CONFIDENTIAL. Ge FM 30-174 FIELD MANUAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS (U) NAT! SECURITY INFORM: Unauthorj closure fect to Criminal Satiotiogs HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FEBRUARY 1973 ~CONFIBENTIAL- Commander, Exempt iain Schetl of Onder 1652 8 IndiaGONFIDENTIAL— FM 30-17 Fite Manuau! HEADQUARTERS | . DEPARTMENT OF ‘THE ARMY No. 30-174, Wasmixcron, D.C., 28 February 1973 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS (U) al Support. IV. Planning and Reporting V. Investigatis Vi. Contral and Cnavresne 2 Section 1 n 111, Offensive Counterespionage. IV. Nentratizativn. Cuavren 3. COUNTERSUBVERSION Seetion 1. "1 a. IV. Terrorism. Cnarten 4, COUNTERSABOTAGE Section L General. 2... I. ‘Types of Sabutage.—. re 5 : Cuavten 5. CONFIDED Section 1. General. 4. uu IIL. Source Administration. Harte 6. UNDERCOVER Section I. General, 1. Planning and Proparati IL. Conduet of Under As GHHEi 6K 0 1V, Concluding an Undercover Assignment......... G-14—-6-17 6-96-10. i Cuavren 7. SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN| STABILITY OPERATIONS Section 1, Introduction - ee H1. Counterintelligence Operations. MI. Plans and Hstimates...... Cuseren 8. TACTICAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DATA BASE, Scetion I. Files, Indices and Analyses. Il, Pattern Analysis...2.22..... Avmsmx AL REFERENCES. 0000000... w, sive eI) 8278-28 covet tseteesesesetenvesee a ORGANIZATION AND RATION ceseee s+. BI—B-10 ©. CHECKLIST FOR TECHNICAL SURVEY. ee CIR C4 D. OFCO REPORTS........ ee. D-I—D-28 RADIO COMMUNICATIONS-CODE. F. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION SYMBOLS. is manval wpenedes FM 30-17A, 28 February 1968, including oll changes. —GONFIDENFIAL—~CONFIDENTFIAE— mM a017A Xt CHAPTER 1 GENERAL Section J. INTRODUCTION 1-2. (U) Changes Users of this manual ure encouraged to submit recommendations to improve its clarity or necun Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph und line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each nent to Insure understanding and complete eval- omments should be prepared using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications) and forwarded direct to the Commanding Officer, US Army Combat. Development: Command Intelli sence Y, Fort Hunchuen, Arizona 85613. O1 nutors of proposed changes which would constitute a t modification of approved Army doctrine send an information copy, through command channels, to the Commanding General, US Army Combat. Developments Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060, to facilitate review and followu,FM 30-174 ae -~GONFIDENTFIAL— a Section Il. HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE 1-4, (U) Introduction ‘The key to effective counterespionage, countersib- version, and countersabotage is to “know your enemy.” Newly assigned counterintelligence person- inust. first familinrize themselves thoroughly with hostile intelligence activities, methods of operation, agencies, and personalities common to the aren in which they must operate. With unlimited resonrees, funds, and professionally skilled case officers or principal agents, counterintelligence special opera- tions may become very sophisticnted, using the litest technological developments, Conversely, the methods be ns simple ns recruiting someone to obser the “enemy” and report on everything he xees or hears, Methods und techniques are also modified to mect the requirements posed by the effectiveness of opposing counterintelligence forces. 1-5. (U) Characteristics of Hostile Intelligence Activities a, Predominant among the hostile intelligence: services faced by US Korees are those of the USSR. The ser Hite nations are either patterned after the Soviet intelligence serviees or operute ives of sa ner, A discussion of these im included ns appendix B. 4. Insurgent movements will probably haw intelligence network patterned after the North Vietnamese apparatus purticularly in newly develop- ing countries. FM 30-31 should be referred to in insurgency situati ons. 1-6. (U) Functions of Counter Counterintelligence is that phase of intelligence covering ull netivity devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimicnl foreign intelligence nctivities, It also protects information guinst telligence espionnge, personnel against subversion, and installations material against sabotage. Counterintelligence spe‘ operations are activities which have pencetime und wartime applications since they are used to gain knowledge about enemy intentions before, during, and after hostilities. > 1-8. (U) Countersubversion Countensibversion includes: operations detect, prevent, or neutralize the activities of sub versive grompe and. individuals, The eo mission may be limited to designated defen entive mensures Ww designed to onfines of In other enses tie ll 1, to include offensive mensures directed toward the origin of hostile subversive plans and policies (chap 3) 1-9, (U) Countersabotage Countersnbotage operations are the snost difficult all counterintelligence special operations to mann; This is due te the highly compartinens » of sabotage cells or teams; the high security required for saboteurs; and the fact that such operations normally stem from incidents mstend of personnel (chap 4). Section Ill. TECHNICAL SUPPORT 1-10. (U) General In both defensive and offensive counterintelligence mensures described in this mann or support may be employed within prescribed fi ws (ARCBS1-17). be included in operational briefings and planning so that. they Iviee on available technical support and make specific: recommendations for the Spee erned, Spe fred and must be neconted for ns prescribed by AR SS1 143 tn echnical spevintists should ay ive 1 operations ial equipment 12 “CONFIDENTIALFM 30-17A Section IV, TERRORISM 11, (U) General a. Terrorism is normally employed in un insur art of the subversive arm of the revolu- 2 is used as a (action! and/or strategic pon whereby the populace is frightened inte neutrality in the conflict, into cooperation with the insurgent, or inte joining the insurgent overtly or covertly. ‘Terrorism employed nguinst an armed farce can imake it redeploy combat troops out of the field and inte a security mission, exhaust its resources by attempting to hunt down terrorists, over- extend its fines of communication, and divert its \ergies into other directions. 4b. ‘Perrorism, in an insurgency, will tend to be less phistiexted Una terrorism in a conven Niet, therefore, those portions of chupter 4 which pertnin to sabotage in rear areas during a conven- tional conflict, are ulso applicable to terrorist tacties. corism can be, and sometimes appears to be, miss, haphazard, seemingly patterntess series of acts. In most instances, however, terrorism campuigns are as fully orgunized and planned as are sabotage campaigns. Therefore, every effort must be made to analyze incidents of a potential terrorism ct the pattern if one exists. One aren the terrorists route into und out of the , all people in the wren should be interviewed in order to establish methods of opera- tion, and descriptions of the terrorists. An indentikit can be most. vlurly with illiterate in- dividuals. ‘This ‘MO and. individuat descriptions, must be widely disseminated umon; sourees and security forees in onder ly counteract u * lorrorism.FM 30-17A CHAPTER 4 COUNTERSABOTAGE Section |. 4-1. (U) Introduction a. Snbotage is nny net with an intent to damage, interfere with, or obstruct by willfully damaging or destroying or attempting to damage or destroy material, premises or utilities, in the interests of x foreign power or subversive political organization, b. Counterbotage, then, ix any uction designed to destroy the effectiveness of foreign sabotage through, the process of identifying, penc- and manipulating, neutralizing or repressi individuals, groups or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such nctivities he crime af srhotage is dis nder Title 18, United States Gade, chapter 105, ns 2151 2156 and is complex and not simply defined. ‘This ne ean ocenr in peacetime or wartime; however, it common during war. Ina peacetime environ- see ix more ment, any willful net or attempt ef omission or jc intent to is of th commission committed with the speci interfere with, damaze, or ds fense effort and of forcign power or subversive group ix sabotage. In wartime, the peacetime definition applies and, additionally, 2 willful net of omission or ¢ mission, Vo hy a person whi is deemed to have “reason to believe” that his act may adversely affect e warmaking potential ean be convicted of sabotage, During wartime, and particularly during internal def 1 war Situations, enre mnt be taken to distinguish those fine enemy ag from overt acts of war perpetrated by armed units. s invalving elandes: mn omy de The use of sabotagt n be expeeted Uy in during any future cont involved. Developments in tec ive power of sabe izing the size of their ost military Inryets tly prior to and $ fares ponent parts, @. The specific: countersabotage responsibility signed to a unit. verics with the area, mil sitation, jurisdictional agreements, and directives. During and since World War 15, subotage has been directed mainly against material and Faciliti ich CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL support the military effort. Accordingly, the counter- subotage role will be extensive in most eases nnd may require the employment of » significant portion of available counterintelligence resources in thenters of operations. f. To successfully fulfill countersabotage respy bilities, counterintelligence personnel must hnve, in addition to complete understanding of installation and personnel security, a thorough knowledge of znnizntions, methods, capabilities, and imitations. ‘They must be able to recognize un net AF sabotage, understand its relationship to hostile shjectives, analyze patterns of snbotage nctivity, defensive and offensive operations designed to prevent or neutralize sabotage activities . (U) Sabotage Targets The planning and implement sabotage program requires a theroinh andderst of the procedures used by sabotage organiznt ting snbutyge targets, Majer sabotag ule natural resources, transportation, con cations, power, fuel, in cl eqttipment. All ure susceptible to dn could substantially impede their primary fw and are wotenty Is Incentive heen ineapacitation may hay a serions effect. on morale, strategic enpubility, or combat effectiveness. a. Target Selection Factors, bn select the sophistiented sabotage organization 1 several factors in relation te the expabil available saboteur personnel and the inherent risks tty perform the task; how ell may only be concerned with (2) and (3), below (1) Value, ‘The strategic andl tactient valu he considered. For example, the re value of disrupting the supply syst yom combat or the strategic: i production facili {to the value of n target is its enpn- of other sof the st nportanee of destroying es may be cone sidered. Relat y for reenvery und the nvailnbitit ‘or funetic facilities 10 nese the miss selected targat. at |FM 30-174 (2) Accessibility. ‘The availubility of ae pends ehiefly upon the amount and type of s¢ inaintained nnd the gcographie location (3) Vulnerability. Nearly ell materiel and facil- are vulnerable to sabotage. The degree of vulner- ability to destruction, however, varies and is important factor in target. selection, Some targets have un inherent capability to destroy themselves a relutively small sabotage devier is ignited. (4) Availability of sabotage materials. The pro- curement, transportation, and storage of some types of explosives; und chemical, biologienl, or nuclear devices will present special problems for some types of sabotage activity. However, in most instances it can be anticipated that the sabotage organization will he wble to provide the materials required for the particular imeanx most suitable for w purticulur target. b. Special Target Vulnerabilities. "Those targets particularly vulnerable to sabotage, which are of sufficient importance to warrunt sabotage considera- tion oe discussed in FM 19-30. Additional targets are listed below: (1) Lund transportation systems: power sys- tems; loading, transfer, and repair plants; and the rond nets. (q) Air transportation: aircraft, gasoline and Jubricunts, or runways. (6) Water transportation: destruction of many vital components of the ship, piers, canal locks, blocking harbors, er navigational equipment and aids. (@) Rail transportation: track system, tun- nels, bridges, switches, or signal ean be reversed. (d) Bridges attacked by sabotuge are normall limited to those with less than 12-inch girders, Split charges, on each side of the girder, one slightly above the other to give n scissor effect, are used. Railway bridges ean be destroyed by the train detonating preset. charges. (e) Rolling stock: brake hoses, freight cars, usaline tankers; and locomotive oylinders, fireboxes, Drakeshoes, connecting Fods, oF air compressors, (J) Railrond repair and transfer points: round jouse turntables, locomotive brakes, hydraulic or clecitic switches in marshalling yards, warchouses, and eranes. ~GONFIDENTFIAL__ (2) Machinory is a vital satan nll Grass portation, communications, and power systems, ws well ws in manufacturing. Neatly HW types ean be readily sabotaged. The simplest means is to interfere with lubriention by draining oil, damaging wuto- matic lubricator and oil pipes, substitu viseosity oils, or by introducing ubrasives into the system. Sensitive vital parts, part can be smashed of steel fraginents can be dropped into moving parts or eylinders of engines. Explo- xives, too, are effective when placed in proximity to bearing pedestals, casi iron surfaces, or vital com ponents and inside closed spaces. (3) Fuol and power are essentinl to all trans: portation, communication, und manufacturing. Con- sequently, they aro important subolage targets. (@) Hydroelectric systems ure vulnerable to explosives at underwater parts of dams and sluice gates, turbines, governor gears, generators, pipeline and valves. (®) Steam powerplants can be attacked with explosives at conllooding crunes and winches, the motor, gears, und supports of cont: conveyers, enst iron links of stokers>beuring pedestals or iron custing surfaces of turbogencrators, feet and inspection doors of cast iron condensers, pumps, und water-cooling towers. (©) Gus plant production may be stopped by damaging the relort stanchion supports for the distillation tubes, suction pumps, or the motor, gear- box, or supports for the coal conveyor. (4) Factories can be incapacitated by burning records and stores, steuling or smashing patterns, cutting of power, or destroying loading J moving gear. ng improper 4-3. (U) Counterintelligence Responsit Counterintelligence elements will have varying de recs of responsibilities for the detection, prevention, end neutralization of subotage uctivity. The specif ‘countersubotage responsibility assigned to » counter- intelligence clement will depend on the aren, military 1, and jurisdictional or status-of-forces merce: te "This rate will be extensive in most cases und may require the employment of w significant portion of availublo resources in theaters of operation. Section Il. TYPES OF SABOTAGE 4-4, (U) Che Sabotage Chemical und biological agents, as well us propos tioned nuclear devices, may be used ax means of committing sabotage in future wars or insurgenc) situations short of war. |, Biological, and Nuclear a2 a. Chemical Agents. Chemical agents can produce fleets ranging from highly lethal to mildly ineapuck- tating Chemical compounds may be employed by » sabotcur to produce a deep sleep for hours; psycho- chemical ugents which produce confusion and in- bility to earry out orders; poisons which enter the —GONFIDENTIAL——CONMDENTIAL— body by absorption and are lethal; and drinking water can very easily be contaminated with chem- icals sufficiently potent to cause death. Initial delivery of chemical agents must be of a sufficient quantity to achieve the desired effect. Factors of dispersion and dilution will reduce the poteney of the chemical agent. Therefore, to be effective, the agent must be delivered to the target in the necessary strength to accomplish what is desired before th agent dissipates. Aerosols, capsules, vials, special types of weapons, and spreading chemicals carried by the wind and dust are means of disseminating chemical agents. b. Biological Operations. Biological operations are the employment of biological agents to produce casualties in man oF animals and damages to plants or materials. Biological agents, when employed by w trained saboteur, have great subotage potential. (1) Biologienl agents are microorganisms which enuse disease in man, plants, or animals, or cause the deterioration of mnterinl. Such microorganisms, grown, cultivated and introduced by man, are u dendly weapon which can enter humans throu inhalation or through enting, and ennnot be readily detected by the five senses. Further, it may be days rather than hours before disense symptoms enused by the microorganisms become apparent. (2) ‘There are many devices for spronding. bio~ logical agents. Use und methods of such devices are limited only by the ingenuity of the saboteur and the desired effect. ‘The saboteur’s devices may consiyl of vinls, capsules, various sizes of aerosol bombs, and specially designed devices with delaying mecha- nisms. Under favorable conditions microorganisms may be placed in old tin cans, bottles, and boxes 41 ati area from which the microorganisms may multiply and spread. An aerosol bomb placed in an air intake ventilation system is a quick and ensy method of spreading the agents throughout an entire building. ¢. Nuelear Denices, Prepositioned nuclear aeviers muy also be tools of the saboteur. Nuclear devices have grent. destin destroy lives, crops, property, industrin! sites, material, and equipment. A hostile nation may plan the use of small nuclear devices to erente panie and undermin the mornle of the citizens, Ad contained in ATE 380-150 nnd 4-5. (U) Incendiary Sabotage Fire is n very destructive type of sabotage und is easily employed by even the untrained saboteur hecause the means are almost always avail H almost all targets can be destroyed by fire. In addi fire isn natural hazard making it easier for Uh tN FM 30-17A saboteur to camouflage his actions. The means of starting a fire are simple and, once the saboteur succeeds in igniting combustible material, time will dictate the amount of destruction achieved. ¢. Origin, Fires may be classified as natural or deliberate. (1) Natural fires include accidental fires ax well as those caused by spontancous combustion, ligh ning, electricity, and by sparks from other fires. (2) Deliberate fires started by saboteurs, di gruntled employees, or people with other personal motives are often disguised as natural fires. b. Materials. A saboteur may use the inherent combustible material of the target, or available within the target, ignited by a simple deviee, or he may use specifically prepared chemicals known ax “hot in- condiaries.” When using “hot incendinries” the saboteur usually prefers to select those mecting the following four requirements: (1) Burn with an intense hent. (2) Be easy to ignite. (3) Be difficult to extinguish. (4) Burn without leaving a residue or nt lent alter the external appearance of evidence at the scene of the fire. ¢. Components. Incendiary devices, us well as ives, used by a snbotour usually include three components. (1) A delay mechanism provides sufficient. time safe withdrawal of the agent who phiees the provides iscrepancy for the establish- ment of un alibi, and insures the ignition or deton- tion of the device nt the most advantageous time. (2) An initintor insures the complete and ef ficient initintion of the main charge. (3) The main charge conta diary or explosive material to ignite or demolish the target. dL. Simple Devices. Simple devices are those re ng little or no preparation and using materi lily available to the subotenr. T =preplanned or they may be used when advantage of 1 sabotage target of oppo example would be a cigarette and match ghted end of the ci sufficiently effective to nee target, the suboteur may use incendinries. A fow examples are ns follows chlorate (1) A msisture of three parts potas and one part suger by volume will Burn at a very high temperature -CONMDENTIAL “3FM 30-174 £2) Impee of paper with whi phosphorussis another effective means of making “4 ry. ‘Phe impregnated pap urvied in uw vial filled with water; phosphorus will not b water, but will ignite when it dries, 63) Another « is suiv carbide capsules. Sodium is placed i in apsule and a quantity of cal in another and dropped into water near combustible terials. When the capsules dissolve, the xo will ignite on the water's surface and, in turn, ignite the acetylene yas produced by calcium carbide and water. The resulting seetylene flame will ignite any nearby combustible material. (4) Thermite, which burns at approximately steel, is made by mixing on powder and three parts iron oxide by volume. As thermite ix diffirult. to extinguish, ensily obtained, and produ inteane bel i provides Us it is difficult to ignite and Jenves a reid J. Reference. Adilitionat details regarding ine dinry subotae may be found in FM 19-30. 4-6. (U) Explosive Sabotage Explosives include any chemical compounds or al mixtures that, triggered by heat or shock, ergo sudden chemical change (decomposition) liberating, at high speed, heat and gas which cause tremendous pressures. . Explosives ure employed ngainst esint destruction by other mes destruction must be accomplished instantaneously, or when targets are of such a nature that destruc requires u shearing or shattering fore also be used to kill, maim, or instill fear. explosives hus many disadvantages and_ problems such as introducing the material into aren, the need for technical or speciutized training in their employment, the almost certain investigation resulting from their use, and the consequent tighten- ing of security. +. Classification of Explosives. Explosives ure classified uecording to rates of decomposition as high and low explosives. A high explosive is one in which chemical decomposition occurs within an extremely short period of time; it is said Lo detonate. Low explosives are those in which the decomposition takes place us rapid burning; they are said to deflu- krate. Explosives are also classified according to their inherent sensitivity. An insensitive explosive is one ‘hich requires only normal care in handling or storing. A sensitive explosive must be given special care in handling, storage, or use. Both high and low explosives may be either sensitive or insensitive. a4 CONFIDENFAL ¢. Common Types. different physical states and forms. Nitroglycerine U high explosive, whieh is very sensitive to CENT) is a high velvet ¢ explosive either in block form or gran Niteustareh isn explosive and powdere Explosive mnterinls exist, siti penrance of ordinary ul Bigs wn very per and is a lemon: sition G-series which have un appearance similar to that of putty, ure the ideal all-around subotage crinl. Black powder is a low o extreme sensitivity to heut and friction. Nipolit is an ins ive high explosive, and is a plasti which ean be pressed into any desired shape, machined of enst, or formed into a one-piece bomb without casting. Additional details on explosive sabotage methods are included in FM 19-30. 4-1. (U) Mechanical Sabotage al subotage whi s of explosive or materials full within the category of mechunical sabotage. This type of sabotuge is one of the most difficult. to prevent and the ensiest. Wo perpetrate Mechanical sabotage is used in military operations, but most atincks are directed against. transportation and industria! fueilities, 5. Mechanical sabotage can be grouped into the following basic clussifieations, u detailed discussion of which is found in FM 19-30. . (1) Breakaye ean be directed equipment and machinery. (2) Abrasives can be introduced into lubricants and fuels to cause undue wear in motors, generators, or moving parts. (3) Acts of omission are those perpetrated through willful failure to aet, thereby causing damage through neglect. (4) Substitution is performed by replacing good with faulty materials, changing direction of ship- ments, or altering important points of information. (5) Contamination is the introduction of sub- stances into muteriuls for the purpose of rendering] the materials impure or injurious. A relatively ne} process of contamination is metal embrittlement, Embrittlement occurs when a prepured formula is placed or rubbed on the ferrous or nonferrous metal parts of the target item. When the metal part) is stressed under tension—usually by mechanical] meons—the pores in the metal are temporarily} opened. The formula then seeps into the pores und} begins a rapid disintegration of the internal struc ture of the metal, resulting in extensive cracking and eventual total breakage of the item. | st delicate mye | CONFIDENTIAL i4-8, (U) Countersabotage Measures ‘That part of the counterintelligence mission which directs ‘the detection, prevention, or neutralization” of sabotage requires a comprehensive program in- cluding defensive measures and aggressive offensive action. a. Detection of sabotage depends on thorough in- vestigntion of individual and incident complaint cases in which saboinge is alleged or suspected. b. Prevention of sabotage is achieved through, rigorous application of personnel security procedures, FM 30-174, and establishment and enforcement of high standards of installation security ¢. Neutralization of the snboteur or sabotage orgunization before sabotage is attempted ix the most difficult part of countersabotage operations and depends on penetration of sabotage, partisan, or other dissident groups to determine sabotage plans and identify saboteurs, methods of operations, and specific targets. No single measure or type of uctivity will provide adequate protection from the threat of sabotage. , “CONPIDENTHAE “3FM 30-174 CONFIDENTIAL Section Il. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS. 7-2. (U) General Standard counterintelligenee practices and proce- conducting counterintell operations. Sundurd practices und procedures only in degree and emphasis. Counterintell of stability: specinl operat 2 -CONPIDENTHAECONFIDENTIAL FM 30-174 CHAPTER 8 TACTICAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE—-DATA BASE Section |. FILES, INDICES AND ANALYSES 8-1. (U) General ‘a. Effective counterintelligence operations ure frequently dependent on the quality and complete- ect of files, indices, and the analyses of these files vid indices. This chapter discusses files, indices and “inalyses at the tactival level during. an insurgency: however, with slight modifieation, this information applicable «1 all Tavele of command, and in all intensities of warfare 8. Files and indices, after proper anulysi yield insurgent indicators (FM 30-5 and FM 30-31), and generate a useful data base from wi ‘ich target. nmmendations, populace and resources contrel dnt inp security Fe ‘elligence specinl operations, & ¢. Counterintelligence files provide the counterin- telliggen Lowith an expedient reference date hase from which can be drawn accurate, timely information for use in both short- and long-range counterintelligence operations. Additionally, these will provide n measure of continuity © pern- tions and climinate the possibility that element per- sonnel will waste time und effort on activities and methods attempted or rejected during previ ‘will also provide a menns for ¢ Grienting newly assigned personnel, One warning, however, must_be bore constantly in mind. ‘Too h information is offen as confusing as too Tittle. Good files are asly sereened ins order Wo evant, material. tina eliminate obsolete or irr From this data base, the counterintelligence clement. enn recommend tactical interreption, cordon + is, maids and searehes, popul tion and resonrees contrat measures, border security menses, und other tactical operations to the commander. and search opera CONFIBDEN THA a4FM 30-174 CONFIDENTIAL 8-3. (U) Cross-Referencing rapidly into subdivision A while the subilivision igure 8-19 graphically shows the crow refereneine raope in B will be forced to stop at boundary AB if tiles. If the information cantained in # file cannot ‘The insurgents, since they. are still in, heir awn sui Tre fonned, then the file is worthless, ‘This figure any Sill be uenr familiar eaches and rest wreus. aa vsmueaystem for each eekelm “The sole Jon woutkd be close cooperation between the suggests ne and each combat. environment must devise Hy owt visions A and B as long as the insurgent ystem to fib its own newbs chooses to maintain subdivision CG. In addition, the insurgents: Idivisional boundaries reflect his ne 8-4, (U) Use of Files where he ferls strongest. 1 Connterintelligence files have many vari depicted in figure 8-20. Busienlly, thes nid lo further collection and/or to ta tion for support. of the tuetical com T ehe unit’s mission, ‘To fully illustrate the 68 Information could be vital in an analysis of wdminis- trative and pacification roles to be taken by the loxt Kove . b. Enemy Control. “The host govern for luck of it, is an indicator as to how m Us pr ise of the foregoing files, the following, samples are trol the host government exercises in an aren furnished: The absence of host government tax offices, schooks, _ Bnemy Boundaries. Wnsurgents frequently have police departments, hospitals, am elections in areas : different political atl jurisietionnl boundaries thaw sentive of insurgent control. ‘This information ‘ The host government. A data base that does not ine be obtained fr STMAP where (lieate these different boundaries will be incomplete maargent-and host country agencies are nmap plotted, (han allowing insurgent exploitation of the bounds enemy Initiated Incidents. ‘The political SUP fies, und x distortion of the insurgent infrastruc MAP ean form a nucleus for analysis of enemy ink Nantayge vo the insurgent could — tated incidents Kuch abduction, bombin if the hunt government employs regional — Hon oF other such Rond'AOs. For example, the host analyst, however, should not jump jons A and Boas di ut should analyze such a be tactic nilitary forces vormment has two stbdiv Fieted in figure S-21 hile Une insurgent sub vi of such activity could incan ; ve verlape the two. In this instance, the insurgents Control or it coukd mean he ne 09 ‘ fan attack a target in subdivision Bo and move Nemely, a high incident rate may’ indi k Av THE EHD OF A 30-08Y TRANSFERRED TO A FILE FOLDER woes #6 STORED tm EHROMOLOGICAL ORDER COVERING PREVIOUS PERIODS. Figure 8-17 (U), Incident files (U).(CLasstFiearitu) FM 30-174 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S Loc (An 220-348 & Pe 108-5) PATLGERIA ae Cl SECTILN, 2332 MID. PERIOD COVERED. mea 207H DIVISION 0COl iF iy &4 [2400 J 2 tay A [ 26 {2330 2035 fH Tm A vie rudio: Radio station vic UT G2, Ca Notified. Lav 365402 searched. ‘12 Ibs docts uncovered. | i eee 27 (12340 2045 | FM Div G2 via Lf: &, lst Be reported arnt Tm D instr to luv ed civ captured en route to Pu cage. Brocecd to THC. 28 2355 | 2400 | FX Tm B via radio: Circle Trigon Party ‘Tm F ordered to |Liv official disclosed loc of conzesled encny op records in cave at UM 370622. docts to CP & - ” cont intg of Crp 7 oe fe ~ | official, Ineius A. Valliant, $/a, 2322 MI Det DA FoR 1594 (CLASSIFIcaTICN) Figure 81811), CF jo 8-19FM 30-174 insurgent is employing terrorism te consolidate bi control over contested areas. Basically, incidents de “The key is interpretation. WL. Organizational Files. Organizational lies, te fine ane block charts, are useful analytical tools for establish Wy subordination and L-developed, complicated line and Diack chart allows the analyst to draw certain cone ‘clusions about the insurgent, for example, his or Fatonal and niimerical strength, particularly Jn urens of low amifitary ane ty. New organizations might reflect a Additional imissions assigned to that subdivision: Deletions of old organizations, and consolidations of existing organizations could surgent ix Deing hurt, cither in this subdivision oF in others, oF un he ix streamlining these organizations ing who is stub Taye a meanin includ stron it could Tor a new mission, By also analy dinate to whom, it will be ensier Wo establish pri for targeting ngninst the organization or individuals within it. or? CC SEIEEEOE’”SZ = lhl TS —GoNFIDEN FAL fe. Other Uses. Money and foot are important be insurgent. Map plots of taxation points or food of insurgent uh therefore, ix limited only by the porson making th the information contained therein.FM 30-174, Section Il. PATTERN ANALYSIS 8-6. (U) General Because human beings have certain needs and habits, the insurgent’s activities, movement and locations, may be analyzed through pattern analysis. Counter- intelligence personnel should be aware of these methods in case of employment in support of stability operations, 8-7. (U) Area of Operations An analysis of the insurgent should first begin with the “aren-of-eperation” study. This study should yield descriptive facts about the area, a discussion on how they influence certain fnetors selected for their importance in developing courses of actions, nnd conslusions on how the influenced factors affect possible courses of neti 8-9. (U) Terrain Analysis In effect, the above analysis leads into w purallel analysis which can be furnished to the tactical cominander. Terrain needs to be factually described for its effect. on insurgent and on counterinsurgent. If certain terrain features ure best suited for insurgent basing areas, then the counterinsurgent should consider all terrain of this type as key terrain, ‘Th same principle applies to avenues of approuch whic are logically, in an insurgency, avenues of movement since an insurgent band tends to retrace its previous movement. CONTIDENTHAE 8-27ion ity ent ned ing in ork, ‘ort ties the ble ort nly nts on nts CONFIDENTIAL FM 30-174 APPENDIX A REFERENCES AR 380-series AR 381-series ‘AR 405-10 AR 716-2 DA Pam 310-series DA Pom 381-series (DIT 53 \ 6) DIAL (8) DIAM 58-1 (8) DIAM 58-11 FM 19-30 FM 19-40 FM 21-76 FM 30-15 FM 30-16 FM 30-17 (S) FM 30-18, FM 30-31 FM 31-73 (C) FM 32-5 FM 33-1 FM 100-series FM 101-series TB (PMG series) TC 3-16 TOE 30-series Military Intelligence. - ‘Acquisition of Real Property and Interest Therein. Materiel Management for Using Units, Support Units, and Instalistions. Indices, as appropriate. Intelligence, Security, and Related Subjects. Defense Intelligence Agency Instructions (U). Defense Intelligence Agency Instructions, Intelligence: Acq Defense Intelligence Acquisition Manual (U). Defense Human Resources Intelligence Collection Management Manual (U) Vol I, Human Resources Collection System Management. Vol IT, Controlled ITUMIN'T Collection Operational Planning and Tradecratt, Physical Security. Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees. Survival, Evasion, and Escape. Intelligence Interrogation. ‘Techniesl Intelligence. Counterintelligence Operations. Intelligence Collection Operations Intelligence Corps, WSA (U). Stability Operations-Intelligence. ‘Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations. Signal Security (SIGSEC) (U) Psychological Operations—US Army Doctrine. Field Service Regulations. Staff Officers. Provost Marshal General. Employment of Riot Control Agents, Flame, Smoke, Plant Agents, end Personnel Detectors in Counterguerrilla Operations. Military Intelligence. tion (ISR) (U)- (Note, For additional references, see FM 30-17.SONFIBENTIAL APPENDIX B (SG) HOSTILE ESPIONAGE ORGANIZATION AND METHODS OF OPERATION FM 30-174, a ., Introduction Basie methods of expionage have not. varied signifienntly in the past except as technological developin sation and modification of these methods. Regardless of the sponsoring country, certain factors or principles Inve contributed ta successful expion ‘The purpose of this appendix ix to nnplify trine on espionage contained in chapter 2 by pre: ing additional information on espionage organi ee shave permitted the sophist tal methods of eperation Vomntties with many years of experionee in worldwide espionnge have achieved a high degree of professionalism in their intelligence porsonnel. Stall and operational personne! are enrefully selected after Hharovgeh investigation with max spbnsis on politieal loyalty. Intelligence may bo w lifetime pro- fession, barring purges, and there is a grout deal of spocinlization, Intelligences personnel are well ne qininted with th economies, nnd polities of thei Frequently, they spend time in the target. country for area familintizns Lion prior to enygnging in espionage operations. target countries AUInived states constitartionnl liberties lave be studied in detail, and hostile intelligence onanizn Gons take full advantage of our frecdoms of speech, self-chosen purwuits of edu tho freedom of internal and external travel, 1 absence of censorship of communi B-2. Operational Controls ©)in operations in the field, three fundamental tional control procedures are usually ¢ hostile intelligence organizations. ‘These emphasize the concern for operational scenrity ow zntion and professions, pd the eporn- ed by pntrols, B+Fra 30-17 B-3. Types of Operations Qifostile intelligence operations abroad may be referred to us cither legal or Mogal. ‘This distinetion hus nothing to do with tho legality of espionage: rather it refers to tho statusiof the personnel involved in such operations. (Phe logal operation makes use of logul represchtations such as an embassy, consulate, trade or cultural mission, oxchange group, or econom organization as cover for the hostile intelligence porsonnel. As a member of such a legal representation, ono the target country with official status, sanctioned by the host government. (ayn a legal operation, hostile intelligence personnel ‘may enjoy the privilege of diplomatic im- munity; they are not subject to search, arrest, oF prosceution for their unlawful activities. AL best, they ean be declareit persona non grata and asked wo Teuve the country. : (6GPhe logal operation, particularly when controlled from diplomatic representations, has rela~ lively secure communications with the heudquarte in tho home country through uso of tho diplomatic pouch, Communications is a prime problem for agents and this method offers a good solu CONFIDENTIAL a pulse ps Ie ins been stated Unt requirements hy the collee (UP Stent, in avert collectios y severnl 1.5 90 percent of their intelli nygninst the US can be fulfilled the of maternal openly available. o Wostite intel ors fr be CONFIDENTIALB-4. Types of Agents and Agent Systems (Lyin conducting espionnge operations, hostile intel- ligence uses several types of agents and agent systems: of? The individual agent system involves the in- tellzence collection efforts of one person. ‘The intel- figence collector operates alone, with direct chin- destine communication with intelligence in the home country (vin radio, courier, of personal contuct). He may have support agents such as radio operators or courier xystem, or both; however, only one per- son docs the collecting. An individual agent may be any one of the xeveral categories of agents, as follows: (Penetration agents. These agents have direct uceess ‘to information of n military, political, ec: i OF comnterintelligence nature, recruited ayents, Mass recruited agents are low-level, poorly trained agents who are infiltrated into target countries in large numbers whenever favorable opportunities oxist. ‘They are infiltrated among refugee streams, repatrinted prisor ons of war, displaced persons, and linecrossors. ‘They ro assigned low-level missions, such as the colle: fion of military unit identification, movements of militury equipment and weapons, and troop innnen- ver netivitics. The hostile intelligence services: have little difficulty in recruiting them. The of a few not really constitute much of an operational loss sinee quantity, rather than quali is w major consideration in these operations. fusion and provocation ayents. Sone Mo Agents are instructed to fabriente long and letniled stories of contact with hostile intelligence, ‘Tho hope is to lure target country counterintelligence into recruiting those agents or dissipating its efforts useless investigation. Othe: may carry Pabricated Mets containing seemingly important duta concerning the home country for the purpose of isdireeting countorintelligence. Prov- nn agents ure axed to provoke Lirgel country into some course of ne- Won which will be to their disadvantage and to the of the sponsoring eon mp mt may he instructed to contnet a target untry intelligence: agency and denounce a publie olficinl as being an informant of hostile intelligence, A false demumeintion of this type could result in lengthy investigation of the offi ial concerned and possibly organizational upheavals. (QU Btecper agente, Sleopor agente may ho in filtrated into the target country or recruited fron umong local residents. They remain inactive unt the sponsoring intelligence servien has a specili For e: mision for them to perform. Sleeper agents, for the ater part, cost othing, and some have the FM 30-174 potential of developing into high-level, well-concealed agents. B-3FM 30-174 SONFIDEN FAL B-5. Multiple Coverage ayMore dian one expionaze system from the xs ifferent intelligence cies may be used srrentty ty operale a same lirgel. oF projeet. ‘They may opernte hither nnd may not know of ea Une possibility that Huained, Purthe from the different nets can be compared in order Wo submit 2 more complete” nnd necurate evaluation, us well as to reorient the effort when necessary. 1 B-6. Agent Recruitment QBsvionnse pra ally include at least » three-phase hex phases ure spotting, analysis or study, and the appronch. Oe miust locate individuals who be induced or coerced into accepting recruitment, phasis is naturally phiced on persons who have neces: to information sought, or on persons who inserted into positions of access. are sought— managers, edluentons, and others, How- and the lower pmtion obtain military of ever, the unsehool military ranks, ©. conler personnel, are Ierati serve fe sourens and also .seful purposes as expionage agents. A secretary, lypist, or a message center clerk: may have access to highly sensitive ation which would make bi| | | here are many Bo . Agent Motivation motivations used in recruiting agents. OF these, three nre exploited most frequently by De intelligence agencies: 1 toward "a eteatamy. Preference ix given tw the ideolo reenhit; thal is, the one favorably dispose home country oF its national theories. ‘This type of person generally is the most relinble, for he works with politienl convietit al, perseverance, and complete adhere structions; he is "Pron willing to make many pervonal sacrifices, temuneration. Hostile intelligence hns reeruited ndividuals on the basis of _ moreenary: Some mercenaries offer to sell information. ce, and others are recruited after having heen spotted by hostile intelligence repre- sentatives in Lhe target country. Cf} Walk-ins” may have large zambl they mny have wild spending procliviti may be motivated simply by greed. Generally, their ntentions are to sell information to the hostile ntelligence xervice or to any buyer on a short-term basis, Hostile intelligence may be quick to take advantage of these exploitation opportunities; and as son as possible they develop leverage factors to foree i informants’ contin tender tw the hostile ser 1 canperntion. (2{}Lostile intel!izence is continuously on the lookout for individwils with financial difficulties or ather personal problems. Excessive gaumblens, holies, and irresponsible spenders in Ure Army are: among the favored recruitinent targets. Attractive Tomales are often used to induce soldiers to spend money freely nnd excessively. Sometimes fe esful in persuading the soldiers Wo provide oney, an “eusy” means for them to indulgences. Initinl requests are climes eamoutlaged by false claims that the rmation ix for some national cause, sstiLute, or friendly country. ‘Phe innocent requests then develop into demands, with the revelation that hostile intelligence hus been the “er of information already: provided. info continae A Pressure. ‘The instances in which hostile intelli gence serviers have reeraited by pressure tactics FM 30-174. tire innumerable. Despite the fact that many indi- ‘duals have reported pressure recruitment xp- pronches and ae espionage, pressure treties ave been used! with x great deal of success, The tae ¥y take numerous forms their effectiveness depends upon the extent to whi various types of acts have been tolerated in the untries. "hreats to expose past or current criminal hich have not come to the altention of employers or law enforcement agencies. ‘The eriminnl Sets may involve anything from blnck-marketing U theft, smuggling, extortion, dope peddling, sexual frimes, and even murder, In_ some eases, hostile intelligence has induced individuals to commit or participate in eriminal nets, the sole purpose being to develop presure points which ean be applied in forcing, them to engnge in expionnge. ‘abstain of character weaknesses anit indiseretions. ‘These frail holism, drug addiction, adultery, of sexunl perver- on. Female agents are used to hn soldiers into illiegt sexual nffains, and homosexual agents are plnead in contact with Army homosexuals, ‘The soldiers are then confronted with photographs of the sets, with threats to send prints to wives, snperior officers, of government. officinls, wnless they eo Lo cooperate. Because of the many control problems presented by drug users, humtile intelligence Nerviees are not expected to exploit a drug nddiet exeepL on a one-time-busis proposition, Weeploitation of prisoners ank prisoners af war, ‘There have been exes where political prisoners were offered) carly release, provided they ign Rereements to work as agents, ‘The sune is true Of prisoners of war, who are offered carly repatrintion or who are threatened with nonrepatrintion, the condition being that they work ax agents after release. Another technique is to threaten the prisoner of war with tort death unles: thay heeome informers, One in be applied Ws force the ml involvement in might involve uleo- (aQVecploitation of family tier. Aetive ngents Uy recruiting. Unedr eles considerable adled oF pressured ‘This can bo impunity, beeause to expose the recruiter-relative to the Many agents have been recruited thi Uo first degeco relatives living in the home country of the hostile intelligence service. ‘Threats muy entail confixention of property, imprisonment, in carceration in slave labor camps, torture, and even death. A varintion is the promise to allow relatives la emigente ty the West, provided that the subject grees to cooperate. Presurn recrnitihents through relntives. GONFIDENTIAT. Bs