball.
Doqueña, who was also in the yard, stepped in and caught the ball before throwing it at Juan Ragojos,
hitting him in the stomach. Juan Ragojos chased the Doqueña around the yard and slapped him on the
nape when he caught up with him. Doqueña then turned against the Ragojos, assuming a threatening
posture, for which reason Ragojos struck him on the mouth with his fist before returning to play. Offended
by what he perceived to be an abuse on the part of Ragojos, who was taller and more robust than him,
Doqueña looked around the yard for a stone with which to attack the Ragojos, but finding none, he
approached a cousin of his Romualdo Cocal to him to lend him his knife. When Rarang heard this, he told
Cocal not to give Doqueña his knife because he might use it to attack Ragojos. Doqueña successfully
obtained the knife and then challenged Ragojos to another fistfight, to which the Ragojos replied that he
did not want to do because he was bigger than Doqueña. Ragojos continued playing and while he was
thus unprepared and in the act of stopping the ball with his two hands Doqueña stabbed him in the chest
with the knife he was carrying.

The trial court held that Doqueña acted with discernment in committing the crime and was conscious of
the nature and consequences of his act which is the subject of this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the Doqueña should be exempt from criminal liability by reason of his minority.

Held: NO. The Supreme Court held that the appeal is unfounded because it is error to determine
discernment by the means resorted to by the attorney for the defense.

According to the counsel of the defense, in order to determine whether or not a minor acted with
discernment, we must consider not only the facts and circumstances that gave rise to the minor's act, but
also his state of mind at the time the crime was committed, the time he might have had available to him
for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have

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had at the time. However, the Supreme Court found that the attorney for the defense mistakes the
discernment referred to in article 12, subsection 3, of the Revised Penal Code, for premeditation, or at
least for lack of intention which, as a mitigating circumstance, is included among other mitigating
circumstances in article 13 of said Code.

As held in the case of US v. Maralit, the discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from
criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine who commits an act prohibited by law,
is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be
known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances accorded
by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior
of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the
trial.

Ortega v. People

GR No. 151085 20 August 2008 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Minority

Keyword: MMM is 13 yrs old when he raped AAA thus matic exempt from crim liability under ra 9344

Doctrine: What is controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL,
is not the CICL's age at the time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the time of the
commission of the offense.

Facts: At the time of commission of rape, the accused was only 13 years old, while the victim AAA was
6, both minors. It was alleged that petitioner raped her three times on three different occasions in 1996.
The lower courts convicted him of rape with criminal and civil liability imposed. The case was pending
when Republic Act 9344 (R.A. No. 9344) or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted
amending the age of criminal irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15 years old. Said law took effect on
May 20, 2006. At the time of the promulgation of judgment, the accused already reached the age of
majority. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claimed that petitioner is not exempt from criminal
liability because he is not anymore a child as defined by R.A. No. 9344. The OSG further claimed that
the retroactive effect of said law is applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old.

Issue: Whether or not the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner's case, considering
that at the time he committed the alleged rape, he was merely 13 years old.

Held: Yes, the petitioner is exempt from criminal liability. For one who acts by virtue of any of the
exempting circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete absence of any of the
conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises. Hence, while
there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches.Therefore, while there is a crime committed, no
criminal liability attaches.

By virtue of the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344), the age of criminal irresponsibility
has been raised from 9 to 15 years old. Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of
the alleged rape. The first paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly provides that, a child fifteen
(15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this
Act. The Court gives retroactive application insofar as it favors the persons guilty of a felony. While the

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law exempts the petitioner from criminal liability, however, he is not exempt from civil liability. For this
reason, petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA civil indemnity.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 filed against
petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the local social
welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention program. Nevertheless,
the petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00).

Notes:

Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time
of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment,
in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below, at
the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to
the appropriate local social welfare and development officer (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore,
with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at the time of the
promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the time of the commission of the offense.

Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord retroactive application to
the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law —
favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given
retroactive effect.

People v. Mantalaba

GR 186227 20 July 2011 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Minority

Keyword: shabu, 17 years old

Doctrine: Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. can now be appreciated in
fixing the penalty that should be imposed.

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Facts: The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a
report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years old at the time, was
selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust team was organized,
composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers who were provided with two
(2) pieces of ₱100 marked bills to be used in the purchase.

Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked money, proceeded
to Purok 4 for the buy-bust operation. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner
and said to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each
other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave
the marked money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to the police officers and told them that
the transaction has been completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed
the appellant as he was leaving the place.

Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against appellant for
violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165

Issue: WON the accused must be acquitted of the crime charged.

Held: NO. Appellant insists that the prosecution did not present any evidence that an actual sale took
place. However, based on the testimony of PO1 Randy Pajo, there is no doubt that the buy-bust operation
was successfully conducted.

Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court finds it appropriate to discuss the effect
of his minority in his suspension of sentence. The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-
bust operation took place or when the said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time
of the promulgation of the RTC's Decision.

It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on this
case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the
sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code and Section 32
of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, the laws that were applicable at
the time of the promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA
9165 is life imprisonment to death.

It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under
Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application.However, this Court has already
ruled in People v. Sarcia that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still
be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time
of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence
until the child reaches the maximum age of 21.

Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the
provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already
moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case was
under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed
his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant
was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the
sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law,
which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to
the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603.34

Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA No. 9344,
which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:

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SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities. - A child
in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence,
in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that
may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. can now be appreciated in fixing the
penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the
proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower
in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of
reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance. The
ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible
penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion
temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Therefore, a
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty.

US v. Tañedo

GR L-5418 February 12, 1910 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Accident

Keyword: Wild Chicken Hunter

Doctrine: It is uniformly held that if life is taken by misfortune or accident while in the performance of a
lawful act executed with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability.

Facts:
The accused was a landowner. On the morning of the 26th of January, 1909, he, with Tagampa,
Pascual, Paulillo, and Arellano, went to work on a malecon or dam on his land. The defendant took with
him a shotgun and a few shells, with the intention to hunt wild chickens after he had set his laborers at
work. He remained with his laborers an hour or so and then went a short distance away across a stream
to see how the alteration which he had made in the malecon affected the flow of water from the rice field
on the other side of the stream. He carried his shotgun with him across the stream. On the other side of
the stream he met the deceased, who, with his mother and uncle, had been living in a small shack for a
month or so during the rice-harvesting season. The accused asked the uncle of the deceased where he
could find a good place in which to hunt wild chickens. Although the accused directed his question to the
uncle inside of the shack, the deceased answered the question and pointed out in a general way a
portion of the forest near the edge of which stood the shack.

Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by gunshot wound. Chicken feathers
were found inconsiderable qualities at the point where the chicken was shot and where the accident
occurred. The accused then went back to his laborers and told Tagampa (who was the deceased’s
relative) about what happened. They then went to see the body and covered it with cogon grass. Later
that evening, they carried the body about 1700-1800 meters from where they had initially hidden it and
buried the same. During trial, Tagampa testified that he helped Tanadeo to disposal of the body because

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he was afraid of him although he admits that the accused in no way threatened or sought to compel him
to do so.

Issue: Whether Tanedo should be exempted from criminal liability due to the fact that the deceased was
shot by mere accident?

Held: Yes. So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations between the accused and
the deceased had been normal. The deceased was a tenant on land belonging to a relative of the
accused. There was no enmity and noun pleasant relations between them. No attempt was made to
show any. There appears to have been no motive whatever for the commission of the crime. The
Government has not attempted to show any. The only possible reason that the accused could have for
killing the deceased would be found in the fact of a sudden quarrel between them during the hunt. That
idea is wholly negative by the fact that the chicken and the man were shot at the same time, there having
been only one shot fired.

Article 1 of the Penal Code says:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law. Acts and omissions
punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary unless the contrary shall appear.

Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as follows:

He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere accident without liability
orintention of causing it.

Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:

A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in
case ofa reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal.

The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly held that if life is taken by misfortune or accident
while in the performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is no
criminal liability.

In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of the accused. Neither is there any
question that he was engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there any
evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the deceased. The only thing in the case at all
suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his concealment and denial.

Note:

It seems like the acquittal of the accused relied heavily on the prosecution’s failure to prove that there was
intention on the part of the accused to kill the deceased. They only have evidence as regards the alleged
accidental killing and they merely questioned the suspicious disposal of the body. The court cited: the case of
the State vs. Legg, to, it is said (p.1165):

Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required to prove such a defense by
apreponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon theState
to show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the evidence, both that for the Stateand the
prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing was accidental or intentional, thejury should

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acquit. . . . But where accidental killing is relied upon, the prisoner admits the killing but deniesthat it was
intentional. Therefore, the State must show that it was intentional, and it is clearly error to instructthe jury that the
defendant must show that it was an accident by a preponderance of the testimony, andinstruction B in the Cross
case was properly held to be erroneous.

People v. Castillo

GR 172695 29 June 2007 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Accident

Keyword: Sling and Arrow; Killed wife; Accident.

Doctrine: "Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and
convincing evidence. The essential requisites for this exempting circumstance, are:
(1) A person is performing a lawful act;
(2) With due care;
(3) He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
(4) Without fault or intention of causing it.
By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be considered as
performing a "lawful act."

Facts: Isaias Castillo shot with a dart from a rubber string his wife, Consorcia Castillo, hitting her at the
neck and causing her instantaneous death. In the letters written by Isaias to Consorcia’s family, he
accepted fault and asked for their forgiveness; he claimed that he had no intention to do the fatal harm to
his wife. According to Isias, he was just practicing the use of the weapon when Consorcia was hit by the
arrow. The trial court found Isaias guilty of parricide. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Isaias appealed,
contending that even assuming that he was the one who killed his wife, the same was accidental and not
intentional.

Issue: WON the exempting circumstance of accident under Article 12(4) of the RPC is applicable.

Held: NO. "Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and
convincing evidence. The essential requisites for this exempting circumstance, are:
(1) A person is performing a lawful act;
(2) With due care;
(3) He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
(4) Without fault or intention of causing it.
By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be considered as
performing a "lawful act." Furthermore, by claiming that the killing was by accident, Isaias has the burden
of proof of establishing the presence of any circumstance which may relieve him of responsibility, and to
prove justification he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution, for even if this be weak, it can not be disbelieved after Isaias has admitted the killing. Other
than his claim that the killing was accidental, Isaias failed to adduce any evidence to prove the same.

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People v. Retubado

G.R. No. 124058 10 December 2003 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Accident

Keyword: shot on the forehead, pedicab driver, mentally ill brother

Doctrine: It is indispensable that the state of necessity must not be brought about by the intentional
provocation of the party invoking the same. The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying
circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. It is an affirmative defense that
must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence.

Facts: Shortly before November 5, 1993, someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the appellant’s
younger brother who was mentally ill. Someone inserted a lighted firecracker in a cigarette pack and
gave it to Edwin. He brought the cigarette home and placed it on the dining table as he was having
dinner with his father. Momentarily, the firecracker exploded. The suspect was Emmanuel Cañon, Jr.,
The Cañons and the appellant were neighbors. The matter was brought to the attention of the barangay
captain who conducted an investigation. It turned out that Emmanuel Cañon, Jr. was not the culprit. The
barangay captain considered the matter closed. The appellant, however, was bent on confronting
Emmanuel Cañon, Jr.

On November 5, 1993, at about 9:00 p.m., 50-year-old Emmanuel Cañon, Sr., a pedicab driver called it a
day and decided to go home after a day’s work. He drove his pedicab and stopped at the junction of
Rizal and Gallardo Streets, at the poblacion of Tuburan. The appellant, who was conversing with Marcial
Luciño saw him. "Noy, why is [it] your son did something to my brother?" Emmanuel ignored the
appellant. The appellant was incensed and ran after Emmanuel. He overtook Emmanuel, grabbed and
pushed the pedicab which nearly fell into a canal. Emmanuel again ignored the appellant and pedaled on
until he reached his house. His wife, Norberta Cañon was on the balcony of their house, above the porch
waiting for him to arrive. Emmanuel, Jr., meanwhile, was already asleep. Undeterred, the appellant
continued following Emmanuel.

Shortly after Emmanuel had entered his house, the appellant arrived and tarried at the porch. Emmanuel
suddenly opened the door and demanded to know why he was being followed. The appellant told
Emmanuel that he just wanted to talk to Emmanuel, Jr., but Emmanuel told the appellant that his son
was already asleep. Norberta went down from the balcony and placed her hand on her husband’s
shoulder to pacify him. The appellant forthwith pulled out a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot
Emmanuel on the forehead. The latter fell to the floor as the appellant walked away from the scene.
Norberta shouted for help. The neighbors, her daughter, and her son-in-law arrived. They brought
Emmanuel to the Tuburan District Hospital, but the victim died shortly thereafter. The appellant admitted
shooting the victim but claimed that he was merely performing a lawful act with due care; hence, cannot
be held criminally liable for the victim’s death. He claims that it was an accident and his story goes:
He testified that when he insisted that Emmanuel wake up his son, Emmanuel went to his room
and emerged therefrom holding a handgun with his right hand. Emmanuel’s trigger finger was outside
the trigger guard, and he held the firearm with the muzzle facing downward. Fearing that he would be
shot, the appellant took hold of Emmanuel’s right hand with his left, and pulled the gun towards
Emmanuel’s stomach. The appellant grabbed Emmanuel’s free hand with his right hand, and the old
man almost fell on his knees to the ground. Emmanuel still resisted. The appellant pulled the gun to the
level of Emmanuel’s forehead, and the gun suddenly went off.

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After due proceedings, the trial court rendered a judgment convicting the appellant of murder, and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.

Issue: Whether the death of the deceased was caused by an mere accident without fault or malice on
the part of the accused

Held: The contention of the appellant has no merit. Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code
reads:

4) Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to
another provided that the following requisites are present:

First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;

Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;

Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

It is indispensable that the state of necessity must not be brought about by the intentional provocation of
the party invoking the same. The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance under Article
12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. It is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the
accused with clear and convincing evidence. By admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim, the
accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the
prosecution because if such evidence is weak but the accused fails to prove his defense, the evidence of
the prosecution can no longer be disbelieved. Whether the accused acted under a state of necessity is a
question of fact, which is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The legal aphorism is that
the findings of facts by the trial court, its calibration of the testimony of the witnesses of the parties and of
the probative weight thereof as well as its conclusions based on its own findings are accorded by the
appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless the trial court ignored, misconstrued or
misapplied cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, will change the outcome
of the case. The Court has meticulously reviewed the records and find no basis to deviate from the
findings of the trial court that the appellant was the provocateur, the unlawful aggressor and the author of
a deliberate and malicious act of shooting the victim at close range on the forehead.

Pomoy v. People

GR 128359 6 December 2000 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Accident

Keyword: Rocky Balboa

Doctrine: Article 12, Section 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that any person who, while
performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of
causing it. The elements of accident are as follows:

(1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful act with due care;
(2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and
(3) on the part of the accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury.

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Facts: On January 4, 1990, about 7:30 in the morning, some policemen arrived at the Concepcion College
to arrest Tomas Balboa, allegedly in connection with a robbery which took place in the municipality in
December 1989.

Roweno Pomoy, a PNP member of the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company then attached to the defunct
321st PC Company, was one of the investigators of their outfit and at about 2 o’clock or past that time of
January 4, 1990 he got Balboa from their stockade for tactical interrogation. As he was already holding the
door knob of their investigation room and about to open and enter it, all of a sudden he saw Tomas Balboa
approach him and take hold or grab the handle of his gun.

The victim was to his right side when the attempt to grab his gun began and was still to his right when the
gun was drawn from its holster until it fired, as they were still grappling or wrestling for it. Pomoy’s gun
was already loaded in its chamber and cocked when he left his house, and it was locked when it fired.
After the gun fired, they were separated from each other and Balboa fell to the ground.

Erna Basa who was then working in her office in the camp, heard some noise and exchange of words
which were not clear, but it seemed there was growing trouble. She opened the door to verify and saw
Roweno Pomoy and Tomas Balboa grappling for the possession of the gun.

When the source of the shots was verified, petitioner was seen still holding a .45 caliber pistol, facing
Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood, about two (2) feet away. When the Commanding Officer of the
Headquarters arrived, he disarmed the petitioner and directed that Balboa be brought to the hospital, where
the latter died of his wounds.

Pomoy pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide stating that the death of Balboa was through an accident
but to the appellate court, all the foregoing facts discredited the claim of petitioner. The CA anchored its
Decision to rule on the guilt of the accused on the following factual findings: 1) the victim was not successful
in his attempts to grab the gun, since petitioner had been in control of the weapon when the shots were
fired; 2) the gun had been locked prior to the alleged grabbing incident and immediately before it went off;
it was petitioner who released the safety lock before he deliberately fired the fatal shots; 3) the location of
the wounds found on the body of the deceased did not support the assertion of petitioner that there had
been a grappling for the gun, 4) and, that there was not just one but two shots fired.

Hence, the appellant filed for this petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the death of Balboa was through accidental firing of the gun.
2. Whether or not Pomoy can validly invoke self defense.

Held:
1. Yes, the petition is meritorious. The Supreme Court may overturn the erroneous conclusions
drawn by the courts a quo. Where, as in this case, the facts in dispute are crucial to the question
of innocence or guilt of the accused, a careful factual reexamination is imperative. Accident is
an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which provide that
exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to the victim was not due
to the fault or negligence of the accused, but to circumstances that could not have been foreseen
or controlled.

At the time of the incident, petitioner was a member, specifically, one of the investigators
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force
Company. Thus, it was in the lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer that, under
the instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latter’s cell for a routine
interrogation.

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Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence because exercised all the necessary
precautions to prevent his service weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he
so assiduously maintained, he had kept his service gun locked when he left his house; he kept
it inside its holster at all times, especially within the premises of his working area. At no instance
during his testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury to the deceased,
much less kill him. Furthermore, Nicostrato Estepar, the guard in charge of the detention of
Balboa, did not testify to any behavior on the part of petitioner that would indicate the intent to
harm the victim while being fetched from the detention cell.

The elements of accident are as follows:

1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful act with due care;
2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and
3) on the part of the accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury.

From the facts, it is clear that all these elements were present.

US v. Caballeros

GR 1352 29 March 1905 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Irresistible force or uncontrollable
fear of a greater injury

Keyword: 4 Teachers and a burial; From banana gathering to corpse burying

Doctrine: The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of
irresistible force - Art. 8(9)

Facts: Defendants were charged as accessories for the crime of assassination or murder on 4 American
school-teachers. (Accessories because they took part in the burial of the corpses of the victims in order
to conceal the crime.)

One of the defendants, Roberto Baculi, confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it
appears that he did so because he was compelled to do so by the murderers of the four teachers.

This was corroborated by the lone eyewitness for the prosecution who said that when the 4 Americans
were killed, Robert Baculi was in a banana plantation gathering bananas. He ran when he heard shots
but was seen by the leaders of the band. The was called and struck as they forced him to bury the
corpses.

Another defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, claims that he did not take any part in the burial of the
aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the place of occurrence when the burial took place. A witness
stated that the prior confession of Caballeros’ guilt is not valid because the confession was made
through the promise made to him and to the other defendants that nothing would be done to them.

Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely and voluntarily, without force, intimidation,
or promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a trial.

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Issue: Whether assisting in a crime, when under an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear renders the
actor criminally liable.

Held: NO. Any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of a
greater injury is exempted from criminal liability.

In this case, there was coercion on Baculi’s actions exempting him from criminal liability.

Note: Ang focus ng topic natin for this case is yung kay Roberto Baculi. Yung kay Caballeros kasi more
on extrajudicial confessions not made voluntarily can not be received in evidence. Plus failure to report to
the authorities the commission of a crime is not an offense punished by the RPC.

People v. Loreno

GR L-54414 9 July 1984 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Irresistible force or uncontrollable
fear of a greater injury

Keyword: barrio dance; NPA

Doctrine: A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the
impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does
not act with freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only
without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily
harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a
character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.

Facts:Barangay Captain Elias Monge was at his house with his two young daughters - Monica, then 14
years old, and Cristina, married, then 22 years old. They were preparing to attend the dance to be held in
the barrio proper that evening when four men came to their house, saying that there was a letter from the
Chief. However, upon reading the letter, it said, “Kami mga NPA” and the men announced to all those
inside not to make any scandal. They were ordered to lie on the floor. They also recognized Eustaquio
Loreno while the latter tied them up. Both Monica and Christina were raped by the man in a dark
sweater.

Thereafter, the malefactors went down from the house one by one, bringing along all the things they
robbed from their victims. Despite the revalation of her daughters to him that they were sexually abused
that fateful evening, Elias Monge forced himself to report the robbery- rape incident. Therafter, Eustaquio
Loreno and Jimmy Marantal were charged with the crime of Robbery with Double Rape.

Appellants Loreno and Marantal claimed that they acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force
and/or under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury. They admitted that they were in
the house of Elias Monge on the night of January 7, 1978, but they were only forced by a man wearing
black sweater and his five companions who claimed to be members of the New People's Army (NPA),
operating in the locality, with the threat that if they did not obey, appellants and their families would be
killed.

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Issue: Whether the exempting circumstance of irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of a greater injury
is present in the case?

Held: NO. NO, The following acts demonstrated the voluntary participation and the conspiracy of the
appellants:

1. Loreno was armed with a short firearm when he and the man in a dark sweater went up to the house of
Elias Monge, and pointed the gun to the victims which enabled the malefactors to ransack the house.
2. Loreno, without prior instructions, positioned himself near the post of the balcony.
3. Loreno tied the victims with rattan and with ropes.
4. Loreno pointed his gun to the other victims when Monica Monge was struggling and shouting for help
from inside the room.

A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with
freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but
against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending and of such a
nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat
of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to the
accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.

People v. Del Rosario

GR 127755 14 April 1999 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Irresistible force or uncontrollable
fear of a greater injury

Keyword: driver-killer

Doctrine: A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse
of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with
freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act. The force
contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will
but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of
such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A
threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for
the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.

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Facts:
Accused Joselito Del Rosario was found guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
he was sentenced to suffer the death penalty and to pay damages to the heirs of the victim. cdasia
Del Rosario alleged that he was just hired by Virgilio Santos to drive him to a cockpit. He was not aware
of the plan of Santos and his two companions to rob and kill the victim. He was not able to seek assistance
because Santos threatened to shoot him if he did. He also failed to inform the police authorities about the incident
because the culprits has threatened him and his family. He claimed exemption from criminal liability as he
allegedly acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force.

Issue: Whether the accused’s claim for exemption from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 5, Revised Penal
Code as he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force must be sustained?

Held:
As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by fear when threatened with weapons, even those less powerful
than a gun, such as knives and clubs. People will normally, usually and probably do what an armed man asks
them to do, nothing more, nothing less. In the instant case, del Rosario was threatened with a gun. He could
not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under the same circumstances
would be more concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a person whom he
only saw for the first time that day. There is no doubt that the fear entertained by del Rosario because of the
gun directly pointed at him was real and imminent. Such fear rendered him immobile and subject to the will of
Boy Santos, making him for the moment an automaton without a will of his own. In other words, in effect, he
could not be any more than a mere instrument acting involuntarily and against his will. He is therefore exempt
from criminal liability since by reason of fear of bodily harm he was compelled against his will to transport his
co-accused away from the crime scene.|||

People v. Bandian

GR 45186 30 September 1936 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Insuperable cause

Keyword: nagpoop pero nanganak pala at iniwan sanggol

Doctrine: The law exempts from criminal liability any person who acts under the circumstances in which
the appellant acted in this case, by giving birth to a child in a thicket and later abandoning it, not because
of imprudence or any other cause than that she was overcome by severe dizziness and extreme debility,
with no fault or intention on her part. She has in her favor the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances

Facts: Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and
the corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina Bandian appealed from her
sentence.

At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor, saw the
appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond to a call of nature
because it was there that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he again
saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering
and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and, having noted that
she was every weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house and placed her in her
own bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what had happened to her, the

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appellant merely answered that she was very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such
circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later
requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant.
Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the body of newborn babe near a path
adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it
and the latter told him to bring the body to the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the baby
which had just been shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.

Upon being notified of the incident of 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno,
president of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant's house and found
her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and beneath it, directly under the bed, were
full of blood. Basing his opinion upon said facts, the physician in question declared that the appellant gave
birth in her house and in her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it for
the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore been
living maritally, because the child was not but of another man with whom she had previously had amorous
relations. To give force to his conclusions, he testified that the appellant had admitted to him that she had
killed her child, when he went to her house at the time and on the date above-stated.

Issue: Whether or not Bandian committed the crime of infanticide.

Held: The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's death in one way or
another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to
kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to
her second lover, Luis Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol — she
considers him her husband as he considers her his wife — began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial,
he knew that the appellant was pregnant and he believed from the beginning, affirming such belief when
he testified at the trial, that the child carried by the appellant in her womb was his, and he testified that he
and she had been eagerly waiting for the birth of the child. The appellant, therefore, had no cause to be
ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.

The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the thicket, according to her,
to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful.
If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning
it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and
extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all happened by mere accident, with no
fault or intention on her part. The law exempts from liability any person who so acts and behaves under
such circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).

In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting that the appellant
was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take her child therefrom,
having been so prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it should be held that the
alleged errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant are true; and it appearing that under such
circumstances said appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, she is
hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had been accused and convicted, with costs de oficio, and as
she is actually confined in jail in connection with this case.

People v. Lua Chu

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G.R. No. 34917; 56 Phil. 44 7 September 1931 OTHER EXCULPATORY CAUSES

Instigation

Keyword:

Doctrine: ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been said that the practice of entrapping
persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while
instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been
held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the
perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal
act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning
complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that
class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes
evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense
was committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of
an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny,
provided the original design was formed independently of such agent; and where a person approached by
the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities, and, being authorized by them to
do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held
that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a 'spotter,'
detective, or hirded informer; but there are cases holding the contrary.

Facts: Uy Se Tieng, consignee of the Shipments of Opium coming from Hongkong, who represented
agents of the real Owners of Shipments of Opium containing 3,252 tins. He collaborated with Juan
Samson, chief of the customs secret service of Cebu, & Joaquin Natividad of the Customs by paying them
an amount of P6,000 for the opium to be released safely from Customs. On Dec. 1929, upon arrival of the
Shipment of Opium in the ports of Cebu, Uy Se Tieng informed Samson that the former consult the real
owners of the shipment on how to proceed the payment of P6,000 & will come over to Samson house on
Dec. 17, 1929 to inform the decision of the owners. On the same day, Samson informed the Constabulary
represented by Captain Buencosejo & the Provincial Fiscal requesting a stenographer to take down the
conversation between Samson & Uy Se Teung. On the night of Dec. 17, 1929, Captain Buencosejo and a
stenographer named Jumapao from a law firm and hid themselves behind the curtains in the house of
Samson to witness the conversation between Samson, Uy Se Teung and Lua Chu. Captain Buencosejo
& Jumapao noted the ff. important facts:
1. Uy Se Tieng informed Samson that Lua Chu was one of the owners of the Opium.
2. Lua Chu informed Samson that aside from him, there were co-owners named Tan and another
located in Amoy.
3. Lua Chu promised to pay the P6,000 upon delivery of the opium from the warehouse of Uy Se
Tieng.
4. A Customs Collector had a conversation before when Samson was on vacation in Europe, with
Lua Chu and agreed on the business of shipping the Opium.

The following morning Uy Se Tieng and companion, Uy Ay presented papers to Samson & Captain
Buencosejo showed up & caught them in the act & arrested the two Chinese. The Constabulary then
arrested Lua Chu & confiscated P50K worth of Opium (3,252 tins).

Issue: Whether or not Juan Samson, a public official, was involved in the crime.

Held: NO. Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein defendants-appellants to import the
opium in question, as the latter contend, but pretended to have an understanding with the collector of
customs, Joaquin Natividad who had promised them that he would remove all the difficulties in the way of
their enterprise so far as the customhouse was concerned not to gain the P2,000 intended for him out of
the transaction, but in order the better to assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the
surreptitious importers. There is certainly nothing immoral in this or against the public good which should

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prevent the Government from prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for this is not a case where an
innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it is simply a trap set to catch
a criminal. Thus, the court convicted the accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part of
the law enforcement officer.

People v. Doria

GR 125299 22 January 1999 OTHER EXCULPATORY CAUSES

Instigation

Keyword: Buy-bust operation;

Doctrine: Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense available to the accused. It is instigation that is a
defense and is considered an absolutory cause.To determine whether there is a entrapment or instigation,
our courts have mainly examined the conduct of the apprehending officers, not the predisposition of the
accused to commit the crime.
Entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker. When an accused is
apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but
duty-bound to arrest him, even without a warrant.

Facts: Accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of Section 4,
in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Members of PNP Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from two civilian informants (CI)
that one “Jun” who was later identified to be Florencio Doria was engaged in illegal drug activities and
decided to entrap and arrest “Jun” in a buy-bust operation.

During the buy-bust operation”Jun” took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3
Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested “Jun” as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They
frisked “Jun” but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, “Jun” revealed that he left the money
at the house of his associate named “Neneth” (Violeta Gaddao) “Jun” led the police team to “Neneth’s”
house.

The team found the door of “Neneth’s” house open and a woman inside. “Jun” identified the woman as
his associate. SPO1 Badua asked “Neneth” about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over
“Neneth’s” house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He
saw that one of the box’s flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic
wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier “sold” to him by “Jun.” His suspicion
aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered “Neneth’s” house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box
and found that it contained 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.

The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants.

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Gaddao testified that inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They
asked her about a box on top of the table. This was the first time she saw the box. The box was closed
and tied with a piece of green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its contents. She said she
did not know anything about the box and its contents.

She denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in her person.
The RTC convicted the accused-appellants.

Issue: W/N entrapment is a valid defense available to the accused

Held:
No. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense available to the accused. It is instigation that is
a defense and is considered an absolutory cause.

Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the
commission of an offense.Entrapment has received judicial sanction when undertaken with due regard to
constitutional and legal safeguards.

While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting
criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has
often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable,
the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were
purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking
to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently
assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind
habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception
by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him, free from the influence or
instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief
is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed
independently of such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the
owner or the public authorities, and, being authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the
plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for
an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired informer; but there
are cases holding the contrary.

The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of Appeals. In People v.
Galicia, the appellate court declared that "there is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation."
The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself
becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the peace officer for the
purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan. In People v. Tan
Tiong, the Court of Appeals further declared that "entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction
of the lawbreaker.

The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Galicia was affirmed by this Court in People v.
Tiu Ua. Entrapment, we further held, is not contrary to public policy. It is instigation that is deemed contrary
to public policy and illegal.

Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense available to the accused. It is instigation that is a
defense and is considered an absolutory cause. To determine whether there is entrapment or
instigation, our courts have mainly examined the conduct of the apprehending officers, not the

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predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. The "objective" test first applied in United States v.
Phelps has been followed in a series of similar cases. Nevertheless, adopting the "objective" approach
has not precluded us from likewise applying the "subjective" test. In People v. Boholst, we applied both
tests by examining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust operation and admitting evidence of the
accused's membership with the notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang. We also considered
accused's previous his convictions of other crimes and held that his opprobrious past and membership
with the dreaded gang strengthened the state's evidence against him. Conversely, the evidence that the
accused did not sell or smoke marijuana and did not have any criminal record was likewise admitted in
People v. Yutuc thereby sustaining his defense that led to his acquittal.

Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales v. People

GR 181409 11 February 2010 Absolutory circumstances

Keyword: brother-in-law; nagbenta ng ariarian ng MIL, hindi binigay proceeds; fake SPA

Doctrine: The coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain,
categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple
crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned
under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through
falsification.

Facts: Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix of petitioner intestate
estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa
against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. William moved for the quashal of the
Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person
allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance.

Based on the affidavit, Mediatrix G. Carungcong found that prior to the death of her mother, William Sato
was able to secure the signature and thumbmark of Manolita on a Special Power of Attorney whereby her
niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her attorney-in-fact, to
sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. William told Manolita, who was
completely blind at that time, that such document she was to thumbmark involved her taxes. On the basis
of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William Sato found buyers for the property and made Wendy
sign three (3) deeds of absolute sale. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under
the power of attorney fraudulently secured from Manolita, which total P22,034,000.00, William failed to
account for the same and never delivered the proceeds to Manolita until the latter died on June 8, 1994.
Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and to deliver the proceeds of the
sales to me as Administratrix of my mother's estate, but he refused and failed, and continues to refuse and
to fail to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the estate of the deceased Manolita.

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The trial court granted William’s motion to quash the information and ordered the dismissal of the case.
The prosecution's motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated June 2, 2006. Dissatisfied with
the trial court's rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
but was again dismissed. After the motion for reconsideration was denied by CA, this petition was filed.

Issue: Whether or not the beneficial application of Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification.

Held: NO. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court which was directed to try the accused
with dispatch for complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.

ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. — No criminal, but only civil liability shall
result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief committed or
caused mutually by the following persons:

1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the

same line;.

Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause in the crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling) and malicious
mischief. It limits the responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees him from criminal liability by
virtue of his relationship to the offended party.

The Supreme Court held that the following view was more consistent with the language and spirit of
Articicle 332 (1) of the RPC: The continuing affinity view maintains that relationship by affinity between the
surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased
spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not. Under this view, the relationship by
affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one
of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to
benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these people and their relatives-by-marriage
is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties.

However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain,
categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple
crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned
under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through
falsification.

While the Information against William charges him with estafa, the real nature of the offense is determined
by the facts of the alleged information; in this case, it is really complex crime of estafa through falsification
of public documents. Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, William cannot avail himself of the
absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor.

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People v. Jaurigue

Adm. Matter No. 384 21 February 1946 CLASSES OF MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES
Privileged

Keyword: Minanyak siya sa chapel so stinab niya (go ate gurl)

Doctrines:
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES; DEFENSE OF HONOR. — The attempt to rape a woman constitutes
an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense, inasmuch as a woman's honor
cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, than her very existence; and it is evident that
a woman who, thus imperiled, wounds nay kills the offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal
liability, since such killing cannot be considered a crime from the moment it became the only means left
for her to protect her honor from so great an outrage.

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; VOLUNTARY SURRENDER OBFUSCATION. — The fact that

defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered to the barrio
lieutenant, admitting having stabbed the deceased, and agreed to go to her house shortly thereafter and
to remain there subject to the order of the said barrio lieutenant, an agent of the authorities, and the further
fact that she had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against her a few
moments before, and upon such provocation as to produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of
reason and self-control, should be considered as mitigating circumstances in her favor.

LACK OF INTENTION TO COMMIT so GRAVE A WRONG AS THAT ACTUALLY COMMITTED. — It

appearing that defendant and appellant merely wanted to punish the offending hand of the deceased with
her knife, as shown by the fact that she inflected upon him only one single wound, the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that actually committed should be
considered in her favor.

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; COMMISSION OF OFFENSE IN CONSECRATED PLACE. — The

aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated to religious worship, cannot be
legally considered, where there is no evidence to show that the defendant and appellant had murder in her
heart when she entered the chapel the fatal night.

Facts:
Avelina Jaurigue and Nicolas Jaurigue, her father, were prosecuted for the crime of murder for which
Nicolas was acquitted while Avelina was found guilty of homicide. At about 8:00 PM of September 20,
1942, Amado Capina, deceased victim, went to the chapel of Seventh Day Adventists to attend religious
services and sat at the front bench facing the altar. Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the
arrival of her father for the same purpose and sat on the bench next to the last one nearest the door. Upon
seeing Avelina, Amado went and sat by Avelina’s right side from his seat on the other side of the chapel,
and without saying a word, placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh.

Avelina Jaurigue, therafter, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife which she had in a pocket of her
dress with the intention of punishing Amado’s offending hand. Amado seized her right hand but she quickly
grabbed the knife on her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck inflicting
upon him a wound about 4 ½ inches deep, which is mortal. Nicolas saw Capina bleeding and staggering
towards the altar, and upon seeing his daughter approached her and asked her the reason for her action
to which Avelina replied, “Father, I could not endure anymore.” Amado Capina died a few minutes after.

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Barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada was there and Avelina surrendered herself. Lozada advised the
Jaurigues to go home immediately for fear of retaliation of Capina’s relatives.

Events prior:
One month before that fatal night, Amado Capina snatched Avelina’s handkerchief bearing her
nickname while it was washed by her cousin, Josefa Tapay.

7 days prior to incident (September 13, 1942), Amado approached her and professed his love for her which
was refused, and thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed her and touched her
breasts. She then slapped him, gave him fist blows and kicked him. She informed her matter
about it and since then, she armed herself with a long fan knife whenever she went out.

2 days after (September 15, 1942), Amado climbed up the house of Avelina and entered the room where
she was sleeping. She felt her forehead and she immediately screamed for help which awakened her
parents and brought them to her side. Amado came out from where he had hidden and kissed the hand of
Avelina’s father, Nicolas.

Avelina received information in the morning and again at 5:00 PM on the day of the incident
(September 20, 1942) that Amado had been falsely boasting in the neighbourhood of having taken
liberties with her person. In the evening, Amado had been courting the latter in vain.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the defendant should be completely absolved of all criminal responsibility because she
is justified in having acted in the legitimate defense of her honor
2. Whether or not the Court should find the additional mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender,
presence of provocation and absence of intent in her favour
3. Whether or not committing said offense in a sacred place is an aggravating circumstance in this case

Held:
1. Conviction of defendant is sustained and cannot be declared completely exempt from criminal liability.
To be entitled to a complete self-defense of chastity, there must be an attempt to rape.

To provide for a justifying circumstance of self-defense, there must be: a) Unlawful aggression, b)
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, c) Lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself. Attempt to rape is an unlawful aggression. However, under the
circumstances of the offense, there was no possibility of the defendant to be raped as they were inside the
chapel lighted with electric lights and contained several people. Thrusting at the base of Capino’s neck as
her means to repel aggression is not reasonable but is instead, excessive.

2. Mitigating circumstances are considered in her favour. Circumstances include her voluntary and
unconditional surrender to the barrio lieutenant, provocation from the deceased which produced temporary
loss of reason and self-control of the defendant and lack of intent to kill the deceased evidenced by infliction
of only one single wound.

3. Aggravating circumstance of having committed offense in a sacred place is not sustained as there is no
evidence that the defendant had intended to murder the deceased when she entered the chapel that night.
She killed under great provocation.

Penalty: For homicide, penalty is reclusion temporal. However, with 3 mitigating circumstances
and no aggravating circumstance, it is reduced by two degrees, in this case, prision correccional.
Indeterminate Sentence Law provides the penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its medium
degree to prision correccional in its medium degree.

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Avelina is sentenced to 2mos and 1 day of arresto mayor as minimum to 2 years, 4 months, and
1 day of prision correccional as maximum; to indemnify heirs of Capina in the sum of 2,000; with
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment not to exceed 1/3 of principal penalty and to pay costs.
She is given the benefit of ½ of her preventive imprisonment.

People v. Narvaez

GR L-33466-67 20 April 1983 CLASSES OF MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES
Privileged

Keyword: fencing; rice drier

Doctrine: The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance of
self-defense or defense of one's rights under paragraph 1 of Article 11, Revised Penal Code. When the
appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to
the attack.

Facts: At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibanez
together with the two deceased Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were fencing the land of George
Fleischer, father of deceased Davis Fleischer. The place was in the boundary of the highway and the
hacienda owned by George Fleischer. This is located in the municipality of Maitum, South Cotabato. At
the place of the fencing is the house and rice drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez. At that time, appellant
was taking his rest, but when he heard that the walls of his house were being chiselled, he arose and there
he saw the fencing going on. If the fencing would go on, appellant would be prevented from getting into
his house and the bodega of his ricemill. So he addressed the group, saying 'Pare, if possible you stop
destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over what is good,' addressing the deceased Rubia, who
is appellant's compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however, answered: 'No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.'
Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot Fleischer, hitting him. As Fleischer
fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing there is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia,
likewise hitting him Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of the shooting'

It appears, however, that this incident is intertwined with the long drawn out legal battle between the
Fleischer and Co., Inc. of which deceased Fleischer was the secretary-treasurer and deceased Rubia the
assistant manager, on the one hand, and the land settlers of Cotabato, among whom was appellant.

In any case, Fleischer had given him up to December 31, 1968 within which to vacate the land. He should
have allowed appellant the peaceful enjoyment of his properties up to that time, instead of chiselling the
walls of his house and closing appellant's entrance and exit to the highway.

Issue: WON the act of appellant in shooting the deceased was justified.

Held: NO. The deceased had no right to destroy or cause damage to appellant's house, nor to close his
accessibility to the highway while he was pleading with them to stop and talk things over with him. The
assault on appellant's property, therefore, amounts to unlawful aggression as contemplated by law.

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In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of appellant's property which he had the right to
resist, pursuant to Art. 429 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:

Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment
and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel
or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.

The third element of defense of property is present, i.e., lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
appellant who was defending his property. As a matter of fact, there was no provocation at all on his part,
since he was asleep at first and was only awakened by the noise produced by the victims and their laborers.
His plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with him was no provocation at all.

Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since not all the elements for
justification are present. He should therefore be held responsible for the death of his victims, but he could
be credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense.

The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance of self-defense
or defense of one's rights under paragraph 1 of Article 11, Revised Penal Code. When the appellant fired
his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.

Consequently, appellant is guilty of two crimes of homicide only, the killing not being attended by any
qualifying nor aggravating circumstance, but extenuated by the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense-in view of the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims and lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the appellant-and by two generic mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation.

People v. Ulep

GR 128359 6 December 2000 CLASSES OF MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES
Privileged; Incomplete Justification

Keyword: Mindblown (literally)

Doctrine: Incomplete justification is a special or privileged mitigating circumstance, which, not only
cannot be offset by aggravating circumstances but also reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than
that prescribed by law.

Facts:

Around 2am in the morning of 22 December 1995, Wapili was having a high fever and was heard talking
insensibly to himself in his room. He later became wild and violent prompting his cousin, Leydan, to seek
help from their neighbor policewoman, Norman Plando who in turn asked assistance from SPO1 Ulep,
SPO1 Espadera and SPO2 Pillon and all members of PNP assigned within the vicinity.

At around 4am, SPO1 Ulep, SPO1 Espadera and SPO2 Pillon arrived at the scene and saw Wapili
approaching them. Wapili was armed but the its kind is in dispute (Police officers said it was a bolo but his
relatives said it was merely a rattan stool). SPO1 Ulep fired a warning shot in the air and told Wapili to put
down his weapons or they would shoot him. Wapili replied and said “pusila!” (“fire!”) and continued
advancing towards the police officers. When Wapili was only about two (2) to three (3) meters away from

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them, SPO1 Ulep shot the victim with his M-16 rifle, hitting him in various parts of his body. As the victim
slumped to the ground, SPO1 Ulep came closer and pumped another bullet into his head and literally blew
his brains out.

The post mortem examination conducted by Dr. Omandac showed that Wapili sustained 5 gunshot
wounds. He concluded that the shots were fired at close range, perhaps within twenty-four (24) inches,
judging from the powder burns found around some of the wounds in the body of the victim, 8 and that the
wound in the head, which caused the victim's instantaneous death, was inflicted while "the victim was in a
lying position.”

Ulep was charged with murder. Although he pleaded not guilty during arraignment, he insisted during the
trial that he acted in self-defense. The trial court nonetheless convicted him of murder and death penalty
having been imposed , the case was automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court. Ulep prays for his
acquittal mainly on the basis of his claim that the killing of the victim was in the course of the performance
of his official duty as a police officer, and in self-defense.

The Supreme Court did not appreciate the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Art. 11,
par.5 since the 2nd requisite was not present (shooting Wapili in the head was obviously unnecessary). Nor
did the SC appreciate the justifying circumstance of self-defense in this case since there is no presence of
unlawful aggression (victim was already laying down when shot in the head).

Issue:

Whether the special or privileged mitigating circumstance of Incomplete justification can be appreciated
in computing for Ulep’s penalty?

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of accused-appellant the incomplete justifying circumstance of
fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right. Under Art. 69 of The Revised Penal Code , "a penalty
lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly
excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from
criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Arts. 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such
conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in
view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking."

Incomplete justification is a special or privileged mitigating circumstance, which, not only cannot be offset
by aggravating circumstances but also reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by
law. 15 Undoubtedly, the instant case would have fallen under Art. 11, par. 5 of The Revised Penal Code
had the two (2) conditions therefor concurred which, to reiterate: first, that the accused acted in the
performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office; and second , that the injury or offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of
such right or office. But here, only the first condition was fulfilled. Hence, Art. 69 is applicable, although its
"that the majority of such conditions be present," is immaterial since there are only two (2) conditions that
may be taken into account under Art. 11, par. 5. Article 69 is obviously in favor of the accused as it provides
for a penalty lower than that prescribed by law when the crime committed is not wholly justifiable. The
intention of the legislature, obviously, is to mitigate the penalty by reason of the diminution of either freedom
of action, intelligence, or intent, or of the lesser perversity of the offender.

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Guillermo v. People

GR 153287 20 January 2009 CLASSES OF MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES
Privileged

Keyword: Restaurant; Knife; Neck; Beer bottle.

Doctrine: Article 69 provides that: “A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law
shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required
to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Articles 11 and 12,
provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period
which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or
lacking.” Since Guillermo's plea of self-defense lacks only the element of "reasonable means", Guillermo
is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. Consequently, the penalty
for homicide may be lowered by one or two degrees, at the discretion of the court.

Facts: While sitting at the table inside a restaurant, Winnie Alon had an argument with Arnel Socias
regarding the cutting of wood by means of a chain saw. Noel Guillermo suddenly took hold of Alon and
stabbed him on the neck 3 times with a knife. Guillermo pleaded the justifying circumstance of self-defense
claiming that Alon struck him with a beer bottle on the head when he intervened to pacify the quarrel.
Nonetheless, RTC convicted Guillermo of homicide but appreciated the presence of a special or privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete justification sentencing him to imprisonment of 6y to 10y. CA
affirmed the RTC decision. Guillermo appealed, contending that RTC and CA erred in failing to recognize
the existence of all the elements of self-defense.

Issue: WON RTC and CA erred.

Held: NO. Guillermo's plea of self-defense lacks the element of "reasonable means" because knife wounds
were all aimed at vital parts of the body; while he was only stuck by a beer bottle and only sustained injuries
above his ear. The imposable penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the RPC is reclusion temporal in
its full range. Article 69 however provides that: “A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed
by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions
required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Articles
11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty
in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption
present or lacking.” Since Guillermo's plea of self-defense lacks only the element of "reasonable means",
Guillermo is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. Consequently,
the penalty for homicide may be lowered by one or two degrees, at the discretion of the court. The penalty
which the RTC imposed and which the CA affirmed lowered the penalty of reclusion temporal by one
degree, which yields the penalty of prision mayor.

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People v. Ural

L-30801 27 March 1974 ORDINARY MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES
Lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong

Keyword: maltreatment of prisoner, policeman as accused,murder by means of fire

Doctrine: Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating, circumstance of
abuse of his official position.

Facts: Ural, a policeman, at around 8 in the evening in the municipal jail Buug, Zamboanga del Sur was
boxing a drunk prisoner by the name of Felix Napola. Napola collapsed on the floor and Ural stepped on
his body. Ural went out of the cell, and went back with a bottle. He poured the contents of the bottle on
Napola’s body, ignited it with a match and left the cell. All of this was witnessed by Brigido Alberto, a
former detention prisoner who had been accused of murder but was set free after posting bail. Ural
cautioned Alberto not to tell anyone of the incident. The trial court found Ural guilty of murder by means
of fire due to the positive testimony of Alberto.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of Ural having no
intention to commit so grave a wrong.

Held: Yes. Ural is entitled to mitigating circumstance, but this is offset by generic aggravating
circumstance of abuse of official position. But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating
circumstance "that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed".It is
manifest from the proven facts that appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola. His design was only to
maltreat him may be because in his drunken condition he was making a nuisance of himself inside the
detention cell. When Ural realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed Napola to
secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary.

The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public position. He could not have
maltreated Napola if he was not a policeman on guard duty. Because of his position, he had access to
the cell where Napola was confined. The prisoner was under his custody. "The policeman, who taking
advantage of his public position maltreats a private citizen, merits no judicial leniency. The methods
sanctioned by medieval practice are surely not appropriate for an enlightened democratic civilization.
While the law protects the police officer in the proper discharge of his duties, it must at the same time
just as effectively protect the individual from the abuse of the police."

Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating, circumstance of abuse of his
official position.

People v. Gonzales

GR 128359 6 December 2000 ORDINARY MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES
Lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong

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Keyword: Road rage, Barilan malapit sa Loyola Memorial Park (makes sense)

Doctrine: The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong obtains when there is
a notable disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting
crime committed.

Facts: In the afternoon of October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m., at the intersection near the Garden of
Remembrance, while the accused-appellant Gonzalez was turning left towards the exit and the
complainant Noel Andres, who was driving a Tamaraw FX, was headed straight along the road to the exit
their two vehicles almost collided, Noel Andres was able to timely step on the brakes. The appellant
continued driving along his way while Noel Andres drove behind the appellant’s vehicle for some time and
cut him off when he found the opportunity to do so. Noel Andres then got out of his vehicle and knocked
on the appellant’s car window. This is as far as their versions of the incident coincide.

The prosecution’s version of the incident is that Noel Andres calmly told the appellant to be careful with
his driving and informed the latter that he, Andres, is with his family and to this Inocencio Gonzalez
allegedly replied. “Accidents are accidents, what’s your problem.” Andres stated that he saw the appellant
turning red in anger so he decided to go back to his vehicle when he was blocked by the appellant’s son
who said, “Anong problema mo sa erpat ko.” Both of them get into an altercation.

Dino and the appellant stated that Andres remained outside his vehicle during the altercation with Dino.
When Andres suddenly reached for something inside his vehicle, Dino froze on the spot where he stood.
This prompted the appellant to get his gun from the glove compartment and feeling that his son was
threatened he got out of his car ready to shoot.

A single bullet was fired and hit the last window on the left side of the Tamaraw FX. The appellant claims
that he did not see the passengers inside the vehicle at the time of the shooting.

Suddenly, one of his passengers said “Binaril kami.” He turned to his wife Feliber Andres and saw her
bloodied and unconscious. He turned around and saw his son Kenneth and nephew Kevin were also
wounded.

On November 4, 1998 an Information for the complex crime of Murder, Double Frustrated Murder and
Attempted Murder was filed against herein accused-appellant, stating that the same was guilty of.

Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to appreciate the mitigating
circumstances of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong on the part of the appellant.

Held: No mitigating circumstances are present in the case. The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit. This mitigating
circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the accused
to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed.

The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon
used, the mode of attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim. The appellant’s use of a gun,
although not deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should have reasonably placed the appellant on
guard of the possible consequences of his act. The use of a gun is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes
committed.

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People v. Pagal

G.R. No. L-32040 October 25, 1977 ORDINARY MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES
Sufficient provocation

Keyword: Robbery of chinese dude; stabbing icepick; clubbing iron pipe (not the kind of clubbing na
masaya)

Doctrine: Two mitigating circumstances cannot be considered as two distinct and separate
circumstances but should be treated as one when they both come from the same incident.

Facts: December 26, 1969, City of Manila, the accused, Pedro Pagal with Jose Torcelino, by means of
violence took from one chinese dude, Gau Guan, cash amounting to PHP 1281. The victim was then
stabbed with an icepick and clubbed with an iron pipe inflicting mortal wounds which caused his death.
With the generic aggravating circumstances of (1) nighttime purposely sought to better accomplish their
criminal design; (2) evident premeditation; (3) in disregard of the respect due the offended party; and (4)
with abuse of confidence, the accused being then employees of the offended party.

The accused admitted the information charged however, they presented evidence to prove the
mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation and passion or obfuscation.

They were still sentenced to DEATH for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Appellants assail the trial
court in not appreciating in their favor the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation, and passion
or obfuscation.

Issue: Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation and passion or obfuscation should
be given credence.

Held: NO.
FIRST, the alleged provocation which caused the obfuscation of the appellants arose from the same
incident, that is, the alleged maltreatment and/or ill treatment of the appellants by the deceased, these
two mitigating circumstances cannot be considered as two distinct and separate circumstances but
should be treated as one.

SECOND, the circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be mitigating in a crime which is
planned and calmly meditated before its execution.

THIRD, the maltreatment that appellants claim the victim to have committed against them occurred
much earlier than the date of the commission of the crime. Provocation in order to be a mitigating
circumstance must be sufficient and immediately preceding the act.

(not related on topic of mitigating circumstance but good to know pa rin)

LASTLY, appellants claim that the trial court erred in considering the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime, evident premeditation, and disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his
rank and age. - The SC disagrees that evident premeditation and disregard of the respect due the
offended party were present in the commission of the crime.

Evident premeditation is inherent in the crime of robbery. However, in the crime of robbery with homicide,
if there is evident premeditation to kill besides stealing, it is considered as an aggravating circumstance.
In other words, Evident premeditation will only be aggravating in a complex crime of robbery with
homicide if it is proved that the plan is not only to rob, but also to kill. In this case, the original plan was

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only to rob, and that, they killed the deceased only when the latter refused to open the "kaha de yero",
and fought with them.

The aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due
the offended party on account of his rank, age or sex may be taken into account only in crimes against
persons or honor, when in the commission of the crime there is some insult or disrespect shown to rank,
age, or sex. Not proper to consider this aggravating circumstance in crimes against property. Robbery
with homicide is primarily a crime against property and not against persons.

Therefore in this case, there is only generic aggravating circumstance, i.e., nighttime or nocturnity.
Since the aggravating circumstance of nighttime is offset by the mitigating circumstance of plea of
guilty, the penalty of the accused has been changed from death to reclusion perpetua.

Urbano v. People

GR NO. 182750 20 January 2009 ORDINARY MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES
Sufficient provocation

Keyword: “lucky punch”

Doctrine: The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. If no danger existed in the condition except because of
the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.

Facts: On September 28, 1993, at around 8:00 p.m., the victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner Rodel
Urbano were at the compound of the Lingayen Water District (LIWAD) in Lingayen, Pangasinan, having
just arrived from a picnic in the nearby town of Bugallon, Pangasinan, where, with some other co-
workers, they drunk beer in a restaurant. While inside the compound, the two had a heated altercation in
the course of which Tomelden hurled insulting remarks at the petitioner. Reacting, the petitioner asked
why Tomelden, when drunk, has the penchant of insulting the petitioner.

The exchange of words led to an exchange of blows. Cooler heads succeeded in breaking up the fight,
but only for a brief moment as the protagonists refused to be pacified and continued throwing fist blows at
each other. Then the petitioner delivered a "lucky punch," as described by eyewitness Orje Salazar, on
Tomelden’s face, which made Tomelden topple down. Tomelden was on the verge of hitting his head on
the ground had their companions not caught him and prevented the fall. The blow, however, caused
Tomelden’s nose to bleed and rendered him unconscious.

Petitioner and his other co-workers brought Tomelden to the office of the LIWAD general manager where
he spent the night. He remained in the compound the following day, September 29, 1993. Upon arriving
home at around 6:00 p.m. of that day, Tomelden informed his wife, Rosario, of the fight the previous night
and of his having been rendered unconscious. He complained of pain in his nape, head, and ear which
impelled Rosario to immediately bring him to the Lingayen Community Hospital where Dr. Daisy Arellano
examined him and treated his lacerated left index finger, contusions, and hematoma at the right cerebrum.

On October 2 and 7, 1993, Tomelden went back to the hospital complaining of dizziness, headache, and
other pains. The attending doctors observed the patient to be in a state of drowsiness and frequent

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vomiting. On October 8, 1993, Rosario brought Tomelden to the Sison Memorial Provincial Hospital in
Dagupan City, where the attending physician, Dr. Ramon Ramos, diagnosed Tomelden suffering from
"brain injury, secondary to mauling to consider cerebral hemorrhage."

Tomelden was confined in the provincial hospital until 3:00 p.m. of October 10, 1993, and, due to financial
constraints, was thereafter discharged despite signs negating physical condition improvement. Upon
reaching their house, however, Tomelden again complained of extreme head pain, prompting his wife to
bring him back to the Lingayen Community Hospital where Dr. Arellano again attended to him. This time,
things turned for the worst, the doctor noting that Tomelden appeared to be semi-conscious, sleepy,
uncooperative, and not responding to any stimulant. Tomelden died at 9:00 p.m. of that day due, per Dr.
Arellano, to "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral
hemorrhage due to mauling incident."

The defense presented petitioner who denied having any intention to kill, asserting that hypertension, for
which Tomelden was receiving treatment, was the cause of the latter’s death.

RTC: found petitioner guilty as charged. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt
of the accused of the crime of Homicide.

CA: affirmed the conviction of petitioner

Issue: Whether the CA erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on
the part of the victim and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong in favor of the petitioner?

Held: YES, Yes, the CA erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances that are present in this
case. Petitioner next contends that the mitigating circumstances of no intention to commit so grave a
wrong and sufficient provocation on the part of the victim ought to be appreciated in petitioner’s favor.

When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential element of self-
defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of exciting, inciting,
or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying; the provocation
must be sufficient to excite one to commit the wrongful act and should immediately precede the act. This
third requisite of self-defense is present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the aggressor; (2)
when, even if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the provocation was sufficient,
it was not given by the person defending himself; or (4) when even if a provocation was given by the person
defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate to the act of aggression.

In the instant case, Tomelden’s insulting remarks directed at petitioner and uttered immediately before the
fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. This is not to mention other irritating statements made by the
deceased while they were having beer in Bugallon. Petitioner was the one provoked and challenged to a
fist fight.

Moreover, the mitigating circumstance that petitioner had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed should also be appreciated in his favor. While intent to kill may be presumed from the fact of
the death of the victim, this mitigating factor may still be considered when attendant facts and
circumstances so warrant, as in the instant case.

Petitioner tried to avoid the fight, being very much smaller than Tomelden. He tried to parry the blows of
Tomelden, albeit he was able, during the scuffle, to connect a lucky punch that ended the fight. And lest it
be overlooked, petitioner helped carry his unconscious co-worker to the office of the LIWAD’s general
manager, Surely, such gesture cannot reasonably be expected from, and would be unbecoming of, one
intending to commit so grave a wrong as killing the victim. A bare-knuckle fight as a means to parry the
challenge issued by Tomelden was commensurate to the potential violence petitioner was facing. It was

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just unfortunate that Tomelden died from that lucky punch, an eventuality that could have possibly been
averted had he had the financial means to get the proper medical attention. Thus, it is clear that the
mitigating circumstance of "no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" must also be
appreciated in favor of petitioner while finding him guilty of homicide. That petitioner landed a lucky punch
at Tomelden’s face while their co-workers were trying to separate them is a compelling indicium that he
never intended so grave a wrong as to kill the victim.

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People v. Benito

GR L-32042 13 February 1975 ORDINARY MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES
Vindication of a wrong

Keyword: CSC

Doctrine: Stated otherwise, the act of killing did not immediately or proximately follow the supposed sufficiently
insulting and provocative remark. The juridical reason for appreciating this mitigating circumstance is the
implied recognition by the law of the weakness of human nature such that an ordinary human being if
sufficiently provoked would immediately retaliate in the unchristian spirit of vindictive retribution. But the
circumstances of this case are such that the act of murder committed by the accused could not reasonably be
attributed to an immediate or proximate retaliatory action on his part to vindicate what personally appeared to
him as sufficient provocation in the form of an insulting remark allegedly uttered by the victim.

Facts:
It is not controverted that at about 5:30 p.m. of December 12, 1969, the victim Pedro Moncayo, Jr., Assistant
Chief of Personnel Transaction and Acting Chief of the Administrative Division of the Civil Service Commission,
while driving his car on P. Paredes street in front of the Office of the Civil Service Commission was followed by
the accused, and when the car was about to turn at the intersection of P. Paredes and Lepanto Streets, Manila,
the accused shot him eight times with a .22 caliber revolver, causing the victim's death. The accused was
charged with murder and when the case was called for trial, through counsel de parte, he manifested his desire
to withdraw his previous plea of not guilty and substitute it with a plea of guilty without prejudice to proving
mitigating circumstances. The prosecution manifested that it would controvert whatever mitigating
circumstances the accused would prove and also prove other aggravating circumstances. The trial court
repeatedly explained to the accused the nature and consequences of his plea of guilty to the offense charged
and warned him that the maximum penalty imposable is death. Notwithstanding the explanation and warning of
the trial court, the accused, assisted by his counsel de parte upon being re-arraigned, entered a plea of guilty.
The accused presented evidence to prove mitigating circumstances and the prosecution subsequently
introduced evidence to prove aggravating circumstances not mentioned in the information. The Court
sentenced the accused to death after finding him guilty as principal in the crime of murder qualified by
treachery, with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and disregard of the respect due to the
offended party on account of his rank, offset by the mitigating circumstance of accused's plea of guilty.|||

Issue: Whether the criminal act of murder was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense done
by the victim against the accused?

Held: The victim's remark that the Civil Service Commission, of which the accused was a clerk, is a hangout of
thieves cannot be considered a grave offense against the latter, since it was general in nature and not
specifically directed to him. If the accused felt alluded to by such remark, that was his own individual reaction
thereto. At most, said remark might be considered a mere provocation and not a grave offense which might
have impelled the accused to commit a crime in immediate retaliation.|

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Bacabac v. People

GR 149372 11 September 2007 ORDINARY MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES
Vindication of a wrong

Keyword: dance hall

Doctrine: In order for the mitigating circumstance of vindication to be appreciated, the act should
“committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony, his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within
the same degree."

Facts: December 23, 1990 - Hernani Quidato (the victim) was at a dance hall in the company of Eduardo
Selibio (Eduardo) and Melchor Selibio (Melchor). And so were Jonathan Bacabac (Jonathan) and Edzel
Talanquines (Edzel). Jonathan and Edzel left the dance hall. Not long after, the victim and his companions
also left and on their way home, they encountered Jonathan and Edzel. It appears that the two groups
then and there figured in a misunderstanding. On his way home, Jesus Delfin Rosadio (Jesus), who was
also at the dance hall, noticed a commotion. He soon saw that Melchor was "hugging" Edzel, and later
"tying" Jonathan "with his hands." Still later, he saw the victim hit Edzel with a "stick." Jesus left and
proceeded to Edzel's residence to report to his father what he had witnessed. In the meantime, Edzel and
Jonathan managed to flee. The victim and his companions thereafter headed for home in the course of
which they met Pat. Ricardo Bacabac (herein petitioner), together with Edzel and Jonathan who are his
nephews, and Edzel's father, Jose, his mother, and two sisters. Petitioner and Jose were carrying M-16
armalites, while Jonathan and Edzel were carrying a piece of wood and a revolver, respectively. Jesus
thereupon pointed to the victim and his companions as the ones who had manhandled Jonathan and
Edzel. The victim apologized, explaining that he and his companions mistook Jonathan and Edzel for other
persons. Petitioner, at that instant, fired his armalite into the air, while Jose fired his armalite. Quidato
died, Eduardo died 2 hours later and Jonathan was also hit in the thigh. Trial court and CA convicted
petitioner of 2 counts of murder. Petitioner contends that he should be credited with the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense.

Issue: W/N there’s mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense.

Held: As for petitioner's invocation of the mitigating circumstance of "immediate vindication of a grave
offense", it fails. For such mitigating circumstance to be credited, the act should be, following Article 13,
paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, "committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the
one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted
brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degree." 59 The offense committed on Edzel
was "hitting" his ear with a stick 60 (according to Jesus), a bamboo pole (according to Edzel). By Edzel's
own clarification, "[he] was hit at [his] ear, not on [his] head." That act would certainly not be classified as
"grave offense". And Edzel is petitioner's nephew, hence, not a relative by affinity "within the same degree"
contemplated in Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.

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US v. Hicks

G.R. No. 4971 23 September 1909 ORDINARY MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES
Passion or obfuscation

Keyword: She wants to move on but her ex wouldn't let her; shooting

Doctrine: The only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such
as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral
passions.

Facts: Augustus Hicks (Afro-American) and Agustina Sola (Christian-Moro) illicitly lived together from
1902 to November 1907 in the municipality of Parang, Cotabato. Agustina left Hick’s house and went to
live with her brother-in-law, Luis Corrales. She later had a new relationship with Corporal Wallace Current
(Afro-American) and lived together. On December 21, at about 7:30p.m., Hicks together with Lloyd Nickens
went to the house. He talked with Agustina in the moro dialect, then talked with Wallace. Hicks told Wallace
“Did I not tell you to leave this woman alone?” to which Wallace answered “That is all right, she told me
that she did not want to live with you any longer, but if she wishes, she may quit me, and you can live with
her.” Hicks said “I have made up my mind” and drew his revolver. Current saw this, snatched his hand and
said “Don’t do that”. Current jumped into the room, hiding himself. Hicks fired at Sola who was close by in
the sala and died in a little more than an hour later. The Court of First Instance found Hicks guilty and
sentenced him to the penalty of death, indemnity of P1,000.00 and to pay the costs.

Issue: Whether or not passion and obfuscation is applicable in this case.

Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of First Instance. The shot that struck the deceased in the
breast and caused her death was not due to an accident but to a willful and premeditated act on the part
of the aggressor with intent to deprive the victim of her life.

In addition to the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the presence of other aggravating circumstances,
such as premeditation, and the fact that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the deceased should
be taken into consideration.

Inasmuch as in the present case the crime has already been qualified as committed with treachery, the
circumstance of premeditation should only be considered as a merely generic one. Premeditation is,
however, manifest and evident by reason of the open acts executed by the accused.

All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused, deliberately and after due reflection
had resolved to kill the woman who had left him for another man, and in order to accomplish his perverse
intention with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was already provided with a clean and well-prepared
weapon and carried other loaded cartridges besides those already in his revolver, he entered the house,
greeting everyone courteously and conversed with his victim, in what appeared to be a proper manner,
disguising his intention and claiming her by his apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to
successfully accomplish his criminal design, behaving himself properly as he had planned to do
beforehand.

As against the two foregoing aggravating circumstances no mitigating circumstances is present, not even
that mentioned in paragraph 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, to wit loss of reason and self-control produced
by jealousy as alleged by the defense, in as much as the only causes which mitigate the criminal
responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise
from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.

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US v. Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 7094 29 March 1912 ORDINARY MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES
Passion or obfuscation

Keyword: heat of passion; caught in the act

Doctrine: Causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate
from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.

Facts: The convict, in the heat of passion, killed the deceased, who had been his querida (concubine or
lover) upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance.

Issue: : W/N Dela Cruz crime may be mitigated by reason of passion and obfuscation

Held: YES. There is an extenuating circumstance present in the case. The Court is of the opinion that the
defendant acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation when
he caught his querida in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance.

The Court mentioned the view taken by the Supreme Court of Spain regarding a case with similar state of
facts: A man who kills a woman (his lover) for having caught her in her underclothes with another man and
afterwards shoots himself inflicting a serious wound should be responsible for the act but with extenuating
circumstance considered because he acted as such due to strong emotion which impelled him to perform
the criminal act. The situation presents a sufficient impulse in the natural and ordinary course to produce
the violent passion and obfuscation which the law regards as a special reason for extenuation.

People v. Gelaver

GR 95357 9 June 1993 ORDINARY MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES
Passion or obfuscation

Keyword: ginawang human shield ni paramour si wife

Doctrine: The act producing the obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission of the crime
by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might have recovered his equanimity. The
crime was committed almost a year after the victim had abandoned the conjugal dwelling

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Facts: This is an appeal from the trial court’s decision that found accused-appellant Eduardo Gelaver guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code for stabbing his wife,
Victoria Pacinabao.

Gelaver was married to victim with whom he begot 4 children. They lived together at their conjugal home
until July 3, 1987 when she abandoned her family to live with her paramour.

According to the accused-appellant, after he was informed by his daughter about where his wife and
paramour was living, he went to the place and saw his wife having sexual intercourse. When his wife saw
him, she pushed her paramour aside. Her paramour immediately stood up, took a knife placed on top of
the bedside table and attacked appellant. The latter was able to wrest possession of the knife and then
used it against the paramour, who evaded the thrusts of the accused-appellant by hiding behind the victim.
Thus, it was the victim who received the stab intended for the paramour.

According to the witness for the prosecution, Randy Mamon, he heard shouts coming from the house of
Tessie Lampedario in Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Sto. Niño, South Cotabato. He saw the Gelaver
and a woman having a heated argument. Thereafter, Gelaver held the neck of the victim, dragged her and
with a knife on his right hand, stabbed the latter three times on the breast. Gelaver then went out of the
gate and fled in the direction of the public market of Sto. Niño.

The accused-appellant admitted to the killing of his wife but in his defense, he continued stabbing his wife
as his mind had been “dimmed” or overpowered by passion and obfuscation by the sight of his wife having
carnal act with her paramour.

Issue: Whether or not passion and obfuscation shall merit Gelaver a lower sentence.

Held: NO. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in finding the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation "as a result of his (appellant's) wife leaving their home and their
children." Before considering this circumstance, it is necessary to establish the existence of an unlawful
act sufficient to produce such a state of mind. The act causing the obfuscation must not be separated from
the commission of the crime by a significant amount of time, during which the accused may have regained
his composure. The crime was committed nearly a year after the victim had left the conjugal residence.

People v. Bello

L-18792 28 February 1964 ORDINARY MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES
Passion or obfuscation

Keyword: Nagpropose siya sa hostess niyang jowa kaso dineny siya so nagpakalasing siya and
strinanggle niya si ate gurl awtsu

Doctrine:
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; PASSION AND OBFUSCATION. — The accused's insistence that his
common law wife abandon her work as hostess and live with him again, and his rage at her rejection of
the proposal, cannot be properly termed as arising from immoral and unworthy passions, and therefore
the accused in the case at bar can be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of having acted on
a provocation sufficiently strong to produce passion and obfuscation.

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Facts: Guillermo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Guillermo
was a 54 year old widower, and Alicia’s senior by 30 years. Prior to Alicia’s employment at Maring’s Place,
the couple led a ‘blissful’ life. Due to poverty, Alicia became an entertainer/public hostess at the said bar,
and Guillermo used to watch her there everyday; very much smitten by her beauty[1].

However, on May 16, Guillermo saw Alicia enter the Gumaca theater with a man, and surprised the man
caressing her inside the movie house. Guillermo dragged her outside.

Two weeks later, Guillermo visited Maring’s Place to ask Alicia for money, but the owner, Maring (who was
fantastically creative enough to name the bar after him), told him to go home and to leave Alicia alone
because he was an old invalid. He proceeded to walk home empty handed, but upon passing Bonifacio
Street, he came across the Marasigan brothers who mocked him with the above stated remark. The self-
loathing Guillermo proceeded to Paty’s place and downed give glasses of Tuba.

By nighttime of the same day, Guillermo returned to Maring’s Place and did then and there stab Alicia
several times. Realizing what he had done, he ran to Gumarca and surrendered to the police there. He
was found guilty by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City of murder attended by the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, alevosia, and abuse of confidence and ungratefulness; The penalty for which
is death; thus the automatic review of the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the victim should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of passion or
obfuscation, albeit his relationship with the victim being merely a common-law marriage?

Held: Yes. By stare decisis, passion or obfuscation on the part of the offender must arise from legitimate
and moral sentiments. Since common-law marriages are considered unlawful in the Philippines,
Obfuscation, when relationship is illegitimate, cannot be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.

To answer this question, we must first differentiate the circumstances of this case with that of U.S. v Hicks.
In the said case, the common-law wife of Mr. Hicks terminated her relations with the American, and
contracted new relations with a certain corporal. Mr. Hicks shot his ex-common-law-wife when she refused
to go home with him and resume their relationship. Since they were not married, she was entitled to do so.
What she did – cruel as it may be – was legal in the eyes of law. Passion and obfuscation were not
appreciated in such a case, since:

The common-law wife had a right to leave her common-law husband, as they were not united in holy
matrimony. He had no right to compel her to go with him. Remember that the first requirement of passion
or obfuscation is that there be an unlawful act, sufficient to produce diminution of self-control or the exercise
of will power.
Returning now to the case at hand, what Guillermo was asking from Alicia was that she (1) quit her job as
a hostess; an ill-reputed profession corroborated by her promiscuous relations with other men, and (2)
resume her job as a hostess.

The Supreme Court held that Alicia’s flat out refusal was an exhibition of immorality itself. A monogamous
illegitimate relationship is definitely of higher standing than illicit relationship for the sake of gain – or gainful
promiscuity as the court put it.

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People v. Amaguin

GR 54344-45 10 January 1994 ORDINARY MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES
Voluntary surrender or plea of guilt

Keyword: Indian pana, fiesta, La Paz, Iloilo

Doctrine: While it may have taken both Willie and Gildo a week before turning themselves in, the fact is,
they voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities before arrest could be effected. For voluntary
surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following elements must be present: (a) the
offender has not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and
(c) the surrender must be voluntary. 28 All these requisites appear to have attended their surrender.

Facts: Hernando Oro narrated that in the afternoon of 24 May 1977, he and his brothers Diosdado and
Danilo, brother-in-law Rafael Candelaria, an first cousin Sergio Argonzola were invited by their eldest
brother Pacifico to the latter's house in the interior of Divinagracia Street, La Paz, Iloilo City, for a small
gathering to celebrate the town fiesta. At about five o'clock in the afternoon, after partaking of the meager
preparations put together by Pacifico, he (Hernando) and his companions decided to leave. They were
accompanied by their host to the plaza where they could get a ride.

On their way, while traversing Divinagracia Street, Pacifico was called by accused Celso Amaguin : "Pare,
come here." But Pacifico answered : "Pare, not yet because I have to conduct my guests first."
Immediately, Celso, with a butcher's knife in hand, rushed towards Pacifico. Gildo, Celso's younger brother,
with a knife tucked to his waist, followed with a slingshot known as "Indian pana" or "Indian target". While
Gildo aimed the dart from his slingshot at Danilo, which hit the latter on the chest, Celso hacked Pacifico.
Gildo then stabbed Diosdado with a knife. Thereafter, Willie, the eldest of the Amaguin brothers, appeared
with a handgun and successively shot the brothers Pacifico, Diosdado and the fleeing Danilo. Diosdado,
own kneeling, gasping for breath and pleading for his life, was again shot by Willie who next fired anew at
Pacifico. Meanwhile, Gildo and Celso repeatedly stabbed Pacifico who already lying prostrate and
defenseless.

The then Court of First Instance of Iloilo found the accused Gildo Amaguin, guilty of Murder. As regards
Willie Amaguin alias "Tikboy," the trial court found him guilty "as accomplice”.

Issue: WON the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender must be appreciated.

Held: YES. We agree with accused-appellants' view that voluntary surrender should be appreciated in
their favor. While it may have taken both Willie and Gildo a week before turning themselves in, the fact is,
they voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities before arrest could be effected. For voluntary
surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following elements must be present: (a) the
offender has not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and
(c) the surrender must be voluntary. All these requisites appear to have attended their surrender.

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People v. Dela Cruz

GR L-45284 December 29, 1936 ORDINARY MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES
Voluntary surrender or plea of guilt

Keyword: 26 pesos

Doctrine: Samting samting

Facts:

Accused Dela Cruz, together with Legaspi and 3 other persons whose identities are still unknown acted in
conspiracy in robbing Yu Wan giving him fist blows on the face and other parts of the body. They stole and
carried away 26 pesos in cash. Dela Cruz was then a habitual delinquent having previously convicted once
of the crime of theft and twice of the crime of estafa. Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty.
During the trial and after two witnesses for the prosecution had testified, the accused withdrew their plea
of not guilty, substituting it by that of guilty.

Issue:
Whether Dela Cruz’s plea of guilty constituted as a mitigating circumstance under Art. 13 of the RPC.

Held: No. The appellant's plea of guilty does not constitute a mitigating circumstance under article 13
,subsection 7, of the Revised Penal Code, which requires that this plea be spontaneous and that it be
made prior to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution. The confession of guilt, although
subsequent to the consummation of the crime and entirely alien to its development, constitutes a cause
for the mitigation of the penalty, not because itis a circumstance modifying criminal responsibility already
incurred and in the evolution of which it has not intervened absolutely, but because, as an act of repentance
and respect for the law, it indicates a moral disposition in the accused favorable to his reform. It is clear
that these benefits are not deserved by the accused who submits to the law only after the presentation of
some evidence for the prosecution, believing that in the end the trial will result in his conviction by virtue
thereof.

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Canta v. People

GR 140937 28 February 2001 ORDINARY MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES
Analogous Circumstances

Keyword: Surrender cow to authorities.

Doctrine: For surrender to be voluntary, there must be an intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the
authorities, showing an intention to save the authorities the trouble and expense that his search and
capture would require. In Canta's case, he voluntarily took the cow to the municipal hall of Padre Burgos
to place it unconditionally in the custody of the authorities and thus saved them the trouble of having to
recover the cow from him. This circumstance can be considered analogous to voluntary surrender and
should be considered in favor of Canta.

Facts: Narciso Gabriel acquired a cow. He left the cow’s care and custody to Gardenio Agpay. One day,
Agpay found that the cow was gone but he found hoof prints which led to the house of Filomeno Vallejos.
Vallejos told Agpay that Exuperancio Canta had taken the animal. They tried to recover the cow from
Canta’s wife, but the latter told them that Canta had delivered the cow to his father, Florentino Canta who
was at that time, the barangay captain. Florentino said he told his son to take the cow to the Municipal Hall
of Padre Burgos. Canta did as he was told. Three days later, Florentino and Exuperancio were called to
the police station for investigation. Canta admitted taking the cow but claimed that it was his and that it
was previously lost; he presented certificates of ownership to support his claim but the same was denied
by the municipal treasurer stating that Canta had no records of such certificates of ownership. The trial
court found Canta guilty of violating the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law. CA affirmed the RTC decision sentencing
him to imprisonment of 10y1d to 12y5m11d.

Issue: WON Canta should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary
surrender.

Held: YES. The circumstance of voluntary surrender has the following elements:
(1) the offender has not actually been arrested;
(2) the offender surrenders to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; and
(3) the surrender is voluntary.
In the present case, Canta had not actually been arrested. In fact, no complaint had yet been filed against
him when he surrendered the cow to the authorities. For surrender to be voluntary, there must be an intent
to submit oneself unconditionally to the authorities, showing an intention to save the authorities the trouble
and expense that his search and capture would require. In Canta's case, he voluntarily took the cow to the
municipal hall of Padre Burgos to place it unconditionally in the custody of the authorities and thus saved
them the trouble of having to recover the cow from him. This circumstance can be considered analogous
to voluntary surrender and should be considered in favor of Canta. Penalty is reduced to 4y2m to 10y1d.

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People v. Legaspi

G.R. Nos. 136164-65 20 April 2001 Art. 14 and 62 of the RPC

Keyword: Rape and robbery

Doctrine:

Facts: At around 2:00 in the morning of February 11, 1997, complainant Honorata Ong, who was then
sleeping inside her house with her three daughters, was awakened by the sound of their door opening.
When Honorata opened her eyes, she saw a man armed with a knife standing by her feet. More
terrifying, the man already had his pants and briefs down on his knees and he was pointing to her eldest
daughter. Alarmed, Honorata told the man not to touch her daughter. The man poked his knife at her and
told her to stand up and then was made to lie down on the adjacent sofa. Thereafter, the man removed
Honorata's panties and had sex with her. All this time, he had his knife at Honorata's neck. Honorata
noticed that the man reeked of alcohol. After slaking his lust, Honorata's assailant stood up then asked
for money. Since the man still had his knife pointed at her, Honorata could do nothing but comply. She
gave him the only money she had, several bills amounting to P500.00.

On the other hand, all that accused-appellant could interpose as defenses were denial and alibi, stating
that at the time of the alleged incident, he was at his home in Manapat Street sleeping. Accused-
appellant also testified that he had been previously convicted of homicide and Roberto Eugenio, the
victim therein, was a resident of the exact same address where complainant Honorata was living.
Accused-appellant hinted at the possibility that relatives of Roberto Eugenio had conspired with
complainant Honorata to get rid of him.

The trial court, found accused-appellant guilty of rape aggravated by dwelling and nighttime, and of
robbery aggravated by dwelling.

Issue: Whether the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling can be considered in raising
the penalty imposable upon accused-appellant from reclusion perpetua to death.

Held: No. Chief Justice Davide and Justice Panganiban agreed and emphasized that the presence of
aggravating circumstances can make the difference between life and death where the imposable
penalty is reclusion temporal maximum to death or reclusion perpetua to death. Justice Panganiban
added that the prosecutors will now be compelled to prepare well-worded information.

To make sure that the circumstances that need to be alleged are not missed out in the information,
Justice Mendoza suggested that the Court can prescribe an updated form in the Rules of Court.

Thus, the Rules now require qualifying as well as aggravating circumstances to be expressly and
specifically alleged in the Complaint or Information, otherwise the same will not be considered by
the court even if proved during the trial. And this principle is applicable in all criminal cases, not only
in cases were the aggravating circumstance would increase the penalty to death. With this, the Court
gives fair warning to prosecutors that henceforth, they must prepare well-crafted information that allege
the circumstances qualifying and aggravating the crimes charged, otherwise the same will not be
considered by the court in determining the proper imposable penalty.

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People v. Capalac

No. L-38297 6 December 2000 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Taking advantage of public office

Keyword: Away sa sabong, Policeman

Doctrine: A policeman who acted purely like a brother in forthwith avenging an attack on his brother cannot
be said to have taken advantage of his official position. Killing made to avenge attack on brother of accused
entitles him to mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense.

Facts: On September 20, 1970 at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the scene of the gory incident
being a duly licensed cockpit in the City of Iligan was where Jimmy Magaso stabbed Moises Capalac,
killing him.

The aggressor, attempting to escape, was confronted by two brothers of Moises, Jesus Capalac, originally
included in the information but now deceased, and appellant Mario Capalac, a policeman. The attempt of
Magaso to board a jeep was unsuccessful, he alighted after two shots were fired in succession. Knowing
that he was completely at the mercy of the two brothers, he raised his hands as a sign of surrender, but
they were not to be appeased. He was pistol-whipped by appellant Mario Capalac, being dealt several
blows on the head and the face. After he had fallen to the ground, Jesus Capalac stabbed the deceased
on the chest three or four times. He was brought to the hospital where he died, the cause, according to
the coroner's report, being "hemorrhagic shock due to a wound of the heart."

The lower court also held that appellant took advantage of his position as a police officer and employed
means or brought about circumstances which added ignominy to the natural effects of his act. It sentenced
him to suffer the death penalty.

Hence, this case is before this Tribunal for automatic review.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in its application of the aggravating circumstance of using
one’s position in the commission of the crime.

Held: Yes. The lower court erred in finding the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, of
means being employed or circumstances brought about to add ignominy to the natural effects of the act,
and of the crime being committed with the offender taking advantage of his official position as having
attended the commission of the crime.

The mere fact that appellant Mario Capalac is a member of the police force certainly did not of itself
justify that the aggravating circumstance of advantage being taken by the offender of his public
position be considered as present. He acted like a brother, instinctively reacting to what was
undoubtedly a vicious assault on his kin that could cause the death of a loved one. It would be an affront
to reason to state that at a time like that and reacting as he did, he purposely relied on his being a policeman
to commit the act. He pistol-whipped the deceased because he had his pistol with him. It came in handy
and he acted accordingly.16 That he was a policeman is of no relevance in assessing his criminal
responsibility. The decision was modified to ten years and one day of prision mayor minimum to seventeen
years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal maximum.

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People v. Gapasin

GR 73489 25 April 1994 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Taking advantage of public office

Keyword: pamisa; armalite; constabulary/ public officer

Doctrine: A member of the Philippine Constabulary, committing the crime with an armalite issued to him
upon receiving a mission order is a valid ground for the aggravating circumstance of: taking advantage of
public position.

Facts: According to a prosecution witness, the accused and Rodrigo Ballad left the house of Enteng
Teppang at about 2:00 P.M. of October 6, 1979 after attending the "pamisa" for the deceased father of
Teppang.

Jerry Calpito followed them. While they were walking along the barangay road, Calpito was shot by
appellant with an armalite rifle. When Calpito fell on the ground, the appellant fired more shots at him.
Thereafter, one of the accused, Amor Saludares planted a .22 caliber revolver on the left hand of Calpito.
Upon hearing the shots, Faustina Calpito ran to help her fallen husband. The body of Calpito was
autopsied and found that the victim sustained 4 bullet wounds.

The appellant invoked self-defense stating that he was issued a mission order to investigate unidentified
armed men in Isabela. He was informed that Calpito had an unlicensed firearm. According to the
accused, when Calpito was about three meters away from him, appellant asked him what was bulging in
his waist. Instead of answering, Calpito took a step backward, drew his firearm from the waist and fired
twice at the appellant. He missed because appellant dropped to the ground simultaneously firing his
armalite.

The accused is charged with murder qualified by treachery.

Mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Aggravating circumstances of: 1) ignominy, the accused having stepped and kicked
the body of the deceased; (2) abuse of superior strength, and (3) taking advantage of public position,
with respect to the accused CIC Loreto Gapasin who is a Philippine Constabulary soldier

Appelant contended that the crime committed is homicide and not murder.

Issue: Whether the advantage of public position as an aggravating circumstance is proper.

Held: YES. The trial court properly appreciated taking advantage of public position as an aggravating
circumstance. Appellant, a member of the Philippine Constabulary, committed the crime with an armalite
which was issued to him when he received the mission order.

Had the appellant and his companion not intended to harm the victim, they could have simply
apprehended him. Or, having verified that Calpito possessed an unlicensed firearm, appellant could have
reported the matter to his superiors so that warrants for Calpito's arrest and the seizure of his unlicensed
firearm could have been obtained.

The two conditions to constitute treachery were present in the case at bench, to wit:
(a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person who is attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate; and

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(b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.

In view of the presence of treachery which qualified the killing as murder, the evident premeditation
should be considered only as a generic aggravating circumstance. It also correctly held that treachery
absorbed abuse of superior strength.

The decision is affirmed, accused is charged with murder qualified by treachery.

People v. Tiongson

GR L-35123-24 25 July 1984 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Insult to public authority

Keyword: prison break

Doctrine: The circumstances specifying an offense or aggravating the penalty thereof must be proved
as conclusively as the act itself, mere suppositions or presumptions being insufficient to establish their
presence according to law. No matter how truthful these suppositions or presumptions may seem, they
must not and cannot produce the effect of aggravating the condition of the defendant.

Facts: The accused Rudy Tiongson escaped from the Municipal Jail of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro,
together with George de la Cruz and Rolando Santiago, where they were detained under the charge of
Attempted Homicide. While in the act of escaping, Tiongson killed Pat. Zosimo Gelera, a member of the
police force of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, who was guarding the said accused, and PC Constable
Aurelio Canela of the PC Detachment stationed in Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, who went in pursuit of
them. By reason thereof, Rudy Tiongson was charged with Murder, to which he pleaded guilty. The trial
court, however, did not render judgment outright, but ordered the prosecution to present its evidence,
after which, it sentenced the said accused to suffer the death penalty. The death penalty having been
imposed, the cases were elevated to the SC court for mandatory review.

Issue: Whether the aggravating circumstance of insult to public authority is present?

Held: NO. The circumstances specifying an offense or aggravating the penalty thereof must be proved
as conclusively as the act itself, mere suppositions or presumptions being insufficient to establish their
presence according to law. No matter how truthful these suppositions or presumptions may seem, they
must not and cannot produce the effect of aggravating the condition of the defendant.

In this case, the aggravating circumstance that the crimes were committed in contempt of or with insult to
the public authorities cannot be appreciated since Pat. Gelera and PC Constable Canela were the very
ones against whom the crime were committed. Besides, Pat. Gelera and PC Constable Canela are not
persons in authority, but merely agents of a person in authority.

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People v. Magdueño

GR L-68699 22 September 1986 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Insult to public authority

Keyword: Fiscal!

Doctrine: The aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime with insult to public authority does not seem
to be borne by the records. For this aggravating circumstance to be considered it must not only be shown that
the crime was committed in the presence of the public authority but also that the crime was not committed
against the public authority himself. (U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150; People v. Rizal, 103 SCRA 282). In the
instant case Fiscal Dilig, the public authority involved in the crime, was the victim. Hence, the lower court, erred
in including commission of the crime with insult to public authority as an aggravating circumstance.

Facts: On October 15, 1980, a few minutes past 8:00 o'clock in the morning, as soon as the late Fiscal
Fernando M. Dilig had placed himself at the driver's seat inside his jeep parked near his house at the corner
Roxas and D. Mendoza Streets, Puerto Princesa City, all of a sudden, two successive gunshots `burst into the
air, as the gunman coming from his left side aimed and poured said shots into his body, inflicting two fatal
wounds (Exhibit N) that instantaneously caused his death. ||

Magdueño also executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he admitted that he killed Fiscal Dilig for a price
or reward and implicated Leonardo Senas and Mauricio de Leon to the commission of the crime. However,
both Senas and de Leon were later dropped from the amended information for lack of a prima facie case
against them|||

Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of murder?

Held: YES.
We have carefully examined the records and considering the testimony of the three eyewitnesses to
the shooting, their positive and categorical identification of the appellant as the assailant, the corroborative
evidence on the circumstances of the killing, and the more than coincidental presence of Magdueño in
Palawan when he should have been in Manila, we see no error in the lower court's finding that the appellant
committed the crime of murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and aggravated by price and
reward. Magdueño, in effect, also admitted that he was a recidivist at the tune of his trial. However, recidivism
was not alleged in the information and makes no difference in the determination of the penalty in this case.|||
However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime with insult to public authority does
not seem to be borne by the records. For this aggravating circumstance to be considered it must not only be
shown that the crime was committed in the presence of the public authority but also that the crime was not
committed against the public authority himself. (U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150; People v. Rizal, 103 SCRA
282). In the instant case Fiscal Dilig, the public authority involved in the crime, was the victim. Hence, the
lower court, erred in including commission of the crime with insult to public authority as an aggravating
circumstance.

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People v. Ilaoa

GR 94308 16 June 1994 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Insult to public authority

Keyword: “Nang-Kwang”

Doctrine: Abuse of superior strength cannot be considered because there was no evidence whatsoever that
appellant was physically superior to the deceased and that the former took advantage of such superior physical
strength to overcome the latter's resistance to consummate the offense.

Facts: In 15 June 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City found Ruben and Rogelio guilty of murder
with the attendant circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and cruelty, and imposed
upon them the penalty of "life imprisonment." The conviction was based on the following circumstantial
evidence:

One. The deceased Nestor de Loyola was seen at about eleven o'clock in the evening of 4 November 1987, in
a drinking session with his compadre Ruben Ilaoa together with Julius Eliginio, Edwin Tapang and a certain
"Nang Kwang" outside Ruben's apartment.

Two. The drunken voices of Ruben and Nestor engaged in an apparent argument were later on heard. Nestor
was then seen being kicked and mauled by Ruben and his brother Rodel, Julius Eliginio and Edwin Tapang.
Nestor was crying all the while, "Pare, aray, aray!" Afterwards, Nestor, who appeared drunk, was seen being
"dragged" into Ruben Ilaoa's apartment. Nestor was heard saying, "Pare, bakit ninyo ako ginaganito, hirap na
hirap na ako!"
Three. Ruben Ilaoa and Julius Eliginio borrowed Alex Villamil's tricycle at about two o'clock the following morning
allegedly for the purpose of bringing to the hospital a neighbor who was about to give birth. Ruben was seen
driving the tricycle alone, with a sack which looked as though it contained a human body, placed in the sidecar.
The tricycle was returned an hour later to Alex who noticed bloodstains on the floor. The latter thought that they
were those of the pregnant woman.
Four. Blood was found on Ruben's shirt when he was asked to lift it during the investigation by the police.
Moreover, Ruben's hair near his right forehead was found partly burned and his shoes were splattered with blood.
Susan Ocampo, Ruben's live-in partner, was likewise seen in the early morning of 5 November 1987 sweeping
what appeared to be blood at the entrance of their apartment.
In this appeal, brothers Ruben and Rogelio Ilaoa argue for their acquittal. They contend that the circumstantial
evidence relied upon by the trial court for their conviction failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Specifically, they assail the finding of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and cruelty as totally
unwarranted.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of murder?

Held: NO.
The Court ruled that appellant is liable only for homicide, not murder, on the ground that the qualifying
circumstances alleged in the information, namely, abuse of superior strength, cruelty and evident
premeditation, were not sufficiently proved to be appreciated against appellant. Abuse of superior strength

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cannot be considered because there was no evidence whatsoever that appellant was physically superior to the
deceased and that the former took advantage of such superior physical strength to overcome the latter's
resistance to consummate the offense.The fact that Nestor de Loyola's decapitated body bearing forty-three
(43) stab wounds, twenty-four (24) of which were fatal, was found dumped in the street is not sufficient for a
finding of cruelty where there is noshowing that appellant Ruben Ilaoa, for his pleasure and satisfaction,
caused Nestor de Loyola to suffer slowly and painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral
pain. Number of wounds alone is not the criterion for the appreciation of cruelty as an aggravating
circumstances. Neither can it be inferred from the mere fact that the victim's dead body was dismembered.
Evident premeditation cannot likewise be considered. There is nothing in the records to show that appellant,
prior to the night in question, resolved to kill Nestor de Loyola, nor is there proof to show that such killing was
the result of meditation, calculation or resolution on his part. On the contrary, the evidence tends to show that
the series of circumstances which culminated in the killing constitutes an unbroken chain of events with no
interval of time separating them for calculation and meditation. Absent any qualifying circumstance, Ruben
Ilaoa should only be held liable for homicide.|||

People v. Tac-an y Hipos

GR Nos. 76338-89 26 February 1990. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Insult to public authority

Keyword: Use of an unlicensed firearm

Doctrine: In sentencing Renato to suffer the penalty of death for the crime of murder, the trial court did take into
account as a "special aggravating circumstance" the fact that the killing of Francis had been done "with the use
of an unlicensed firearm." In so doing, we believe and so hold, the trial court committed error. There is no law
which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in homicide or murder. Under
an information charging homicide or murder, the fact that the death weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot
be used to increase the penalty for the second offense of homicide or murder to death (or reclusion perpetua
under the 1987 Constitution). The essential point is that the unlicensed character or condition of the instrument
used in destroying human life or committing some other clime, is not included in the inventory of aggravating
circumstances set out in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.

(QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE) Renato claimed that he was acting in self-defense, or at least in incomplete
self-defense, when he shot Francis. For a claim of self-defense to be sustained, the claimant must show by clear
and convincing evidence that the following requisites existed: a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to repel the aggression; and c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused.

Facts: Respondent Renato Tac-an (18) and deceased victim Francis Ernest Escano III (15) were classmates in
the third year of high school of Divine Word College in Tagbilaran City. They used to be close friends, being
members of the same Bronx gang, until Francis withdrew from the gang and their friendship turned sour
thereafter.

At 2pm of 14 December 1984, Renato entered Room 15 of their high school building to attend English III class,
where Francis is also a classmate. Renato had placed a scrapbook he prepared for their next Mathematics class
on his chair while he approached their English III teacher (Mrs. Liliosa Baluma) to raise a question. Upon returning
to his chair, Renato then saw Francis sitting on the said scrapbook which angered him that he promptly kicked
the chair where the latter was seated. Francis explained that he had not intentionally sat down on Renato’s
scrapbook. A fistfight would have ensued if not for the intervention of their classmates and two teachers (Mrs.

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Baluma and Mr. Pasilbas). When the two had calmed down and had shaken hands, Mrs. Baluma resumed her
class.

Subsequently, Renato slipped out of the classroom in the middle of their English III class to go home and get a
gun. The next Math class under Mr. Pasilbas started when Renato suddenly burst into the room, shut the door
and shouted “Where is Francis?”. Upon seeing Francis, Renato fired four times before it hit the victim on the
head and fell to the floor.

After having shot Francis, Renato was found alone outside Room 15 when a teacher (Mr. Pablo Baluma),
unaware that the latter was the killer, asked if he could help Francis who was still alive inside the room. Renato
thereupon reentered Room 15, aimed at the chest of Francis and fired once more.

Thereafter, Renato proceeded to the faculty room where he held hostages of some teachers and students, and
reloaded his gun. Philippine Constabulary troopers led by Capt. Lazo arrived and surrounded the faculty room.

After some time, Renato’s father and brother pleaded for his surrender. Renato then turned over his gun to his
brother while Capt. Lazo placed Renato under arrest. The teachers and students afterwards rushed Frances to
Celestino Gallares Memorial Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

On 14 December 1984, RTC of Tagbilaran City held respondent Renato Tac-an guilty beyond reasonable doubt
to the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions qualified with Murder to suffer a penalty of death.
Respondent was also held guilty beyond reasonable doubt to the crime of Murder, appreciating aggravating
circumstances of acting: 1) while under the influence of drugs, 2) with the use of an unlicensed firearm, and 3)
with insult to a person in authority, to also suffer a penalty of death.

Issue: Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.

Held: No. Court held its disagreement that a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school may
be regarded as a “public authority” within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 (Aggravating Circumstances)
if the RPC. Careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 of the RPC (Persons in authority and agents of
persons in authority) will show that while a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school is deemed
to be a “person in authority”, such teacher or professor is so deemed only for purposes of application of Articles:
148 (Direct Assault upon a person in authority), and 151 (Resistance and Disobedience to a person in authority
of the agents of such person) of the RPC.

People v. Diaz

G.R. No. L-24002 21 January 1974 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Disregard of rank, age, or sex, and
dwelling

Keyword: Bolo; Bardog;

Doctrine: There was no evidence that the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the age of
the victim.

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Facts: In the afternoon of September 4, 1963, 14 years old Remegia Carasos and her first cousin 11 years
old Anita Pakaira were gathering camotes in a farm called Sitio Camotian, Barrio Perito, municipality of
Sta Margarita, Western Samar. Suddenly, 24 year old Francisco Diaz, an unmarried farmer and known to
Remegia and Anita appeared. Without any preliminaries, he embraced Remegia from behind and against
her will held her breast. She shouted for help. Anita, with a bolo, struck Francisco on the head and hands.
Francisco suffering some injuries, fled.

The girls went to the house of their grandfather Quintin Tadia in Sitio Ilawod. They informed him of the
incident. Tadia immediately reported the incident to the barrio lieutenant. He gave Tadia a note for the
municipal authorities so that the proper complaint could be filed.

In the morning of the following day, Tadia and the girls were on their way to the población of Sta. Margaita
to file the complaint. He was unarmed. While they were ascending the hill or cliff in Sitio Ilawod, Franciso
and his younger brother Gerardo appeared on the crest of the hill. Gerardo was armed with a locally made
shotgun called bardog. He immediately fired sidewise at Tadie while about four meter from the latter, hitting
him I the neck. The shot felled Tadia.Gerardo told his brother: “Go ahead, stab that fellow.” Francisco
repeatedly stabbed Tabia with a bolo.

Remegia ran to her house. Anita hid herself among the bushes and saw all that was happening. Tadia
died on the spot. Gerardo went home while Francisco surrendered to the authorities.

Francisco set up the exculpatory plea of self-defense. According to him, he did not accede to Tadia’s
request for a pig. Tadia allegedly followed him to his abaca plantation. When he refused to grant the
request, Tadia allegedly hacked him with his bolo. He retreated and when he was cornered, he pulled the
trigger of his shotgun and picked up Tadia’s bolo and hacked the latter.

Gerardo, on the other hand, had an alibi. According to him, he was in his house sick.

The Trial Court convicted them of the crime of murder.

Issue: Whether or not there was a disregard of age.

Held: The crime committed by the appellants is murder qualified by treachery as alleged in the information.
There was treachery (alevosia) because the brothers made a deliberate surprise or unexpected assault
on Tadia. They literally ambushed him. They waited for him on the cliff, a high ground which rendered it
difficult for him to flee or maneuver in his defense. Tadia was shot sidewise while he was ascending the
hill or cliff burdened by his catopis or food basket. That was another circumstance which handicapped him
in resisting the assault. The initial attack was successful. Tadia fell and rolled down the cliff and landed
near the creek below. In that helpless state, he was ruthlessly stabbed by Francisco Diaz.

The appellants resorted to means of execution which directly and specially insured the killing without any
risk to themselves arising from any defense which the victim could have made. Actually, he was not able
to make any defense, unarmed and attacked unaware as he was. The treacherous mode of attack is
incontrovertible (Par. 16, Art. 14 and Art. 248, Revised Penal Code).

The attack was also attended with abuse of superiority. Two armed young men unexpectedly assaulted
an unarmed sexagenarian. However, abuse of superior strength is merged with treachery

The circumstance of old age cannot be considered aggravating. There was no evidence that the accused
deliberately intended to offend or insult the age of the victim. That circumstance may be absorbed in
treachery (People vs. Gervacio, L-21565, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 960; People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil.
548; People vs. Limaco, 88 Phil. 35, 44).

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As to Francisco Diaz, evident premeditation should be appreciated. It should be recalled that the embracing
incident was reported by Tadia to the barrio lieutenant after two o'clock in the afternoon of September 4,
1963. Thus, there was a sufficient interval of time, more than one-half day, within which appellant Francisco
Diaz had full opportunity for meditation and reflection and to allow his conscience to overcome the
resolution of his will (vencer las determinaciones de la voluntad) had he desired to hearken to its warnings
(U.S. vs. Gil, 13 Phil. 530, 547).

However, with respect to Gerardo Diaz, premeditacion conocida should not be appreciated. Obviously, he
participated in the assault in order to help his elder brother who exercised some moral ascendancy over
him and who was the one directly affected by the embracing incident which preceded the killing (People
vs. Talok, 65 Phil. 696, 707; Art. 62, Revised Penal Code).

Premeditation, which was alleged in the information as a qualifying circumstance, should be considered
only as generic aggravating circumstance with respect to Francisco Diaz since treachery has already been
used to qualify the killing as murder (See People vs. Ubiña, 97 Phil. 515, 535). In his case, it is offset by
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to the authorities.

People v. Arizobal

GR No. 135051-52 14 December 2000 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Keyword: Maskara; Sari-sari store

Doctrine: Generally, dwelling is considered inherent in the crimes which can only be committed in the
abode of the victim, such as trespass to dwelling and robbery in an inhabited place. However, in robbery
with homicide the authors thereof can commit the heinous crime without transgressing the sanctity of the
victim's domicile.

Facts: On 12 August 1994 two separate Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Cataingnan, Masbate, charging Clarito Arizobal, Erly Lignes, Rogelio Gemino and two John Does with
Robbery in Band with Homicide for robbing and slaying Laurencio Gimenez.

On 24 March 1994, Clementina Gimenez, together with her husband Laurencio Gimenez and a grandchild
were sound asleep in their house. At around 9:30 in the evening, Laurencio roused her from sleep and told
her to open the door because there were persons outside the house. Since it was pitch-dark she lit a
kerosene lamp and stood up to open the door. She was suddenly confronted by three armed men pointing
their guns at her. She recognized two (2) of them as Clarito Arizobal and Erly Lignes but failed to recognize
the third person who was wearing a maskara. She readily identified Clarito because she used to pass by
his house in San Rafael while Erly was also a familiar face as he was a regular habitue of the flea market.

The intruders ransacked their cabinet and scattered everything on the floor until they found
P8,000.00 among sheets of paper. Before leaving with their loot they ordered Laurencio to go
with them to Jimmy's house. Against his will, Laurencio went with them. Clementina recalled that
shortly after the group left she heard a volley of shots. On the same night, while Jimmy Gimenez
was in the process of skinning a chicken for their supper, 3 men suddenly appeared and ordered
them to lie face down. One of them pushed her to the ground while the others tied Francisco
and Jimmy as they whipped the latter with an armalite rifle. The robbers proceeded to ransack
the household in search for valuables. They took around P1,000.00 from her sari-sari store and

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told them to produce P100,000.00 in exchange for Jimmy's life. Since the couple could not
produce such a big amount in so short a time, Erlinda offered to give their certificate of large
cattle. Culprits did not accept. 3 masked men then dragged Jimmy outside the house and together
with Laurencio brought them some 50 meters away while leaving behind Clarito Arizobal and Erly
Lignes to guard Francisco and Erlinda's son. Moments later she heard a burst of gunfire which
reverberated through the stillness of the night.

Issue: W/N robbery with killing was aggravated: by a band, with treachery, by nighttime (nocturnity) and,
by dwelling

Held: The trial court is correct in appreciating dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. Generally, dwelling
is considered inherent in the crimes which can only be committed in the abode of the victim, such as
trespass to dwelling and robbery in an inhabited place. However, in robbery with homicide the authors
thereof can commit the heinous crime without transgressing the sanctity of the victim's domicile. In the
case at bar, the robbers demonstrated an impudent disregard of the inviolability of the victims' abode when
they forced their way in, looted their houses, intimidated and coerced their inhabitants into submission,
disabled Laurencio and Jimmy by tying their hands before dragging them out of the house to be killed.

But treachery was incorrectly considered by the trial court. The accused stand charged with, tried and
convicted of robbery with homicide. This special complex crime is primarily classified in this jurisdiction as
a crime against property, and not against persons, homicide being merely an incident of robbery with the
latter being the main purpose and object of the criminals. As such, treachery cannot be validly appreciated
as an aggravating circumstance under Art. 14 of The Revised Penal Code.

While it appears that at least five (5) malefactors took part in the commission of the crime, the evidence on
record does not disclose that "more than three" persons were armed, and robbery in "band" means "more
than three armed malefactors united in the commission of robbery." Nowhere in the records can we gather
that more than three (3) of the robbers were armed. Hence, "band" cannnot be aggravating where no proof
is adduced that at least four (4) of the five (5) perpetrators involved in this case were armed.

The Court also ruled that the aggravating circumstance of nighttime did not attend the commission of the
crime. The fact that the offense was committed at 9:30 in the evening does not suffice to sustain
nocturnidad for, by itself, nighttime is not an aggavating circumstance.To be properly so considered, it must
be shown that nocturnidad was deliberately and intentionally sought by accused-appellants to help them
realize their evil intentions.Nowhere can we infer from the records that the malefactors sought the cover of
darkness to facilitate the accomplishment of their devious design.

People v. Daniel

GR L-40330 20 November 1978 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Disregard of rank, age, or sex, and
dwelling

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Keyword: rape sa dorm in Baguio

Doctrine: Although Margarita was only renting a bed in a boarding house, her room was, for all intents
and purposes, a "dwelling" as defined in Article 14(3) of the Revised Penal Code. The victim is not required
by law to own the property where he lives or resides. The place is his home, whether he is a lessee, a
boarder, or a bed-spacer, and the law seeks to protect and uphold its sanctity.

Facts: This case originated from the Court of First Instance of Baguio City by virtue of a complaint filed by
13-year old Margarita Paleng accusing Amado Daniel alias "Amado Ato" of rape. In the Information, it was
declared that in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance that it was committed in the
dwelling of the offended party (the latter not having given provocation for it) is present.

Paleng, then a first year student of Baguio Eastern High, is a native of Mountain Province who was
boarding at a house located in Baguio City. At about 3 in the afternoon of September 20, 1965, she had
just arrived in the city on a Dangwa bus from Tublay. Because it was then raining and the bus was parked
several meters away from the bus station, she waited inside the bus. After about three minutes of waiting,
the accused-appellant Daniel came and started molesting her by inquiring her name and getting hold of
her. She called the attention of the bus driver and the conductor about the actuation of the Daniel, but it
looks like they were also afraid of him. He also, pursued her to her boarding house on the same evening
and pulled a dagger eight inches long and threatened her. He then succeeded in gaining carnal knowledge.
Margarita went unconscious. He had already left when she regained consciousness. Her father came to
see her the next morning. She told him about her terrible misfortune. She was immediately taken to the
Baguio General Hospital and examined. They then went to the Police Department. The Chief of Police
accompanied them to the Health Center, where she was examined again by Dr. Perfecto O. Micu, who
then submitted his medical report certifying that the defloration was recent. Margarita and her father both
testified in front of the police.

Issue: Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of disregard of dwelling shall be appreciated by the
court to increase the penalty.

Held: YES. The Supreme Court held that Daniel committed rape with the use of a deadly weapon, which
was made worse by the fact that it occurred in the offended party's home. Although Margarita was only
renting a bed in a boarding house, her room was, for all intents and purposes, a "dwelling" as defined in
Article 14(3) of the Revised Penal Code. The victim is not required by law to own the property where he
lives or resides. The place is his home, whether he is a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, and the law
seeks to protect and uphold its sanctity. Hence, the correct penalty for the crime committed is death
pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. However, for lack of the necessary number
of votes, the penalty next lower in degree is to be applied.

People v. Apduhan

L-19491 30 August 1968 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Disregard of rank, age, or sex, and
dwelling

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Keyword:

Doctrine:
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; USE OF UNLICENSED FIREARM. — A perceptive analysis of the
provisions of Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code reveals that said article is exclusively linked and
singularly applicable to the immediately antecedent provision of Article 295 on robbery in band, as the
latter article, in turn, is explicitly limited in scope to subdivisions 3, 4 and 5 of Article 294. Consequently,
although the use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance under Article 296, as
amended by Republic Act No. 12, it cannot be appreciated as such in relation to robbery with homicide,
described and penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 294.

2.ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH; ABSORPTION IN CIRCUMSTANCE OF "BAND". — The

withdrawal by the prosecution of the circumstance of abuse of superiority alleged on the ground that
since the offense of robbery was committed by a band, the element of cuadrilla necessarily absorbs the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, was ill-advised, since the circumstances of band and abuse
of superiority are separate and distinct legal concepts.

3. DWELLING; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. — The settled rule is that dwelling is aggravating in
robbery with violence or intimidation of persons, since this class of robbery, could be committed without
the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the home.

4. NOCTURNITY. — Nocturnity is aggravating when, as in the case at bar, it was purposely and
deliberately sought by the accused to facilitate the commission of the crime or to prevent their being
recognized or to insure unmolested escape.

Facts: On 23 May 1961, Apolonio Apduhan together with five others, all of them armed with unlicensed
firearms, daggers, and other deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping one another with
intent to gain did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter by means of violence, the house
of the spouses Honorato Miano and Antonia Miano, in which they attacked and shot Geronimo Miano and
Norberto Aton who happened to be in the said house. Thereby inflicting upon the said two (2) persons
physical injuries which caused their death; and thereafter the same accused and their five (5) other
companions, did take and carry away from said dwelling house cash money amounting to Three Hundred
Twenty-two Pesos (P322.00).

"Act committed contrary to the provisions of Art. 294, par. I, of the Revised Penal Code with the special
aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed by a band with the use of unlicensed firearms (Art.
296, Rev. Penal Code), and other aggravating circumstances, as follows:

"1. That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended parties without any provocation from the
latter;

"2. That nighttime was purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the crime; and

"3. That advantage was taken of superior strength, accused and their companions, who were fully armed,
being numerically superior to the offended parties who were unarmed and defenseless."

In the trial, Apolonio Apduhan changed his plea from not guilty, with the condition that death penalty will
not be imposed to him, and instead just life imprisonment. The case was reopened. The trial judge
recommends to the President of the Republic the commutation of the death sentence which he imposed
on the accused to life imprisonment. The Solicitor General supports this recommendation for executive
clemency.

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Issue: Whether or not the trial court is correct in penalizing Apduhan for death after he pleaded guilty in
the crime robbery with homicide, appreciating band?

Held: No, the trial court is incorrect in penalizing Apduhan for death after he pleaded guilty in the crime
robbery with homicide, appreciating band. As previously stated, art. 295 provides that if any of the classes
of robbery described in subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294 is committed by a band, the offender shall be
punished by the maximum period of the proper penalty. Correspondingly, the immediately following
provisions of art. 296 define the term "band", prescribe the collective liability of the members of the band,
and state that "when any of the arms used in the commission of the offense be an unlicensed firearm, the
penalty to be imposed upon all the malefactors shall be the maximum of the corresponding penalty
provided by law." Viewed from the contextual relation of articles 295 and 296, the word "offense" mentioned
in the above-quoted portion of the latter article logically means the crime of robbery committed by a band,
as the phrase "all the malefactors" indubitably refers to the members of the band and the phrase "the
corresponding penalty provided by law" relates to the offenses of robbery described in the last three
subdivisions of art. 294 which are all encompassed within the ambit of art. 295. Evidently, therefore, art.
296 in its entirety is designed to amplify and modify the provision on robbery in band which is nowhere to
be found but in art. 295 in relation to subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294. Verily, in order that the aforesaid
special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm may be appreciated to justify the imposition
of the maximum period of the proper penalty, it is a condition sine qua non that the offense charged be
robbery committed by a band within the contemplation of art. 295. To reiterate, since art. 295 does not
apply to subdivisions 1 and 2 of art. 294, then the special aggravating factor in question, which is solely
applicable to robbery in band under art. 295, cannot be considered in fixing the penalty imposable for
robbery with homicide under art. 294(1), even if the said crime was committed by a band with the use of
unlicensed firearms. The special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, however, was
initially applicable to all the subdivisions of art. 294 since the -said Rep. Act No. 12 also amended art. 295
to include within its scope all the classes of robbery described in art. 294. With the then enlarged coverage
of art, 295, art. 296, being corollary to the former, was perforce made applicable to robbery with homicide
(art. 294[1]). Thus, in People v. B-ersamin (See note 3), this Court, in passing, opined: "The use of
unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance applicable only in cases of robbery in band (Art.
296, Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 3, Republic Act No. 12)."

People v. Mandolado

GR L-51304-05 28 June 1983 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Abuse of confidence or obvious
ungratefulness

Keyword: ESQ Rum, lasing, sumakay jeep

Doctrine: In order that abuse of confidence be deemed as aggravating, it is necessary that "there exists
a relation of trust and confidence between the accused and one against whom the crime was committed
and the accused made use of such a relationship to commit the crime. It is also essential that the
confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal such as would give that accused some
advantage or make it easier for him to commit the crime; that such confidence was a means of facilitating

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the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party's belief that the former
would not abuse said confidence

Facts: In the morning of October 3, 1977, Julian Ortillano, Martin Mandolado, Conrado Erinada and
Anacleto Simon, trainees/draftees of the Armed Forces of the Philippines got acquainted and decided to
drink ESQ rum, at a bus terminal. After drinking for about an hour, appellant Mandolado got drunk and
went inside the public market. Subsequently, he returned, grabbed his .30 caliber machine gun and started
firing. Sensing trouble, Conrado Erinada and Anacleto Simon ran away, hailed and boarded a passing
Ford Fiera with some passengers on board. Appellants followed and boarded also the vehicle. The soldiers
forced the driver of the Ford Fiera to bring them to the Midsayap crossing.

On their way, appellant Mandolado got his knife and tried to attack the driver. After appellants alighted at
said crossing, the Ford Fiera sped away. Appellant Mandolado fired his .30 caliber machine gun at the
speeding vehicle hitting the right side of the back of the driver's sister who was then on board said vehicle.

While waiting for a ride at the Midsayap crossing a privately owned jeep, driven by Herminigildo Tenorio,
with Nolasco Mendoza passed by. Conrado Erinada and Anacleto Simon boarded the jeep. Appellants
Mandolado and Ortillano also boarded the jeep. On the way, both appellants kept firing their guns
prompting Herminigildo Tenorio to remark, "Kung hindi kayo tatahimik, ibabangga ko itong jeep"

Upon learning that the jeep was bound for Cotabato City and not Pikit, North Cotabato, appellant
Mandolado got angry, "cocked" his gun and ordered the driver to stop. While the jeep was coming to a full
stop, Conrado Simon and Anacleto Erinada immediately jumped off the jeep. Appellants also got off the
jeep. Thereupon, appellant Mandolado fired his .30 caliber machine gun at and hit the occupants of the
jeep. Appellant Ortillano likewise, fired his armalite, not at the occupants of said jeep but downwards hitting
the ground.

Appellants were accused of murder for the death of the victims Herminigildo Tenorio and his driver Nolasco
Mendoza with the use of their firearms qualified with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength.

Issue: WON there was abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness.

Held: NO. While the informations allege as aggravating circumstances that of evident premeditation and
the use of superior strength, aside from treachery, We cannot agree with the finding of the trial court that
the aggravating circumstances of (1) advantage was taken of his being a Draftee in the Philippine Army,
and (2) abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness were present in the commission of the crime.

While it may be true that a soldier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines is deemed as one who holds
public position, there is no persuasive showing that herein appellants being draftees of the Army, in full
military uniform and carrying their high-powered firearms, facilitated the commission of the crimes they
were charged. It may be conceded that as draftees, the accused could easily hitch hike with private
vehicles, as in the case of the deceased Tenorio's owner-type jeep, but there is no evidence that when
they stopped the jeep the accused already intended to shoot the occupants of the vehicle.

There could be no abuse of confidence as the evidence on record showed the lack of confidence by the
victims to the appellants, that this confidence was abused, and that the abuse of the confidence facilitated
the commission of the crimes. In order that abuse of confidence be deemed as aggravating, it is necessary
that "there exists a relation of trust and confidence between the accused and one against whom the crime
was committed and the accused made use of such a relationship to commit the crime. It is also essential
that the confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal such as would give that accused
some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the crime; that such confidence was a means of

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facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party's belief that the
former would not abuse said confidence (People vs. Hanasan, 29 SCRA 534). In the instant case, there is
absolutely no showing of any personal or immediate relationship upon which confidence might rest
between the victims and the assailants who had just met each other then. Consequently, no confidence
and abuse thereof could have facilitated the crimes.

Similarly, there could have been no obvious ungratefulness in the commission of the crime for the simple
reason that the requisite trust of the victims upon the accused prior to the criminal act and the breach
thereof as contemplated under Article 14, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code are manifestly lacking or non-
existent. In all likelihood, the accused Army men in their uniforms and holding their high-powered firearms
cowed the victims into boarding their jeep for a ride at machine gun point which certainly is no source of
gratefulness or appreciation.

People v. Garcia

GR L-30449 13 October 1979 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Nighttime, uninhabited place,
or by a band

Keyword: Nocturnal Pregnant Sister

Doctrine:

There are two tests for nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance: the objective test under which nocturnity
is aggravating because it facilitates the commission of the offense; and the subjective test, under which
nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely sought by the offender. These two tests should be
applied in the alternative.

Facts:

The legal verdict in this case hinges on the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution, Corazon
Dioquino Paterno, sister of the deceased, Apolonio Dioquino, Jr. She testified that during her residence in
Pasay City, her brother Apolonio visited her family for about 20 times. While residing at Pasay City, she
conceived a child and during this period, it was not unusual for her, accompanied by her husband, to step
out of the house in the wee hours of the morning. They set out on these irregular walks about five times.

Before the incident which gave rise to this case, Corazon’s husband informed her that he saw Apolonio
engaged in a drinking spree with his gang infront of an establishment known as Bill’s Place at M. de la
Cruz St. Pasay City. Upon learning this information from her husband, Corazon obtained permission to
leave the house at 3:00 a.m. so she could fetch her brother. At that time, she had not been aware that
Apolonio was in Pasay City; she had been of the belief that he was with his family in Pampanga. In
explaining the rationale for her noctural mission, she employed in her sworn statement the following
language: "Dahil itong si Junior ay meron na kaming nabalitaan na naaakay ng barkada niya sa paggawa
ng hindi mabuti."

On her way, Corazon saw her brother fleeing a group of about seven persons, including the two accused,
Antonio Garcia and Reynaldo Arviso. She recognized the two accused because they were former

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gangmates of her brother; in fact, she knew them before the incident by their aliases of "Tony Manok" and
"Rene Bisugo," respectively. During the incident, she exerted efforts to identify the other group members,
taking care to conceal herself as she did so. She heard a gunshot which caused her to seek cover. When
she ventured to look from where she was hiding, about 20 meters away, she saw the group catch up with
her brother and maltreat him. Some beat him with pieces of wood, while others boxed him. Immediately
afterwards, the group scampered away in different directions. Antonio was left behind. He was sitting
astride the prostrate figure of Apolonio, stabbing the latter in the back with his long knife. Corazon was not
able to observe where Antonio later fled, for she could hardly bear to witness the scene. When Corazon
mustered the courage to approach her brother, she saw that he was bathed in a pool of his own blood.

Both of the accused were charged and convicted of murder with aggravating circumstances of nighttime,
superior strength and treachery with a penalty of death. Hence, the present petition.

The defense contended that the trial court erred in finding nighttime as an aggravating circumstance
despite absolute absence of evidence that nighttime was purposely sought to insure the execution of the
crime.

Issue:

Whether the aggravating circumstance of nighttime should be considered in this case since the crime was
committed at around 3 in the morning.

Held:

No. The offense took place at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. It may therefore be said that it was committed
at night, which covers the period from sunset to sunrise, according to the New Civil Code, Article 13. Is
this basis for finding that nocturnity is aggravating? The Revised Penal Code, Article 14, Provides that it is
an aggravating circumstance when the crime is committed in the nighttime, whenever nocturnity may
facilitate the commission of the offense. There are two tests for nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance:
the objective test under which nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitates the commission of the offense;
and the subjective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely sought by the
offender. These two tests should be applied in the alternative.

In this case, the subjective test is not passed because there is no showing that the accused purposely
sought the cover of nighttime. Next, we proceed and apply the objective test, to determine whether
nocturnity facilitated the killing of the victim. A group of men were engaged in a drinking spree, in the
course of which one of them fled, chased by seven others. The criminal assault on the victim at 3:00 a.m.
was invited by nocturnal cover, which handicapped the view of eyewitnesses and encouraged impunity by
persuading the malefactors that it would be difficult to determine their identity because of the darkness and
the relative scarcity of people in the streets. These circumstances combine to pass the objective test, and
we find that nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitated the commission of the offense. Nocturnity
enticed those with the lust to kill to follow their impulses with the false courage born out of the belief that
they could not be readily identified

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People v. Rodas

GR 175881 28 August 2007 AGGRAVATING

CIRCUMSTANCES
Nighttime, uninhabited place,
or by a band

Keyword: 8pm benefit dance; Petromax.

Doctrine: Nocturnity is considered aggravating only when it facilitated the commission of the crime, or was
especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of impunity. The essence of this
aggravating circumstance is the obscuridad afforded by, and not merely the chronological onset of,
nighttime. Although the offense was committed at night, nocturnity does not become a modifying factor
when the place is adequately lighted and, thus, could no longer insure the offender's immunity from
identification or capture.

Facts: At around 8pm, a benefit dance was held. Titing Asenda was standing near a fence to watch the
affair. Charlito Rodas, Armando Rodas, Jose Rodas, Jr., and Jose Rodas, Sr. was seen surrounding
Asenda. Charlito then suddenly, without a word, stabbed Asenda on the back with a knife. Armando then
clubbed him with a chako. Thereafter, Jose Sr. handed Jose Jr. a bolo which the latter used to hack
Asenda. An information was filed charging them of murder with the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity,
among others. The trial court found Armando and Jose Sr. guilty of murder. CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Armando and Jose Sr. appealed contending among others that they could only be held liable for homicide,
not murder.

Issue: WON the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity can be considered.

Held: NO. Nocturnity is considered aggravating only when it facilitated the commission of the crime, or
was especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of impunity. The essence of
this aggravating circumstance is the obscuridad afforded by, and not merely the chronological onset of,
nighttime. Although the offense was committed at night, nocturnity does not become a modifying factor
when the place is adequately lighted and, thus, could no longer insure the offender's immunity from
identification or capture. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to show that nighttime facilitated the
commission of the crime, or was especially sought or taken advantage of by Rodas for the purpose of
impunity. The crime scene was sufficiently lighted by a Petromax which led to the identification of Rodas.

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People v. Damaso

L-30116 20 November 1978 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Nighttime, uninhabited place,
or by a band

Keyword: sugarcane field, daughters, guns/weapons

Doctrine: The aggravating circumstance of band exists whenever more than three armed malefactors
act together in the commission of an offense.

The uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by the distance of the nearest house to the scene of
the crime, but whether or not in the place of commission, there was reasonable possibility of the victim
receiving some help.

Facts: Donata Rebolledo and her son-in-law, Victoriano de la Cruz were residents of Barrio Bangar,
municipality of Victoria, province of Tarlac. At about 9 o'clock in the evening of November 21, 1959,
Donata and Victoriano heard the barkings of dogs outside their house. Shortly, two men armed with
guns, entered, pointed their weapons at them, tied up the hands of Victoriano, covered him with a
blanket and asked Donata for the wereabouts of her daughter Catalina Sabado. Stricken by fear, Donata
kept silent and blocked the door leading to her daughter's room but was promptly pushed aside. Donata
was then ordered to open an "aparador" from which the two men took valuables like jewelry, clothing,
documents, and cutting instruments. All the while, Donata and Victoriano could hear the movements and
voices of some three to four other persons beneath the house. The two men brought Catalina Sabado
down from the house and then asked where they could find Susana Sabado, Donata's other daughter
who was then in her store located about five meters away in the same house. Thereafter, Donata heard
the men opening the door to Susana's store. After several minutes, feeling that the intruders had left,
Donata untied the hands of Victoriano and asked him to go to the store to see if her daughters were
there. When the two women could not be found, Donata sent Victoriano to the barrio lieutenant to report
the incident. Accordingly, Victoriano went to the barrio lieutenant and the two later went to town to inform
the police of the occurrence.

On the same night, Chief of Police Pedro Valdez with the aid of several policemen and a handful of
civilians went out in search for the Sabado sisters. It was only the following morning when the two
women were found already dead with wounds in several parts of their bodies.

Donata Rebolledo singled out the accused Fausto Damaso from a police line-up as one of the men who
went up to her house on that evening. She and Victoriano had recognized Damaso because of the light
coming from a kerosene lamp placed on a small table near the "aparador." Damaso, however, initially
denied ever having been to Donata's house that night. Later, the PC rounded up four other suspects in
the persons of co-accused Gregorio, Eugenio Alviar and Espejo.

Issue: Whether the crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances of armed band and
uninhabited place.

Held: Yes. The aggravating circumstance of band exists whenever more than three armed malefactors
act together in the commission of an offense.

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The prosecution presented the following evidence to show that Damaso was also armed and, as such,
there were more than three of the accused who were armed: (1) that extrajudicial confession of Damaso
himself that he was carrying a caliber .22 paltik revolver; (2) the sworn statement of accused Eugenio
that Damaso had a caliber .22 paltik revolver; (3) the separate written confessions of Alviar, Gregorio
and Espejo that Damaso had a caliber .30 Springfield rifle; and (4) the testimonies of Donata Rebolledo
and Victoriano de la Cruz that both men who entered their house (one of whom they later Identified as
Damaso) were carrying firearms. It is clear from the above, that Damaso was armed during the
night of the commission of the crime, and it is immaterial what kind of firearm he carried, the only
important thing being that he was armed. In this case, the presence of an armed band is to be
considered as a generic aggravating circumstance under Article 14(6) of the Revised Penal Code
inasmuch as the crime committed was that provided for and penalized in Article 294, paragraph 1 and
not under Article 295, Revised Penal Code

The uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by the distance of the nearest house to the scene of
the crime, but whether or not in the place of commission, there was reasonable possibility of the victim
receiving some help. Considering that the killing was done during nighttime and the sugarcane in the
field was tall enough to obstruct the view of neighbors and passersby, there was no reasonable
possibility for the victims to receive any assistance. That the accused deliberately sought the solitude
of the place is clearly shown by the fact that they brought the victims to the sugarcane field
although they could have disposed of them right in the house of Donata Rebolledo where they
were found. Thus, in People v. Saguing, the Court considered the crime as having been committed in
an uninhabited place because the killing was done in a secluded place at the foot of a hill, forested, and
uninhabited.

People v. Baldera

GR 128359 6 December 2000 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Recidivism

Keyword: Recidivist, Radio

Doctrine: Article 14, Section 9 provides that a recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime,
shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of
this Code.

Article 62 provides that, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, if within a period of ten
years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of robo, hurto, estafa, or falsificacion,
he is found guilty of any of said crime, a third time or oftener.

Facts: At about 4 a. m. on December 23, 1947, a Casa Manila bus loaded with passengers left Batangas,
Batangas, bound for Manila. On the highway in barrio Calansayan, municipality of San Jose, same
province, it was held up by a group of five or six armed men. One of these, later identified as herein
appellant Pedro Baldera, who was then armed with a .45 caliber pistol, fired a shot, and this was followed
by a hail of bullets coming from different directions. As a result, several passengers, among them Jose
Cabrera, Jose Pastor and Francisco Mendoza, were wounded. After the firing had ceased, appellant got
on the bus and, threatening the passengers with his gun, took P90 f from Jose Pastor and P34 from

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Ponciana Villena. Another passenger named Francisco Mendoza was also relieved of his P3. Appellant
then alighted and ordered the bus to proceed, whereupon the driver headed for the municipal building of
San Jose and there reported the incident to the authorities. The wounded were taken to the hospital, where
Jose Cabrera died from his wounds on the following day.

Shortly after the commission of this crime, appellant was arrested in the municipality of Batangas in
connection with the theft of a radio, and as his features tallied with the personal description of one of the
highway men given to the chief of police by some of the passengers of the held-up bus, he was also
investigated in connection with the hold-up, and he then made a confession, which was reduced to writing
and later subscribed by him before the justice of the peace, admitting his participation in the crime as the
one who, armed with a pistol, boarded the bus and through intimidation relieved Ponciana Villena of her
money.

The arrest of Baldera in Batangas for another crime prompted the lower court to declare Pedro Baldera as
a recidivist, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Pedro Baldera is a recidivist, thus the same as aggravating his crime.

Held: No. The lower court did err in appreciating against the accused the circumstance of recidivism by
reason of his previous conviction for theft, it appearing that that crime was committed on or about
December 30, 1947 while the offense now charged took place seven days before that date.

In conclusion, we find appellant guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and serious and less serious
physical injuries with two aggravating circumstances. But there being no sufficient vote to impose the
extreme penalty, appellant can be sentenced to life imprisonment only.

In the case at bar, Baldero had only been arrested after 7 days from committing the crime of robbery by a band
and murder. Article 14, Section 9 provides that a recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime,
shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of
this Code, to which Baldero is not.

People v. Melendrez

GR 39913 December 19, 1933 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Habitual delinquency

Keyword: Robbery at a store/house at Pasay; twice convicted for theft; once for estafa; recidivist

Doctrine: Recidivism is an aggravating circumstance that should be taken into consideration in imposing
the principal penalty in its corresponding degree, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant, by reason
of such recidivism, is also sentenced to an additional penalty as a habitual delinquent.

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Facts: An Information was charged against Ricardo Melendrez and Elias Martinez for forcibly breaking
open the door of the store in Pasay, an inhabited house belonging to and occupied by Tin Bun Boc.
Once inside, they sole personal properties amounding to Php 76.68 pesos. (1933 itong case na to, may
watch and jewelries na nakuha).

Accused Ricardo Melendrez is a habitual delinquent, having been previously convicted by final judgment
of competent courts twice of the crime of theft and once of the crime of estafa and having been last
convicted of the crime of estafa on September 3, 1932.

Melendrez pleaded guilty and was sentenced to eight years and one day of prision mayor, AND to serve
an additional penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor for being a habitual delinquent.
The SC recognizes that the fact that the appellant pleaded guilty upon arraignment is a mitigating
circumstance which should be considered in his favor.

Issue: Whether recidivism as an aggravating circumstance was properly appreciated.

Held: YES. (note that this is a very outdated case promulgated during the transitional period of the RPC)

The aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into account in imposing the principal
penalty in its corresponding degree, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant is also sentenced to
suffer an additional penalty as a habitual delinquent.

The facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of robbery committed without the use of arms in
an inhabited house, the value of the articles taken being less than P250. In accordance with article 299
of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed for said crime is prision correccional in its medium
degree. Inasmuch as there is a concurrence therein of one mitigating and one aggravating circumstance,
this penalty should be imposed in its medium degree.

US v. Manalinde

GR NO. 5292 28 August 1909 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Evident premeditation

Keyword: “Chinaman”

Doctrine: This case, wherein the accused made up his mind to kill two undetermined persons, the first
whom he should meet on the way, in compliance with the inducement of a third person, is entirely
different from that of a criminal who, intending to kill a particular person, deprives of his life a person
other than the object of his criminal act; both deeds are equally punishable, but they are different and are
differently dealt with by the penal law.

Facts: While Juan Igual, a Spaniard, was seated on a chair in the doorway of Sousa's store he suddenly
received a wound on the head delivered from behind and inflicted with a kris. Ricardo Doroteo, a clerk in
the said store, who was standing behind the counter, upon hearing the noise and the cry of the wounded
man, ran to his assistance and found him lying on the ground.

Meanwhile the aggressor, the Moro Manalinde, approached a Chinaman named Choa, who was passing
along the street, and just as the latter was putting down his load in front of the door of a store and was

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about to enter, attacked him with the same weapon, inflicting a severe wound in the left shoulder, on
account of which he fell to the ground. The Moro, who came from the rancheria of Dupit and had entered
the town carrying his weapon wrapped up in banana leaves, in the meantime escaped by running away
from the town. Both wounded men, the Chinaman and the Spaniard, were taken to the hospital, where the
former died within an hour, the record not stating the result of the wound inflicted on the Spaniard Juan
Igual.

When Manalinde was arrested, he pleaded guilty and confessed that he had perpetrated the crime herein
mentioned, stating that his wife had died about one hundred days before and that he had come from his
home by order of the Datto Rajamudah Mupuck, who had directed him to go juramentado.

Issue: Whether there is a mitigating circumstance that can be appreciated on the basis that accused
was induced by another person?

Held: NONE. The fact that the arrangement between the instigator and the tool considered the killing of
unknown persons, the first encountered, does not bar the consideration of the circumstance of
premeditation. The nature and the circumstances which characterize the crime, the perversity of the
culprit, and the material and moral injury are the same, and the fact that the victim was not
predetermined does not affect nor alter the nature of the-crime. The person having been deprived of his
life by deeds executed with deliberate intent, the crime is considered a premeditated one as the firm and
persistent intention of the accused from the moment, before said death, when he received the order until
the crime was committed is manifestly evident. Even though in a crime committed upon offer of money,
reward or promise, premeditation is sometimes present, the latter not being inherent in the former, and
there existing no incompatibility between the two, premeditation can not necessarily be considered as
included merely because an offer of money, reward or promise was made, for the latter might have
existed without the former, the one being independent of the other.

In the present case there can be no doubt that after the crime was agreed upon by means of a promise of
reward, the criminal by his subsequent conduct showed a persistency and firm intent in his plan to carry
out the crime which he intentionally agreed to execute, it being immaterial whether Datto Mupuck did or
did not conceive the crime, once Manalinde obeyed the inducement and voluntarily executed it.

People v. Ilaoa

GR 128359 6 December 2000 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Evident premeditation

Keyword: (unique keyword/phrase that makes it easier to remember the case) ex. Mayor or Manila;
pokpok; midnight; Mindanao (O diba alam niyo agad na Villavicencio vs. Lukban yan)

Doctrine: Samting samting

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Facts: Petitioner x y z

Issue: Whether the something something

Held: NO. Lorem Ipsum

People v. Bibat y Descargar

GR 124319 13 May 1998 QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES

Evident premeditation

Keyword: nakichismis si witness sa saksakan

Doctrine: There is evident premeditation when the following requisites are met: 1. The time when the offender
determined (conceived) to commit the crime; 2. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his
determination; and 3. A sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of
time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.

Facts: Gari Bibat stabbed Lloyd del Rosario to death in Sampaloc, Manila. The victim was on his way to school
waiting for a ride when he was stabbed. Thereafter, the suspect fled while the victim was brought to the United
Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Nona Avila Cinco, a witness and a
laundry woman, testified that while she was at Funeraria Gloria waiting for her bettor, she saw a person about
one meter away talking to the accused. She heard that said person told the accused "O pare, anduon na.
Puntahan mo na. Siguruhin mo lang na itumba mo na." to which the accused answered: "Oo ba. Ganito ba,
ganito ba?" (as the witness was speaking, she was demonstrating with her arms.) After hearing the accused, she
(witness) left towards Honrades Street to see another bettor. She first went inside a house and after a while, she
went outside where she saw the accused along Honrades Street, entering an alley. She walked along with the
accused. She and the accused were even able to look at each other. While the victim was going out of a gate,
the accused hurried towards the victim and took a pointed object from a notebook, then stabbed the victim in the
left chest twice. She was only about 4 to 5 meters away from the scene of the crime. Thereafter, the accused
fled, the victim shouted for help. Upon hearing the shouts of the victim, the accused returned and stabbed the
victim again in the middle part of the chest.

Appellant Gary Bibat y Descargar was found guilty of the crime of murder by the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
In this appeal, appellant raises the following issues: credibility of prosecution witnesses, defense of alibi and the
presence or absence of the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. Appellant theorizes that
prosecution witness Nona Cinco was lying when she testified that she was taking bets for a PBA game on October
14, 1992, a Wednesday despite the fact that PBA games are held only on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating evident premeditation against the appellant.

Held: NO. On the issue of the presence or absence of evident premeditation, the Court ruled that the same was
thoroughly and sufficiently established. The determination or conception of the plan to kill the victim could be well
deduced from the outward circumstances that happened on the day of the killing.

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Even without the testimony of Rogelio Robles, the presence of the first requisite of evident premeditation appears
to have been thoroughly and sufficiently established. The determination or conception of the plan to kill the victim
could be deduced from the outward circumstances that happened on the fateful day of October 14, 1992. Records
show that at 11:30 in the morning of October 14, 1992, prosecution witness Nona Cinco saw the accused with
some companions at Funeraria Gloria. She personally heard the plan to kill someone. Another prosecution
witness, Florencio Castro, who works at the Funeraria Gloria also saw the group of Gari Bibat in the said place.
At around 1:30 in the afternoon, Nona Cinco saw the appellant for the second time. She saw the appellant hurry
towards the victim, take a pointed thing from a notebook and with the use of such weapon, stab the victim on the
chest. These overt acts clearly evinced that the appellant clung to his resolution to kill the victim. From the time
Nona Cinco heard the plan to kill someone at 11:30 up to the killing incident at 1:30 in the afternoon of the same
day, there was a sufficient lapse of time for appellant to reflect on the consequences of his dastardly act. As held
in the case of People vs. Dumdum "the killing of the deceased was aggravated by evident premeditation, because
the accused conceived of the assault at least one hour before its perpetration." In the case under examination,
two hours had elapsed from the time appellant clung to his determination to kill the victim up to the actual
perpetration of the crime.

People v. Empacis

G.R. No. 95756 14 May 1993 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Craft, fraud, or disguise

Keyword: Hold-up; resisting to be robbed

Doctrine: The aggravating circumstance of craft or fraud was properly appreciated against Empacis. He
and Romualdo pretended to be bona fide customers of the victim's store and on his pretext gained entry
into the latter's store and later, into another part of his dwelling.

Facts: At about 9 o’clock on the night of September 16, 1986, Fidel Saromines and his wife Camila were
about to close their small store, located in their house at Kanguha, Dumanjug, Cebu. Romualdo Langomez
and Crisologo Empacis came and asked to buy some sardines and rice. Camila served them.

After eating, Romualdo asked for cigarettes. As Fidel was handing over the cigarettes, Romualdo
announced a “hold-up”. Fidel started to give P12,000.00 wrapped in cellophane to Romualdo. Fidel
suddenly decided to fight to keep his money. Romualdo stabbed Fidel about 3 times. Crisologo joined and
stabbed Fidel with his own knife. Gunshots were heard outside of the house; and a neighbor Balbino Bulak
recognized Carlito Antiga as the one shooting. A voice was heard saying “Stab him!” to which Romualdo
replied “I already stabbed him”.

Fidel’s 13 year old son Peter saw his father fighting for his life. Peter took hold of a “pinuti” (long bolo) and
rushed to his father’s defense. He struck Crisologo twice. Romualdo and Crisologo fled.

The Trial Court convicted them of the crime of robbery with homicide.

Issue: Whether or not craft of fraud is applicable in this case.

Held: This Court also agrees that conspiracy is adequately proven by the evidence. Langomez and
Crisologo Empacis came to Fidel's store late at night, acting as bona fide customers. Immediately after
finishing their supper, they demanded the delivery to them of Fidel's money, of which they evidently had
prior knowledge, Crisologo lending silent support to his companion's order for Fidel to turn over the money

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to them; they helped each other wrest the money away from Fidel and subdue him by deadly knife thrusts;
Romualdo stabbing Fidel thrice, Crisologo, once; they had obviously arranged for shots to be fired from
outside Fidel's store as a means of frightening Fidel to submit to their command; and they fled from the
scene, together. They acted in concert, helping and cooperating with one another (and others) by
simultaneous acts, evidently in pursuit of a common objective.

The aggravating circumstance of craft or fraud was properly appreciated against Empacis. He and
Romualdo pretended to be bona fide customers of the victim's store and on his pretext gained entry into
the latter's store and later, into another part of his dwelling. This Court has held stratagems and ruses of
this sort to constitute the aggravating circumstance of fraud or craft, e.g: where the accused —

a) pretended to be constabulary soldiers and by that ploy gained entry into the residence of their
prey whom they thereafter robbed and killed;

b) pretended to be needful of medical treatment, and through this artifice, entered the house of
the victim whom they thereupon robbed and killed;

c) pretended to be wayfarers who had lost their way and by this means gained entry into a house,
in which they then perpetrated the crime of robbery with homicide;

d) pretended to be customer wanting to buy a bottle of wine;

e) pretended to be co-passengers of the victim in a public utility vehicle;

f) posed as customers wishing to buy cigarettes; and as being thristy, asking for drink of water.

The Court also agrees that nighttime was properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance against the
accused. To be sure, nighttime is not per se aggravating. It must be shown that nocturnity was deliberately and
purposely sought to facilitate, or that it actually facilitated, the commission of the crime. In the case at bar, the
lateness of the hour no doubt precluded the presence of other customers who could have deterred the felons, or
come to the aid of the victim.

For the aggravating circumstance of superior strength to be deemed present in a case, it does not suffice to
prove superiority in number on the part of the malefactors; it must appear that they purposely employed excessive
force, force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. In this case, the evidence
shows that Empacis helped his co-accused by also stabbing the victim; he and his companion took advantage
of their combined strength and their bladed weapons to overcome their unarmed victim and assure the success
of their felonious design to make off with his money.

That the crime was "committed in the dwelling of the offended party, . . . the latter . . . not (having) given
provacation," was also correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.

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People v. Bigcas

G.R. No. 94534 2 July 1992 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Taking advantage of superior
strength, or means employed to
weaken the defense

Keyword: Killed with bolo and a piece of wood;

Doctrine: For the qualifying circumstance of abuse or taking advantage of superior strength to be
considered, it is not sufficient that there be superiority in number or strength; it is necessary that the
accused must have cooperated and intended to use or secure advantage from such superior strength.

Facts: In October 13, 1988, the defendants-appellants were charged with murder allegedly committed by
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, abuse of superior
strength, and with treachery by suddenly attacking the victim without giving him the opportunity to defend
himself and without justifiable cause, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault,
and stab Ambrocio Palapar with the use of a sharp pointed bolo and a piece of wood thereby inflicting
upon the vital parts of the body of the victim mortal wounds or injuries which resulted directly to the
immediate death of the victim. Furthermore, the Court of Bohol also considered the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime being purposely taken advantage of by the defendants-appellants to facilitate
the commission of the said crime. Both Bigcas and Butron pleaded not guilty to the allegations during the
arraignment. During the trial, the prosecution and defense presented different versions of the
circumstances which gave rise to the alleged killing.

On one hand, the prosecution presented a version that revolved around the testimonies of two
eyewitnesses, Rosito Doydoy and Jesus Capale, with corroborative and supplementary testimonies on
other aspects furnished by Pfc. Ponciano Butron who was a member of the Integrated National Police
Station and also a municipal health officer of the town. The summaries of said testimonies are as follows:

Doydoy testified that he and his son were on their way home when he saw three people engaged in a
commotion. He recalled that it was not so dark then because the moon was shining brightly, and so he
was able to watch from behind tall cogon grass the crime that ensued. Doydoy said that he saw appellant
Butron strike Amborcio Palapar with a piece of wood on the latter’s back. In his attempt to flee from his
aggressor, Palapar passed beside witness Doydoy who was then trying to hide himself and his son behind
the bushes. Palapar was chased by appellant Bigcas who, upon catching up with the former stabbed him
twice with a bolo at the back. The chase continued until Bigcas was able to stab the victim again at the
back of the latter's right knee. The victim fell on the ground, after which he uttered, "Long, stop because I
will die of these wounds." Butron shouted at him saying, "I will kill you, Boyax." He then approached Palapar
and hit him twice with a piece of wood on the right jaw. Bigcas, on his part, stabbed the supine victim
several times. Thereafter, both appellants left the victim, with Butron telling Bigcas. "You own the killing
and these two bolos and I will be with you anywhere.”

Capale testified on essentially the same facts. He said that he was on his way to his friend’s house when
he saw the victim being attacked by the two appellants. Butron hit Palapar twice with a piece of wood at
his back. Bigcas told the victim to fight but the latter refused. Palapar pleaded for his life but appellant
Bigcas instead stabbed him twice, also at the back. Due to his fear after seeing Bigcas stab the victim,
Calape ran home and told his wife what he witnessed. The next morning, he heard that the victim died.

Issues: 1. Whether or not Bigcas should be acquitted for the crime of murder in the light of
Butron’s admission that he alone killed the victim

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2.. Whether or not the Court should appreciate the aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity, abuse of superior strength and treachery.

Held:

1. NO, Bigcas cannot be acquitted for the murder of Palapar even though Butron confessed to committing
the felony on his own. There were two eyewitnesses to the incident who testified that appellants Bigcas
and Butron did act in a concerted manner in bringing about the death of victim Palapar. This indicates the
existence of conspiracy between them, although such concurrence of wills arose and was adopted by
appellants just momentarily before attacking the victim.

Conspiracy already exists the moment two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it, unlike the qualifying circumstances of treachery and taking
advantage of superior strength which require at least some prior deliberation and adoption of a specific
mode of commission. To establish conspiracy, prior agreement between both accused to kill the victim is
not essential for the same may be inferred from their own acts showing a joint purpose or design, which
was illustrated in the case by the concerted acts of appellants.

2. NO, The SC held that appellants have committed only the felony of homicide, since treachery was not
proved and abuse of superior strength cannot be considered against them. Neither is the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity attendant in this case.

Treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance against appellants since there was no
evidence that in the commission of the crime they deliberately adopted means, methods or forms
considered in law as treacherous.

The Court was not convinced that the crime was committed by appellants with abuse or by taking
advantage of superior strength.For this qualifying circumstance to be considered, it is not sufficient that
there be superiority in number or strength; it is necessary that the accused must have cooperated and
intended to use or secure advantage from such superior strength. In People vs. Cabiling, abuse of superior
strength may be considered not only when there is an inequality of force between the victim and the
aggressor but there must be a situation of superiority of strength notoriously selected or taken advantage
of by him in the commission of the crime.

The Court cannot accept nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance because even the prosecution
witnesses testified that, during the incident, the moon was shining brightly. The light was bright enough to
see what was going on and to recognize the assailants. Moreover, nocturnity neither facilitated the
commission of the crime nor was it purposely sought by appellants in order to afford impunity. Therefore,
it does not qualify as an aggravating circumstance under either the subjective or objective tests laid down
by the Court for it to be considered as such.

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People v. Sangalang

GR L-32914 30 August 1974 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Treachery

Keyword: 1 vs 5, namatay by the coconut tree

Doctrine: Cortez victim was shot while he was gathering tuba on top of a coconut tree. He was unarmed
and defenseless. He was not expecting to be assaulted. He did not give any immediate provocation. The
deliberate, surprise attack shows that Sangalang and his companions employed a mode of execution
which insured the killing without any risk to them arising from any defense which the victim could have
made. Treachery was successfully established.

Facts: This is case is regarding the murder of Ricardo Cortez.

Based on the testimony of Flora (Cortez’ wife), at dawn of June 9, 1968, Cortez left his nipa hut located at
Sitio Adlas, Barrio Biluso, Silang, Cavite to gather tuba from a coconut tree nearby. Flora then heard three
successive shots. She went outside the hut. From a distance of about twenty-five meters, she saw five
men (one of whom was Laureano Sangalang whom she recognized) each armed with a long firearm, firing
at her husband. He was already wounded and was lying on the ground at the foot of the coconut tree. His
assailants were about five meters away from him. She also recognized Conrado Gonzales, Irineo Canuel,
Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the other malefactors. She then ran where her husband was,
shouting "Bakit ninyo pinagbabaril ang aking asawa". Five people opened fire on her. At that point, she
was around 20 meters away from them. She turned back to the hut for safety. She heard additional gunfire.
After around five minutes had passed, Laureano Sangalang and his friends departed the area. Flora went
back to where her husband was lying on the ground, but he was already dead.

The necropsy report shows that the twenty-five-year-old Cortez sustained twenty-three gunshot wounds
on the different parts of the body, fourteen of which were entrance-wounds, and nine were exit-wounds.
He died due to the multiple gunshot wounds.

The police filed on June 10 in the Municipal Court a complaint for murder against the 5 aforecited persons
(Sangalang, Gonzales, Canuel, Perinel, and Cuyom). The CFI of Cavite, Tagaytay City Branch convicted
Sangalang of murder with a penalty of reclusion perpetua. In this appeal, Sangalang insists on his alibi (he
was allegedly at Sampaloc, Manila when the incident occurred) and impugns the credibility of the
prosecution eyewitnesses.

Issue: Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery shall be appreciated by the court to
maintain the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Held: YES. Cortez victim was shot while he was gathering tuba on top of a coconut tree. He was unarmed
and defenseless. He was not expecting to be assaulted. He did not give any immediate provocation. The
deliberate, surprise attack shows that Sangalang and his companions employed a mode of execution
which insured the killing without any risk to them arising from any defense which the victim could have
made. The qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia), which was alleged in the information, was duly

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established. Hence, the killing can be categorized as murder. Treachery absorbs the aggravating
circumstance of band.

People v. San Pedro

GR L-44274 22 January 1980 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Treachery

Keyword: Beep beep beep ang sabi ng jeep/ Jeepney Driver

Doctrine:
Lack of instruction is not applicable to crimes of theft and robbery, much less to the crime of homicide. The
reason is that robbery and killing are, by their nature, wrongful acts, and are manifestly so to the
enlightened, equally as to the ignorant

Facts:

A lifeless body of a person was found In the afternoon of June 2, 1970. It was later on identified to be
Felimon Rivera. Upon autopsy, it was found that he died of profuse hemorrhage due to 23 lacerated and
stab wounds and multiple abrasions found on the different parts of the body of the deceased. It was not
until June 11, 1971, that the police authorities found a concrete lead to the solution of the case. Esguerra,
when apprehended and interviewed by the police, admitted his participation and named his companions
which include accused Banasihan who recounted that 4 days before committing the crime, he and his co-
accused met and planned to het the jeep driven by Rivera. Carrying out their plan, both of the accused
approached Rivera in the afternoon of June 2, 1970 on the pretext of hiring his jeep to haul coconuts. They
then proceeded to Puypuy in Bay, Laguna where they were joined by Litan. Upon reaching a river between
the barrios of Mainit and Puypuy, San Pedro ordered Rivera to stop. Whereupon, at Esguerra's signal,
Litan hit Rivera at the nape with the water pipe. Rivera jumped out of the jeep but was chased by San
Pedro and Litan who stabbed him at the back several times with a dagger. Esguerra then drove the jeep
and the group proceeded to Makati, Rizal, where they joined Piso and Antonio Borja. The jeep was brought
to Cavite City where it was sold for P2,000.00. Four days later, Piso went to Los Baños and gave San
Pedro, Litan and Banasihan P50.00 each, with the promise that the balance would be given later. However,
the promised balance was not given them.

The aforementioned facts were found by the trial court through which the accused failed to dispute.
Admitting the accuracy of the facts, appellant raises only questions of law, particularly in the appreciation
the modifying circumstances proven by the evidence, with a view to reducing the penalty of death as
imposed, to reclusion perpetua, as prayed for.

Specifically, the legal questions raised affecting the degree of culpability of appellant is whether the
aggravating circumstance of craft is absorbed by treachery, and whether the resulting single aggravating
circumstance of treachery should be offset by the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, as
appellant claims should be appreciated in his favor, thereby calling for the reduction of the death penalty
to that of life imprisonment.

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Issue:

Whether the resulting single aggravating circumstance of treachery should be offset by the mitigating
circumstance treachery should be appreciated in his favor, thereby calling for the reduction of the death
penalty to that of life imprisonment.

Held:

No.

With the presence of two aggravating circumstances, craft and treachery, it would make no difference even
if the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction were appreciated in appellant's favor — which is even
doubtful from the fact alone, as was allegedly proven by the testimony of appellant that he cannot read
and write but can only sign his name. This, apart from the fact that as held categorically in the case of
People vs. Enot,) lack of instruction is not applicable to crimes of theft and robbery, much less to the crime
of homicide. The reason is that robbery and killing are, by their nature, wrongful acts, and are manifestly
so to the enlightened, equally as to the ignorant (People vs. Salip Manla, et al.).

As recently held by this Court, speaking through Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., the "criteria in
determining lack of instruction is not illiteracy alone, but rather lack of sufficient intelligence." It is significant
that neither to the trial court nor to the appellant's counsel has the mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction entered the mind. No attempt was made to prove it, as direct proof, not mere inference, is
required, and must be invoked in the court below (People vs. Mongado, et al.), the reason being that the
trial court can best gauge a person's level of intelligence from his from his manner of answering questions
in court (People vs. Manuel). If the trial court did not consider the mitigating circumstance invoked for the
first time here on appeal, it must be because from appellant's testimony, and even more so from his given
occupation as a merchant, his alleged lack of intelligence never suggested itself to the trial court or to his
lawyer, as entitling him to the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.

WHEREFORE, there being no error committed by the trial court, its decision imposing the death penalty,
together with the indemnity awarded, has to be, as it is hereby, affirmed.

People v. Castillo

GR 120282 20 April 1998 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Treachery

Keyword: Cola Pubhouse; EDSA; Iglesia Ni Cristo

Doctrine: Treachery is committed when two conditions concur, namely, that the means, methods, and
forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate[;]
and that such means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by

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the accused without danger to his person." These requisites were evidently present in this case when the
accused appeared from nowhere and swiftly and unexpectedly stabbed the victim.

Facts: On May 25, 1993, around one o'clock in the morning, Eulogio Velasco, floor manager of the Cola
Pubhouse along EDSA, Project 7, Veteran's Village, Quezon City, was sitting outside the Pubhouse talking
with his co-worker, Dorie. Soon, Antonio "Tony" Dometita, one of their customers, came out of the
pubhouse. As he passed by, he informed Eulogio that he was going home. When Tony Dometita was
about an arms length [sic] from Eulogio, however, appellant Robert Castillo suddenly appeared and,
without warning, stabbed Tony with a fan knife on his left chest. As Tony pleaded for help, appellant
stabbed him once more, hitting him on the left hand.

Responding to Tony's cry for help, Eulogio placed a chair between Tony and appellant to stop appellant
from further attacking Tony. He also shouted at Tony to run away. Tony ran towards the other side of
EDSA, but appellant pursued him.

Eulogio came to know later that Tony had died. His body was found outside the fence of the Iglesia ni
Cristo Compound, EDSA, Quezon City.

The trial court also found that the killing was qualified by abuse of superior strength, because "the accused
used a deadly weapon in surprising the victim who [was] unarmed." Although treachery was present, the
trial court held that this was absorbed by abuse of superior strength.

Issue: WON there was treachery in the case at bar.

Held: YES. We disagree with the trial court that the killing was qualified by abuse of superior strength. "To
properly appreciate the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the prosecution must
prove that the assailant purposely used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available
to the person attacked." The prosecution did not demonstrate that there was a marked difference in the
stature and build of the victim and the appellant which would have precluded an appropriate defense from
the victim. Not even the use of a bladed instrument would constitute abuse of superior strength if the victim
was adequately prepared to face an attack, or if he was obviously physically superior to the assailant.

Nonetheless, we hold that the killing was qualified by treachery. "Treachery is committed when two
conditions concur, namely, that the means, methods, and forms of execution employed gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate[;] and that such means, methods, and forms of
execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person." These
requisites were evidently present in this case when the accused appeared from nowhere and swiftly and
unexpectedly stabbed the victim just he was bidding goodbye to his friend, Witness Velasco. Said action
rendered it difficult for the victim to defend himself. The presence of "defense wounds" does not negate
treachery because, as testified to by Velasco, the first stab, fatal as it was, was inflicted on the chest. The
incised wounds in the arms were inflicted when the victim was already rendered defenseless.

People v. Arizobal

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GR No. 135051-52 14 December 2000 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Keyword: Maskara; Sari-sari store

Doctrine: Generally, dwelling is considered inherent in the crimes which can only be committed in the
abode of the victim, such as trespass to dwelling and robbery in an inhabited place. However, in robbery
with homicide the authors thereof can commit the heinous crime without transgressing the sanctity of the
victim's domicile.

Facts: On 12 August 1994 two separate Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Cataingnan, Masbate, charging Clarito Arizobal, Erly Lignes, Rogelio Gemino and two John Does with
Robbery in Band with Homicide for robbing and slaying Laurencio Gimenez.

On 24 March 1994, Clementina Gimenez, together with her husband Laurencio Gimenez and a grandchild
were sound asleep in their house. At around 9:30 in the evening, Laurencio roused her from sleep and told
her to open the door because there were persons outside the house. Since it was pitch-dark she lit a
kerosene lamp and stood up to open the door. She was suddenly confronted by three armed men pointing
their guns at her. She recognized two (2) of them as Clarito Arizobal and Erly Lignes but failed to recognize
the third person who was wearing a maskara. She readily identified Clarito because she used to pass by
his house in San Rafael while Erly was also a familiar face as he was a regular habitue of the flea market.

The intruders ransacked their cabinet and scattered everything on the floor until they found
P8,000.00 among sheets of paper. Before leaving with their loot they ordered Laurencio to go
with them to Jimmy's house. Against his will, Laurencio went with them. Clementina recalled that
shortly after the group left she heard a volley of shots. On the same night, while Jimmy Gimenez
was in the process of skinning a chicken for their supper, 3 men suddenly appeared and ordered
them to lie face down. One of them pushed her to the ground while the others tied Francisco
and Jimmy as they whipped the latter with an armalite rifle. The robbers proceeded to ransack
the household in search for valuables. They took around P1,000.00 from her sari-sari store and
told them to produce P100,000.00 in exchange for Jimmy's life. Since the couple could not
produce such a big amount in so short a time, Erlinda offered to give their certificate of large
cattle. Culprits did not accept. 3 masked men then dragged Jimmy outside the house and together
with Laurencio brought them some 50 meters away while leaving behind Clarito Arizobal and Erly
Lignes to guard Francisco and Erlinda's son. Moments later she heard a burst of gunfire which
reverberated through the stillness of the night.

Issue: W/N robbery with killing was aggravated: by a band, with treachery, by nighttime (nocturnity) and,
by dwelling

Held: The trial court is correct in appreciating dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. Generally, dwelling
is considered inherent in the crimes which can only be committed in the abode of the victim, such as
trespass to dwelling and robbery in an inhabited place. However, in robbery with homicide the authors
thereof can commit the heinous crime without transgressing the sanctity of the victim's domicile. In the
case at bar, the robbers demonstrated an impudent disregard of the inviolability of the victims' abode when
they forced their way in, looted their houses, intimidated and coerced their inhabitants into submission,
disabled Laurencio and Jimmy by tying their hands before dragging them out of the house to be killed.

But treachery was incorrectly considered by the trial court. The accused stand charged with, tried and
convicted of robbery with homicide. This special complex crime is primarily classified in this jurisdiction as
a crime against property, and not against persons, homicide being merely an incident of robbery with the
latter being the main purpose and object of the criminals. As such, treachery cannot be validly appreciated
as an aggravating circumstance under Art. 14 of The Revised Penal Code.

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While it appears that at least five (5) malefactors took part in the commission of the crime, the evidence on
record does not disclose that "more than three" persons were armed, and robbery in "band" means "more
than three armed malefactors united in the commission of robbery." Nowhere in the records can we gather
that more than three (3) of the robbers were armed. Hence, "band" cannnot be aggravating where no proof
is adduced that at least four (4) of the five (5) perpetrators involved in this case were armed.

The Court also ruled that the aggravating circumstance of nighttime did not attend the commission of the
crime. The fact that the offense was committed at 9:30 in the evening does not suffice to sustain
nocturnidad for, by itself, nighttime is not an aggavating circumstance.To be properly so considered, it must
be shown that nocturnidad was deliberately and intentionally sought by accused-appellants to help them
realize their evil intentions.Nowhere can we infer from the records that the malefactors sought the cover of
darkness to facilitate the accomplishment of their devious design.

People v. Escote

GR 140756 4 April 2003 AGGRAVATING

CIRCUMSTANCES
Treachery

Keyword: Passenger bus; Midnight; Passengers sleeping; SPO1 was shot; Pleas for mercy.

Doctrine:
(1) There is treachery when the following essential elements are present:
(a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and
(b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or
forms of attack employed by him.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring
its commission without risk to himself. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was
warned of the danger to his life where he was defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the
infliction of the coup de grace.

(2) Although treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons, it is likewise applicable to
robbery with homicide (a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime). Since
treachery is not a constitutive element of the crime of robbery with homicide nor is it inherent in
said crime, without which it cannot be committed, treachery is an aggravating circumstance to
said crime. In the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with
homicide, the law looks and applies treachery at the constituent crime of homicide which is a
crime against persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against
property. The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against
property or as a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery merely increases the penalty for
the crime.

(3) Even if treachery is proven but it is not alleged in the information, treachery cannot aggravate
the penalty for the crime.

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Facts: While a Five Star Passenger Bus was travelling along a highway at midnight and while passengers
were sleeping, Juan Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan, who both initially posed as normal passengers,
suddenly stood up, whipped out their handguns and announced a hold-up and thereafter divested the
passengers of their money and valuables and the bus conductor of his collections of the fares of the
passengers. On the occasion of the robbery, Escote and Acuyan shot to death SPO1 Jose Manio, Jr.
despite the latter's pleas for mercy. Escote and Acuyan was charged with robbery with homicide. The RTC
found Escote and Acuyan guilty and imposed upon them the supreme penalty of death for robbery with
homicide, defined in Article 294(1) of the RPC, punishable with reclusion perpetua; it held that under Article
63(1), Escote and Acuyan should be meted the supreme penalty of death when the crime is committed
with an aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime absent any mitigating
circumstance; the court found that Escote and Acuyan shot SPO1 Manio treacherously on the occasion of
or by reason of the robbery. Escote and Acuyan appealed.
|
Issue:
(1) WON treachery was attendant in the commission of the crime
(2) WON treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide; and
(3) WON treachery may be appreciated against Escote and Acuyan.

Held:
(1) YES. There is treachery when the following essential elements are present:
(c) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and
(d) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or
forms of attack employed by him.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring
its commission without risk of himself. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was
warned of the danger to his life where he was defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the
infliction of the coup de grace. In the case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds, one on the
mouth, another on the right ear, one on the shoulder, another on the right breast, one on the
upper right cornea of the sternum and one above the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed
with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as he pleaded for
dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He was shot at close range, thus
insuring his death. The victim was on his way to rejoin his family after a hard day's work. Instead,
he was mercilessly shot to death, leaving his family in grief for his untimely demise.

(2) YES. Although treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons, it is likewise applicable to
robbery with homicide (a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime). Since
treachery is not a constitutive element of the crime of robbery with homicide nor is it inherent in
said crime, without which it cannot be committed, treachery is an aggravating circumstance to
said crime. The classification of robbery with homicide as a crime against property is irrelevant
and inconsequential in the application of treachery because when robbery is coupled with crimes
committed against persons, the crime is not only an assault on the property of the victims but
also of the person of the victims themselves. In the application of treachery as a generic
aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of
homicide which is a crime against persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is
a crime against property. Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of "homicide" and not to
the constituent crime of "robbery" of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The
crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against property or as
a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciated as
a generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery merely increases the penalty for the crime.

(3) NO. Treachery cannot be appreciated against Escote and Acuyan because the same was not
alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Although at the time the crime was committed, generic aggravating circumstance

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need not be alleged in the Information, however, the general rule had been applied retroactively
because it is more favorable to the accused. Even if treachery is proven but it is not alleged in
the information, treachery cannot aggravate the penalty for the crime.

People v. Villonez

G.R. Nos. 122976-77 16 November 1998 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Treachery

Keyword: 7 armed men, hit with a bottle

Doctrine: Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of danger to his
person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
himself or to retaliate.

Facts: On 3 May 1994, at around 9:00 p.m., while Edgar Jimenez was resting inside his store at Hulo,
Malabon, Metro Manila, a certain Tonton informed him that his close friend Longasa had a fistfight with
one Rudy, alias Dede, at Liwayway Street, Baritan, Malabon. Edgar proceeded to the area to mediate,
since Longasa and Rudy were both his friends. Edgar passed through Javier II Street in going to
Liwayway Street. At Javier II Street, a group of seven armed men, including accused-appellants,
attacked Edgar. Ruel hit Edgar on his forehead and back with a bottle. Edgar was able to escape from
his attackers. While fleeing, he ran past Longasa, who seemed drunk. When Edgar called Longasa, the
attackers were already upon Longasa

While he was about eight arms length away from Longasa, Edgar saw Emerlito hit Longasa with a 2 x 2
inches piece of wood. Simultaneously, Regando and Ruel struck Longasa with bottles. Rudy Santos and
Eddie Santos then stabbed Longasa seven and eight times, respectively, even as two other persons
named Rey and Budda held Longasa’s arms. Longasa fell to the ground. Edgar saw all these because
the scene of the incident was illuminated by a big fluorescent lamp located about three arms length
away. Edgar rushed to Longasa’s house and reported the incident to the latters parents.

The trial court ruled against the presence of treachery, since Longasa was engaged in a fight with the
accused before the fatal attack and was, therefore, sufficiently warned of the assault against him.

Issue: Whether he aggravating circumstance, treachery, should be appreciated.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court does not share the assessment of the trial court that there was no
treachery in this case because the victim had engaged in a fight previous to the killing and was thus
forewarned of an attack against him. Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was
forewarned of danger to his person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. The overwhelming number of the accused, their
use of weapons against the unarmed victim, and the fact that the victims hands were held behind him
preclude the possibility of any defense by the victim.

The other qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which the trial court appreciated, will no
longer be taken against accused-appellants, for it is absorbed in treachery.

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People v. Guzman

GR 169246 6 December 2000 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Treachery

Keyword: Minor, 7 Years old, Sinasaksa!, Sudden

Doctrine: There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

This is even more true if the assailant is an adult and the victim is a minor. Minor children, who by reason
of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. Thus, when an adult person illegally attacks
a minor, treachery exists.

Facts: Ronald (witness) is a jeepney driver and resident of Barangay Commonwealth, Quezon City. He
testified that on 25 November 1999, at about 9:00 in the evening, he stopped by and ate at a carinderia.
He noticed Nicolas Gizmant and two other persons having a drinking spree in a nearby grocery store. He
also saw Michael walking towards the direction of the same grocery store. When Michael was passing in
front of the grocery store, appellant and his two companions suddenly approached and surrounded
Michael. Appellant positioned himself at the back of Michael while his two companions stood in front of
Michael. Suddenly, they grabbed the shoulders of Michael and overpowered the latter.

One of appellant’s companions, whom he described as a male with long hair, drew out a knife and
repeatedly stabbed Michael at the stomach. Later, appellant went in front of Michael, took the knife from
the companion with flat top hair, and likewise stabbed Michael at the stomach. Appellant also kicked
Michael when the latter was already lying on the ground. He witnessed this stabbing incident at a distance
of five arms’ length.

On 12 November 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting appellant of murder. It sustained the
“clear, direct and positive” testimony of the prosecution witnesses who all declared that they saw appellant
stab Michael. It also ruled that there was treachery in the killing of Michael since the latter was unarmed,
unsuspecting and very young at the time of the attack.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery arguendo
that the accused appellant can be held liable for the death of Michael.

Held: No, the qualifying circumstance of treachery lies in the case at bar. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. In the instant case, treachery was alleged in the
Information against appellant. Moreover, all the essential elements/conditions of treachery were
established and proven during the trial through the suddenness of the attack against Michael by the
appellant.

According to Guzman, the stabbing incident occurred in a place that was properly lighted. There were
many people in the area then walking in different directions. He claims that if he and his two companions
wanted to ensure that no risk would come to them, then they could have chosen another time and place
to attack Michael. However, the fact that the place where the incident occurred was lighted and many
people were walking then in different directions does not negate treachery. It should be made clear that

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the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the
slightest provocation on his part.

This is even more true if the assailant is an adult and the victim is a minor. Minor children, who by reason
of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. Thus, when an adult person illegally attacks
a minor, treachery exists. As we earlier found, Michael was peacefully walking and not provoking anyone
to a fight when he was stabbed to death by appellant and his two companions. Further, Michael was a
minor at the time of his death while appellant and his two companions were adult persons.

People v. Torriefel

GR 128359 6 December 2000 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Ignominy

Keyword: khaki clothes; Eady the British and Ceferina the ate mo girl; sinampal si ate mo girl; cogon
lumpia wrap; rape tapos hatid pauwi.

Doctrine: Ignominy- a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace and obloquy to
the material injury caused by the crime. This aggravating circumstance is applicable when the crime
committed is against chastity.

Facts: December 17, 1942, 5pm, the accused, Oscar Torrefiel and Leon Ormeo were on their way to
their HQ in the mountains, stopped at the residence of a British person named Eady. Eady was living in
that house with (pinay-aahon-sa-laylayan) Ceferina Cordero.

The accused were then guerrillas, they went to Eady to ask for khaki clothes. Eady said he didn’t have
khaki clothes. While they were talking, Ceferina came to the balcony and, upon seeing the accused, she
demanded what they wanted in the house. Appellants explained their mission as guerrillas of the
USAFFE. Instead of answering in a polite manner, Ceferina began to scold them saying that the
USAFFE soldiers looted all their belongings. Torrefiel became irritated so he slapped her and brought
out his revolver. The two were then blindfolded and were brought to the USAFFE to prove their charge
that the USAFFE soldiers were looters. Torrefiel accompanied Eady while Ormeo led Ceferina.

The accused was lost on their way to the HQ, which led to the escape of the Eady. Torrefiel went back to
inform Ormeo that Eady escaped. As Ceferina was about to urinate, the accused pushed her and carried
her to a log and laid her on it to rape her. Torrefiel began to unbutton his pants and wrapped cogon
leaves around his penis. Both Torrefiel and Ormeo raped ate mo girl. She was then returned to their
house. Cordero then informed her husband that she was abused.

Issue: Whether the aggravating circumstance of ignominy can be appreciated.

Held: YES. Ignominy is present from the act of winding cogon grass on his genitals before raping the
victim. The wrong done was augmented by increasing its pain and adding ignominy thereto.

(Note: Ang cogon leaves toothed yung gilid tapos hairy yung base. So parang binalot sa sand paper
yung genital.)
Ignominy is applicable to crimes against chastity, rape, less serious physical injuries, light or grave
coercion and murder. For ignominy to be appreciated, it is required that the offense be committed in a

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manner that tends to make its effect more humiliating, thus adding to the victim's moral suffering. It is, as
the saying goes, adding insult to injury.

Ormeo was acquitted, Torrefiel was convicted for rape.

People v. Jose

GR L-28232 6 February 1971 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Ignominy

Keyword: movie actress; rape

Doctrine: While a plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it constitutes an admission of all the
material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances, and it matters not that
the offense is capital, for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime and its attendant
circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime||

Facts: On June 26, 1967, the petitioners Jose et. al. conspired together, and confederated and with lewd
design to forcibly abduct Magdalena “Maggie” dela Riva who is 25 years old and single, a movie actress
by profession at the time of the incident. The petitioners waited the actress from ABS CBN Studio and
followed her on her way home. Upon reaching her home, a Pontiac two-door convertible car with four
men aboard came abreast of her car and tried to bump it. Maggie stepped on her brakes to avoid
collision, and then pressed on the gas and swerved her car to the left, at which moment she was already
in front of her house gate; but because the driver of the other car (Basilio Pineda, Jr.) also accelerated
his speed, the two cars almost collided for the second time. This prompted Miss De la Riva, who was
justifiably annoyed, to ask: "Ano ba?" Forthwith, Pineda stopped the car which he was driving, jumped
out of it and rushed towards her. Undaunted, Pineda, who is one of the accused opened the door of Miss
De La Riva’s car and grabbed the lady’s left arm. With the help of the other co-accused, they succeeded
in abducting Maggie.

The car reached a dead-end street. Pineda turned the car around and headed towards Victoria Street.
Then the car proceeded to Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Street, Shaw Boulevard, thence to Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue. When the car reached Makati, Aquino took a handkerchief from his pocket and, with the
help of Jose, blindfolded Miss De la Riva.

The latter was told not to shout or else she would be stabbed or shot with a Thompson. Not long after, the
car came to a stop at the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City The blindfolded lady was led out of the car to one of
the rooms on the second floor of the hotel.

Inside the hotel, the four accused requested Maggie to strip-tease in front of them. After seeing her naked
for 10 minutes, they took turns in successfully having carnal knowledge with the victim. They also gave
her physical blows when they are encountering resistance from Miss Dela Riva.

Thereafter, they drop Maggie in front of the Free Press Building and not far from EDSA near Channel 5 to
make it appear, according to them, that she had just come from the studio. She rode a taxi cab and upon
reaching her home she said, “Mommy, mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me.”

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Issue: What is the crime committed by the four principal accused?

Held:The Court ruled that there is a conspiracy in this case. Hence, the accused is also liable for the
crime committed by the other. All of these consideration set aside, notwithstanding, it is quite obvious
that the version of the defense has not been able to explain away a very vital piece of evidence of
prosecution which, if unexplained, cannot but reduce any defense unavailing. The result of the physical
(external and internal) examination conducted on the person of Maggie de la Riva in the afternoon of
June 29, the pertinent findings of which quoted earlier in this decision, establish beyond doubt that at the
time that Maggie de la Riva was examined she bore on her body traces of physical and sexual assault.

The evidence is clear and overwhelming that all the appellants participated in the forcible abduction. Miss De la
Riva declared on the witness stand, as well as in her sworn statements, that they helped one another in dragging
her into the car against her will; that she did not know them personally; that while inside the car, Jose and Aquino,
between whom she was seated, toyed with her body, the former forcing his lips on hers, and the latter touching
her thighs and raising her skirt; that meaningful and knowing glances were in the meanwhile being exchanged
among the four; and that all of them later took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel. This testimony, whose
evidentiary weight has not in the least been overthrown by the defense, more than suffices to establish the crimes
charged in the amended complaint. In the light thereof, appellants' protestation that they were not motivated by
lewd designs must be rejected as absolutely without factual basis.

The commission of rape by each of the appellants has, as held by the court below, likewise been clearly
established.

Jose, Aquino and Canal contend that the absence of semen in the complainant's vagina disproves the fact of
rape. The contention is untenable. Dr. Brion of the NBI, who testified as an expert, declared that semen is not
usually found in the vagina after three days from the last intercourse, especially if the subject has douched herself
within that period. In the present case, the examination was conducted on the fourth day after the incident, and
the complainant had douched herself to avoid infection and pregnancy. Furthermore, the absence of
spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape, the important consideration being, not the emission
of semen, but penetration.

As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes committed, the
latter is definitely the more serious; hence, pursuant the provision of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period. Consequently, the appellants should suffer the
extreme penalty of death. In this regard, there is hardly any necessity to consider the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature of the penalty to be imposed.

The commission of said crimes was attended with the following aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime,
appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of
superior strength, the crime having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one another (Cf.
People vs. De Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113); (c) ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the complainant
to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about ten minutes, before raping her, brought about a circumstance
which tended to make the effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With respect to
appellants Jose, Aquino and Canelo none of these aggravating circumstances has been offset by any mitigating
circumstance. Appellant Pineda should, however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea
of guilty, a factor which does not in the least affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the
reason that there would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining. As a result, appellants should
likewise be made to suffer the extreme penalty of death in each of these three simple crimes of rape. (Art. 63,
par. 2, Revised Penal Code.)

The SC modified the judgment as follows: appellants Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., and Eduardo Aquino are
guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and each and every one of them is likewise convicted

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of three (3) other crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is likewise convicted with four death
penalties and to indemnify the victim of the sum of P10,000 in each of the four crimes. The case against Rogelio
Cañal was dismissed only insofar as the criminal liability is concerned due to his death in prison prior to
promulgation of judgment.

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People v. Butler

GR L-50276 27 Jaunary 1983 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Ignominy

Keyword: anal intercourse to a dead person

Doctrine: The Court find and sustain the finding of the lower court that the aggravating circumstance of
outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the deceased applies against the accused since it is established that he
mocked or outraged at the person or corpse of his victim by having an anal intercourse with her after she was
already dead.

Facts: On August 7, 1975, at about 10:30 p.m., accused-appellant Michael Butler and the victim, Enriquita
Alipo alias Gina Barrios were together at Colonial Restaurant in Olongapo City. They were seen together by
Lilia Paz, an entertainer and friend of the victim, who claimed to have had a small conversation with the
accused, and by one Rosemarie Juarez, also a friend of the victim. At about 1:00 of the same evening, the
accused and the victim left the said restaurant, after the latter invited Rosemarie Juarez to come to her house
that night.
Emelita Pasco, the housemaid of the victim, testified that, at about 11:30 p.m. or so of August 7, 1975, her
mistress (Gina Barrios) came home with the accused-appellant. As soon as she opened the door for them, the
victim and accused-appellant immediately entered the victim's bedroom. Shortly thereafter, the victim left her
bedroom holding an ID card and a piece of paper, and on the piece of paper, the victim purportedly wrote the
following words: MICHAEL J. BUTLER, 44252-8519 USS HANCOCK. Said words were copied from the ID
Card.
Pasco testified that the victim said she was copying the name of the accused because she knew he would not
be going back to her. Then she rushed back to her bedroom after instructing Pasco to wake her up the following
morning. Before retiring, however, the victim's friend, Rosemarie Juarez, came to the former's house and after
having a small conversation, also left.
The following day, August 8, 1975, at about 4:00 a.m., Pasco rose to wake her mistress as instructed. She
knocked at the door. She found that the victim was lying on her bed, facing downward, naked up to the waist,
with legs spread apart, with a broken figurine beside her head. Immediately, Pasco called the landlord and they
called the authorities.
Patrolman Rudyard de los Reyes of the Olongapo Police Department arrived together with Fiscal Llamado and
Corporal Sobrepeña at about 6:00 a.m. of August 8, 1975. Pasco informed Patrolman de los Reyes that the
accused Butler slept with the victim the previous night, and the former gave the latter the piece of paper where
the name of the accused was written.
Issue: whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder qualified by abuse
of superior strength, with aggravating circumstances of treachery and scoffing at the corpse of the victim?

Held:
In the light of the above legal precepts and considering the evidence adduced, this Court holds that there was
an abuse of superior strength attending the commission of the crime. It is not only the notorious advantage of
height that the accused had over his helpless victim, he being 6 feet tall and weighing 155 lbs. while the girl
was only 4 ft. 11 inches tall, but also his strength which he wielded in striking her with the figurine on the head
and in shoving her head and pressing her mouth and nose against the bed mattress, which pressure must
have been very strong and powerful to suffocate her to death and without risk to himself in any manner or mode
whatsoever that she may have taken to defend herself or retaliate since she was already struck and helpless

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on the bed, that convinced Us to find and rule that the crime committed is murder with the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
The evidence on record, however, is not sufficient to show clearly and prove distinctly that treachery attended
the commission of the crime since there was no eyewitness account of the killing. The extra-judicial confession
of the accused merely stated, thus: "I thought she was going to do something dangerous to me so I grabbed
her, and we started wrestling on the bed. She grabbed me by the throat and I picked up a statue of Jesus
Christ that was sitting on the bedside stand and I hit her in the head. She fell flat on her face." Although the
figurine was found broken beside her head, the medical report, however, do not show any injury or fracture of
the skull and no sign of intracranial hemorrhage.
The Court find and sustain the finding of the lower court that the aggravating circumstance of outraging or
scoffing at the corpse of the deceased applies against the accused since it is established that he mocked or
outraged at the person or corpse of his victim by having an anal intercourse with her after she was already
dead. The fact that the muscles of the anus did not close and also the presence of spermatozoa in the anal
region as testified to by Dr. Angeles Roxas, the medico-legal officer, and confirmed to be positive in the
Laboratory Report, Exhibit "B-1", clearly established the coitus after death. This act of the accused in having
anal intercourse with the woman after killing her is, undoubtedly, an outrage at her corpse.

People v. Saylan

GR L-36941 29 June 1984 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Ignominy

Keyword: missionary position and dog position

Doctrine: The trial court disregarded superiority because it "is inherent in the crime of rape or is absorbed in the
element of force." It also did not consider nocturnity "there being no evidence that the accused purposely sought
it to facilitate the commission of this rape.

The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the missionary position, i.e.
male superior, female inferior, but also "The same position as dogs do" i.e., entry from behind. The appellant
claims there was no ignominy because "the studies of many experts in the matter have shown that this 'position'
is not novel and has repeatedly and often been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation." This may well be
if the sexual act is performed by consenting partners but not otherwise.

Facts: Rafael Saylan was accused of rape in the sworn complaint of Eutropia Agno but entered a plea of “not
guilty” after the trial court rendered judgment.

One afternoon, Eutropia (the victim) went to a public market in Gingoog City to buy foodstuffs for her family and
to fetch her 5-year old daughter. On their way home, Eutropia and Nilsonita boarded a passenger jeepney and
while inside the vehicle she (Eutropia) noticed that the other passengers were Rudy Gonzales, a grade I pupil of
the Malinao Elementary School, the appellant, Rafael Saylan, and a couple whom she did not know. The
jeepney went only as far as Malinas citrus farm because the road to Barrio Malinao was not passable by vehicles.
It was almost 6:30 o'clock in the evening when the jeepney arrived at the Malinas citrus farm and so all the
passengers alighted and had to walk all the way to Barrio Malinao which was about three and a half
kilometers away. After walking some distance and upon reaching a junction, the couple separated from the group
and took the road leading to their house while Eutropia's group took the opposite Road. The appellant, however,
joined the group of Eutropia and when they reached the place where the road was plain, appellant who was then

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walking side by side with Eutropia suddenly pulled out a dagger about eight inches long and pointing it at the
latter said, Do not shout, Nang, I will kill you!. At this juncture, appellant placed his right arm around the neck of
Eutropia with the dagger pointed at her left breast, after which he dragged Eutropia at some distance. When they
reached the junction of the trail for men and a trail for carabaos, he ordered everybody to
stop and told the children (Nilsonita and Rudy Gonzales) to stay behind and threatened to kill them if they
persisted in following them. Thereafter, appellant again dragged Eutropia by her hand and brought her towards
a creek near a coconut tree which was about five meters away from where Nilsonita and Rudy Gonzales were.
The appellant then ordered Eutropia to remove her panty which she refused at first, but appellant threatened to
kill her, so she removed her panty after which appellant ordered her to lie down. Subsequently, appellant placed
himself on top of the victim and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. After the first intercourse, the
accused ordered the victim to stand up and did the intercourse again. Unsatisfied with the second, the victim
ordered the accused to stand up and then he bent her body downwards with her hands and knees resting on the
ground. At this point, accused put himself behind the victim and executed the sexual intercourse the way dogs
do. The intercourse went further up to a fifth instance. The accused only let go of the victim when the victim
promised to accused not to tell her husband what he did to her.

Issue: Whether or not there the offense of rape was attended by the aggravating circumstances of: abuse of
superior strength, nighttime, uninhabite place, ignominy and reitaracion.

Held: The trial court disregarded superiority because it "is inherent in the crime of rape or is absorbed in the
element of force." It also did not consider nocturnity "there being no evidence that the accused purposely sought
it to facilitate the commission of this rape.

Despoblado was present according to the trial court because: "The accused dragged the offended party, at the
point of a dagger, to the carabao trail, about 10 meters from the junction, but 40 to 50 meters below to better
attain his purpose without interference, and to better secure himself from detection and punishment (U.S. vs.
Vitug, 17 Phil. 1). Even the junction where the two children were left is already 400 meters from the nearest
house. While there maybe occasional passersby, this does not destroy its being an uninhabited place. (People
vs. Bangug, 52 Phil. 87)." (Id., p. 62.) We hold that the trial court for the reasons stated correctly held that the
crime was committed in an uninhabited place.

The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the missionary position, i.e.
male superior, female inferior, but also "The same position as dogs do" i.e., entry from behind. The appellant
claims there was no ignominy because "the studies of many experts in the matter have shown that this 'position'
is not novel and has repeatedly and often been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation." This may well be
if the sexual act is performed by consenting partners but not otherwise.

The trial court also held that "there is no reiteracion because one of the offenses, namely Robbery in Band, for
which the accused has been penalized, was committed after the commission of this rape case, and the penalty
imposed on the other offense of Frustrated Homicide, is lighter than the penalty for rape."

Although not alleged in the complaint, the trial court stated that the offense was aggravated by disregard of rank
because it was a fact known to the appellant that Mrs. Agno was a school teacher. The appellant claims that this
circumstance cannot be assigned to him because there was no deliberate intent to offend or insult the rank of
Mrs. Agno. The Solicitor General agrees with the appellant for the same reason.

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People v. Sultan

G.R. No. 132470 27 April 2000 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Ignominy

Keyword: Hold-up with Rape; Planned elopement

Doctrine: The Court realized that there was no law providing for the additional rape/s or homicide/s for
that matter to be considered as aggravating circumstance.

Facts: On June 2, 1997, about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Juditha Bautista was on her way home from a
visit to her cousin Cristina Mansilongan in Novaliches, Quezon City. When she passed a dark alley, she
was accosted by Fernando Sultan, who pointed a sharp instrument at her neck and announced it was a
“hold up”. He grabbed her and brought her to his house along the alley.

He made her sit down and offered her a drink. He started to divester her of her watch, ring, earrings and
necklace and her cash of P130.00. After taking her valuables, he started kissing her on the lips and cheeks.
She told him she was married with 2 children but Sultan was not dissuaded. While pointing an ice pick at
her he ordered her to undress. She acceded for fear that she would kill her. He went on top of her, held
her 2 hands on the level of her head, spread her thighs and inserted his penis into her vagina.

After satisfying his lust, he ordered her to put on her bra and panty, tied her hands and went out of the
room to smoke. He came back, untied her, and once again with threat and intimidation sexually abused
her. Thereafter, he tied her hands to a wood and held her in his arms. He told her that he loved her and
that he would answer for what he had done to her.

In her effort to be free, she “agreed” to elope with him. He allowed her to go home at noon to get her things.
He even accompanied her to the highway to get a ride home.

When Juditha arrived home she saw her sister Antonette in the house. She told her of the harrowing
experience. Anotonette called her brother SPO1 Fernando Bautista who resides in Bulacan. Bautista
arrived and advised Juditha to go back to the house of Sultan for the “planned elopement” so that he and
his 2 companions could stage an arrest.

When Juditha arrived at the house, Sultan was already waiting for her. They boarded a bus while Bautista
and his companions trailed them. When the bus reached the corner of Forest Hill subdivision, it slowed
down. Bautista and his companions boarded the bus. Juditha motioned them. They immediately
approached Sultan and boxed him before they could arrest him. The other passengers joined in hitting
him. Some policemen saw the disturbance, boarded the bus and assisted in facilitating the arrest.

The Trial Court found Sultan guilty.

Issue: Whether or not the additional rape can be considered as ignominy.

Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The testimony of complainant as to the taking of her
cash and valuables is evidence enough to sustain a conviction for robbery considering that we find no fault
in the pronouncement of the trial court that her testimony is credible. The persuasive value of the
declaration of credibility is bolstered by our own scrutiny of the testimony of complainant showing her
answers to the incisive questions propounded to her to be firm and straightforward.

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Accused-appellant might not have employed force in committing the rape but he definitely used intimidation
which was sufficient to make complainant submit herself to him against her will for fear of life and personal
safety. Accused-appellant grabbed her and dragged her to his house. He was armed with an ice pick and
threatened to kill her with it if she did not follow his wishes. She was naturally intimidated and her
intimidation started from that moment on, and subsisted in her mind when the rape was started until its
consummation. Intimidation is subjective so it must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and
judgment at the time of the commission of the crime, and not by any hard and fast rule. It is enough that it
produces fear, as in the present case, fear that if the complainant does not yield to the bestial demands of
accused-appellant something would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter. Thus, it is irrelevant
that she was not certain when cross-examined that accused-appellant was armed with an ice pick when
the rape commenced; it was enough that he was holding something that looked like an ice pick which
engendered fear in her. With fear instilled in her mind, it is understandable that she did not offer any
resistance since any attempt to do so would only be futile. Such failure on her part should not be taken to
mean consent so as to make her a willing participant in the sexual confrontation.

The Court realized that there was no law providing for the additional rape/s or homicide/s for that matter
to be considered as aggravating circumstance. It further observed that the enumeration of aggravating
circumstances under Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive, unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code
which enumerates the mitigating circumstances where analogous circumstances may be considered,
hence, the remedy lies with the legislature. Consequently, unless and until a law is passed providing that
the additional rape/s or homicide/s may be considered aggravating, the Court must construe the penal law
in favor of the offender as no person may be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the
statute. Under this view, the additional rape committed by accused-appellant is not considered an
aggravating circumstance.

People v. Ladjaalam

G.R. Nos. 136149-51 19 September 2000 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Use of illegal firearms or explosives

Keyword: Police raid; suspected drug den; tambays shouted “Police Raid! Police Raid!”

Doctrine: If an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate
offense of simple illegal possession of firearms.

Where direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed, the accused can neither be held
liable for illegal possession of firearms as a separate offense nor it can be deemed as an aggravating
circumstance.

Facts: The accused was charged with the following: 1. Maintenance of a drug den. 2. Illegal possession
of firearms and ammunition 3. Multiple attempted murder with direct assault 4. Illegal possession of drugs.

In the afternoon of September 24, 1997, by virtue of a Search Warrant No. 20, thirty members of the
Zamboanga City Police conducted a police raid on the residence of herein appellant Ladjaalam and his
wife suspected to be a drug den. 10 meters before approaching the main gate of the house of Ladjaalam,
three bystanders near the area shouted “Police Raid! Police Raid!”. Thereafter, the policemen were met
by a rapid burst of gunfire coming from the second floor. There was also gunfire at the back of the house.
The police saw appellant Ladjaalam firing the M14 gun at the window of the second floor.

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After gaining entrance, two of the police officers proceeded to the second floor where they saw the
appellant firing the rifle. As he noticed their presence, the appellant jumped from the window to the roof of
a neighboring house. He was subsequently arrested at the back of his house after a brief chase.

Several firearms and ammunition were recovered from the appellant's house. Also found was a pencil case
with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside, each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride. A paraffin
test was conducted and the casts taken from both hands of the appellant yielded positive for gunpowder
nitrates. Records show that appellant had not filed any application for license to possess firearms and
ammunition, nor has he been given authority to carry firearms.

Issue: W/N the crime of illegal Possession of Firearms should be considered as an aggravating
circumstance to the separate crimes committed by Ladjaalam

Held: NO. Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the person
arrested committed "no other crime." Furthermore, if the person is held liable for murder or homicide, illegal
possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but not a separate offense. Hence, where an
accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14
rifle at several policemen who were about to serve a search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the
separate offense of illegal possession of firearms. Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have
aggravated the direct assault.

Section 1 of RA 8294, which amended PD 1866 provides that:

“Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition

Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. -- The penalty of
prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000)
shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess
any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part
of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be
imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in
diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered
firearms 261 but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other
firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no
other crime was committed by the person arrested. If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.”

A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there
can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or
homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate
offense.

Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case; appellant can no longer
be held liable for illegal possession of firearms. The Court also ruled that when the crime was committed
on September 24, 1997, the original language of PD 1866 had already been expressly superseded by RA
8294 which took effect on July 6, 1997. In other words, no longer in existence was the earlier provision of
PD 1866, which justified a conviction for illegal possession of firearms separate from any other crime. It
was replaced by RA 8294 which, among other amendments to PD 1866, contained the specific proviso
that "no other crime was committed.”

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Celino v. Court of Appeals

GR 170562 29 June 2007 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Use of illegal firearms or explosives

Keyword: gun ban, possession of illegal fire arms, bawal DAW isabay

Doctrine: When the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, any information
for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have
to be tried together with such other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder
or homicide, or absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC which assails the Court of Appeal’s decision
to affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the petition of Angel Celino Sr.’s motion to quash and motion for
reconsideration in relation to cases charging him of Section 2 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 6446 (gun
ban), and Section 1, Paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8294 (illegal possession of firearm). He
pleaded not guilty to the two Information that was filed against him.

In his motion to quash, Celino contended that he "cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms
... if he was also charged of having committed another crime of [sic] violating the Comelec gun ban under
the same set of facts ….” This was denied by the trial court on the ground that the offense charged is not
one of those enumerated under RA 8294. A motion for reconsideration was also filed but was subsequently
denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the mere filing of an information for gun ban violation against him necessarily bars
his prosecution for illegal possession of firearm.

Held: NO. The crux of the controversy lies in the interpretation of the following proviso under Section 1 of
RA 8294: “Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.” The petitioner
contends that the mere filing of an information for gun ban violation against him necessarily bars his
prosecution for illegal possession of firearm.

The Supreme Court held that the accused can be convicted of illegal possession of fire arms, provided no
other crime was committed by the person arrested. The word "committed" taken in its ordinary sense, and
in light of the Constitutional presumption of innocence, necessarily implies a prior determination of guilt by
final conviction resulting from successful prosecution or voluntary admission.

When the other offense involved falls under one of the RA 8294, any information for illegal firearm
possession should be quashed since it would have to be tried alongside another crime, either as an
element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition, or an attempted coup d'état or as an aggravating
circumstance in murder or homicide. On the other hand, if the additional offense implicated is not one
of those listed under R.A. 8294, then the separate case for illegal firearm possession should still be
prosecuted.

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People v. Atop

GR G.R. No. 124303-05 10 February 1998 ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES

Relationship

Keyword: (unique keyword/phrase that makes it easier to remember the case) ex. Mayor or Manila;
pokpok; midnight; Mindanao (O diba alam niyo agad na Villavicencio vs. Lukban yan)

Doctrine: Samting samting

Facts:
Private complainant Regina Guafin is a granddaughter of Trinidad Mejos and that the accused Alejandro
Atop is the common law husband of said Trinidad Atop. Herein accused committed 3 counts of rape: (1)
On October 9, 1992; (2) sometime in 1993; (3) December 26, 1994Sometime in 1991 when she was
already 10 years of age, the accused started having lustful desire on her. The accused then inserted his
finger into her vagina. She told her grandmother about this but her grandmother did not believe her. This
led to the 3 countsof rape above-mentioned, which was also reported to the grandmother but still refused
to believe her.Herein accused made use of a knife and gagged the mouth of the victim when he
committed the said crimes.In defense, accused said that the reason why Regina Guafin filed a case
against him because the said private complainant was coached by her aunt who wanted him and hiswife
Trinidad to be separated.The RTC also ruled that the circumstances of nighttime and relationship
aggravated all the three incidents of rape, considering that the last rape occurred after the effectivity of
RA 7659, the death penalty law, the court meted out the capital punishment to accused-appellant

Issue: The trial court erred in appreciating the circumstances of nighttime and relationship as
aggravating the penalty imposable for the rape allegedly committed on October 9, 1992, in 1993 and on
December 26, 1994.

Held: NO.
(1) The time-settled rule is that nocturnity, as an aggravating circumstance, must have been deliberately
sought by the offender to facilitate the crime or prevent its discovery or evade his capture or facilitate his
escape. The culprit must have purposely taken advantage of the cover of night as an indispensable
factor to attain his criminal purpose.

The prosecution failed to prove that nighttime was deliberately sought by appellant to facilitate his
dastardly acts. In fact, the prosecution failed to show that appellant consummated his carnal designs at
night (except only for the December 26, 1994 incident which the victim said occurred at 11:00 p.m.).

Much less is there any evidence substantiating the trial courts conclusion that appellant intentionally
sought the darkness to advance his criminal exploits.

Neither can we appreciate relationship as an aggravating circumstance. The scope of relationship as

defined by law encompasses (1) the spouse, (2) an ascendant, (3) a descendant, (4) a legitimate, natural
or adopted brother or sister, or (5) a relative by affinity in the same degree.

Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal bond such as marriage. Relatives by affinity
therefore are those commonly referred to as in-laws, or stepfather, stepmother, stepchild and the like; in
contrast to relatives by consanguinity or blood relatives encompassed under the second, third and fourth
enumeration above.

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The law cannot be stretched to include persons attached by common-law relations. Here, there is no
blood relationship or legal bond that links the appellant to his victim. Thus, the modifying circumstance of
relationship cannot be considered against him.

Neither is the following provision of Sec. 11, RA 7659 applicable:

Sec. 11. Article 335 of the [Revised Penal] Code is hereby amended to read as follows
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law
spouse of the parent of the victim.

Undisputed is the fact that appellant is not the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. He is the
common law husband of the girls grandmother. Needless to state, neither is appellant the victims parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree. Hence,
he is not encompassed in any of the relationships expressly enumerated in the aforecited provision.
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construedin favor of the
accused. Courts must not bring cases within the provision of a law which are not clearly embraced by it.

No act can be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by statute; so, too, no person who is not
clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought within them. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved
in favor of the accused.

US v. McMann

GR L-2229 1 July 1905 ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES

Intoxication

Keyword: mules, MASTER, matches

Doctrine: The court below held that the defendant was drunk at the time the act was committed, but held
also that drunkenness was habitual with him and therefore his condition could not be taken into
consideration for the purpose of lessening the sentence.

Facts: The defendant, McMann, and one McKay were packers at Camp Vicars in Mindanao. On the day
in question the defendant had charge of some mules about one and one half miles from the camp.
McKay was near the place where the defendant was stationed with the mules. McKay went to the house
of a Moro, Amay Pindolonan, for the purpose of getting matches with which to light his cigar. With his
revolver in his hand he attempted to enter the house, but the owner would not allow him to do so. A few
moments later the defendant arrived at the same house. He attempted to enter, but was unable to do so
on account of the opposition of the owner. He also carried his revolver in his hand with the hammer
raised ready to be discharged. A Moro named Master, who was there at the time, was carving the head
of a bolo with one hand, holding the blade in the other. The defendant snatched the bolo from him,
cutting his fingers. This Moro left for the camp to report the matter to the authorities.

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Soon after this, McKay and the Moro Pindolonan, were seated when the defendant, McMann raised his
pistol and fired at McKay. The bullet struck him in the back of the head and killed him instantly. The Moro
at once jumped up, looked around to see where the shot came from, and started to run, whereupon the
defendant shot him. The exact nature of his injuries does not appear,, but it appears that at the time of
the trial, about a month after the event, he was still in the hospital. The defendant and McKay were both
drunk at this time.

The defendant claims that he had no intention of killing McKay, the only evidence in support of it is the
proof that the defendant and McKay were good friends prior to the occurrence and that no reason is
shown why he should have committed such an act. It may be difficult to state what the exact cause was.
It appears from the testimony that the defendant was talking to McKay, but McKay said nothing in reply.
The cause for the commission of the crime might be found perhaps in this conversation, if we knew what
it was. Or perhaps the defendant killed McKay because he, the defendant, was drunk

Issue: WON drunkenness can be considered as a mitigating circumstance in the case at bar.

Held: NO. The court below held that the defendant was drunk at the time the act was committed, but
held also that drunkenness was habitual with him and therefore his condition could not be taken into
consideration for the purpose of lessening the sentence. In the case of Commonwealth vs. Whitney (5
Gray; 85) the court said:

The exact degree of intemperance which constitutes a drunkard it may not be easy to define, but
speaking in general terms, and with the accuracy of which the matter is susceptible, he is a drunkard
whose habit is to get drunk, "whose ebriety has become habitual." To convict a man of the offense of
being a common drunkard it is, at the least, necessary to show that he is an habitual drunkard. Indeed
the terms 'drunkard' and 'habitual drunkard' mean the same thing.

People v. San Pedro

L-44274 22 January 1980 ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES

Degree of Instruction

Keyword:

Doctrine: the "criteria in determining lack of instruction is not illiteracy alone, but rather lack of sufficient
intelligence."

Facts: On June 2, 1970 between the barrios of Masaya and Paciano Rizal Municipality of Bay,
Laguna,Felimon Rivera (a jeepney driver) was killed. He died of profuse hemorrhage due to 23 lacerated
and stab wounds and multiple abrasions found on the different parts of the body.Four days prior to the
date of crime, Luisito, Artemio, and others planned to steal the jeep of the victim. They then rented
Rivera's jeep to haul coconuts (with him as driver), where they proceeded to Brgy. Puypuy in Bay,
Laguna. They were joined by Salvador Litan and Rodrigo Esguerra.At Esguerra's signal, Litan hit Rivera
at the nape with a water pipe. Rivera jumped out of the jeepbut was chased by San Pedro and Litan who
stabbed him at the back several times with a dagger.Esguerra then drove the jeep and the group
proceeded to Makati, Rizal, where he was joined byNelson Piso and Antonio Borja. The jeep was sold
for Php 2,000.00 at Cavite. Piso then went to LosBaños after four days and gave San Pedro, Litan and

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Banasihan Php 50.00 each.On June 11, 1971, police caught Rodrigo Esguerra. He then admitted his
participation and named his companions. Artemio Banasihan was apprehended in 1972

Issue: WON the aggravating circumstances could be offset by the mitigating circumstance of “Lack of
Instruction”.

Held: NO. With the presence of two aggravating circumstances, craft and treachery, it would make no
difference even if the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction were appreciated in appellant's favor
— which is even doubtful from the fact alone, as was allegedly proven by the testimony of appellant that
he cannot read and write but can only sign his name. This, apart from the fact that as held categorically
in the case of People vs. Enot, lack of instruction is not applicable to crimes of theft and robbery, much
less to the crime of homicide. The reason is that robbery and killing are, by their nature, wrongful acts,
and are manifestly so to the enlightened, equally as to the ignorant. As recently held by this Court,
speaking through Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., the "criteria in determining lack of instruction is
not illiteracy alone, but rather lack of sufficient intelligence." It is significant that neither to the trial court
nor to the appellant's counsel has the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction entered the mind. No
attempt was made to prove it, as direct proof, not mere inference, is required, and must be invoked in the
court below, the reason being that the trial court can best gauge a person's level of intelligence from his
manner of answering questions in court . If the trial court did not consider the mitigating circumstance
invoked for the first time here on appeal, it must be because from appellant's testimony, and even more
so from his given occupation as a merchant, his alleged lack of intelligence never suggested itself to the
trial court or to his lawyer, as entitling him to the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.

WHEREFORE, there being no error committed by the trial court, its decision imposing the death penalty,
together with the indemnity awarded, has to be, as it is hereby, affirmed.

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