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FM 30-17

Copy 2 FIELD MANUAL

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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

OPERATIONS

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hEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE A^RMY

IANUARY1972
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 ;Popy 2 *FM 30-17

VlANUAL \
Field Manual HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
-17
No. 30-1 ) Washington, DC, 2U January 1972

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Paragraph Pase
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1-1—1-6 1-1
2. ORGANZATION AND EMPLOYMENT
Section I. General 2-1—2-3 2-1
II. CONUS and theaters of operation 2-4—2-7 2-1
III. Military intelligence group (Counterintelli-
gence) ASCOM 2-8—2-13 2-4
CHAFTES 3. INVESTIGATIVE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Section I. General 3-1—3—4 3-1
II. Obtaining evidence 3-6—3-11 3-2
III. The sworn statement 3-12—3-28 3-8
CHAPTER 4. BASIC INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES
Section I. Introduction 4-1—4-3 4-1
II. Records examination 4—4—4-6 4-2
III. Interviews 4-7—4-15 4-6
IV. Interrogations 4-16—4-18 4-12
V. Elicitation 4-19—4-22 4-14
VI. Surveillance 4-23—4-30 4-15
VII. Collection and handling of physical evidence .. 4-31—4-35 4—27
VIII. The special agent as a witness 4-36—4-38 4-30
IX. Special situations 4-39—4-40 4-32
CHAPTER 6. TECHNICAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES
Section I. General 5-1—6-2 5-1
II. Audio surveillance 5-3—6-5 6-2
III. Surreptitious entry and Investigative photo-
graphy 5-6—5-9 5-5
IV. False documentation and secret writing 5-10—5-11 5-7
V. The polygraph 5-12—5-20 5-8
CHAPTER 6. SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Section I. General 6-1—6-2 6-1
II. Human sources 6-3—6-5 6-1
III. Documentary sources 6-6—6-9 6-2
IV. Technical/materiel sources 6-10—6-11 6-3
V. Liaison 6-12—6-15 6-3
CHAPTER 7. INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS
Section I. Introduction 7-1—7-4 7-1
II. Purpose and use of counterintelligence
investigative reports 7-5—7-11 7-2
CHAPTER 8. PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTI-
GATIONS
Section I. General • 8-1—8-2 8-1
II. Conduct of background investigations 8-3—8-19 8-1
Chapter 9. COMPLAINT TYPE INVESTIGATIONS
Section I. General- 9-1—9-4 9-1
II. Sabotage investigations 9-5—9-7 9-2
III. Espionage investigations 9-8—9-12 9-3
IV. Treason investigations 9-13—9-16 9-6

*Thi» manual supcriedui FM 30-17, 28 February 1968.

The Pentagon Library
Rm 1A518, Pentagon
Washington, DjQ. 20310
 Paragraph Page
Section V. Sedition investigations 9-17—9-21 9-6
VI. Subversive activity and disaffection
investigations 9-22—9-24 9-7
CHAPTER 10. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEYS
AND INSPECTIONS
Section I. Counterintelligence surveys 10-1—10-2 10-1
II. Preparation for counterintelligence surveys . - 10-3—10-5 10-2
III. Conduct of counterintelligence surveys 10-6—10-13 10-3
IV. Counterintelligence inspections 10-14—10-16 10-7
V. Reports of counterintelligence surveys and
inspections 10-17—10-18 10-9
VI. Security education 10-19—10-22 10-9
CHAPTER 11. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TECHNICAL
SURVEYS AND INSPECTIONS
Section I. General 11-1—11-2 11-1
II. Conduct of counterintelligence technical sur-
veys and inspections 11-3—11-8 11-2
Chapter 12. CONVENTIONAL COMBAT OPERATIONS
Section I. Introduction 12-1—12-2 12-1
II. Functions 12-3—12-6 12-1
III. Planning and conduct of operations 12-17—12-14 12—4
IV. Tactical support operations 12-15—12-16 12-12
CHAPTER 13. STABILITY OPERATIONS
Section I. Introduction 13-1—13-2 13-1
II. Counterintelligence operations - 13-3—13-7 13-2
III. Operational techniques and procedures 13-8—13-14 13-6
CHAPTER 14. INTERRELATIONSHIPS
Section I. Introduction 14—1 14-1
II. Relationship with civil affairs 14-2—14-9 14-1
III. Relationship with military police 14-10—14-12 14-3
IV. Relationship with psychological operations .. 14—13—14-14 14-4
V. Relationship to other intelligence elements ___ 14-15 14-4
APPENDIX A. REFERENCES A-l
B. INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS B-l
C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SERVICES
REPORTS C-l
D. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEY
CHECKLIST D-l
E. NARCOTIC AND DRUG ABUSE GUIDE E-l
Index ' Index-1
 FM 30-17

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1—1. Purpose and Scope synonymous and include officers with MOS Code
a. This manual provides operational guidance 9666—Counterintelligence Officer, warrant
for Army counterintelligence personnel and out- officers with MOS Code 971A—Counterintel-
lines standard investigative procedures for em- ligence Technician, enlisted men with MOS Code
97B—Counterintelligence Agent and DA civilians
ployment by counterintelligence elements and
units of the United States Army. who have been accredited as Special Agents by
the Chief of Personnel Operations, Department
b. This manual includes a general orientation of the Army, and who are assigned to duty for
on several types of counterintelligence elements the performance of counterintelligence functions.
existing within the Army and describes in Accreditation includes issuance of identifying
greater detail the basic techniques and proce- badge and credentials in accordance with AR
dures employed by Army counterintelligence per- 640-20.
sonnel in both peace and wartime situations. Spe-
cific applications of these techniques and proce-
1—3. Scope of Counterintelligence Activities
dures are covered in those chapters which deal
with counterintelligence investigations and ser- The mission of counterintelligence elements and
vices. units is to support the commander through the
detection of treason, espionage, sabotage, sedi-
c. Material in this manual is limited to those
tion, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the
aspects of counterintelligence which are the spe-
prevention and neutralization of espionage and
cific responsibilities and functions of counterin-
sabotage for the protection of the US Army. In
telligence personnel and units in accordance with
the fulfillment of this mission, counterintel-
AR 381-103.
ligence personnel and units engage in a broad
d. The material presented herein is applicable range of operational activities, with direction and
in both nuclear and nonnuclear warfare and in guidance from higher authority, within the areas
chemical, biological, radiological and internal de- of its jurisdiction to include those activities res-
fense environments as well as to peacetime coun- ponsible for—safeguarding defense information;
terintelligence operations. protecting Army functions and property such as
facilities which have classified defense contracts
e. Users of this manual are encouraged to sub- or that have been designated as key defense in-
mit recommended changes or comments to im-
stallations ; conducting personnel security investi-
prove the manual. Comments should be keyed to gations for Army personnel and contractor em-
the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text ployees under the Defense Industrial Security
in which the change is recommended. Reasons
Program ; conducting counterintelligence surveys,
should be provided for each comment to insure services, and inspections ; and conducting investi-
understanding and complete evaluation. Com- gative activities authorized in connection with
ments should be prepared using DA Form 2028 civil disturbances within the United States, the
(Recommended Changes to Publications) and District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
forwarded direct to the Commanding Officer, US Puerto Rico, and the United States territories
Army Combat Developments Command Intellig-
and possessions. Counterintelligence operations
ence Agency, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613. may be divided into the following three catego-
ries:
1—2. Counterintelligence Personnel
a. Counterintelligence Investigations. This op-
As used in this manual, the terms "counterin- erational category constitutes the bulk of the
telligence personnel" and "Special Agents" are counterintelligence workload worldwide, and in-

1-1
 3©— H ^

eludes specific investigations of individuals and c. Status of Forces Agreements. Agreements

incidents which, for the most part, are conducted between the United States and foreign nations in
in an overt but discreet manner. Personnel secur- which US Army units are stationed normally in-
ity investigations (PSI) and complaint-type in- clude clauses delimiting the jurisdiction and
vestigations (CTI) are included in this category. scope of activities of counterintelligence agencies.
Implementing directives within the Army are
b. Counterintelligence Services. This opera-
normally promulgated by the major command di-
tional category encompasses specific security ser-
rectly concerned with the "status of forces agree-
vices provided by counterintelligence personnel
ment."
and units to assist commanders at all echelons in
planning, implementing, and maintaining proper d. DOD Directive 5200.27. This directive is a
and adequate safeguards against the threats of restatement of the limits applied to military
sabotage, espionage, and subversive activity. counterintelligence activities to include those per-
These services include counterintelligence sur- sons or organizations affiliated with the DOD. A
veys and inspections, security education and person, group of persons, or organization is con-
training programs, and technical surveys and sidered to be affiliated with DOD if the individu-
inspections. als involved are:
c. Counterintelligence Special Operations. Spe- (1) Employed by or contracting with DOD
cial operations which are concerned mainly with or any activity under the jurisdiction of DOD,
sophisticated and highly specialized techniques in whether on a full time, part time, or consultative
the areas of counterespionage, countersabotage, basis ;
and countersubversion are discussed in the classi- (2) Members of the Armed Forces on active
fied supplement to this manual, FM 30-17A. duty or National Guard members in a reserve or
retired status;
1—4. Limitations of GoyntecinteBiigemise (3) Residing on, having authorized access to,
Operations or conducting or operating any business or other
The jurisdiction and scope of authorized investi- function at any DOD installation or facility;
gative techniques in counterintelligence opera- (4) Authorized access to defense informa-
tions will vary according to legal considerations, tion ;
operational circumstances, and areas of opera-
tions. The following types of limiting directives (5) Participating in other authorized DOD
may restrict the jurisdiction of counterintel- programs to include persons upon whom investi-
ligence elements and preclude or inhibit employ- gations have been initiated under the following:
ment of certain investigative techniques and pro- (a) AR 230-2—Personnel Policies and
cedures described in this manual: Procedures.
(&) AR 604-20—Security Requirements
a. Delimitations Agreement. AR 381-115 pre- for Personnel in Information and Education Ac-
scribes the Army's counterintelligence investiga- tivities.
tive jurisdiction and its coordinating responsibili- (c) AR 690-1—Civilian Applicant and
ties with respect to the Federal Bureau of Inves- Employee Security Program.
tigation (FBI), Department of Justice; the (rf) AR 930-5—American Red Cross Ser-
Naval Investigative Service (NIS), Department vice Program and Army Utilization.
of the Navy; and the Office of Special Investiga-
(e) DOD Regulation 5220.22R—Industrial
tions (OSI), Department of the Air Force.
Security Regulation.
b. National Security Directives. Operational
(6) Applying for or being considered for any
limitations and coordinating responsibilities for status described above to include applicants for
United States agencies conducting security inves- military service, preinductees, and prospective
tigations or intelligence operations in foreign contractors.
areas are set forth in classified policy directives
issued by the National Security Council. These
directives are normally implemented within the 1— 5. isask [FViiradplIes @0 CauinitfeiräinifeMDgjeifiiGe
Army by operational instructions prepared and ©¡peratfeinis
disseminated by the Office of the Assistant Chief Regardless of the type of operation, or of opera-
of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the tional circumstances, all counterintelligence oper-
Army. ations adhere to certain basic principles :

11—2
 FM 30-17

a. Conformance to Mission. The basic mission the use of additional investigative techniques, by
requires that every counterintelligence operation consulting additional sources of information, and
support the commander, contribute to the secur- by regularly testing the reliability of those
ity of the US Army, and be within the scope of sources which are utilized over an extended pe-
activities prescribed in the mission of counterin- riod of time. Confirmation of small details, which
telligence units and personnel of the US Army. in themselves appear insignificant, is fundamen-
tal to all investigations and will often prove the
b. Avoidance of Publicity. The "golden word of
only reliable means of establishing the true sta-
intelligence is silence." This is an established tus of a person suspected of participation in hos-
principle in all intelligence operations, and one tile intelligence activities. However, reporting of
that is especially applicable to counterintelligence
information to permit initiation of preventative
activities. There will be occasions when it is de- action, when an immediate threat to security ap-
sirable to publicize successfully completed inves- pears probable, should not be delayed pending
tigations of espionage or other activities to deter confirmation.
others from engaging in such activities, or to en-
courage voluntary reporting of information (i.e., e. Offense. One of the most important princi-
publicizing the location where information of ples of counterintelligence operations is a well-
counterintelligence interest may be reported). In planned positive program of offensive actions to
this, however, counterintelligence personnel must thwart actions of the opposition. The neutraliza-
exercise discretion and avoid individual publicity. tion of hostile espionage and subversive organiza-
tions is especially dependent on positive, offensive
c. Objectivity. Counterintelligence elements are actions for success. Offensive counterespionage
primarily factfinding agencies whose purpose is details are discussed in FM 30-17A, the classified
to collect and report factual data upon which res- supplement to this manual.
ponsible commanders may base decisions relative
to the security of their commands. It is absolutely /. Flexibility. Each counterintelligence ele-
essential that counterintelligence operations be ment, from the individual to the largest opera-
planned, executed, and reported in a completely tional unit, must be able to respond immediately
objective manner. The principle of objectivity is and positively to changes in the situation, e.g., a
perhaps most important in the reporting phase of sudden influx of large numbers of refugees or a
operations. All information pertinent to the issue, rapid change from a peacetime to a hostile envi-
whether favorable or unfavorable to an individ- ronment.
ual or organization, whether consistent with or g. Continuity. Continuity of action in counter-
contrary to previously reported information, intelligence investigations is imperative particu-
must be recorded and reported accurately and ob- larly in connection with case control personnel.
jectively. However, important derivative infor- Continuity can be realized only through meticu-
mation, indicators and/or leads must not be over- lous efforts to have detailed results of investiga-
looked or ignored because they are not based on tions properly recorded in official files. The full
factual information at the time. Such leads may status of any investigation at any given time
be confirmed or substantiated in the future, or should be as clear to successors as to those who
may contribute significantly in other ways to the originally obtained or processed the information
successful conclusion of the investigation. collected or received.
d. Confirmation. Regardless of the probable re- h. Coordination. In all counterintelligence in-
liability of the source of any item of counterintel- vestigations and operations, coordination consist-
ligence information, independent confirmation ent with security considerations and the policy of
will always be sought in all counterintelligence the command is maintained with units and agen-
investigations. Confirmation may be achieved by cies having a direct interest.

1-3
 1

+
 FM 30-17

CHAPTER 2

ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT

Section I. GENERAL

2—1. Introduction ence directives and related delimiting policy

directives.
This chapter provides a general orientation on
the organization and employment of counterintel- (4) Counterintelligence mission prescribed
ligence elements. Continuing research and devel- by the supported command which indicates rela-
opment studies and the evolutionary changes in tive emphasis to be given to the various functions
the Army bring about changes in organizational enumerated in AR 381-103 and AR 381-130.
structures. These changes affect tactical counter- (5) Availability of counterintelligence per-
intelligence units more than others; therefore, sonnel, including the availability of qualified lin-
reference to the 30-series TOE for detailed infor- guists in foreign areas.
mation on the current tactical counterintelligence (6) Threat posed by hostile intelligence.
organizations is recommended.
2—3. Employment of Counterintelligence
2—2. Organizational Principles and Personnel
Considerations a. Basic policies governing the employment and
a. Counterintelligence elements are organized utilization of counterintelligence personnel are
in consonance with the principles of organization contained in AR 381-103. Personnel may be em-
described in FM 100-5 and FM 101-5. Organiza- ployed in units which consist almost exclusively
tion along functional lines with maximum inter- of counterintelligence personnel (e.g., military
nal flexibility is essential to insure responsiveness intelligence (MI) groups in CONUS), or they
to changes in operational environments, shifts in may be assigned to intelligence units which con-
emphasis or priorities, and variances in the na- tain other intelligence specialist elements (e.g.,
ture and degree of the threat to the supported MI groups, battalions, or companies assigned to
command. either tactical or nontactical units).
b. Considerations which influence the organiza- b. The specific needs of some nonihtelligence
tion of counterintelligence elements include: units and installations, particularly those respon-
(1) Mission, type, strength, location, geo- sible for weapons or materiel of a classified na-
graphic responsibility, and scope of activities of ture, will sometimes require the assignment of
the supported command. counterintelligence personnel on a permanent
basis. US Army missile commands are examples
(2) Intelligence and counterintelligence esti- of units which include organic counterintel-
mates and studies setting forth the characteris- ligence personnel within their TOE- Details re-
tics of the area of operation. grading the employment of counterintelligence
(3) Intelligence mission assigned to the sup- personnel in assignments of this type are outside
ported command, together with specific intellig- the scope of this manual.

Section II. CONUS AND THEATERS OF OPERATION

2—4. The US Army Intelligence Command the supervision of the Chief of Staff, Department
The US Army Intelligence Command of the Army, is responsible for the tasking and
(USAINTC), Fort Holabird, Maryland, under controlling of all Army CI activities in support of

2-1
FM 30-17

the CONUS-basèd major commands, Puerto Rico Army in CONUS, counterintelligence operations
and the US Virgin Islands on a geographic area consist primarily of security investigations and
basis. USAINTC exercises control office functions services conducted throughout the geographic
for personnel security investigations which origi- area of responsibility. Figure 2-1 illustrates the
nate in United States Army, Europe (USA- organization of the USAINTC with its subordi-
REUR) ; United States Army, Pacific (USAR- nate MI groups. Figure 2-2 is a chart of the func-
PAC) ; United States Army, Alaska (USARAL), tional organization of a typical CONUS MI
and United States Army, Southern Command group. Subordinate elements of the group—re-
(USARSO). It also performs other intelligence- gions, field offices and resident offices—are stra-
counterintelligence functions as assigned by De- tegically located throughout each of the geo-
partment of the Army and makes recommenda- graphic areas of responsibility. The regional
tions to higher and collocated echelons on these office or headquarters is the principal operational
matters. Military Intelligence Groups (CI) are element of most CONUS groups and normally is
assigned to USAINTC as operating elements responsible for a specific geographic area; this
with the mission of providing CI support to all area may correspond to a single political subdivi-
designated US Army operations in specific geo- sion such as a county, or be comprised of multiple
graphic areas. An MI group is collocated with political subdivisions such as a group of counties,
each of the headquarters of CONUS armies and or portions of one or more states.
the Military District of Washington. The area of
responsibility of a MI group normally coincides 2-5. Tactical Counterintelligence Elements
with the geographic area of the Army to which it The concept of integration of all intelligence spe-
is assigned. Because of the Delimitations Agree- cialists at tactical levels is contained in FM 30-9.
ment and the limited intelligence mission of the Assigned to the field army is a MI battalion or

CG
US ARMY
INTEL COMD
"f

DCSPER COMP C-E

DCS! DCSOP DCSLOG OFFICER

AG HQ USAIIC DIR SP DIR OF DIR OF

COMMDT OP INVES INVES REC

109th Ml GP, lllth Ml GP, 112th Ml Gp, USAASD,

(Ft Meade, (Ft Mc Pher- (Ft Sam (Balto., Md )
Md) son, Ga ) Houston, Tx)

115th Ml Gp, 902d Ml GP,

USA FAC 116th Ml GP,
(Presidio of Sari (Falls Church,
(Wash, D C) (Wash , D C )
Francisco,Co) | Va)

Figure 2-t. US Army Intelligence Command.

2-2
 FM 30-17

CO

D(:o

B&F LN

REGION

ADMIN SECURITY SPEC OP SUPPLY FIELD OFFICES

MIL PER Cl SVC CONUS INTEL MAINT RESIDENT OFFICES
PLANS & TNG
COMM
INVES
I
PSI
SPEC INVES
POLYGRAPH
Figure 2-2. Functional organization of type CONUS
MI groups.

group which has subordinate MI units attached accomplished within the area of jurisdiction of
to corps, divisions, and separate brigade-sized the five MI groups in CONUS and, at times, cross
units to provide intelligence support. These units one or more jurisdictional boundaries. Special
contain CI tactical support elements. Military in- Agents of these units will normally notify the ap-
telligence units supporting corps, divisions, and propriate MI groups and/or the senior intellig-
separate brigades/armored cavalry regiments will ence staff officer of the major command of their
move with the supported units when restationed presence in the area and, when permissible, state
or deployed overseas. All tactical intelligence their mission.
units are controlled by the commander of the unit
to which they are attached, with general staff su- 2—7. Theaters of Operation
pervision exercised by the intelligence officer,
S2/G2 or the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intellig- The employment, functions, and operational con-
ence. The CI elements of these units are opera- cept of counterintelligence elements in a theater
tionally restricted to the confines of the military of operations are prescribed in FM 30-9. Coun-
reservation where they are stationed ; however, in terintelligence units must maintain a close work-
CONUS local jurisdictional agreements between ing relationship with other intelligence agencies,
these units and the CONUS MI groups facilitate both civilian and military, with civil affairs and
accomplishment of the mission. with military police elements at all echelons
within the theater in accordance with existing
2-6. Special Counterintelligence Units theater policies. Counterintelligence operations
may be divided into two levels of activity, theater
The Department of Defense, the US Continental army and field army.
Army Command and the US Army Intelligence
Command have assigned counterintelligence per- a. Theater Army. Counterintelligence missions
sonnel and units over which they exercise opera- and activities do vary considerably between the-
tional control. The operations of these units are aters of operation and between peacetime and pe-

2-3
riods of hostilities. Differences are based on the ords facility which will serve all security and in-
number of installations and troop strengths telligence elements of both theater army, and
within a theater, the nature and magnitude of the field army, as well as elements of other US mili-
hostile threat in the area, and the relations and tary services.
agreements with host country and allied govern-
ments. Some situations may require deviations b. Field, Army. The field army is provided coun-
from the general principles of organization and terintelligence support by a CI company organic
control, although deviation is not the normal pro- to the field army MI battalion and by CI elements
cedure. Fundamentally, theater army is a plan- organic to the military intelligence units attached
ning and coordination headquarters that retains to corps, divisions and separate brigade-sized or-
for itself only those functions which cannot be ganizations. However, military intelligence units
accomplished efficiently by lower echelons. The- attached to corps and divisions are controlled by
ater army may delegate the responsibility for the corps and division commanders, respectively,
rear areas to Theater Army Support Command with general staff supervision exercised by the
(TASCOM). The mission of rear area security in- respective G2. The field army has a rear area se-
cludes all aspects of counterintelligence. To ac- curity mission, including all aspects of counterin-
complish the counterintelligence portion of rear telligence, similar to theater army. The CI com-
area security, a MI Group (CI), (sec III), cons- pany assigned to the MI Battalion (Field Army)
isting predominantly of counterintelligence per- normally will have the counterintelligence mis-
sonnel, will be assigned to TASCOM or other res- sion from division rear to the field army rear
ponsible command. To provide area coverage, boundaries. The unit may have several stations
subordinate companies, detachments, or regions strategically located to facilitate control and com-
will be located strategically throughout the area. munication with a number of small mobile teams
Included in this MI Group (CI) is a central rec- working out of each station.

Seelfem) ODD. MDyïAKY HNlïEliyiSEWCI ©IKMJP

(COyMTiiiONTEIlUGEMeii), ß&COVü

2—S. ©©miecgaD (5) Supervising the operation of a central

records facility on personnel of intelligence inter-
a. Mission and Functions. A Military Intellig-
est for TASCOM and other elements within the
ence Group (Counterintelligence) is assigned to
theater army.
the area support command (ASCOM). It provides
counterintelligence specialist support to theater (6) Providing liaison with parallel US, host
army support command (TASCOM) for the se- government, and allied nation intelligence and se-
curity of US personnel and installations within curity activities.
the TASCOM area. The group accomplishes its (7) Exercising control of security investiga-
mission by— tions to include personnel security investigations
(1) Supporting TASCOM, ASCOM, and its (PSI) and complaint-type investigations (CTI).
subordinate area support groups (ASGP) by (8) Supervising and coordinating security
providing specialized assistance in the field of services to include CI surveys and inspections, se-
counterintelligence. curity education and training programs, and
(2) Commanding, controlling, and supervis- technical surveys and inspections.
ing operational, administrative, and logistical (9) Providing CI support for army nuclear
functions of subordinate elements. weapon systems and facilities.
(3) Planning CI operations and activities to (10) Coordinating the allocation of counterin-
achieve maximum security for army units and in- telligence personnel resources, based on ASCOM
stallations within the TASCOM area and to priorities, functional requirements, and disposi-
achieve maximum neutralization of hostile es- tion of army units and hostile elements.
pionage activities. b. Organization. Figure 2-3 depicts the organi-
(4) Exercising centralized control and man- zation of the MI Group (CI), ASCOM.
agement of special operations in the areas of coun-
terespionage, countersabotage, and countersub- 2—9. lF!J)tridi®iras
version within the TASCOM area. a. The MI Group (CI), ASCOM, coordinates its

2-4
 FM 30-17

Ml Gp, Cl

Imagery | MID
HHC Ml Co, CI*
Intpr i Cen Ree Fac

Legend:
i- —->
L _ . j Augmentation, os required
* One per SGP

Figure 2-8. MI Group (CI), ASCOM.

operations through direct liaison with the MI conduct reconnaisssance patrols or other combat
Battalion (Field Army) ; the MI group, theater missions against guerrilla forces.
army; and other services or joint intelligence and
c. The MI Group (CI), assists TASCOM unit
security elements at theater level. This group
commanders in the exercise of their security res-
maintains liaison with intelligence and security
ponsibilities and will conduct interviews, inquir-
services of host governments, allied nations, and
ies and other actions necessary to meet
the United States, as well as with military police
USAINTC requirements on PSI and CTI. This
and civil affairs (CA) units which may be pri-
group will exercise control and management of
mary sources of intelligence information. Host
such investigative activities conducted by its sub-
government agencies may be responsible for
ordinate units. This group also exercises central-
providing information on which to base clearance
ized control and management of personnel secur-
actions on indigenous labor force personnel re-
ity actions. The MI group headquarters depends
quested by a TASCOM unit, depending on perti-
on the theater common-user signal system for
nent status of forces agreements, or other appro-
communication with subordinate elements and on
priate agreements.
the personnel and administration (P&A) battal-
ion, ASCOM, for the production of P&A reports
b. The HQ, MI Group (CI), ASCOM, (fig 2-4)
and the maintenance of P&A records.
is organized and trained to operate against the
hostile clandestine threat. It exercises centralized d. The MI Group (CI), has no imagery inter-
control and management of counterespionage, pretation capability. When an air reconnaissance
countersabotage, and countersubversive opera- and surveillance unit is assigned to ASCOM, a
tions within TASCOM. Further, the group is res- cellular-type (TOE 30-600) MI detachment with
appropriate imagery processing and interpreta-
ponsible for unified planning and operations
tion capabilities can be assigned to the group.
against hostile elements whose activities tran-
scend ASGP boundaries. As a result of these op-
erations, this group can collect intelligence infor- 2-10. Military Intelligence Detachment
mation on guerrilla forces. The MI Group (CI), (Central Records Facility)
ASCOM, is not organized, equipped, or trained to The MI Detachment (Central Records Facility),

2-5
 FM 30-17

Gp HQ

Comd Sec Si Sec S2 S ec S3 Sec S4 Sec

Admin Spt Overt i ai son Gen Sup

Br Coll B Tm

Plans 8> Tech Spt Intel Sup

Msg Cen Br
Tng Br Br Br

Per Br Scty Br Sp Op B Maint Br

Per Scty Instl Scty Counter- Counter- Counter- Source

Tm Tm Sbtg Tm Espg Tm Subv Tm Admin Tm

Figure 2-U. HQ, MI Group (CI).

(fig 2-5) maintains files on personnel of intellig- b. Opening new dossiers and updating existing
ence interest to theater army and provides direct dossiers with incoming reports.
support (DS) to theater army intelligence units.
The detachment performs its mission by— c. Maintaining a central index and a dossier
file.
a. Receiving, screening, extracting, and filing
reports from detachments of the MI Group (CI), d. Responding to queries from within the group
and other intelligence units of the theater and and from other theater army intelligence units,
field armies. conducting file searches and providing support to

Ml Det
Cen Ree Foc

HQ Def Dossier Serv ice

File Sec
Sec Sec

Figure 2-5. MI Detachment (Central Records Facility).

2-6
 FM 30-17

counterespionage, countersabotage, and counter-

subversive operations.
Ml Co,
e. Maintaining operational files for the MI CI
Group (CI).

2-11. Functions
The MI Detachment (Central Records Facility),
normally is in the immediate vicinity of the MI HQ Sec Op Pit HQ Field Ofc
Tm
Group headquarters and depends on the head-
quarters for its administrative communication
and logistical support. The detachment operates
under the direct supervision of the group S3. It
maintains its own message center and teletype
terminal and provides its own control of classified Per Scty Instl Scty Sp Op
Sec Sec Sec
documents.

2-12. Military Intelligence Company

(Counterintelligence) Figure 2-6. MI Company (CI).
The Military Intelligence Company (Counterin-
telligence), (fig 2-6) conducts operations that for administrative support. It provides security
will enhance personnel and installation security support for ASGP and army units or facilities lo-
of US personnel and facilities in the ASGP area cated within the ASGP area. Subordinate ele-
of responsibility and reduce the hostile clandes- ments of the company are located within the
tine threat thereto. The company accomplishes its ASGP area at locations that facilitate counterin-
mission by— telligence operations. The disposition of person-
nel resources is based on requirements of the MI
a. Assisting in the screening of indigenous per-
Group (CI) and the ASGP.
sonnel for intelligence operational leads and for
suspected dissidents. b. The company is in the immediate vicinity of
ASGP headquarters. The MI Company (CI) de-
b. Conducting CI surveys, inspections, and
pends on ASGP for normal combat service sup-
technical inspections.
port. It operates under the staff supervision of
c. Conducting counterespionage, countersabo- the Assistant Chief of Staff for Security, Plans,
tage, and countersubversive operations. and Operations in developing the command's se-
curity program. The Assistant Chief of Staff for
d. Processing requests for clearance of indige-
Security, Plans, and Operations levies require-
nous labor force personnel.
ments directly on the company. He also deter-
e. Assisting ASGP in security education pro- mines requirements for interrogation personnel
grams. or other MI specialist support and directs the uti-
lization of such assets when they ar provided.
f. Conducting interviews, record checks, and
Unit requests for CI surveys, inspections, and
other investigative activities in response to re-
technical inspections go to ASGP for approval
quirements of PSI and CTI.
and designation of priorities for accomplishment
by the company. Resulting reports go directly to
2-13. Functions
the requesting unit with information copies to
a. The MI Company (CI), is attached to ASGP ASGP.

2-7
 FM 30-17

CHAPTER 3

INVESTIGATIVE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Section I. GENERAL

3—1. Introduction solution of any issue of concern. Evidence may in-

clude the testimony of witnesses, documents, ob-
a. Although only a small percentage of coun-
jects, photographs, and sound and video record-
terintelligence investigations will result in the
ings as well as the results of scientific tests.
prosecution of an offender before any type of
court, investigations should be conducted with an b. Normally, only evidence that has been law-
awareness of the principles of law and the rules fully obtained is admissible in courts. "Lawfully
of evidence which govern the prosecution of any obtained" means obtained in accordance with the
criminal activity. The majority of counterintel- legal principles of the jurisdiction concerned. Ev-
ligence investigations, particularly personnel se- idence which is admissible in a court proceeding
cur.Ly investigations, usually require only admin- is always preferred in an administrative hearing
istrative actions, in which the actual legal re- as well, because of the greater weight logically
quirements regarding evidence are much less accorded it by reasonable men. The normal job of
stringent than in the case of court proceedings. It the Special Agent is to conclude his investigation
is nevertheless essential that counterintelligence with all his evidence having been lawfully ob-
personnel have a basic understanding of the legal tained and admissible in court, and therefore in
principles and procedures involved in conducting any board.
an investigation, for at least three reasons :
(1) To be able to apply them in cases where 3—3. Criminal Offenses
they are strictly applicable ; a. A "criminal offense" or "crime" is generally
(2) To be guided by them in cases not fore- defined as a violation of penal law. In the United
seen, but where there is no time to seek specific States, penal law is largely statutory in form.
guidance or assistance ; and The statute prescribing a criminal offense will
usually include in some detail the acts or omis-
(3) To be able to recognize those cases where
sions constituting the offense.
specific guidance or assistance must be obtained
prior to proceeding further. b. The responsibility of counterintelligence per-
sonnel for investigating criminal offenses is spec-
b. The legal principles covered in this chapter
ified in paragraph 1-3 above. Chapter 9 further
are designed to aid counterintelligence personnel
discusses these offenses.
in recognizing basic legal problems that might
arise during an investigation and to provide guid- 3—4. Rules of Evidence
ance when evidence is sought from an accused or
suspect. Basic legal principles are applied in spe- a. Every court or board has rules concerning
cific investigative situations; accordingly, coun- the evidence that it will accept. The Manual for
terintelligence personnel should obtain advice Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Rev. Ed.),
from a staff judge advocate or legal officer to be contains the "rules of evidence" in cases before
certain that full consideration is given to recent courts-martial. The "rules of evidence" for fed-
court decisions interpreting statutes and regula- eral and state courts may be found in legal texts
tions. or other published volumes of law. "Rules of Evi-
dence" for administrative boards, however, to
whatever extent they exist, may or may not be
3-2. Evidence
contained in the regulation pursuant to which the
a. In the broadest sense, "evidence" consists of board was established. Most often, AR 15-6 ap-
all matters which are logically relevant to the re- plies, and, as a result, the exclusionary rules of

3-1
FM 30-17

evidence do not apply, necessarily. In their stead ence of evidentiary problems that arise in the
evidence will be accorded weight consistent with course of an investigation. A general explanation
its relevancy and materiality value. of the rules of evidence is contained in the Man-
b. Counterintelligence personnel are not ex- ual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Rev.
pected to be experts on rules of evidence nor need Ed.). Specific questions or problems should be di-
they be. However, they must have sufficient rected to a staff judge advocate or other legal of-
knowledge of these rules to recognize the exist- ficer.

Section II. OBTAINING EVIDENCE

3—5. Introduction should be sought on a continuing basis from a

judge advocate.
This section discusses the constitutional rights of
a suspect or accused person during an investiga- a. Interrogation or Interview of a Subject,
tion and the legal ramifications when obtaining Suspect, or Accused Person.
evidence by means of interviews or interroga- ( 1 ) To enforce the constitutional prohibition
tions, search and seizure, and apprehension. A vi- against psychologically coerced confessions, the
olation of legal principles involved in these Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Court of
means will substantially, if not completely, re- Military Appeals have acted to require Special
duce the chances of a subsequently successful Agents to explain legal rights to all suspects and
criminal prosecution, and could adversely affect accused persons prior to questioning. Failure to
administrative action. give the explanation, even to a suspect who is
himself a lawyer or Special Agent, will result in
3—6. Suspect or Accused Person the exclusion of the interviewee's statements at
any trial. Therefore, prior to beginning any sub-
Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice
ject interview, the Special Agent will inform the
(UCMJ), and the Fifth Amendment to the
individual of the offense of which he is accused or
United States Constitution prohibit the US Gov-
suspected. If the Special Agent is unsure of the
ernment from compelling any person to incrimi-
precise charge, he will explain, as specifically as
nate himself or to answer any question, the an-
possible, the nature of the facts and circum-
swer to which may tend to incriminate him, and
stances which have resulted in the Special
further that he may remain absolutely silent and
Agent's considering the individual to be a sus-
not answer any questions. To be admissible
pect.
against him, a confession or admission of the ac-
cused must be voluntary. A statement obtained (2) If a suspect waives his rights, then the
through any use of coercion (or other unlawful Government must be prepared at trial to prove
influence or inducement) is termed involuntary; beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant un-
physical violence, confinement, and interrogation derstood his rights and chose to waive them vol-
to the point of exhaustion are examples of acts untarily, knowingly, and intelligently. This is a
which may produce involuntary statements. greater burden than merely showing that he was
Courts will use a "reasonable man" test to deter- "read his rights" and did not attempt to assert
mine whether the investigator should have con- them. Whether the Government can sustain this
sidered the individual a suspect and, therefore, burden at trial will depend largely upon the testi-
given an explanation of rights under article 31, mony and written record furnished by the Special
UCMJ. It should be noted, however, that much Agent who conducted the interview.
derogatory information from the point of view of
security suitability or even loyalty is not criminal b. Manner in Which Explanation of Rights Is
in nature; however, the explanation of rights re- To Be Given.
quirements as set forth in AR 381-130 will be ad- (1) The explanation of rights set forth
hered to in those cases required by the control below replaces all previous explanations of legal
office. If the individual appears confused as to his rights, including the customary reading of Arti-
rights or status, the agent should make every cle 31, UCMJ, and the Fifth Amendment to the
reasonable effort to remove the confusion. As the United States Constitution. A mere recitation of
factors that affect a proper warning may be this explanation, however, does not assure that
changed by court decision, appropriate advice subsequent statements by the subject will be ad-

3-2
 FM 30-17

missible in court, as it must be shown that the to stopping the interrogation may be
suspect, in fact, understood his rights. used against you.)
(2) The explanation of rights will not suffice (2) Any statement you make, oral
if delivered in an off-hand or ambiguous manner. or written, may be used as evidence
Nor should the tone of the interrogator's voice against you in the event of a criminal
suggest that the explanation is a meaningless for- trial or administrative proceeding.
mality. It also would be improper for the interro- (3) (a) For military: You have
gator to "play down" the seriousness of the inves- the right to counsult with a lawyer and
tigation or "play up" the benefits of cooperating. to have a lawyer present with you dur-
In short, the interrogator must not, by words, ac- ing questioning. You may hire a lawyer
tions, or tone of voice, attempt to induce the indi- at your own expense, or a military law-
vidual to waive his right to remain silent or his yer will be appointed for you at no ex-
right to counsel. Such action will be denounced by pense to you. He will be a military law-
the courts as overreaching and contrary to the yer of your own selection if he is reason-
purpose of the explanation of rights requirement. ably available. (You have the right to
The same result will occur if the interrogator ac- both a civilian lawyer at your own ex-
cidentally misstates or confuses the provisions of pense and a military lawyer at the gov-
the explanation. Even in a purely administrative ernment's expense. Your military law-
hearing, it will tend to cast Special Agent in a yer will either be someone you choose,
very unfavorable light; this, in turn, could dam- provided he is reasonably available, or
age his own credibility before the board. In addi- someone appointed who is acceptable to
tion, all other evidence offered will become sus- you.)
pect, for besides excluding illegally obtained (b) For civilians: You have the
statements, the courts may reject, and the boards right to consult vñth a lawyer before
are free to reject, any evidence which is not the being asked any questions and to have
logical product of legally obtained statements. the lawyer present with you during
However, tricking, deceiving, or emphasizing the questioning. If you can/not afford a
benefits of cooperating with the government have lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be
not been declared illegal per se. The methods appointed for you.
used must merely be directed toward obtaining a
(4) Even if you decide to answer
voluntary and trustworthy statement and not to-
questions now without a lawyer present
ward vitiating an otherwise proper Article 31
you may stop answering questions at
and fifth amendment explanation of rights.
any time or stop answering questions
c. The Explanation of Rights. The Special until you consult with a lawyer. (You do
Agent will administer the following explanation not have to answer any of my questions.
of rights, making use of the parenthetical expla- You can answer some, and refuse oth-
nation when the suspect appears confused or in ers. You can stop the interrogation
doubt. Any further explanations which are neces- whenever you wish. If you tell me that
sary should be given as well : you do not want to answer any more
Before I ask you any questions, you questions, I will not ask you any more
must understand your rights. You are questions and we will end the interview
accused or suspected of right there.) Also, you may request a
(offense) by/for (facts lawyer at any time during questioning.
supporting offense). d. Explanation of Rights. If the interviewee in-
(1) You have the right to re- dicates that he wishes to consult with counsel for
main absolutely silent. (You do not have any reason, no further attempt to question him
to answer my questions and you do not will be made until he has conferred with counsel,
have to make any statement. Your deci- or has been afforded the opportunity to do so. If
sion to remain silent cannot be held he decides to waive any right, such as his right to
against you. If you decide to speak, but have counsel present at the interrogation or his
later change your mind, you can assert right to remain silent, he will be informed that
this right at that time and the interro- he may reassert the right at any time. Under no
gation will stop immediately. However circumstances will he be questioned until the in-
any statement you may have made prior terrogator is satisfied that the individual under-

3-3
FM 30-17

stands his rights. An effort will be made to have (1) Do you understand that you have the
him sign a "Waiver Certificate" (part I, DA right to have a lawyer of your choice here at this
Form 2820, Statement of Accused or Suspect Per- interrogation to advise and assist you?
son). If the suspect cannot afford a lawyer, the (2) Do you also understand that your right
interrogation cannot resume until he has been to a military counsel means a professional lawyer
furnished with a qualified counsel. If the suspect and not just an officer or military superior?
refuses an appointed counsel, he must have a rea-
sonable basis for that refusal, e.g., obvious incom- (3) Do you understand that the Army will
petency, but he may not arbitrarily declare the provide you with a military lawyer free of
counsel unacceptable. charge ?
(1) Military Suspects. If the individual is (4) Do you understand that you have the
suspected of an offense under the Uniform Code right to remain silent?
of Military Justice, and is himself subject to the (5) Do you understand that if you decide to
Code, he is entitled to be represented by an attor- answer questions that you may stop whenever
ney at government expense, either an Army law- you choose?
yer of his own choice, or if he is not reasonably
(6) Do you understand that anything you
available, any detailed lawyer from the local
say will be made a matter of written record and
JAG office. The suspect may also retain a civilian
can be used against you in a court of law?
lawyer at his own expense. If the suspect re-
quests his own civilian lawyer, the interrogator f. The Waiver.
must allow him the opportunity to retain one be- (1) Evidence that the suspect made a con-
fore continuing the interrogation. The interroga- scious and knowledgeable decision to answer
tor should assist the individual in obtaining ac- questions without a lawyer (or to speak with the
ceptable counsel. The interrogator may not limit assistance of a lawyer) also should be obtained in
the suspect to one telephone call or otherwise in- writing and through the use of the following ap-
terfere in his assertion of his rights to counsel. answering my questions ?
(2) Civilian Suspects. Civilians generally are (a) Do you understand each right that I
not entitled to have counsel provided for them by have just explained?
the armed services. If a civilian suspect demands (5) Do you have any questions about your
an attorney, the interrogator must permit him to rights ?
retain his own counsel. If he has no lawyer, the
(c) Do you want a lawyer to assist you in
interrogator should aid him in obtaining legal
answering my questions.
counsel by providing him with the names and ad-
{d) Do you want to answer my questions
dresses of local agencies that provide legal ser-
without the assistance of a lawyer?
vices. Such organizations as Legal Aid and the
Lawyer's Referral Service are generally listed in (2) Any written waiver should state explic-
local telephone directories. It is to the interroga- ity:
tor's advantage to aid the suspect, for the interro- (a) I (do, do not) want counsel at this
gation can only continue when the suspect is pro- time.
perly represented. All questions about legal rep- (b) I (do, do not) want to make a state-
resentations should be directed to the local Staff ment or answer questions.
Judge Advocate.
g. Halting Interrogation After Waiver Ob-
e. Understanding of Rights. The interrogator tained.
should be prepared to question the suspect about
each right. Whenever possible a verbatim record- (1) If, at any time and for any reason, the
ing of these questions and answers should be suspect indicates in any manner that he does not
made. If this is not possible, the interrogator want to answer any more questions or wants to
should ask the suspect to acknowledge both the see a lawyer, the interrogation should stop imme-
explanation of rights and his understanding of diately. No attempt should be made to persuade
his rights in writing. It is highly desirable to ob- him to change his mind.
tain oral and written acknowledgements. With (2) If the suspect does not want to stop the
evidence of both oral and written acknowledge- interrogation entirely, but chooses to refuse to
ments, the interrogator is well prepared to rebut answer some questions while answering others,
any charge that the suspect did not understand the interrogator is under no obligation to con-
his rights. Appropriate questions are : tinue but should certainly do so in most cases.

3-4
 FM 30-17

However, the interrogator must not end the in- suspicion, report, or good reason to suspect, and
terrogation in a manner calculated to intimidate, it must have been obtained legally. Any evidence
induce, or trick the suspect into answering ques- found as a result of an illegal search or seizure is
tions that he does not care to answer. Under no inadmissible in any civil or military trial and
circumstances should the interrogator ask the might well taint other evidence derived from the
suspect why he decided to reassert his rights. material found, thus precluding further judicial
action.
h. Evidence Obtained Involuntarily From a
Suspect or Accused Person. Article 31 also prohi- b. Legal Search.
bits any use of coercion, unlawful influence, or (1) General.
unlawful inducement in obtaining any other evi- (a) The legality of each search necessarily
dence from a suspect or accused. One general rule depends upon all of the facts in each situation.
is that evidence which requires a suspect to exer- ( b ) A search may be overt or covert.
cise his mental faculties may not be compelled.
Conversely, acts which do not require such exer- (2) Types of legal searches.
cise of the faculties may be compelled provided (а) Search warrant. A search conducted
the means of coercion fall within the limits of in accordance with the authority granted by pro-
fundamental decency and fairness. Each of these per search warrant is lawful. The warrant must
rules is often quite difficult to apply unless guid- be issued from a court having jurisdiction over
ance is obtained from a legal officer or judge ad- the place searched.
vocate. (б) Incident to lawful arrest or apprehen-
sion. A search of an individual's person or the
i. Improper Explanation of Rights. If a suspect clothing he is wearing, and of the property in his
has been interrogated without a proper explana- immediate possession or custody is lawful when
tion of rights, it is possible to cure the defect and conducted as an incident to the lawful apprehen-
proceed after a valid explanation of rights; how- sion of such persons.
ever, he must be told that his previous state- (c) To avoid removal of criminal goods. A
ment(s) cannot be used against him. If the sus- search is lawful when made under circumstances
pect has not been told that his previous state- necessitating the taking of "Immediate Action"
ments cannot be used against him, subsequent ad- to prevent the removal or disposal of property be-
missions might be the result of his belief that his lieved on reasonable grounds to be criminal
earlier admissions were still of use to the Govern- goods.
ment. If the Special Agent does not know (d) Consent search. A search is legal
whether a prior statement was properly obtained, when made with the freely given consent of the
he should give this curative explanation of owner in possession of the property searched.
rights, and he may succeed in producing useful
However, such consent must be the result of a
evidence notwithstanding the irregular procedure knowing and willing waiver of the rights of the
(para 140a, Manual for Courts-Martial, 1969
individual concerned and not the mere peaceful
(Rev. Ed.)).
submission to apparent lawful authority. Circum-
stances may dictate the need to obtain written
3—7. Search and Seizure permission of the owner to avoid later denials
a. Search. The Manual for Courts-Martial and that permission was "freely given." Figure 3—1,
the fourth amendment protect individuals against provides a format which incorporates the legal
"unreasonable searches and seizures of their per- requirements for consent of the owner.
sons, houses, papers and effects" and prescribes (e) United States property.
that this right will not be violated. The fourth 1. A commanding officer having juris-
amendment forms the basis for this right in our diction over the place wherein is situated property
federal, state, and military court systems. An owned or controlled by the United States and
"unlawful search" is one made of a person or of under the control of an armed force may lawfully
his house, papers, or effects without probable authorize the search of such property. It is im-
cause to believe that thereon or therein are lo- material whether or not the property is located
cated certain objects which are subject to lawful in the United States or a foreign country. Such a
seizure. "Probable cause" means evidence from search must also be based upon probable cause.
which a reasonable, prudent, and responsible in- 2. For most purposes, routine personnel
dividual would conclude that an offense has been security investigations and routine investigations
or is being committed; it means more than mere of military or civilian personnel when entering or

3-5
FM 30-17

CONSENT TO SEARCH

DATE:

PLACE :

TIME:

^ Sb , fully understanding
my right to refuse, doo h^ret
hereby voluntarily authorize Special Agent(s)

J-Sl.

to search my ^ /| located (at) (in)

I have been informed of my rightf tg) resist this search under

paragraph 152 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, 1969 (Rev. Ed.) and

under the fourth amendment to the Constitut^on^of the United States

of America. I am also aware that any evidence which is found may be

used against me in a court of law.

E

WITNESS :

Figure 8-1. Consent search form.

leaving military areas are not considered to be 3. If possible, requests for authority to
"searches" but are treated as legitimate adminis- search should be in writing and should state suf-
trative measures. Contraband {e.g., narcotics, ficient factual information to support a conclu-
other illegal goods, etc.) may be seized when dis- sion that an offense has been committed and that
covered during a legitimate administrative certain property used in committing the offense,
inspection by gate guards or other personnel. or obtained as a result of the offense, is located at

3-6
 FM 30-17

or within the place or property to be searched. band as evidence) or an illegal seizure during a
Permission to search should be granted by in- legal search.
dorsement to such request. (2) In any given judicial procedure, the first
c. Search Procedures. The law of search and point of inquiry will be the legality of the search.
seizure must always be related to the actual cir- If it was illegal, there will be no need to go any
cumstances ; the advice of a staff j udge advocate further; only if the search was legal will it be-
or legal officer should be obtained in any doubtful come necessary to determine the legality of the
case. The following procedures however, are seizure.
valid for any search: f. Seizure. If the search is lawful, certain ob-
(1) The Special Agent secures all available jects may be seized and admitted in evidence
evidence that an offense has been committed and against the suspect:
that property relating to the offense is located at (1) Contraband. Property which is prohi-
a specific place. bited by law. Narcotics and untaxed liquor are
(2) The Special Agent submits this evidence examples.
to the person with authority to order a search of (2) Fruits of the crime. Property which has
the place or property. If the place or property is been wrongfully taken or possessed.
located in a civilian community in the United
States, the evidence is submitted to the judge or (3) The tools or means by which the crime
court with authority to issue a search warrant. If was committed.
the place or property is located in a foreign coun- (4) Other evidence of the crime, such as clo-
try, or occupied territory and is owned, used, or thing.
occupied by persons subject to military law or the
law of war, the evidence is submitted to a com- 3—8. Apprehension
manding officer of the US Armed Forces who has
a. "Apprehension" (called "arrest" in many ci-
jurisdiction over personnel subject to military
vilian jurisdiction) is the taking of a person into
law or to the law of war in the place where the
custody. A person has been taken into custody or
property is located. If the place where the prop-
apprehended when his freedom of movement is
erty is owned or controlled by the United States
restricted in any substantial way.
is under the control of an armed force wherever
located, the evidence is submitted to the com- h. Authorized individuals may apprehend per-
manding officer having j urisdiction over the place sons subject to the UCMJ upon reasonable belief
where the property is located. that an offense has been committed and that the
(3) The person with authority to order a person arrested committed the offense. This is ap-
search must find in the evidence probable cause to prehension for probable cause.
believe that the specified place or property con-
c. The authority of the Special Agent to appre-
tains specified objects subject to lawful seizure. If
hend is specified in Article 7, UCMJ ; paragraph
the person finds probable cause, he may then law- 19a, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States,
fully authorize the search.
(Rev. Ed.), and AR 381-103.
(4) Having been so authorized, the Special
Agent may search the specified place or property d. To cause the apprehension of a DOD affili-
for the specified objects. ated civilian suspect, counterintelligence person-
nel must establish liaison with civilian police who
d. Civilian Search Warrants. To obtain a have arrest authority. The basis for arrest by ci-
search warrant from a civilian court, counterin- vilian police will depend on the particular juris-
telligence personnel must establish liaison with diction concerned. In general, civilian police make
local civilian police agencies who are authorized arrests either by a warrant upon a showing of
to request search warrants and perform the probable cause to a magistrate or without a war-
search. rant, but for probable cause, when a felony or
e. Search and Seizure as Separate Factors. misdemeanor is committed or attempted in their
presence, or if a reasonable belief exists that the
( 1 ) It is possible to have a legal seizure dur-
person committed the offense.
ing an illegal search (e.g., the seizure of contra-
band is always legal, although the illegality of e. Incident to a lawful apprehension, the sus-
the search will prevent the use of such contra- pect's person, clothing that he is wearing, and

3-7
FM 30-17

property in his immediate possession or control violates an individual's rights is usually a com-
may be searched. Any weapon or means of escape plex and technical determination. Advice should
may be lawfully seized in addition to those ob- be obtained from the local judge advocate or as
jects specified in 3-70(2). specified by the unit in its SOP. The mere fact
that such an object is not related to the purpose
3—9. Results of Unlawfully Obtained for which the search was undertaken does not
Evidence necessarily make the seizure unlawful.
Evidence unlawfully obtained through any of the
ways covered in this section is inadmissible as ev- 3—11. Authority to Search
idence against the suspect or accused; any other
evidence subsequently obtained as a result of this a. All searches, overt or covert, require prior
evidence is likewise inadmissible. approval from the unit headquarters or as speci-
fied by SOP.
3—10. Unlawful Seizures b. Agent Reports revealing covert searches will
Whether the use of a particular item in evidence be classified at least CONFIDENTIAL.

Section III. THE SWORN STATEMENT

3—12. General no reference to accusations, Article 31, UCMJ, or

the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
In the course of counterintelligence investiga-
tion.
tions, the Special Agent frequently finds it neces-
sary to request a statement from a person who b. In some instances an affiant (or his counsel)
has personal knowledge crucial to an investiga- may prefer to submit his own sworn statement
tion. The best means of making an accurate and following his own format. He may do so, but the
complete record of this information is the sworn Special Agent will endeavor to make certain that
statement. A sworn statement (sometimes called the statement is complete. It is recommended that
an affidavit) is a written statement of facts vol- the Special Agent supply the affiant with the ap-
untarily made by a person competent to be a wit- propriate blank forms for this purpose.
ness who affirms under oath that the contents of
the statement are true. Counterintelligence Spe- 3—14. Uses for Sworn Statements
cial Agents are authorized by Article 136(b),
Sworn statements are requested to help Special
UCMJ, to administer the oath in conjunction
Agents and case control officers to appraise the
with sworn statements taken in the course of
credibility of sources for investigative purposes
their duties.
and to protect the interests of sources and sub-
jects by providing an accurate record of their in-
3—13. Application terview or interrogation. Sworn statements also
a. Special Agents will request sworn state- furnish means of persuading magistrates, US
ments from sources whenever credible derogatory Commissioners, and commanders to authorize
information is given or whenever credible non- searches, apprehensions, or arrests. In addition,
derogatory information which tends to rebut pre- they provide loyalty adjudicators, clearance issu-
viously obtained credible derogatory information ing authorities, and personnel officers with credi-
is given. Special Agents will request sworn state- ble information from which to determine the loy-
ments from subjects, suspects, and accused per- alty and suitability of military and civilian per-
sons whenever such persons are interviewed. Ap- sonnel. On occasion sworn statements are used in
propriate forms are published for this purpose. trials to prove confessions made out of court, to
However, no special form is required to make a refresh a witness recollection, and to assist gov-
sworn statement admissible in evidence, but De- ernment attorneys in impeaching defense wit-
partment of the Army policy requires prepara- nesses or to support government witnesses who
tion of a sworn statement on DA Form 2820 have been accused of telling inconsistent stories.
(Statement by Accused or Suspect Person).
Whenever a Special Agent prepares a sworn 3—15. Contents of a Sworn Statement
statement for a source or witness he will use DA A complete sworn statement normally will con-
Form 2823 (Witness Statement), which contains tain the following information :

3-8
 FM 30-17

a. The name of the person making the state- rights, if the sources offer information which
ment (called the "affiant"), his social security ac- tends to incriminate them. At that time, the in-
count number, military unit, or civilian address. terview will be suspended until a full explanation
of rights has been given and a valid Waiver Cer-
b. The place at which the oath affirming the
tificate (part 1, DA Form 2820) has been ob-
statement was administered (the city and state is
tained.
sufficient).
c. When a witness or informant confesses be-
c. The date the statement was affirmed.
fore he was considered a suspect, the Special
d. An acknowledgment, if appropriate, that a Agent may have to explain in court why no ex-
full explanation of rights was given. planation of rights was administered. His expla-
nation will be satisfactory if he can clearly show
e. Statements, if appropriate, showing that any
that at the time of the confession :
decision not to exercise a legal right was made
with full knowledge of the nature of the suspi- (1) the Special Agent did not suspect the
cion, accusation, or investigation, without any subject of a crime,
coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful induce- (2) the atmosphere in which he was ques-
ment. tioned was not coercive, or
(3) that the confession came as a spontane-
/. An association paragraph (similar to that
ous outburst from the subject.
found in the accompanying Agent Report).
d. Elicitation of information from unsuspecting
g. Relevent probative facts (the body of the
suspects by undercover agents need not be ex-
statement).
posed by the administration of an explanation of
h. A concluding statement (technically the "af- rights as long as such elicitation was not direct
fidavit") by the affiant, supplemented by his ini- questioning of the suspected offense and because
tials at the bottom of each page, acknowledging they normally do not take place in a coercive at-
that he has written, read, or (if blind or illiter- mosphere. However, in cases where it is impor-
ate) heard the statement, understands it, affirms tant to gain competent evidence, the advice of a
it to be true, has approved (by initialing) all judge advocate should be first solicited, as this
corrections, and (if not stated previously) makes area of law is subject to changing technical rules.
the statement freely without hope of benefit or
reward, fear of punishment, and without being 3—17. Waiver of Legal Rights
subject to coercion, unlawful influence, or unlaw-
a. If the subject, suspect, or accused person
ful inducement.
does understand his rights, the Special Agent
i. Signature of the affiant. should then specifically ask him :
j. A statement (technically the "jurat") by the (1) "Do you want counsel?"
official administering the oath attesting that the (2) "Do you consent to being questioned?"
statement was "sworn to and subscribed before
b. If it is desired to obtain competent evidence,
me this day of 19 ,
the person questioned should always complete a
at ".
"Waiver Certificate" (Part 1 of DA Form 2820).
k. Signature of the Special Agent administer- The Special Agent should also establish in the re-
ing the oath. cord of the interview (i.e. through Agent Re-
ports, witnesses, and/or tape recordings) : that
I. Special Agent's authority to administer such
the full explanation of rights was given; that it
oath (Article 136(b), UCMJ).
was understood by the subject, suspect, or ac-
cused person (by his own acknowledgment) ; and
3—16. Explanation of Rights—To Whom that the waiver of a legal right, if any, was made
Given freely, with full knowledge of the charges, the
a. The Constitution and the Uniform Code of consequence of not remaining silent, and with the
Military Justice require that an explanation of awareness that the right or rights waived could
rights be administered to all subjects, suspects, have been reasserted at any time during the in-
and accused persons prior to questioning. terrogation.
b. Sources, such as listed and developed charac- c. The interrogator should ask the following
ter references, will be given an explanation of question of the individual prior to questioning

3-9
FM 30-17

and will include the question in Part II, Sworn d. It is important that any statement obtained
Statement, immediately following the word contain as much detail as possible to minimize the
"oath risk that the statement could be explained or re-
QUESTION : Before you make any statement I pudiated later to avoid criminal implications.
■would like to ask you if you
understand that the word "counsel"
used in Part I, above, means lawyer 3-19. Initials, Marks, and Margins
or attorney or attorney-at-law and
do you understand that by stating The initials of the affiant at appropriate places on
"I do not want counsel" you mean the face of the statement insure against repudia-
that you do not want a lawyer or tion at a later date. By initialing the statement
an attorney or an attorney-at-law
present during your questioning, the affiant adopts it as his own. Typewritten
even though such an attorney or statements prepared by the Special Agent should
lawyer would be furnished to you
free of charge, and if you state "I be initialed—before the first and after the last
do want counsel" it means you word of the statement on each page ; above or be-
want a lawyer or an attorney or
an attomey-at-law present during side each erasure, correction, or crossout; and at
your questioning. Do you also un- the bottom of each page. Handwritten statements
derstand that the words "military
counsel" as used in Part I, above, need not be initialed, except where crosscuts,
means lawyer or attorney in the corrections, and erasures occur. Further, to avoid
military service and not a "military
superior?" charges of tampering, the Agent should type
ANSWER: close to all margins, line out unused spaces, and
draw in margins as appropriate. It is further
suggested that the affiant initial lined-out areas.
3—18. Format
a. All sworn statements should be written in 3—20. Rumor, Second-Hand Information,
the first person. The vocabulary and grammar of and Potential Hearsay
the affiant should be used throughout even if it is
Sworn statements should be requested primarily
vulgar. Parenthetical expressions, official sound-
from persons who have direct, personal knowl-
ing abbreviations, military-style data, and inves-
edge of the facts. If the information offered was
tigative jargon or capitalization (such as "fnu",
"SUBJECT", etc.) should be avoided. This prac- told to the affiant by someone else, the Special
Agent will attempt to obtain a sworn statement
tice insures that the writing reflects the witness'
from the originator. When the Special Agent has
intentions and therefore it is more likely that
courts and administrative agencies will give the opportunity to assist the affiant in preparing
weight to its contents. the statement, he should tactfully attempt to
have the statement distinguish between first-
b. Sworn statements can be written in several hand and second-hand information and state
formats, including: the narrative, the question- clearly the sources of all information. At the
answer, and the combined question-answer-narra- same time, the Agent should not refuse to accept
tive. Sworn statements prepared by or for sworn statements prepared by the affiant which
sources (such as listed or developed character fail to make this distinction. Inadmissible re-
references) usually will be written in the narra- marks can be edited out by the judge or law
tive. This technique is the least time-consuming officer before the statement is read to the jury or
for the Special Agent and the easiest for the court-martial. To assist other investigators and
source who normally is asked to complete a hand- loyalty and suitability adjudicators, however, the
written statement before the interview is termi- Agent should question the affiant about each
nated. When the source tends to be vague in his source of information and note the source in the
expression of crucial information, the Special accompanying agent report.
Agent will employ the question-answer technique
to the extent necessary to assure an accurate and 3-21. Opinions and Conclusions
complete statement.
Opinions and conclusions tend to discredit the re-
c. In all sworn statements prepared for sub- liability of a sworn statement. The function of a
jects, suspects, and accused persons, the Special court-martial, jury, or other adjudicativo board is
Agent will use the question-answer or the ques- to form its own opinion and its own conclusions
tion-answer-narrative format, thereby assuring a from verifiable facts. Therefore, conclusions
substantially verbatim record for use at subse- about the subject's suitability for a "position of
quent adjudications and trials. trust and responsibility" have no place in a sworn

3-10
 FM 30—17

statement. Similarly, speculations by the source make the translation. An appropriate certifica-
about the subject's possible motives, income, ac- tion is: "I affirm that I am fully conversant in
tivities, etc., should be avoided whenever possible. both the English and languages and
Instead, the Special Agent should attempt to ob- that my interpretation and translation in prepa-
tain the facts upon which such opinons are based, ration of this sworn statement have been accur-
and persuade or guide the affiant to substitute the ate and complete." The Special Agent must ad-
facts for the opinions. In this way, the fact-find- minister the oath of truthfulness (para 3-27) to
ers are not distracted by irrelevant conclusions the interpreter-translator and attest to its admini-
and the subject, suspect, or accused person is stration by signing a jurat (the "Sworn to and
guaranteed a fair administrative or judicial deci- subscribed before me. ..." paragraph) which will
sion. Following this procedure in no way ham- be entered on the sworn statement following the
pers the investigation; opinions and conclusions interpreter-translator's certificate.
are recorded in the Agent's Report.
3—25. Oath of Truthfulness
3—22. Handwritten Statements
a. Prior to asking the affiant any questions, but
A statement taken at the time of the interview or following the explanation and acknowledgment
interrogation should be in the affiant's own hand- of legal rights, the Special Agent will administer
writing (DA Forms 2820 and 2823 should be the oath. An appropriate oath is: "Do you affirm
used). Nevertheless, typewritten statements are that the statements you are about to make are the
preferred for administrative convenience. There- truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
fore, if the handwriting of the affiant is difficult truth?" Additional remarks such as "So help you
to read, the Special Agent should have it typed God" are unnecessary and may, in the case of an
and return it to the affiant for his signature, agnostic or an atheist, be offensive.
under oath. Once this is accomplished, the two
statements should be included in the record of the b. If the affiant brings in a sworn statement of
investigation. Under no circumstances should the his own making, the Special Agent will adminis-
original handwritten statement be destroyed. ter the following oath : "Do you affirm that the
statement you are about to sign is the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth?"
3—23. Statement Taken in Foreign Countries
The procedures for taking statements of US per-
3-26. Unsworn Statements
sonnel outside the United States do not differ
from those employed for taking statements in If a person refuses to make the statement under
CONUS. When statements are taken form the na- oath, the Special Agent should not attempt to per-
tionals of a host country for use by that country suade him to change his mind. However, the
as well as by the United States, the statements Agent may discuss the meaning of the oath and
should conform to that country's requirements as explain that there are severe penalties for false
well. In such instances it should be remembered swearing or making a false official statement, and
that it is the completeness, and not the form, that that an unsworn statement also may be used as
determines the validity of a sworn statement evidence. In a loyalty action every effort should
under American law. A judge advocate should be be made to obtain a sworn statement from the
contacted as to the procedures and legal limita- subject involved.
tions involved in administering an oath to foreign
nationals. 3-27. Unsigned Statements
When a person makes a oral statement under
3-24. Statements in a Foreign Language
oath but refuses to sign a statement prepared
When a sworn statement is taken from a person from his remarks, the Special Agent should not
who does not speak English, an interpreter-trans- attempt to persuade him to change his mind. The
lator must be used. He will assist in the prepara- Agent should explain, however, that it is the
tion of copies of the sworn statement in each lan- oath, and nöt the signature, that makes a state-
guage. Both statements must include a certifica- ment a sworn statement. Therefore, if the affiant
tion by the interpreter-translator that his rendi- has any reservations about the accuracy or com-
tions of the affiant's statements and the Special pleteness of the sworn statement he gave orally,
Agent's questions are accurate and complete and he should consider making another statement
that the interpreter-translator is competent to under oath for the purpose of extending or clari-

3-11
FM 30-17

fying his remarks. If the affiant chooses to make the Special Agent make detailed and accurate
a supplementary sworn statement, the Agent notes for use as support testimony in court.
should repeat the explanation of rights and ob-
tain another completed waiver form. An oral con-
3—28. Examples
fession or admission can be used in court if it is
corroborated even though not sworn to or re- The following are examples of properly executed
duced to writing. It is absolutely necessary that sworn statements.

3-12
 FM 30-17

STATEMENT BY ACCUSED OR SUSPECT PERSON

(AR 195-10)
DATE TIME FILE NUMBER
(Enter City and State) (Date (Time
prepared) prepared) (Dossier Number)
LAST NAME. FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME §OCI»L. SECURITY ACCOUNT NO.
ocial Security (Enter Grade
(Self-explanatory) Account Number nr N/A)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(Self-explanatory)
PART I - WAIVER CERTIFICATE
i have been informed by (Name of Special Agent)
of Military Intelligence, US Army
THAT HE WANTS TO QUESTION ME ABOUT TT
OF WHICH I AM ACCUSED OR SUSPECTED. HE HAS ALSO INFORMED ME OF MY RIGHTS.
I UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND THAT ANY STATEMENT I MAKE MAY BE
USED AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ME IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL.
I UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONSULT WITH COUNSEL AND TO HAVE COUNSEL PRESENT
WITH ME DURING QUESTIONING. I MAY RETAIN COUNSEL AT MY OWN EXPENSE OR COUNSEL WILL BE APPOINTED FOR
ME AT NO EXPENSE TO ME. IF I AM SUBJECT TO THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, APPOINTED COUNSEL
MAY BE MILITARY COUNSEL OF MY OWN CHOICE IF HE IS REASONABLY AVAILABLE.
I UNDERSTAND THAT EVEN IF I DECIDE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS NOW WITHOUT HAVING COUNSEL PRESENT,
I MAY STOP ANSWERING QUESTION AT^AWY TIME. ALSO, I MAY REQUEST COUNSEL AT ANYTIME DURING QUESTIONING.
A (DO) (DO NOT) WANT CoJjNSEL, (Signature of Deponent)
I (DO) (DO NOT) WANT T^U^KE A STATEMENT AND
ANSWER QUE£\lONS. (Signature of Person To Be Questioned)

interrogator: (Sel f-<vxp1 anatory^ witness: (Self-explanatory)

(Signature) (Signature)
h
(Self-explanatorvl (Sel f-o-vpl anat-nry)
(Typed Name and Organization) (Typed Name and Organization)
PART II - S' ATEMENT
(Enter Deponent's Name) ANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER
OATH:
Q: Before you make any statement I would like t-ii an* you if you understand that the
word "counsel" used in Part I above, means lawye* ot attorney or attorney-at-law and do
you understand that by stating "I do not want coJnsel" you mean that you do not want a
lawyer or an attorney or an attorney-at-law present duting your questioning, even
though such an attorney or lawyer would be furnished t© you free of charge, and if you
state "I do want Counsel" it means you also understand [that the words "military counsel
as used in Part I above, means lawyer or attorney in the military service and not a
"military superior"?3 > —
•^Enter appropriate phrase; e.g., "my background," "my qualification of DD Forms 98
and 398," "my association with John Jones, a member of the CPUSÀ, " or the name of the
individual or incident being investigated.
^When deponent waives his right to counsel, he will strike out the word "(do)"
waiving this right, and initial above these strikeovers.
^Begin statement with above question and have deponent initial above the first
word of the statement; above any corrections or strikeovers in the body of the state-
ment: and above the last word of the statement.
^Enter total number of pages of the statement.

EXHIBIT INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(Leave blank) (Self-explanatory) PAGE I OF
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF TAKEN AT DATED CONTINUED. " THE
BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE
INITIALED AS "PAGE OF PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LIN-
ED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.
REPLACES DA FORM IS-24. I SEP S2. WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
DA, 1^2820
Figure 3-2 Sworn statement format.
3-13
FM 30-17

STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFIDAVIT
'■ (Enter Deponent1« Name) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATE-
MENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE5 I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT
MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE
CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT
OF PUNISHMENT. AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.
Self-explanatory
(Signature of Person Making Statement)
WITNESSES:
(Signature) Subscribed and sworn to before me. a person authorized by law
to administer oaths, this day of , 19
(NAME TVPRH) at City and State
(SpeMal Agp.nt or 1 f rlvtHan, givp arfHrpgc)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(S/A Signature)
fSignarure of Pereon Adminiatering Oath)

(S/A NAME TYPED) (Special Agent)

CTyped Name of Person Adm/n/ster/ng Oath)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS Article 136(b). UCMJ
(Authority To Adminieter Oatha)
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(Have deponent Initial Here)

Figure 8-2—Continued.
3-14
 FM 30-17

STATEMENT OF (Name of Deponent) Taken at (City and State), (Date) (continued).

(When additional space is needed, continuation sheets (bond paper) will be

used. The above heading will appear on each additional sheet. Deponent's
initials and "page of pages" will also be typed on each additional page
as illustrated below. At the conclusion of the statement, regardless of
the number of pages, the following entry will be made:)
///////////////////////////////END OF STATEMENT/////////////////////////////
(HAVE DEPONENT INITIAL)

l\

DEPONENT'S INITIALS 5pAGE 0F PAGES

Figure 3-2—Continued.

3-15
m m-17

STATEMIMT BY ACCÜSEÍD OR SÜSPICT PERSON

(AR 195-10)
PLACE DATE TIME FILE NUMBER
Presidio of San Francisco, California 2 Feb 72 1500 BB 35 67 98
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME. MIDDLE NAME SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NO. GRADE
Neuman, Alfred E. 458-58-5821 CPT
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
US Army Repository Group (3000), Presidio of San Francisco, California
PART I - WAIVER CERTIFICATE
t HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY Elliot A. Ness r SpeMal Agpnt-
of Military Intelligence. US Armv
THAT he wants to question me about an omission and possible falslf icaflon nf an SPH
OF WHICH I AM ACCUSED OR SUSPECTED. HE HAS ALSO INFORMED ME OF MY RIGHTS.
I UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND THAT ANY STATEMENT I MAKE MAY BE
USED AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ME IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL.
I UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONSULT WITH COUNSEL AND TO HAVE COUNSEL PRESENT
WITH ME DURING QUESTIONING. I MAY RETAIN COUNSEL AT MY OWN EXPENSE OR COUNSEL WILL BE APPOINTED FOR
ME AT NO EXPENSE TO ME. IF I AM SUBJECT TO THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, APPOINTED COUNSEL
MAY BE MILITARY COUNSEL OF MY OWN CHOICE IF HE IS REASONABLY AVAILABLE.
I UNDERSTAND THAT EVEN IF I DECIDE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS NOW WITHOUT HAVING COUNSEL PRESENT.
I MAY STOP ANSWERING QUESTION AT ANY TIME. ALSO, I MAY REQUEST ST CpUNSEJ.
COUNSEL AT^A
AT ANYTIME DURING
NY T IME DURI QU
NG QUESTION ING.
I 1BSD ("DO NOT> WANT COUNSEL.
I (DO) SBßUÜMK WANT TO MA«Ç A ST ATEME liT» AND (Signature oi Pareen To Be Queeifoned)
ANSWER QUESTIONS.

v
INTERROGATOR: WITNESS: ¿¿CCif cJC.
(Signature) (Signature,)
Elliot À. Ness, 116th MI Group

(Typed Name and Orgeniaat/on) (Typed JVame and Organization,)

N STATEMENT
PART II -
i, Alfred E. Neuman want to make the following statement under
OATH: r V
(ß Q: Before you make any statement I would like coa^k you if you understand that the
word "counsel" used in Part I above, means lawyer or attorney or attorney-at-law and
do you understand that by stating "I do not wanu counsel" you mean that you do not
want a lawyer or an attorney or an attorney-at-law present during your questioning,
even though such an attorney or lawyer would be furnished to you free of charge, and
if you state "I do want Counsel" it means you want a ¡lawyer or an attorney or an
attorney-at-law present during your questioning. Do you also understand that the words
"military counsel" as used in Part I above, means lawyer ij^Sttorney in the military
service and not a "military superior"? (ps,
A: Yes, I understand that the word "counsel" means lawveril or attorney-at-law. and that
I may have a lawyer present at my questioning if I so desire.
Q: Please state your full name, grade, service number, organization, duty station, and
place of birth.
A: Alfred E. Neuman, Captain, 458-58-5821, US Army Repository Group, Presidio of San
Francisco, California, born 22 January 1945 in San Francisco.
Q: Captain Neuman, it is the policy of the Department of the Army to allow the subject
of a personnel security investigation every reasonable opportunity to refute, explain,
or mitigate the effect of derogatory information that has arisen during the course of
an investigation. Information has been received that you were arrested on 11 November
1968 in San Francisco, California, and charged with responsibility for a hit-and-run

EXHIGIT INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE I OF
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF TAKEN AT DATED CONTINUED." THE
BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE
INITIALED AS "PAGE OF PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LIN-
ED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.
'û\ FORM * REPLACES DA FORM 10-24, 1 SEP 62. WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 OCT e7¿

Figure $-3. Example of a completed DA Form 2820.

3-11S
 FM 30-17

ST A-TEMEN T (Continued)
cclflent. You did not list this arrest on your Statement of Personal History, DD Form
398, dated 10 November 1970. The purpose of this interview is to determine why you
omitted this arrest. Do you understand the purpose of this interview?
I do.
Q: I now show you a copy of DD Form 398 dated 10 November 1970. Do you recall prepar-
ing this form? :
A Yes, I do.
Q Is this your signature on this form?-

day did you not list your 11 November 1968 arrest

It is true I was arrested in 1968 for hit and run. However, the charges were
dropped. The case never even went to trial. Three days after I had been arrested, the
police decided I was telling the truth when I said I did not realize I had hit someone.
As it turned out, the victim was a drunken derelict who had walked into the right rear
side of my car as I was making a right hand turn on a dark rainy night. The police
even found a witness who that the victim walked into my car and that I was not
speeding.
Q: Are you aware of the that question 18 of DD Form 398 asks if you have ever
been detained or arrested ardless of whether or not you were convicted or ever went
to trial?
A: That is not the way I interpreted the question, especially since the arrest was
really not justified and I nevey opbnt any timlv*iiv jail.
Q: Is there anything which you/wouW like to add to this statement?
A: No./////////////////////////////End of.Statement//////////////////////////////////J

m M

L
AFFIDAVIT
Alfred E. Neuman have TO ME THIS STATE-
MENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ËNDS ON PAGE 2 I FULLY UNDERSTAND ENTIRE STATEMENT
MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND TOM OF EACH PAGE
CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT
OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

9^/gnafuro of Person Mafcíng Síatemeníj

WITNESSES:
Subscribed and sworn to before me, o person authorized by law
m-cA to administer oaths, this 2 day of FsblTlláirV * 19 72
at The Presidio of San Francisco, California

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS Tu**

fSignature of Pereon Administering Oath)
/// j, A
Elliot À. Ness
(Typed Neme oí Person Admin/sfer/ng Oath)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS Article 136(b). UCMJ
fAuthority To Administer Oaths)
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

Figure 3-3—Continued.
3-17
FM 30-17

WITNESS STATEMENT
For use of this form, see AR 195-10 - TB PMG 3; the proponent agency is Office of the Provost Marsha I Genera).
PLACE DATE TTIME FILE NUMBER
Fort Huachuca, Arizona RSftn n Tan 77 ! 1300 AB 971-666
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NO. I GRADE
FINK. Leonard D. 014-30-7963 i PAC. GS-12
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Fort Huachuca Security and Plans Office
SWORN STATEMENT
T.pnnarH D. F^nV WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH
I first met CPT Robert H. Humphrey in May 1965 when I was assigned to the Fort
Huachuca Security and Plans Office. He was the Plans Officer for the Office.
We worked together until August 1968 when he was reassigned somewhere in Asia.
I have not seen him since and we have not communicated in any way. While he
was stationed at Fort Huachuca, we visited in each others homes on an alternate
weekly basis. One day in January 1968, I saw Humphrey placing classified
defense information, to include SECRET material, into his briefcase. I questioned
the necessity of taking classified defense information home, and I pointed out
that it was in violation of^nost regulations. Humphrey told me that he frequently
worked on plans at home that he would not have to work at the office at night,
but Humphrey assured me tn*t he secured the material in his home so that no
unauthorized personnel could\ead or obtain copies of it. I did not repeat this
to our superior, COL WillfcsuB^A. Custer, Chief, Security and Plans, because I was
confident that Humphrey was careiyi with the handling of classified defense
information while it was out of kmt office. I also knew that Humphrey's hobby
was photography with miniature Jamaras and that he maintained his own darkroom
in a storage closet of his quarters? Additionally, I was aware that in August
1968 when Humphrey was departing from SortAHuachuca that the classified cage
easily cleared him and that he had no pM^tjanding documents charged to him. I
am unaware of any altered certificates] o\lcfestruction during any period in which
he was the Destruction Officer for the)Fort»Huachuca Security and Plans Office.
I know of no foreign friends or relatives that he may have. I consider Humphrey
to be an honest, loyal officer in the US Army.^^W^

i/ß

EXHIBIT INITIALS OF PEflS« ING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF PAGES
ADDITIONAL. PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF TAKEN AT DATED CONTINUED. "
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND
BE INITIALED AS "PAGE OF PAGES. " WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL
BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

DA 1^.2823

Figure 3-A. Example of a oompleted DA Form 2823.

3-18
 FM 30-17

STATSMENT fConiinuôd;

S
A)

fK

AFFIDAVIT
i, Leonard D. Fink HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATE-
MENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 » FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT
MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE
CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT
rww iINDUCEMENT
OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL n uui. cracn i p.

AU
(Signature
Ignature ol
o/ Parson Making Statement)
Sis
WITNESSES:
Subscrlbod ond sworn to baforo m«, o person authorised by low
illiam R. Cot! to administer oaths, this 13tMoy of January » 19 7 2
Fort Huachucat Arizona
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(Signature o/ Parson Adkninlstering Oath)
115th MI Group
Glenn F. Beach
(Typed JYame of Parson Administering Oath)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS Article 136 (M . UCMJ
(Authority To Administer Oathe)
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
z

Figure S-U—Continued.
3-19
 FM 30-17

CHAPTER 4

BASIC INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

Section {. INTRODUCTION

4—1. General phase or lead of an investigation. The plan of an

individual Special Agent, for example, may be no
"Investigation" is a duly authorized, systema- more than consideration of the approach to a sin-
tized, detailed examination or inquiry to uncover gle interview. An investigative plan should in-
facts and determine the truth of a matter. The clude as many of the following considerations as
purpose of a counterintelligence investigation is are applicable :
to supply the commander with sufficient factual
information on which to base an adjudicative de- a. Reasons for, or purpose of, the investigation.
cision or to initiate action to insure the security b. Phases or elements of the investigation
of his command. Counterintelligence investiga- which have been assigned.
tions utilize basic investigative techniques and
procedures similar in many respects to those em- c. Whether the investigation is to be conducted
ployed by criminal investigators of law enforce- overtly or discreetly.
ment agencies. The purpose of criminal investiga- d. Priority of the investigation and time per-
tions, however, is to determine the facts of an al- mitted for completion.
leged crime and to apprehend the offenders.
Counterintelligence investigations are aimed at e. Restrictions or special instructions.
the detection, prevention, and/or neutralization of /. Information provided, including information
actual or potential threats to the security of the from the unit or office files.
command and the Army, regardless of whether
criminal activity is involved. Although prosecu- g. Definition of the problem.
tion of the offenders may be the natural consequ-
h. Methods and sources to be used.
ence of some counterintelligence investigations,
the primary objective is the security of command. i. Coordination required.
Many operations of counterintelligence units
must be coordinated carefully with those of mili- The investigative plan is updated as warranted
tary police investigative units and other intellig- by new developments and the continuing analysis
ence and security agencies, to preclude the opera- of results.
tions of one agency having a negative effect on, or
compromising the operations of, another. 4—3. Basic Investigative Techniques
The following basic techniques are employed as
4—2. The Investigative Plan appropriate in all areas of operation and in all
An investigative plan must be formulated at each types of investigative activity :
operational level down to and including the level a. Records Examination. An examination of the
of the individual Special Agent. The purpose of records is made to locate, gain access too, and ex-
the investigative plan is to define information re- tract or copy pertinent data from diverse official
quired and pertinent aspects to be considered and and unofficial documents and records for the
to preclude unnecessary investigative effort. The production of factual data. Records are also used
investigative plan will vary in scope and detail as a source of leads for further investigation.
from one at control office or MI group headquar-
ters, which may outline the plan for an entire or b. Interview and Interrogation. Direct or indi-
major part of an investigation, to a simple plan rect questioning of individuals is made for the
of a regional or resident office involving only one purpose of obtaining information.

4-1
FM 30-17

c. Surveillance. Surveillance in counterintel- cannot always be anticipated and the Special

ligence operations may be employed for the pur- Agent must have a basic knowledge of the tech-
pose of providing- protection or for the collection nique and planning involved.
of information, evidence, or leads. This technique e. Collection and Handling of Evidence. Al-
is expensive in terms of time and manpower ; con- though the results will not often be presented in
sequently, it should be applied judiciously—gen- court, care must be taken to insure that evidence
erally only when required to produce results not collected is handled in such a manner as to make
obtainable by other means. it admissible in the courts. If the evidence has
d. Raids and Searches. Raids and searches are been properly handled, it will also be usable by
seldom employed by counterintelligence units ex- administrative boards.
cept in areas of hostilities. However, the need

Section II. RECORDS EXAMINATION

4—4. General documentary form does not in itself insure its re-
liability. Many recorded facts, particularly items
The systematic employment of records examina- of biographical data of interest in complaint-type
tion is particularly adaptable and important to and personnel security investigations, are merely
the broad scope of most counterintelligence inves- repetitions of unsubstantiated information
tigations. The full exploitation of records exami- provided by the subject himself. Reliability of
nation as an investigative tool is dependent upon records will vary considerably according to the
several factors which must be considered by the area, the status of the agency or organization
Special Agent : keeping the records, and many other intangible
a. Types of Records Available. The counterin- factors. For example, records to be found in
telligence specialist must know what, where, by highly industrialized Western Europe will be
whom, and for what purpose records are main- more extensive and far more reliable than those
tained throughout the area in which he is operat- of underdeveloped areas of Southeast Asia. Until
ing. The initial orientation of a Special Agent, experience with a certain type of record has been
upon his assignment to an operational unit, sufficient to establish a basis for evaluating their
should stress thorough familiarity with records reliability, it is necessary to treat information
which can be of assistance in investigations. from these records with skepticism.
d. Legal Aspects. If the record of interest is to
b. Methods of Gaining Access to Records. Most
be used in a court or board proceeding, the man-
records will be available to the Special Agent on
ner in which the record is copied, extracted, or
an official request basis. In some cases, however,
preserved will have a bearing on its use as evi-
access will be contingent upon the ability of the
dence.
investigator to obtain discreet cooperation of the
custodian of the records. Such cooperation will be e. Value of Negative Information. In counterin-
enhanced by mature, professional conduct and at- telligence investigations, for example, the ab-
titued, effective liaison, and mutual assistance. If sence of a record is often just as important as the
all efforts to obtain the desired information fail it existence of a record. This is especially important
must be recognized that such information or rec- in the investigation of biographical data fur-
ords are not obtainable by a subpoena if a legal nished by the subject of a complaint-type investi-
proceeding has not been initiated. A search war- gation. Another example is the systematic and
rant could compromise an investigation even if meticulous examination of records to confirm or
the required probable cause, in the legal sense, refute a suspect's story is very often the best
could be shown. Consequently, there will be occa- means of breaking and enemy intelligence agent's
sions when documentary information or evidence cover story.
will have to be obtained through other investiga-
tive means. 4—5. Types of Records of Counterintelligence
c. Reliability of Recorded Data. The possibility Interest
of intentional deception or false information in The types of records and amount of detail of
both official and unofficial records must always be their content will vary markedly with the area of
considered. The fact that data is recorded in some operation. Regardless of the area, it is important

4-2
 FM 30-17

for the Special Agent to be aware of the types of world. The residence record may be for tax pur-
records he may be able to use in the conduct of poses, in which case it probably will be found on
investigations. The following are some of the file at some local fiscal or treasury office; when
major types of records which often will be of the residence record is needed for police and se-
value for information or for leads. curity purposes, it is usually kept in a special sep-
arate police file. Residence directories, telephone
a. Police and Security Agencies. Local, re-
books, and utility company records may also be
gional, and national police agencies of most na-
used. In other countries, the village chief may
tions maintain extensive personality files on crim-
maintain these records which may double as a re-
inals, suspects, victims, and other persons who
cord of vital statistics reflecting births, mar-
have come to the official attention of police in
riages, and deaths.
connection with some actual or alleged criminal
activity. Police interest in precise descriptive de- e. Education. Both public and private schools
tails, often including photographs and fingerprint at all levels, from primary grades through uni-
cards, makes police records particularly valuable versities, will have records which may serve for
and usually more reliable than comparable records purposes of background verification. The school
of other agencies. Police and security agency files yearbook or comparable publiaction at most
are usually divided into subcategories ; it is im- schools will contain a photograph and brief re-
portant for the Special Agent to become familiar sume of the activities of each graduating class
with the records system concerned to insure that member, a record of value both for verification
all pertinent files have actually been checked. and as an aid to locating leads. Registrar records
normally contain a limited amount of biographi-
b. Intelligence Agencies. Because the reliability
cal data and a detailed account of academic activ-
and validity of records checks with allied intellig-
ities.
ence agencies will often depend to a large degree
on the personal relationship between the counter- /. Employment. Official and Business records
intelligence representative and the custodian of related to employment of individuals may be of
the records of interest, such examinations nor- value.
mally will be the assigned responsibility of a liai- (1) Personnel records. Personnel records
son officer. This may also be necessary with other usually contain information on dates of employ-
agencies when the volume of records examina- ment, positions held, payment recieved, efficiency,
tions dictates the need for a single representative reason for leaving, attendance record, special
of the counterintelligence element. At times it skills, and biographical and identifying data. Ac-
may be necessary, due to the sensitivity of a par- cess to such records for the Special Agent will be
ticular investigation, to conceal specific interest relatively simple in the United States but may
in a person whose name is to be checked. In this prove difficult in some overseas areas. In such
instance, the name of the individual may be sub- areas it may be possible to obtain the records
mitted routinely in the midst of a lengthy list of through liaison with local civil authorities, or
persons of routine interest who are to be checked. through private credit and business rating firms.
c. Vital Statistics. The recording of births, (2) Unemployment, and social security rec-
deaths, and marriages is mandatory in nearly ords. Depending upon the area of operation, there
every nation, either by national or local law. This may be either local, regional, or national offices
information may only be maintained in family for the administration of unemployment and so-
journals or Bibles in newly developing countries cial security programs. Records of these offices
or in the case of very old records. In any case, often will contain extensive background material
confirmation of such dates may be important in on individuals, but in most cases these data will
many types of investigations. The records sought represent unsubstantiated information provided
may be filed at local level, as is usually the case by the applicant and cannot necessarily be re-
in overseas areas, or they may be kept at state or garded as confirmation of other data obtained
regional level, such as with state bureaus of vital from the same individual. It must be noted, how-
statistics in the United States. Rarely will origi- ever, that the records of the US Social Security
nal vital statistics records on individuals be Administration can only be obtained by the De-
maintained centrally with a national agency. partment of Justice by written request in cases
involving high level security investigations.
d. Residence. Some form of official registration
of residence is required in most nations of the g. Citizenship. Immigration, naturalization,

4-3
FM 30-17

passport, and similar records of all nations con- larly if the individual has had national guard or
tain data regarding1 the citizenship status of in- reserve status as a commissioned or warrant
dividuals. In most instances, independent investi- officer. This would, however, be the exception
gation has been undertaken to verify background rather than the rule.
information contained in such records, and thus (d) Army hospital records which have
these are generally more reliable than other been retired are filed by hospital, by year, by
types. The records of both official and private re- name; consequently, the hospital name and year
fugee welfare and assistance agencies will also will be required.
provide extensive details relating to the citizen- (2) Foreign records. Access to foreign mili-
ship status of persons of counterintelligence in- tary records in overseas areas may be very diffi-
terest. As a general rule, refugee records (partic- cult. In cases where it is not possible to arrange
ularly those of private welfare groups) should be for examination of official records, leads or perti-
used as a source of leads rather than for verifica- nent information may be obtained from unofficial
tion of factual data inasmuch as they have been unit histories and similar documents which have
found to be unreliable in nearly all areas of oper- been published commercially and also from files
ation. on various veteran organizations. Since military
h. International Travel. A system of access to service is a convenient means of accounting for
records of international travel is especially im- periods of time spent in intelligence activities, or
portant to counterintelligence operations in over- periods of imprisonment, it is frequently a criti-
seas areas. Records of interest include customs cal item in dealing with suspected enemy agents.
records, passport and visa applications, passenger Special efforts may be made to locate some form
manifests of commercial carriers, currency ex- of records which will either confirm or deny an
change files, transient residence registrations, individual's service in a particular unit or the ex-
private and government travel agency records, istence of the unit at the time and place he claims
and frontier control agency (e.g., border police) to have served. Order of battle and personality
files. Records of foreign travel of US citizens are files of various intelligence services also may be
maintained by the State Department and such in- helpful.
formation is available by means of a National j. Miscellaneous Organizational Affiliation.
Agency Check in accordance with AR 381-130. Many organizations maintain records which may
i. Military Service. Records of current and past be of value to a particular investigation. Exam-
members of the armed services of most nations ples are labor unions, social, scientific, sport
are detailed and are usually accurate : groups, cultural and subversive organizations.
Although it is important for the Special Agent to
(1) US records. Counterintelligence special- consider such organizations when seeking sources
ists will encounter no difficulty in obtaining ac-
of information, he must be thoroughly familiar
cess to US military service records on an official
with the organization before attempting to ex-
request basis. If a serviceman changes branches, ploit it. Organizations are often established as
has a break in service, or is hospitalized, certain front groups or cover vehicles for hostile intellig-
elements of information must be furnished to the ence operations.
control office so these records can be located for
review if necessary :
4—6. Access to Records
(a) For those personnel who have changed
branches of service, the control office will need Having determined which records may include in-
the man's former service number, social security formation pertinent to an investigation, the Spe-
account number, full name, and date and place of cial Agent must select the best means of gaining
birth. access to the records for purposes of examining
(&) When an individual has had a break or copying. In general, access to records will be
in service, his field 201 file is retired, and to ob- accomplished by the following methods :
tain it for review, the control office will need the a. Official Inquiry. The Special Agent must con-
individual's full name, and any former service tact the custodian of the records; identify him-
numbers. self as a Special Agent of Military Intelligence,
(c) In addition, The Adjutant General's United States Army, using his credentials; state
Office, or control branch files may be more com- the purpose of the inquiry ; and ask for any infor-
plete than the individual's field 201 file, particu- mation available. This procedure is most com-

4-4
 FM 30-17

monly employed in personnel security investiga- c. Check of National Agencies. The records of
tions, but it may be employed in certain phases of national agencies in the United States are
complaint type investigations. checked by forwarding a request for a National
b. Liaison. This process involves reciprocal co- Agency Check through channels on DD Form
operation between the agency whose records are 1584. Normally, these checks will have been ini-
of interest and the unit. Such liaison may include tiated by the control office concurrently with as-
authorization for the liaison representative to ar-
signing the investigative tasks to subordinate lev-
range for records checks on an exchange basis
within limitations imposed by higher headquar- els. Results of such checks, when they have a
ters. Liaison of this type normally will be the res- bearing on the investigative tasks being con-
ponsibility of a designated liaison officer, or it ducted at the operational level, will be forwarded
may be an additional duty for counterintelligence through channels to the investigating officer.
specialists.

Section III. INTERVIEWS

4—7. General ligence investigations, and a number of inter-

The interview is a form of direct interrogation views are conducted in conjunction with each
used to extract information from an individual by PSI.
questioning. Use of the word "interrogation" in
conjunction with criminal and intelligence activi- 4—8. Preparation for an Interview
ties has resulted in a generally accepted connota-
tion implying use of authority and application of Prior to an interview, the Special Agent must
subterfuge and psychological pressures. The gen- study carefully all the background information
eral solicitude for the interviewee and the pleas- available on the case. In a PSI the subject of the
ant atmosphere of the normal counterintelligence investigation will have submitted a DD Form 398
interview are missing in an interrogation, except (Statement of Personal History). This document
as they may be phases of a planned interrogation is the initial source of leads ; it may give an indi-
technique. The distinction between "interview" cation of the relationship between the listed ref-
and "interrogation" is at times difficult. In some erences (prospective interviewees) and the sub-
instances, e.g., interviews of walk-ins or wit- ject, and it may assist in creating a mental pic-
nesses, the hostility of a subject may necessitate ture of the subject—an invaluable aid in formu-
the application of interrogation techniques by the lating a line of questioning for an interview.
Special Agent. Differentiation between the two, Often an interview will be based on a DD Form
however, is academic provided there is adherence 339 (Lead Sheet), which normally contains less
to legal and other requirements. In counterintel- background information. Other sources of infor-
ligence operations, the interview is used exten- mation, concerning both the subject and the
sively in but not limited to, personnel security in- prospective interviewee are unit files, local and
vestigations (PSI). In certain instances, it may Federal law enforcement agency files, telephone
be necessary to conceal the true purpose of an in- books, and city directories. It is frequently desir-
terview or to obtain information without the sub- able, and necessary in critical cases when indica-
ject becoming aware that an "interview" is tak- tions of the credibility of an interviewee are
ing place. Techniques for interviewing an unwit- needed, that something about the interviewee be
ting source are discussed in paragraphs 4-19 learned. In addition to files and records, the inter-
through 4-22. The purpose of a interview as viewee's neighborhood, class of housing, condi-
part of a PSI is to determine the loyalty, trust- tion of the home, and occupation or position may
worthiness and the suitability of an individual by give a general, but fallible, indication of the per-
questioning people acquainted with the person. In sonality of the interviewee. A telephone call to
this manner, an objective and composite picture arrange an appointment with a prospective inter-
of a person may be obtained. No single source of viewee is a courtesy often advantageous to the
information can satisfy the requirements of such investigator. The Special Agent's final prepara-
an investigation. Personnel security investiga- tory step is the. formulation of a tentative plan
tions constitute the majority of counterintel- for questioning the interviewee.

4-5
FM 30-17

4—9. The Approach work, where he is under no official compulsion to

furnish the information sought. Topics found to
The approach to an interview is simply an appli-
be of mutual interest may be used by the Special
cation of the social code of polite behavior, to-
Agent to assist in establishing rapport, but cau-
gether with certain investigative requirements.
tion must be exercised to prevent the interview
а. Identification of the Interviewee. The Special from becoming a mere casual conversation.
Agent should first determine that he is talking to
the right person. The full name of the inter- 4—10. The Interview Proper
viewee must be used to preclude all posibility for
error. Once the interviewee has indicated his willing-
ness to cooperate, the Special Agent must esta-
б. Identification of the Special Agent. The Spe- blish the area of knowledge through questioning.
cial Agent may have introduced himself by tele- The area of knowledge consists of : when the in-
phone, but he must again introduce himself as a terviewee and subject first met; under what cir-
Special Agent of Military Intelligence and pre- cumstances; when interviewee and subject last
sent his credentials for the inspection of the in- met; under what circumstances; the period of
terviewee. closest association; the type of association; fre-
c. Identification of the Subject of Investigation. quency of contact ; and if there has been any com-
The Special Agent must identify the subject of munication between them. This information will
investigation to ascertain that the interviewee is also aid the Special Agent in formulating ques-
or was, in fact, acquainted with the subj ect. tions on the subject's loyalty, integrity, discre-
tion, and moral character. The Special Agent now
d. Statement of Purpose of the Interview. The must explore all aspects of the subject's back-
Special Agent must explain to the interviewee the ground to the knowledge of the interviewee,
purpose of the interview. Some people are in- which are pertinent to the investigation. He must
clined to look with suspicion on all investigators. be constantly alert for leads to other persons not
The patient explanation by the Special Agent of listed by the subject as references. If the inter-
the purpose and importance of the interview and viewee is or was an employee or coworker of the
the need for the interviewee's cooperation is gen- subject, attention is focused on the subject's
erally sufficient to allay suspicion and forestall efficiency, initiative, and ability to get along with
any reluctance to provide information. fellow workers and subordinates, and on his hon-
e. Privacy of the Interview. The Special Agent esty, reliability, and general character. If the in-
should insure, to the extent conditions permit, terviewee is or was a neighbor of subject, the
that the interview will not be interrupted or ov- subject's general reputation and that of his fam-
erheard. He should also emphasize the Army pol- ily, his leisure time activities, morals, and per-
icy limiting dissemination of details of a PSI. sonal habits may be discussed. Concentration on
some points does not imply exclusion of others.
/. Confidential Nature of the Interviewee's Information which will assist in establishing sub-
Statements. The Special Agent should inform the ject's loyalty, trustworthiness, and suitability
interviewee that his having been interviewed and must be sought. Following is a tentative checklist
the matters discussed are regarded by the Army which may be useful as a general framework for
as official Army business and should not be dis- an interview and a basis for discussion :
cussed by the interviewee with other persons.
Birth of subject Date and place, with particular
g. Establishing and Maintaining Rapport. The attention to origin.
foregoing steps provide a means by which the Education Names and addresses of institu-
Special Agent may establish rapport with the in- tions; dates of attendance, aca-
terviewee before beginning the interview proper. demic records, and degrees re-
Rapport creates mutual confidence and coopera- ceived.
tion between the interviewee and the Special Employment Names and addresses of employers
Agent. Important to good rapport are proper and dates of employment; names
of immediate superiors and co-
dress, a pleasant voice, a courteous demeanor, and workers; nature of duties; qual-
a professional manner. The burden for maintain- ity of performance; reason for
ing rapport throughout the interview rests with departure from job.
the Special Agent. Normally an interview will Technical skills Education and circumstances of
take place in the interviewee's home or place of development.

4-6
 FM 30-17

Interests Hobbies and avocations. b. Be Specific in Questions. General questions

Temperament Emotional stability, natural incli- should be avoided since they are usually confus-
nations, and idiosyncrasies. ing. The Special Agent should pinpoint specific
Moral character Personal habits, particular virtues information desired.
and faults, illegal use of nar-
cotics, and excessive consumption c. Determine Reasons for Interviewee's Opiris-
of alcohol. ions. When the interviewee states, for example,
Mental ability Inherent talent, intellectual devel- that he considers the subject to be an indiscreet
opments, general alertness. person, he should be requested to cite specific in-
Loyalty Adherence to principles of the Con- cidents to support his opinion. If he claims the
stitution and to laws of the man is a drunkard, his concept of the term
nation; reaction to foreign ideol- should be clearly defined and his statement
ogies. should be substantiated by pertinent facts.
Integrity ..Uprightness of moral character
and strength of convictions. d. Be Logical. The Special Agent should ana-
Discretion Speech and behavior, judgment, lyze point by point each phase of the subject's
and self-control. background. If the interviewee presents informa-
Reputation Personality, character, and popu- tion in a haphazard manner, the Special Agent
larity. must attempt with tact to guide the discussion
Record Appropriate police authorities and into a logical pattern.
other agencies such as credit
bureaus. e. Get All Pertinent Information the First
Time. The conscientious Special Agent cannot to-
Family background . Origin of parents, relatives abroad,
general reputation. lerate gaps in his report, and he should get all
Association the facts the first time; however, the Special
. Male and female friends, busi-
ness or other associates, favorite Agent must fill any gaps in his report even if it
haunts. means returning for another interview.
Organizations .Membership, active participation, /. Be Interested in the Interviewee. The Special
position, professional societies,
Agent must maintain an attitude of interest no
character of organization, finan-
cial contributions, persons for matter how often the information he is receiving
membership, awareness of aims may have been repeated by various persons.
of organization.
g. Do Not Discuss Official Information. In
Leads .Names and addresses of persons
acquainted with various phases many cases, the interviewee expresses curiosity
of subject's background; impar- about the Special Agent's position and duties.
tial sources of information not The interviewee may want to know additional de-
listed by subject as references. tails about the purpose of the investigation or
Recommendation .Interviewee's overall opinion of about information received from other sources.
subject's qualifications for a po- These are matters which cannot be disclosed due
sition of responsibility and trust; to their official nature, and the Special Agent
questions concerning religious be-
liefs, racial matters, politics, la- must decline to answer inquiries with tact.
bor affiliations, or personal and h. Keep Notes to a Minimum. It is preferable to
domestic matters should be a-
voided unless absolutely essential take notes only on pertinent points of the inter-
to the investigation; such ques- view, with particular attention to names, ad-
tions not relevant to the purpose dresses, dates, and direct quotations of signifi-
of the interview constitute un- cance. If the Special Agent feels he should am-
necessary and unwarranted in- plify his notes, he can make the necessary elabo-
vasion of the subject's privacy.
ration as soon as possible after the interview.

4—11. Important Precepts i. Remember Leads. It is understandable that

persons listed as references by the subject of in-
a. Be Professional in Approach. A Special vestigation normally will paint a highly favor-
Agent, as a representative of Military Intellig- able picture of the subject and his qualifications.
ence should always be dressed in accordance with In a search for objective information the Special
his assigned duty, courteous in manner, and Agent must als.o consult individuals (throw-offs)
efficient in the execution of his duty. whose names were not provided by the subject

4-7
l^ívl 1/

who are identified as associates of the subject. leads before the conduct of the interview. Ques-
Names, locations, and associations of such per- tions for each interview will be carefully pre-
sons with the subject should be obtained during planned, with the advice and assistance of supe-
interviews of references or developed sources. riors. The subject matter of the interview should
be reviewed carefully to insure that only infor-
j. Leave a Good Impression. Regardless of the
mation specifically authorized by the control office
nature of the reception by the interviewee, the
is released to the subject during the interview.
Special Agent should be courteous. When the
Under no circumstances will the subject be al-
Special Agent encounters hostility, he should try
lowed access to any portion of his intelligence
to dissipate it by maintaining a courteous but
file. When directed by Department of the Army,
businesslike manner, tactfully citing reasons for
or when, from facts available, it is considered
the interview. He should express his appreciation
likely that a recommendation for removal or
for the interviewee's time and courtesy.
elimination wil result, verbatim transcripts will
be made of the interview or of any oral state-
4—12. liraüeirvDews Subjjedfs ®{? C®(yjirîiieir=
ments. There is usually no obligation to furnish
5iratf®0DG§jeiraGe OüwesftDgpoiifcGís the interviewee with a copy of the transcript or
When authorized by proper authority, the subject recording or of a statement made by him, but he
of a PSI or of a CTI may be interviewed (AR will be permitted to inspect the official transcript
381-130). In all interviews of subjects of a coun- of his interview of statement. The Special Agent
terintelligence investigation where the subject is must then explain to him that, if he is called to
accused or suspected of violating the law, the appear before a field board of inquiry or a civil-
subject must be properly advised of his rights ian security hearing board, a copy of the inter-
under the provisions of the Fifth Amendment to view will be provided on his request. If the sub-
the Constitution of the United States or of Arti- ject participates in the interview or signs a tran-
cle 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice script or statement conditional upon obtaining a
and of his right to counsel. It is emphasized that copy of same, a copy will be furnished, unless res-
questions concerning religious beliefs, racial mat- trictions of AR 380-5 on the release of classified
ters, politics, labor affiliations, or personal and information apply. The copy furnished the sub-
domestic matters should also be avoided in sub- j ect will not bear a protective marking but should
ject interviews; however, when such information contain a statement substantially as follows: "A
has a direct bearing on the investigation the Spe- copy of (describe) is furnished at your request.
cial Agent will phrase and time his queries so as The official copies of this document will be pro-
to establish clearly that they are relevant to the tected to safeguard your confidence and will be
investigation. used for official purposes only."
a. Subject's Right to Counsel. A suspected or c. Precepts. The Special Agent acts as a repre-
accused subject has the right to legal advice at sentative of the US Army. His every statement,
question, or contact will be regarded by the sub-
any time prior to, during, or following the inter-
j ect as part of the official proceedings, whether so
view (3-6).
intended or not. There will be no off-the-record or
b. Preparation for the Subject Interview. The unofficial phases in the interview. Special Agents
subject shall be contacted and informed of the will make no promises or commitments to the
precise reason for the interview. He will be ad- subject which are beyond their authority to ful-
vised that the interview offers him the opportu- fill. Special Agents will avoid statements or rep-
nity to refute questionable and/or misleading in- resentations which might be misunderstood and
formation or circumstances; to provide informa- comments which might be construed as expres-
tion not otherwise obtainable ; or to remain silent, sions of opinion or advice to the subject concern-
neither affirming nor denying the information. If ing his past, present or future action's. Special
the subject expresses a willingness to be inter- Agents will not argue with subjects or express
viewed, arrangements should be made for the personal viewpoints on any matter.
time, date, and place of interview. Should the d. Female. When the subject to be interviewed
subject refuse to be interviewed or to answer per- is female, female witnesses must possess the ap-
tinent questions, this refusal must be made a propriate security clearance. Any immoral or ab-
matter of official record by the Special Agent in normal behavior allegations by the WAG must be
verbatim form. The Special Agent must accumu- referred to the WAG commander for action. In
late all available information and all pertinent the absence of a WAG commander, such allega-

4-i
 FM 30-17

tions must be referred to the command WAC ad- (12) When appropriate, ask the subject if he
visor. If personal questions are to be asked that is willing to submit to a polygraph examination.
may prove to be embarrassing, the female should (13) If appropriate, obtain a handwritten
be so warned in advance (para 4-17ci(3)). sworn statement before terminating the inter-
e. Steps of the Interview. The Special Agent view.
conducting a subject interview should take the (14) If appropriate, make arrangements for
following actions in the sequence listed : obtaining the subject's signature on a typewritten
(1) Dictate identifying data into the tape re- sworn statement.
corder prior to the subject's arrival. Turn off the (15) Thank subject for his cooperation, re-
machine. mind him that his statements will be held in con-
(2) Identify and welcome subject, identify fidence and used for official purposes only.
self, and present credentials. (16) Terminate the interview.
(3) Explain the general purpose and confi-
dential nature of the interview. 4—13. Interviews of "Walk-Ins" or
(4) Obtain subject's permission to record the Volunteers
interview, explaining that the recording will fa- a. General. Persons who volunteer information
cilitate the preparation of a written transcript of of intelligence interest usually do so for some
the interview which subject will have an oppor- personal motive. When interviewing such per-
tunity to review, correct, and sign under oath. sons, the Special Agent must consider the
(5) Turn on the tape recorder. (If the sub- source's motive (nationalism; personal gain; pro-
ject objects to the tape recorder, (e.g., "Those tection of self, family, and belongings; vindictive-
machines make me nervous") but is willing to ness; or revenge). The source's motive(s) may be
proceed without the tape recording, the Special invaluable in evaluating the information or in de-
Agent should proceed taking verbatim notes. termining the nature and extent of his knowl-
Lack of a tape recording is an administrative in- edge. Motivation may not always be known, and
convenience, but will not unduly hamper the tak- may be other than that stated by the source. The
ing of the Sworn Statement and the preparation Special Agent's primary concern is to obtain all
of the Agent Report.) information of both intelligence and counterintel-
(6) Ask the subject to state, for the record, ligence value. If, however, the source volunteers
information which is not within the jurisdiction
his name, rank, social security account number,
of Military Intelligence, the source will be re-
and other identifying data as appropriate.
ferred to the local police or local office of the
(7) If appropriate, administer a full expla- FBI. If the source refuses such referral, the in-
nation of rights as outlined in paragraph 3-6. formation will be obtained and immediately fur-
(8) If the explanation of rights was given, nished to the proper office. Upon request, the
request subject complete "Waiver Certificate" identity of a source will be protected. This proce-
(part I, DA Form 2820) on which he acknowl- dure will also apply to anonymous telephone call-
edges receipt of the explanation of rights and de- ers or written messages.
cides to exercise or waive his rights to remain si-
b. Method of Interview. Differences in types of
lent and to consult counsel.
information and in motivation dictate the need
(9) If the subject chooses to waive his right for varied techniques. A story of an incident can-
to remain silent, ask him if he is willing to take not be examined in quite the same manner as a
the oath. (If he is not, ask him if he is willing to story involving a subversive organization. A re-
answer questions or make a statement without luctant source will require a different technique
taking the oath. If he is, remind him that the from a willing source. Despite these differences,
statements and answers still can be used as evi- the following steps in the order given are basic to
dence against him. If he is still willing to be in- the interview of sources volunteering informa-
terviewed, proceed.) tion :
(10) Administer the oath in accordance with (1) Put the source at ease. The Special
paragraph 3-27. Agent's initial attitude frequently affects the suc-
(11) Conduct the interview using prepared cess of the interview. The atmosphere should be
questions designed to elicit narrative answers. pleasant; the Special Agent should be courteous

4-9
FM 30-17

but professional. Effort should be made to avoid (3) Adapt himself to the source's intellectual
taking up more of the source's time than neces- level.
sary. Care must be exercised to prevent compro- (4) Exercise utmost discretion and avoid
mising the source by indiscreet questioning in the controversial discussions.
presence of others.
(5) Secure all names of other individuals
(2) Let the source tell his own story. The who may have knowledge of the same informa-
source should be encouraged to tell his story in tion.
his own way. Premature questions may be discon-
certing or may reveal the Special Agent's suspi- (6) Remember security regulations and
cious attitude, thus alarming the source and caus- make no commitments which cannot be fulfilled.
ing him to limit his information to vague gener-
alities. If the source strays too far from the basic 4—14. Interviewing a Witness
story, the Special Agent should tactfully steer a. General. The nature of the information from
him back to the main topic. Throughout this first a witness dictates the need for special considera-
narration by the source, the Special Agent should tion in the manner of interview. The importance
make mental notes of the salient points to guide of a witness is that he can provide direct evi-
him in the subsequent review of the story. dence. A witness may also provide data and leads
(3) Review the story and take notes. Once which, although they may not be usable in a legal
the source has completed his basic story, he gen- proceeding, may serve to aid further investiga-
erally has little reluctance to answering specific tion. In many respects, the general principles ob-
questions on the details. Given the assurance that served in interviewing voluntary sources are also
his information will be kept in strict confidence, applicable in interviewing witnesses; however,
he will now be less apprehensive of notetaking. there are a few additional factors which have a
The story should now be reviewed critically in its bearing on the questioning technique.
entirety. Disparities, contradictions, and gaps in
b. Basic Psychology. The reputation, social
the story must be clarified. Every lead must be
standing, and profession of the witness, plus the
noted accurately.
fact that his statements are generally recorded
(4) Obtain background information. To as- for possible use in court, cause understandable
sist in the evaluation of the source's information, psychological reactions. A normal person may be
something must be known about the source him- unable to prevent personal prejudice from caus-
self. The source's identity, his origin, past activi- ing distortion of his thinking and presentation of
ties, present and past addresses, occupation, in- the facts, and a less conscientious person may not
terests, and motives are pertinent facts which even attempt to be objective. The witness may not
may throw light on his reliability. be aware that he is capable of distorting facts un-
(5) Develop secondary information. The wittingly, or that forgotten details might be re-
source's story and background frequently indicate placed with the product of his imagination. The
that he may have further information of signifi- misgivings of a conscientious witness, who must
cant intelligence interest. make incriminating statements against another
(6) Termination of the interview. When the person, are understandable. The longer the lapse
Special Agent is certain the source has no further between the incident and the interview, the
information, he should close the interview in a greater the possibilities that imagination may
manner calculated to leave a favorable impres- alter the facts. These psychological effects occa-
sion. If future contact with the source is a possi- sionally reveal themselves in the form of a wit-
bility, at least tentative arrangements should be ness' resistance to questioning and his refusal to
made. The Special Agent should be sure to ex- testify. It may become necessary to apply interro-
press his appreciation. gation techniques to witnesses who are unwilling
to respond to questions asked during the inter-
c. Precepts. In preparing for and conducting an
view (para 4-16 through 4-18). The witness may
interview of volunteers, the Special Agent feel that once his testimony becomes public
should— knowledge and he is identified, his personal af-
(1) Check, or initiate check of, the files of fairs may be affected adversely. In some in-
his unit for possible information on the source. stances, the witness may visualize with misgiv-
(2) Attempt to make arrangements to avoid ings a courtroom scene in which he will be the
interruption. butt of a sarcastic lawyer's barbs and public ridi-

4-10
 FM 30-17

cule. These concerns may cause the witness to lie (2) Some witnesses are eager to demonstrate
in an attempt to avoid association with the case. their knowledge and to prove to themselves that
they are indispensable members of society. They
c. Circumstances or Conditions Affecting Ques- may be braggarts ; they may talk too much ; they
tioning Witnesses. There are certain circum-
may know it all. The Special Agent must be pa-
stances and conditions which may be present and tient, weigh critically everything that is said,
which may aflfect the evaluation of the informa-
separate truth from fiction by asking pertinent
tion received from a witness. questions, and analyze the information carefully
(1) The physical and mental qualifications by comparing with other known facts.
and condition of a witness are the most accurate (3) Some witnesses are timid and others
gauge of his value. The accuracy of the witness'
may be suffering from emotional stress and ner-
observations may be affected; for example, if a vous tension. The Special Agent must attempt to
witness stated that he observed something at a quiet their fears by being patient and under-
distance of 100 yards, the condition of his eyes standing. There may be occasions when the Spe-
would have to be considered in evaluating his tes- cial Agent will gain much by asking questions
timony. when the witness is extremely vocal due to his
(2) Witnesses must have the capacity to ob- emotional condition; however, after the witness
serve, comprehend, and report. The qualifications has calmed down, he should be requestioned. Ex-
of a scientist, for example, to testify on scientific perience indicates that some witnesses offer the
matters within his field of interest would differ most factual information during periods of emo-
considerably from those of a layman. tional upset because their normal mental pro-
(3) Categorical statements regarding the sex cesses, which would have permitted them to ra-
of a witness as a basis for evaluation are mislead- tionalize events and color their stories, are not
ing. A woman's emotional traits may differ from functioning.
those of a man, but instability is a characteristic (4) A habitual liar obviously is a poor type
not peculiar to either sex. These facts notwith- of witness, but there are occasions when such a
standing, the Special Agent must not ignore the person is the only possible source of direct evi-
fact that some women frequently rely upon intui- dence against a suspect. In such an instance, the
tion rather than critical analysis. Special Agent cannot ignore the witness because
(4) A categorical statement with respect to of his weakness. Habitual liars usually contradict
age as a qualification for the competence Of a wit- themselves ; if the witness can be made to repeat
ness also is not justified. Once a child has at- his story often enough, the truth may emerge.
tained the age of reason, his testimony may be (5) A drunk witness should be questioned on
just as valid as that of a mature person. There the spot if possible. At the risk of being led
are psychological patterns which fit certain age through a conversational maze, the Special Agent
groups. The likelihood that children will falsify should talk with the witness and strive to ex-
the facts in a deliberate attempt to influence the tract, by use of flattery, boastful disclosures
situation is relatively slight; on the other hand, which the witness might not make if sober.
their vivid imaginations are not hampered by the Later, these statements may be used as a basis
demands of logic and they tend to exaggerate. for a formal interview or interrogation of the
witness.
d. Special Cases. The Special Agent's task is
further complicated because he may deal with e. Method of Interview. (1) The Special
witnesses whose attitudes require a change in Agent should, as soon as possible, but preferably
technique. The following are types of cases which prior to the interview, check his unit files for in-
require special treatment. formation about the witness. He also should be
thoroughly familiar with all available facts of
(1) There are witnesses who are indifferent
the case.
to the problems of the Special Agent. Others
flatly refuse to talk because of possible danger to (2) The approach must include an attempt to
themselves. The Special Agent should attempt to anticipate and overcome the witness' objections,
stimulate their cooperation by appealing to their if any, to talking. As with a volunteer source, the
patriotism, by pointing out that it is to their per- witness should be put at ease.
sonal interest to talk, or by leading them into a (3) The witness should be encouraged to tell
logical path of reasoning. his story in his own way.

4-11
FM 30-17

(4) During the formal questioning on salient 4-15. Evaluating a Potential Witness
points of the story, the Special Agent must at-
The judge, jury, or other factfinding body will
tempt to separate positive evidence from infer-
judge the credibility of a witness according to his
ence, fact from fiction.
persuasive effect. The probable persuasive effect
(5) He must take precise notes on the data of a potential witness can be assessed in advance
received. of his appearance before the factfinding body by
(6) The nature of the information and its consideration of several factors:
possible use in a legal proceeding make it neces- a. Capacity for Observation, Recollection, and
sary for the Special Agent to verify the full iden- Narration. The witness who perceives all the de-
tity of the witness. tails of what he observes and is able to recall
(7) The Special Agent must determine these details and communicate the circumstances
whether the witness has information of collateral to a listener will have a very persuasive effect on
or secondary interest or information of interest any factfinding body. The degree to which these
to other intelligence and security agencies. In capacities have been developed can be tested in
some instances, it may be advisable to refer the any number of ways to assist in the evaluation of
witness to another agency for questioning; at a potential witness in advance of his appearance
other times, joint questioning may be advanta- before a factfinding body.
geous. b. Appearance. The physical appearance of an
(8) In terminating the interview, the confi- individual who may be used as a witness will
dential nature of the matter must be impressed have a decided influence on his presuasive effect.
upon the witness to prevent endangering his per- If he appears immature or his countenance con-
sonal safety, to avoid causing the witness embar- stantly reflects doubt or lack of comprehension,
assment, and to avoid possible compromise of the he is not likely to appear highly credible to the
investigation. It may be desirable to make ar- jury or other factfinding body.
rangements for contacting the witness at a future c. Prejudice. If a witness holds some prejudice
time in the event developments indicate that he which may influence or color his testimony, this
may be of further assistance. should be considered in advance of his use as a
/. The Sworn Statement. In many instances, witness.
particularly when the witness' statements are d. Agency Checks. In some cases, it will be nec-
significant to the case, the Special Agent must at- essary to have local and/or national agency
tempt to obtain a sworn statement. The procedure checks conducted on potential witnesses in an at-
outlined in chapter 3 of this manual is applicable. tempt to determine their reliability.

Section IV. INTERROGATIONS

4—16. General in AR 381-130 as the basis for complaint type in-

vestigations, but also violations of security regu-
Interrogation is the formal and systematic ques- lations. A person may be suspected of being di-
tioning of an individual in order to extract the rectly implicated in an overt act which threatens
maximum amount of usable information. The the security of the US Army or a command, or he
principles and techniques of interrogation con- may be suspected of sympathetic association with
tained in FM 30-15 are applicable to counterin- members of subversive organizations. In combat
telligence interrogations. Brief discussions of for example, the Special Agent may have little
those aspects of interrogation peculiar to counter- more to work with than scraps of information and
intelligence investigations are included here. his knowledge of the situation and area. Regard-
Combat counterintelligence interrogations are de- less of whether the suspicion is founded upon a
scribed in chapter 12. minimum of information such as an unlikely story
or unusual nervousness of a subject, or whether it
4—17. Interrogation of Suspects is founded on a wealth of factual data, the Special
Agent's duty is to be objective and impartial in
a. General. A suspect is a person believed to be his search for facts. Paragraph 4-12 also con-
associated with a prohibited activity. Prohibited cerns suspects when they are subjects of com-
activity includes not only the major crimes listed plaint-type investigations.

4-12
 FM 30-17

b. Psychological Aspects. The instinct of self- formation of counterintelligence interest. When

preservation is stimulated in an individual when counterintelligence personnel apprehend the sus-
he knows he is considered a suspect. This deep- pect, the apprehension, search, and seizure of evi-
rooted reaction frequently is reflected in stubborn dence should be performed in accordance with
resistance to interrogation. It is natural for the the principles and procedures given in FM 19-5.
subject to consider the interrogation as a battle Basic rules of preservation of evidence, receipt-
of wits in which he has much to lose and to look ing and accounting for the suspect's property,
upon the interrogating Special Agent as the pro- and maintaining the chain of custody of evidence
secutor. This attitude may prevail whether the must be observed (para 4-31 through 4-35). If
individual is a guilty man fully aware of his the suspect is a military female, the Special
crime or an innocent person fighting to clear him- Agent must advise her that she has the right to
self of circumstantial evidence. request a WAC of nurse officer (or any WAC or
any female) to be present during the interview.
c. Purpose of the Interrogation. Special Agents If she waives this right, a female witness must
must keep in mind the twofold objective of inter- still be within listening distance during the inter-
rogations—detection and prevention of activity view (either inside or outside the interview
which threatens the security of the US Army and room) as provided in paragraph 16, AR 600-3.
the collection of information of intelligence inter- This additional female may be of assistance by
est. Generally, in interrogation of a suspect, the conducting a body search of suspect when such a
Special Agent seeks a confession because it tends search is necessary. If the female is not in the
to expedite the flow of intelligence information military service, no requirement exists for either
the suspect possesses. a female or a male to be present during the inter-
d. Preparation. view; however, paragraph 3-21c(3) AR 195-10
states that a witness should be within listening
(1) Study of the case. The Special Agent
distance or present when a nonmilitary female is
must gather and digest all available material con-
interviewed. In addition, a signed waiver should
cerning the suspect and the case.
be obtained from the suspect or accused attesting
(2) Legal requirements. The Special Agent to the waiver (para 4-12e(8)).
must be familiar with those legal principles and
(4) A suspect not in custody. When the sus-
procedures (chap 3) which may be applicable to
pect to be questioned or interrogated is not in cus-
the case at hand. Legal requirements may differ, tody, preparations may include a consideration of
depending on whether—
a discreet approach (i.e., the suspect would be ap-
(a) The US is at war or in a military oc- proached with some plausible reason as a ruse
cupation ; and questioned). Frequently there may be insuf-
(&) The counterintelligence unit is operat- ficient evidence to bring about the apprehension
ing in overseas areas; of a suspect, or operational considerations may
(c) Status-of-forces or other agreements dictate the advisability of not apprehending the
are in effect; suspect.
(d) The suspect is or is not a US citizen;
(5) Physical preparations. The Special
(e) The suspect is a member of the US
Agent must insure the following preparations
Armed Forces; or
prior to an interrogation :
(/) The individual is a prisoner of war.
(a) The interrogation room must be avail-
In case of doubt as to the legalities in the interro-
able and free of distractions.
gation or the investigation, the Special Agent
(b) If use of recording equipment is antic-
must seek clarification from higher authority, ipated, it must be installed and checked for oper-
and with the cognizance of his superiors should ating condition.
seek the assistance of an appropriate judge advo- (c) If more than one Special Agent is to
cate. take part in the interrogation, the team must be
(3) Apprehension of suspect. Counterintel- thoroughly oriented on the case and the plan of
ligence personnel have been given the authority interrogation.
to apprehend certain categories of suspects as (d) If witnesses or other persons are to be
outlined in AR 381-103. Normally, however, sus- used to confront the suspect, availability of these
pects are apprehended by other US and/or Allied persons must be arranged.
agencies and referred to the CI element for inter- (e) Arrangements must be made to mini-
rogation because they are presumed to have in- mize unplanned interruptions.

4-13
FM 30-17

(/) Arrangements must be made for the (8) A final appeal, planned as a sustained
suspect to be held in custody or provided billeting and convincing attack on the suspect's wall of re-
accommodations, if appropriate. sistance, should be built up. Eloquent and persua-
sive reasoning, with presentation of all the facts
e. The Interrogation Proper. The basic tech-
of the case, may succeed where piecemeal consid-
niques and procedures of interrogation given in
eration of evidence has failed to bring a confes-
FM 30-15 will be applied, as appropriate. The
sion. This appeal may be based on overwhelming
following points are particularly important in in-
evidence, contradictions, or discrepancies in the
terrogations of suspects :
suspect's story, or the suspect's emotional weak-
(1) Use background questioning to provide nesses.
an opportunity to study the suspect face to face.
(2) Avoid misinterpretation and impulsive f. The Confession. If the suspect desires to
conclusions. The fact that the subject is a suspect make a confession, a syrorn statement, if possible,
may in itself create reactions of nervousness and will be obtained and the procedures of chapter 3
emotion. will apply. As long as the suspect has been given
(3) Do not permit notetaking to interfere an explanation of rights, any unsworn statement
with observation of the suspect's reactions. normally can be used in court against him. If the
suspect is neither a citizen nor a member of the
(4) Seek all details concerning the suspect's
Armed Forces, reiiuirements will be stipulated in
implication in prohibited activity.
the unit's SOP.
(5) Concentrate on the details of the story to
detect flaws. Each statement of the suspect must
be examined for its plausibility, relationship to 4—18. The Polygraph
other statements made or to facts known, and The polygraph is frequently used as an aid to
factual completeness. Discrepancies called to the counterintelligence interrogations. The operation
suspect's attention which require adjustment fre- of the polygraph and its general application are
quently weaken the suspect's position. discussed in FM 30-15. The conditions under
(6) Every cover story has a weakness; find- which polygraph examinations are conducted
ing it is frequently the key to a successful inter- within the Department of the Army are set forth
rogation. in AR 195-6. Chapter 5 of this manual covers the
(7) Treatment required by Geneva Conven- application of the polygraph in counterintel-
tions must be strictly followed, as applicable. ligence investigations.

Section V. ELICITATION

4—19. General ble intelligence files and records, personality dos-

siers, and knowledge of other individuals who
Elicitation is a technique whereby information of
have dealt with the subject in the past should be
value is obtained through a process of directed
utilized in order to ascertain the individual's
communication in which one or more of the
background, motivations, emotions, and psychol-
parties involved is unaware of the specific pur-
ogical nature.
pose of the conversation. Elicitation is a planned
and systematic process requiring careful prepara-
tion. 4—21. Approach
The subject should be approached in normal sur-
4—20. Preparation roundings in order to avoid suspicion. There are
Elicitation is always applied with a specific pur- two basic elicitation approaches, flattery and
pose in mind. The objective, or information de- provocation. Many possible variations to these
sired, is the primary factor in determining the approaches may be used :
subject, elicitor, and setting for the elicitation ef-
a. By appealing to the ego, the self-esteem, or
fort. Once the subject has been selected, based
thé prominence of the subject, it may be possible
upon his access to, or knowledge of, the desired
to guide him into a conversation on the area-of-
information, there are numerous areas of social
interest.
and official intercourse which may be exploited
for the setting. Prior to the approach, all availa- b. By insinuating that the subject is an author-

4-14
 FM 30-17

ity on a particular topic, his opinions may be so- 4—22. The Conversation
licited. a. Once the approach has sucessfully opened
the conversation, techniques must be employed to
c. By adopting an unbelieving attitude, it may
channel and direct the conversation about the
be possible to induce the subject to expound on
area-of-interest. Some common techniques in-
the correct view or to answer out of irritation.
clude :
Exercise caution so as not to provoke the subject
to the point that rapport is broken. (1) Attempt to obtain more information by a
vague, incomplete, or too generalized response.
d. By inserting bits of factual information on a (2) Elicit additional information in areas in
particular topic, it may be possible to induce the which the subject's response is unclear (i.e., "I
subject to confirm and further expound on the agree ; however, what did you mean by. . .?").
topic. This approach does not lend itself to spon- (3) Present a hypothetical situation which
taneity. can be associated with a thought or idea ex-
pressed by the subject. Many people will express
e. By offering sincere and valid assistance to
an opinion on hypothetical situations, who would
the subject, it may be possible to determine his
make no comment concerning an actual situation.
specific area-of-interest.
b. To be successful, the elicitor must be re-
/. By exhibiting an area of mutual or common sourceful ; use initiative and imagination ; and be
interest, the subject may talk freely on the mat- unusually perceptive. He must be persistent with-
ter. (The elicitor must have more than superficial out being obnoxious, and remain in complete con-
knowledge of the subject matter.) trol of the conversation at all times.

Section VI. SURVEILLANCE

4—23. General d. To confirm or refute information furnished

by informants or anonymous reports.
Surveillance is a form of investigation which con-
sists of keeping a person, place, or other target e. To obtain admissible legal evidence for use
under physical or technical observation in order in court.
to obtain evidence or information pertinent to an
/. To obtain "probable cause" for searches.
investigation. It is a method which should be em-
ployed only when simpler and more economic ff. To locate deaddrops, meeting sites and postal
procedures are not conducive to success. This boxes.
method can produce accurate direct information
k. To check on the reliability of informants.
but usually requires a considerable amount of
planning, preparation, and extensive expenditure i. To prevent the commission of espionage or
of manhours by trained personnel. It is used to sabotage.
amplify known data, confirm or refute allega-
j. To provide background for undercover as-
tions, obtain leads upon which to base further in-
signments.
vestigation, or provide protection.

4—25. Types of Surveillance

4-24. Objectives
Surveillance is often employed by investigators In counterintelligence operations, surveillances
as an aid in acheiving investigative objectives are commonly referred to by certain terms to in-
which vary with the requirements of the case. dicate the relative intensity and sensitivity as
The most common objectives of a surveillance are well as the methods of execution. Inasmuch as a
the following: surveillance frequently includes a change of in-
tensity or the simultaneous application of more
a. To learn the identity of persons involved in a than one method, it is inadvisable to treat these
given activity. terms as inflexible categories.
b. To obtain information for a subsequent in- a. Category as to Intensity or Sensitivity.
terrogation.
(1) Discreet. A discreet surveillance is one
c. To develop leads for further investigation. in which every effort is made to insure that the

4-15
 subject remains unaware that he is under obser- mation on the area in which a surveillance is to
vation. Although every effort is made to gain as take place should be studied and analyzed. The
much information as possible, the paramount areas in which the subject lives, works, and
consideration is that the subject not become spends leisure time must be considered. If possi-
aware of the surveillance. Generally, the guiding ble a reconnaissance should be made of the road,
rule is to discontinue surveillance rather than transportation, and traffic systems in areas in
risk actions which make the subject aware of the which a moving surveillance is anticipated. The
surveillance. nature, location, and types of buildings likely to
(2) Close. A close surveillance is one in be encountered during a surveillance should be
which maintaining constant observation of the considered. Study of the subject should include
subject is the paramount objective, even though physical description, manner of dress (with em-
he may become aware of the surveillance. Sur- phasis on peculiarities contributing to ready iden-
veillance to provide protection is frequently of tification under various conditions, particularly
this nature inasmuch as the subject is generally from the rear), habits, interests, probable degree
the person to be protected. of suspicion that he might be under surveillance,
type of transportation generally used, names and
b. Category as to Method. addresses of likely contacts, financial status,
(1) Fixed. A fixed surveillance is one in walking gait, and other factors which will aid in
which the surveillant (s) remains in a relatively pinpointing problems to be encountered by the
fixed position to observe the activities at a specific surveillants. More extensive preparations, includ-
location. ing such things as renting a room or an office in
the area, studying the physical characteristics of
(2) Moving. In a moving surveillance, the
the building, procuring technical equipment for
surveillant(s) follows the subject from place-to-
observation and communication, and establishing
place to maintain continuous watch over his ac-
a cover or plausible reason for being in the area
tivities. The movement may be by foot, or by ve-
will be required if the fixed surveillance is to con-
hicle, to include land, water and air, or any com-
bination of these. tinue over an extended period of time.

(3) Technical. Technical surveillance is ac- b. Surveillance Plan. Once surveillance has
complished by the use of technical visual devices, been directed and the area and target have been
electronic equipment, and photography. Chapter studied, a plan for execution should be developed.
5 and the classified supplement to this manual, The plan must establish the number and type of
FM 30-17A, discuss techniques and procedures personnel required, the general and specific in-
employed for this and other investigative pur- structions for the surveillants to insure that the
poses. overall objective of the surveillance is under-
(4) Combination or Mixed. A combination of stood, and the, operational limitations or special
technical, fixed and moving surveillances are usu- instructions which may have been imposed. The
ally the most expensive in terms of money and plan must assign specific tasks to teams or indi-
vidual surveillants, provide for administrative
personnel but will usually achieve the best re-
and logistical support, prescribe communication
sults. Two of the most common are the progres-
sive and checkpoint surveillance. methods and procedures, and establish necessary
control measures. The degree of complexity of
the operation and the time available will deter-
4!—IPir®|j3xaiir<saftD@ifi) fee SmurwsíllDeüiñKS© mine whether the plan is formal or informal, oral
Regardless of the purpose, sensitivity, or method or written. The plan should be sufficiently de-
of a surveillance, the degree of success or amount tailed to prevent misunderstanding and confu-
of information obtained is generally proportion- sion, but it should not be so restrictive as to elim-
ate to the thoroughness of advance planning and inate all flexibility or to preclude the exercise of
preparation. Although short advance notice of all initiative by individual surveillants. Every
the requirement for a surveillance is sometimes possible contingency should be visualized in plan-
necessitated by the sensitivity or critica'ity of the ning and preparing for a surveillance; however,
information to be obtained, the follow ing plan- mobile surveillants, in particular, must not be ov-
ning and preparatory measures should be taken erburdened with special equipment.
to the extent time permits.
c. Selection of Personnel. Selection of person-
a. Area and Target Study. All available infor- nel to participate in a surveillance must be done

<3-11 &
 FM 30—17

with care, as an unqualified person can readily ing together. Practice surveillances serve to per-
compromise the task and perhaps make other fac- fect the.coordination of team members.
ets of the investigation even more difficult. If a
d. Personnel Limitations.
choice must be made between conducting a sur-
veillance with an inadequate number of qualified (1) In overseas areas, it frequently will be
surveillants and a full complement which in- necessary to use indigenous personnel as surveil-
cludes several unqualified personnel, the former lants since US personnel in some areas or locales
choice is preferable. The principal qualifications would be conspicuous. These natives should have
of surveillants include : the appropriate physical characteristics, customs,
dialects, economic status, and other characteris-
(1) An inconspicuous appearance. An other-
tics necessary in the area concerned.
wise qualified person must be disqualified from
participation if he has some outstanding physical (2) When indigenous personnel are used, US
feature or possesses mannerisms which will draw personnel should be used as the control and su-
attention to his person. pervisory element of the surveillance team, as
well as for other broad aspects of the surveil-
(2) Ability to remain unnoticed. The surveil- lance effort. These indigenous personnel should
lant must be able to blend with his surroundings also be full-time employees of the MI unit. This
in a wide variety of environmental conditions. will insure, as fully as possible, their loyalty to
Thorough area and target study contribute to the the unit. Their association with the unit must not
surveillant's success in adapting himself to vary- be well-known to avoid compromise and should
ing circumstances without attracting attention to not be normally used in surveillances involving
himself. American personnel.
(3) Resourcefulness. The surveillant must be (3) The US surveillance team commander
able to meet unexpected situations with poise and should participate in the surveillance for control
presence of mind. Resourcefulness is especially purposes but he should stay in the background.
valuable when it is necessary to locate a subject The team commander should be familiar with the
who has eluded or otherwise become lost to the language, racial characteristics, and other social
surveillant(s). aspects of the area. He must train the indigenous
(4) Patience and physical stamina. Nearly surveillants in his general method of operation.
every surveillance will include long periods of
e. Administrative and Logistical Arrange-
relative inactivity during which the surveillant ments. These arrangements will require advance
must remain alert and prepared for an eventual-
planning and preparation to support a surveil-
ity.
lance. They include, but are not limited to, the
(5) Keen sensory perception and retention following :
memory. The surveillant must develop the ability
(1) Relief from other duties and issuance of
to examine systematically what he sees or hears
appropriate orders, when required, for surveil-
so that details will register clearly in his mind.
lance personnel.
Opportunities for making notes may be limited,
and a good memory for details is a very valuable (2) Procurement of any special documenta-
attribute. tion which may be required.
( 6 ) Prior surveillance experience. It is essen- (3) Provision of funds to cover projected
tial that a maximum number of participating and contingency expenditure.
personnel have previous experience in surveil- (4) Arrangements for transportation for
lance. The details and techniques required, par- moving surveillance as well as transportation to
ticularly for team operations, cannot be learned and from fixed observation points.
completely from textbooks or by participating in
a few exercises. Experience must be gained in sim- (5) Special supplies, such as special clo-
ple surveillance of less sensitive subjects and in thing, photographic equipment, audio and com-
protective surveillance operations of a more rou- munications equipment, and similar logistical
tine nature. A CI unit in an area where surveil- items.
lance can be anticipated should maintain one or (6) Arrangements for the surveillants to
more surveillance teams of Special Agents. The eat, if it would be unwise for them to enter res-
success of a team surveillance is frequently de- taurants, or if they cannot get to an eating estab-
pendent on the experience gained through work- lishment.

4-17
 PWi g®-! F

(7) Issuance of firearms if necessary or re- b. Moving Surveillance.

quired. (1) Foot surveillance. When a foot surveil-
(8) Preparation of a cover story to explain lance is employed, it is essential that it be con-
the surveillants' presence and activity in given ducted by a team rather than by an individual
areas (ditch diggers, surveyor, traffic counters, surveillant. There may be a few occasions when a
etc. ). foot surveillance has to be conducted with only
one surveillant, but these are exceptions. The
(9) Details on shift changes planned well in
general inadequacy of results obtained and the
advance.
greater risk of compromise militate against the
/. Communications and Control Arrangements. use of a lone surveillant who normally will con-
The success of a surveillance is frequently depen- duct a fairly close surveillance.
dent upon a reliable means of communication be- (a) ABC method. The most common proce-
tween the control element and the surveillants. dure for the foot surveillance is referred to as the
Radio, telephone, sound, or visual signals may be "ABC" method (fig 4—1). One member of the
employed alone or in combination. Aerial and vi- team takes a position (A) a short distance (dis-
sual signals to be used between the surveillants tance will depend on the environment, number of
must be developed carefully to allow flexibility people in the area, and nature of the area) be-
and preclude compromise and must be practiced hind the subject(s). Another takes a position (B)
to insure recognition during an actual surveil- behind A, and a third takes a position (C) on the
lance. When possible, radio communication subject's flank, usually across the street. If the
should be established as the primary means of team has other members, they follow behind B
communication between operating elements and and C. Such a surveillance over an extended pe-
the surveillance control point. Under certain con- riod of time may require replacement to prevent
ditions, consideration should be given to the use the subject from recognizing a surveillant. It is
of secure communications systems such as opera- best to relieve the surveillance team one at a time
tional codes and voice security equipment. Re- at staggered intervals to insure continuity and
gardless of the communication arrangements, it avoid confusion. Prearranged visual and/or audio
is essential that one central point be established signals are usually essential to the success of a
for direction and control of operations at all foot surveillance.
times. The chain of command must be clearly pre- (b) AB method. A less desirable but ac-
scribed from the individual surveillant to the ceptable technique for a foot surveillance is re-
control point. ferred to as the "AB" technique where the surv-
eillant directly behind the subject is again in the
Q—TF. Coffidtagfl' @<? SyrveoDlaorae© A position. The B position can either be behind A
or on the subject's flank. When both surveillants
a. Fixed Surveillance. A fixed or stationary operate on the same side of the street as the sub-
surveillance may vary from intermittent periods ject, and the subject turns a corner, A continues
of short observation to a carefully prepared ob- in the original direction and crosses the intersect-
servation point operated on a 24-hour basis over ing street. From his vantage point across the
an extended period. It may be conducted from an street, A will then signal the correct procedure
outside standing post, a vehicle, or within a for B to follow. B should not turn the corner or
building. It often includes the use of photo- come into sight until he has received the signal.
graphic equipment, and frequently a technical When B is operating across the street and the
surveillance is also involved. Surveillance from a subject turns a corner to the right, away from B,
fixed observation point is physically and mentally B will cross the street behind the subject and
exhausting. If the observation is to continue over take up the A position. This move should be
too long a period, arrangements for frequent re- prearranged, and no signals should be necessary.
lief should include provisions which will allow All visual signals employed should be discreet
the relief surveillance personnel to arrive and the and consistent with the environment (fig 4-2). If
relieved personnel to depart without attracting the subject turns to the left and crosses the street
such notice as might compromise the surveil- toward B, B should drop back to avoid meeting
lance. If a fixed vehicular surveillance is used in the subject. B could go into a store or continue
a neighborhood at night, the car doors should be straight ahead. B should keep A in sight to ob-
opened and closed since people unconsciously lis- serve his signals indicating what the next move
ten for car doors to close after hearing a car stop. should be.

41—11®
 FM 30-17

x
«'f
i i

1
vl
I
i

1. APPROACHING INTERSECTION 2. SUBJECT TURNS RIGHT

-O --y *-0 v

3. EXCHANGE OF POSITIONS 4. NEW POSITIONS

Figure 4-1. "ABC" method of surveillance.

4-19
 FM 30-1IJ

m
•Ni

^¡3

éteK ^vt«
h Approaching intersection 2. Subject turns right

«/.-ti
& te
rôViî ®*5
üy.
«»íí éO-
m aj I
m «JS

»«iTfi
Wái-ál M
azi1
!«»sï
JCW&feSiVÍ
m Left Tu rn Tu rn
3. Subject turns Deft 4. Mew positions

iF<SiX S&i» m'Zfr

£&iA i ) na _•?■ rt». ï «
JLV¿'

:l§:

Figure U—2. "AB" method of surveillance.

<«-2®
 FM 30-17

(c) One-man method. A one-man surveil- packages on the rear window ledge or removing
lance should be avoided in a moving surveillance them from the ledge, or similar changes. In addi-
because it does not provide for flexibility. Its best tion, frequent changes of cars must be considered.
employment is in a fixed surveillance. If a moving Radio communication between surveillance cars
one-man surveillance must be resorted to then the is normally available (FM 30-17A). If radios are
surveillant should operate to the rear of the sub- not available, a set of visual signals must be ar-
ject when on the same side of the street, and keep ranged to coordinate the movement of the cars.
as close to the subject as possible to observe his Care must be exercised to prevent use of the
actions. Crowd and street conditions normally radio equipment from attracting undue attention.
dictate the appropriate distance to be maintained When the driver is the only surveillant in the
between the subject and the surveillant, however, car, it may be useful to place a small tape re-
consideration must be given to the prevailing corder in the car with him which he can use for
light conditions, the subject's evasive actions, and his notes instead of a distracting pad and pencil.
the Special Agent's personal desires. As a general Advance coordination of a vehicular surveillance
rule, the more people on the street, the closer the with other agencies, particularly the police, is de-
surveillant stays to the subject. If the subject sirable and essential in some areas. The police
turns a corner in an uncrowded area the surveil- need be informed only to a degree commensurate
lant should continue across the intersecting with security of the activity. To aid in identify-
street. By glancing up the streeet in the direction ing subject's vehicle under adverse traffic,
the subject traveled he can note the subject's po- weather, or light conditions, it may be possible to
sition and actions, and act accordingly. The surv- equip the subject's vehicle with some recognition
eillant can then operate across the street from device which the subject will not notice. For ex-
the subject, recrossing the street at his leisure to ample, reflective tape could be placed on the vehi-
fall back in behind the subject. When the subject cle's undercarriage, or one taillight could be re-
turns a comer on a crowded street, the surveil- placed with one of higher intensity. Under cer-
lant should stop at the corner and unobtrusively tain conditions, it may be possible to use surveil-
observe the subject's actions. Unless the subject lance vehicles with direction-finding radio equip-
is standing just around the corner, the surveil- ment, e.g., attaching a small transmitter to the
lance can be continued from the same side of the subject's vehicle and thereby following or locat-
street. Whatever the conditions, however, the in- ing his vehicle by the transmitted signal. Vehicu-
vestigator should not turn a corner immediately lar surveillance must be practiced to achieve any
behind the subject. When operating from across degree of professionalism. The driver must gain
the street, circumstances will dictate whether to experience so that he depends mainly on the
operate forward, to the rear, or abreast of the other occupants of his car for observation, thus
subject. It is best if the surveillant can be abreast devoting his attention to the driving. Again, the
of the subject when he turns a corner to enable ABC method is highly preferred, but in cases
the observation of any contact made or an entry where only two vehicles can be employed, both
into a building. vehicles should follow the subject at different dis-
(2) Vehicular surveillance. Under most con- tances on the same street, (fig 4-2) as in the AB
ditions, two or more vehicles are required to con- method of foot surveillance. This technique can
duct a vehicular surveillance, although, traffic be varied by having one vehicle going in the same
conditions permitting, one may suffice for a short direction as the subject on a parallel street while
period of time. The first car should remain some receiving radio-transmitted directions from the
distance behind the subject with not more than surveillants directly behind the subject. This
one or two vehicles between it and the subject's technique is more flexible than the one-vehicle
vehicle if the traffic is at all heavy. The second surveillance in that two vehicles can exchange
car should be further behind or following a par- places from time-to-time, or one vehicle can pre-
allel route one or two blocks away (fig 4-1, 4-2). cede the subject. If more vehicles and people are
At times, one car may precede the subject; in any available, other techniques can be planned that
event, the surveillance cars should alternate posi- are even more flexible. When one vehicle is used
tions frequently to reduce the chances of subject's for surveillance it must remain far enough be-
recognition of the surveillance cars. These "pro- hind to escape detection. When the subject's vehi-
files" can be changed by shifting occcupants cle turns a corner, the surveillants may continue
(front-to-rear or rear-to-front), adding or drop- to follow, or they may make one of two possible
ping an occupant, changing license plates, placing moves to help break up the following pattern (fig

4-21
FM 30-17

4-3). They may continue in the original direc- c. Mixed or Checkpoint Surveillance. When the
tion, cross the intersecting street and make a daily pattern of activity of a subject under inves-
U-tum ; the subject will take little interest in a ve- tigation is relatively constant, a checkpoint sur-
hicle turning into a streeet behind him coming veillance can be employed. It consists of placing
from a direction that is opposite to that which he mobile, fixed, or technical surveillants at strate-
was traveling before turning the corner. An al- gic points to mark the subject's progress from
ternate move would be to continue in the original one point to another along routes normally used
direction, crossing the intersecting street and by the subject. Foot or vehicular surveillants, de-
continuing around the block. The subject will not pending on subject's mode of transportation, can
expect to be under surveillance by a vehicle ap- be placed to the rear and/or front of the subject
proaching him from a frontal direction. but at a greater distance than is normally used in

JS
m
m %
m
m
an & m ¡SL

wnsm

r-i
« n
m «m mmm
A A ï-t
w
\7
3

S I B I
22 &
A
A «c-.
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ST-3 SUBJECT (b) surveillant on foot

TTTU SURVEILLANTS ('") [ZZZî alternate positions

Figure US. One-vehicle surveillance.

4-22
 FM 30-17

a discreet surveillance. When the subject deviates directions of a passer-by, or merely pausing to
from his normal pattern, these floating surveil- light a cigarette are examples of natural actions
lants would then proceed into a normal discreet which may allay the suspicions of the subject.
surveillance. Many variations of this technique Minor changes in dress to present a new pattern
can be used. of appearance also contribute to maintaining an
inconspicuous appearance. Such things as putting
d. Progressive Surveillance. Progressive sur-
a rolled up newspaper in a topcoat pocket, chang-
veillance is employed in cases when the experi-
ing from a necktie to a bowtie, wearing or remov-
ence and caution of an important subject make
ing a hat or spectacles require little time and are
extreme care mandatory. Whether or not he not-
very effective in altering an appearance outline of
ices any evidence that he is being followed and
the individual.
because of the importance of his mission, the sub-
ject will resort to every technique and subterfuge c. Encountering Acquaintances. During a sur-
to elude possible surveillance. By following the viellance over an extended period of time, a surv-
subject only a short distance each day, the surv- eillant may encounter acquaintances or even
eillant minimizes the probability of detection by members of his own family while he is engaged
the subject. This type of subject will be most cau- in following the subject. The general rule in such
tious when emerging from his home or office, and cases is to avoid recognition and ignore the pres-
for the first several blocks, or comparable dis- ence of the acquaintance or relative if at all pos-
tance, will take measures to elude surveillance. sible. If this cannot be done the surveillant must
After subject's residence, office, or other starting be prepared with some acceptable excuses for
point has been located, the surveillants, generally limiting the encounter to a brief natural ex-
by trial and error from day-to-day, pick up the change which will permit him to continue the
subject some distance from the starting point and surveillance without interference. Encounters of
follow or observe him only a short distance on this nature are to be expected and prior plans
the first day. On the second day, the surveillants must be made through prearranged signals to
endeavor to pick up the subject at the time and those assisting for any changes that may be re-
place they left off the day before, and then follow quired.
or observe him a short distance to a new point. If
d. Eye Contact. Normally the surveillant
the subject varies his daily routine once in a
should avoid any direct eye contact with the sub-
while, this method will be painuflly slow, but it
ject, since the impression made on his subcon-
will eventually lead the surveillants to those con-
scious mind may be manifested in later recogni-
tacts which the subject is trying to keep secret.
tion and consequent suspicion. However, a hasty
deliberate move to turn aside when confronting
4—28. Surveillance Techniques
the subject is an unnatural and obvious action,
Although no predetermined solution can be estab- which may make a deeper impression than direct
lished for all situations encountered during sur- eye contact.
veillance, there are several general guidelines
which will aid in determining action to be taken e. Using Conveyances.
in situations which are commonly encountered. (1) Taxicab. If the subject enters a taxi, the
a. Identification. The subject should be pointed sruveillant should attempt to obtain another cab
out to all members of a surveillance team, al- or vehicle in which to follow. In a large metro-
though in some cases a picture or detailed de- politan area, it is possible that any taxi driver
scription must suffice for identification purposes. will accept instructions to follow another car
Each surveillant must study the subject's physi- without question or evidence of special interest,
cal appearance and mannerisms so that identifi- particularly if his efforts are rewarded with a
cation under all conditions will be facilitated. Do more substantial tip. However, the surveillant
should be prepared in all cases to provide the
not rely on subject's dress for identification.
driver with some innocuous but logical explana-
b. Remaining Inconspicuous. The surveillant tion if the driver is reluctant to comply with the
must be constantly aware of his surroundings to request. If necessary, the presentation of creden-
be able to proceed with an apparently natural tials or badge for this purpose may be effective,
and deliberate act if the subject should approach but this procedure will be governed by prior in-
him directly or evince undue interest in his ac- structions from the unit controlling the surveil-
tions. Entering a business establishment, asking lance. If the surveillant is unable to obtain any

4-23
FM 30-17

vehicle to follow subject's taxi, he should note the ject are significant considerations in determining
name of the cab company, the cab number, license further action.
tag number, and the time and place of loading.
(1) Small building. If the building has exits
This information should be relayed to the surveil-
which can be kept under observation from a dis-
lance control point as soon as possible, to deter- creet outside position, the surveillant normally
mine, if required, subject's route and destination
should not enter. However, if the previous pat-
through the appropriate cab company and/or au-
tern of activity indicates that the subject may
thorities.
make a contact or engage in some other action
(2) Bits or streetcar. The surveillant should pertinent to the investigation, the surveillant
try to enter the same conveyance as the subject should enter by an entrance other than that used
and position himself to the rear of the vehicle by the subject, or otherwise convey the impres-
and behind the subject. If he misses the bus or sion that he has arrived at the building from a
streetcar, he may be able to use a taxicab or other different direction than the subject.
means to overtake and board the bus or streetcar (2) Large building. A surveillant normally
at a subsequent stop. will follow the subject into a large building such
(3) Plane, bus, or railroad. If the subject en- as a department store or office building. Within
ters a station or terminal and purchases a ticket, the building, the surveillant must take advantage
the surveillant should discreetly attempt to ob- of the building layout to observe subject without
tain as much information as possible regarding attracting attention to himself. Magazine and
the trip. A position in line one place removed cigar counters in office building lobbies will often
from the subject will often afford the opportunity afford cover for the surveillant's actions immedi-
to overhear the discussion between the subject ately after he enters the building. If the subject
and the clerk without any indication of obvious enters an elevator, the surveillant should also
interest. The limits imposed on the surveillance enter if there are passengers and the subject is
will govern whether or not the surveillant pur- unsuspecting. The surveillant may ask for the
chases a ticket and follows subject on his trip. In floor below or above that requested by the sub-
many cases, an air shuttle will arrive sooner than ject. In the latter case, the surveillant should
a scheduled airline and can be used in getting to then use the stairs to reach the same floor as the
the destination ahead of the subject for resump- subject in order to resume his observation. If the
tion of the surveillance or for boarding the same elevator is used and the surveillant gets off on the
aircraft with subject. The ease of boarding air same floor as the suspect, the surveillant should
shuttles will alleviate certain surveillance re- immediately move to a particular counter or de-
quirements. If the surveillant is not to follow partment on that floor. Loiterers are conspicuous.
subject, he should attempt to obtain as much of If the subject enters an elevator as an only pas-
the following data as possible so that the surveil- senger, the surveillant should remain in the lobby
lance may be resumed by another counterintel- and determine subject's destination by watching
ligence unit either en route to or at subjects' des- the floor indicator. Surveillance can then be re-
tination : sumed by using either the stairs or the elevator
(a.) Description of subject's dress, empha- to reach the same floor as the subject.
sizing outstanding items which might facilitate (3) Hotel. If the subject registers at a hotel,
recognition. the surveillant should attempt to ascertain the
(b) Description of hand baggage and hold room number by observation of the registration
baggage. process from a discreet distance. Since the room
(c) Date and time of departure and date, keys are normally maintained on a numbered
time, and place of arrival at destination. board or in boxes directly behind the clerk, it is
(d) Name and number of the train, plane usually possible to observe which key is with-
flight, or bus and type of accommodations (coach, drawn and given to the subject. The surveillant
sleeper, first class, etc.). should exercise caution in seeking the assistance
(e) Any other details which will facilitate of hotel staff personnel to obtain a room adjacent
resumption of surveillance en route to or at des- to the subject, monitor his mail, obtain a record
tination. of incoming calls or telegrams, examine the regis-
ter, or take any other action connected with the
/. Entering Buildings. The size, nature, and investigation. In overseas areas in particular,
surrounding locale of buildings entered by sub- hotel staff personnel frequently have ties with in-

4-24
 FM 30-17

telligence and subversive organizations. The unit lent opportunity to find a suitable point from
SOP or policy on such matters must be known which to make a photograph, if required, as the
thoroughly by the surveillant. subject emerges from the booth.
(4) Motel. If the subject's vehicle enters a g. Subject is Lost. If the subject is lost during
motor court, the surveillant should not follow im- the surveillance, the first action is to report this
mediately, but from a discreet distance he should fact to the surveillance control point. Relocating
attempt to observe if the subject registers and to the subject is most often accomplished by study-
which cabin or unit he proceeds. Should it then ing the pattern of his prior actions and establish-
be determined advisable for the surveillant to ing temporary fixed surveillance at points he is
also register, he must exercise caution. He has most likely to visit. If the loss-of-contact took
not only the problem of remaining inconspicuous place during a moving vehicular surveillance, it
himself but he must keep his vehicle from at- is often possible to resume observation by system-
tracting subject's attention. Many motels are sim- atically searching the general area where subject
ilar to hotels ; in such instances, the same guide- disappeared, using lookouts at major intersec-
lines will apply. tions, and giving special attention to parking
(5) Restaurant. When the subject enters a lots and sidestreets. Subject may also reappear in
restaurant, the surveillant must seat himself out the area where he was last seen. Pretext calls to
of the direct view of the subject but with a view his home or office may also locate his wherea-
of the subject. If the subject is accompanied by bouts. The use of a square or box pattern in the
others, and thier conversation is deemed to be of area where the subject was last seen may also
probable interest to the investigation the surveil- yield results if radio communications are availa-
lant should attempt to place himself within hear- ble for reassembling the surveillance team should
ing distance. The surveillant must give attention subject be located by a single surveillant. Assist-
to the type of service ordered by the subject and ance from police or other authorities should not
govern his own order accordingly to insure that be requested without approval from the surveil-
he will be able to pay his check and depart from lance control point.
the restaurant without disrupting the surveil- h. Compromise of Surveillant. If the subject of
lance when the subject leaves. In some instances, a discreet surveillance clearly indicates by his ac-
the departure of the subject can be anticipated, tions that he has become aware of the surveil-
and it may be advantageous to pay the check and lance, the surveillant should withdraw from the
leave ahead of the subject, provided that this can area, discontinue the surveillance, and notify the
be done without attracting the subject's atten- control point. The surveillant should insure that
tion. his departure from the area is conducted in an
(6) Telephone booth. When the subject en- unobtrusive and natural manner, regardless of
ters a phone booth, the surveillant must consider the degree of his certainty of compromise. The
the following possibilities of gaining information surveillant must always be prepared to offer a
which may contribute to the investigation : logical response if confronted by the subject and
(a) It may be possible to use a adjoining accused of following him. In such case, a good of-
booth to overhear the conversation of the subject. fense is often the best defense; a belligerent de-
(b) The subject may leave the phone book nial of the allegation, coupled with a threat to
open to the page containing the name of the per- summon police, may succeed in deceiving the sub-
son called, or he may note the number on the ject. If an incident or occurrence draws the sub-
phone booth wall or a slip of paper which can be ject's attention to one or more of the surveillance
retrieved by the surveillant. team members, those members must drop from
(c) The surveillant may be able to ascer- the team and withdraw from the area. Possible
recognition of a team member or members at a
tain the number called by observing the dialing
later date could be avoided by this action. Eye
action of the subject. If the number of coins de-
contact between a surveillant and the subject is
posited indicates that the call is long distance,
the surveillant should note the exact time of the usually sufficient cause for the surveillant to drop
call and obtain the telephone number of the booth from the team.
from which the call was placed to aid in an at-
tempt to trace the call. 4-29. Detecting Surveillance
(ef) The time spent in the phone booth by It is important for the Special Agent to know
the subject will afford the surveillant an excel- various means of detecting surveillance so that he

4-25
FM 30-17

will recognize such action when taken by the sub- (2) The subject may leave the conveyance in
ject of a surveillance, but also so that he may em- an area with little pedestrian or vehicular traffic
ploy these devices himself en route to covert and then loiter in the area to determine if a sus-
meetings, cover locations, or other locations when pected surveillant dismounts at the same stop, or
he desires to insure himself against surveillance. the next one.
Some of the most common and effective means of (3) The subject may board several succes-
determining if a surveillance is in progress are— sive conveyances along a single route within a
a. Use of a "Convoy". A person who suspects short period of time and watch for faces which
he is under surveillance, or who anticipated sur- reappear.
veillance, may employ the services of one or more
g. Automobile Tactics. If the subject of surveil-
colleagues to follow him at a distance to deter-
lance is driving an automobile, he may use traffic
mine if he is being followed. The assistant is
signals and other controls to advantage to deter-
termed a "convoy" or countersurveillant. This
mine the presence of surveillance vehicles. For
means is one of the most effective in detecting
example, he may time his approach to a traffic
surveillance.
light so that he will pass through the intersection
b. Retracing Course. By changing direction of just as the light turns to red and then watch the
movement several times in a short span of time rearview mirror to determine if any other vehicle
and retracing his course, a person who suspects commits a deliberate traffic violation in order to
surveillance may be able to determine if he is follow him. He may also drive the wrong way on
being followed. This procedure is equally effec- a one-way street, feign motor trouble in a
tive for detecting foot or vehicular surveillance. sparsely traveled area, or employ a wide variety
of other tactics to test for surveillance.
c. Window Reflections. In business districts, a
subject concerned about a possible surveillance
may pause in front of a large show window for 4—30. Eluding Surveillance
the ostensible purpose of window shopping, and Many subjects who suspect surveillance, or be-
then observe the reflections of passers-by to spot cause of the clandestine nature of their activities,
indications of surveillance. expect it, will take steps to elude the observation.
Common and effective measures for eluding sur-
d. Use of Bait. The subject may throw away a
veillance include—
scrap of paper, an envelope, or some similar item
which would be of interest to anyone following a. Entering and Leaving Crowded Buildings. In
him. He will then use window reflections or a business areas, a person seeking to evade surveil-
similar means of observation to determine if any- lance can usually succeed with little difficulty by
one retrieves the bait. hurrying in and out of crowded buildings and
e. Change of Pace. In areas where pedestrian taking advantage of multiple entrances and exits
and vehicular traffic is relatively sparse, the sub- found in larger buildings.
ject may detect surveillance by moving very b. Concealment. The subject may elude his sur-
slowly for a distance, then changing to a very veillance by dodging into an available entrance
rapid pace, and later again changing to a slow immediately upon rounding a corner and disap-
pace. The subject may couple this procecure with pearing. Entry into apartment buildings for this
a sudden stop after turning a corner in order to purpose can usually be gained by pressing a num-
observe the actions of those behind him. These
ber of bells to the various apartments. At least
procedures may be encountered in both a foot
one person will usually respond and release the
surveillance and a vehicular surveillance.
entry latch, after which the subject may enter,
/. Actions on Public Conveyances. On convey- remain concealed, and later depart by using a
ances, a person who suspects or anticipates sur- rear entrance.
veillance may employ a variety of actions to test
for the presence of surveillance. c. Use of Decoy. The subject may engage a sub-
(1) The subject may board the conveyance, stitute of like physical appearance to act as a
pay the fare, and then get off just as the vehicle decoy to mislead the surveillants. This technique
starts to move, observing the actions of others can be employed most effectively when the decoy
who have boarded at the same stop to see if any- is put into service from the subject's place of res-
one attempts to follow. idence or of employment, as surveillants are less

4-26
 FM 30-17

likely to doublecheck identification at such points. forced to rely on color of clothing or silhouette to
d. Change of Appearance. The same tactic em- maintain contact.
ployed by a surveillant to avoid becoming con-
e. Dodging. Pursuing an erratic course through
spicuous can be equally effective for the subject
seeking to elude surveillance. Changing appear- dense pedestrian or vehicular traffic is effective,
ance is particularly effective where, because of particularly when traffic controls are used to the
crowds or limited visibility, the surveillants are maximum advantage.

Section VII. COLLECTION AND HANDLING OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

4—31'. General cal evidence encountered by counterintelligence

personnel. Manuscripts, magnetic tapes, records,
a. Physical evidence is tangible in nature and
files, reports, sworn statements, photographs,
recognizable in form. It tends to prove or dis-
video tape movies, pamphlets, maps, sketches,
prove a fact in dispute. It includes all articles and
passports, identity papers, and similar documents
material collected in connection with an investi-
are likely to be collected in counterintelligence
gation to establish the identity of the perpetrator
operations.
and the circumstances under which an incident
occurred. These articles and material are used to a. Questioned Documents. Questioned docu-
aid in the prosecution of the offender or in other ments are those whose validity is disputed. FM
termination of the case. Physical evidence may be 19-20 describes various categories of questioned
encountered in any type of counterintelligence op- documents and types of assistance available from
eration, and its importance is not limited to those criminal investigation experts and laboratories.
investigations likely to result in a court trial. This assistance may be obtained through liaison
Physical evidence of probative value is often es- with the appropriate provost marshal's office.
sential to the proper determination of adminis-
trative action such as the granting of a security b. Documents Containing Codes and Ciphers.
clearance, the issuance of a visa for entry into Codes and ciphers (cryptography) are often used
the United States, or the admission of an alien in communications between operational elements
into the Armed Forces. of espionage agencies. Unless the key to the sys-
tem has been obtained, the investigator should
h. It is not expected that every Special Agent not expend any time attempting to decrypt the
will be an expert in physical evidence. The analy- message. The document, along with a history of
sis of various substances normally will require the circumstances under which it was obtained
the services of one or more specialists such as and a brief summary of the related investigation,
ballistics experts, chemists, and fingerprint tech- should be given to the nearest United States
nicians, to fully identify the substance as contrib- Army Security Agency (USASA) unit in accord-
uting to or not contributing to the crime. How- ance with FM 30-15.
ever, the Special Agent should have a general
knowledge of the value, limitations, and charac- c. Documents Suspected of Containing Secret
teristics of physical evidence and should be able Writing. Secret writing or the concealment from
to recognize, collect, handle, and preserve evi- visible detection of written material by means of
dence encountered during the course of investiga- invisible inks, specially treated papers, micropho-
tion. The following publications will be of value tography, and similar systems, are also important
for reference and training purposes : AR 190-22, facets of espionage communications systems. Doc-
FM 19-5, FM 19-20, Army Subject Schedule uments taken from espionage suspects, or other-
19-29, and Technical Bulletins of the Provost wise obtained under conditions indicating the
Marshal General (PMG)-series. He should also possible presence of secret writing, should be
be familiar with the procedures of his unit for tested for indications of secret writing. FM 30-18
obtaining the assistance of appropriate experts and DIÄM 58-11 contain guidance on the han-
and laboratory facilities. dling of documents suspected of containing con-
cealed writing. No attempt should be made to re-
cover any secret text. The material should be for-
4—32. Documentary Evidence
warded to a facility or agency where the exper-
Documents are the most common items of physi- tise is available.

4-27
FM 30-17

4—33. Other Types of Evidence portant evidence in the investigation of security

violations in which forced entry is apparent.
Traces and clues often may be found in the form
of latent fingerprints; firearms and ammunition; (5) Glass fractures, if examined by an ex-
indentations made by tools, tires, or shoes; and pert, may reveal the direction of the blow or the
from deposits of foreign substances such as type of instrument employed to break the glass.
fibers, soil, and stains. The nature of a projectile which pierced the glass
can sometimes be identified. Since each type of
a. Fingerprints. Fingerprints offer one positive glass has peculiar characteristics, examination
means of identifying individuals since they never may serve to identify the manufacturer of the
change throughout a person's lifetime. Surface glass and thus provide leads in some investigative
fingerprints can be transferred, photographed, situations.
and developed by various techniques, thus provid-
(6) Serial numbers and trademarks are im-
ing invaluable evidence for purposes of identifi-
pressed by manufacturers on many items. Nor-
cation. Detailed consideration of fingerprint pat-
mally they are found on weapons, high-grade
terns and methods of collection and preservation
locks, watches, binoculars, precision instruments,
are included in FM 19-20. Assistance of finger-
power tools, and automobile engines. If the origi-
print experts of the criminal investigation ele-
nal number has been obliterated, a crime labora-
ments of the area provost marshal may be ob-
tory can often bring it out.
tained through liaison.
c. Fibers. Hairs and fibers have distinctive
b. Indentations and Fractures. Physical im- characteristics which may be useful in identifica-
pressions and indentations left in various media tion. They may be classified as animal, vegetable,
are often of value as evidence; e.g., footprints, mineral, and synthetic.
tool marks, and markings left on ammunition by
the weapon from which it is fired. (1) Animal fibers include hair, wool, silk,
and fur. Each type can be distinguished from an-
(1) Tire imprints may identify a particular other and many types have individual character-
vehicle by association of the brand, amount of istics which permit further differentiation. By
wear, and unique scars. Direction of travel can study of the diameter and texture of a human
often be determined from the direction in which hair, for example, determination can sometimes
sand, soil, or water was thrown ; the speed, from be made of the race, sex, and general age of the
the distinctiveness of the track; and the weight individual.
of the load, from the depth of the track.
(2) Vegetable fibers include cotton, linen,
(2) Footprints may reveal direction and jute, and sisal, each of which has its own distinc-
speed of movement, sex, approximate height and tion such as color of dye and number of strands
weight, and physical deformities. In addition, the per thread.
brand of footwear may be apparent and provide
(3) Mineral fibers include glass and asbestos.
additional leads.
(4) Synthetics have expanded much beyond
(3) Firearms and bullets have individual
the well-known rayon and nylon, but each can be
characteristics which are subject to scientific ex- distinguished from other types by laboratory
amination for identification purposes. Each
analysis.
firearm and each bullet fired therefrom has indi-
vidual characteristics which may be detected by d. Soil and Stains. Samples of soil can provide
expert examination under a microscope. The information of value when examined microscopi-
weapon will have on it the name of the manufac- cally and chemically. Study may indicate a differ-
turer, a trademark, serial number, and possibly ence between soil and dust, the latter being com-
fingerprints or distinctive features. When dis- posed chiefly of vegetable fibers. Soil analysis
charged, a cartridge casing and bullet will have may reveal the geological source or general ori-
such characteristics as scratches or indentations gin, and at times a specific area of origin. Stains
associating them specifically with a particular resulting from any cause are susceptible to analy-
weapon. sis in a laboratory. They may be identified as
food, vegetable matter, grease, oil, paint, rust, or
(4) Tool m-rks sometimes indicate the type
body fluids.
of instrument used, since frequently impressions
or abrasions will be apparent at the place of use. e. Laundry Marks. Dry cleaning, laundry, and
The presence of such marks may constitute im- other clothing or linen marks, whether they be

4-28
 FM 30-17

made with indelible or invisible ink, may provide (1) Inner wrapper. The sealed container is
valuable clues in identification. Police usually wrapped and properly sealed. The following in-
maintain records which can help with this type formation should be placed on the wrapper : full
of identification. adress and return address of the transmitting
/. Detective Dyes. Police at times employ dyes agency ; when appropriate, the notation "evidènce
and fluorescent powders which can be dusted or —to be opened by laboratory personnel only" ;
sprayed on items likely to be handled by suspects. and the classification of contents. Except for the
Some of these are virtually indelible; others, in- addresses, these notations are placed on all six
visible, but susceptible to detection under ultravi- sides of the package. An envelope containing two
olet light for prolonged periods after contact. additional copies of the evidence receipts, two
copies of security receipts, plus two copies of the
letter of transmittal, should be affixed to the
4-34. Handling of Physical Evidence
inner wrapper.
a. All counterintelligence personnel should be
familiar with the material on evidence or eviden- (2) Middle wrapper. The package is then
tiary property contained in FM 19-20. A guide to wrapped and sealed a second time. The markings
the procedures for handling physical evidence is are the same as for the inner wrapper except that
outlined in figure 4-4. The Special Agent acquir- no notation is made that the package contains ev-
ing items of physical evidence is personally res- idence.
ponsible for their safekeeping until he turns (3) Outer wrapper. The package is then
them over to the designated custodian of unit evi- wrapped a third time and again sealed. The outer
dence. The custodian is, thereafter, responsible wrapper bears only the two addresses. However,
for control of and accounting for such items. a special handling notation must be made if the
Normally an officer of the counterintelligence evidence is perishable, flammable, fragile, explo-
unit will be designated as custodian of evidence sive, corrodible, or corrosive.
as an additional duty. For obvious reasons, evi-
dence must be securely stored and protected from d. The letter of transmittal for shipment of ev-
the time it is acquired to the time of its use in idence to a laboratory will be prepared in accord-
legal or other proceedings. When applicable, suf- ance with instructions contained in FM 19-20
ficient quantities of evidentiary materials must be and the appropriate PMG technical bulletin. The
acquired to permit laboratory analysis and use in following items are typical of appropriate data
court. For physical evidence to be admissible in a for inclusion in letters of transmittal of this
court of law, it is often necessary to establish type—
that the evidence was part of, and found at, a (1) Warning that the package contains evi-
particular place. For this reason photographs dence.
should be taken of the scene showing the position
of the evidence in relation to that scene. The (2) Brief summary of the case.
value of photography as evidence and pertinent (3) Brief history of the evidence.
rules are discussed in chapter 5. (4) Specific list of items and their classifica-
b. Maintaining the chain of custody of evidence tion.
is important in that it permits proof that the
(5) Clear statement of request explaining
piece of evidence collected at the scene is the
reasons for transmittal of the evidence.
same as that presented in court, that it was col-
lected at the time specified, and that it was not (6) Statement as to whether the evidence
tampered with or handled by unauthorized per- submitted has already been subjected to examina-
sons. The chain of custody is maintained by a re- tion.
ceipt system for items of evidence. (DA Form (7) Special considerations or instructions.
19-31 (Military Police Receipt for Property)). In
addition to DA Form 19-31, classified items will
also be covered by a security receipt. The use of 4—35. Release of Evidence
DA Form 19-23 (Military Police Property Identi-
Items of evidence will be released or disposed of
fication Tag), will provide for easy identification
in accordance with AR 190-22 and, in the case of
and inventory of property in custody.
classified items, in accordance with regulations
c. For transmittal of classified evidence three governing the handling or release of classified
wrappers should be used. material.

4-29
 FM 30-17

PHYSICAL EVIDENCE PROCEDURE CHART

ITEM OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

RECOGNITION
PROTECTION
A. PHOTOGRAPHY
I i C. AT THE SCENE
B. SCALE SKETCH

COLLECTION
A. ADEQUATE 0. TAGGING OR
SAMPLING LABELING
B. STANDARD OR I E. EACH ITEM
KNOWN SAMPLE SEPARATELY WRAPPED
C. MARKING FOR OR PLACED IN
IDENTIFICATION ENCLOSURE
HANDLING
CD
<
A. CARE B. GOOD JUDGMENT

O PACKING
v
u
< A. USE SUITABLE B. INCLOSE EVIDENCE
u. CONTAINER ' AND SECURITY RECEIPTS
O
C. SEAL CONTAINER
z
< WRAPPING
X
u C. THREE WRAPPER SYSTEM
(1) INNER (2) MIDDLE (3) OUTER
A. SEAL EACH WRAPPER ADDRESSES ADDRESSES ADDRESSES
B. WARNING ON WRAPPERS , CLASSIFICATION CLASSIFICATION
IF NEEDED. EXAMPLE, EVIDENCE WARNING
HANDLE WITH CARE,' «te. LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
EVIDENCE RECEIPTS
SECURITY RECEIPTS
POSSESSION
u
ujz A. TRANSPORTATION
O C. STORAGE
> B. LABORATORY
COURT PRESENTATION
TERMINATION OF CASE
DISPOSITION OR RELEASE OF EVIDENCE

Figure A—U. Physical evidence procedure chart.

Section VIII. THE SPECIAL AGENT AS A WITNESS

4—36. General through the major Army command Staff Judge

AR 381-103 discourages the use of counterintel- Advocate. However, infrequently the counterintel-
ligence personnel as witnesses at court trials. The ligence Special Agent will be called on at a mili-
regulation requires that prior to authorizing the tary court-martial, military board proceedings,
appearance of counterintelligence agents in legal Federal court trial, or at a foreign court trial to
proceedings related to the results of counterintel- relate certain facts he may have learned during
ligence activities, such appearance will be cleared the course of investigation. To be an effective wit-

4-30
 FM 30-17

ness, the Special Agent must be cognizant of what counsel for both sides of the case with equal res-
to expect when called to appear, and he must also pect and must not lose his temper, regardless of
be familiar with the procedures for taking testi- how trying the questioning may become.
mony from a witness.
b. Response to Questioning. On both direct and
4—37. Procedures for Taking Testimony cross-examination, the witness must answer only
questions asked by counsel and not volunteer
a. Direct Examination. The side which calls an other information. During cross-examination, in
individual as a witness may elicit the information particular, the witness should be cautious in re-
only by a direct examination of that individual. sponding to questions which might tend to place
The direct examination has the sole purpose of him in an equivocal position with the intent of
bringing out the facts within the personal knowl- diminishing his persuasive effect on the factfind-
edge of the witness so far as that information is ing body. Ordinarily, the witness must be positive
admissible under the rules of evidence. In gen- in his answers, testify openly, and admit frankly
eral, the questions on direct examination cannot when he does not know the answer to a question.
be leading ; that is, they cannot suggest the form He should be especially cautious in answering
of the answer, assume a fact not testified to, or questions involving judgment, such as passage of
contain a conclusion of counsel. time, speed of a moving vehicle, distance between
b. Cross-Examination. After his direct exami- objects, and similar questions. Because the an-
nation, a witness may be cross-examined by the swer to such a question is nearly always an esti-
attorney for the opposing side. Cross-examination mate or approximation, the Special Agent should
of a witness is a legal right and its denial is phrase his answer so as to make it clear that it is
highly prejudicial to a criminal defendant. The an estimate and not an exact answer. A positive,
purpose of cross-examination is to place direct categorical assertion in answer to such a question
testimony in its true context to avoid misleading may place the witness in a position where he will
the factfinding body, and to establish contradic- be made to appear ridiculous under cross-exami-
tions and improbabilities in the direct testimony nation. If asked, the Special Agent should ac-
in an effort to diminish or destroy the credibility knowledge that he has discussed the case with
of the witness. If a witness has indicated in a the attorney of the side which called him as a
previously sworn statement that one fact exists, witness. This is normal procedure and does not
and on the witness stand tells a different story, imply collusion.
the cross-examining attorney may point out the
c. Use of Memoranda and Notes. Sometimes a
inconsistency during cross-examination and
witness does not remember an incident when he
thereby attempt to impeach the credibility of that
is questioned regarding it in a courtroom. He is
witness.
permitted in such circumstances to refresh his
4—38. Appearance of the Special Agent memory from notes, statements, sketches, or
as a Witness other records he may have made at the time of
the investigation of the incident. If his memory is
a. Physical Appearance and Demeanor. When a refreshed, he then testifies of his independent
Special Agent is called to appear as a witness, his recollection, answering the question posed. The
physical appearance should be faultless, not only witness must, however, be prepared to submit
in his personal grooming, but also in posture and such memoranda or notes for inspection by the
physical attitude when on the witness stand. He court of counsel.
should adhere to all the normal courtesies of the
particular tribunal and should maintain a profes- d. Classified Information. Legally, if evidence
sional manner and bearing. When testifying, he is relevant and material to the prosecution or the
should speak clearly and distinctly so that his defense of a case before a court, board, or other
testimony will be heard and understood. He must tribunal of the United States, its disclosure can-
take his time in answering questions, especially not be avoided on grounds of security. It is true
during cross-examination, so that he will phrase that courts, boards, or tribunals would not force
his reply clearly and concisely, thereby affording the individual to commit a violation (unautho-
the attorney of the side which called him an op- rized disclosure of classified defense informa-
portunity to object to a question not proper under tion), and in most instances the possibility or
the rules of evidence. To be effective and persua- probability that testimony may involve classified
sive as a witness, the Special Agent must treat information can be predetermined. In all such in-

4-31
FM 30-17

stances, guidance must be sought by the Special made at Department of the Army level. In any
Agent through his command channels from De- event, as soon as he can anticipate being called as
partment of the Army level. In counterintel- a witness involving classified information, the
ligence cases, the decision to prosecute a case or Special Agent must seek specific guidance and in-
to institute proceedings may involve weighing the structions. A legal proceeding does not relieve the
effects of information disclosure against security Special Agent of his obligations under the provi-
consequences. Normally such a decision would be sions of AR 380-5.

Section IX. SPECIAL SITUATIONS

4-39. Use of Interpreters a higher echelon by an American fluent in the

language.
Interpreters should not be used in briefing, de-
briefing, interrogation and interview if Special
Agents fluent in that language are available, but 4-40. Interviews of Illiterates
in their absence, a properly cleared US or indige- Illiterate sources present a problem area for Spe-
nous interpreter may be used. The selection of in- cial Agents. In general, illiterate sources should
terpreters should be based on area knowledge, di- not be used unless the Special Agent concerned
alect, social status and personality as discussed in has had experience in handling illiterates. How-
FM 30-15. The techniques for the use of inter- ever, many situations will require the use of illit-
preters are contained in that field manual. If at erates, e.g., walk-ins, low level agents, witnesses
all possible, the Special Agent should record on to incident or personnel security or complaint in-
magnetic tape all translations by the interpreter. vestigations. Techniques for the interview or in-
He should then make random selections of trans- terrogation of illiterates are contained in FM
lations for review, comparison, and evaluation at 30-15.

4-32
 FM 30-17

CHAPTER 5

TECHNICAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES

Section I. GENERAL

5—1. Introduction lance countermeasures technical personnel are

qualified to conduct both physical and electronic
Counterintelligence units normally have assigned
searches for clandestine listening devices, advise
to them, or available from CI units at a higher
commanders on the existence of technical secur-
level, counterintelligence personnel skilled in
ity hazards, and provide technical support of CI
audio surveillance countermeasures, defense
operations. A discussion of CI technical surveys
against methods of entry, investigative photogra-
and inspections is contained in chapter 11. The
phy, and operation of the polygraph. Although
legal aspects are covered in chapter 3.
these personnel are trained and experienced as
counterintelligence Special Agents, the demands b. Surreptitious Entry. Surreptitious entry is
for expertise in respective technical skills dictate any entry into a guarded or locked area or con-
the need for continued assignment in positions re- tainer and a departure therefrom without leaving
quiring these skills. It is the purpose of this a trace that such entry was made. In certain in-
chapter to describe generally the technical areas stances, surreptitious entry may violate the prov-
involved and encountered in counterintelligence isions of the fourth amendment and constitute a
operations so that all counterintelligence person- crime under burglary or housebreaking statutes.
nel will have sufficient knowledge in these fields Persons caught in the course of such entry are
to consider the use of the technical specialist as- liable to prosecution individually. Defense
sistance available to them. The employment of against methods of entry (DAME) technicians
such personnel and their skills in support of are qualified to recognize the relative security
counterintelligence special operations is discussed factors, delay capabilities, limitations or weak-
in the classified supplement to this manual, FM nesses of each type of lock, locking device, lock-
30-17 A. ing system, intrusion alarm systems, vault stor-
age area and container, and electronic surveil-
5—2. Technical Fields lance devices and systems, e.g, concealed video
monitors.
a. Audio Surveillance. Audio surveillance is the
employment of electronic devices for the purpose c. Investigative Photography. The overt or cov-
of monitoring conversation, or other sound, as an ert use of photographic equipment to obtain evi-
aid in the conduct of investigative activities. In dence or information of intelligence value is an
the United States and its territories, the use of important technical investigative method. How-
wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping is ever, the circumstances involved in setting up the
strictly limited by the Fourth Amendment to the photographic equipment or in getting it into posi-
US Constitution, Section 605 of the Federal Com- tion may constitute a violation of US law, e.g.,
munications Act of 1934, and paragraph 15.11 trespassing or an illegal search within the legal
and 15.220 of the Federal Communications Rules limits of the fourth amendment. Title 18, US
and Regulations. Within the Department of the Code 2236 is the primary statute of concern to
Army this activity is regulated by AR 381-17. photographic technicians. The local Judge Advo-
Hostile intelligence services have employed audio cate Office should be contacted if any question ex-
surveillance techniques in espionage, sabotage, ists. Although photographic technicians specially
and subversion against the United States mili- trained in investigative photography and photo-
tary. These operations must be prevented, or de- graphic laboratory processing normally are avail-
tected and neutralized, if a reasonable degree of able, all counterintelligence personnel should at-
military security is to be attained. Audio surveil- tain sufficient proficiency in photography to be

5-1
FM 30-17

able to take acceptable photographs under nor- cal support and assistance in the detection of these
mal conditions as well as video recordings and re- techniques normally are available at the MI unit
producing equipment. or higher headquarters.
d. False Documentation and Secret Writing. e. The Polygraph. The use of the polygraph is
Falsified passports, identification cards, and other invaluable as an investigative aid, but it should
papers used by hostile intelligence agents to es- never be used as a substitute for further investi-
tablish their cover and facilitate movement must gation. The conditions under which polygraph ex-
be detected in order to enhance security. Of equal aminations may be conducted are set forth in AR
importance is the detection of secret writing used 195-6. Trained polygraph examiners normally
to transmit information and instructions between are assigned to military intelligence and counter-
enemy agents and their control elements. Techni- intelligence units.

Section II. AUDIO SURVEILLANCE

5—3. Audio Surveillance Systems cealed, and used in a covert or clandestine man-
ner with variations, limited only by the ingenuity
a. Any audio surveillance device, including
of the technician. They can be incorporated into
those employed by hostile intelligence services, existing electrical or communications wiring or
will consist of three basic components—
electronic equipment, concealed in building cavi-
(1) Pickup device. A typical system involves ties or conduits, hidden inside office equipment, or
a transducer, such as a microphone or similar de- placed in furniture or clothing. The listening post
vice, to pick up the sound and convert it to electr- can be any secure location from a broom closet to
ical impulses. a hotel suite. It may be located within the same
(2) Transmission link. The impulses created building as the listening device, if a metallic link
by the pickup device are carried by a pair of con- is employed, or it may be in a separate building
ductors, such as wires, conductive paint or tape, some distance away, if a radio signal is involved.
directly to the listening post, or to a transmitter
which converts the electrical impulses to a modu- 5—4. Characteristics of Audio Surveillance
lated radio frequency (RF) signal and transmits Equipment
the signal to the listening post.
Items of equipment which can be used in audio
(3) Listening post. The listening post con- surveillance systems vary greatly in size, physi-
tains the necessary equipment to receive the sig- cal appearance, and capacity. Many items are
nals from the transmission link and process them identical to, and interchangeable with, compo-
for monitoring and/or recording. nents of commercially available telephones and
(a.) Detection and amplification equip- radios. Indeed, audio surveillance and counter-
ment. Weak signals from the metallic transmis- measures equipment is available on the open mar-
sion links are amplified and applied to the moni- ket, although many firms limit the sale to law en-
toring and/or recording equipment. Radio signals forcement or security agencies.
must first be received on a radio receiver and con-
verted to audio frequency before being applied to a. Microphones. Microphones can be obtained
the amplifying and monitoring equipment. in practically any size and form. Various types
are available for specialized application and may
(b) Monitoring and recording equipment.
be disguised to appear as such common items as
Audio signals from the amplifier may be moni-
fountain pens, tie clasps, brooches, wristwatches,
tored on headphones or by visual indicators
or various household or office fixtures. Dimen-
and/or recorded on electronic recording devices to
sions vary from the relatively large carbon mi-
provide a permanent record. In special circum-
crophones to those as small as 1/4 inch in diame-
stances, the audio from the amplifier may be ap-
ter. Generally microphones must be placed in
plied to a higher powered transmitter and re-
such a position that air movement generated by
transmitted directly to a remote listening post at
sound waves will strike the diaphram of the mi-
an operational headquarters.
crophone. However, access to the area desired
b. The components described above are illus- may be attained by means of a hollow tube, usu-
trated in figures 5-1 and 5-2. They are available ally of plastic, which transmits the sound waves
in miniaturized form and can be disguised, con- to the microphone itself. This tube or the micro-

5-2
 FM 30-17

Pickup Device Transmission Link Listening Post

••
co

Tape Recorder

¿7

Transmission Line oo oo
y
Microphone
Amplifier

Earphones

Figure 5-1. Basic components of audio surveillance

wire systems.

Pickup Device Transmission Link Listening Post

I
3 Microphone

Speaker

Radio Signal
O O i_
TT T •• O O
OO fi 00
Transmitter
CD
Receiver/Amplifier

Figure 5-2. Basic components of audio surveillance

wireless systems.

5-3
FM 30-17

phone may be concealed behind a wall, under a preclude reception by ordinary household radios
floor, or above a ceiling, with a small hole bored and television receivers, transmitters are de-
to permit entrance of sound waves. Another type signed to operate on frequencies not normally as-
of microphone, the contact microphone, does not signed to commercial broadcast bands. Receivers
require air movement to actuate the diaphram, are small enough to be carried in briefcases and
but is placed against a solid which is vibrating as may be battery operated. They are equipped with
a result of sound waves striking its surface. The earphones as well as with output jacks to permit
solid may be a wall, ceiling, door, window, pipe, connecting a recorder.
or wire conduit1 which will transmit the vibra-
e. Recorders. Many commercially available
tions from the desired area to the location of the
wire and magnetic tape recorders may be em-
microphone.
ployed in audio surveillance systems. Some of
b. Transmission Systems. The simplest trans- these have such advantageous features as auto-
mission system is a pair of metallic conductors to matic start and stop (by a sound-actuated relay
carry the audio from the microphone to the lis- operating at voice frequencies), extended play
tening post. These conductors may be conven- and variable tape speeds to permit longer record-
tional wires installed and concealed for this spe- ing time, automatic volume control, and remote
cific purpose. Any existing conductors, such as control to permit turning off and on from a re-
unused electrical wire or ungrounded electrical mote location (by means of a radio signal). Min-
conduits or similar existing facilities may be iaturization of components and use of transistors
used. Special devices such as conductive paint or has led to production of recorders which are ex-
conductive tape may also be employed as well as tremely light in weight, compact, and self-pow-
existing power or telephone systems. However, ered, with extended recording time.
wires are not essential. Development of miniature
f. Other Items. Cavity resonators (self-con-
electronic components permits a microphone to be
tained monitoring units requiring no internal
connected to a very small radio transmitter
power source) and infrared transceivers (use of
which can be easily concealed. Such transmitters
invisible beam of light to transmit sound) are no
may operate from standard power sources of HO
longer new. The use of a parabolic reflector with
or 220 volts, or they may be battery operated. Re-
a microphone attached to a preamplifier to moni-
gardless of power source, they are small enough
tor conversations out-of-doors from a remote
to be concealed easily in floors, walls, electrical
point is now available. The rapidly advancing
outlets, lamp fixtures, or in recesses of uphol-
state-of-the-art of audio surveillance and counter-
stered furniture, and may have the capability of
measures equipment dictates the need for audio
remote control to permit operations from distant
surveillance countermeasures technicians to in-
locations. A battery-powered transmitter may be
crease their proficiency by continuous assignment
concealed on a person without being noticeable.
in their technical fields and continued study of
c. Amplifiers. The weak signal from a metallic new developments.
transmission link must be fed through an ampli-
fier prior to employing monitoring or recording 5—5. The Telephone
equipment. An amplifier, more correctly called a
Monitoring of telephone conversations is among
preamplifier, is normally a solid state miniature
the most productive means of surreptitious collec-
device capable of operating for an extended pe-
tion of information. Federal statutes regulate the
riod of time on a set of batteries.
use of electronic eavesdropping devices, and court
d. Receivers. A receiver is required to detect decisions have held unconstitutional the use of in-
the signal from a RF transmission link and con- formation derived from such devices as evidence.
vert it to audio frequency before it is applied to Questions regarding the evidentiary value of in-
the amplifier and the monitoring equipment. RF formation so obtained should be referred to a
links provided by normal commercial equipment judge advocate. Frequent use of the telephone
usually employ frequency modulation (FM) tech- tends to reduce alertness to the security threat
niques. Other forms of transmission include sin- posed by the instrument. Almost all telephones
gle side band (SSB), amplitude modulation are susceptible to "bugging" and "tapping." A
(AM), or pulse modulation. The radio signal may "bug" is a modification of the telephone instru-
be capable of continuous transmission or re- ment which permits monitoring of both sides of a
motely keyed. Any radio receiver may be used telephone conversation and also allows the pickup
provided it is compatible with the transmitter. To of conversation in the vicinity of the monitored

5-4
 FM 30-17

telephone, even when the handset is on the cra- test set, a miniature telephone monitoring device,
dle. "Bugging" may be accomplished by adding of a radiation type transmitter, or even a telephone
a wire to the existing normal set, internal altera- number recording device. Indirect tapping of a
tion or modification of the telephone instrument, line (requiring no physical connection to the line
or concealing a microphone inside the telephone itself) may be accomplished by means of an in-
instrument. A telephone "tap" is a device con- duction coil in conjunction with an amplifier. It
nected to the telephone instrument or line which must be realized that all of these methods are not
permits both sides of a telephone conversation to readily recognized on sight. The use of technical
be monitored. "Tapping" may be accomplished by equipment and a high degree of proficiency are
connecting a device to the wires from an instru- required for the audio surveillance countermea-
ment at any point along the line, at connector sures technician to check telephones or systems
blocks, junction boxes, or the multiwire cables for security. The most thorough check is not ab-
leading to a telephone exchange. A device used solute insurance against the monitoring of tele-
for this purpose may be a telephone lineman's phones.

Section III. SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY AND INVESTIGATIVE

PHOTOGRAPHY

5-6. General 5—7. Uses of Investigative and Intelligence

a! The DAME technician serves as a security Photography
consultant and advisor. He has a thorough o. Investigative Photography. The many uses
knowledge of regulations, directives, federal of photography in counterintelligence investiga-
specifications, and data on locks, locking devices, tions include—
locking systems, vaults, storage areas, and con-
tainers. He is also familiar with foreign locks, al- (1) Identification of individuals. Both overt
though he will require study of the locks in any photography and surreptitious photography are
particular area-of-operation to perfect his profi- performed in conjunction with surveillance oper-
ciency. His assistance in the planning and execu- ations.
tion of CI surveys, inspections, and security spot (2) Recording of incident scenes. Both over-
checks is essential. In case of suspicion of surrep- all views and specific shots of significant items
titious entry or in determining the relative secur- within the incident scene are essential.
ity of an area or container, the DAME technician
(3) Recording activities of suspects. Photog-
is fully qualified to give expert assistance. While raphy is used to provide a record of a suspect's
the DAME technician can support the local com- activities which are observed during surveillance
mander in assessing weaknesses in locking de- and cover operations.
vices, he should not be used as the local locksmith
in such services as changing all the lock combina- b. Intelligence Photography. Uses of intellig-
tions in the locale. ence photography with which counterintelligence
b. TOE or TD for most counterintelligence investigators should be familiar include—
units provide for one or more Special Agents (1) Overt photography. Photographs inno-
highly trained in investigative photography. cently taken as private snapshots frequently in-
These technicians are experienced in the use of clude information of intelligence value. For ex-
press and 35mm cameras, 16mm motion picture ample, a street scene snapshot found in the pos-
cameras, video, the Polariod system of photogra- session of a civilian refugee from a hostile area
phy, microphotography, the latent image silver might include as part of the background a good
physical system, and the counterintelligence and view of an enemy intelligence agency headquar-
intelligence applications of ultraviolet and in- ters—a major CI target.
frared photography. They are also proficient in (2) Surreptitious photography. Concealed
laboratory work associated with photography. miniature cameras, microdots, and other surrepti-
These technicians are invaluable in training tious means are used to obtain and transmit pic-
counterintelligence Special Agents in the use of tures of military installations, items of military
cameras and accessories. TM 11—401 contains equipment, maps, documents, manuals, and other
basic guidance in photographic theory and the matters of intelligence interest. Advances in the
use of photographic equipment. technology of photography, both from the point

5-5
FM 30-17

PHOTO DATA CARD

Case Number: Subject: Photographer:.

Location: Date:

Time of Day: Weather Conditions:

Camera: Negative Size:

Lens (Type):. Focal Length:

Diaphragm Setting: Shutter Setting:.

Film: _____ Filter:

Camera Positions:

A. Compass Reading:, B. Height:

C. Lateral Position:_ D. Tilt:

Artificial Light Used:. Developer:

Developing Time: Temperaturen Agitation:

Method of Printing: Contrast:

Type of Enlarger Lens:

Paper:

Distances Between Important Objects in View:

Description of Area:

Remarks:.

Figure 5-3. Photo Data Card.

5-6
 FM 30-17

of view of miniaturization and quality of photog- photographs must have been made in accordance
raphy, tend to increase the importance of surrep- with the following general rules :
titious photography to intelligence operations. a. The represented object must be material to
c. Photographs of Individual Items as Evi- the case under trial.
dence. Both documents and other physical items b. The photograph must be free of distortion.
of evidence may be photographed in connection
with investigations. c. The photography must be verified by a per-
son who is personally acquainted with the local-
d. Specific Techniques for Analysis of Docu- ity, object, person or thing represented, and who
ments. Photography may be used to copy impres- is able to state that the photograph represents
sions on paper, carbon paper, or chemical era- the appearance of the subject matter in question.
sures. This type of photography normally re-
quires the services of the trained photographic d. Nothing must be removed or altered at the
technician and laboratory facilities. scene of an incident prior to the taking of the
photograph unless absolutely necessary; then a
note should be made indicating the reason for the
5—8. Photography as Evidence
removal or alteration.
A photograph may be valuable as evidence since
e. Although not a prerequisite for admissibility
it—
as evidence, photographs should be supported by
a. Presents facts in pictorial form and creates notes made at the time of photography to provide
mental impressions more vivid and realistic than a description of whát the photograph includes,
those achieved by words alone. case number of name of the subject, time and
b. Presents evidence in pictorial form more ac- date, lighting and weather conditions ; plate, film,
curately than the verbal description. lens and type of camera; time of exposure and
stop used; specific reason for taking the picture;
c. Permits consideration of evidence which, be-
location of the camera; compass direction; and
cause of size, bulk, weight, or condition, cannot
specific reference to all important objects por-
be brought into the courtroom.
trayed. Any one of these details may be of impor-
d. Reduces the need for lengthy descriptions tance during a trial, particularly if the photo-
and explanations. graph is challenged. The notes should be retained
by the investigator (photographer) on a format
5-9. Rules Pertaining to Photographs as similar to the Photo Data Card as shown in
Evidence figure 5-3. All photographs must be marked for
In order to qualify for admissibility as evidence, identification purposes as explained in FM 19-20.

Section IV. FALSE DOCUMENTATION AND SECRET WRITING

5-10. -'Detection writing may be found in DIAM 58-11 and FM

a. In counterintelligence investigations, partic- 30-18.
ularly in counterespionage and countersub-
version, use of false documentation to support 5-11. Availability of Technical Support
cover stories by hostile intelligence agents should a. Personnel trained in detecting false docu-
be anticipated. False documents are expertly fab- mentation and secret writing may be obtained by
ricated and extremely difficult for an untrained counterintelligence elements from higher Mili-
person to detect. tary Intelligence headquarters, or through The-
b. Detection of secret writing, frequently used ater Army. Normally, procedures for obtaining
to conceal messages in innocuous appearing cor- this type of support will be established in SOP.
respondence, is usually beyond the capability of b. Assistance in detecting false documentation
an untrained Special Agent. Suspicion that cer- may often be obtained from other intelligence
tain correspondence contains an invisible message and security agencies, including those of host
may arise, but confirmation, or actual detection, countries, within the area-of-operations. Such as-
normally requires the services of specially sistance includes information about the types of
trained technicians and laboratory^ facilities. false documentation which may be encountered,
Techniques to establish the legitimacy of per- identifying characteristics, and other data con-
sonal or other documentation, and to detect secret cerning the origin and use of these documents.

5-7
fM 30-17

Section V. THE POLYGRAPH

5—12. General any problem areas or attempts to determine the

The polygraph may be used as an investigative reason for questionable reactions or responses.
aid, subject to the provisions set forth in AR b. Emotional Factors. Numerous emotions may
195-6, tó further interrogation or investigation be involved and will appear on the chart as phys-
by furnishing indications of attempted deception. iological responses. The chief psychological fac-
Through the employment of proper investigative tor in all polygraph examinations is to focus ex-
and interrogation techniques, the polygraph ex- aminee's psychological set on that portion of the
amination of the average subject may provide test which causes him the most concern.
valuable information. The polygraph will record
certain physiological phenomena such as changes
in blood pressure, pulse rate, respiration, and 5—15. Suitability of Subjects for Exam-
skin resistance. The results of a polygraph exam- ination
ination, unless supported by admissions or con- The counterintelligence Special Agent must rec-
fessions must be viewed in terms of possibility ognize that certain mental and physical condi-
or, at best, probability of the examinee's truthful- tions may influence a person's suitability as a
ness. As an aid to interrogation, the instrument subject for examination and affect his reactions
has been of considerable value in the field of during an examination. The polygraph examiner
counterintelligence. Under no circumstances will decides whether or not a person is fit to take the
the polygraph examination be used as a psychol- examination, but he does not attempt a psychia-
ogical prop. Trained examiners, certified as quali- tric or medical examination of the subject. It is
fied polygraph examiners by the Department of important that he, as well as the counterintel-
the Army, are provided in the TOE and TD of ligence investigators on the case, consider the fol-
most CI units. Counterintelligence Special lowing :
Agents, however, must be familiar with the capa-
bilities and limitations of the polygraph examina- a. Permanent Physical Illness.
tion in order to exploit its use properly. (1) Certain heart conditions and breathing
disorders sometimes make a person unfit to take
5—13. Objectives of Polygraph Examination an examination.
The polygraph examiner attempts to— (2) A highly nervous or excitable person
may be unfit.
a. Ascertain the probability of a person at-
tempting deception. b. Temporary Physical Illness. A person who
b. Obtain leads to the facts of an offense, the is intoxicated, injured, or suffering pain or dis-
location of items, and the whereabouts of per- comfort is unfit to be examined. Extreme physical
sons. or mental fatigue and certain ills, such as colds,
coughing spells, hay fever, asthma, hiccups, and
c. Compare conflicting statements. severe allergies, may influence a person's suitabil-
d. Verify statements. ity for examination.

e. Obtain the facts after a test has indicated c. Mental Illness. Mentally deficient and in-
the possibility that a person is attempting decep- sane persons cannot be examined. Persons of very
tion. low intelligence may be difficult to examine suc-
cessfully. Often they display little moral sense or
fear of being caught in a lie or an offense. It may
5—14. Polygraph Examinations
be difficult or impossible for them to understand
a. General. The examination consists of a pre- the difference between the truth or a lie, or to un-
test discussion during which the examiner ex- derstand the purpose and procedures of the ex-
plains the operation of the instrument and re- amination. If the examiner believes a subject is
views the questions to be asked during the exami- mentally deficient, insane, or physically ill, he
nation ; the test proper, during which questions to must so inform the agency or office requesting the
be asked and the subject's physiological changes examination so that action can be taken to have
to his responses are recorded; and the post-test the subject examined by competent medical au-
interview, during which the examiner discusses thorities.

5-8
 FM 30-17

d. Other Considerations. A person who has (3) Stress the professional qualifications
been treated or questioned improperly prior to and the impartiality of the polygraph examiner.
the examination may not be a fit subject for the
examination. A person who is emotionally upset 5-17. Preparation for a Polygraph
or under the influence of a depressant, narcotic, Examination
stimulant or other drug capable of materially ef-
a. Planning Examination Questions.
fecting physiological responses, should not be ex-
amined while he is in such a condition. A person (1) The examiner prepares the actual exam-
who is unduly afraid of the test may also present ination questions from information provided by
a problem. Proper treatment and a clear explana- the investigator. General facts, theories, and sus-
tion of the examination will usually overcome picions are not enough; the examiner needs de-
these difficulties. tailed facts.
e. Pretended Ills. Some persons may seek to (2) Whenever possible, the investigator
evade or postpone the examination by pretending should inform the examiner of the unpublicized
a mental or physical illness or some other defect facts of the offense, particularly those known
which they feel will make it difficult or impossi- only to the victim, the offender, and the investi-
ble for them to be examined. gator.

/. Use of Drugs. The use of certain drugs by a b. The Setting for Examination.
person may affect his reactions on the polygraph. (1) The examination must be conducted in a
The examiner should be alert for symptoms quiet, private place. If possible, two rooms should
which may indicate that the subject is under the be provided : one as the examination room proper,
influence of drugs. When an investigator has ad- and the other as a combination waiting room and
vance knowledge that the subject has injested office. The examination room should be plainly
drugs, he should so advise the examiner prior to furnished with only a desk, chair for the subject,
the investigation. (See app E for guidance.) and chair for the examiner. The subject's chair
should face a blank wall or one free from distrac-
5—16. Treatment of the Subject tions. The room should be soundproof to elimi-
nate extraneous noises. If the setting is in a
Success of a polygraph examination depends in
warm climate, air conditioning should be in-
part on how the subject was treated before he
stalled. A two-way mirror should be placed in one
was asked to take the examination, the manner in
wall to allow for observation when a witness is
which he was asked to take the examination, and
needed. However, AR 195-6 states that the sub-
his treatment while awaiting the examination.
ject must be informed of the two-way mirror and
a. Routine Questioning. A proper interview the existence of audio recording equipment.
seldom affects the examination results. However, (2) The waiting room should contain com-
the investigator should use common sense as to fortable chairs, a desk for the examiner, and
the length and persistence of questioning. The in- other equipment which creates a professional im-
vestigator should not reveal details of an offense pression.
to a person who may be asked to take a poly-
graph examination. (3) The ideal setting for a polygraph exami-
nation will be impossible to achieve in some situ-
h. Asking a Person To Take the Polygraph ations. It is suggested that an effort be made to
Examination. The Special Agent should— approach as closely as possible the conditions de-
(1) Ask the person to be examined if he is scribed above. The examiner will be able to ascer-
willing to take the polygraph examination and in- tain quickly whether the setting is adequate to
form him that if he refuses," no adverse action permit a successful examination.
will be taken against him. Further, advise him c. Arrangements for Witnesses. Normally,
that no information concerning an individual's only the examiner and the subject should be pre-
refusal either to submit to or volunteer for a po- sent in the examination room during the exami-
lygraph examination will be recorded in any per- nation. When the subject is a woman, there
sonnel file. should be a witness to the examination. Depend-
(2) Attempt no explanation of the poly- ing on the circumstances, the witness may be pre-
graph instrument or of the examination as this is sent in the room or may observe the examination
the sole responsibility of the polygraph examiner. through a two-way mirror (with the subject's

5-9
FM 30-17

knowledge) and listen to the examination by days prior to the polygraph examination, and
means of a monitoring device (also with subject's made available during the examiner's consulta-
knowledge). tions with the Special Agent.
c. It is imperative to inform the examiner,
5—18. Use of Interpreters when known, that the subject is overly emotional,
uses alcohol to excess, may be under the influence
a.. At times, the investigator will have to ar- of sedatives or drugs, may be addicted to nar-
range for an interpreter to work with the esxam- cotics or marijuana, suffers some mental abbera-
iner. The interpreter must be fluent in the two tion, or possesses other disabilities or defects
languages to be used so that the translations will which may cause abnormal responses.
be accurate and in the proper idiom. The inter-
preter should also have some experience in inves- d. He must consult with the examiner when in
tigative questioning. doubt as to the person's fitness to take the exami-
nation. If there is still doubt, consult the individ-
b. The interpreter must have a security clear- ual exercising command or operational supervi-
ance equivalent to the security classification of sion for further determination and appropriate
the matter to be discussed during the examina- action.
tion or such material as may be revealed as a re-
e. He should never describe the polygraph in-
sult of the examination.
strument as infallible.
c. The interpreter must understand how the f. The polygraph is used solely as an investiga-
examination works and what can be accomplished tive aid and does not determine guilt or innoc-
by it. The examination should be practiced in pri- ence.
vate until the interpreter thoroughly understand
the procedure. The interpreter should be briefed
beforehand on the facts with which he must deal 5—20. Reports, Records, and Charts
in his interpretation.
a. Reports and Records. The report forms to be
d. All examination questions should be pre- used, records to be maintained, and distribution
pared and translated prior to the examination. are prescribed in AR 195-6. The Special Agent
Procedures for using an interpreter are similar to will coordinate with the examiner in the prepara-
those followed in interviews and interrogations tion of portions of the form having to do with the
except that the interpreter asks the prepared background of the investigation.
questions at a predetermined signal from the ex-
aminer who is operating the instrument. b. Polygraph Examination Results. Polygraph
examination reports obviate the necessity for pre-
paring a detailed Agent Report, DA Form 341,
5—19. Avoidable Mistakes except that the Agent Report may be used as a
cover sheet to transmit the material. No mention
Most unsatisfactory polygraph examinations are of the results of the examination or of the infor-
due mainly to unfitness of the subjects and the mation obtained will appear in the Agent Report
lack of preparation by examiners and investiga- (chap 7).
tors. The Special Agent must bear the following
in mind : c. Statistical Data. Polygraph examiners will
maintain monthly statistics of all examinations
a. It is Department of the Army policy that conducted. The data collected will not contain the
counterintelligence investigations shall be based names of persons examined. In addition, a log of
on evidence, rather than on self-disclosure in- persons examined, by name, may be maintained
duced by polygraph examinations. All other in- provided that the results of the examination are
vestigative techniques should be exhausted prior not indicated or keyed to the names.
to granting authorization for the use of the poly-
graph examination. d. Statement of Consent. The Polygraph Ex-
amination Statement of Consent (DA Form
b. He must be thoroughly familiar with the 2801) will be read and signed by each person
case file to include subject's background. This in- prior to submitting to polygràph examination.
formation, including the dossier, if available, Prior to signing the statement, examinees must
should be provided the examiner at least two be given an explanation of rights under Article

5-10
 FM 30-17

31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and polygraph examinations are admissible which
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and would be an incorrect assumption. Polygraph ex-
their right to counsel (chap 3) since the answers aminations are not reliable enough to be admissi-
to the examiner's questions can be introduced into ble in a court of law. The procedures outlined in
evidence against him. This is not to imply that AR 195-6 apply.

5-11
 FM 30-17

CHAPTER 6

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Section I. GENERAL

6-1. Introduction knowledge and exploitation of the sources of in-

formation available to him.
The counterintelligence mission requires the con-
6—2. Sources of Information
tinuous availability of sources of timely and reli-
able information on individuals, groups, and or- A "source of information" is defined for purposes
of this manual as any person, thing, or activity
ganizations which pose a security threat to the
from which intelligence information is obtained.
military establishment. One of the counterintel- All sources fall into one or more of the following
ligence Special Agent's most effective means of three categories:—human, . documentary, and
obtaining the required information is through technical/materiel.

Section II. HUMAN SOURCES

6-3. General (1) Interviewees. Individuals contacted by

Among the Special Agent's most valuable sources Special Agents or summoned to a counterintel-
of information are people. Whether their attitude ligence office during the course of an investiga-
is friendly, hostile, or indifferent, the ability to tion for the purpose of being interviewed and
exploit those persons who possess or can obtain who are aware that they are in contact with an
information of CI interest requires a special in- official military agency are termed interviewees.
vestigative proficiency that must be developed by (2) "Walk-ins" or volunteers. Individuals
all professional counterintelligence personnel. who, of their own accord, contact a counterintel-
ligence office in order to divulge information they
6—4. Conventional Source believe to be of CI interest are termed "walk-ins"
A conventional source is an individual with or volunteers. This category includes well-mean-
whom unconcealed, normal, overt contact is main- ing, patriotic citizens who furnish valuable infor-
tained. This type of source may provide any type mation, but also emcompasses a wide range of
of intelligence information; under normal cir- persons motivated by malice, avarice, revenge, or
cumstances, his identity, relationship, and con- jealousy, who may volunteer biased, distorted, or
nection with US intelligence will not jeopardize completely false information for personal rea-
him in any manner. If the source repeatedly fur- sons. Hostile intelligence agencies may also spon-
nishes privy information, the source's identity in sor confusion agents who act as "walk-ins" to
counterintelligence reports may be concealed in disseminate false or misleading information. De-
order to protect the flow of information and in- termination of the true identity and motives of
sure continued usefulness. Conventional sources "walk-ins" is essential to the evaluation of any
are divided into the following classifications : information they may offer (para 4-13).
a. Incidental Sources. Individuals who furnish (3) Unwitting sources. Individuals who
information either on a one-time basis with no in- provide information of CI interest without being
tention of repeating this service or who furnish aware that they are imparting such information
information on an infrequent and irregular basis are termed unwitting informants. Information
which does not meet the criteria for classification may be obtained from such persons by subtle eli-
as a "casual" source are known as incidental citation techniques or through technical surveil-
sources. These include— lance.

6-1
FM 30-17

(4) Others. Any individual, by virtue of his be relied upon only for that information which is
position and knowledge, may possess vital or spe- routinely available to him, and normally there is
cial information of CI interest. Normally, such no assurance that he would not furnish the same
sources are contacted for a specific purpose and information to any other agency requesting it.
continuous contact is not anticipated. The infor-
c. Official Sources. Individuals who, by virtue
mation provided may be either wittingly or un-
of their official positions, are expected or obli-
wittingly disclosed by the source, and the nature
gated to provide intelligence information openly
and circumstances of the type information ob-
to counterintelligence units in the normal course
tained determine the need for protection of his id-
of their duties are termed official sources. Certain
entity. These types of incidental sources are—
government officials, police officers, and technical
(a) Defectors.
experts are examples of official sources. Foreign
(b) Escapees.
government officials and representatives may also
(c) Refugees and displaced persons.
fall within this category, depending upon the cir-
(d) Repatriated personnel and expellees.
cumstances and agreements in effect. Continuing
(e) Detainees.
contact with offiical sources over a period of time
(/) Captured enemy personnel.
will frequently result in a relationship where the
(fir) Expatriates and members of minority degree of cooperation with the counterintel-
groups. ligence unit extends beyond that inherent in the
(h) Tourists and other transient person- official's position. In such cases, measures must be
nel/ taken to protect his connection and identity with
(i) Attendees at international gatherings. the information provided.
U) US citizens living abroad.
(k) Local nationals employed by US 6—5. Confidential Source
forces.
A confidential source is an individual whose iden-
(I) US military personnel, active, re-
tity and association with US intelligence for per-
serves, or retired, and their families.
sonal, business, official, or other reasons must be
b. Casual Sources. A casual source is one who, afforded security protection. In the field of coun-
by his social or professional position, possesses or terintelligence, confidential sources are generally
has access to information of continuing interest, employed in special operations, counterespionage,
and who willingly provides this information to countersabotage, and countersubversion activi-
the counterintelligence unit, either in response to ties. Confidential sources used in counterintel-
a specific request or on his own initiative. A cas- ligence special operations must be administered
ual source is under no obligation to furnish infor- and registered in compliance with appropriate
mation and normally is subjected to only as much directives. For a detailed explanation of confiden-
control as he is willing to accept. He usually can tial sources, see FM 30-17A.

Section III. DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

6—6. General 6-7. Mass Media

A document is defined as any written, drawn, or Mass media documentary sources are those read-
printed material which conveys information. The ily accessible to the general public and, in most
ability to exploit available documentary sources instances, easily obtained. Routinely available
is an investigative technique that provides a publications, both domestic and foreign, should
wealth of intelligence information, and greatly re- be utilized by the Special Agent in order to keep
duces the time and effort expended in counterin- well informed of current world and local events,
telligence investigations and operations. Docu- trends, political movements, personalities and or-
mentary sources include mass media, scientific ganizations. Newspapers and news magazines;
and technical material and correspondence or telephone, city, business and professional directo-
other documents exchanged between individuals, ries; maps; town plans; gazetteers; trade jour-
agencies, and governments as well as documents nals ; transportation listings, schedules and
captured by US forces or obtained from friendly routes; and standard references such as "Who's
forces. Who," almanacs and encyclopedias are some of

6-2
 FM 30-17

the publications available. Propaganda efforts of individuals, agencies and governments. As ex-
hostile and opposition forces, such as leaflets, plained in chapter 4, the files and records main-
newspapers and magazines, and trade publica- tained in the offices of the numerous federal,
tions, also assist in planning and conducting state, and local agencies, both military and civil-
counterintelligence investigations and operations. ian, are constantly utilized by the Special Agent
The mass media approach to the collection of in- during the course of investigations. Counterparts
telligence information requires a great deal of of our national, local, state, and private agencies
manpower and time to evaluate the worth of the also exist in most overseas areas. Although the
material. Differences between developed and un- scope and operations of these various overseas
developed societies usually mean a corresponding agencies will vary from their American counter-
difference in the quantity of publications that parts, in most cases, their recorded information
might provide information concerning the work- will parallel or even exceed that information
ings of a society and its people. available in similar agencies in the United States.
The reliability of recorded information obtained
from overseas agencies will vary depending upon
6-8. Scientific and Technical Documents/
the country and agency involved. Such informa-
Data
tion must be closely analyzed and evaluated be-
Exploitation of documents and data pertaining to fore being accepted as established evidence or
scientific and technical matters may reveal ad- fact. Important sources of information to the
vances and weaknesses of,a country. FM 30-16 Special Agents are those documents obtained
contains guidance on the handling, of scientific from local and higher intelligence headquarters;
and technical documents. these include such publications as intelligence
summaries (INTSUM), periodic intelligence re-
ports (PERINTREP), intelligence studies, direc-
6-9. Correspondence, Documents and
tives, and SOPs. Through judicious use of availa-
Records
ble records and files, investigation can be reduced
Perhaps the most widely and often used type of greatly and information verified. Leads can be
documentary source is correspondence or other provided indicating the existence and location of
documents legally and overtly exchanged between information which can be exploited.

Section IV. TECHNICAL/MATERIEL SOURCES

6-10. General 6—11. Technical Intelligence

Technical devices or equipment, materiel, or Whenever captured or confiscated equipment or
physical items that can be exploited for investi- materiel used or manufactured by foreign nations
gative purposes are valuable sources of informa- comes to the attention of counterintelligence per-
tion to the Special Agent. Common sources are sonnel, the item should be examined for possible
ordinary AM or FM radio broadcasts and tele- counterintelligence use and then turned over to
casts. Additional sources include photographs or the technical intelligence unit for exploitation
films, tape recordings, and charts (chap 5). (FM 30-16).

Section V. LIAISON

6-12. General and the many legal restrictions imposed, particu-

larly by status-of-forces or other delimiting
a. Inherent in the exploitation of sources is li-
agreements, frequently make the collection of
aison between individual parties or organizations
counterintelligence information dependent to a
to insure mutual cooperation, understanding, and
large extent upon the effectiveness of liaison. Li-
unity of purpose and action. In CONUS, and par-
aison with appropriate US, host country, and al-
ticularly in overseas areas, liaison with the agen-
lied military and civilian agencies is fundamental
cies and individuals having records and informa-
to the success of counterintelligence operations.
tion of CI interest is essential to the success of
Liaison procedures should be established by unit
counterintelligence investigations and operations.
SOP. Frequently the employment of a full-time
b. The nature of counterintelligence activities liaison officer, or section, to maintain regular con-

6-3
 FM 30-17

tact with designated military and civil agencies be aware that, whether of an official or informal
will be necessary. nature, liaison is a two-way street. The person
contacted by the Special Agent is usually from
c. In addition to national agencies maintaining
some other intelligence, law enforcement, or se-
or processing records and information of CI in-
curity agency, US or foreign, and expects to re-
terest, there exists numerous local agencies
ceive information from the Special Agent as well
which may also provide assistance to CI activities
as to provide information. Counterintelligence
and operations. Counterintelligence personnel
personnel involved in liaison duties must be fa-
must be familiar with available agencies and the
miliar with pertinent local directives and SOP,
type and scope of information which they can
A 380-5, AR 381-115, and other pertinent ARs
provide. Chapter 4 discusses the principal types
of the 380- and 381-series. The general rule
and locations of pertinent records that will often
("third agency rule") is that information will
be of CI interest.
not be passed to another or third agency without
the consent of the originating agency. Liaison po-
6—13. National Agencies in CONUS sitions differ in complexity from those involving
Liaison activities at the national level with mili- only records checks or exchange of documented
tary, Department of Justice, Treasury Depart- material to those involving detailed coordination
ment, State Department, Central Intelligence of all types of counterintelligence investigations
Agency (CIA), Civil Service Commission, Veter- and operations. The skilled liaison officer must
ans Administration (VA), and the Office of Selec- recognize his own limitations and bring other
tive Service are normally conducted at Depart- counterintelligence personnel into contact with
ment of Defense or Department of the Army other agencies when the occasion demands.
level. Information contained in the reports and
c. Additional overseas agencies include :
files of these agencies is usually received as a re-
sult of a National Agency Check (NAC). For (1) US official agencies.
further information, see FM 30-17A. (a) US embassies, legations, or consulates.

6—14. Local Agencies in CONUS (ft) Other intelligence and tactical units
in the area.
Liaison with military, civilian, private agencies,
and with offices of national agencies at local lev- (c) Local Judge Advocate General offices.
els is usually accomplished by a Special Agent (d) Intelligence advisors to host country
designated by his unit to establish direct, per- military forces.
sonal contact. In addition to Federal agencies rep-
resented at the local level, other agencies that ( e) Special Forces units.
should be contacted include : (/) Military Assistance Advisory Groups
a. Military G2/S2, personnel sections and pro- (MAAG).
vost marshals of units in the area. (g) Labor service battalions.
b. Civilian agencies such as state and local po-
(h) US Operations Missions (USOM).
lice or sheriffs' offices, bureaus of vital statistics,
state crime commissions, state adjutants general, (i) Civil Affairs units or staff sections.
state boards of education, motor vehicle bureaus,
and local courts. (j) Psychological warfare elements.

c. Private agencies such as chambers of com- (k) Provost Marshal and US Army Crimi-
merce, credit agencies, and public utilities. nal Investigation Command (USACIDC).
(I) USASA units.
6—15. Agencies Overseas
(2) Host country official agencies. Regard-
a. Liaison is essential to the success of counter- less of the status of US elements in the host coun-
intelligence exploitation of information in over- try, liaison personnel must exert all possible ef-
seas areas of operation. Many US agencies and
forts to establish personal rapport with their mil-
counterpart agencies of host country and allied
itary and civilian counterpart agencies at na-
forces will be found in overseas areas.
tional and local levels. In overseas areas, liaison
b. Personnel engaged in liaison activities must functions normally are assigned to full-time liai-

6-4
 FM 30-17

son personnel who should possess local language gaged in tactical operations in conjunction with
capabilities, have broad professional background, armed forces of allied nations, close and contin-
and possess personal characteristics of maturity ued liaison must be established with the respec-
and good judgment. tive counterintelligence and other intelligence
(3) Allied forces. When US forces are en- agencies.

6-5
 FM 30-17

CHAPTER 7

INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

7-1. General used by authorized requesters to request a back-

ground investigation and by control offices to no-
The information obtained through application of
tify requesters of the results of investigation.
the various investigative techniques and proce-
dures will be of little value unless it is accurately e. DD Form 1584 (Department of Defense Na-
recorded and reported. In general, counterintel- tional Agency Check Request)—DD Form 1584 is
ligence reports are written to transmit informa- used by authorized requesters to request the con-
tion to an action agency, serve as a source of in- duct of a NAC, regardless of whether or not the
formation for intelligence research, and serve as NAC is a component of a background investiga-
a permanent record of investigation. Since the tion.
end product of any investigation performed by
counterintelligence personnel is the written re- 7—3. Basic Characteristics of Reports
port, a system of standardized counterintelligence The secret of writing good counterintelligence re-
investigative reports is used to insure the logical ports lies in the writer's ability to pay strict at-
presentation of specific information gathered. tention to details. Attention must be given to the
Sample investigative reports of all types are pro- application of the six standard characteristics of
vided by command or intelligence unit SOP ; sam- all good reports.
ples of pertinent reports are included in appendix
B to this manual as well as details on how to com- a. Accuracy. Accuracy is the most important
characteristic. Reports must reflect exactly what
plete them correctly.
was seen, heard, or done. The Special Agent
7-2. Types of Reports must not make assumptions, interpret informa-
tion, nor draw conclusions. When a source
There are five basic forms of counterintelligence expresses an opinion or belief, it should be
investigative reports. Forms to be used in report- reported as such, and not as a fact. Accuracy also
ing polygraph examinations are described in AR means precision (i.e., correct spelling of names,
195-6 while special operational reports are con- business firms, and cities; exact reporting of
tained in the classified supplement to this man- dates, addresses, and times; and careful descrip-
ual, FM 30-17A. tions of actions, comments, and records).
a. DA Form 341 (Agent Report)—DA Form b. Completeness. If even one small link in the
341 is the primary report form for recording re- chain of facts is omitted, those who must take ac-
sults of counterintelligence investigations. tion on the report may make the wrong decision.
b. DA Form 342 (Report of Investigation)— So far as possible, the six basic interrogatives
Accumulated Agent Reports and exhibits for a (who, what, when, where, why, and how) must
single investigation will be compiled and results be answered in relation to every phase of the re-
forwarded by DA Form 342 (ROI). port. To insure against omissions, the report
should be proofread carefully and compared with
c. DA Form 568 (Summary of Information)— the notes on which it is based after the report is
A brief narrative, sufficiently detailed to enable finished.
the reader to understand what is contained in
c. Pertinency. Pertinency means that the infor-
other investigative records and reports, is for-
mation recorded in the report has a direct bear-
warded on DA Form 568 (SOI).
ing on the purpose of the investigation. Only in-
d. DA Form 2784 (Request for and Results of formation that is relevant to the investigation
Personnel Security Action)—DA Form 2784 is should be included in the report.

7-1
FM 30-17

d. Clarity. Material included in investigative to the point. Although conciseness does imply
reports must be clearly phrased so that it will be brevity, it does not dictate the length of the re-
easily understood and cannot be misinterpreted. port. This will be dependent upon the number of
Clear phrasing is the result of clear thinking. pertinent facts to be reported. Conciseness is
Emphasize main ideas in a direct, uncomplicated achieved by eliminating nonpertinent information
style; arrange paragraphs in logical order; and and irrelevant explanatory detail.
write in simple, standard, grammatical English
so that anyone using the report can understand
7-4. Protection of Investigative Reports
it.
Case files and dossiers pertaining to counterintel-
e. Impartiality. An impartial or unbiased re-
ligence investigations conducted in accordance
port is one in which the Special Agent has been
with AR 381-130 and individual leads or respon-
completely impartial and objective in reporting
ses containing significant derogatory information
all pertinent information, regardless of whether
concerning an identifiable person will be marked :
it is favorable or unfavorable to the subject of
"FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" and annotated
the investigation. The report must not include
that it is excluded from automatic termination
words which reveal or arouse feelings, except
(AR 340-16). Case files, dossiers, and other docu-
where such words are a direct quotation from the
ments containing classified defense information
source. Even then, the individual's reasons for
will be classified CONFIDENTIAL or higher in
using such words should be ascertained and re-
accordance with AR 380-5. Individual leads and
corded.
favorable responses to individual leads should be
/. Conciseness. A concise report goes straight marked "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY."

Section II. PURPOSE AND USE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS

7—5. General information, both favorable and unfavorable, to

preclude incorrect or arbitrary conclusions by a
Subsequent paragraphs will discuss the five basic reviewing or action agency. However, Agent Re-
counterintelligence forms in use in the US Army ports will not be passed outside of MI channels.
and their purpose and use. Details on how to com-
plete these forms are contained in appendix B, or
in AR 381-130. 7—7. Report of Investigation (DA Form 342|
The Agent Report and exhibits accumulated as a
7—6. The Agent Report (DA Form 341) result of specific investigative activities con-
ducted during the course of an investigation will
The Agent Report is used to record information be compiled and a synopsis of their content pre-
obtained as a result of counterintelligence investi- pared. These three elements—synopsis, Agent
gative activities conducted by one or more Special Reports, and exhibits—are combined to form a
Agents in connection with personnel security in- Report of Investigation (ROI), which is a com-
vestigations or incidents, and obtained through plete account of either the entire investigation or
interview, interrogation, observation, surveil- particular portion of the investigation. The syn-
lance, records examination, or other special in- opsis will be prepared on the ROI, to which the
vestigative techniques. Normally, each single in- Agent Reports and exhibits are attached. The
vestigative activity will be reported on a separate synopsis allows the requester or action agency to
Agent Report. Agent Reports serve as the basis study the investigation systematically and then
for other counterintelligence reports such as the base its decision upon the findings. Reports of In-
Report of Investigation and Summary , of Infor- vestigation are prepared by the control office for
mation. Therefore, Agent Reports must contain the investigation under the following conditions:
sufficient information in proper form to justify
any resultant action, and they must answer any a. Upon completion of :
reasonable questions which might be raised by
(1) All CTIs.
authorities reviewing the case. It is the responsi-
bility of the Special Agent to develop fully and (2) All personnel security investigations
record accurately and impartially all pertinent which result in evidence deemed sufficient to war-

7-2
 FM 30-17

rant recommendations adverse to the interest of support, speakers, autographs, drill teams, bands,
the person investigated. and even escorts for festivals and homecomings.
(3) All personnel security investigations of In these cases, characterizations may be re-
such importance or complexity that it is felt that quested for use in determining the appropriate
DA Form 2784 (Request for Results of Personnel response or course of action.
Security Action) would not furnish an adequate
summary of the rests. 7—9. Request for and Results of Personnel
Security Actions (DA Form 2784)
b. Prior to the completion of an investigation :
(1) In urgent situations which require im- Request for and Results of Personnel Security
mediate precautionary or preventive measures. Action (DA Form 2784) provides a standard for-
mat for requesting a background investigation,
(2) In cases of treason, espionage, sabotage,
limited investigation, review of previous investi-
or sedition, when the initial ROI is prepared
gations in order to validate an existing clearance,
within 30 days of initiation of the investigation,
or a check of intelligence files for any purpose.
regardless of the status of the case. Subsequent
Its use is restricted to actions involving individu-
reports of investigation will be submitted as nec-
als. Control offices will utilize DA Form 2784 to
essary and upon completion of the investigation.
notify requesters of the results of investigation.
(3) Whenever the investigation is sus- When the results of a background investigation
pended, canceled, or transferred to another jur- are completely favorable, the investigative re-,
isdiction. ports will not be furnished the requester (action
agency) unless specifically requested. This form
7—8. Summary of Information (DA Form will not be used to request a National Agency
568) Check (NAC) or Entrance National Agency
The Summary of Information (SOI) is used to Check (ENTNAC) only. (See AR 381-130 for
present a concise history or summary of the in- distribution and instructions for completion of
formation available concerning an individual, or- DA Form 2784.)
ganization or an incident. A SOI may be used as a
basis for some decisions (e.g., a decision to ini- 7—10. Department of Defense National
tiate an investigation), but is never used as a Agency Check Request (DD Form
basis for direct action against an individual. It 1584)
is used as a means of transmitting information Department of Defense National Agency Check
between commands and offices, including counter- Request (DD Form 1584) will be used to request,
intelligence offices. It is not intended to replace control, conduct, and return results of a National
other forms, such as the ROI, Agent Reports, or Agency Check (NAC) or Entrance National
Lead Sheet, and it is not used to report original Agency Check (ENTNAC). For details in pur-
information. The SOI normally is used to transmit pose, preparation, and distribution, see AR
the following types of information: 381-130.
a. A summary of files or records.
7—11. Spot Reports
b. Information which is considered of impor-
In addition to the five basic investigative reports,
tance to any government agency which has a pro-
any information obtained by counterintelligence
per interest in the facts.
personnel which requires immediate dissemina-
c. Characterizations are biographic sketches of tion to user agencies (tactical or nontactical) will
individuals or organizations who routinely ser- be submitted so that the responsible command
vice Army installations or make requests to and, if appropriate. Headquarters, Department of
Army elements and officials. These requests may the Army, may be promptly advised. Transmittal
be for a variety of reasons. For example, requests of such information is normally in the form of a
may be for admittance to installations as for civic spot report (AR 381-130).

7-3
 FM 30-17

CHAPTER 8

PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

Section I. GENERAL

8—1. Purpose 8—2. Types of Personnel Security Investiga-

Security regulations, particularly AR 380-5, gov- tions
erning classified material and information prov-
Personnel security investigations are of two
ide that no person is entitled to knowledge or pos-
session of classified defense information or mate- types: National Agency Check (NAC), and Back-
rial solely by virtue of his grade and position; ground Investigation (BI). The type and scope of
that such will be entrusted only to those individu- investigation required in any instance will depend
als whose official duties require access to such upon the category of classified defense informa-
knowledge; and that all such persons be cleared tion to which a clearance for access is required
to receive this material or information on a and on the citizenship status of the individual
"need-to-know" basis. One means employed to concerned. General principles, supervision, con-
protect classified defense information and mate- trol, and procedures governing the conduct of
rial from unauthorized disclosure is the conduct these investigations are contained in AR 381-130
of personnel security investigations of those per-
and AR 604-5. When personnel security investi-
sons who have or will have access to classified de-
gations are conducted on foreign nationals in ov-
fense information. This is done to insure that
personnel concerned are of unquestioned loyalty, erseas areas, the scope of investigation will be
integrity, and discretion; of excellent character; prescribed by the responsible area commander.
and of such habits and associations that no doubt Chapter 7 and appendix B describe procedures
exists concerning their ability and judgment in used by counterintelligence personnel to report
properly handling such information. the results of personnel security investigations.

Section II. CONDUCT OF BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS

8—3. Scope of Background Investigation c. There are times when the period of coverage
may be extended to any period of the individual's
a. Most counterintelligence investigations are
life :
background investigations (BI). Their scope en-
compasses fourteen component parts and gener- (1) In the event that such a step is necessary
ally covers the last 15-year period of the individ- to substantiate or disprove derogatory informa-
ual's life to the date of the investigation, or from tion.
the subject's 18th birthday to the date of investi- (2) When extended coverage is required by
gation, whichever is shorter. competent authority.
b. The education and birth records checks, (3) When the individual is 17 to 19 years of
which are considered important parts of the BI, age (the investigation will embrace coverage
are conducted without regard to the time and back to age 15).
date of birth limitations indicated above. The res-
triction on the 15-year coverage, or the individ-
8—4. Components of a Background
ual's 18th birthday, concerns the Special Agent
Investigation
only in that he is not required to deliberately seek
information not within the usual period of cover- There are fourteen minimum components or re-
age unless a discrepancy develops during the in- quirements of a BI, all of which are significant in
vestigation. determining} an individual's loyalty and suitabil-

8-1
FM 30-17

ity. These components are prescribed in AR rural areas, may be accepted. Baptismal and
381-130 and AR 604-5 and are discussed individ- church records may provide verification, as would
ually below. entries in an old family Bible. In cases of adop-
tions or of illegitimate births, the verification
8—5. National Agency Check may require a check of court records, or inter-
a. A National Agency Check (NAC) consists views with parents, guardians, or lawyers. In
verifying birth data, the Special Agent must be
of a search of the records and files of appropriate
careful that the information obtained is a verifi-
national agencies for information bearing on the
cation and not merely a repetition of the original
loyalty, trustworthiness, and suitability of indi-
source of information.
viduals under the investigative jurisdiction of the
DOD establishment. Whether used as the basis
for a clearance or as a part of a BI, the procedure 8-7. Education
is the same. The types of National Agency a. Time spent in high school or college repre-
Checks, national agencies of concern, location of sents a formative period of an individual's life,
specific records, conditions under which these rec- and much can be learned which may not be re-
ords will be examined, and pertinent administra- flected in the school records. It is important that
tive instructions are described in detail in AR in addition to a check of school records, personal
381-130. interviews be conducted with teachers or others
connected with the school who may have an inti-
b. The designation and processing of NACs are
mate knowledge of the subject's activities. Teach-
administrative responsibilities of the control
ers at high school and college level generally
office; however, if during the course of an investi-
have about four different classes every day, and
gation there is indication that additional specific
the composition of these classes usually changes
agencies should be checked, the Special Agent
every 6 months. It can be expected that a teacher
should recommend that such checks be made.
may not be certain that he knows the subject.
c. The control office will extend the inquiry to Most schools publish yearbooks with individual
obtain additional information as necessary in the photographs of students which can be used as an
event that derogatory or adverse information is aid in identification. Some teachers may have
received in reply to an inquiry or developed dur- more significant information than others, and
ing the conduct of the investigation. these should be searched out. The Special Agent
should not be satisfied with broad statements
8—6. Birth Records such as "John was a good student," or "George
showed subversive tendencies." He must obtain
Examination of birth records is normally not in-
facts and details; he should determine what the
cluded in a BI. If, however, in the course of the
subject said or did that led to a conclusion con-
investigation a discrepancy is noticed in the date
cerning his character, integrity, and loyalty. In
and place of birth as listed by subject on his DD
some areas, juvenile delinquency is not recorded
Form 398, (Statement of Personal History), spe-
on criminal records, but it may be found in school
cial effort is made to determine which informa-
records.
tion is correct. In establishing the correct date
and place of birth, the best information is ob- b. Extracurricular activities, as well as aca-
tained from an official birth certificate or vital demic achievements of the subject, should be con-
statistics records maintained by municipal, state, sidered. Not only the names of organizations, but
or other government agencies. The appropriate the subject's degree of interest and participation
agency varies in different areas. Birth records should be determined. Mere membership in a sub-
may be kept by a bureau of vital statistics, de- versive organization is not conclusive evidence of
partment of health, or similar agency, and may disloyalty. For example, some individuals are
be maintained at state, county, city, or township "professional joiners" and become affiliated with
level. Other methods of verifying birth informa- every club, society, or activity possible. Often
tion may be resorted to when no official records they have little idea of the purpose or func-
are available. In such cases, the investigator at- tions of these organizations and may have become
tempts to find the best information obtainable. members of subversive or front organizations
Records of doctor, midwife, or a hospital may be without actual knowledge of that fact. No conclu-
used. The vital statistic files of a newspaper sive opinion can be based on the mere fact of
which carry birth announcements, especially in membership in such an organization. The Special

8-2
 FM 30-17

Agent should intensify and extend the investiga- dren, etc., who may be, for various reasons, omit-
tion so as to prove or disprove any alleged sub- ted from DD Forms 398. Relatives of subject will
versive connections of the subject. Among the not be interviewed as listed or developed refer-
facts to be determined are subject's contributions, ences unless special circumstances warrant.
activities, degree of association, and acceptance
d. Most people, when told the subject is under
of the organization's principles.
consideration for a position of trust and responsi-
bility with the US Government or the Army, feel
8—8. Employment a moral obligation to be truthful. They are fre-
Employment records are examined in order to quently more honest in appraising a subject than
verify the period of employment and to determine he may have anticipated when he listed them as
details regarding the subject's duties and general rferences.
reliability. The reasons for termination of em-
ployment are significant. Data extracted from 8—10. Neighborhood or Residence
employment records should be substantiated by Investigations
obtaining additional information from individu- The interview of persons residing in the vicinity
als familiar with circumstances reflected in re- of the subject's residence may be conducted when
cord entries, e.g., a coworker, supervisor, or em- considered necessary to the completion of the in-
ployer. In addition, such persons may provide in- vestigation.
formation concerning subject's loyalty, character,
behavior traits, and reputation. Unions and labor 8—11. Criminal Record
activities are primary targets for subversive ele- When appropriate, or when information devel-
ments, and subject's participation in union activi- oped from a NAC is not considered adequate, it
ties may provide information concerning his par- may be necessary to check the records of police
ticular views and attitudes. However, member- departments and other law enforcement agencies
ship in a union known to have been infiltrated by in the vicinity of subject's past and present resid-
subversive personnel is not in itself evidence that ences and employment. Such checks are com-
the subject subscribes to objectives inimical to monly referred to as local agency checks. In all
the United States. In such instances, an ex- records checks, attempts are made to substantiate
tremely careful and sensitive investigation of the or verify the recorded information with testi-
subject's participation and affiliation in union ac- mony, evidence, and statements. Police records
tivities is essential, in order for responsible au- may show possible involvement in a crime, but
thorities to reach objective and valid conclusions court records may reveal that the subject was ac-
concerning its significance. quitted. On the other hand, acquittal may be
based upon a legal technicality or upon a faulty
8—9. References indictment. Scrutiny of the actual trial record is
important to obtain significant information; it
It can be assumed, in most cases, that listed ref-
may be derogatory to the subject or provide leads
erences will be prejudiced in favor of the subject.
for further inquiry. While the Special Agent
Obviously, the subject selects as listed character
seeks the best evidence, facts, and definite infor-
references those people on whom he can best rely
mation, he is also interested in rumor, hearsay,
to furnish favorable information.
and opinion, if they are pertinent to the investi-
a. Listed references may unwittingly reveal gation and lend themselves to further develop-
derogatory or adverse information during the in- ment as leads.
terview concerning subject's background, charac-
ter, or activities, thinking that they are flattering 8—12. Military Service
the subj ect. The service of an individual in the Armed Forces,
b. Listed references are usually sources of and the type(s) of discharge will be verified. The
leads to individuals who have knowledge of sub- verification of an individual's present sérvice is
ject's background and associates, but who are not accomplished by a check of the local and major
listed as references. unit's personnel files and by interviewing the im-
mediate supervisor and coworker when required.
c. Listed and developed character references Past service and type(s) of discharge received
are also the best sources for obtaining informa- are components of the NAC and will be accom-
tion regarding spouses, former spouses, or chil- plished by the control office. It is possible under

8-3
FM 30-17

certain circumstances to execute administrative b. In verifying citizenship, the Special Agent

discharges for such activities as disloyalty, sub- should be familiar with the terms "alien" and
version, indiscretion, or moral turpitude, and "immigrant alien."
such discharges may not be honorable. It is, ( 1 ) An alien is any person who is not a citi-
therefore, imperative that discharges not only be zen of the US.
verified but the circumstances of the discharge be (2) An immigrant alien is an alien who le-
investigated. gally entered the US under an immigration visa
for permanent residence. During a BI, the alien
8—13. Foreign Countries registration records will be checked at the INS
Both the material and personal interest an indi- District Office in the area that subject cur-
vidual may have in foreigners or foreign organi- rently resides in, to verify the date and place of
zations, either domestic or abroad, must be con- legal entry into the US. If subject has moved to
sidered during the investigation, since coercion or this residence since 1 January of the current
pressure may be put upon such an individual year, the records of the INS, Washington, DC
through foreign relatives or investments. This should be searched to obtain the required infor-
does not necessarily indicate that an individual is mation.
untrustworthy, but it is a factor to be considered
for the protection of both security and the indi- 8—15. Foreign Travel
vidual. If an individual has traveled outside the US
within the last 15 years, except in military ser-
8—14. Citizenship Status vice, or while the dependent of persons in such
The citizenship status of the individual must be service, records of the Department of State will
established in every BI. In all cases where the be checked to determine the reasons for travel.
subject is not a natural born United States citi- a. Department of State records may have such
zen, the investigation should show whether he is information as dates of departure and return,
a naturalized citizen, holds derivative citizenship, destination and possible activities in which the
or is an alien. individual was involved while abroad.
a.. United States citizenship may be acquired in b. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) may
three ways— have information on foreign travel, activities,
(1) Citizenship by birth. Records check of and connections of US citizens. However, their
the individual's birth will establish this type of files do not antedate July 1946.
citizenship.
8—16. Credit Records
(2) Naturalized citizen. When the individual Whenever necessary, credit agencies and credit
or his parents are naturalized citizens, the date references will be checked. Credit record checks
and place of birth, as well as naturalization of are made to determine the integrity and suitabil-
the individual, are verified through records of the ity rather than the loyalty of the individual. The
appropriate US District Court. If the place of na- investigation should be expanded if an indication
turalization cannot be determined, Immigration of bad credit or lack of financial responsibility is
and Naturalization Service (INS) records, Wash- revealed. All bad credit references obtained from
ington, DC, are examined. Citizenship itself is not financial institutions which were obtained from
awarded by the INS, but is normally granted in a other firms should be checked with the reporting
Federal or state court. firm since errors do occur or the subject may
( 3 ) Derivative citizenship. have had a legitimate complaint which was later
(a) If a minor is brought into the US by settled.
his parents and the parents obtain US citizenship
prior to the child's 18th birthday, the latter may 8—17. Organizations
claim derivative citizenship. a. When it is determined that the subject of a
(b) An individual born outside the US, BI had or has affiliation or sympathetic associa-
but whose parents are US citizens, may have dual tion with subversive type persons or affiliation
citizenship. However, he can renounce citizenship with, or membership in, subversive organizations
of the country where born and claim US citizen- as explained in AR 381-130, this association will
ship based on his parentage. He should have be established in fact and included in the Agent
proof in the form of a "certificate of citizenship." Report of the BI.

8-4
 FM 30-17

b. Subversive elements make concerted efforts may be conducted when essential to fair and pro-
to infiltrate and penetrate all groups and organi- per resolution of the case.
zations, to include educational institutions, labor
unions, veteran groups, and fraternal organiza- 8—19. Derogatory Information
tions. In view of this fact, all such associations by a. Suitability. If, during the course of a BI, ,
the subject should be reported. This serves not credible information is received or developed
only to determine subject's friends' associates, which reflects adversely on the character, integ-
and possible activities or ideologies, but also to rity, morals, or discretion of the subject, the con-
provide a reference for future checks should any trol office may change the case category to that of
of these organizations later be determined to an expanded BI. AR 604-5 lists a number of suit-
have subversive tendencies or membership. ability criteria; but information indicating that
c. The frequent explanation that participation the subject has engaged in conduct falling within
in subversive activities was due to immaturity, these criteria does not necessarily mean that he is
misplaced ideals, exercise of intelligence freedom, unsuitable. It is only upon completion of appro-
youthful impulsiveness, etc., is no basis for fail- priate inquiry of investigation and review of all
ure of the Special Agent to report such informa- pertinent facts that a positive determination can
tion. The Special Agent must report all informa- be made.
tion reflecting on the subject. b. Loyalty. If, during the course of a BI, credi-
ble information is received or developed which
8—18. Divorce Records reflects adversely on the subject's loyalty to the
Appropriate court records will be reviewed for US, the control office may change the case cate-
verification of pertinent information when the gory to that of a CTI. Chapter 9 explains th*»
subject has been divorced. Further investigation types and conduct of CTI.

8-5
 FM 30-17

CHAPTER 9

COMPLAINT TYPE INVESTIGATIONS

Section I. GENERAL

9-1. Definition and Purpose port the loss of defense information by the mili-
A complaint-type investigation (CTI) is one in tary custodian of such information.
which sabotage, espionage, treason, sedition, sub-
9—3. Complaint Type Case Categories
versive activity, or disaflfection is suspected be-
cause of the receipt or development of credible All complaint cases, whether incident or personal
derogatory information. The primary purpose of subject type, will be assigned a specific case cate-
each CTI is to produce information of such a na- gory for control, reporting, and statistical pur-
ture, form, and reliability that the requesting poses. (See AR 381-125, and AR 381-130 for ex-
agency (action agency) may determine the extent planation and definitions.) These categories are—
and nature of action, if any, necessary to insure a. Sabotage
the security of the Army.
b. Espionage
9—2. Incident and Personal Subject Cases
c. Treason
Complaint-type investigations may be either inci-
dent or personal subject cases. d. Sedition
e. Subversive activity
a. Incident Cases. Incident cases concern acts
or activities which are committed by, or involve, /. Disaffection
an unknown person or group of persons. Exam-
ples of incident cases are— 9-4. Conduct and Control
(1) Fire of suspicious origin in a sensitive a. Instructions concerning the control and di-
military installation. rection of complaint investigations are prescribed
(2) The theft of classified documents from a in AR 381-130 and AR 604-10.
military office by person or persons unknown. b. Investigation of cases which contain allega-
(3) The distribution of subversive or sedi- tions that, if proved, would constitute offenses
tious literature within a military installation by under civil or military law are conducted with a
unknown persons. view toward developing information of sufficient
(4) Damage to equipment or supplies which probative value to permit its use in the appro-
is obviously mànmade and malicious in nature. priate civil or military court. However, such in-
vestigations should not be limited to the produc-
b. Personal Subject Cases. Personal subject tion of evidence, and the investigative reports
cases involve one or more known persons. Exam- should include all relevant and material informa-
ples of activities or individuals which might re- tion inadmissible in a civil or military court of
sult in the conduct of personal subject complaint law.
investigations include—
c. The scope of knowledge and skills which the
(1) Membership or affiliation with one or
Special Agent must possess to successfully con-
more subversive organizations by a member of
duct CTIs encompasses all aspects of the tech-
the US Army.
niques and procedures described in chapters 3
(2) Collaboration with the enemy, or mis- through 7. Special Agents assigned to conduct
conduct as a prisoner, by a member of the US complaint-type investigations must also have a
Army in prisoner-of-war status. thorough understanding of the objectives and op-
(3) Negligent loss or failure to promptly re- erations of hostile espionage, sabotage, and sub-

9-1
[FM 3®—1)7

versive organizations (FM 30-17A). Extensive greater in importance when conducting counter-
counterintelligence investigative experience is espionage operations is the need for an individual
usually an essential requirement for Special with training and/or experience in MOS
Agents designated to conduct CTIs. Equally or 9668/972A/97C.

SssifeBD öl SÄiOTTA©! BGWESTOÂTOINl!

©SFoeirsiD 9—7. Dinivesîigeofive Pmeedw© im Ssateiteig)©

The essence of the crime of sabotage, Title 18, DinivestigísíiQiras
United States Code, chapter 105, sections Immediate action is of paramount importance in
2151-2156, is the deliberate injury, destruction, conducting a sabotage investigation. The possibil-
or defective production of national defense or ity may exist that the saboteur is still near the
war materials by either an act of commission or scene, or that other military targets may require
omission. Because the first indication of sabotage immediate additional security protection or pre-
normally will be the discovery of the injury, de- clude or limit further damage. Of vital signifi-
struction, or defective production, most sabotage cance is the preservation and analysis of the inci-
investigations will be incident type cases; i.e., dent scene before the evidence may be altered or
cases involving an unknown person or persons. It destroyed.
can be anticipated that acts of sabotage, both in
a. General Investigative Guidelines. The inves-
overseas areas-of-operation and in CONUS, will
tigation must proceed with objective, analytical,
increase significantly in future wars, regardless
logical thoroughness. The standard investigative
of the type or level of conflict. Sabotage is a par-
interrogatives should be applied, usually in the
ticularly effective weapon of guerrilla and par- following sequence :
tisan groups, operating against logistical and
(1) What. The Special Agent must deter-
communications installations in occupied hostile
mine what military target was sabotaged and the
areas, and of insurgents in internal defense oper-
degree of damage to the target.
ational areas. Acts of sabotage may be committed
by trained saboteurs sponsored by hostile guer- (2) When. The exact time when the act of
sabotage was initiated and when it was discov-
rilla, insurgent, or intelligence organizations;
ered must be established and confirmed from as
they may be conducted by individuals operating
many sources as possible.
independently and motivated by revenge, hate,
(3) Where. The precise location of the target
spite, or greed. In an internal defense or limited
and its relation to surrounding activities must be
war situation where guerrilla forces are active,
determined.
care must be taken to distinguish those acts in-
volving clandestine enemy agents or dissatisfied (4) How. The type of sabotage (incendiary,
explosive, mechanical, chemical, biological, or nu-
friendly personnel from overt acts of war perpe-
clear) must be established and the procedures
trated by armed enemy units.
and materials employed determined through in-
vestigation and technical examination and analy-
<&. Types ®{? Ssiboîcage sis.
Incidents of sabotage or suspected sabotage nor- (5) Why. All possible motives of the sabo-
mally are classified according to the means em- teur may be established through a process of
ployed. The traditional types of sabotage have elimination by investigation of suspects deter-
been incendiary, explosive, and mechanical. In mined to have had motive and opportunity to con-
the future, it can be expected that chemical, bio- duct the sabotage act.
logical, and nuclear means of sabotage will pose b. Specific Investigation Actions. The following
an even greater threat to military operations. A outline of possible investigative actions may be
detailed discussion of materials and devices em- employed as a guide for investigation of most in-
ployed in these types of sabotage is included in cidents in which sabotage is alleged or suspected :
FM 19-30. Special operations designed to counter (1) Obtain and analyze the details surround-
the overall threat of sabotage to the military es- ing the reporting of the incident to the counterin-
tablishment are covered in FM 30-17A. telligence unit. The identity of the person report-

©-2
 FM 30-17

ing the incident and his reasons for doing so must further damage to the target and to safeguard
be established. The facts connected with the re- classified information or material.
ported discovery of the sabotage must be deter- (3) Interview witnesses and attempt to ob-
mined and examined for possible discrepancies. tain written statements before the witnesses have
(2) Examine the incident scene as quickly as had a chance to forget details or compare stories.
possible. The Special Agent should attempt to (4) Based on facts determined from incident
reach the scene before possible witnesses have scene examination and interview of witnesses,
dispersed and evidence has been disturbed. Upon check all pertinent files. Files of particular im-
arrival at the scene, he should employ the stan- portance may include unit modus operand! files,
dard crime-scene investigative procedures, to in- partisan, guerrilla, or insurgent activity files,
clude the following steps : local police files on arsonists, local police modus
(a) Protect the scene from mutilation by operandi files, and Provost Marshal files. File
removing all unauthorized personnel from the checks should include personality checks on wit-
area, roping off the area if necessary, and posting nesses and the person who discovered and re-
one or more guards to deny entrance and prevent ported the act of sabotage.
anything from being removed.
(5) Interrogate suspects. All available infor-
(b) Locate all possible witnesses, record mation such as evidence, technical and laboratory
their names and addresses, and if feasible, hold reports, statements of witnesses, and information
them for questioning. Witnesses held should be from informants should be compiled and studied
segregated. in preparation for interrogation of suspects. In
(c) Preserve the incident scene by taking some instances, discreet surveillance may be em-
notes, causing detailed sketches to be made, and ployed prior to detention and interrogation of
taking pictures. suspects.
(d) Obtain the assistance of technical ex- c. Additional Aid. FM 19-20 contains investi-
perts to search the scene of the sabotage act, col- gative guidance particularly applicable to the in-
lect and preserve physical evidence, and obtain vestigation of incendiary sabotage; is a valuable
all possible clues. Arson specialists, explosives ex- aid in the conduct of complaint investigations in
perts, or other types of technicians may be re- which explosive sabotage is alleged or suspected;
quired. and provides excellent guidance for the protec-
(e) Take any steps necessary to prevent tion, search, and processing of the incident scene.

Section III. ESPIONAGE INVESTIGATIONS

9—8. General surveys, inspections, and technical surveys or

inspections.
Unlike sabotage cases, most espionage investiga-
tions will be personal subject rather than inci- d. Reports submitted by military units in ac-
dent type cases; that is, they will originate with cordance with provisions of AR 381-12 regarding
allegations regarding the activities of known in- espionage directed against the US Army and US
dividuals. There are instances, however, when Army personnel.
counterintelligence investigations will be directed
e. Discovery of evidence of espionage during
to conduct investigations of incidents in which es-
screening of refugees, line crossers, displaced
pionage is suspected, but the identity of suspects
persons, prisoners of war, and similar groups.
has not been established (e.g., the theft of classi-
fied documents or materiel). Leads in espionage /. Information developed during the course of
investigations may originate from a wide variety routine personnel security investigations.
of sources, prominent among which are the fol-
g. Information or evidence obtained through
lowing :
censorship operations.
a. Reports from confidential sources.
9—9. Federal Espionage Statutes
b. Reports from other intelligence, security,
The espionage statutes encompass many kinds of
and law enforcement agencies.
activities and have the ultimate goal to prevent
c. Discovery of evidence of espionage during defense information from falling into the hands

9-3
FM 30-17

of a foreign nation. The salient aspects of the Each facet, grossly negligent loss and failure to
Federal Espionage Act, Title 18, United States promptly report, is a separate and distinct crime.
Code, Sections 793-796, are summarized as fol- b. The espionage investigation must be directed
lows : toward the collection of information and evidence
Whoever for the purpose of obtaining informa- to show—
tion respecting the national defense— (1) That national defense information was
involved.
a. With the intent or reason to believe that the
information is to be used to the injury of the (2) That there was an intent or reason to be-
United States or to the advantage of a foreign na- lieve that the United States would be injured, or
tion: that a foreign nation would benefit.
(1) Goes into a place connected with the na- (3) That one or more of the acts enumerated
tional defense, for the purpose of obtaining de- in the statute actually occurred.
fense information, or—
9-11. Spying, Article 106, Uniform Code
(2) Copies anything connected with the na- of Military Justice
tional defense, or—
a. Although the crime of spying as defined in
(3) With either lawful or unlawful posses- Article 106, UCMJ, differs from espionage, com-
sion, delivers national defense information to one plaint-type investigations based on Article 106
not entitled to receive it, or fails to deliver on de- will be categorized as espionage cases for report-
mand to one entitled to receive it, or— ing and statistical purposes.
(4) Receives or obtains any writing con- b. Spying is strictly limited to a wartime mili-
nected to the national defense with reason to be- tary situation because of the requirements of in-
lieve that it was obtained contrary to law, or— ternational law, particularly the provision of the
b. With intent to communicate to the enemy Geneva Conventions. There are four elements to
during time of war, collects, communicates, or at- the crime; all four must be present to constitute
tempts to elicit information pertaining to the the crime of spying—
public defense, or— (1) Breach of our lines and apprehension
within US zone-of-operations.
c. With lawful possession, permits national de-
fense information to be lost, stolen, or ab- (2) Clandestine operations or false preten-
stracted ; or having knowledge of such loss, theft, ses.
or abstraction fails to make a prompt report of (3) Obtaining or seeking information to
the same will have committed espionage. communicate to the enemy.
(4) Specific intent to so communicate.
9—10. Investigative Guidelines in Espionage
Cases 9—12. Conduct of Espionage Investigations
a. Analysis of the statute and of pertinent Because of the wide variety of circumstances
court decisions permit the following conclusions under which espionage cases may originate, the
to be drawn with respect to proof of espionage. many different elements that may constitute the
(1) "National defense information" is infor- crime of espionage, and the fact that it may not
mation of military significance which has not always be desirable to direct the course of the in-
been published for public consumption; i.e., not vestigation toward the arrest and prosecution of
distributed in public channels. It need not be clas- the offender, no single set of investigative proce-
sified defense information as defined in AR 380-5. dures can be recommended as applicable to the
The critical points are that it relates to the na- conduct of espionage investigations. It is essential
tional defense and has been restricted to autho- that Special Agents responsible for such an in-
rized channels. vestigation have a thorough and up-to-date
knowledge of all espionage and counterespionage
(2) "Any foreign nation" means the nation
methods and procedures discussed in FM 30-17A.
involved need not be a declared enemy, as in trea-
Any or all of the investigative techniques de-
son.
scribed in this manual and FM 30-17A may be
(3) Loss through gross neglect requires no employed in espionage cases. Records examina-
positive act because it is a crime of omission. tions can be used to break the cover story of an

9-4
 FM 30-17

espionage suspect. Visual or technical surveil- Investigation, explains why arrest and prosecu-
lance can be used to obtain leads or evidence. tion are not always the objectives of espionage in-
Confidential sources or undercover operations can vestigations :
be used to locate and identify suspects. Investiga-
tive photography can be used to provide evidence In a criminal case the identification and arrest
of an attempt to transmit national defense infor- of the wrongdoer are the ultimate objectives. In
an espionage case the identification of the wrong-
mation to a foreign nation. The techniques em- doer is only the first step. What is more impor-
ployed must be determined in each individual tant is to ascertain his contacts, his objectives,
his sources of information and his methods of
case through continuing study and analysis of all communication. Arrest and public disclosure are
known information developed throughout the steps to be taken only as a matter of last resort.
It is better to know who these people are and
course of the investigation. The following quota- what they are doing, and to immobilize their
tion from testimony in February 1950 by Mr. J. efforts, than it is to expose them publicly and
then go through the tireless efforts of identifying
Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of their successors.

Section IV. TREASON INVESTIGATIONS

9-13. General owes temporary allegiance to the US because he

enjoys the protection of US laws.
a. The abuse of treason statutes in English
legal history led the framers of the US Constitu- (2) A levy of war must be an actual waging
tion to include a limiting definition of treason in of open hostilities against the Government with
that document. The Constitution also imposes specific intent to cause its overthrow.
qualifications regarding the conviction of an indi- (3) Adherence to the enemy means, in gen-
vidual for that crime—"no person shall be con- eral, any act committed after a state of war ex-
victed of treason unless on the testimony of two ists which indicates a want of loyalty to the Gov-
witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession ernment of the US, and sympathy with its ene-
in open court." (Articles, US Constitution.) mies, and which, by fair construction is directly
b. Counterintelligence complaint-type investi- in furtherance of their hostile designs.
gations in which treason is alleged or suspected (4) The levy of war and adherence to the
may occur during wartime, but are more apt to be enemy are alternative acts, either of which, when
directed immediately upon the conclusion of hos- done by a person owing allegiance to the United
tilities. Allegations of treason may originate with States, constitutes treason.
liberated prisoners of war, interned US civilians,
b. The investigative burden in treason cases is
examination of captured enemy records, or inter-
as follows :
rogation of enemy military and civilian person-
nel. Treason cases will almost always be personal (1) Allegiance to the United States at the
subject rather than incident cases. Unlike most time of the act of treason must be shown.
other complaint type investigations, the investi- (2) A levy of war under the two following
gation of a treason case will be primarily con- conditions must be shown :
cerned with obtaining evidence of past rather (a) Open hostilities against the US Gov-
than current activities of the suspected or ac- ernment must be shown.
cused person. (b) Specific intent to overthrow the Gov-
ernment of the United States must be established.
9-14. Elements of Treason Under Federal
Statute (3) There must be an adherence to the
enemy under these conditions :
a. Interpretation by the Federal courts in trea-
(a) Tangible or intangible aid to an enemy
son cases leads to the following generalities con-
must be shown.
cerning the legal elements of the crime of treason
under the Federal statute: (b) The enemy must be in a state of open
hostility with the US Government.
(1) The accused must owe allegiance to the
United States. A US citizen owes permanent alle- (4) Two witnesses to the same overt act
giance whether in the United States or on foreign must testify or—
soil (unless an effective renunciation of citizen- (5) It must be established that the acccused
ship was made). An alien in the United States intends to confess in open court.

9-5
FM 30-17

9—15. Aiding the Enemy, Article 104, and proving the overt act by two witnesses which
Uniform Code of Military Justice are essential under the Federal treason statute do
not apply.
Investigations conducted by counterintelligence
personnel to prove or disprove charges brought c. Korean War Cases Under Article 104. Arti-
against an individual subject to the UCMJ under cle 104 was used in the majority of the courts-
Article 104, Aiding the Enemy, may in some martial cases arising from the Korean prisoner
cases by categorized as treason cases (AR of war incidents. Most of the specifications in
381-130). The article provides that "any person these cases concerned the third act listed above
who (1) aids, or attempts to aid, the enemy with and specifically that part of the act making corre-
arms, ammunition, supplies, money, or other spondence, without proper authority, a crime.
things or (2) without proper authority know- The Court of Military Appeals established in
ingly harbors or protects or gives intelligence to, these cases that there are only three types of
or communicates, or corresponds with or holds communication with the enemy which may be
any intercourse with the enemy, either directly or made with "proper authority" under military
indirectly, shall suffer death or such other pun- law, regardless of the motives which prompt the
ishment as a court-martial or other military com- communication :
mission may direct." (1) A communication disclosing name, rank,
a. Physical Acts Which Constitute Aiding the SSN, and date of birth.
Enemy. From the wording of the article and (2) A communication concerning the necessi-
from interpretation by the Court of Military Ap- ties of life.
peals, there are three physical acts which consti-
(3) A communication concerning regulations
tute the crime of aiding the enemy. Any one of
and orders of the place of confinement.
these acts with general criminal intent is a viola-
tion of the article—
9—16. Conduct of Treason Investigations
(1) Aiding the enemy with ammunition,
arms, supplies, or other things. Records examination, interview, and interroga-
(2) Harboring or protecting the enemy with- tion normally will be the principal investigative
out proper authority. techniques employed in treason complaint cases.
The Special Agent must give particular attention
(3) Giving intelligence to, communicating
to the legal requirements governing the collection
with corresponding with, or holding any inter-
and preservation of evidence, especially the tak-
course with the enemy without proper authority.
ing of statements from witnesses and suspects.
b. Proof Requirements Under Article 104. He must be careful to sort out fact from rumor or
(1) It is necessary to prove only that one or hearsay when taking testimony from witnesses
more of the prohibited acts actually occurred. and when reporting the results of investigations.
In many cases, it will be necessary for the inves-
(2) The enemy need not be a declared enemy tigator to consult regularly with legal authorities
but may be a "substantial" enemy as in the case during the course of the investigation to insure
of the Communist forces in the Korean War or in that the elements of proof are being fulfilled and
the Vietnam conflict. that all applicable legal conditions and restric-
(3) The requirements of proving allegiance tions are met.

Section V. SEDITION INVESTIGATIONS

9—17. General subject type, as in the distribution of such litera-

ture by known persons. Leads or allegations
Complaint-type investigations regarding alleged
which prompt the opening of sedition investiga-
or suspected sedition may be based on either the
tions by control offices may come from many
Federal sedition statute (Sections 2384 and 2385,
Title 18, United States Code) or the UCMJ (Ar- sources, but they are most often based on infor-
ticle 94, Mutiny and Sedition). Sedition cases mation : submitted by confidential sources ; con-
may be either incident type, as in the case of the tained in reports from other agencies; or devel-
discovery of literature advocating the violent oped during the course of routine background in-
overthrow of the US Government, or personal vestigations. Complaint-type investigations in-

9-6
 FM 30-17

volving sedition may occur with equal frequency Act will necessarily be directed toward proving
in either peacetime or periods of hostilities. that the oral or written material involved in-
tended to incite listeners or readers to take ac-
9-18. Seditious Conspiracy tion.
Section 2384 of Title 18, US Code, makes it a spe-
cific crime to conspire to overthrow the Govern- 9—20. Mutiny and Sedition, Article 94,
ment of the United States. Unlike the general Uniform Code of Military Justice
conspiracy statute, which makes it a crime to Counterintelligence personnel may be directed to
conspire to commit any Federal crime, the sedi- investigate sedition or (less frequently) mutiny
tious conspiracy statute does not require the com- cases. Such complaint-type case may be either
mission of an overt act toward fulfillment of the personal subject or incident type.
conspiracy's objective. The crime of seditious con-
a-. Mutiny. Mutiny is defined as a collective ef-
spiracy is complete when two or more persons
fort to overthrow lawful military authority. It
have entered into agreement to overthrow the
Government, or to prevent, hinder, or delay the also includes, under Article 94, the individual
execution of any law of the United States. It creation of a riot or disturbance with the intent
should be noted that seditious conspiracy is a con- to overthrow lawful military authority. The of-
spiracy to actually overthrow, as distinct from a fenses may be committed in two ways : by several
conspiracy to advocate overthrow. persons acting in concert to refuse to obey orders
from proper authority, and with intent to over-
9-19. Advocacy of the Overthrow of the ride military authority ; or by a person, with sim-
ilar intent, acting either alone or in concert with
US Government
others, creating a violence or disturbance. The in-
Section 2385 of Title 18, US Code, also known as vestigation of incidents of mutiny normally will
the Smith Act, enumerates four specific types of not be assigned to counterintelligence personnel
activity which, if done with intent to cause the unless the mutiny is believed to be related to hos-
overthrow of the Government by force or vio- tile intelligence or subversive activities.
lence, constitute sedition. The prohibited acts
are : advocating or teaching thé duty or necessity b. Sedition. Article 94 makes it a crime for any
of such overthrow; or printing, publishing, sell- person, with intent, to cause the overthrow or de-
ing, or distributing written matter advocating or struction of lawful civil authority, or to create in
teaching the duty or necessity of such overthrow ; concert with any other person a revolt, violence,
or organizing a society or group whose purpose is or other disturbance against such authority. The
to advocate or teach the duty or necessity of such investigation of charges of sedition under Arti-
overthrow ; or being or becoming a member of, or cle 94 normally will be assigned to counterintel-
affiliating with, such society or group knowing ligence personnel.
the purpose thereof. Court decisions relative to
advocacy of overthrow have established that the 9—21. Conduct of Sedition Complaint
advocacy must be calculated to incite persons to Investigations
take action toward the violent overthrow of the Covert investigative techniques are likely to be
Government. The mere advocacy or teaching of applicable to the conduct of sedition investiga-
forcible overthrow of government as an abstract tions. The standard techniques of interview and
principle, divorced from any effort to instigate interrogation will also be important. A thorough
action to that end, does not constitute the crime knowledge of subversive activities, individuals,
of sedition under the Smith Act. The requirement and organizations in the area usually will be an
for the advocacy to "incite persons to take ac- essential attribute for Special Agents conducting
tion" is of particular significance to the Special sedition complaint cases. FM 30-17A provides ad-
Agent, and it can be expected that considerable ditional investigative techniques likely to be appl-
effort in any case alleging violation of the Smith icable to the conduct of sedition investigations.

Section VI. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND DISAFFECTION INVESTIGATIONS

9-22. General most areas-of-operation will be in either the sub-

The majority of complaint-type investigations versive activity or disaffection categories. Most of
conducted by counterintelligence personnel in these will be personal subject cases based on: ad-

9-7
FM 30-17

verse loyalty information developed during rou- a. Determine what act occurred,
tine background investigations; reports submit-
b. Show, based on evidence of probative value,
ted by military units under AR 381-12, reports
that the activity was detrimental to the national
from other intelligence and security agencies;
security, and
and leads obtained directly from sources used in
counterintelligence special operations (AR c. Show that the activity did not rise to the
381-47 and FM 30-17A). Because neither subver- level of treason, sedition, espionage, or sabotage.
sive activity nor disaffection, as such, is defined
AR 604-10 and AR 690-1 include specific guid-
as a specific crime in either the Federal criminal
ance regarding the conduct of complaint-type in-
code or the UCMJ, the objective of such com-
vestigation of alleged subversive activities on the
plaint-type investigations usually will be to deter-
part of uniformed or civilian personnel of the De-
mine if there is a need for some administrative
partment of the Army.
action ; e.g., removal from the sensitive assign-
ment to protect the security of the military com-
mand. 9—24. Disaffection
Disaffection, as defined in AR 381-130, is a state
9—23. Subversive Activity of mind and, although the disaffected person may
have criminal intent, there is no conduct in-
AR 381-130 defines subversive activity as all will-
volved. Hence, disaffection is noncriminal in na-
ful acts which do not fit the categories of sabo-
ture. However, a person within the military es-
tage, espionage, treason, or sedition, but which
tablishment possessing such a state of mind
are intended to lend aid, comfort, or moral sup-
creates a vulnerable spot in the national security
port to individuals, groups, or organizations ad-
and is most susceptible to approach by persons
vocating the overthrow of the United States Gov-
whose objectives are inimical to the United
ernment by force or violence, or are otherwise in-
tended to be detrimental to the national security States. The Special Agent must show the requis-
of the United States. Since this area is very nebu- ite mental attitude for disaffection through such
lous and there are no statutory standards which tangible indications as oral statements, written
the actor's conduct must meet, the investigation statements in personal correspondence, published
must: statements, or published textual material.

9—3
 FM 30-17

CHAPTER 10

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEYS AND INSPECTIONS

Section I. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEYS

10-1. General programs. Counterintelligence surveys are coor-

dinated with the local provost marshal who,
a. One of the functions of counterintelligence
under the staff supervision of the Gl, develops
units is to assist commanders in establishing sys-
and executes plans and procedures pertaining to
tems, procedures, and safeguards designed to pro-
crime prevention, maintenance of discipline, law,
tect military installations, personnel, and activi-
order, and physical security.
ties from the threat of espionage, sabotage, and
subversion. To determine the requirements for es- d. Signal security is the responsibility of the US
tablishing such systems, procedures, and safe- Army Security Agency (USASA). USASA ele-
guards, it is necessary: to analyze all counterin- ments monitor and analyze Army telecommuni-
telligence factors influencing security at the com- cations and evaluate the status of communica-
mander's installation; to ascertain the counterin- tions security (COMSEC) in support commands.
telligence measures required by the sensitivity or Additionally, these elements assist in determining
criticality of the installation; to determine the the electronic security (ELSEC) characteristics
counterintelligence measures which now exist, of Army equipment systems and recommend op-
and finally; to provide recommendations which erating techniques and procedures for ELSEC
will bring existing counterintelligence measures purposes. See FM 32-5 for details on USASA as-
to the required standards. The accomplishment of sistance to CI elements.
these four requirements is the objective of the
counterintelligence survey. 10-2. Initiation of a Counterintelligence
b. The counterintelligence survey is a service to Survey
determine the security measures necessary to pro- The request for a CI survey must orginate with
tect military installations and offices against es- the commander of the installation concerned or
pionage, sabotage, and unauthorized disclosure with a higher commander in the same chain of
of, or access to, classified defense information. command. A CI survey may be requested for the
While Army Regulations provide certain mini- following reasons:
mum requirements for security, and inspections
a. Activation or reactivation of an installation
are made to determine that these requirements
or activity, or a major component thereof.
are being met, the scope of the counterintel-
ligence survey is much broader, as it must prov- b. Significant change in mission, function, per-
ide recommendations designed to fit a specific in- sonnel strength or structure, or physical reorgan-
stallation. Because the survey is to establish re- ization.
quirements rather than test compliance with es-
c. New, hazardous conditions within an instal-
tablished requirements, it is not a recurring ser-
lation which necessitate the re-evaluation of the
vice. As long as there is no major change in the
security system.
physical characteristics of an installation or its
mission, the counterintelligence survey once con- d. Significant change in material produced,
ducted will remain valid. processed, stored, or handled.

c. Physical security is a responsibility of the e. Change in the locale or environment in

Provost Marshal (AR 190-13). However, in ac- which the installation is located.
cordance with Department of the Army policy, /. Receipt of sufficient justification for reasons
personnel performing CI services are responsible other than those stated above, such as no record
for assessing the CI aspects of security plans and of a previous survey having been conducted.

10-1
FM 30-17

Section II. PREPARATION FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEYS

10—3. Preparatory Procedures light), photographic equipment, special technical

a. Selection of Personnel. The number of per- devices, and appropriate office equipment for pre-
paring records and reports.
sonnel used to conduct the survey will vary ac-
cording to the size and nature of the installation, e. Coordination. A designated representative of
the number of prsonnel available, and special op- the counterintelligence unit concerned normally
erational or technical considerations. In some will contact the commander of the
cases, the survey may be conducted by a single installation/activity to be surveyed prior to the
Special Agent ; more often it will be conducted by initiation of the survey for the purposes of :
a team operating under the direct control of a (1) Determining and coordinating the pro-
designated Special Agent-in-Charge. Frequently, posed scope of the survey.
the team will include personnel who have been
(2) Arranging for access to necessary rec-
trained in defense against methods of entry
ords, buildings, and areas.
(DAME), audio surveillance countermeasures
(DASE), and investigative photography (Photo). (3) Procuring applicable installations/activ-
ity security directives.
b. Collection of Data. It is essential that the
survey team be as well informed as possible rela- (4) Arranging for an initial briefing prior to
tive to the particular installation to be surveyed. the actual conduct of the survey, at which time
Counterintelligence unit files, particularly rec- the Special Agent-in-Charge of the team will thor-
ords of prior surveys or inspections, will provide oughly brief key installation personnel on what is
valuable background and reference data. Infor- to be accomplished and answer any questions con-
mation regarding the area surrounding the in- cerning the survey that they may have.
stallation to be surveyed may be found in investi-
gative or other intelligence reports in unit files of 10—4. Preparation of Checklists
the military intelligence element, the Provost a.. Study and analysis of data collected regard-
Marshal's Office, and the local Criminal Investi- ing the installation to be surveyed may indicate
gation Command (CIDC) element. In particular, the necessity or desirability of preparing a
the CIDC Crime Prevention Surveys, both exter- checklist to serve as a guide for personnel con-
nal and internal, will assist the survey team in ducting the survey. A checklist is a list of general
the conduct of the survey. Other investigative or or specific points that must be covered during the
intelligence agencies in the area may also be able survey. It serves as a reminder to surveying per-
to assist, e.g., OSI and NIS. Additional informa- sonnel to insure that the scope of the survey is
tion relative to the geography of the area can be met. A checklist may be either general or specific.
obtained from road or military maps. Regulations (1) General checklist. A general checklist
and directives pertinent to the installation to be provides reminders of the security considerations
surveyed, if available, should also be collected which are usually inherent to all installations;
and studied. e.g., documents and information security, person-
c. Security Regulations. A complete set of se- nel security, and physical measures. Within these
curity regulations should be collected and tabbed three major divisions, there will be many subdivi-
for ready reference. Security regulations of ref- sions.
erence value during a CI survey include, but are (a) Documents and information security
not limited to, the following : AR 340-series, AR considerations may include storage facilities,
380-5, AR 380-6, AR 380-20, AR 380-25, AR marking and handling of classified documents,
380-150, AR 381-12, AR 381-14, AR 381-130, application of "need-to-know," duties of security
AR 600-31, AR 604-5, and AR 604-10. FM 19-30 control personnel, maintenance of classified docu-
will also be of reference value in preparation for ment log, and destruction procedures.
and conduct of CI surveys. (b) Personnel security requires atten-
tion be given to clearance procedures, security ed-
d. Equipment. The survey teams should pro- ucation program, and similar matters.
cure tools and equipment which will be needed (c) Physical measures include perimeter
during the conduct of the survey. Such items may fencing, perimeter lighting, guard systems, pass
include tools (hammer, screwdriver, sidecut and badge systems, restricted areas, and building
pliers, measuring tape, small crowbar, flash- security. In this connection, particular attention

10-2
 FM 30-17

is invited to the physical security checklist con- Each checklist must be modified by additions,
tained in FM 19-30. (Physical measures should changes, or deletions before it can be applied to
be included in the physical security conducted by any one installation. Even then, the application
military police units under the control of the pro- of good investigative techniques can be expected
vost marshal.) to extend the survey beyond the detail contained
in the checklist. See appendix D for a checklist
(2) Specific checklist. A specific checklist is
which may be used as a guide for conducting a CI
one that applies to a particular installation or a
survey.
unique type of installation. An expample would
be a checklist prepared for use at US Army Air
10—5. The Escort Officer
Defense Command installations. In many res-
pects, all of these installations are alike. Usually, a. From the standpoint of both the Special
these sites occupy the same amount of real estate, Agent team and the installation, it is desirable
operate at the same echelon of command, have that an escort be provided by the installation to
the same equipment, the same number and type accompany the survey personnel during the con-
of troops, and, in most cases, operate under the duct of the survey. Preferably, this escort should
same policy from an operational and security be a representative of the installation's intellig-
point of view. When there is a requirement to ence or security office. In any event, he should be
surevy a number of these installations, it would a person conversant with all security practices
be worthwhile to prepare a specific checklist and procedures in effect at the installation.
which would apply to these sites. Specific check- b. The escort officer serves as a guide to the
lists normally include more detail than general Special Agent or survey team as they proceed
checklists. through the installation conducting the survey. He
b. A checklist, either general or specific, is used identifies the surveying personnel to those per-
sons who will give information and makes ar-
only as a guide. It is improper to assume that any
rangements to satisfy their operational require-
checklist will provide a complete basis for action
ments. The escort officer is present to gain timely
in completing the survey. Each installation has notice of any outstanding hazards discovered,
its own particular security problems. These dif- provide information pertaining to previous at-
ferences may have their origin in size, location, tempts to correct such hazards, and make such
mission, or surrounding area of the installation. on-the-spot corrections as possible.

Section III. CONDUCT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEYS

10—6. Preliminary Exterior and Interior population, has or could have upon the security of
Checks the installation. The CIDC Crime Prevention Sur-
As soon after the initial briefing as possible, the vey (External) may assist greatly in this area.
survey team should conduct a tour of the area The team should also tour the interior of the in-
stallation to determine those areas, buildings, or
surrounding the installation. The purpose of such
an inspection is to gain a general knowledge of offices which will require additional security con-
those elements outside the installation which do siderations or which are considered to be sensi-
or could conceivably have a direct or indirect in- tive. After the inspection, it may be necessary to
confirm the findings by arranging for an inter-
fluence upon the security of the installation ei-
view with staff officers of the installation to learn
ther in peacetime, under actual war conditions, or
in case of riot, strikes, or other domestic disor- the operational importance of particular areas of
buildings.
ders. It is in these areas adjacent to the installa-
tion that many of the installation personnel
gather for relaxation or entertainment, often 10—7. History of the Organization and
under circumstances conducive to "loose talk." Installation
The survey team should also check geographical When survey personnel have completed a check
features: terrain, road and railroad networks, of the surrounding area of the installation and a
bridges, and natural or manmade hazards near preliminary survey of the interior of the installa-
the installation. They should also determine, to tion, they should be ready to commence the. actual
the greatest extent possible, what influence the survey. The team should first determine the his-

10-3
FM 30-17

tory of the organization to be surveyed and of the congested residential, urban in nature, or
installation on which it is located. In most cases, sparsely populated. The type of surrounding area
the history, background information, or both are may offer favorable natural cover to enemy es-
readily available in printed form. From a secur- pionage or sabotage agents. Consideration should
ity point of view, the survey personnel are inter- also be given to the area's transportation facili-
ested in the history of the organization and in- ties and to natural hazards which may arise from
stallation from its inception. There frequently is the surrounding area such as flood, forest fires, or
information in the history of the organization or adjacent flammable storage areas.
installation which directly affects the current se-
d. Security Classification of Information. One
curity situation (abandoned tunnels or sewer
of the major points for consideration in evaluat-
lines).
ing the sensitivity of an installation is the classifi-
cation of the information stored, used, and
10—8. Establishment of the Installation's created there. Logically, information which is of
Sensitivity greater importance to national defense required
At this point, the security needs of the installa- greater safeguarding from all standpoints. While
tion in relation to its sensitivity and importance Army Regulations establish some safeguarding
must be determined. During the preliminary sur- requirements, comparable measures will very
vey the survey team has had an opportunity to likely be required in areas of consideration not
make a rough evaluation of the installation's im- specifically established by regulations. When con-
portance to national defense and its vulnerability sidering the classification of information, the
or value as an espionage or sabotage target. An amount of classified information present must be
accurate appraisal must be made prior to the in- determined.
vestigation in order that specific recommenda-
e. Number of Like Installations. In determin-
tions commensurate with the actual security
ing the overall importance of an installation, con-
needs of the installation can be presented to the
sideration must be given to installations or activi-
commander and his staff. The following points
ties which are capable of absorbing the functions
should be considered in determining sensitivity:
of the surveyed installation in order to maintain
a. Mission. The first consideration is the mis- mission continuity, in the event the surveyed in-
sion of the organization being surveyed. It must stallation were neutralized or destroyed. If no
be determined if the mission is continuous or of other organization is capable of assuming these
short duration, unclassified or classified, and if duties, the importance of the surveyed installa-
technical or highly skilled personnel are neces- tion would be increased immeasurably. However,
sary for its successful operation. the mere fact that similar installations or activi-
ties exist may not significantly lower the critical
b. Cost of Replacement. In estimating the cost rating. Similar installations may be in no position
of replacement of the installation, a comparative to absorb the mission of another, or, if the mis-
analysis, not a dollar and cents figure, is ob- sion is primarily devoted to a defined geographi-
tained. The time necessary to replace personnel, cal area, there may be no substitution regardless
documents, and materiel in the event the installa-
of how many similar installations exist. In con-
tion were neutralized or destroyed is estimated.
sidering the substitution or replacement of an in-
Further consideration is given to potential
sources of personnel of similar experience and stallation or its mission, due consideration must
knowledge and to a source of copies of essential be given to the time factor. What will be the time
and critical documents which would be required consumed before the changeover or substitution is
in replacing or reactivating the installation. The effected? Are the facilities of the alternate in-
financial cost of replacing the installation may stallation of such a nature as to achieve an oper-
then be considered. ating efficiency comparable to the previous level?
If the alternate installation cannot operate at an
c. Location. Consideration must be given to the
location of the installation and the effect the ele- acceptable level of efficiency, how long would it
ments surrounding it have upon its security. Most take to attain this desired level. Will this transi-
of the information concerning this aspect is de- tion period affect the national defense effort to a
termined from file checks and examination of the great degree? All of these questions must be con-
surrounding area before actually commencing the sidered concerning the number and adaptability
investigation. The area may be highly industrial, of like installations.

10-4
 FM 30-17

f. Importance to the Defense Effort. In some survey personnel available, personnel capability,
instances, evaluation of the installations impor- and choice. Since three types of security are in-
tance may be made locally based upon a joint ef- volved (document and information, personnel,
fort between the CI survey team, the installation and physical) and will be reported in separate
commander, and his staff. Other knowledgeable portions of the survey report, it may be easier but
persons within the installation and command and more time-consuming to attack each of the types
an evaluation and correlation of available infor- as a separate problem (i.e., gather all the infor-
mation from other agencies, adjacent commands, mation pertaining to physical measures first and
and the agency utilizing the end product are also then return over the same ground gathering in-
of prime importance. In most instances this eval- formation pertaining to personnel security). If
uation has been made at higher echelons of com- more than one Special Agent is available, it is
mand or at Department of the Army level. The better for a two-man team to investigate jointly
basic consideration is how important is this in- than to use individuals in separate areas. If sub-
stallation and its mission, functions, and produc- teams of two or more investigators are assigned
tion to the national defense effort. The mission of to separate portions of the survey to'facilitate its
the installation affords a fairly good indication of accomplishment, extensive coordination is re-
its importance. However, when the mission is quired during the information-gathering portion
compared with the cost of replacement, location and the evaluation portion because of the interac-
of the installation, existence of like installations tion between the types of security or areas being
which could absorb the operations, and classifica- considered.
tion of the installation's activities and informa-
tion, the overall importance of the surveyed in- 10—10. Document and Ihformation Security
stallation may be higher or lower than antici-
pated. This is the information the survey team The document and information security phase is
requires before it can determine the actual secur- probably the most important part of the CI sur-
ity needs of the particular installation. When this vey. Accordingly, this portion of the survey must
sensitivity rating is compared with the installa- be minutely detailed. In addition to using a
tion's current security situation, the investigator checklist, survey personnel must examine, ana-
will be in a position to offer recommendations to lyze, check and cross-check always, seeking to cor-
either raise or lower the level of security on the rect weaknesses and discrepancies. Each survey
installation in consonance with its sensitivity or team member must visualize the security proce-
importance to the national defense effort. dures employed from a viewpoint of an enemy
agent. Many aspects of document and information
security appear to be mechanical in nature, but
10—9. Determination of Existing Security
these appearances are misleading. Security, in all
Measures
its phases, must be an alert, live process in order
a. The foundation having been laid, the survey to constitute an effective defense against enemy
personnel can devote themselves to examination agents attempting to penetrate or destroy the in-
of the existing security situation at the installa- stallation. With these ideas in mind, the survey
tion. This portion oí the survey is a minute exam- team can effectively inspect the procedures used,
ination of all factors pertaining to personnel se- evaluate the security situation, and recommend to
curity, physical measures, and document and in- the commander corrective measures necessary to
formation security. It is: a collection of factual eliminate weaknesses and gaps in existing proce-
data that will, when reported, show what exists dures. Conduct of the survey of document and in-
at this installation that affects security, without formation security will include consideration of
regard for its being labeled as a hazard or a pre- the following specific areas :
caution. Much of the security situation will not
be based upon existing written requirements. a. Organizational Structure. The survey team
Therefore, much of what is examined will not must first have a clear understanding of the or-
have been officially determined to be hazardous or ganizational structure of the installation or unit
precautionary in nature. The survey team must being surveyed in order to check the security and
arrive at its own conclusions that these factors flow of classified information. This can best be
will be reflected in its recommendations. determined by interviewing individuals who
likely have a thorough knowledge of the struc-
b. The techniques of conducting this portion of ture and operational relationship between the in-
the survey are dependent upon the number of stallation and the units stationed thereon. Organ-

10-5
FM 30-17

izational charts obtained from the facility and classified information while insuring flexibility of
units to be surveyed are also of great assistance command that is vital to successful combat opera-
in this respect. tions.
b. Flow of Classified Documents. The inflow of b. Records on Security Clearances. The clear-
classified information generally commences at the ance level required by each TOE or TD position
higher headquarters and continues down through must be determined; this information should ap-
intermediate offices to lower units. The outflow of pear on a roster or manning table used by all
classified information usually follows the reverse staff sections for planning purposes. A compari-
pattern. The suggested apprqach is to examine all son of the actual clearance level of personnel as-
applicable items at each message center or classi- signed and the clearance required by the position
fied document control or storage point before pro- occupied will indicate the effectiveness of the pro-
ceeding on to the next point to be checked. gram being surveyed. Each unit or installation
should maintain a file on each individual assigned
c. Document Records. Classified document reg- to the command to include forms executed and
isters, receipts, retirement records, and destruc- correspondence received or forwarded in connec-
tion certificates are accounting records. They are tion with the personnel security clearance pro-
part of a protective system designed to overcome gram (AR 340-18-series). A reference card file
human error by assisting individuals to systemat- indicating the full name, date and place of birth,
ically handle classified information in a secure social security number, and duty assignment of
manner. Accountability records are also detective all personnel possessing a security clearance
in nature, for discrepancies may indicate loss, should be maintained in the intelligence office.
theft, or possible compromise of the information. The system employed to insure the accurate and
Such records may also indicate by their accuracy up-to-date status of the card file should be
and completeness, the attitude of the individuals checked by the survey team.
administering the records toward security.
(1) The distinction between the clearance
level of an individual and the level of access to
10—11. Personnel Security classified information authorized should be made
Personnel security, from the viewpoint of the clear. Surveying personnel should emphasize that
conduct of a CI survey, may be divided into two a person may possess a Top Secret clearance, but
separate categories, security clearances and se- in applying the "need-to-know" principle, a com-
curity education. The security clearance program mander may limit access to that level of classified
is discussed below; security education is covered information consistent with the duty assignment
separately in paragraphs 10-19 through 10-22. of the individual.
a. Security Clerance Program. The personnel (2) General efficiency of the personnel se-
clearance procedures for an installation or unit curity program in the overall operation of the
must be carefully audited. AR 380-5 established command is often indicated in the personnel as-
that the basic requirement for dissemination of signment section. Each set of orders prepared on
classified information is a "proper clearance" and an individual should, whenever necessary, indi-
a "need-to-know." A proper clearance is obtaina- cate the clearance status of the person concerned.
ble only upon initiation of appropriate adminis- A duplicate of the card file system in the intellig-
trative action by the command in accordance with ence office may be maintained in the personnel as-
AR 604-5. The system for initiating a request to signment section. If so, the administrative proce-
a higher headquarters, to include all administra- dures practiced to insure that the duplicate set is
tive measures and forms, should be carefully re- always current should be examined by surveying
viewed. Internal methods for supervision of prep- personnel.
aration of requests, suspense files, tracers, and (3) Military personnel who have been
verifications of clearance status of incoming per- cleared should have a valid DA Form 873 (Cer-
sonnel should be clearly outlined in the installa- tificate of Clearance and/or Security Determina-
tion or unit SOP. In those cases where the activi- tion under EO 10450) in their 201 files. The
ties of a unit with a tactical capability are being clearance certificate of a civilian employee is filed
surveyed, careful attention must be given to the in his official personnel folder. A signed copy of
security portion of the tactical SOP. A personnel DD Form 98, (Armed Forces Security Question-
security program under tactical conditions must naire) for military personnel and DA Form 1111,
be designed to insure maximum protection for (Statement of Nonaffiliation with Certain Organ-

10-6
 FM 30-17

izations) for civilian personnel must be a part of tions which relate directly to counterintelligence
the permanent records of all military and civilian security requirements, emphasis will be placed on
personnel of the Department of the Army. The examination of physical security factors which
DA Form 66 (Officer Qualification Record) and directly affect classified storage areas, restricted
the DA Form 2Q (Enlisted Qualification Record) areas, or sensitive locations. When the entire in-
must indicate the date of completion of the inves- stallation's physical security system is essential
tigations, type investigation and level of security to the protection of classified documents or mate-
clearance granted. rial, the survey must be expanded to include these
additional physical security safeguards.
10-12. Physical Security d. Counterintelligence surveys and inspections
a. Physical security is understood to be a dis- by CI units, and SIGSEC surveys conducted by
tinct type of security differentiated from docu- USASA units complement each other. Coordina-
ment and information security and personnel se- tion through G2/S2 channels of these efforts
curity in that it comprises a system of controls, serve to maximize the overall security posture of
barriers, and other devices and procedures to the installation.
prevent destruction, damage, and unauthorized
access to Army facilities/activities. Counterintel- 10—13. The Exit Briefing
ligence surveys, conducted to assess the counter-
intelligence effectiveness of physical security After the survey team has completed its investi-
plans and procedures, is not understood to include gation and has arranged the results of its work
primary staff interest of the provost marshal in in draft form prior to departing the installation,
physical security surveys as described and defined it should determine if the commander and his
in FM 19-20 and FM 19-30. staff desire a final conference or exit briefing. The
Special Agent-in-Charge should discuss with the
b. In the event the installation/activity being commander and any other individuals designated
surveyed already has on record a physical secur- by the commander the findings and tentative rec-
ity survey performed by military police person- ommendations. The recommendations are based
nel, a statement referring to the report is deemed
on facts developed during the survey and cover
sufficient, providing those deficiencies noted
the safeguards which should be established to ad-
which directly affect the security of classified equately protect the installation against espion-
documents and material have been corrected. If age, sabotage, and subversion. The recommenda-
this has not been accomplished, appropriate rec- tions should be tempered with reason, taking into
ommendations will be made in the written report. consideration cost, time, manpower, availability
c. If there is no record of a previously con- of materials, etc. For each item which the survey
ducted physical security survey, coordination team establishes as a hazard, there must be a rea-
with the local provost marshal will be conducted sonable, practical recommendation. A successful
in order to coordinate and schedule a physical se- final critique with the commander and his staff
curity survey to be accomplished in conjunction can, in most cases, insure that the survey team's
with the CI survey. Counterintelligence personnel recommendations are realistic and can be imple-
must, nevertheless, be familiar with, and pre- mented with minimum difficulty. The team is not
pared to examine and assess the counterintel- limited to the number of recommendations which
ligence effectiveness of, barriers, controls, and can be made to eliminate any one hazard. Pri-
other protective devices, as well as the physical mary and alternative recommendations can be
security plans and procedures of the installation made to insure correction of the hazard by the al-
concerned. When the facility being surveyed is of ternative means if the primary recommendation
the "open post" type with few physical restric- cannot be implemented.

Section IV. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INSPECTIONS

10-14. General ligence elements should maintain regular contact

A CI inspection is a service performed to deter- with all US Army units in their area in order to
mine compliance with established security pol- provide continuous informal assistance, support,
icies and procedures. In addition to the formal and advice to commanders at all echelons regard-
inspections discussed in this section, counterintel- ing security.

10-7
FM 30-17

a. The inspection, although akin to the survey, a. Announced Inspections. An announced

is much more restricted in scope, because the sur- inspection is one which has been publicized to the
vey considers everything pertaining to security at installation to be inspected so that all concerned
an installation, while the inspection is limited to personnel should be aware of its imminence and,
an assessment of the degree of compliance with consequently, may make such preparations as are
established policies and procedures. necessary. This type of inspection is conducted on
b. The preliminary and investigative proce- a recurring basis so that the installation, by mak-
dures involved in the conduct of a CI inspection ing periodic preparations for forthcoming inspec-
are essentially the same as those required for a tions, brings its security application to a high
survey. The selection of investigative personnel, level and maintains a responsible level of security
necessary file checks and other preparation, du-
between the inspections. Announced inspections
ties of the Special Agent-in-Charge, use of
are often conducted in conjunction with annual
checklists, coordination with the commander and
escort officer, and actual inspection will very inspections conducted by the Inspector General.
closely parallel the procedures used in the con- Assistance may range from providing the installa-
duct of a CI survey. The usual differences be- tion with checklists which will be used in con-
tween the procedures followed are a matter of de- ducting the inspection to conferences with the in-
gree. There may or may not be prior personal stallation's security personnel.
contact between the installation to be inspected
and the counterintelligence unit. Often, the initial b. Unannounced Inspections. An unannounced
contact is made by a letter of notification origin- inspection is known in advance to certain selected
ated by the headquarters to which the surveying
personnel only. This type of inspection is de-
unit is attached. The file checks need not be as ex-
signed to determine the installation's compliance
tensive as those required for a survey because the
field-of-interest is limited to an appraisal of the with existing requirements at times when special
degree of compliance with established security preparations have not been made. Personnel con-
policies and procedures. Normally, the conduct of ducting an unannounced inspection must have
the inspection will not include the history, mis- with them, in addition to their credentials, au-
sion, or establishment of installation sensitivity. thorization to accomplish the inspection. It is also
necessary that they be accompanied by a respon-
10—15. Scope sible person of the command being inspected.
The scope of the CI inspection will include checks
to determine the degree of compliance by person-
c. Penetration Inspections. A penetration
nel of the installation or activity with established
inspection is conducted in such a way that instal-
security policies and procedures. Areas covered
will include : whether assigned personnel with ac- lation personnel, other than the commander and
cess to classified information and material are those persons he feels it is desirable to notify, are
properly cleared ; whether they are properly safe- unaware that such action is taking place. This
guarding classified information and material ; fa- type of inspection may be all-inclusive or may be
cilities used for storing classified information and limited to an attempt by counterintelligence per-
material to determine their adequacy ; procedures sonnel to fraudulently gain access to some sensi-
which are practices in controlling entrances and tive area within an installation for the purpose of
exits; guard system; and guard personnel with performing simulated espionage or sabotage acts.
reference to their instructions concerning secur- The simulated activities should correspond to ac-
ity. Special emphasis will be placed upon findings
tivities which actually might be attempted by a
noted during previous surveys or inspections to
foreign power or hostile agent, and be realistic.
determine if corrective actions have been taken.
Penetration inspections should be planned and
10—16. Types of Counterintelligence executed in a manner that will not impair or dis-
Inspections rupt the activities of the inspected unit or instal-
Inspections fall into three categories—an- lation unless this is within the context of the re-
nounced, unannounced, and penetration-type quest and has been approved by higher headquar-
inspections. ters.

10-8
 FM 30-17

Section V. REPORTS OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

SURVEYS AND INSPECTIONS

10-17. General Each finding will be followed by an appropriate

recommendation (see example in app C). Find-
a. The results of CI surveys and inspections
ings of a serious nature should be immediately
will be recorded and forwarded by letter of trans-
brought to the attention of the appropriate
mittal to the requester. Normally, reports of CI
official. Minor findings which are actually cor-
services will contain five sections:
rected in the presence of the inspection team or
(1) I. Introduction prior to their departure will be recorded with a
(2) II. Scope statement to the effect that immediate corrective
action was taken and therefore no recommenda-
(3) III. Findings and Recommendations
tion is made.
(4) IV. Comments
(2) RecommencUitions. Recommendations
(5) V. Exit Briefing should be concise, to the point, factual, and real-
b. Subparagraphs will be used within each sec- istic. In many instances, a specific recommenda-
tion, as appropriate, and numbered consecutively tion may require more than a partial quotation
throughout the report. Sketches, photographs, from published directives or regulations to ade-
documents, or other pertinent material will be in- quately assist the command. Each recommenda-
cluded when appropriate for clarity and under- tion should be phrased to eliminate both the basic
standing. Inclosures will be referred to and pre- problem and the underlying cause and should be
pared as exhibits. Reports will be classified, followed by a specific paragraph reference to an
marked FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, or unclas- applicable regulation or directive.
sified according to content. Reclassification in- b. Section IV. Comments. Those existing condi-
structions or dates for removal of protective tions and procedures, which, although not in vio-
markings will be in accordance with AR 340-11, lation of or at variance with published regula-
AR 380-6, and AR 381-45. tions or directives, may possibly have an adverse
effect on overall security, will be recorded as
10-18. Preparation weaknesses. Any other matter of pertinency not
recorded elsewhere in the report may be included.
Appendix C contains an example of a report of
If there are no pertinent remarks or weaknesses
Counterintelligence Survey which should be used
noted, this should be indicated.
as a guide. The following provide additional guid-
ance to assist the Special Agent in those items of c. Section V. Exit Briefing. All findings and
interest to be included in Counterintelligence recommendations should be discussed with the
Survey and Inspection reports : key personnel of the serviced unit. Complimen-
tary comments or discussion of substandard as-
a. Section III. Findings and Recommendations.
pects of the security program should also be pre-
(1) Findings. All violations, discrepancies, sented. The briefing will be made a matter of re-
or deficiencies will be listed as findings, and all cord , in the closing paragraph of the report ; the
entries, will be sufficiently descriptive to convey a report will include the names and titles of all in-
complete understanding to the serviced command. dividuals present.

Section VI. SECURITY EDUCATION

10-19. General portion of the education and indoctrination pro-

gram. Assistance by counterintelligence person-
a. Either in conjunction with the conduct of CI
nel may be particularly helpful in conducting se-
surveys and inspections or in the capacity of
curity orientations in accordance with AR
technical advisors on military security, counterin-
381-12, and AR 381-14.
telligence personnel may assist commanders in
planning and implementing security education b. Protection of classified information is the ob-
programs. The assistance rendered may be advis- jective of security education, with an interme-
ory in nature or be an actual presentation of a diate goal of security awareness on the part of all

10-9
FM 30-17

personnel. The security indoctrination of an indi- poses, to divide personnel into various groups:
vidual can be successful only when he consciously clerks and stenographers, custodial personnel,
accepts security as his personal responsibility. staff members, security forces, and operational
Security consciousness is a state of mind imply- groups. In establishing the status of security
ing an understanding of security objectives, prin- training within a command, the general attitude
ciples and measures, and denoting a willingness of all personnel toward this training and security
and desire on the part of the individual to reach in general should also be established. Care must
these objectives. be taken to insure that the attitude of the com-
mand toward security is not the opinion of key
10—20. Planning a Security Education Program personnel alone. A cross-sectional survey of the
In planning a security education program for a entire command must be obtained in order to rec-
command, many factors must be taken into con- ommend an effective program.
sideration for the program to be successful. The
security requirements of commands will vary, as e. Survey of Surrounding Areas. A survey of
will the role of the counterintelligence unit in as- the area surrounding the command should be
sisting the command in establishing a security made to establish the location and type of recrea-
education program. If the unit has been requested tional facilities frequented by members of the
to suggest a security education program for a command during off-duty hours.
particular command, a preliminary appraisal is
mandatory. Scheduled meetings with the com- 10—21. Phases of a Security Education
mander, his staff, and key personnel will aid the Program
unit in planning an effective program. Planning
A security education program should be cycled
considerations include the following:
and suited to the requirements of a particular
a. Mission. The mission of the command will group. The number of phases required is depen-
usually indicate potential targets for hostile acts dent upon the number of people concerned, status
of sabotage, espionage, or subversion. The mis- of training, amount of time available, physical
sion should be studied carefully to insure that the facilities available, and funds allocated the com-
recommendations for a security education pro- mand for security purposes. Whenever practica-
gram are realistic, pertinent, and in harmony with ble, elements of this program, particularly the
the mission. initial interview and debriefing (a and g below),
b. Standing Operating Procedures. All SOPs, will be incorporated in unit SOP. In addition to
including personnel security, document and infor- the time spent in the actual education of person-
mation security, and physical security, must be nel, a complete and balanced security education
examined to ascertain what security measures are program must also include indirect methods of
in effect. After the review of these procedures, in- approach which will require additional utiliza-
terviews with members of the command should tion of supervisory and security personnel.
provide a reliable means of assessing the degree
of compliance with these established procedures. a. Initial Interview. The first phase of a com-
plete and appropriately cycled security education
The interviewees should remain anonymous in
order to encourage full participation. Personnel program is the initial interview. The initial inter-
view is usually the first contact that new mem-
should be observed performing their duties to de-
termine whether they are complying with the es- bers of the command will have with security, and
tablished security procedures. it is imperative that the approach to this inter-
view be conducted in a serious an professional
c. File Checks. A perusal of the counterintel- manner. The interview may be supplemented by
ligence unit's files as well as those of allied fed- issuance of security regulations and written
eral or civil investigative agencies must be made directives. The initial interview is designed to ac-
to determine if any special security factors or
complish four purposes:
hazards are to be considered.
(1) Impress the individual with the signifi-
d. Status of Security Training. During the pre-
liminary appraisal, the status of the command's cance and value of the information with which he
security training must be established. Not all per- will be entrusted.
sonnel will have received the same amount or (2) Stress the importance of security to the
type of security training. Since their require- command, the US Army, and to the individual
ments vary, it will be necessary, for training pur- himself.

10-10
 FM 30-17

(3) Explain to the individual the penalties (2) Increases the security consciousness of
involved if he carelessly or negligently mishan- the command through group participation.
dles the information with which he has been en- /. Special Interviews. The sixth phase is the
trusted. special interview. Supervisory personnel should
(4) Insure that the individual fully under- be given a special interview. This special inter-
stands that anee he has had access to, and knowl- view should be accomplished in order to obtain
edge of, classified information, he assumes, at the the following objectives:
time of receipt of this information, the responsi- (1) A supervisor should recognize and make
bility for its safeguarding. on-the-spot corrections of faulty or careless prac-
b. Training Conference. The second phase of a tices.
security education program is the training com- (2) The supervisor should set the example in
ference or conferences. The length of time in- sound security practices and procedures.
volved depends on the complexity of security re- (3) The supervisor should demonstrate a
quirements pertaining to the individual's particu- healthy attitude toward security.
lar duties. The training conference should be held
during the normal training or orientation period g. Debriefing. The last phase of a security edu-
for new members of the command. It should be cation program is debriefing. Security debriefing
an integral part of training to emphasize that se- is required whenever a person who has had ac-
curity is one of the important requirements and cess to classified information leaves the com-
conditions of employment. Individuals should be mand. Consideration should also be given to con-
grouped together according to their positions ducting a debriefing upon the completion of spe-
within the command and each group should be cific classified projects. The security debriefing
treated accordingly. During these conferences, it serves two purposes :
may be appropriate to distribute various regula- (1) Special notice to the individual of his
tions, such as a security guide, or extracts from continuing responsibility to protect classified in-
the command's security SOP. formation of which he has knowledge.
c. Refresher Conference. The third phase is the (2) Command assurance that all classified
refresher conference or conferences. These documents and other classified material with
should last at least 30 minutes and should occur which the individual was charged have been pro-
every 6 months or, as a minimum, yearly. The re- perly accounted for.
fresher conference should be designed to satisfy
three requirements: 10-22. Sources of Material
(1) Remind the individuals of their continu- In order for any security lecture or security con-
ing security responsibilities. ference to be effective, appropriate and pertinent
(2) Answer the questions which individuals material must be presented to the participants of
may have about security practices or procedures. the conference or lecture. There are many sources
(3) Serve as a vehicle for explaining new of material available to the average counterintel-
changes or requirements in the field of security. ligence unit. A wealth of information can be ex-
tracted from the files of the unit itself. In the se-
â. Security Reminders. The fourth phase is the lection of this material, it is necessary that only
use of security reminders. As an indirect ap- facts of educational value and motives of interest
proach to indoctrination, security reminders to the audience be selected. If actual cases are used
bring to the attention of individuals their secur- as examples, they must be condensed, sanitized,
ity responsibilities during the normal course of and approved for release. Newspaper articles as
their duties. well as the dead files of local newspapers provide
e. Security Promotion. The fifth phase is secur- a wealth of information that can be used in se-
ity promotion. An active security promotion pro- curity lectures or conferences. A large number of
gram vigorously supported by the command is an books and articles concerning intelligence, espion-
effective method of maintaining security aware- age, and security have been published. Carefully
ness. Security promotion fulfills two require- selected extracts from these books make the se-
ments : curity lecture interesting as well as pertinent. Se-
(1) Provides the command with a method curity skits are particularly effective because
for recognition of individual achievement in they can be tailored individually to fit any given
promoting security. situation.

10-11
 FM 30-17

CHAPTER 11

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TECHNICAL SURVEYS AND INSPECTIONS

Section I. GENERAL

11-1. Definition and Purpose related to counterintelligence. Since there could

be a degree of overlap with the programs under
a. A counterintelligence technical survey is a
the monitorship of the Provost Marshal General
service provided by counterintelligence units to
and the Chief, United States Army Security
assist commanders in determining the physical
Agency, there should be coordination with those
and electronic security measures necessary to de-
agencies.
tect or neutralize attempts at clandestine surveil-
lance through audio and visual means in locations b. A technical survey or inspection is a com-
where classified defense information and oificial plete and detailed examination of all factors, pos-
information of a nondefense nature is present. itive and negative, which affect the audio and vi-
sual security of the location or equipment being
b. A CI technical inspection is a service per-
serviced.
formed by counterintelligence units to assist com-
manders in determining the effectiveness of es- c. Technical surveys will include the following:
tablished technical security policies and proce- (1) A complete physical, visual, and elec-
dures. The CI technical inspection verifies compli- tronic search for unauthorized modification of
ance with recommendations of previous technical equipment normally found in the area.
surveys and inspections to insure the elimination (2) A complete physical, visual, and elec-
of technical security hazards and provide techni- tronic search for clandestine technical penetra-
cal support of limited scope or duration. tion equipment.
(3) All procedures necessary to detect the
c. Locations where technical surveys and
presence of conditions which may allow an unau-
inspections may be desired include, but are not
thorized transmission of any conversation out of
limited to, offices, war rooms, and conference
the area or surveillance of any activity occurring
rooms. Information which may be of value to an
within the area under search.
intelligence service or foreign government in-
cludes not only classified defense information, d. Technical inspections are more limited in
but also information concerning personality scope than technical surveys, and are designed to
traits, habits, interests, and family relationships include those actions and procedures necessary to
of military and civilian personnel assigned to sen- provide the requested service. Examples of activi-
sitive positions. ties which may constitute a technical inspection
are:
d. Technical surveys and inspections are con- (1) Physical and electronic examinations of
ducted when requested by a commander or di- critical equipment such as telephone wires and
rected by higher authority. Sensitive areas in rel- instruments, intercommunications systems, and
atively constant daily use should be surveyed or furniture and hardware prior to placement in the
inspected at irregular intervals of sufficient fre- area. This is done to prevent an unauthorized
quency to afford maximum security from clandes- modification and possible use for clandestine sur-
tine audio and visual surveillance. A technical veillance.
survey or inspection should not be included as a (2) Electronic examinations and tests sched-
integral part of a CI survey or inspection. uled at irregular intervals as a followup inspec-
tion of an area previously cleared.
11—2. Scope (3) Electronic security monitoring activities
a. Technical surveys and inspections will deal in the vicinity of sensitive areas during confer-
with items of technical security only as they are ences wherein classified material is presented.

11-1
FM 30-17

Section II. CONDUCT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

TECHNICAL SURVEYS AND INSPECTIONS

11—3. Technical Survey 11—4. Preparation of Checklist

a. Prior to the actual commencement of the A technical survey consists of a thorough physi-
technical survey, liaison will be established with cal search and full utilization of available elec-
the installation to be surveyed to determine perti- tronic and specialized detection equipment and
nent factors which will assist in the conduct of devices. The sensitivity of the area, the availabil-
the survey. This will be accomplished by a con- ity of qualified personnel and technical equip-
ference among the survey team Special Agent-in- ment, and consideration of the time factor will of
Charge, the commander of the installation to be necessity affect the thoroughness and efficiency of
surveyed or his designated representatives, and the technical survey. Continuing developments in
the installation's communication officer. This con- the electronic surveillance field make it impracti-
ference will acquaint the commander with the pro- cal to set forth a definite step-by-step survey pro-
posed scope of the survey and will establish the cedure which may soon be outmoded. Personnel
requirements for cooperation by members of the who are specially trained in audio surveillance
installation. It will include a guided tour of the countermeasures should be utilized to the fullest
area to be surveyed and will, in addition, include extent possible in planning and conducting a
arrangements for acquiring access to desks, con- technical survey. Each counterintelligence unit
tainers, secured areas, and outside perimeter should prepare a general checklist to be utilized
areas in which related communication, electrical, in conducting a technical survey. The checklist
heating, and plumbing junction facilities are lo- will insure that all aspects of the survey are
cated. It should be emphasized by the Special thoroughly and systematically accomplished;
Agent-in-Charge that upon completion of the sur- however, the checklist should not restrict the ini-
vey the area must be afforded physical security tiative of the technician. A sample general
commensurate with the highest classification for checklist, which may be used as a basis for prep-
which the area is to be used. At this time, any aration of a checklist, is contained in FM 30-17A,
limitations placed on the conduct of the survey by the classified supplement to this manual.
the local command should be clarified. One limita-
tion that should always be considered is the ac- 11—5. Detection Equipment
tual dates and time of the survey which should be
classified as CONFIDENTIAL, and annotated Various types of specialized electronic equipment
FOR EYES ONLY for the key personnel, e.g., are available to counterintelligence technical per-
commander, G2/S2, and perhaps the G3/S3. sonnel to assist in locating concealed clandestine
surveillance and listening devices. The Intellig-
b. Technical survey team members will fami- ence Materiel Support Office, under the control of
liarize themselves with the entire installation to
the US Army Intelligence Command, Department
be surveyed in order to obtain an overall estimate
of the Army, provides funds for certain special
of existing factors which will provide a guide for
the detailed conduct of the survey. The files of items. Sufficient reference material, periodical lit-
the counterintelligence unit are often valuable erature, and technical information bulletins
sources of information relative to the installa- should be procured by units in the field in order
tion. Reports of previous CI surveys will contain to keep abreast of the latest developments in elec-
detailed information concerning the security mea- tronic equipment. Requests for information on, or
sures of the installation and a description of the development of, specific items of electronic equip-
surrounding area, including natural and struc- ment should be forwarded through channels to
tural elements, which may tend to enhance either the Intelligence Materiel Development Office,
audio or visual access to the area, or point out Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219.
any limitations imposed on the previous survey
team. Detailed construction blueprints, as well as
11-6. Technical Inspection
heating, electrical, and communications details,
should be obtained if possible. In addition, The general provisions concerning responsibili-
ground maps indicating overhead and under- ties and planning for the conduct of technical
ground utility networks should be available to surveys (para 11-3—11-5) apply equally to the
the survey team as required. conduct of CI technical inspections.

11-2
 FM 30-17

11-7. Discovery of Clandestine Surveillance have an impact extending to the highest national
and Listening Devices levels.
When discovery of a clandestine surveillance and
11—8. Reports
listening device is made, a report should be sub-
mitted immediately as outlined in AR 38Í-14. Counterintelligence technical survey and inspec-
Counterintelligence units should have a SOP tion reports are prepared in accordance with re-
which will delineate the action to be taken by porting procedures discussed in chapter 10. These
counterintelligence personnel upon discovery of a reports will include technical data which contrib-
clandestine surveillance device. It is essential uted to the conclusions reached in the technical
that all audio surveillance countermeasures tech- survey or inspection. An additional section, "Lim-
nicians be thoroughly familiar with the instruc- itations," is normally added to the five sections
tions contained in AR 381-14. The discovery of a discussed in chapter 10. A sample report of a CI
clandestine surveillance or listening device may technical survey is contained in appendix C.

11-3
 FM 30-17

CHAPTER 12

CONVENTIONAL COMBAT OPERATIONS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

12-1. General 12—2. The Counterintelligence Mission in

The field army is provided counterintelligence Tactical Operations
support by a counterintelligence company at field The counterintelligence mission stated in chapter
army level in the MI Battalion and by counterin- 1 of this manual is valid for all operations. Em-
telligence elements which are organic to military phasis on certain aspects of the mission will
intelligence units attached to corps, divisions, and change with the tactical situation and will vary
separate brigade-sized organizations. These coun- with the echelon of command. Denial of informa-
terintelligence elements and units contribute to tion to the enemy is one of the most important as-
the mission of the commander at each echelon by pects of the counterintelligence mission at the
assisting him in carrying out his counterintel- tactical level and receives greater emphasis dur-
ligence responsibilities. ing actual operations.

Section II. FUNCTIONS

12-3. Introduction sure protection against physical penetration and

compromise of classified information and mater-
a. Counterintelligence operations are aimed at iel. The mobility and frequent displacement of in-
defeating the collection capability of the enemy. stallations, their proximity to the indigenous pop-
In rear areas, overall security is indispensable to ulation, and the complications presented by com-
effective support and control of combat forces. bined operations with diverse allied forces will
The enemy can be expected to exploit the loose compound the security problem. Any recommen-
demarcations of the battlefield by the deep pene- dation on the use of unattended ground sensors
tration of espionage-sabotage elements, the sub- by a unit for physical security should be coordi-
verting of selected elements of the indigenous nated with the unit sensor officer to determine his
population, and employing guerrilla forces to the
capabilities in this area.
maximum extent. To counter these threats, coun-
terintelligence elements must work aggressively (3) Special weapons security. Special weap-
in close coordination with such related activities ons and associated systems within the field army
as psychological warfare, military police, civil af- will require increased security efforts on the part
fairs, and air defense units. of both counterintelligence and other agencies
during use, storage, and transport of system com-
b. Counterintelligence operations within the ponents.
field army under tactical conditions will consist
(4) Civil security. Local civilian elements as
generally of the following :
well as refugees, displaced persons, and indige-
(1) Personnel security. Background investi- nous employees of US Forces, will be lucrative
gations will continue. Close coordination between targets for recruitment by enemy forces for es-
military and civilian agencies which control per- pionage, sabotage, and subversion.
tinent files must be developed to maximize the ef- (5) Counterespionage, countersabotage, and
fectiveness of these investigations. countersubversion. Individuals and groups with
(2) Physical security. Counterintelligence espionage, sabotage, and subversion missions
personnel must provide installation and unit com- must be identified, located, penetrated, and/or
manders with survey and inspection services to in- neutralized (FM30-17A).

12-1
FM 3®-117

112—4. ©peraîSemis in Perweaird Areas civil affairs personnel, and G2/S2 staffs on hostile
intelligence activity and modus operandi.
a.. Offensive Operations.
(2) Enemy guerrilla forces activities and op-
(1) In the attack, emphasis must be placed erations against installations, supply points, lines
on the neutralization and/or exploitation of CI of communications, and other critical areas will
targets which are known to exist in enemy-held increase during defensive operations.
areas as reflected in target lists (see FM
(3) In the defense, forward area counterin-
30-17A). To accomplish this task effectively,
telligence elements may initiate certain special
counterintelligence personnel supporting combat
units may be deployed to forward elements as re- operations designed to collect intelligence infor-
mation or assist the commander in a specific oper-
quired by the mission. Initial advance by combat
ation directed against enemy forces. These opera-
troops through the objective area may be desired
prior to the commitment of counterintelligence tions require careful and detailed planning (FM
30-17A) and will be controlled and monitored by
personnel in forward areas. Flexibility must be
higher commands. Examples are as follows :
maintained in order to obtain maximum use and
(a) Recruitment of confidential sources
effectiveness. Counterintelligence needs and re-
and their injection into refugee groups and pris-
quirements vary constantly and personnel may be
oner of war channels.
deployed from one unit to another and from for-
ward to rear areas as these conditions change. (&) Exploitation of known enemy intellig-
ence agents.
(2) Counterintelligence personnel operating (c) Use of deceptive information as di-
with forward combat units perform their mission rected by higher commands.
within the existing boundaries of the supported
unit. When rear boundaries are advanced, control c. Retrograde Operations.
of the relinquished area will be assumed by the (1) Counterintelligence operations must be
counterintelligence elements gaining responsibil- compatible with the courses of action taken by
ity for the area. All documents and files pertinent the supported combat unit. In a retrograde move-
to the area will be physically transferred, as will ment, the security of troop movements and lines
any personnel held in custody. The gaining ele- of communication is a paramount consideration.
ment must be thoroughly briefed on affairs of CI Other considerations include :
interest in the relinquished area. (a) Evaluation of white and black list
(see para 12-9) personnel.
b. Defensive Operations. In the defense, coun-
(b) Evaluation of prisoners of war of CI
terintelligence elements in forward tactical areas
will be most active in combating enemy intellig- interest.
ence efforts to obtain information and intelligence (c) Evaluation of confidential sources who
concerning US Forces. Enemy intelligence activi- cannot remain behind for either operational or
ties may take many forms during this phase of security reasons.
operations. (2) In conjunction with military police, rigid
controls over civilians and refugees must be ap-
(1) Deployment of counterintelligence per-
plied to detect persons posing a threat to the se-
sonnel normally will differ from that undertaken
curity of friendly operations. Command post
in the attack. In most cases, deployment will be
areas which have been evacuated will be in-
in rear areas rather than forward with the com-
spected by counterintelligence personnel to insure
bat units ; however, counterintelligence personnel
that no information or material has been left be-
will be prepared to operate whenever and wher-
hind which might benefit hostile forces.
ever indications of enemy activities require a
counterintelligence effort. In the defense, empha- (3) During retrograde operations, the trans-
sis will be placed on such functions as : fer of areas of responsibility occurs in reverse of
(a) Civilian and prisoner of war screening that for offensive operations. The forward ele-
and interrogation. ment will establish contact with that element res-
ponsible for the CI coverage of the rear area
(ö) Development of effective human
which it will occupy; receive a briefing concern-
source programs (FM 30-17A).
ing operations in that area; and receive applica-
(c) Security of critical installations and ble files, documents, and personality information1
activities. on sources and other persons of potential CI
(e?) Continued briefings of military police. value within the area.

12-2
 FM 30-17

12-5. Rear Area Operations in these areas. Specific CI activities in support of

rear area security may include:
a. Counterintelligence Area Coverage.
(1) Collection and collation of information
(1) Counterintelligence area coverage refers concerning key personalities among hostile ele-
to counterintelligence responsibility applied ments operating in rear areas.
throughout a geographic area for which a specific (2) Conduct of operations designed to effect
commander may be responsible. In a theater of penetration of hostile intelligence services at all
operations, with an army commander as the uni- echelons.
fied commander, US Army counterintelligence
has the responsibility of conducting all opera- (3) Development of civilian human source
tions within the CI mission necessary to the se- networks dispersed throughout rear areas, which
curity of the command. A unified commander will provide timely and pertinent information.
from another service may assign US Army coun- (4) Application of surveillance techniques
terintelligence units an area coverage mission. to known, suspected, or potential hostile bases of
Counterintelligence units may have investigative operations.
jurisdiction over the activities of indigenous ci- (5) Search and seizure operations against
vilians and US civilians employed by, or accom- hostile personalities, installations, organizations,
panying, the Armed Forces, in addition to the or those sympathetic to the hostile cause.
normal jurisdiction of Armed Forces personnel.
(6) Conduct of CI security and technical
(2) Counterintelligence area coverage surveys and inspections of US and, if directed, al-
throughout a divisional area is provided by the lied installations in US rear areas.
counterintelligence personnel of the division mili-
(7) Assistance to rear area security ele-
tary intelligence company. This same coverage is
ments in the denial of known, suspected, or po-
provided in the area extending from the division
rear boundary to the field army rear boundary by tential sources of food, supply, or other support
to hostile groups.
the MI Company (CI) assigned to the MI Battal-
ion (Field Army). Counterintelligence area cov- (8) Assistance to and support of the con-
erage from the field army rear area boundary tinuing program of security orientation and in-
throughout the comminications zone is provided doctrination of all command personnel, with em-
by the MI Group (CI) of the Area Support Com- phasis on the provisions of AR 381-12.
mand (ASCOM). (9) Contribution to, or, if directed, prepara-
(3) Unless the commands to which they are tion of, recurring memoranda to all command
assigned or attached are employed separately, CI echelons concerning current trends or modus op-
elements of the MI unit supporting corps, army erandi of hostile intelligence.
groups, and separate support commands normally (10) Contribution to, or, if desired, prepara-
will not be assigned a CI area coverage mission. tion of, portions of command policy documents
Their efforts will be directed toward contributing concerning countersubversion and countersabo-
to the internal security of the respective sup- tage.
ported command and particiapting in counterin-
(11) Preparation or recommendation of spe-
telligence planning.
cific CI measures to unit and installation com-
b. Rear Area Security. Rear areas may be de- manders for the enhancement of security prac-
fined broadly as those areas in which combat ser- tices to include such items as the detection of be-
vice support activity is accomplished. Enemy at- havioral patterns detrimental to the security of
tacks against administrative support units and the command.
installations, lines of communications, and vital c. Special Situations. Assignments demanding
communications centers in rear areas, may jeo- a high degree of alertness, flexibility, and re-
pardize the primary mission of combat forces. sourcefulness on the part of counterintelligence
The objective of rear area security is to prevent personnel may include—
serious enemy interference with all operations in
rear areas. By the very nature of their mission, (1) Areas where the populace is basically
CI elements provide area coverage and are in a hostile to US interest.
position to provide valuable assistance to sup- (2) Areas especially vulnerable to insur-
ported commands in countering enemy activities gency activities.

12-3
FM 30-17

(3) Areas in which targets of known enemy mission during the planning and preparation
high-priority collection tasks (or interest) are lo- phase. Measures to be considered include :
cated.
(1) Increased emphasis on counterespionage
activities (FM 30-17A).
12—6. Other Tactical Operations
(2) Increased security indoctrination and
а. Counterintelligence personnel may be re-
training to include CI security and technical
quired to provide CI support for other tactical op-
inspections.
erations. Normally, CI elements will be attached
to the supported unit for the duration of the op- (3) Rigidly controlled security measures to
eration and tailored to meet the demands of the include restriction of personnel, if necessary.
specific operation. Airborne, amphibious, separate
(4) Security of training, logistical and re-
task force, and internal defense/development op-
connaissance activities as well as other prepara-
erations (chap 13) will require varying degrees
tions or activities which could indicate pending
of CI support and participation. In addition, CI
operations.
support and assistance may contribute materially
to the success of unconventional warfare opera- (5) Security of assembly and departure
tions by furnishing timely and accurate informa- areas to preclude infiltration of unauthorized per-
tion related to enemy-occupied terrritory into sonnel, and provide for maximum reduction of
which operations are planned. casual observation opportunities.
б. In most special tactical operations, the se- c. During the operation itself, the amount and
curity of the operation itself, from the time of in- type of CI support required will be influenced by
ception to the time of initiation, is of utmost im- the size and scope of the operation, the objective
portance. Counterintelligence efforts, in conjunc- area and the location and availability of CI tar-
tion with G3 personnel will be directed toward gets. The deployment of counterintelligence per-
denying the enemy access to information concern- sonnel will be dependent upon the targets to be
ing the time, destination, and objectives of the neutralized or exploited in the objective area.

Section III. PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

12—7. Introduction analysis should encompass the relatively perma-

nent features and fundamental characteristics of
Counterintelligence planning is accomplished
a country, area, or broad special subject to in-
concurrently with the planning and conduct of
clude the political, economic, military, and sociol-
theater army operations plans and policies.
ogical aspects.
Within that broad framework, CI plans at lower
echelons will be increasingly detailed but flexible. b. Numerical priority designations which em-
All aspects of CI activities required to insure ade- phasize the relative importance or value of CI
quate direct support for all phases of operations targets and which designate to the responsible
of the supported units will be considered. The ef- unit(s) the degree of interest expressed by the
fectiveness of counterintelligence operations in requester will be influenced by:
tactical areas depends largely upon the planning
( 1 ) Security threat posed by the target.
preceding the operation. FM 30-5 contains exam-
ples of the plans utilized by counterintelligence (2) Relative urgency of need for the neu-
personnel. tralization or exploitation of the target.
(3) Capabilities of the units responsible for
12—8. Target Selection and Priorities accomplishing the tasks.
a. The selection and assignment of CI targets Priority designations which have been estab-
should be based on an assessment of the overall lished at theater level and forwarded to lower
hostile threat. This assessment is the responsibil- echelons will not be altered. Local CI elements
ity of the G2, Theater Army, and should take into may assign priorities to targets locally developed.
consideration both the immediate and obvious Counterintelligence personnel must adjust their
threats to security as well as future threats daily operations to conform with the established
which can be anticipated. A thorough CI target priorities.

12-4
 FM 30-17

12-9. Counterintelligence Targets (a) Potential or actual defectors from the

hostile cause whose bona fides have not been es-
Counterintelligence targets include personalities,
tablished.
installations, organizations, groups, documents
(b) Individuals who have resisted, or are
and materiel. Information on these targets can
believed to have resisted, the enemy government
often be obtained through civil affairs units or
and who may be willing to cooperate with US
Civil-Military Operations Staffs, G5/S5. Civil af-
Forces, but whose bona fides have not been estab-
fairs units are also principal users of this type of
lished.
intelligence.
(c) Nuclear scientists, physicists, and
a. Personalities. technicians suspected of having been engaged in
(1) Black list. Black lists are developed or enemy nuclear research projects or nuclear mis-
compiled at all echelons of command and contain sile programs against their will.
the identities and locations of individuals whose (3) White lists. White lists are compiled or
capture and detention are of prime importance to developed at all echelons of command and contain
the US Army. Black lists include— the identities and locations of individuals in en-
(a.) Known or suspected enemy or hostile emy-controlled areas who have been identified as
espionage, sabotage, political, and subversive in- being of intelligence or CI interest and are ex-
dividuals. pected to be able to provide information or assist-
( b ) Known or suspected leaders and mem- ance in the accumulation of intelligence data or
bers of hostile paramilitary, partisan, or guer- in the exploitation of existing or new intelligence
rilla groups. areas-of-interest. They are uaually in accord
with, or favorably inclined toward, US policies.
(c) Political leaders known or suspected
Their contributions are based on a voluntary and
to be hostile to the military and political objec-
cooperative attitude. Decisions to place individu-
tives of the United States and/or an allied nation.
als, on the white list may be affected by the com-
(d) Known or suspected officials of enemy bat situation, critical need for specialists in scien-
governments whose presence in the theater of op- tific fields, and such theater intelligence needs as
erations poses a security threat to the US Forces. may be indicated from time to time. Examples of
(e) Known or suspected enemy collabora- individuals who may be included in this category
tors and sympathizers whose presence in the the- are:
ater of operations poses a security threat to the
(a.) Former political leaders of a hostile
US Forces.
state who were deposed by the hostile political
if) Known enemy military or civilian
leaders.
personnel who have engaged in intelligence, coun-
terintelligence, security, police, or political indoc- ib) Intelligence agents employed by US or
trination activities among troops or civilians. allied intelligence agencies.
(g) Other personalities indicated by the (c) Key civilians in areas of scientific re-
G2 as automatic arrestees. Included in this cate- search, which may include faculty members of
gory may be local political personalities, police universities and staffs of industrial or national
chiefs, and heads of significant municipal and/or research facilities, whose bona fides have been es-
national departments or agencies. tablished.
\ c id) Leaders of religious groups and other
(2) Gray list. Gray lists, which are compiled
humanitarian groups.
or developed at all echelons of command, contain
(e) Other persons who can materially and
the identities and locations of those personalities
significantly aid the political, scientific, and mili-
whose inclinations and attitudes toward the polit-
tary objectives of the US whose bona fides have
ical and military objectives of the United States
been established.
are obscure. Regardless of their political inclina-
tions or attitudes, personalities may be listed on b. Installations. The installation target is any
gray lists when they are known to possess infor- installation which is of interest or posés a threat
mation or particular skills required by US to the security of US Forces in the area. These
Forces. They may be individuals whose political installations provide information of significant
motivations require further exploration before value if exploited; they can also pose a definite
they can be utilized effectively by US Forces. Ex- threat to our security if imporperly treated: Con-
amples of individuals who may be included in tinued operation of these installations during
this category are : combat operations may jeopardize the com-

12-5
[?ÍVS 3©-ll^

mander's successful accomplishment of his mis- d. Documents and Materiel. Counterintelligence

sion. Installation type targets of interest to the units engaged in tactical operations in a theater
military commander, and of immediate concern to of operations are specifically charged with the ex-
counterintelligence, can be found in any average ploitation of certain type targets known to contain
town or city regardless of its location. Examples or suspected of containing documents, equipment,
of installation type targets are as follows : or materiel of intelligence or counterintelligence
( 1 ) Civilian communications media. value. When assigned such missions, it is impera-
tive that counterintelligence personnel proceed to
(2) Enemy signal communications centers. the target area with a minimum loss of time in
(3) Nuclear research centers and chemical order to confiscate and secure the documents
laboratories. and/or materiel before they can be destroyed.
(4) Installations formerly or currently oc- Some of the documents and material of intellig-
cupied by enemy espionage, sabotage, and subver- ence or counterintelligence interest are as fol-
sive agencies, or enemy police organizations, to lows:
include prisons. (1) Files and records of enemy intelligence
(5) Installations occupied by enemy intellig- operational bases, schools, and training centers.
ence or security organizations. (2) Files and records of courts, prisons,
(6) Ordnance repositories. jails, and police and executive files of political ad-
ministrations.
(7) Embassies and consulates of hostile gov-
ernments. (3) Files and records of national intelligence
agencies, paramilitary organizations, and secret
(8) Military installations. police agencies.
c. Organizations and Groups. Any organization (4) Manufactured products or such other
or group which is an actual or potential threat to materiel which, when left unguarded, may provide
the security of US or allied forces must be neu- support to hostile guerrilla and partisan elements
tralized. The threat which an organization or in rear areas.
group presents may not be immediately apparent
(5) Special items of war which require pres-
to the military commander, the G2, or the coun-
ervation for technical intelligence examinations.
terintelligence unit. The enemy will frequently
These may include chemical warfare products,
camouflage his espionage or subversive activities
ordnance items, pilot products, ordnance re-
with the establishment of front organizations or
search, guided missiles and sites, aircraft, carto-
groups which, if permitted to remain in being,
could impede the success of the military opera- graphic stores, and communications equipment to
include radio, radar, electronic, and telemetric de-
tions. Examples of hostile organizations and
vices.
groups which are of major concern to the coun-
terintelligence unit during tactical operations are
112—11©. IMl®utireallÔ2Eaï5@ira suradl IxpltaDihatfeDH
as follows :
a. Operational Support.
(1) National and local political groups and
parties known to have or suspected of having (1) Tactical troop augmentation. Counterin-
aims, beliefs, or ideologies contrary or in opposi- telligence elements involved in tactical operations
tion to the United States. do not have the capability to provide guards or
(2) Paramilitary organizations to include take under physical control those CI targets from
student, police, militia/veterans, and excombatant which hostile resistance continues. The MI unit
commander must, in his planning, estimate his
groups known to be hostile to the United States.
needs far enough in advance so that requests for
(3) Hostile sponsored groups and organiza- additional personnel or assistance in the objective
tions whose objectives are to create dissension areas are made known to the G2 of the major
and spread unrest among the civilian population command prior to an offensive operation. The G2
in the theater of operations. will arrange to obtain those personnel necessary
(4) Headquarters, provincial, and municipal for the accomplishment of the mission. Once
offices of those hostile organizations indicated by entry has been made into the target area by coun-
the theater commander as subject to immediate terintelligence personnel, a preliminary search
neutralization. Personalities related to those has been completed for information of intellig-
offices should be arrested and detained. ence or CI value, and the employees or occupants

112—<£>
 FM 30-17

have been located or detained, the physical formation of immediate tactical interest to
guarding or control of the target is turned over friendly forces, and to make these persons availa-
to guard personnel or the service or agency with ble for interrogation by other agencies. Black and
primary interest in the target. How and when gray list personalities are not expected to be
troops are assigned specific guard functions cooperative under interrogation; however, coun-
around these CI targets will be influenced by terintelligence personnel should be alert to indi-
local requirements. In some instances, guard per- cations that these individuals may cooperate in
sonnel may accompany Special Agent teams to return for preferential treatment.
the target area ; in other cases, they may rendez-
c. Target Installations. The exploitations of in-
vous with the teams in the target area. It must be
stallation targets may be accomplished immedi-
understood, however, that the tactical effort, ex-
ately following the neutralization of the installa-
cept in unusual cases, takes precedence over CI
tion by counterintelligence personnel, or at a
target neutralization and exploitation. If tactical
later date if exploitation is not immediately possi-
troop augmentation is not possible, the CI ele-
ble due to the tactical situation or for other rea-
ment may have to rely on its own limited capabil-
sons. During the exploitation phase, the installa-
ities to neutralize or exploit the targets.
tion will be searched thoroughly for documents,
(2) Civil police support. Counterintelligence equipment, and materiel of intelligence or CI in-
elements involved in tactical operations may re- terest. Disposition instructions concerning docu-
quest and receive support from civil police agen- ments and materiel captured by counterintel-
cies in friendly controlled territories. Normally, ligence personnel while involved in tactical oper-
this support is arranged through the G2 in coor- ations will be found in command SOP or in FM
dination with the G3 or G5. Civil police may be 30-16. Documents, to include files and records,
utilized to accompany Special Agent teams on should be evacuated only through intelligence
target neutralization missions, assist in appre- channels. In some instances, it may be advisable
hensions of target personalities, and provide or desirable for the documents or materiel to re-
guards for installations which have been neutral- main within the installation, building, office, or
ized. Considerable time and effort may be saved billet where found until such time as they can be
in the performance of the counterintelligence thoroughly examined or analyzed by other coun-
mission if good liaison and working relationships terintelligence or technical intelligence personnel.
can be established with the local civil police
forces. 12—11. Tactical Counterintelligence
Interrogations
b. Target Personalities. The processing of tar-
get personalities apprehended by CI elements op- a. General. The circumstances of combat and
erating in tactical areas will generally be accom- the counterintelligence operations in tactical
plished according to procedures established by areas complicate the task of the Special Agent in-
field army. In most cases prisoners of continuing terrogator. There may be overwhelming numbers
CI interest apprehended in forward combat areas of people who are looked upon as threats to se-
will be evacuated as soon as possible to higher curity, perhaps solely due to their presence in the
echelons. It is essential that such prisoners not be combat zone. The number of suspect personnel
lost in the stream of other prisoners captured by will vary, but it frequently will be large enough
the tactical units. The tactical situation may not to preclude detailed interrogation of all but a se-
permit the immediate routing or "evacuation of lected few. Counterintelligence personnel will be
target personalities, but it may be possible to partly dependent on such agencies as the provost
temporarily secure the prisoner in a local jail or 'marshal, Civil Affairs (CA) units, and prisoner
prison. Counterintelligence prisoners should not of war interrogators to identify suspect persons
be permitted to come into contact or associate or persons of CI interest. In some situations, the
number of persons volunteering information to
with the other prisoners. A record of prisoners
counterintelligence personnel will be large
incarcerated temporarily must be forwarded to
enough to necessitate a preliminary screening op-
field army so that action may be taken, when the
eration to permit concentration on those of the
tactical situation permits, to interrogate and greatest potential interest or value. Most suspects
make disposition of the prisoners. Target per- are apprehended as they try to enter or leave a
sonalities often prove to be valuable sources of zone of operations. If they are in fact enemy
combat and strategic intelligence information. agents, they will have cover stories closely paral-
Action should be taken to promptly elicit all in- leling their true environments and identities. The

12-7
FM 30-17

Special Agent's success in such interrogations (2) In detailed interrogations, the Special
will be dependent primarily on his questioning Agent detects enemy agents with espionage or
skill, linguistic ability, knowledge of the area of sabotage missions.
operations and adjacent areas, and familiarity (3) The wide range of his activities permits
with the intellectual, cultural, and psychological the Special Agent to collect information of value
peculiarities of the persons encountered. to other intelligence and security agencies and
b. Types of Subjects. As the battle lines in the planners of military operations. He must be
combat change, entire segments of the population especially alert to obtain and report information
may be overrun. The local population in any area of immediate tactical value which was not
may be swelled by refugees and displaced persons gleaned from the refugee by prisoner of war in-
(persons from other lands conscripted by enemy terrogators.
forces for labor). The following categories of
e. Indicators Warranting Suspicion. Because
persons are of CI interest :
the Special Agent usually lacks positive evidence
( 1 ) Refugees and displaced persons. and obtaining confirmation of a suspect's story is
(2) Line crossers. an improbability, he must be alert during interro-
gations for indications of espionage or agent ac-
(3) Deserters from enemy units.
tivity. Indications which separately or collec-
(4) Civil prisoners and enemy prisoners of tively may give rise to the suspicion that a sub-
war. ject is in the employ of, or acting in sympathy
(5) Inmates of concentration camps. with, enemy forces are as follows :
(6) Repatriated prisoners of war and escap- (1) Access to information or targets. A
ees. prospective espionage or sabotage agent must
(7) Members of underground resistance or- have access to the information desired by the
ganizations seeking to join friendly forces. enemy or the target installation to be destroyed
(8) Collaborators with the enemy. in order to carry out his mission. Hence, the in-
terrogation should establish a subject's accessibil-
(9) Target personalities, such as black,
ity to potential targets, including his location at
gray, or white list personalities.
the time he was apprehended.
(10) Volunteer informants.
(2) Technical skills. Proficiency in certain
(11) Persons who must be questioned because
technical skills is frequently an attribute of an
they are under consideration for employment
espionage or sabotage agent. The subject who has
with US Forces or for appointment as civil
a mastery of one or several foreign languages, a
officials by CA units.
knowledge of radio operation or of cryptography
c. Other Interrogations. If the security of US should be questioned carefully on the nature and
personnel, units, installations, and military oper- purpose of his training in those fields. His practi-
ations is to be maintained, the threat posed by cal experience and his work in those fields during
the civil population must be ascertained. Rela- or shortly prior to the war should give the Spe-
tively large scale interrogations of civilians may cial Agent cause for strong suspicion, and the in-
be necessary to ferret out concealed enemy dividual's story must be closely examined. Tech-
agents. Civilians are also a source of tactical and nical advice for the interrogation of such individ-
strategic intelligence as well as counterintel- uals should be obtained from USASA elements.
ligence information. In a combat area persons are (3) Documents and funds. An overabund-
often eager to denounce neighbors or acquaint- ance of documents and "new" documents of ques-
ances for personal reasons or gain ; much of this tionable authenticity give reason for doubt and
information may be of little value. should be the basis for detailed questioning. Dis-
d. Objectives of Counterintelligence Interroga- crepancies in document's contents or conflicts be-
tions. The counterintelligence interrogation in tween data and the subject's story have fre-
combat areas assists in the accomplishment of quently led to detection of hostile agents. Unex-
three major objectives. plainable possession of large amounts of money,
(1) In the screening process, the Special valuable jewelry, or other items of great value
Agent helps remove from the battlefield the refu- should be questioned carefully.
gees whose very presence threatens overall secur- (4) Pro-enemy background. Residence or
ity. travel in enemy territory, membership in a hos-

12-8
 FM 30-17

tile party, or known former collaboration with /. Screening or Preliminary Interrogation.

the enemy are facts of obvious importance. The Preliminary interrogation and screening are gen-
Special Agent must determine whether the sub- erally synonymous, except that the former indi-
ject is actually in sympathy with the enemy or cates that there will be a followup detailed inter-
has acted merely to serve his own best interests rogation, while screening involves the selection
with regard to his life, the welfare of his family, by brief questioning of a relatively small number
or his property. from a large group for detailed interrogation
(5) Family in enemy-held areas. Enemy (para 12-16). In both cases the technique, pur-
pressure is often applied to individuals whose pose, and scope of the questioning are generally
families reside under enemy control; particu- the same. The object is to select for detailed in-
larly, if the family had no past connection with terrogation a reasonable number of persons who
the enemy-held area. appear to be suspect or knowledgeable on matters
of CI interest. Preliminary interrogation or
(6) Inconsistent story. Small discrepancies
screening is generally concerned with identity,
in the subject's story may be important. Distance
background, recent activities, and travel or es-
compared to travel time, accent peculiar to an
cape routes. Arrested civilians who are to un-
area the subject refuses to acknowledge as his
own, unreasonable explanation of deferment, ex- dergo preliminary interrogation or screening
must first be searched for weapons and evidence;
emption, or discharge from military service, ex-
the life of the Special Agent and the success of
emption from labor conscription, or implausible
the preliminary interrogation may depend on it.
reasons for risking the crossing of battle lines
may be warning signals to the counterintelligence Documents and personal belongings of a subject
must be examined; the circumstances of appre-
interrogator. Contradictions in a subject's story
hension, if by personnel of another unit, must be
do not warrant jumping to conclusions; however,
studied. Available files should be checked. Coun-
the Special Agent must remain alert to all possi-
bilities. Allowances must be made for defective terintelligence units normally prepare a standard
memory or lack of logic due to the emotional screening report form to serve as a guide and
stress of a subject. convenience for the Special Agent. Circumstances
at the time, number of persons to be screened,
(7) Suspicious actions or activities. Unusual and number of Special Agent interrogators avail-
interest displayed by indigenous persons in troop able will dictate the length or detail of the
units or equipment, or persistent loitering in the screening. Generally, the following items will be
vicinity of troop units and installations without the basic data to be developed during screening or
reasonable explanation should be sufficient to preliminary interrogation :
warrant interrogation for the purpose of clarify-
ing the status of a person so involved. (1) Subject's name and aliases.
(8) Violations of civil or military regular- (2) Date and place of birth.
Hons. Mere violation of military regulations in an (3) Nationality, past and present.
area controlled by the military, such as manda-
tory registration, curfews, travel restrictions, or (4) Family, complete with addresses.
declaration of weapons, may be relatively unim- (5) Education.
portant to CI elements. However, the motives
(6) Technical skills.
which such violations despite severe penalties
must be compelling, and may possibly be of great (7) Occupation.
interest to counterintelligence personnel. (8) Places of residence with dates.
(9) Modus operandi. The frequent similarity
(9) Religion.
of tactics of hostile agents working for the same
enemy agency or force, means of contact with (10) Political affiliations.
their agent handlers, type of cover story, and (11) Military history.
manner of collecting and reporting their informa-
tion may lead to identification of suspects with a (12) Wartime activities.
known enemy agency or group. Established pat- (13) Circumstances preceding apprehension.
terns of activity or behavior of enemy agents
should be disseminated to all intelligence and se- (14) Reason for presence in the area.
curity agencies to assist in the identification of (15) Information of counterintelligence or in-
agents still operating. telligence interest.

12-9
[Fí^l 3©-ï ^

In large scale screening operations, shortage of 112—12. HirtvesîDgeiîDeirDs eamid inffennall Seewüßy
time may be a critical factor. It may be advanta- Funsíiomis
geous to have the subjects fill out forms if they
There are certain unique additional problems
are able to do so. A study of the form with ques-
that may confront counterintelligence personnel
tions on any suspicious entries must follow ; how-
while conducting investigations and services in a
ever, well trained professional agents will rarely
tactical environment.
be exposed by use of this technique. If detailed in-
terrogation appears to be warranted, the subject a. Indigenous Personnel.
is isolated for evacuation or transportation to the (1) Counterintelligence elements are respon-
appropriate interrogation site. This rule applies sible for conducting security investigations of in-
not only to suspects but to persons with an abun- digenous personnel retained in their official civil-
dance of information of counterintellxgence or in- ian positions and of other civilian personnel to be
telligence interest. A copy of the screening report employed by the US Army in a theater of opera-
should accompany the subject to the next interro- tions. The scope of investigation normally will
gation site. depend on the position or job for which the per-
son is applying and the degree of sensitivity and
g. Detailed Interrogation. Detailed CI interro- access to classified defense information. AR
gations may be conducted in joint interrogation 604-5 discusses details concerning the conditions
centers (FM 30-15) or at interrogation sites es- under which indigenous employees may be
tablished by intelligence units (usually at field granted access to classified defense information.
army or higher level). Detailed interrogation The final decision on employment clearance re-
does not differ radically from the preliminary in- mains a command responsibility. Difficulty may
terrogation except that attention is now focused be often encountered by the Special Agent be-
on individuals who are suspect or who are known cause of lack of files, records, and other reposito-
to have extensive information of interest. A study ries of civilian police and other investigative
of the preliminary interrogation or screening re- agencies which have been destroyed or displaced
port, examination of the subject's documents and as a result of tactical operations. Every attempt
belongings, and checks of available files and in- must be made to check all files and records which
formation must be conducted and analyzed in may be available. Utilization of indigenous per-
preparation for the interrogation. The Special sonnel by US Forces presents a definite security
Agent then proceeds with the interrogation using threat because of enemy penetration efforts utiliz-
techniques discussed in FM 30-15. ing indigenous civilian employees who are sympa-
(1) Details of the subject's personal history thetic with, or may be coerced into serving, the
must be reviewed. Should the subject confess that enemy cause. Caution must be exercised by all
he is an enemy agent, he becomes an important using units to preclude compromise of classified
source of information on hostile intelligence information. A threat just as serious is posed by
methods of operation and, perhaps, on identities the capability of employees to collect volumes of
of other hostile agents, unless, of course, he is a unclassified information on planned movements
confusion agent. This will lead to exhaustive in- or tactical operations of US units. Any indication
terrogations on such issues as hostile intelligence, of disloyalty or other suspicious conduct on the
operations, identities of agents, the manner of his part of the indigenous employee will be reported
recruitment, training he received, missions he immediately to the intelligence officer of the com-
was assigned, and those he accomplished. mand through appropriate channels. Once a labor
(2) The suspect or any person being interro- pool of cleared indigenous personnel has been es-
gated may also be an important source of infor- tablished in the command, units normally will
mation of intelligence value, strategic or tactical. hire only from this pool. The command should
publish an SOP concerning hiring, utilization,
(3) The questioning usually should follow a
and control of indigenous personnel. Civil affairs
logical sequence to avoid confusing the subject
under the staff supervision of the Assistant Chief
and to facilitate reporting. An illogical sequence of Staff for Civil-Military Operations (G5) has
may be used as a technique to purposely confuse the responsibility for providing labor for mili-
the subject so that he will inadvertently contra- tary forces and coordinating with CI elements
dict himself. The Special Agent must be alert for concerning measures to provide necessary secur-
discrepancies. He must retain his psychological ity screening of indigenous personnel considered
advantage. for employment. Counterintelligence elements

12-1®
 FM 30-17

will maintain a close working relationship with the movement itself, its purpose, implications,
CA elements and Civil-Military Operations staffs and organization. Counterintelligence personnel
at all echelons within the theater. The security may be called upon to provide advice and assist-
problem does not end with clearances. A close ance in the planning and conduct of troop move-
continuing watch or check on employees must be ments. Some of the services which may be pro-
maintained. vided by counterintelligence personnel include—
(2) Counterintelligence personnel fre- (а) Acting in an advisory capacity or as
quently must rely on qualified indigenous civil- assistants to the G2/S2 in the preparation of the
ians or members of allied forces to serve as inter- CI portion of the movement plan.
preters and translators. Properly utilized and (б) Conducting CI surveys and inspec-
controlled, indigenous interpreters have proved tions, recommending measures for maximum se-
to be of great value to CI operations. They are ca- crecy, and providing assistance in instructions to
pable of detecting dialect differences and discrep- unit personnel concerning troop movement secur-
ancies in civilian accounts of incidents or circum- ity.
stances and are frequently more discerning in in- (c) Observing the move to report and in-
terrogations dealing with local civilians and hos- vestigate security violations or other security
tile intelligence agents. They familiarity with the threats.
country in terms of regional, religious, social and
(2) Regardless of the type and mode of
political schisms, attitudes, and prejudices repre-
transportation utilized for the move, the follow-
sents skills not easily developed by counterintel-
ing security measures must be considered :
ligence personnel from a different environment.
On the other hand, these same advantages may (a) Mail censorship.
influence interpreters' work and color their re- (b) Monitoring or restriction of communi-
ports. Indigenous employees of CI elements must cation facilities.
be strictly controlled by Special Agents. Over- (c) Emphasis on security education pro-
familiarity, lack of restraint, freedom of move- grams.
ment, and independent actions on the part of the {d) Establishment of curfew hours or res-
indigenous employees are unacceptable. FM trictions.
30-15 discusses the use of interpreters and the (e) Conduct of surveillances of areas and
necessity for security clearances. facilities which military personnel frequent dur-
ing off-duty hours and where "loose talk" may be
b. Riots and Civil Disturbances. FM 19-15 out- prevalent.
lines the responsibilities of the major commander (/) Removal of identifying marks and in-
and the utilization of troops when riots and civil signia from clothing, equipment, and vehicles.
disturbances occur in territories where US troops (g) Arrangements for storage or destruc-
are stationed by agreement or consent, or in areas tion of personal diaries, letters, telegrams, and
occupied as a consequence of belligerent actions. other documents or papers.
Effective counterintelligence, however, may pre- (h) Prevention of unauthorized press re-
clude riots and disturbances. Continuous efforts leases.
by counterintelligence with close coordination (-i) Posting of security guards at loading
with the Provost Marshal and the G5 must be or embarkation areas, critical or congested areas
made to determine the probable causes of riots along the route, and off-loading or debarkation
and disturbances, locations where they may sites.
occur, types, and number of people involved, 0) Crating, covering, and guarding mate-
identities of leaders, and whether the riots or dis- rial and equipment to conceal its identity and
turbances are enemy sponsored and directed. provide protection from unauthorized access dur-
With this knowledge, the commander can take ing the move.
necessary action to eliminate potential causes of a (k) Examination of departed areas to in-
riot or civil disturbance. sure that no information of intelligence value has
been left behind which might disclose the destin-
c. Troop Movement Security.
ation, identity, and mission of the unit.
(1) Troop movement security is designed to (I) Examination of the intended destina-
prevent espionage or sabotage from interfering tion for physical security hazards when possible.
with the movement of US Forces, insure the ele- (m) Dissemination of false information
ment of surprise, and deny information regarding designed to deceive or mislead the enemy as to

12-11
FM 30-17

the actual intentions of the move, when approved 12—13. Files and Reports
by the theater commander or higher authority. Counterintelligence elements engaged in tactical
d. Special Weapons Security. operations are responsible for developing and
maintaining their own operational files. These
(1) Special weapons systems require many files will be transferred to the CI element gaining
sensitive components, as well as ancillary equip- area responsibility as tactical elements displace.
ment and supporting documents. The security,
a. Operational Files. Information concerning
classification and the sensitivity of these systems, individuals, organizations, and other subjects of
related equipment, and documents dictate the ne- CI interest is assembled and maintained by CI
cessity for strict security measures. Counterintel- elements engaged in tactical operations for the
ligence personnel assist special weapons unit purpose of furthering the investigative and se-
commanders and others with responsibility for curity mission. This information should be kept
these systems in establishing adequate security to a minimum, consistent with operational needs.
measures at special weapons sites for moves of Operational files maintained may include, but are
special weapons and munitions, and at storage not limited to—
depots. This assistance is provided in the form of (1) Personality files on individuals of cur-
CI surveys and inspections, monitoring of ship- rent or future CI interest.
ments and deliveries to sites or depots, aid in (2) Impersonal files such as dossiers on or-
conducting effective security education programs, ganizations and groups of current or future CI
and coordinating with other units (e.g., military interest.
police) responsible for providing security for (3) Correspondence and other reports con-
these systems. cerning current or pending operations and inves-
tigations.
(2) Regulations governing security require-
ments for special weapons systems provide mini- (4) Hold files containing essentially a collec-
mum security standards and criteria for safe- tion or summary of all CI operational activities
and information assembled during the period in
guarding the weapons and their components.
which the unit has operated in a particular geo-
Counterintelligence personnel involved in special graphic area.
weapons security must be familiar with these
regulations, particularly as they pertain to coun- b. Reports. Counterintelligence units and ele-
terintelligence responsibilities (see AR 50-2, AR ments involved in tactical operations will use
50-3, AR 190-60, and AR 611-15). standard reports and message forms. The basic
forms of CI reports are explained in chapter 7
(3) Special weapons systems are prime tar- and appendix B.
gets for sabotage. Counterintelligence personnel
conducting investigations of sabotage or sus- 12—14. Special Operations
pected sabotage of special weapons systems The planning and conduct of CI special opera-
should request assistance, as required, of techni- tions is included in the classified supplement to
cally qualified personnel. this manual, FM 30-17A.

Section IV. TACTICAL SUPPORT OPERATIONS

12—TS. General terintelligence personnel as outlined in AR

381-150 still apply.
In a combat environment CI elements can support
the commander by conducting CI-oriented tactical
support operations from the divisional and sepa- 12—16. Counterintelligence Screening
rate brigade MI units. These missions should not Operations
become the bulk of the element's activities for the a. General. Counterintelligence screening oper-
tactical unit but should be a complement to the ations in a conventional combat environment
other basic CI tasks previously mentioned in this consist of refugee and prisoner of war screening
manual. The basic limitations on the use of coun- and mobile and static checkpoints which are dis-

12-12
 FM 30-17

cussed below. These operations normally are con- apparatus, CI personnel must be thoroughly con-
ducted with other elements such as military po- versant with their methods of operation, policies,
lice (MP), combat troops, civil affairs and psy- objectives, offices and suboffices, schools, officials,
chological operations teams, and they require and known agents.
close coordination and joint planning. 3. Enemy order-of-battle (OB). Every
b. Counterintelligence Screening. Refugee and member of the CI team should know which units
prisoner of war screening by counterintelligence of the enemy his unit is facing and which units
personnel is conducted with the view to intercept- are in its area of operations. He should be aware
ing hostile intelligence agents, saboteurs, and of their disposition, strength, weaknesses, compo-
subversives trying to infiltrate friendly lines. sition, training, equipment, activities, history,
personalities, and commanders. Current OB in-
( 1 ) Coordination. Planning for these screen- formation should be maintained by the team for
ing operations is accomplished, as far as possible,
possible exploitation of prisoners of war and for
in conjunction with the following elements:
assistance to OB analysts. Counterintelligence
(a) Combat commander. The commander personnel are not OB interrogators but they must
is concerned with channelizing refugees and pris- be capable of expeditiously recognizing, detect-
oners of war through his area of operations, par- ing, exploiting and reporting tactical and OB
ticularly in the attack, to prevent any impedi- data.
ments to his unit's movement, or any adverse ef-
fect on the unit's mission. 4. Enemy-held area. CI personnel
should also become familiar with the area in
(b) Military Police (MP). MP elements
which they are operating; particularly geogra-
are responsible for the control and evacuation of
phy, landmarks, distances, and travel conditions.
prisoners of war and refugees through the differ-
Knowledge of such pertinent information as the
ent echelons.
political, social and economic traditions, customs
(c) Civil Affairs (CA). CA elements,
and racial problems of the area is essential.
under the G5, are responsible for the proper dis-
position of refugees and prisoners of war. (b) Black lists and information sheets
(d) Psychological Operations (PSYOP). listing indicators of CI interest should be distrib-
PSYOP elements, under the G5, contribute to uted to the troops, MP, or other personnel assist-
screening operations by informing the refugees ing with the screening operation. A form should
of the need for their displacement. They also as- be made up and passed out to the individuals to
sist the MP in maintaining control. be screened requiring them to record personal
(e) Civil authorities. Civil authorities are data. This form will aid in formulating the type
included in planning only if control has been re- of questions to be asked and in determining the
turned to them. informational areas needed to fulfill EEI or OIR.
The following data, plus anything else deemed
(2) Preparation.
pertinent, should be included on the form :
(a) Before any screening operation, the
CI teams involved should become intimately fa- 1. Full name, other names, date and
miliar with all available information on indica- place of birth, current and permanent residences,
tors as covered in paragraph 12-lle, as well as and current citizenship of the individual.
the following: 2. The same information as above con-
1. Regulations in the enemy area. To cerning the father, mother, and siblings, includ-
have any success, CI personnel must become fa- ing the occupation and whereabouts of each.
miliar with all restrictions placed on the civilian 3. If married, the names of spouse (in-
population within the enemy-held area, to include cluding female maiden name), date and place of
curfews, travel restrictions, rationing, draft or birth, nationality, occupation and personal data
conscription regulations, mobilization orders for on spouse's family.
civilian labor forces, required political organiza- 4. The individual's education and
tional memberships, etc. Knowledge of these reg- knowledge of languages.
ulations may help the CI screener to detect dis- 5. Details of the individual's career to
crepancies, discern changes in enemy activity, include schools, military service, technical and
and maintain control. professional qualifications, political affiliations
2. Enemy intelliegnce, political infra- and countries visited.
structure and organizations. In order to identify 6. Point of departure, destination and
agents of the enemy intelligence or infrastructure purpose.

12-13
[FÍW ZU-Ï7

(3) Initial screening. Prisoners of war and those who conduct the preliminary or screening
refugees enter prisoner of war and refugee interrogations. The PIR, therefore, should reflect
streams rearward at the forward edge of the bat- as much data as possible under these four head-
tle area (FEBA) where the troops channelize ings:
them after a search for weapons and documents. (a) Identity. Persons should be searched
(Fig 12-1 depicts the prisoner of war and refu- for possible identifying documents in the form of
gee flow.) Couriers, walking wounded, and empty ID cards, ration cards, draft cards, driver's li-
trucks or convoys traveling rearward toward the cense, auto registration, travel documents, pass-
brigade control points can be used as guards port, and the like. If a man is, or has been, a sol-
and/or transport for the prisoners of war and re- dier, his rank, service number, and unit should be
fugees. At this point MP will take custody and recorded. All this information can be checked
responsibility for the prisoners of war and refu- against the form previously filled out by the in-
gees, and initial CI screening will take place. terrogée.
This will consist of, as a minimum, interrogation (b) Background. The use of the form will
by intelligence interrogation personnel. These aid in obtaining the information required; how-
personnel will refer suspects to the CI team for ever, certain informational areas on the forms
further interrogations and possible detention. At will have to be clarified, especially if data indi-
this level, suspects are separated from the pris- cate a suspect category or the person's knowl-
oner of war and refugee streams, exploited if pos- edgeability of intelligence information.
sible, and evacuated to division by MP. Detained
(c) Recent activities. The activities of an
prisoners of war and refugees will be interro-
individual during the days prior to his detain-
gated, further exploited at division prisoner of
ment or capture should be examined. What was
war collecting points or civilian detention cen-
he doing to make a living? What connection, if
ters, and then evacuated to field army civilian de-
any, has he had with the enemy? Why was he in
tention centers or prisoner of war cages for de-
the area? This line of questioning may bring out
tailed interrogation and exploitation, if applica-
particular skills such as those associated with a
ble. Those refugees found to be innocent of any
radio operator, linguist, photographer, etc. Physi-
wrongdoing will be rerouted to the civilian as-
cal checks can be made of certain types of cal-
sembly areas. Those prisoners of war and refu-
louses, bruises, or stains to corroborate or dis-
geees not detained will follow the refugee flow to
prove his story. Sometimes soil on shoes will not
the division control points where more detailed
match that from the area he claims to have come
CI screening is conducted similar to that system
from.
at brigade. Those not detained will be collected
and routed to the field army civilian assembly (d) Journey or escape route. CI personnel
area or prisoner of war cage. should determine the route the individual took to
get to US lines or the checkpoint. The individual
(4) Conduct of screening. Since it is impos- should be further questioned closely on time, dis-
sible to interrogate everyone because of time and tance, and method of travel so that the screener
the usually large number of people to be interro- will be allowed the opportunity to quickly calcu-
gated, civilians moving about the combat area late whether or not the trip was feasible during
have to be subjected to brief inquiries on a selec- the period of time stated and with the mode of
tive basis by MI, CA, PSYOP, and MP personnel. transportation used. Discrepancies in travel time
Such brief inquiries are designed to locate and and distances can be the key to the discovery of
separate suspicious persons from the masses and an infiltrator whose cover story is very shallow.
should be thought of as a preliminary interroga- By ascertaining what an individual observed en
tion. These selected persons are detained for fur- route, the screener can either check the person's
ther CI interrogation. If the interrogée is to be story or pick up intelligence information concern-
referred to a rear echelon for the detailed inter- ing the enemy forces.
rogation, a preliminary interrogation report
(PIR) is furnished the MP who accompanies the (5) Indicators. The following indicators can
interrogée to the rear. The MP will take both the be used in an attempt to identify hostile infiltra-
detainee and the PIR to the next echelon CI team. tors.
The mechanics of this referral procedure will be (a.) Persons of military age.
a matter of operational orientation. Personnel (b) Persons traveling alone or in pairs.
who conduct the detailed interrogations at rear (c) Persons without identification.
area interrogation centers will not be the same as (d) Persons with unusual documents.

12—M
 • •

Bde Control Point

$ Y

m > t.
> >
fS Ji ! %

Bn Checkpoint (Initial limited Interrogation by Bde Interrogation Team

k
Cl Personnel)
/ /
/ /
! / Division Interrogation
(More Detailed)

'ft £
iV «

Division Interrogation
Team

Field Army PW Cages

or
a
Civilian Assembly Areas
.

Cleared Field Army Interrogation Team

Suspect *—<*—*■—r
3
<4
5 Figure 12-1. Channelizing of prisoners of war and refugees. I
en N
FM 30-17

(e) Persons possessing large amounts of or on foot, briefly selects individuals at random
money, precious metals, or gems. or systematically, e.g., every fifth person, to be
(/) Persons displaying any peculiar activ- stopped and questioned. These checkpoints could
ity. be located at various points for periods not to ex-
(g) Persons trying to avoid detection or ceed 1 day.
questioning. (b) Static checkpoints are those manned
( h) Persons using enemy MO. permanently by MP or troops at the entrance to a
(i) Persons having a pro-enemy back- brigade, town gate, river crossing, or similar stra-
ground. tegic point.
0") Persons with a suspicious story. (3) Mobile and static checkpoints are used
(k) Persons with a family in enemy by counterintelligence to :
areas. (a) Detect and prevent enemy infiltration
(0 Persons with a technical skill or spe- of espionage, sabotage, or subversive agents into
cial knowledge. the area.
(m) Persons who have collaborated. (b) Gather information of immediate in-
(n) Persons who violate regulations in telligence value, both tactical and counterintel-
enemy areas. ligence, from refugees and other persons from
(6) Other screening methods. In addition to enemy-controlled areas.
interrogation, the following methods of screening (c) Gather other information not other-
prisoners of war and refugees can be used. wise available to intelligence units.
(a) Black, grey, and white lists.
(4) The preparation needed for static and
(b) Low-level informants inserted into
mobile checkpoints is identical to other screening
the prisoner of war or refugee screens, cages, or
operations, and the indicators will remain basi-
centers.
cally the same.
(c) Sound equipment placed in suspect
holding areas or cages. d. Port and Harbor Security. Port and harbor
{d) Polygraph examinations. security normally is conducted jointly between
(e) Specialized identification equipment, the MP and MI units assigned to the logistical
e.g., metal-trace detection kit. command under which the port is operated.
Counterintelligence elements normally will con-
c. Mobile and Static Checkpoints. This type of
centrate their efforts in the following areas :
CI screening requires that counterintelligence
personnel prepare black and grey lists, indica- (1) Special operations. Those special opera-
tors, and some specialized equipment such as tions described in FM 30-17A, the classified sup-
metal detection kits to be used by screening plement to this manual, will be targeted against
teams. These teams will provide the initial the surrounding and internal areas with special
screening and will detain and refer suspects to emphasis on hostile sabotage and subversion ele-
the MI control element for detailed interrogation ments.
and possible exploitation. (2) Physical security. Normal CI procedures
( 1 ) Screening teams can be made up of com- will be established for port and harbor areas as
bat troops, military police, civil affairs, intellig- are set forth for installations, except that con-
ence interrogators, counterintelligence agents, or trols must also be established for ships and crews
any mix thereof. in port, particularly those under a foreign flag.
(2) Checkpoints are placed at strategic loca- e. Border Security. Border Security is con-
tions where there is sufficient space for assem- ducted by CI element to minimize infiltration of
bling people under guard and for parking vehi- men and supplies into the area of operations—
cles for search and investigation and are set up particularly hostile intelligence or elements
ideally as shown in figure 12-2 as either mobile which will engage in sabotage and subversive ac-
or static missions. Local security must be posted tivities against the friendly war effort. To accom-
to protect the checkpoint and a sufficient amount plish this, CI elements must determine hostile
of personnel must also be posted to the front and methods of operation to establish indicators and
rear to apprehend anyone attempting to avoid must determine infiltration and exfiltration points
the checkpoint. to successfully capture or neutralize infiltration.
(a) A mobile checkpoint can be used as a The indicators will be furnished those friendly
moving system whereby the team, either mounted elements in contact with the border areas, and to

12-16
 FM 30-17

Woods

4*¿^Va > A
y .o

<p

A
n ft * Q>
■^s Y
$<§tâïH£*x Ä
£'C,f Barricade or cS O
Roadblock

•y t _■ ■
V^sí

LEGEND: Concealed elements which seize personnel who

attempt to turn back.

Security elements.

Vehicle and personnel inspection areas.

Figure 12-2. Checkpoint.

12-17
FM 30-17

other MI elements. In addition the friendly mili- cators when engaged in aerial surveillance or
tary forces, to include MP and CA elements, may image interpretation missions. Information thus
utilize those indicators received from the inter- received can go into planning for neutralization
ception of radio communications when conducting and exploitation operations, or use of detection
border surveillance and making documentation powders at possible infiltration points as well as
checks at mobile and static checkpoints (c) interrogation of border area residents and travel-
above). Other MI units can make use of the indi- ers.
 FM 30-17

CHAPTER 13

STABILITY OPERATIONS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

13—1. General the overriding consideration set by the political

arm. A discussion of such a study is contained in
a. To fully understand the counterintelligence
FM 30-17A, the classified supplement to the man-
problems and the application of counterintel-
ual.
ligence techniques and procedures in stability op-
erations, counterintelligence personnel must be d. To accomplish security objectives, the CI ef-
thoroughly acquainted with insurgency, its fort in the following areas must be stressed :
causes and characteristics, and the peculiarities
(1) Denial of all information (classified or
of US Forces employment in insurgency areas.
otherwise) to the insurgents by devising security
FM 30-31, FM 30-31 A, and FM 31-23 should be
controls to prevent breaches.
studied as background for the issues covered
here. (2) Formulating and planning security
training programs and implementing security
b. The normal counterintelligence functions of controls.
routine security investigations and services are
performed in much the same way as they are in a (3) Detection, investigation, and elimination
conventional tactical situation. The basic respon- of security breaches and weaknesses.
sibilities of CI elements and personnel in an in- (4) Detection, identification, and neutraliza-
surgency area are the denial of intelligence infor- tion or destruction of hostile intelligence, subver-
mation to the insurgent force and the identifica- sive, sabotage, and terrorist elements and activi-
tion and neutralization of the insurgent infra- ties.
structure. Particular emphasis should be placed (5) Monitoring the populace and activities
upon the intelligence apparatus. Counterintel- in the area of operation for indications of threats
ligence operations must not only provide security to the security of US/host country activities.
against espionage, subversion, sabotage, and ter-
rorism, but they must include the collection of in- e. The police, in the course of investigating
formation on the insurgents, their organizations, crimes and conducting police law and order oper-
and their activities. Detailed information on the ations, may be the first government agency to de-
insurgent intelligence apparatus, methods of op- tect evidence of an insurgency. Police intelligence
eration, targets, and capabilities is required as a can provide significant information through MI
basis for CI planning and the conduct of an effec- channels and command intelligence for counter in-
tive security program. In addition, this planning surgency operations. Intelligence collection guide-
can be used for future tactical missions by com- lines for police and MI agencies should be ex-
bat units to neutralize CI targets. changed in the preconflict environment of the
first phase of an insurgent threat to assure the
c. If the insurgency is dominated by a Com-
timely provision of police intelligence to MI and
munist regime, a study of the political apparatus
CI agencies and civil intelligence agencies respon-
must also be made since the philosophy that the
sible for detection, surveillance, and penetration
military exists only as an extension of the politi-
of insurgent organizations.
cal arm, and is subordinate to it, will dominate
the insurgency. Such a study, if it is continuous,
may yield information more revealing than a 13—2. Jurisdiction and Responsibility
study of only the military aspects of an insur- Counterintelligence measures normally will have
gency or it may become the key to future opera- been carried out by agencies of the host country
tions, missions, or goals set for the military by prior to arrival of US Forces in the country. US

13-1
FM 30-17

Army CI elements, as part of the US Forces, will porting the host country counterintelligence and
arrive in the host country by request or invita- security services. However, with the participation
tion. Counterintelligence activities of US person- of US Forces in stability operations, the normal
nel may be limited to training, advising, and sup- CI support of these forces must be provided.

Section II. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

13—3. Personnel Security Operations friendly and insurgent elements among the host
country populace magnifies the problem of "loose
Personnel security investigations will be con-
talk." Loose and careless discussion of unclassi-
ducted in accordance with this manual and AR
fied military information presents an even
381-130. Security investigations of local nation-
greater problem inasmuch as the absence of a se-
als involve additional problems.
curity classification gives free license to discus-
a. Subjects may be from Communist- or insur- sion. Such unclassified bits of information in the
gent-controlled areas, within or outside the host hands of insurgents lead to ambushes, surprise
country, where investigation cannot be conducted. raids, and acts of terrorism. The security train-
Special notice must be taken of a subject's listed ing and education of troops must stress that dis-
residences to determine if they were or are in in- closure of unclassified information may be as
surgent-controlled areas. dangerously detrimental as disclosure of classi-
fied information. The indigenous employees of US
b. There may be an absence of reliable and
Forces facilitate the insurgent's acquisition of in-
current records of all types, particularly in newly
formation on our activities, both military and
emerging nations, thus reducing the effectiveness
personal.
of background investigation.
c. Measures which screen the staging, group-
c. In most instances, host country intelligence
ing, training for, and planning of military actions
and security agencies, which may be penetrated
from the observation of the insurgents and the
by the insurgents, will be responsible for investi-
population are extremely important. Troops must
gating and clearing local personnel; capabilities
be warned against patterns of conduct which re-
of local agencies will vary from excellent to non-
veal the tactical intentions of their units. They
existent.
must be reminded that the populace is the pri-
d. The volume of clearance actions on local na- mary source of intelligence information for the
tionals (military, cooks, maids, drivers, interpret- insurgents. Counterintelligence personnel must
ers, laborers) who have frequent access to US in- learn to distinguish what patterns of conduct are
stallations and the probability of limited person- used by the insurgent as indicators and rapidly
nel for conducting background investigations report these indicators to the responsible com-
may dictate the necessity for limiting the scope of mand.
investigations. Employment of local nationals is
discouraged for security reasons, and, when nec- 13—5. Physical Security
essary, should be kept to a minimum. Under these
a. The effective protection of military installa-
conditions, steps may be taken to prevent undue
tions, personnel, and activities from the threat of
risk. One step is to obtain the specific indorse-
espionage and sabotage is based on security mea-
ment of the loyalty of a subject by persons whose
sures implemented and practiced as a result of CI
loyalty and reliability have already been estab-
surveys and inspections and the physical security
lished (the "guarantor system").
surveys conducted by the MP. Counterintelligence
surveys provide recommendations on security
13—4. Security of Information
measures designed to fit specific installations, fa-
a. US Army activities involve daily contact cilities, or activities. A checklist for conducting
with host country personnel over whom US CI surveys is contained in appendix D. A check-
Forces exercise no security control. This unavoid- list for conducting physical security surveys is
able security risk must be balanced with strict se- contained in FM 19-30. In all surveys, particular
curity discipline and effective application of basic emphasis should be given to a check of :
principles of safeguarding military information.
(1) The natural topographic features exist-
b. The difficulty in distinguishing between ing at the periphery of the installation to deter-

13-2
 FM 30-17

mine whether they afford direct observation into (1) Duty details for emergency conditions.
the installation, afford a concealed or covered (2) Immediate availability of adequate wea-
path of approach into the installation, or other- pons and munitions for immediate defense of the
wise adversely affect the security of the installa- installation.
tion. (3) An installation warning system to sound
(2) Organizations (political, labor, frater- the alert.
nal, social) in the area which may present a se- (4) Defense plans indicating posts for all
curity threat. members in the event of an assault, and a fire
(3) Places of entertainment (bars, restaur- plan for all weapons.
ants, night clubs) in proximity of the installation (5) Liaison with local security organizations
to determine whether there have been or may be and tactical units to provide support in case of at-
attempts to solicit information from the soldiers. tack, to include such items as a prearranged fire
support plan by artillery elements.
b. Periodic CI inspections must be conducted at
great frequency in an insurgency environment. (6) Emergency destruction plan for defense
Close attention must be given to: information and equipment.
(1) Close examination of the defensive sys- (7) Security discipline and standards of con-
tem to insure that every possible means of access duct to be observed.
or path of approach has been considered in estab- (8) Duties of security guards and patrol ar-
lishing the physical perimeter security. Particu- rangements indicating frequent changes of tim-
lar attention must be given to culverts, gulleys, ing and methods of patrolling, location of guard
and streambeds which could provide means of ac- posts, and changing of the guards. No discernible
cess to guarded areas. pattern in time or method should be established.
(2) Designation of all sensitive areas of the d. All security measures should be viewed and
installation as restricted areas and posting of undertaken with the knowledge that in stability
"off-limits" signs in both English and the local operations there is no rear area ; the enemy is on
language. Access to restricted areas by local hire all sides.
personnel such as janitors, cooks, guards, trans-
lators, and clerks should be prohibited or permit- 13—6. Populace and Resources Control
ted only when properly escorted by authorized a. A significant factor in stability operations is
personnel. It may be advisable to conduct periodic the implementation of measures to watch and
technical inspections of restricted areas to pre- control the movement channels and patterns nec-
clude or detect the presence of electronic listen- essary for support, communication, and opera-
ing devices which may be planted by opposition tions of insurgent forces. Prior to implementation
elements. Additionally, the periodic shifting of of any control measures, a public information
key installation locations, e.g., command post, program must be initiated to inform the popula-
radio room, will aid overall security. tion of the reason for the controls. Imposition of
(3) A strict visitor control system for han- excessive or unnecessary restrictions on move-
dling the constant security threat posed by the ment will result in the buildup of a strong resist-
presence of laborers, local tradesmen, and rela- ance from the people and should be avoided. To
tives of camp personnel. Security considerations the maximum extent possible, populace and re-
may dictate making the entire base area a res- sources control should be implemented and per-
tricted area into which no civilians are allowed. formed by host country agencies. This is a matter
Laborers should be closely checked and prevented of practicality, but there are also legal and psy-
from loitering near sensitive areas. chological implications. US Army counterintel-
(4) The location of sanitary fills, washing ligence specialists should participate in the plan-
areas, and other troop-associated facilities. Wher- ning stage of a populace and resources control
ever possible, such facilities should be within the program and provide advice and assistance to the
cantonment. host country.
c. A unit security SOP must be prepared at all b. Some examples of populace control tech-
echelons, and all members of the unit must be fa- niques are :
miliar with established security procedures and (1) Nation-wide registry and issuance of
practices. As a minimum, a security SOP must identification cards to all residents and supple-
provide for: mental family registration program.

13-3
FM 30-17

(2) Division of communities or areas into insurgents into a bordering country for sanctuary
blocks with appointed, trusted, and loyal resi- and also restrict materiel and manpower support
dents as block leaders to report on insurgent ac- to the insurgents. Prior to implementation of con-
tivities. trol measures, a thorough study and analysis is
(3) Use of police patrols to detect sources of made of the terrain, vegetation, and human envi-
insurgent support, insurgent sympathizers, and ronment along the border areas. Factors to consi-
routes used by insurgents. der are the activities, intents, and haunts of bor-
der residents, illegal border crossers, and smug-
(4) Establishment of checkpoints to screen
glers and the locations of natural geographic fea-
and control movement of individuals into and out
tures which are impediments to human travel.
of zones of operation or other specified areas.
(5) Employment of travel restrictions to de- e. Of primary concern to CI elements involved
tect violators and nonlocal residents; frequent in border or frontier control during stability op-
change of restrictions and travel bans at certain erations is the infiltration of hostile sabotage, es-
pionage, and subversive elements into and out of
hours of the day.
the host country. This infiltration can be by sea,
(6) A well regulated and controlled curfew land or air. These routes must be detected and
should be employed during hours of darkness to neutralized. The following EEI frequently will be
reduce terrorist and sapper attacks. standard in border or frontier control :
(7) Censorship. (1) Infiltration-point locations.
(8) Prevention of illegal political meetings (2) Exfiltration-point locations.
and rallies. (3) Methods of operation.
(9) Search operations are conducted to clear (4) Indicators of hostile infiltration/exfil-
a built-up area, search watercraft, apprehend tration.
guerrillas, and seize illegal arms, communication
means, medicines, and other items of a critical /. In planning for implementation of a border
nature. A search operation is conducted as a control operation, the following points should be
preventive measure against the accumulation of covered :
critical items by the population, the harboring of (1) Location of authorized road and rail
insurgents, and in accomplishing administrative crossing points along the frontier.
control measures previously established. (2) Establishment of frontier control points
(10) Block control (para h below). to determine identities of persons attempting to
enter or leave and to check their documents.
c. Some examples of resources control tech-
niques are: (3) Provision to apprehend anyone attempt-
ing to evade control restrictions.
(1) Control of production, storage, and dis-
tribution of foodstuffs, and protection of food- (4) Control of frontier area residents.
producing areas. (5) Provisions for interrogation and disposi-
(2) Control of the possession of arms, am- tion of apprehended suspects.
munition, demolitions, drugs, medicine, and (6) Security control of refugees and dis-
money. placed persons attempting to cross the frontier.
(3) Decreeing the possession of such chemi- (7) Liaison with border control authorities
cal combinations as arsenic sulfate and potassium of neighboring countries, if they are friendly.
chlorate, which create explosives, as illegal with-
(8) Mobile and static checkpoints.
out a special permit.
(9) Neutralization and exploitation opera-
(4) Control of certain imports, e.g., 82mm
tions.
pipe which can be converted into mortars while
permitting import of other pipes, i.e., 77mm con- (10) Travel permits.
struction pipe. (11) Documentation checks.
d. In stability operations, border or frontier (12) Imagery interpretation reports on possi-
control must be an integral part of the populace ble infiltration/exfiltration points.
and resources control program. Border control (13) Restricted zones enforced by air strikes/
measures can prevent or impede the movement of artillery fires.

13-4
 FM 30-17

(14) Detection powders laid on possible infil- of the most effective and economical means of po-
tration points. pulace and resources control; however, the sys-
(15) Surveillance, to include use of illumina- tem takes considerable time to establish and, by
tion, radars, night vision devices, and ground sen- its nature, operates more effectively under civil
sors. authority than under military control.

(16) Special operations, as discussed in FM (1) Block control is instituted by dividing

30-17A. each block (or area) in zones, each of which in-
cludes all the buildings on one side of a street
(17) Other intelligence, as acquired. within a block. A zone leader is appointed from
g. Resources control measures are necessary to among the residents for each zone, and a separate
impede or prevent the flow of food, supplies, and block leader is appointed for each, block. Zone
materiel to the insurgents. Insurgents are depen- leaders report to block leaders all movements, to
dent primarily upon the local populace for logis- include arrivals and departures. The block leader
tical support; therefore, regulatory or restrictive reports periodically to the military commander or
measures (rationing of critical supplies) to pre- civil authority on all movements within his block.
clude surpluses will affect the availability of Unusual activities are reported immediately.
these items of the insurgent. Planning must in- (2) If the loyalty of the zone and block
clude provision for disposal of scraps, waste, and leaders is questionable, informants may be lo-
unserviceable equipment and supplies to prevent cated throughout the area as an effective check
utilization by the insurgents. on their operations.
h. Block control is the constant surveillance
and reporting of activities within a block or other 13—7. Special Operations
small, populated area by a resident who has been Counterintelligence special operations in stability
appointed and is supervised by an appropriate au- operations are discussed in the supplement to this
thority in the host country. Block control is one manual, FM 30-17A, and in FM 30-31A.

Section III. OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

13—8. General 73—10. Base Camp or Installation Security

The basic CI techniques and procedures discussed Base camp or installation security in stability op-
in this manual and its supplement, FM 30-17A, erations should involve defensive and offensive
are generally applicable in an insurgency envi- measures. Since defensive measures alone will
ronment. Requirements for highly technical in- tend to play into the insurgent's strategy, the ini-
vestigative equipment are less than normal. Some tiative is usually the enemy's in an insurgency,
modifications or adaptations of techniques and therefore, both types must be employed. Some of
procedures are necessary. these measures can be taken from paragraph
12-5, which pertains to rear area security in a
13—9. Counterintelligence Coverage conventional war situation, but others and either
not mentioned in detail or are conducted differ-
In stability operations, CI coverage resembles
ently in an insurgency.
that coverage as described in chapter 12, Conven-
tional Combat Operations, in that area and tacti- a. Defensive Measures. In conjunction with
cal coverage is again used. The differences will be other agencies, primarily the MPs, the five basic
that tactical MI companies are responsible for areas of base camp or installation defense are
that area of influence around its tactical area of those concerned with physical security as listed
responsibility (TAOR). Area coverage will over- below.
lap the TAOR primarily for strategic type cover-
age. Normally, too, CI elements will not have any (1) Security forces. Counterintelligence in-
investigative jurisdiction over indigenous civil- terest in the security forces of an installation,
ians or US citizens in the supported nation. The compound or activity is the proper clearance of
area coverage elements normally will be given indigenous employees.
advisory duties in addition to the normal mission (2) Detection measures. While this area is
of area coverage. basically an MP responsibility, since it involves

13-5
m 3®-117

the use and deployment of sentry dogs, night vi- graphs 12-15 and 12-16 is a type of offensive CI
sion devices, anti-intrusion devices, and alarm measure.
systems to list a few, counterintelligence person- (3) Cordon and search operations.
nel qualified in the DAME, DASE, and photo-
(«.) General. In stability operations, cor-
graphic specialities can be of assistance to any
don and search operations may be employed to
MP element without this specialized training.
ferret out the insurgent infrastructure as well as
(3) Internal security measures. Counterin- individual unit elements which may use a com-
telligence must assume the greater responsibility munity or area as cover for their activities and/or
for education in the area of internal security as a support base. These operations should be
measures. SAEDA lectures in conjunction with conducted in conjunction with host country forces
MP classes on other aspects of security such as and organizations, not as unilateral US efforts.
fire prevention, arms control, and safety, will Ideally US Forces, to include CI personnel,
take up most of this aspect of physical security. should provide support and the entire operation
(4) Perimeter measures. A prime MP area, should be directed by a host country official. Host
perimeter measures consists of advice to the com- country personnel should, as a minimum, be part
mander on such things as outer perimeter patrol- of the screening and sweep elements on any cor-
ling, barriers, protective lighting, and clear zone. don and search operation.
Counterintelligence and police intelligence infor- (b) Preparation. Before conducting a com-
mant nets near and within the activity, when pro- munity or area cordon and search operation,
perly integrated, will also be needed for proper counterintelligence personnel must:
protection of the installation. 1. Coordinate with local officials to so-
(5) Control measures. This widely overlap- licit their support and cooperation in the opera-
ping area is shared by counterintelligence with tion.
the MP element, and includes such measures as 2. Coordinate with the host country area
population control in and around the activity; ve- coordination center, if established, or if not, the
hicular, personnel and package control into the host country intelligence and police organiza-
activity; and restricted areas. tions : To obtain their participation in the opera-
tion ; to update existing black and gray lists ; to
b. Offensive Measures. The primary objective
arrange to have insurgent defectors, agents, and
should be the identification and neutralization of
other knowledgeable personnel present to iden-
specific members of the insurgent infrastructure
tify insurgents and their supporters; to update
through systematic intelligence collection and
all intelligence on the community or area.
analysis with complete documentation concerning
3. Coordinate with US and host country
the activities of each individual. The ultimate ob-
CA and psychological warfare teams for enter-
jective being to allow the host country to prove
tainment and civic services.
the individual's illegal activity once he is appre-
4. Coordinate with the unit commanders
hended. This will require that CI personnel work
who will be involved in the operation for details
very closely with host country agencies. Liaison
on the conduct of the operations.
and exchange of information with the area coor-
5. Update all intelligence on the com-
dination centers, if they have been established ; or
munity or area.
with the civilian police, military and civilian in-
telligence agencies in absolutely necessary to in- (c) Conduct of the operation. The senior
sure that offensive CI measures are completely tactical unit commander will be the individual
effective. Since the host country agencies will responsible for the conduct of the operation. He
have the prime responsibility for identification will plan, with advice from CI, CA, and psychol-
and neutralization of the infrastructure, US CI ogical warfare personnel, the cordon, which is
activities should complement those of the host usually deployed at night, and the search, which
country. CI personnel should be the focal point normally begins at first light.
for exchange of information concerning the in- 1. The basic operation is the community
frastructure, between the US units and host cordon and search operation (fig 13-1). As the
country organizations. collection/screening station (fig 13-2) is set up by
the screening element, the sweep element escorts
(1) HUMINT, as discussed in FM 30-17A the residents toward the collection/screening sta-
and FM 30-31A should be used offensively. tion, leaving behind one resident to care for fam-
(2) Mobile checkpoints as discussed in para- ily belongings, if required by law. The search ele-

H 3—<2>
 FM 30-17

ment follows behind the sweep element searching any immediately recognizable enemy. These in-
houses, storage areas, cemeteries, etc., with dogs formants will be provided with a means by which
and metal detection equipment, if available. Each to notify a nearby guard or a screener of the
search element should include an interrogator spotted enemy member who will be immediately
with a blacklist to screen persons left behind segregated and interrogated. At the specific
to watch family belongings. In the collection/ screening stations the residents will be asked for
screening station, the residents are brought identification, checked against blacklists,
to the collection area (or holding area) and searched for incriminating evidence or "body-
then systematically led to specific screening marks" or, if available, checked by electronic
stations. En route to the screening station, each equipment. If found suspect or guilty of enemy
individual will be searched for weapons and will activity, persons are moved on for photograph-
pass by the mayor or community leader, enemy ing, further interrogation or put in the screening
defectors or cooperating prisoners hidden from area detection point to be taken back to a base
view so that they can uncompromisingly identify area or area coordination center interrogation fa-

I
I Search Elements Sweep Elements Security Elements

Figure 13-1. Community cordon and search.

13-7
FM 30-17

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Latrine
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- Additional »
Interrogation
Detention Area

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Photography

Í
m

eaâÂfisAessfta Initial
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Enemy Defectors

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r 11
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;
it
Post- Interrogation Area I /w, it
Et
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Included in this area is
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MEDCAP, Water, Food, It
Entertainment, and Resident Search and <)
PSYOPS. Collection Area
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Figure 13-2. Collection/screening station.

13-8
 FM 30-17

cility for detailed interrogation upon completion (4) Neutralization operations, as discussed
of the operation. Innocent residents are passed in paragraph 12-10, chapter 12, is another offen-
through to the post screening area where they sive CI measure.
are provided medical assistance and other civic (5) Raids and searches.
assistance, as well as entertainment and friendly
propaganda. Any persons caught attempting to (6) Planned tactical interception (ambush).
escape or break through the cordon are immedi- (7) Traps.
ately returned to the detention area. When the
operation is terminated, all innocent individuals 13-11. Indigenous Support Personnel
are allowed to return to their homes and the
a. The language communication barrier in most
enemy suspects are removed under guard for fur-
nations with potential insurgency is a major han-
ther interrogation. All members of the commun-
dicap to CI operations. The employment of indig-
ity will be photographed for compilation of a vil-
enous personnel with English language ability
lage packet, (see FM 30-17A) which will be used
will be essential. These persons will serve not
in future operations.
only as interpreters but as intermediaries in con-
2. The second type of cordon and search tacting and developing sources of information. To
operation is very frequently referred to as the minimize the security risks involved in employ-
"soft" or area cordon and search. This operation ment of indigenous personnel, the following pre-
includes the cordoning and searching of a rather cautionary measures must be considered :
vast area, for example, a village area incorporat-
ing a number of hamlets, boroughs, towns, or vil- (1) Employment of indigenous personnel
lages which are subdivisions of a political area who are members of the host country military or
beneath county level. This type of operation re- police services.
quires a multibattalion military force to cordon (2) Quartering and messing of indigenous
off the area, a pooling of all paramilitary, police, employees within the US base area for purposes
CA and intelligence resources to conduct search of activity and movement control.
and screening, and a formidable logistical (3) Use of polygraph examination for initial
backup. This kind of operation extends over a pe- pre-employment check and periodic re-examina-
riod of days and may take as long as a week or tion.
possibly longer. It will generally appear as illus-
trated in figure 13-3. While screening and search b. In many cases, it will be difficult to find
teams systematically go from community to com- enough indigenous personnel who are proficient
munity within the area and screen all residents, in the English language. To avoid misunderstan-
military forces sweep the area outside the com- ding or misinterpretation caused by limited lan-
munities over and over again to seek out anyone guage proficiency, US counterintelligence person-
avoiding screening. As each resident is screened, nel and indigenous personnel must work as teams
counterintelligence agents will insure documents with the US personnel providing the professional
testifying tó the fact that he was screened and, if guidance and direction. Reports from indigenous
necessary, allowing him restricted travel within personnel must be closely scrutinized for reliabil-
the area. Other population and resources control ity and accuracy of content. Obscure points must
measures are used as well, and such an opportu- be questioned to insure accuracy. Sociological fac-
nity may allow the chance to issue new ID cards tors must be considered to determine the extent
and photograph all of each hamlet's residents. to which ties of blood, race, language, locality, re-
As each community screening proceeds, individu- ligion, or tradition may affect the substance of
als who were designated for further interroga- translated information.
tion are sent to an interrogation center set up at
a centralized point in the cordoned area where CI 13—12. Pattern Analysis
personnel will work with intelligence interroga- A discussion on methods of pattern analysis on
tion personnel, both US and indigenous, and with insurgent groups is contained in FM 30-17A, the
police and other security service interrogators. classified supplement to this manual.
Besides field files and other expedient facilities,
located at the interrogation center is a quick
13—13. Records and Files
reaction force ready to react immediately to intel-
ligence developed during the interrogations and a. Principal sources of information for counter-
from informants planted among detainees. intelligence personnel in stability operations are

13-9
 FM 30-17

-o

LEGEND

=^> Sweep forces

rM Town
Interrogation center
Screening and search teams
Traffic control

Figure 13—3. Area cordon and search.

13-110
 FM 30-17

the documents and records maintained by the (5) Political and Religious Sources. Political
host government offices and civilian organiza- organizations and religious sects, particularly in
tions. One of the initial tasks of counterintel- newly developing countries, will often operate in-
ligence personnel in an insurgency area is locat- telligence networks for their benefit. At times, a
ing, gaining access to, and establishing continu- third country, such as the US, may be allowed ac-
ing access to the documentary sources available. cess to information from these networks. Such in-
Generally, the records maintained in the newly formation, particularly on the insurgent, may be
emerging countries are more limited and much very accurate, but it must always be viewed as
less reliable than those in longer-established na- suspect since that organization may slant the in-
tions. formation for its furtherment.
b. Some of the more important types of records (6) Miscellaneous organizational records.
pertinent to CI operations are : Membership lists may be available.
(1) Police and security agency records. c. Efficient and effective CI operations require
Counterintelligence personnel must become thor- the establishment and maintenance of a complete
oughly familiar with the local records systems to system of files and records on all known or sus-
insure that all pertinent files are checked in each pected sympathizers of the insurgency movement.
instance. Variant spellings of local names must be cross-
referenced.
(2) Intelligence agency records. In many
newly emerging nations, intelligence capabilities
and operations are limited or confined to activi- 13—14. Use of Standard Procedures and
ties which are primarily political in nature. Utili- Techniques
zation of US intelligence personne^ with fluency Experience indicates that the procedures and
in the local language and having ^related ethnic techniques outlined in this manual are generally
background is highly desirable. effective in all types of situations and environ-
ments when used appropriately and with common
(3) Residence or family records. Normally
sense. Every attempt must be made to use these
these records are maintained by local police sta-
procedures and techniques, adapting or modify-
tions.
ing them when the situation so demands. Con-
(4) Immigration and travel records. Such versely, the development of new techniques
records may be incomplete, but they are of value should be reported expeditiously (para 1-le) to
to CI operations. permit appropriate expansion of doctrine.

13-11
#

#
 FM 30-17

CHAPTER 14

INTERRELATIONSHIPS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

14—1. General work with those elements in joint operations to

support the combat commander.
a. In conventional combat operations, and espe-
cially in stability operations, CI elements must b. Assistance is, as a rule, a two-way street ; CI
maintain particularly close coordination and liai-
elements can provide CA, PSYOP, and MP ele-
son with civil affairs (CA), psychological opera-
tions (PSYOP), and military police (MP) ele- ments with information and assistance and they,
ments, as well as other friendly agencies in the in turn, can often furnish the same to CI ele-
area of operations. In many cases CI elements ments.

Section II. RELATIONSHIP WITH CIVIL AFFAIRS

14-2. General b. In a conventional war situation background

investigations of indigenous labor personnel are
A close working relationship and continuous co-
considered a standard operational procedure and
ordination between CA and CI units/elements are
a CA requirement. Counterintelligence units, be-
necessary at all levels of operation to provide for
cause of their mission, are responsible for secur-
an exchange of information between the agencies.
ity investigations. Civil affairs operations require
background investigations of a broad nature to
14-3. Coordination Procedures determine suitability of indigenous personnel for
Policies for coordinating CA and MI efforts positions of trust and responsibility or public as-
should be developed at the general staff level. sociation with US or allied military government.
Once policy is developed and coordinated, it The objective of the background investigations is
should be promulgated in writing to all affected to minimize subversive and hostile infiltration
units to familiarize both MI and CA personnel into official or important positions through which
with each other's operations and responsibilities. the mission of the US Army would be hindered.
c. In stability operations, identification of the
14—4. Loyalties of Indigenous Personnel insurgent subversion and infrastructure appa-
a. Counterintelligence and CA elements have a ratus is a high priority target for the CA intellig-
concurrent requirement to determine the loyalty ence effort which has as its primary goal the
of local officials in a conventional war situation in reestablishment of civil order within the troubled
cases where agreements have not been made be- country.
tween nations. This should be a continuously
coordinated effort with mutual responsibilities
14—5. Attitudes of Indigenous Personnel
and objectives. In stability or mid-intensity oper-
ations this requirement may be modified by Attitudes of the indigenous population toward
agreements such as a formal status of forces US troops is a primary area of concern, since CA
agreement. The control office, usually G2, will de- operations are developed to create or exploit local
termine the scope of the CI investigation to be attitudes. If this information is available to CA
performed or adhered to by third country investi- elements, it will assist CI elements in the assess-
gative bodies in cases where the US retains the ment of the area for CI operations. If this infor-
right to reject employees who do not meet speci- mation is not available to CA elements, CI can be
fied criteria. of assistance if it is well established in the area.

14-1
FM 30-17

Counterintelligence elements must continuously (4) Specialized craftsmen, technicians, or la-

monitor the populace for any changing attitudes borers.
that may be influenced through enemy coercion
and subersive efforts. They must also work with 14—7. Civil Security
CA on programs designed to counter and neutral-
a. CA units provide maximum support to CI
ize any hostile threat. In the early stages of an
elements in the detection and prevention of es-
insurgency, CI will orient its monitoring mission
pionage, sabotage, subversion, guerrilla aid, and
primarily on subversion, but this emphasis will
in other similar activities including the follow-
gradually be reoriented toward espionage and
ing:
sabotage if the insurgency moves into phases II
and III. ( 1 ) Identification of known or suspected hos-
tile agents, collaborators, or sympathizers.
14—6. Procurement and Recruitment (2) Prevention of local publication of infor-
mation or opinions which are inimical to the mili-
Direct support to intelligence collection agencies tary force.
may be provided by CA units in the procurement
(3) Control of credit, foodstuffs, clothing,
of essential facilities and equipment and the re-
medical supplies, and related items which may be
cruitment of personnel.
used to support guerrilla activities.
a. Procurement. In addition to normal CA pro- (4) House-to-house searches for contraband
curement, CA personnel may also procure : which may yield persons, documents, or materiel
(1) Biographical data on key persons in the of CI interest.
civilian community or other identifying informa- (5) Seizure and impounding of mail pending
tion essential to special operations. instructions for ^preening and disposition.
(2) Civilian clothing and items of normal (6) Conduct of searches for documents of in-
personal possession. telligence interest.
(3) Maps. (7) Placement of administrative surveillance
(4) Civilian equipment such as binoculars, and restrictions on the movement of persons sus-
cameras, recording devices, and radios. pected of collaborating with guerrilla forces.
(5) Documentary matter including pass- (8) Destruction, surveillance, or control of
ports, visas, vehicle operator licenses, birth and potential hiding places or shelter spots of dissi-
marriage records. dents, such as abandoned mines, caves, isolated
rural buildings, haystacks or similar crop collec-
_ (6) Indigenous funds.
tions.
(7) Foodstuffs, tobacco products, or alcoholic
(9) Collection, evaluation, and interpretation
beverages peculiar to the area.
of police statistics relating to insurgency crimes,
(8) MEDCAP teams, water trailers, and like such as the recurrence of acts of terrorism, which
facilities to support cordon and search operations
may relate to enemy sabotage, espionage, or sub-
in stability operations.
versive activities.
(9) Barteritems.
b. While the close contacts and working rela-
(10) Civilian motor vehicles, bicycles, or do-
tionships between personnel from CA units and
mestic animals.
the civilian population provide valuable intellig-
b. Recruitment. Through contact with civilian ence sources and material, CA units have a two-
organizations, leaders, and political enemies of way potential since they not only serve friendly
hostile governments, CA personnel can compile forces, but may provide an opportunity for ex-
personnel rosters or spot possible enemy infiltra-
ploitation by unfriendly persons and groups. CA
tors for screening by CI or PSYOP personnel for
personnel must be particularly discreet in their
use as :
dealings with the civilian population. Informa-
( 1 ) Interpreters. tion provided civilians should be carefully
(2) Informants. screened, and indigenous persons and agencies
(3) Counterintelligence special operations should be kept under continuing surveillance for
operatives. indications of disaffection.

14-2
 FM 30-17

14—8. Collection Potential of CA Personnel j. Technical equipment, blueprints, or plans.

Civil affairs personnel in their day-by-day opera-
tions deal with people, equipment, and documen- 14-9. Other Civil Affairs Assistance
tary matter, all of which are primary sources of
Other supporting activities in which CA person-
information of intelligence value. Normally,
nel can make significant contributions to the CI
when persons with information of possible value
effort include :
are discovered, they are referred promptly to ap-
propriate intelligence personnel fro exploitation. a. Collection of all types of intelligence infor-
Those sources CA personnel are likely to locate mation for use at different levels of command.
include :
b. Procurement.
a. Refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons
who may be interned or otherwise come under c. Recruitment.
CA control or sponsorship.
d. Assistance to counterintelligence personnel
b. Civilians who were associated with enemy in the following activities :
personnel.
(1) Screening civilian officials.
c. Political enemies of the hostile regime. (2) Obtaining information pertaining to sab-
d. Leaders of fraternal, civic, religious, or pa- otage.
triotic organizations. (3) Detecting the transmission of informa-
e. Governmental documents, libraries, or ar- tion and supplies to enemy forces, unfriendly par-
chives. tisans, or guerrillas through audits of supplies in
warehouses, audits of controlled merchandise in
/. Files of newspapers or periodicals. stores, illegal activities, and routes of communi-
g. Industrial and commercial records. cations.
(4) Locating and detaining war criminals
h. Persons employed in recreational areas.
and enemy military personnel masquerading as
i. Political prisoners of the hostile regime. civilians through contacts with the populace.

Section III. RELATIONSHIP WITH MILITARY POLICE

14—10. General with the impact of organized crime on the war ef-
fort as well as the ties top criminals might have
Counterintelligence and MP units have many par-
with local political leaders, political parties, labor
allel functions and responsibilities which, in some
unions, legitimate businesses, and governmental
cases, may overlap; therefore, close coordination
is essential for both units to be fully effective. agencies.
c. Sabotage. Terrorism through sabotage is a
14—11. Specific criminal act as well as a coordinated enemy ef-
fort.
Counterintelligence and MP units have mutual
interest in the following areas ; primary responsi- d. Refugee Screening. Military Police have con-
bility may be vested in either unit. trol and evacuation responsibilities and can, with
the assistance of furnished indicators, assist CI
a. Intelligence. Military Police develop police
in spotting hostile intelligence, agents, saboteurs,
intelligence based on criminal and operational in-
subversives, and other dissident groups using the
telligence. Criminal intelligence pertains to indi-
refugee and prisoner of war streams as a cover.
viduals and organized crime activities while oper-
ational intelligence pertains to security and other e. Rear Area Security. Both MP and CI ele-
MP activities. Both CI and MP units frequently ments can develop offensive and defensive mea-
will develop information of mutual interest sures in the ASCOM and TASCOM areas of the
which should be shared at the lowest practical US Forces to deny the enemy information and
level consistent with command policy on coordi- materiel for hostile actions.
nation. /. Harbor Security. Military Police elements
b. Subversion. Military Police are concerned can either organize or conduct patrols, security

14-3
FM 30-17

surveys, or surveillance of suspected criminal police intelligence and practice mob, riot, and
groups in harbor areas. crime control measures during civil disturbances.
g. Circulation Control. Military Police can de- k. Others. Many other areas exist, which would
vise registration and identification systems for require coordination between MP and CI ele-
the populace, set curfews, establish checkpoints, ments, such as espionage incident to the investi-
devise a pass system, and collect and analyze the gation of a crime, raids, or cordons and searches
modus operandi for criminal and hostile elements conducted jointly by MP and CI for various pur-
within the area of operation. poses; and mobile and static checkpoints manned
jointly for either MP control purposes or CI spot
h. Physical Security. Miliary Police set up
checks for infiltrators.
physical security measures including but not lim-
ited to the following: barriers, sentry dogs,
alarm and anti-intrusion systems, guards, res- 14—12. Reciprocal Intelligence
tricted areas, and perimeter lighting of key in- The areas above indicate the extreme need for re-
stallations. ciprocal intelligence and close coordination be-
tween MP and CI elements. For instance, the MP
i. Border Security. Military Police are respon-
need intelligence on impending or actual refugee
sible for setting up anti-infiltration methods de-
movements. This reciprocal intelligence can be
signed to keep the border secure from infiltration
obtained formally through staff elements or on a
by enemy, neutral, and criminal elements.
liaison type basis between operations officers or
j. Civil Disturbances. Miliary Police develop liaison personnel.

Section IV. RELATIONSHIP WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

14—13. General and civilian detainees for the neutralization of

their hostile attitudes and reorientation toward
Psychological operations elements have assigned
the US Forces.
interrogators who gain information from pris-
oners of war, detainees, or the local populace for d. Area Estimates are necessary for the con-
attitude assessment and analysis, and target vul- duct of PSYOP within an area of operations and
nerability analysis. will assist the CI data base.
e. Media Analysis is necessary for the discov-
14—14. Specific ery of clandestine subversive printing presses
and other mass media, subversive activities
Psychological operations are geared to assist the
within an area of operations.
military effort in the following areas of CI inter-
est. f. Black and Grey Propaganda consist of covert
PSYOP which do not disclose their source of ori-
a. Consolidation Operations are directed to- gin. See FM 30-17A for CI aspects of these types
ward the populace of liberated or occupied areas of propaganda.
to facilitate military operations and promote
maximum cooperation. g. Subversive Propaganda is of interest to CA,
PSYOP, and CI elements for the sake of planning
b. Populace and Resources Control includes the countermeasures and can be a source of leads to
announcement and reasons for restrictions placed CI elements.
on the populace as well as education for such pro-
h. Others. This includes objectives such as a
grams as resettlement and clear and hold opera-
nation building, cordon-and-search operational
tions.
assistance, and the referral to CI of individuals
c. Reeducation is directed at prisoner of war who have potential for CI special operations.

Section V. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS

14—15. General and security organizations, other elements en-

gaged in classified activities may also use the ser-
a. Since CI units are charged with the overt li- vices of CI elements to perform necessary liaison
aison functions between local police, intelligence, activities.

14-4
 FM 30-17

b. Other MI elements can also assist CI ele- (3) Technical Intelligence (TI). TI person-
ments in fulfilling their mission : nel can keep the CI element advised on changes
in equipment and equipment capabilities.
(1) Imagery Interpretation (II). II elements
can interpret imagery designed to confirm a (4) Signal Intelligence (SIGINT). SIGINT
source's information or furnish imagery designed assists the CI effort by deriving information from
for briefings and debriefings of sources. the intercept, direction finding, and analysis of
enemy communications, including clandestine
(2) Order of Battle (OB). OB personnel can transmissions. Details on SIGINT support to CI
keep the CI element updated on changing unit operations are contained in FM 32-1 (to be pub-
designations, compositions, and dispositions. , lished).

14-5
 FM 30-17

APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

A—1. Army Regulations (AR)

15-6 Procedure for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers Conducting
Investigations.
27-45 Release of Information and Appearance of Witnesses.
50-2 Nuclear Weapon Accident and Incident Control (NAIC).
50-3 Personnel Security Standards for Nuclear Weapons Duty Positions.
55-203 Movement of Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Components, and Related Classi-
fied Non-nuclear Materiel.
105-31 Message Preparation and Processing.
135-380 Release of Classified Information to Army National Guard, United States
Army Reserve, and Reserve Officers' Training Corps.
190-22 Search, Seizure, and Disposition of Property.
190-60 Physical Security Standards for Nuclear Weapons.
195-6 Department of the Army Polygraph Activities.
195-10 Military Police Criminal Investigative Activities.
230-2 Personnel Policies and Procedures.
310-25 Dictionary of United States Army Terms.
310-50 Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes.
340-2 Maintenance and Disposition of Records in TOE Units of the Active Army
and the Army Reserve.
340-15 Preparing Correspondence.
340-16 Safeguarding "For Official Use Only" information.
360-28 Guidance for Conduct of Information Actions in Support of Army Air
Defense Command Missile Program.
360-65 Establishment and Conduct of Field Press Censorship in Combat Areas.
360-81 Command Information Program Objectives and Policies, Publications, and
Armed Forces Radio and Television.
380-series Security.
381-series Military Intelligence.
405-10 Acquisition of Real Property and Interests Therein.
600-3 Women's Army Corps—General Provisions.
600-20 Army Command Policy and Procedure.
600-31 Flag Control Procedures for Military Personnel in National Security Cases
and Other Investigations of Proceedings.
604-series Personnel Security Clearance.
606-series Personnel Identification.
611-15 Nuclear Duty Position Reliability Program (Reports Control Symbol
OPO-133).
(0)614-31 Assignment and Travel Restrictions.
(C)614-32 Restrictions of Assignment and Travel of Personnel Having Access to Spe-
cial Intelligence (U).

A—1
FM 30-17

633-50 Prisoners of War ; Administration, Employment and Compensation.

633-51 Civilian Internees Administration, Employment and Compensation.
640-20 U.S. Army Intelligence Badges and Credentials.
640-98 Filing of Adverse Suitability Information in Individual Records and Re-
view of Intelligence Files Consulted Prior to Taking Personnel Action.
690-1 Civilian Applicant and Employee Security Program.
(0)700-65 Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons Materiel.
710-2 Materiel Management for Using Unit, Support Units, and Installations.
930-5 American National Red Cross Service Program and Army Utilization.

A—2. Army Subject Schedule (ASubjScd)

19-29 Collection and Preservation of Evidence.

A—3. Department of the Army Pamphlets (DA Pam)

27-1 Treaties Governing Land Warfare.
27-100-series Military Law Review.
27-161-1 International Law, Volume I.
108-1 Index of Army Motion Pictures and Related Audio-Visual Aids.
310-1 Index of Administrative Publications.
310-3 Index of Doctrinal, Training, and Organizational Publications.
310-4 Index of Technical Manuals, Technical Bulletins, Supply Manuals, Supply
Bulletins, and Lubrication Orders.
380-1 Commander's Handbook on Security.

A—4. Field Manuals (FM)

3-10 Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents.
3-12 Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense.
5-20 Camouflage.
5-25 Explosives and Demolitions.
5-30 Engineer Intelligence.
(C)5-31 Booby traps (U).
11-40 Signal Corps Pictorial Operations.
19-series Military Police.
20-32 Landmine Warfare.
21-6 Techniques of Military Instruction.
21-26 Map Reading.
21-30 Military Symbols.
21-31 Topographic Symbols.
21^10 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense.
21-50 Ranger Training and Ranger Operations.
24—18 Field Radio Techniques.
24-20 Field Wire and Field Cable Techniques.
30-series Military Intelligence.
31-16 Counterguerrilla Operations.
31-20 Special Forces Operational Techniques.
(C)31—20A Special Forces Operational Techniques (U).
31-21 Special Forces Operations—US Army Doctrine.
(S)31-2XA Special Forces Operations—US Army Doctrine (U).

A-2
 FM 30-17

31-22 U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces.

(S)31-22A U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces (U).
(C)31^0 Tactical Cover and Deception (U).
31-73 Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations.
31-85 Rear Area Protection Operations.
(S)32-1 Signal Intelligence, U.S. Army Doctrine (U). (To be published.)
(C)32-5 Signal Security (SIGSEC) (U).
(S)32-10 USAS A in Support of Tactical Operations (U).
41-5 Joint Manual for Civil Affairs.
41-10 Civil Affairs Operations.
100-series Field Service Regulations.
101-series Staff Officers.

A—6. Other References

(C) SR 380-350-2 Captured Enemy Documents (U).
TB (PMG-series) Provost Marshal General.
TM 11-401 Elements of Signal Photography.
TM 30-series Military Intelligence.
TOE 30-series Military Intelligence.

A—3
 FM 30-17

APPENDIX B

INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS

Section I. GENERAL

B-1. Introduction these reports are general enough so that very lit-
The basic format for Agent Reports, Reports of tle deviation therefrom would be necessary in the
Investigation and Summaries of Information will field unless unusual situations exist. Since all re-
be completed as described in the appropriate sec-
tions of this appendix and chapter 7. Figures are ports presented herein are standardized, a report
used to show graphically how each type of report prepared by a Special Agent in one part of the
is to be completed. world will be understood by a Special Agent in
B-2. Application another part of the world if all rules are fol-
The purpose, use and rules of preparation of lowed.

Section II. THE AGENT REPORT (DA FORM 341)

B—3. Rules of Preparation porting procedures prescribed by the unit com-

mander (fig B-1).
a. General. Each Special Agent will write his
own reports. Supervisors may edit for clarity, but b. Identity of Persons or Organizations.
must not alter the basic meaning or intent. Over-
(1) The surname of the person, or the name,
printed Agent Report forms with spaces to be
abbreviation, or short title of the organization
filled in with appropriate data may be used to ex-
which is the subject of an investigation will be
pedite the reporting of routine records checks
written in upper case letters throughout all re-
and, in completely favorable cases, the recording
ports. The word "SUBJECT" written in upper
of results of interviews with listed and developed
case letters may be used as a substitute for the
character references. Agent Reports are normally
name of person or organization in the body of the
written in narrative style, third person, simple
report. When personal pronouns are used which
past tense, and active voice, except when quoting
refer to SUBJECT (e.g., HE or SHE) the pron-
the source or indicating a state of mind or condi-
ouns will be written in upper case letters. The
tion. The use of simple, direct, standard English
names of persons and organizations not the sub-
facilitates comprehension and reduces the risk of
ject of investigation will be written with normal
misinterpretation. Slang expressions, colloquial-
capitalization. After first being fully identified,
isms, vulgarisms, and technical or trade terms
the person being interviewed may be referred to
should be avoided. Expressions which reflect ap-
as "Source." The word "Source" in this usage is
proval or disapproval by the Special Agent of the
always a proper noun.
occurrences, persons, or objects being described
should not be used. Statements should be such (2) Each investigative document will posi-
that they may be verified through independent in- tively identify persons who are the subjects of in-
vestigation by checking records or other credible vestigations or who are of sufficient intelligence
sources of information. Agent Reports must indi- interest to be considered cosubjects as defined in
cate what the Special Agent determined, not AR 381-45 by including full name, aliases,
what he did. The detailed techniques and proce- maiden names, sex, date and place of birth, and
dures used to develop the information will not be social security account number, occupation, and
described in the Agent Report ; they will be made address. All other persons mentioned in investi-
a matter of local record through operational re- gative documents will be identified by full name,

B-1
FM 30-17

AGENT REPORT
(AR iH-130! FM 30-17)
1. NAME OF SUEJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT 3. DATE SUBMITTED
DOAKES, John Q. 14 December 1971
MSG, 458-58-5821 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
AKA: GREEN, Anthony G. 458-58-5821
DPOB: 18 March 1923, Richmond, Virginia
4. «POIT or FINDINGS
(2 Line Spaces)

(START ON THIS LINE) This line is started on the third line from the
above black line. Indent five spaces from left margin to type phase designa-
tion. Keep left margin no more than one letter space from left margin. Leave
right margin a minimum of 3/4". This leaves enough space to enter the word
LEAD, if applicable. (LEAD)
(1 Line Space)
When there is more than one paragraph in the report, double-space between
paragraphs. Exhibits will be shown in the body of the report as (EXHIBIT ).
The number is omitted by t^e">Çpecial Agent in the field, and a Roman numeral will
be entered by the Control ice.
(1 Line Space)
(HEARSAY INFORMATION) nomally contained in a separate paragraph of the
report.
/ Line Spaces)
AGENT'S NOTES: Indent five spaces^^(l| begin two spaces below the body of
the report.

(5 Line Spa

(SECOND AGENT REPORT ON SAME PAGE) When more tlian one Agent Report appears
on the same page, five spaces will separate the reports.

When the report is too long to be contained on a single

page, two line spaces must be left at the bottom of the
page. The word (continued) will be typed in the lower
right-hand corner of Block No. 4.

(2 Line Spaces)

(continued) if necessary

5 TYPED NAME AND OftGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

JOHN Q. AGENT, 115th MI Group Is/ John Q. Agent

DA ' 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341. 1 JUN 47. WHICH MAY H USED.

Figure B-l, Agent Report Format.

B—2
 FM 30-17

occupation, and address. Elements of a proper United States of America (US) and the Union of
name which cannot be determined from source or Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) will not be ab-
from telephone books, directories, and similar breviated.
references will be indicated by: "fnu" (first name h. Abbreviations. Abbreviations should be kept
unknown) in lieu of the given name, "NMN" for to a minimum. Standard military abbreviations,
No Middle Name, "10" for Initial Only, and as outlined in AR 310-50, or standard civilian ab-
"LNU" (Last Name Unknown) in lieu of the sur- breviations as given by a "desk" or "collegiate"
name. Names will be written in accordance with dictionary may be used in an address or as a
the custom of the country of which the person is means of identity; e.g., CPT for Captain (no pe-
native. (For example, some oriental names are riod is used) or Dr. for doctor (a period is used).
written with the surname first.) When brevity is appropriate, the title should be
(3) Once a person has been identified fully, spelled out when used the first time in the report
as indicated above, he or she will be referred to and the abbreviation or short title placed in par-
thereafter only by surname (without any titles entheses directly after it; thereafter, throughout
such as Mr., Mrs., Dr., or Professor), unless the report the abbreviation or a short title may
there is more than one person with the same sur- be used without parentheses ; e.g., Johns Hopkins
name mentioned in the same Agent Report. University (JHU), and later only JHU.
c. Numbers. Numbers from one to ten, inclu- i. Standard Capitalization. The initial letters of
sive, except in dates, addresses, or military unit proper nouns should be capatalized, such as
designations, will be spelled out. All other num- James H. Brown, Captain, Infantry, 01925940,
bers will be written in arabic numerals. In the Commanding Officer ; William F. Jones, Professor
case of money, numerals will be used regardless of English; Howard Snow, Vice-President, the
of the amount. Rather than writing $10.00, write University of Missouri; SUBJECT joined the
$10. Progressive Party; SUBJECT studied English,
d. Time. The military form will be used (e.g., French, political science, history, and philoso-
1605 hours). phy; HE moved to the West Coast; in the Sum-
mer of 1959, HE entered the US Army, but HE
e. Dates. The military form will be used (e.g., received a discharge in the Fall of 1959.
26 January 1967). The names of months will be
spelled out in full. Significant conflicts in dates j. Units of Measure. Units of measure used in
will be resolved by investigation before cases are reports will be those given by the source. An ap-
considered complete. Unexplained overlap in proximation of conversion of the indicated mea-
dates sometimes occurs when persons completing sures stated in terms of the United States system
personal history statements and persons main- of weights and measures will follow in par-
taining employment, education, and similar rec- entheses. Whenever measurements must be made
ords, fail to show part-time employment, part- or estimated by the Special Agent, they will be
time attendance at educational institutions, stated in terms of the United States system of
breaks in employment, residences, etc. weights and measures.
/. Addresses. Addresses will be as complete as k. Titles and Foreign Terms. In titles of publi-
possible and written in the manner in which they cations, ships and plays, capitalize the first and
are written in the United States. The names of all words except articles, prepositions and con-
cities, towns, counties, or other political subdivi- junctions. Foreign terms normally should be
sions less than a state, will be written out in full. avoided; however, if used, they should have the
In foreign countries the use of UTM coordinates English translation placed within parentheses
for cities, towns, or other locations is encouraged following the first usage ; e.g., Arbeitsamt (Labor
when necessary for positive identification. Repeti- Office). When printed, foreign words and
tious or unnecessary use of coordinates shoùld be phrases, titles of books, plays, magazine names,
avoided. newspaper names, and names of ships are itali-
cized, but when typewritten, they are underlined.
g. States and Countries. The name of a state
will be spelled out when it first appears in a re- I. Reporting Interviews. Statements made by
interviewees normally will be reported in sub-
port. Subsequently, the state may be abbreviated
if it is used as part of an address, except that a stance.
state name with five letters or less will not be ab- m. Quotations. Quotations present exceptions to
breviated. The names of countries other than the the foregoing items. Whenever a verbatim quota-

B-3
FM 30-17

tion is placed in a report, it will be written ex- items being tabulated. Use open punctuation ; i.e.,
actly as it was stated by source except that SUB- no end punctuation should be used in any tabula-
JECT'S last name or a substitute which refers to tions. The left-hand column of items should be in-
SUB JECT will be in upper case letters. When dented five spaces from the left margin. If any
taken from a document, the quotation will be cop- tabulated item in this column requires more than
ied exactly, including misspellings or grammati- one line, the additional line or lines are indented
cal errors which will be called to the reader's at- three additional letter spaces within the column.
tention by the use of the Latin word "sic," mean- The right-hand column of items should be typed
ing "thus," immediately after the error. two spaces to the right of the longest item in the
left-hand column. Any item in this column which
n. Hearsay Statements and Opinions. State-
requires more than one line will be typed without
ments of this nature should be used primarily as
additional indentation. Subparagraph numbers or
the basis for further investigation, and if rele-
letters are not used with the items being tabu-
vant and material to the issue, should be con-
lated (fig B-2).
firmed or disproved if possible.
o. Physical Descriptions. When it is necessary B-4. Format
to physically describe individuals mentioned in DA Form 341, the Agent Report form, has been
Agent Reports, a complete physical picture of the designed to facilitate recording the results of in-
individual should be presented (FM 19-20). Be- vestigative activity in a uniform, well-organized
cause the information and characteristics for complete fashion.
identifving persons lends itself well to tabulation,
a. Block No. 1, Title Block. The title block for
the following format may be used:
an Agent Report is always the same as the title
Name: block of the pertinent request for investigation
Age: except that any aliases or other essential data de-
veloped as a result of the investigation also will
Sex: be inserted. All cases which are closely related
Race: should bear cross-references. Such cross-refer-
Height : ences are entered in Agent Reports as prescribed
by local procedures. Leads or other information
Weight:
reported in an Agent Report do not affect the
Build : title block. If a Special Agent originates an
Other specific information or physical character- Agent Report in cases where there is no pertinent
istics may be woven into this sequence or added Lead Sheet or other request for investigation, an
to the sequence when data is available. In addi- appropriate subject or title will be inserted. The
tion if an Identikit was used, the montage codes subject block of the Agent Report will be pre-
can be tabulated to permit any other agency to pared as follows :
reassemble the composite likeness of the subject. (1) Persons. Subject blocks will contain in
All the montages used in the composite must be columnar arrangement: SUBJECT'S name, rank
listed. Offices not having an Identikit may be and social security number (SSN), any other
able, through liaison, to have another investiga- names (i.e., aliases, pen names, etc.), and date
tive or intelligence agency to reassemble the com- and place of birth (all on one line) as in the fol-
posite. lowing examples :
p. Tabulated Material. Although Agent Re- (a) BURNS, John E.
ports normally are written in narrative style, LTC, 561-54-6706
there are times when material can best be pre- AKA: Green, Anthony T.
sented in tabulated form. Descriptions, certain DPOB : 25 December 1925, Athens,
records checks, and lists of persons and ad- Ohio
(5) JONES, Mary Ann
dresses, for example, may be tabulated to the ad-
NEE : Williams
vantage of both writer and reader. All 201-file
SSN : 212-40-2306
checks and birth records checks should be re-
DPOB : 10 September 1945, Reno, Ne-
ported in tabulated form. Tabulated material will
vada
be presented in the following manner: One line
space will be provided between the body of the Open punctuation is used in the subject block.
report and the tabulation, but none between the (2) Organizations. In the investigation of or-

B-4
 FM 30-17

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130: FM 30-17)
1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE Of INCIDENT 2. DATE SUBMITTED
DOAKES, John A. 14 December 1971
MSG, 458-58-5821 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
AKA: GREEN, Anthony G. 458-58-5821
DPOB: 18 March 1923, Richmond, Virginia
4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
(LISTED CHARACTER REFERENCE)*
(DEVELOPED CHARACTER REFERENCE)*

a. DATE INTERVIEW CONDUCTED

b. INTERVIEWEE

c. OCCUPATION

d. RESIDENCE

e. Social Security Account

nt
Q Number
Wyn

£. Subject's Name with Aliases

g. Length of Acquaintance.

h. Type of Contact

1. Degree of Association M
j. Last Seen

k. Names of Parents & Siblings P

1. Marital Status

m. Residences L

n. Education

o. Employment E

p. Character & Reputation

q. Honesty and Integrity

r. Personal & Financial Habits

s. Mental Stability and Maturity

t. Political Proclivities

(continued)

S. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT 6. SIGNATURE Of SPECIAL AGENT

JOHN Q. AGENT, 115th MI Group /s/ John Q. Agent

DA sr.. 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47. WHICH MAY SE USED.

Figure B-2. Columnized Agent Report.

B-5
FM 30-17

AGENT REPORT: (LCR) RE: Subject's name; DPOB; Date of Report, (Names
of Interviewee(s))

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS:

u. Organizations

v. Foreign Travel

w. Relatives in Foreign Countries

x. Loyalty

y. Recommendation for Position of

Trust

z. Throw Offs
S
aa. Remarks

(\

*Type in or overprint the appropriate phase designation, Use only

when results are favorable.
t

Signature of Special Agent page 2 of 2

Figure B-2. Continued.

ganizations, the subject block will contain the lead, it is recommended that the following items
name and, if applicable, the address of the organ- of identity be included at least once in the body of
ization. The name will be written entirely in the report:
upper case letters and may be followed by an ab- (a) Full title in English alphabet charac-
breviation or short title to be used in the report ters and in native writing (for non-Latin names
as a substitute for the organization's name. Care only).
should be taken to insure that the abbreviation or (ft) English translation (for all foreign
short title chosen is not ambiguous or misleading. languages) and short title, when appropriate.
When a foreign organization is the subject of an (c) Former name or names (when defi-
investigation, or when it appears as a possible nitely known).

B—6
 FM 30-17

(d) Address (headquarters, branch, or graphs of classified reports will be marked in ac-
office, as applicable). cordance with AR 380-5. Numbering of reports
(e) Nationality, when needed for better normally will be done by the office preparing the
understanding. Report of Investigation (fig B-3).
(3) Incident. The investigation of an inci- (2) Phase designation. In background inves-
dent is a specialized type of investigation. The in- tigations, the first item in the first paragraph of
cident case title should answer three questions in the Agent Report will be the designation of the
the following order: what, where, and when. In phase of the investigation most applicable to that
incident cases, normal capitalization will be used report. Normally, the Agent Report is the writ-
for each word except that prepositions, articles, ten result of a single investigative activity; that
and conjunctions, when not the first word of a is, one report will be devoted to each source of in-
title, will not be capitalized. Although incident formation. Occasionally, reports concerning
cases eventually may involve known persons, or sources that satisfy the same investigative phase
perpetrators may be revealed, the initial title of may be included on the same form. For example,
an incident case should not be changed. This does a verification of education by records check and
not preclude opening a separate case with a new an interview with a former teacher or classmate
individual title on a person mentioned in an inci- —both activities conducted by the same agent at
dent case if the new case concerns activity not a the same school—may be included on the same
part of the incident case. form since both concerned the education phase.
Where more than one such report appears on a
b. Block No. 2, Date Submitted. The date the
page, five spaces will separate the reports, and
report is prepared by the Special Agent is en-
each will begin with the phase designation. There
tered in normal military style without abbrevia-
is an exception to the requirement that one Agent
tions.
Report will be a record of a single investigative
c. Block No. 3, Control Symbol or File Number. activity ; when interviews of several persons
This space will contain the file or dossier number (again satisfying the same investigative phase)
of the investigation as prescribed by AR 381-45 concerning the same individual or the same inci-
and assigned by the Control Office. dent produce substantially the same favorable in-
formation, these interviews may be combined into
d. Block No. U, Report of Findings.
one Agent Report. Each interviewee must be com-
(1) Format. The report will start on the pletely identified, and the duration and extent of
third line space from the black line at the top of his knowledge of SUBJECT or of the incident
block No. 4, thus leaving two blank lines at the must be stated. However, when adverse, deroga-
top of block No. 4. Also, when the report is too tory, or conflicting information is obtained, each
long to be contained on a single page, two blank report will be recorded on a separate report form.
lines must be left at the bottom of the page, and The first paragraph of each report will begin
additional DA Forms 341 may be used or plain with the phase designation in upper case letters
bond paper 8 x 10 1/2 can be used as illustrated enclosed in parentheses. Generally, the phase des-
in figure B-2. A margin of no more than one let- ignation covers that part of SUBJECT'S life of
ter space from the vertical black line on the left which the source has most knowledge. Following
side of the page and a minimum 3/4-inch margin are some of the standard phase designation head-
from the black line on the right side of the page ings:
will be maintained at all times. The first line of a
(NATIONAL AGENCY)
paragraph should be indented five spaces from
(NATIONAL AGENCIES)
the left margin; a double space is left between (LOCAL AGENCY)
paragraphs. Proper paragraphing and spacing (LOCAL AGENCIES)
are illustrated in sample reports included as fig- (MILITARY SERVICE)
ures to this appendix. The blocks Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, (MEDICAL RECORDS)
and 6 will be completed in full on all pages if DA (201-FILE CHECK)
Form 341 is used. If bond paper is used, the ex- (CIVILIAN PERSONNEL RECORDS)
ample as shown in figure B-2 is mandatory. A (CITIZENSHIP)
system for numbering of pages may be prescribed (BIRTH)
(LISTED CREDIT REFERENCE)
in the unit SOP. Unless otherwise instructed, (DEVELOPED CREDIT REFERENCE)
Special Agent will not number Agent Reports or (LISTED CHARACTER REFERENCE)
the paragraphs of the report; however, para- (DEVELOPED CHARACTER REFERENCE)

B—7
FM 30-17

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)
I. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TULE OF INCIDENT 2. DATE SUBMITTED
GREER, John A. II 15 January 1971
DAC, Adm Asst, GS-12; Gl, SSAN: 063-36-2179 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
DPOB: 7 May 1924, Bayside, New York 063-36-2179
4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
(EDUCATION) On 14 January 1964, the following, persons were Interviewed,
separately, concerning John A. GREER II, at the College of Business, Middle State
University, 2460 Hyde Park Boulevard, Chicago, Illinois, and they furnished sub-
stantially the same information:

James J. Collins, Assistant Professor, 319 Edward Street, Chicago, who knew
SUBJECT from 1946 to 1950 as a classmate.

Henry C. Adams, Admijaistrator, 217 Oakdale Avenue, Chicago, who knew SUBJECT
as a classmate from 194(/tCT 1950.

John R. Williford, ^epsonnel Director, 1 Wilson Avenue, Chicago, who knew

SUBJECT as a student from 1946 .to 1950.

Sources had no social corftàat with SUBJECT and were only associated with HIM
in an educational capacity, vheyxiave neither seen nor corresponded with GREER
since the Summer of 1951 when they met at. a class reunion on the university campus.

SUBJECT was an exceptional studenn/and received an award in HIS senior year for
wr
iting an article on "cost-plus" construction. HE was well liked by students and
faculty. HE belonged to no organization. Whibe at college, HE held a part-time
job with a construction firm in Chicago. Adnitironal information concerning HIS
employment is not known. I

SUBJECT'S closest associate while at school Was Harry L. Waldrop, 4433 West
Alameda Parkway, Des Moines, Iowa, who was an accounting major with whom HE did
much of HIS research at the university. HE was alca closely associated with
Barbara M. Koncher, 320 South Beach Street, Atlanta, Georgia, a member of the Chi
Alpha sorority, whom HE dated frequently. (LEAD)

Sources had no reason to question GREER'S moral cnaracter, honesty or trust-

worthiness. SUBJECT never made any statement or performed any act, in Sources'
presence, that would be considered inimical to the best interests of the United
States. HE indulged in the moderate use of alcholic beverages. Sources had no
knowledge of SUBJECT'S financial reliability; however, they have never heard
anything unfavorable concerning HIS financial status. To the best of Sources'
knowledge, SUBJECT has never traveled outside the United States and HE has no
relatives or financial Interests in any foreign country.

(continued)
S. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
JOSEPH S. ANDERS, 113th MI Group /s/ Joseph S. Anders

DA -„341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, I JUN 47. WHICH MAY BE USED.

Figure B—8. Example of a completed Agent Report.

B—8
 FM 30-17

AGENT REPORT: (EDUCATION) RE: GREER, John A. II, DPOB: 7 May 1924,
Bayside, New York, dated 15 January 1964 (Interviewees: Collins, Adams,
Williford).

Sources recommended that John A. GREER II be considered for assignment

to a position of trust and responsibility with the US Army.

Signature of Special Agent Page 2 of 2

Figure B-3.—Continued.

B-9
FM 30-17

The Special Agent will occasionally have need for tion of record ; office or other location ; name and
phase titles to fit particular situations such as position of the person who sought the record or
(NEIGHBORHOOD CHECK), (SURVEIL- made it available (Special Agent must indicate
LANCE), or (SUBJECT INTERVIEW). To fa- whether he personally examined the record or if
cilitate review the agent may have need of multi- the information was orally furnished to him),
ple phase titles, such as (BIRTH—EDUCA- full identity of the record; i.e., volume, title,
TION), (EMPLOYMENT—DEVELOPMENT page, date, or similar appropriate information
CHARACTER REFERENCE), or (EMPLOY- when available (fig B-4).
MENT COWORKER). 5. Raids, searches and seizures. The date
(3) The body of the Agent Report. Here is of the activity; identity of persons and/or units
recorded the information obtained by investiga- conducting such activity; and authority for such
tive effort. The Special Agent must organize the activity. In searches or seizures, the name of the
facts and present the information in a clear and witnessing officer (usually the individual's com-
logical manner, insuring that the information is manding officer or his designated representative)
accurate, complete, pertinent, clearly phrased, will be included.
unbiased, and concise. 6. Attempt. Phase designation; date of
(a) Introductory element. The first sen- attempt; identity of intended interviewee or re-
tence or paragraph of each Agent Report is cord (as above) ; identity of person(s) spoken to;
known as the introductory element. The introduc- reason why intended interviewee or record was
tory element must contain, as appropriate, the not available; and any possible leads. The expla-
complete identities of the individuals interviewed, nation should clearly indicate that all possibili-
the custodians of files checked, the records them- ties to locate the intended source of information
selves, official and home addresses, and accurate were exhausted (fig B-5, B-6).
locations of files checked. A secondary purpose of 7. Confidential source. Confidential
the introductory element is to permit the retrac- sources who have been coded for security pur-
ing of any previous investigative effort at a later poses will not be identified nor will information
date should it be necessary. An introductory ele- or phraseology tending to identify, pinpoint, or
ment will include specific items of information compromise them appear in investigative reports.
arranged in the following manner : Confidential sources will be referred to only by
1. Interviews (background investiga- their designated code or symbol, e.g., source
tions). The phase designation; date of interview; R-S-17. The source of the information will be
identity of interviewee (to include full name, oc- mentioned only once in the Agent Report and
cupation, complete address, SSN, and, in the case that will be in the introductory element. To assist
of military personnel, full name, grade, branch of in the evaluation and adjudication processes, the
service for officers, SSN, position or job title, and Special Agent will indicate by word picture the
complete official address) ; and place of interview degree of reliability of the source when submit-
if other than address listed. The period of knowl- ting information derived from them. Where the
edge, and the relationship of the interviewee to word picture proves inadequate in determining
SUBJECT will be stated briefly. reliability, additional clarifying comments may
2. Interviews (incident investigations). be made in the introductory element or in Agent's
Date of interview; complete identity of source; Notes. The word picture, which may be used only
place of interview; and, if applicable, the reason for coded confidential sources, may be as outlined
for interview. below though not necessarily confined to these
3. Surveillance. The date, duration, type, examples :
name of subject of surveillance (if other than (a) Source, who has furnished reli-
SUBJECT, and all possible identifying data con- able information in the past . . .
cerning the person or persons under surveil- (b) Source, who has furnished infor-
lance) ; place; and identity of person or persons mation corroborated in part or in whole by other
conducting the surveillance. If the situation ne- sources . . .
cessitates protection of the identity of the person (c) Source, whose reliability is un-
or persons other than Special Agents conducting known, but who has been an acquaintance of
the surveillance, a coded reference will be pre- SUBJECT for the past 5 years . . .
scribed. (b) Information obtained. Following the
i. Record checks. Phase designation (in introductory element, a new paragraph will con-
background investigations); date of check; loca- tain the information obtained by the investigative

B—10
 FM 30-1/

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)
1. NAME OF SUBJECT OS TITLE OF INCIDENT 3. DATE SUBMITTED
DOAKES, John A. 15 December 1970
MSG, 458-58-5821 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
DPOB: 18 March 1923, Richmond, Virginia 458-58-5821
4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCY) On 15 December 1963, records checks concerning John A. DOAKES

were conducted at the following listed agencies with the results as Indicated :

Police Department, Baltimore, Maryland No Record

Baltimore Office, FBI, Baltimore, Maryland No Record

Provost Marshal's Office, Ft. Holabird, Md. No Record

/\

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

JOHN Q. AGENT, 109th MI Group /s/ John Q. Agent

JAr341 DEPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, I JUN 47. WHICH MAY BE USED.

Figure B-i. Example'of a LAC-Type agent report.

B-ll
FM 30-17

AGENT REPORT
(AR 331-130; FM 30-17)
1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT 2. DATE SUBMITTED
DOAKES, John A. 14 December 1970
MSG, 458-58-5821 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
DPOB: 18 March 1923, Richmond, Virginia 458-58-5821
4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LISTED CHARACTER REFERENCE) On 14 December 1970, an attempt was made to

interview Mr. Leslie J. Warren, 2317 St. Paul Court, Seattle, Washington, concern-
ing John A. DOAKES. Mrs. Ray Smallwood, owner of the building, 2317 St. Paul
Court, Seattle, stated that Warren had moved from that address in February 1969.
His forwarding address is 516 Flagstone Avenue, El Paso, Texas. (LEAD)

S
A

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

JOHN Q. AGENT, 115th MI Group /s/ John Q. Agent

DA.?» 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, I JUN 47. WHICH u.

Figure B—5. Example of an attempt-type agent report (Lead).

3—12
 FM 30-17

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)
1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR HUE OF INCIDENT 2. DATE SUBMITTED
DOAKES, John A. 14 December 1970
MSG, 458-58-5821 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
DPOB: 18 March 1923, Richmond, Virginia 458-58-5821
4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(NEIGHBORHOOD CHECK) On 10 April 1962, a neighborhood check was conducted in

the vicinity of 3709 Grand Avenue, Oasis, California, in an attempt to locate per-
sons with a knowledge of SUBJECT. Joe Jenkins, landlord of 3709 Grand Avenue,
stated that he purchased the property in 1958 and did not have a list of the
tenants who lived in this property at the time of SUBJECT'S residence. Jenkins
did not know SUBJECT and could not suggest anyone with knowledge of HIM.

EL

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAl AGENT 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

JOHN Q. AGENT, 115th MI Group /s/ John Q. Agent

DA.'»?» 341

Figure B—6. Example of an attempt-type agent report (No-Lead).

B-13
FíVJ 3®-liy

efforts of the Special Agent. In the case of per- derogatory information is furnished in the course
sonnel security investigation (SPI) interviews, a of an interview, pertinent and relevant state-
definite and logical pattern should be followed. ments made by interviewees should be quoted
1. Relationship paragraph. The report verbatim, or as near verbatim as possible. In all
of interview should begin with a complete and such cases, after obtaining all available informa-
thorough treatment of the relationship between tion, the Special Agent should ask the inter-
the interviewee and the subject. This information viewee whether he is willing to—
may be contained in a separate paragraph re- (a) Submit a sworn statement.
ferred to as the "relationship paragraph." More (b) Have his information made
specifically, under what circumstances, to what known to the subject.
extent, and exactly when the interviewee knew (c) Be identified to the subject as the
the subject. A simple but effective way to begin a source of the information.
relationship paragraph would be, "Source first (d) Appear before a proceeding in
met ABLE in April 1958 . . ." Then complete the open or closed session.
relationship paragraph concisely with appro- Interviewee's answers to the above questions will
priate factual statements pertaining only to the be included in the narrative report of interview.
nature, degree, and duration of the association A sworn statement will be obtained if possible
between Source and ABLE, and conclude with a and attached as an exhibit to the Agent Report.
concise statement as to when Source last saw In those cases where the answers to any of the
ABLE or communicated with HIM. The purpose above questions are negative, an attempt should
of a good relationship paragraph is to permit the be made to determine and record the reason for
reader to form an opinion as to the general relia- refusal. When the source who has given deroga-
bility of the information which should follow. tory information about the subject requests anon-
2. Background information. In most PSI ymity, the investigative effort must be extended
interviews, background information pertinent to to further develop such information and to safe-
the subject is obtained. This may be placed in a guard the identity of the source. A key sheet, DA
paragraph immediately following the relation- Form 2357-R (fig B-7) which will be locally re-
ship paragraph. Background information should produced on 8- x 10 1/2-inch paper, will be pre-
be reported chronologically. This background pared and forwarded as a separate element of the
data may verify or give basis to doubt informa- investigative file; access to it will be limited to
tion reported by the subject on his statement of adjudicating authorities and review boards or
personal history. A discrepancy between state- panels. The source will be referred to by code in
ments of source and SUBJECT will require addi- the Agent Report. Should the interviewee provide
tional investigative effort. Confinement of this hearsay information or rumors, the original
type of information to a separate paragraph per- source of which cannot be determined or to which
mits the Special Agent to devote the remainder of confirming or refuting leads cannot be developed,
the report to a full treatment of the information a separate paragraph, clearly labeled as hearsay,
regarding loyalty, integrity, discretion, morals, will be included in the Agent Report. The para-
and character with which the BI is primarily graph will be started with the words (HEAR-
concerned. More than one paragraph pertaining SAY INFORMATION) in upper case letters and
to background information may be needed in cer- inclosed in parentheses.
tain cases. Recommendation paragraph. The last
3. Narrative report of interview. Com- paragraph of background investigation interview
plete reporting is achieved only by a thorough ex- reports will contain the interviewee's recommen-
pository treatment of the subject's loyalty, integ- dation concerning the advisability of appointing
rity, discretion, morals, and character, in addi- the subject to a position of trust and responsibil-
tion to a routine chronology of personal history. ity with the US Army. The Special Agent should
The element of loyalty will be stressed in all make every effort to obtain a definite positive or
background investigations and, where applicable, negative recommendation from the interviewee
in complaint investigations. Subject's financial and avoid qualifying remarks. If interviewee dec-
responsibility, emotional stability, and social hab- lines to give any recommendation, his reasons
its should also be determined. Questions concern- will be a part of the last paragraph as will any
ing religious, racial, or political matters should restriction he places on the use of his information
not be raised unless absolutely necessary and per- and his willingness to testify at board hearings.
tinent to the purpose of the investigation. When In certain cases when the subject has demon-
 FM 30-17

CLASSIFICATION

KEY SHEET
(AR 331-131)
1. SUBJECT a. DATE OF BIRTH b. PLACE OF BIRTH

2. DOSSIER NUMBER 3. DATE FORWARDED 4. KEY SYMBOL IDENTITY

CODE
5. NAME OF SOURCE 6. POSITION OF SOURCE IN RELATION.
SHIP TO SUBJECT

7. EVALUATION OF SOURCE AND INFORMATION GIVEN

8. REASON FOR CODING (Check one and add further explanation if necessary)
Divulging the identity of Source will have an adverse effect on
£U national security (Confidential Source).

/ / The Source refuses to be confronted and wishes to remain anonymous.

t / Include reason, if given.

THIS SHEET IS NOT PART OF THE INVESTIGATIVE FILE.

DA FORM 2357-R, 1 SEP 60
CLASSIFICATION
Figure B-7. DA Form 2857-R, key sheet.

strated his unreliability (e.g., AWOL and defec- the concluding paragraph of the report. Agent's
tors) a recommendation is not required from in- notes are used to aid the reviewing officers in
terviewees. Instead, a statement will be included their study and evaluation of the information re-
to the effect that source will notify proper military ported and to draw attention to pertinent discrep-
authorities should additional pertinent informa- ancies. Agent's notes should contain only com-
tion arise. ments and opinions of the Special Agent; all in-
(4) Agent's notes. Agent's notes are an ad- formation obtained by investigation must be
dendum to the Agent Report and are placed after stated in the body of the report. The reasons for

B-15
FM 30-17

the Special Agent's opinions should be evident ; if by the Special Agent in contacting the source, un-
not, the reasons must be made clear. Comments less this reflects on the source's reliability.
will be presented as concisely as possible. 5. Refer to internal correspondence or
(a) Agent's notes may be used to— forms peculiar to the local unit.
1. Call attention to, and set forth rea- 6. Indicate recommendations.
sons why, the Special Agent did not, or why oth- (c) When used, agent's notes will be
ers should not, follow up an obvious lead if not placed at the conclusion of the Agent Report to
otherwise apparent. which they pertain. The designation will be typed
2. Give facts from the Special Agent's in upper case letters, i.e., "AGENT'S NOTES,"
knowledge of the area or situation, otherwise not followed by a colon. Agent's notes are indented
apparent, which might help to clarify an issue. five spaces and are contained in one paragraph
3. Give pertinent information concern- regardless of the diversity of the contents.
ing the source, which for any reason is not in- Agent's notes will begin two spaces below the last
cluded in the body of the report, e.g., adverse line of the Agent Report to which they pertain.
comments concerning the reputation, competency, e. Block No. 5, Typed Name and Organization
or credibility of the source, or competency in the of Special Agent. The reporting Special Agent's
language in which the interview was conducted, name will be typed in upper case letters in nor-
if relevant. mal order followed by the intelligence unit desig-
■4. Give the Special Agent's opinion of nation.
the interviewee (bias, prejudice, senility, etc.) or
of the information obtained, if necessary for clar- /. Block No. 6, Signature of Special Agent. The
ification or proper evaluation. This should be investigating Special Agent's signature will
stated as an opinion, never as a fact. appear as typed in block No. 5. The agent will per-
5. Point out discrepancies in subject's sonally sign in ink all copies of the Agent Report
statement of personal history, conflicting infor- when it contains adverse or derogatory informa-
mation submitted in other reports, and cross-ref- tion or concerns a complaint type investigation.
erence to related material. Variations of this policy may be authorized by
6. Point out the condition of records, if the investigating unit in individual cases for unu-
this might affect their validity or reliability. sual circumstances. Agent Reports not concerned
7. Explain any unusual terms or words with complaint type investigations and contain-
in the paragraph if such explanation requires ing no derogatory or adverse information may be
more than one word placed in parentheses after signed for the investigating Special Agent by an
the term. individual responsible for thé authenticity of the
8. Draw attention to conflicts or discre- reports.
pancies in different accounts of the same matter
and state the Special Agent's opinion, supported B—5. Leads
by his reasons, as to which is the more reliable a. A lead is any information collected during
version. an investigation which may require further de-
9. Indicate whether two sources having velopment of investigation. It may be the name,
the same last name are related. address, or location of a person, firm, or organiza-
10. Make reference to other related re- tion. It is usually a source which can furnish fur-
ports in the same case. ther information on the case or which can lead to
(&) Agent's notes will not be used to— additional information. Leads are included in the
1. Provide a catchall for nonpertinent Agent Report paragraph as information obtained.
information.
b. Initially, the Control Office extracts leads
2. Call attention to minor discrepancies
from subject's statement of personal history.
in dates of employment or education and in house
Normally, these initial leads are distributed by
numbers of listed street addresses. It is prefera-
means of DA Form 339 (Lead Sheet) (AR
ble in such cases to focus attention by underlin-
ing the information at variance. 381-130) to the MI units that will conduct the in-
vestigation. The leads noted on Lead Sheets or
3. Take the place of a negative report.
contained in Agent Reports must be specific and
When effort by the Special Agent fails to locate
complete, so that the investigative activities may
an interviewee or a record, this effort will be re-
be conducted intelligently and thoroughly.
corded in a separate Agent Report as an attempt.
í. Describe the difficulties experienced c. Leads collected during an investigation, e.g..

B—16
 FM 30-17

"throwoffs" or other developed references not be inserted by the Control Office when the assem-
contained in a Lead Sheet, are subsidiary leads. bled Agent Reports and exhibits are organized
Normally, the reporting unit is authorized to de- for review and forwarding to the action agency.
velop all subsidiary leads within its own area of Exhibits must supplement, not replace, Agent Re-
jurisdiction. Therefore,, if the lead can be devel- ports.
oped by the reporting agent or by someone within a. In preparing paragraphs concerning ex-
the jurisdiction, of the command, no formal indi- hibits, the following procedures apply :
cation of the lead is necessary. This type lead is
(1) When the source of information is a
referred to as a "jurisdictional lead." However,
written record, it must be identified by office, lo-
when the lead is outside the jurisdiction of the
cation, title, volume, page number, and date. A
reporting command, necessitating communication
copy of a portion of a record included as a part of
with an MI group in another command, the Spe-
an Agent Report will be designated as an "ex-
cial Agent will formally indicate the lead in the
tract." Care will be exercised in making extracts
Agent Report in the following manner : The word
to insure that divorcing the passage from its con-
"(LEAD)", typed in upper case letters and en-
text does not alter its meaning. A complete copy
closed in parentheses, will be placed in the 3/4-
of a record will be designated as an "exhibit" and
inch marginal space on the right of the Agent
attached to rather than incorporated into the
Report on the line in which the lead is first men-
Agent Report. If the source of information ob-
tioned. The closing parentheses will be flush to
tained from written records is classified, or if the
the back vertical line on the form. This type of
revelation of such source would compromise
lead is referred to as an "indicated lead." Leads
counterintelligence operations or embarrass the
naming persons, firms, or organizations known to
agency furnishing such records, the material in
the reporting Special Agent as being suspect or
the reports may be paraphrased and the source
subversive are also indicated. The reason for in-
referred to by code designation. The exact refer-
dicating such leads will be reported in Agent's
ence to the source will be maintained in a manner
Notes.
consistent with the security considered necessary
by the responsible counterintelligence unit or ap-
B-6. Exhibits propriate Control Office. This information should
To amplify or to confirm information contained be accessible, however, if required by further de-
in Agent Reports, particularly if they prove or velopments in the case.
disprove derogatory information, or provide evi- (2) When the exhibit is a copy of an affida-
dence of the nature of incidents and the manner vit, a letter, or other document, the Special Agent
in which they were caused, the Special Agent must include all information which reveals how,
must submit available documentary and physical where, when, from whom, and under what cir-
evidence. This evidence must be in the form of cumstances the exhibit was obtained. The sub-
records, identification documents, affidavits, state- stance of information contained in the exhibit
ments, photographs, transcripts of interviews, will be included in the body of the Agent Report.
photostats, sketches (made by either the Special The Special Agent must not omit any detail which
Agent or other persons), documents, pamphlets, indicates the value the exhibit has in relation to
newspaper clippings, and sound recordings. Ex- the purpose of the investigation. Facts which later
hibits or objects of physical evidence which are may have a bearing on its probative or adjudica-
to be presented in legal proceedings must be tivo value must be reported fully.
maintained in a continuing chain of custody. Cop- (3) The Special Agent will state in his re-
ies will be attached to the Agent Report as EX- port, or on the copies of the exhibits, the exact lo-
HIBITS. In the body of the report, the designa- cation, name, and title of the custodian of the
tion should follow immediately after references original evidence. In some instances, the originals
to the item attached. Example: "SCHMIDT are not obtainable and copies must suffice, but the
wrote a letter (EXHIBIT I) to Charles B. location of the original must be given in the re-
Walker, Beverage Salesman, Tasty Beverage port. In such a situation, the names and addresses
Company, 666 Dundalk Avenue, Baltimore, of two persons who could testify to the authentic-
Maryland 21219." Or: "Attached hereto is EX- ity and existence of the original should also be
HIBIT I, (three pages) sworn statement, pre- stated in the Agent Report. In the case of docu-
pared by Jones dated 9 January 1960." Normally ments or copies of documents which are obtained
in a PSI, the exhibit is not numbered by the Spe- covertly, the Agent Report transmitting them to
cial Agent; the numbers (Roman numerals) will higher headquarters must contain sufficient iden-

B-17
m

tifyingf information to enable case officers to pro- umentary information is developed on a subject
perly appraise their validity and importance. or when favorable documentary data is obtained
(4) In the case of physical evidence, if the which wholly or partially refutes adverse infor-
nomenclature of the material will not serve as a mation, certified true, photostatic, or other au-
description, the Special Agent should describe thentic copies or extracts will be obtained to ac-
generally the equipment or the apparatus so that company and substantiate the report information.
the reader will be able to comprehend the physi- When it is impossible to accomplish the forego-
cal characteristics and utilization of the material ing, the Special Agent should personally verify
to which reference is made. the information in the documents and so state in
the Agent Report. If the documents are not made
b. In preparing exhibits to be attached at the available for verification, a signed sworn state-
end of an Agent Report, the following procedures ment by the document custodian will be obtained,
apply : if possible, concerning the contents. Lacking this,
(1) The identifying data for each exhibit the Special Agent will obtain full identifying
will be typed on the cover sheet. Cover sheets will data concerning the custodian.
contain the exhibit number, subject, file num- (7) Extreme care will be exercised in citing
ber (s), designation of the preparing unit, date of any local intelligence studies or reports which
the Agent Report to which the exhibit(s) applies, have not received Department of the Army evalu-
and, when applicable, security classification. ation. Reports or studies which have not been so
(2) If an original documentary exhibit re- evaluated normally will be referred to in Agent
quires a security classification, the classification Reports only as an aid to supervisory and investi-
may be stamped on a backing sheet, a cellophane gative control personnel in directing further in-
or other envelope, a permanent folder, or other vestigation. Agent Reports containing such une-
means used which will keep the security classifi- valuated reports or studies will not be included
cation on or near the exhibit without defacing it. with the Report of Investigation prepared upon
Duplicates of documentary exhibits are marked conclusion of an investigation. Properly evalu-
with the proper security classification in accord- ated data from local intelligence studies or re-
ance with the provisions of AR 380-5. Newspa- ports may be entered in Agent Reports included
pers and other public periodicals will not be clas- with the Report of Investigation, provided the
sified, but the file may be classified to prevent dis- original source can be identified and his reliabil-
closure of MI interest in this area. ity established.
(3) Original copies of documentary exhibits,
which have been received from other sources, B—7. DrsfomsslfoQifii ©bifoiiraedl from ©©vemmemi
will not be marked in any way. Agjemieios

(4) Documentary exhibits normally will be Charges or allegations of counterintelligence sig-

prepared or mounted on 8- x 10 1/2-inch paper. nificance against personnel subject to Department
Exhibits larger than 8- x 10 1/2 inches will be of the Army jurisdiction are often received in the
folded to such size, if this can be done without af- course of interviews or records checks from other
fecting their value. Where the exhibit is an iden- government agencies. These charges or allega-
tity document, pass, sample of stationery or item tions, together with the evaluation of the source
of possible counterintelligence operational use, as given by the contributing agency, should be in-
the exhibit should be placed unfolded in a clean cluded in the Agent Report. When the agency re-
envelope after data identifying the exhibit has porting these charges is another investigative
been placed on the envelope. agency, no new investigation will be instituted
without the approval of the reporting agency.
(5) Sworn statements are obtained in ac- This coordination will preclude the possibility of
cordance with chapter 3. compromise to any investigation currently in
(6) In all cases when serious derogatory doc- progress.

SeeíD©ira DDO. KSPDSÏ ©IF llNVliSTl©ATI©INl (BA FOfêM 342)

E-S. F®irinnioif smd FVepeiirsilfeira The accumulated Agent Reports are ar-
The Report of Investigation is prepared accord- ranged in a logical order and each report is num-
ing to the following procedures : bered in a single series with Arabic numerals.

HS-li
 FM 30-17

This numeral is placed in the five-space indenta- (3) "Investigative Data," the last major di-
tion of the introductory element of each attached vision of DA Form 342 is composed of blocks 19
Agent Report. The logical order of the Agent Re- through 25.
ports will vary as follows (fig B-8) : (a) Block 22 indicates the status of the in-
(1) In background investigations, the se- vestigation. The status indicated must be one of
quence of phase designations stated in AR the following :
381-130 should be used. 1. Closed. An investigation is indicated
(2) In complaint type investigations and in- as closed when no further investigative activity is
cident investigations the scope and nature are so necessary to enable proper authorities to make a
varied that no sequence can be prescribed. The se- final determination.
quence should logically present the development 2. Terminated. An investigation is indi-
of the investigation. cated as terminated when the investigation is
ended for some reason other than completion,
b. The exhibits prepared for the investigation e.g., withdrawal of the request for investigation,
are arranged in numerical order using Roman nu- transfer of investigative jurisdiction, etc.
merals. Exhibits are numbered in the order in
3. Susvended. An investigation is indi-
which they are mentioned in the numerically ar-
cated as suspended when the findings are incon-
ranged Agent Reports and are placed as a group
clusive and all tangible leads have been ex-
following the Agent Reports. Exhibits are never
hausted, yet there remains a possibility that new-
interspersed among the Agent Reports. Originals
information will be available at some future time.
of exhibits will be retained by the control office
with the open case file until required by the ac- Jf. Pending. An investigation is indicated
tion agency or higher authority. However, origi- as pending when the investigation is continuing.
nals will be included, if possible, in the closed (ft) Block 23, the Synopsis, is written in a
case file which is forwarded to the US Army In- narrative style and contains the essence of the
vestigative Records Repository (IRR), Fort Hol- pertinent information in the collected Agent Re-
abird, Maryland 21219. In instances when re- ports. It is a concise summary of the who, what,
sults of polygraph examinations are used as ex- when, where, why, and how of the investigation.
hibits, instructions contained in AR 195-6 will Each statement of fact in the synopsis contains
apply. parenthetical references to the appropriate num-
bered Agent Reports or exhibits. Any recommen-
c. DA Form 342 is prepared as follows : dations, reviewer's opinions, or conclusions
(1) "Identifying Data" is the first major di- deemed appropriate should be noted on the letter
vision of DA Form 342, and is composed of blocks of transmittal accompanying the Report of Inves-
1 to 15. Definite entries are made in blocks 1 tigation ; no such comments should be included in
through 10 when the subject of an investigation the Report of Investigation. The margins will be
is a known person or organization. The letters the black lines at the sides of the page, and the
"NA" (not applicable) are entered in blocks 11 text will begin on the third line of block 23. Two
through 15 in this case. When the investigation blank spaces are left at the bottom of the page. If
deals with an incident in which the person or additional space is needed, block 23 will be con-
persons concerned are not known, blocks 11 tinued on a plain sheet of white bond paper,
through 15 will contain definite entries identify- using normal margins. At the top of the continu-
ing the incident, and the letters "NA" entered in ation sheet the title will be placed on the left and
blocks 1 through 10. the date and file reference on the right. The text
(2) "Control Data," the second major divi- is continued on the third line below the file refer-
sion of DA Form 342, is composed of blocks 16 ence. (See AR 381-130 for the distribution of the
through 18. Report of Investigation.)

B-19
 FM 30-17

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION DATE SUBMITTED

(Bmckgrcund or Ccmpimint)
(AR 3»1'130) 1 April 1971
SCOPE (If bmckground) CASE CLASSIFICATION
I I IAC N/A I I GAC I I PB I I I CB I
IDCNTIFYING DATA
1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME 2. SVC NO. (Utl) 3- RACE H ■ GRADE 3. ARM OR SVC
BROWN, Margaret, Nee: ROE 207-24-3003 Cau Captain WAC
t. DUTY OR JOB ASSIGNMENT 7. DATE OF BIRTH 8. PLACE OF BIRTH
Administrative Asst, S4 Section 10 June 1920 Nashville, Tennessee
9. out* station or business address |X0. HOME OR QUARTERS ADDRESS
Stockton Ordnance Depot I 1526 Center Street
Stockton, California t Stockton, California
11- TITLE OF INCIDENT (Hi 12* DATE (incident case« only) 13* TIME (Jncidmnt caaaa
onlr)
N/A N/A N/A
1H. LOCATION (¡nmtml istion, unit, building) I?. SERIAL NUMBERS OF EQUIPMENT, TANKS, ETC.
N/A N/A
S CONTROL DATA
It. CONTROL SYMBOL AND FILE NO. 17 investigMion MADE BY (Orgmniamtion) IB. CONTROL OFFICE
US Army Intelligence Command
207-24-3003 115th
3 th up Fort Holabird, Maryland
INVESTI8ATIVE DATA
X9. investigation requested by 20. WASyt FOR INVESTIGATION
Commanding General
Sixth US Array, Presidio of San ToldMermine whether SUBJECT is or ever was a
Francisco, San Francisco, Calif. member fcf an organization inimical to the
United States- or in sympathy with such an
«• DATE INVESTIGATION organization.J
COMMENCED COMPLETED

22. STATUS I I CLOSED I I TERMINATED I I »SPENDEO I I PENDING

23. SYNOPSIS
BROWN was born on 10 June I92O in Nashville, Tennessee ii»» 2). From 1937 to
19Ul, SUBJECT attended the University of Kentucky, LexingtoA Kentucky (2). During
HER senior year at the university, SHE wrote a paper in whicfx SHE voiced strong
Marxist sentiments (3). In 19Ul, SUBJECT married William Rcfger Brown, a University
of Kentucky instructor, The Brown residence became a center of leftist activities
at the university. In 191x2, BROWN'S husband was dismissed from the faculty of the
University of Kentucky because of Communist activities and propagandism (3, h, 19,
20).

In 191x2, BROWN moved to New York, New York, with HER husband who was appointed
an assistant professor at New York University. In 191x3, BROWN'S husband left his
position at New York University to devote his entire time to Communist propaganda
activities (3, 19, 20). SUBJECT'S ideas marked HER as a militant Communist, and in
191x3, SHE was issued Communist Party Membership Card No. 679UNE (7). BROWN was a
secretary of a Communist front organization and an active member of many Communist
2M. DISTRIBUTION
3 - CG, Sixth US Army, 1 - File

2». REVIEWED BY
TYPED «AME ANO TITLE SIGNATURE
ROBERT C. HALL.Colonel. GS JiÀ. /s/ Robert C. Hall

DA 1 APR 92 342 REPLACES WO AGO FORM 392,. X JUN 97, WHICH MAT BE USED. SPO »MBB»

Figure B-8. Example of an ROL

B—20
 FM 30-17

(CLASSIFICATION)

SUBJECT: BROWN, Margaret, Nee: ROE Date: 1 April 1971

Control Symbol: 207-24-3003

sponsored groups (8,18,19). In 1944 BROWN made a speech in which SHE berated
labor "for playing into the hands of the capitalists" (6). According to a
neighbor SUBJECT and HER husband entertained frequently in their home, but these
occasions were quiet and reserved. This neighbor described SUBJECT as friendly
and patriotic(11).

In March 1944, when SUBJECT'S husband was inducted into the US Army, he
listed his political affiliations as "Communist." In December 1945, he was
discharged at Fort Dix, New Jersey (12). One year after HER husband's
discharge, BROWN joined the WAC in the grade of second lieutenant. SHE is
currently assigned duties at the Stockton Ordnance Depot (13, 14, 15).
SUBJECT'S Commanding Officer and four co-workers noticed no manifestations
of left-wing activity oj^pf sympathy for left-wing causes on the part of
BROWN (13, 14, 15, 16^17). BROWN's name appeared on a membership list of
the National Committee rör Human Welfare, a Communist front organization
(EXHIBIT I) (18, 25). JnJ1958, BROWN's daughter, a Communist Party youth
director in Stockton, married/k suspected Communist Party organizational
leader (20). The Browns receájgXCommunist literature at their home in
Stockton (8, 21). They have/corresponded or spoken on the telephone with
three recognized Communists (22, 23, 24).

NOTE: a. Items 1 through 21 are self-explannto».

b. The appropriate term of the "statuy" üílock (Item 22) always must
be checked. 1
c. Plain bond used for continuation page.

El

(CLASSIFICATION)

Figure B-8—Continued.

Section IV. SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (DA FORM 568)

B—9. Format and Preparation Summary of Information are as follows (fig

B-9) :
A Summary of Information should contain con-
cise statements of both derogatory and favorable a. The date of preparation and the preparing
information so that the perspective will not be office must be recorded in the appropriate spaces.
distorted. Rules relative to the preparation of a A file number, if appropriate, may be entered in

8-21
FM 30-17

the extreme right portion of the space labeled the source may be identified in such identification
"preparing office." is necessary for complete understanding of the
facts. When the source is not identified, an indica-
b. The subject of the summary must be identi-
tion of the nature of the source's accessibility to
fied as thoroughly as possible. Rules for comple-
the information may be included in the summary.
tion of the subject block for the Agent Report
When Summaries of Information are prepared in
also apply for the Summary of Information.
which sources are not identified, the file copy
c. The text of the Summary of Information will which remains in the office of origin should be
start on the third line from the black line at the annotated to show the sources, using code number
top of the block titled "Summary of Informa- of sources whose identity requires protection. A
tion," leaving two blank spaces at the top of this bibliography may be attached to the file copy
block. The black lines will be used as the left when multiple sources are used in the prepara-
margin for all items. tion of the Summary of Information.
d. Paragraphing and subparagraphing should
follow the rules of military correspondence (AR B—11. Information from Other Government
340-15). Paragraphs are numbered at the time of Agencies
preparation. Each paragraph should be limited to Information obtained from government agencies
information from one major source only (i.e., one other than the Department of Defense will not be
file, one agency, etc.), but not necessarily from included in Summaries of Information prepared
one ultimate source (i.e., each person inter- for a requesting or receiving agency outside of
viewed, each report of a records check, etc.), and the Department of Defense or the Federal Bu-
should contain all information from that source reau of Investigation without first securing the
pertinent to the subject ot the Summary of Infor- approval of the originator or source. When a
mation. Summary of Information contains information
from other government agencies, such informa-
e. Each paragraph of the Summary of Infor-
tion will be underlined and capitalized. Such
mation will be evaluated, using the standard sys-
Summaries of Information will contain the fol-
tem of evaluation ratings (FM 30-5), taking into
lowing statement :
consideration the evaluation (s), if any, of the
original report(s). When pertinent, evaluation Information derived from sources other than
Army Sources is included in this summary. This
should be made of subparagraphs or sentences. information will not be passed to any agency
outside the Department of Defense or the Federal
/. If additional space is needed, two lines will Bureau of Investigation.
be left at the bottom of the form, and the text This statement will appear as a final, but unnum-
will be continued on a plain sheet of white paper; bered, paragraph in the summary.
normal margins will be used. At the top of the
continuation sheet the subject will be placed on B—12. Format and Preparation
the left side and the date and file references on
the right; the text is continued on the third line A Summary of Information could be used as a
below these items. characterization; however, many occasions arise
where a biographic sketch of an individual or or-
gr. The Summary of Information is not signed; ganization will satisfy the needs of the requester.
however, the file copy will have the name of the Characterizations may be prepared from existing
individual who prepared the summary typed in records in the US Army Investigative Records
the upper-right hand corner of the DA Form 568. Repository, the Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff for Intelligence, DA, or the Federal Bureau
B—10. Limitation on Identification of Sources of Investigation. If not available from these
sources the information will only be obtained
The sources of information normally should not through authorized liaison with local, state, and
be revealed in a Summary of Information sent federal authorities, and from public sources, such
outside intelligence channels. However, if the as reputable news media or libraries (fig B-10,
summary is to remain in intelligence channels. B-ll, B-12).

B—22
 FM 30-17

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION I CATE

(AR 381-13Í)
1 15 March 197.3
PREPARING OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND, Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219.
SUBJECT CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
DOE, John Joseph OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:
DPOB: 3 August 1936, Hometown, AZ COMPLETELY RELIABLE . ... A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES .1
USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2
SSAN : 216-52-3724 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE .... 0 DOUBTFULLY TRUE M
UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE . . .}
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN .... F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . ..6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION
1. On 1 March 1972, a source who has provided reliable information in the past
reported the following: On 28 February 1972, John Joseph DOE, DAC, 1969 Tucson
Avenue, Bisbee, AZ, had dinner with Alex A. Smith in the Longhorn Restaurant
in Douglas, AZ. The two men ate quietly in an isolated part of the restaurant
and exchanged several pieces of paper before departing company. They were together
from 1700-1900 hours. (B-3)

2. Investigative reports concerning Alex A. Smith on file at this headquarters

revealed the following: Smith was born on 28 October 1930, in Portland, ON. He
was graduated from Central High School in 1949, and then attended the University of
California at Berkley, where ha^vrate graduated magna cum laude in 1953 with a
degree in international affair^- fee has been an active sympathizer with the
Communist Party, USA. He was dra^Ved into the U.S. Army in June 1953. Throughout
his term of service in the Armys»^f«ith was known as an agitator, trouble-maker, and
Communist sympathizer. Basing his actntons upon minor or imaginary grievances against
military service, he made numerous ati&mts to organize protest meetings among
Tnilitary personnel. (Information coaceriVng Smith's Army activities was obtained in
ten interviews with members of his military unit. Sworn statements attesting to
these activities are filed at the US Army Inkestijiatlve Records Repository, Fort
Holabird, Maryland 21219.) Smith received al^Ki^Al discharge in January 1955.
Smith is considered unacceptable for furtherImd^tkry service. Smith has been
living in Mexico since 1970 following federal charges of destruction and theft of
government property. , (B-l)

3. An investigative report concerning John Joseph DiSe on file at this headquarters

revealed the following: DOE was born on 3 August loló, in Hometown, AZ. HE attended
Hometown High School from 1951 to 1955 and was graduated ¿ salutatorian of HIS class.
After graduation, HE attended World Electronics School in Chicago, Illinois for two
years. HE then applied and was accepted for a job with thp Fort Huachuca Communica-
tions-Electronics Agency. Throughout the Vietnam War HE expressed strong opposition
to the War on the grounds that the American involvement in Indo-ClllM" was for
territorial gain. He is suspected of having aided U.S. Army deseitprs in their flight
to Canada. 1 (B-3)

4. A source considered to be usually reliable reported that in February 1972, DOE

applied for a sensitive position with another government agency. (B-2)

Information derived from sources other than Army sources is included in this
summary. This information will not be passed to any agency outside the Department of
Defense or the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

01STRIBUTI0N
Tucson Office, FBI, Tucson, AZ - 2 copies
File - 1 copy
A FORM ETCQ (Formerly REPLACES WD AGO FORM 568. I JUH 47.
Jr\ I DEC 51 OOO DA AGO) MAY BE USED.
WHICH MA

Figure B-9. Example of an SOI.

B-23
 FM 30-17

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION I CATC

(AX sai.131) I 23 Nov 1972
PREPARING OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND, Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219
SUBJECT CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
NOMAN, Raffel D. OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE .... A CONFIRMES BY OTHER SOURCES.!
DPOB: 30 February 1900, City, Utah USUALLY RELIABLE 6 PROBABLY TRUE 2
SSAN: 100-00-000 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE .... 0 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E INPROBABLE J
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN .... F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . ..6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Raffel D. NOMAN, born 30 February 1900, City, Utah, retired from the US Army in
1952, with rank of Colonel, NOMAN was decorated for HIS service in World Wars I and
II.

2. NOMAN is a legitimate collector of autographs and photographs, especially from

prominent military, political and industrial persons.

01 STRIBUTION

J
I A A FORM CßQ (Formerly REPLACES WD AGO FORM S'.B. I JI.'N 47.
Uf\ t DEC 51 OOO DAACOJ WHICH MAY BE USED.

Figure B—10. Example of a characterization—individual, SOI format.

B—24
 m 30-17

SUMMARY OF INFORMATI OH (CATE

<**'»'-Iii) . i 15 March 1977
PAIPAAINO OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND. Fort Holabird. Maryland 21219
SUBJECT CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
RETREAT COFFEE HOUSE OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATIOM:
200 Rollybird Avenue CONPLETCLY Ri LI ABLE .... A CONFIRMEOBY OTHER SOURCES.1
USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2
Baltimore, Maryland FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE ... .0 DOUBTFULLY TRUE H
UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE J
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN .... F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . ..6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION
1. The RETREAT COFFEE HOUSE (RCH), 200 Rollybird Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland, opened
28 February 1977, to provide a meeting place for dissident military personnel in the
Baltimore and surrounding area. RCH was organized by the No Military Action Group
(NMAG), a corporation which has established coffee houses near major US Army installa-
tions for the purpose of generating and supporting military dissidence.

2. Although the RCH management staff is composed entirely of civilians, the patron-
age of RCH is entirely military. Approximately 30-A0 individuals reportedly attend
SUBJECT nightly.

3. Activities at RCH center around "rap sessions" and military, counseling. Trained
counselors, both civilian and military, advise and assist servicemen to seek service
discharges on grounds of conscientious objector status. RCH patrons discuss and
plan a variety of disruptive actions against the Army.

01STRIeUTION

DA 568

Figure B—ll. Example of a characterization—organization, SOI format.

B-25
FM 30-17

PERSONALITY CHARACTERIZATION
Dossier No
As of Date

1. NAME: 12. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

DPOB : SEX:
ASN: RACE:
S S AN : HEIGHT:
WEIGHT:
2. Aliases : EYES:
HAIR:
3. Marital Status: OTHER:

4. Current Residenc
-s
5. Current Employment : PHOTOGRAPH AS OF:

6. Education:
A
7. Previous Residences:

8. Previous Employment: M

9. Military Service:

10. Arrest Record: P

11. Foreign Travel:

POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

AND AFFILIATIONS

OTHER INFORMATION

Figure B—12. Example of a characterization—individual on bond paper.

B—26
 FM 30-17

APPENDIX C

COUNTÈRINTELLIGENCE SERVICES REPORTS

Example 1. Format—Report of Counterintelligrence Survey.

Example 2. Format—Report óf Counterintelligence Technical Service.
EXAMPLE 1
REPORT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEY
OF
(UNIT AND LOCATION)
(Requester Control Number) (Date)
Section I. INTRODUCTION
1. A courtterintelligencè survey was conducted (during the period
to ) or (on ) by the following
representative(s) of (Region ), ( ) Military Intelligence
Group :
(List as necessary using title, first name, middle initial, and last name.)
2. The following unit representatives accompanied the counterintelligence
survey. team :
(List as necessary using rank or title, first name, middle initial, last
name, and position.)
3. (Indicate whether or not there is any record of a previous counterin-
telligence survey having been conducted on the above installation.)
4. The mission of (identify the surveyed unit completely) is (discuss
briefly the complete mission of the survèyed unit).
5. Based on the factors discussed below (maximum, medium, minimum)
degree of security is required for the surveyed unit.
a. (Discuss effect of the mission of the surveyed unit on the level of
security required.)
b. (Statement of cost of replacement.)
c. (Briefly discuss location of the installation.)
d. (Give number and names of like installations.)
e. (State the security classification of information' and/or materiel.)
/. (Discuss other factors relating to the overall importance of the sur-
veyed unit.)
6. Command diréctives for this installation are promulgated by (enter
identification of surveyed unit's major command) through (enter command
echelons, if any, between major command and surveyed unit). The intelli-
gence directives are disseminated to this installation by (enter source of
directives) through (enter the intelligence echelons, if any, between major
command and the surveyed unit) ).
7. This survey was conducted to assist the commander in establishing the
security requirements necessary to protect his installation against espio-

C-l
nage, sabotage and the unauthorized access to, or disclosure of, classi-
fied defense information.
Section II. SCOPE
8. This survey included the following (elements, offices, sections, etc) of
(re-identify the unit).
(List the sections or sub-elements surveyed.)
9. (Use this paragraph to indicate the amount and classification of docu-
ments and materiel on hand either by number and type or in linear feet
and type.)
Section III. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
10. Security of Information:
a. Receipting: (Narrate the entire procedure used in receipting for all
classified documents within the unit being surveyed and follow with ap-
propriate recommendation (s). An alternate method would be to subpara-
graph where required, as in example below.)
(1) TOP SECRET: (Narrate)
(a) Recommendation: (Follow the narration with appropriate rec-
ommendation (s). Use a similar procedure for subsequent paragraphs
throughout the report, varying as necessary to adapt survey findings to
this report format.)
( b ) Recommendation :
(2) SECRET: (Narrate)
(a) Recommendation:
( b ) Recommendation :
(c) Recommendation:
(3) CONFIDENTIAL: (Narrate)
(a) Recommendation:
( 6 ) Recommendation :
b. Storage. (Narrate in detail facilities and procedures employed in
storing classified matter.)
Recommendation ( s )
c. Distribution: (Narrate in detail procedures employed for internal
distribution of classified matter.)
Recommendation ( s)
d. Preparation : (Narrate in detail how classified matters are generated
and prepared, to include drafts.)
Recommendation ( s )
e. Marking: (Narrate in detail how prepared classified matters are
marked for proper safeguarding, to include drafts, stenographer's notes,
etc, and also authority.)
Recommendation ( s )
/. Reproduction: (Narrate in detail how classified matters are repro-
duced and how marked.)
Recommendation ( s )
g. Regarding: (Narrate in detail procedure for reviewing and regrading
classified matter; include responsibility.)
 Recommendation (s)
h. Transmission: (Narrate in detail procedure employed for transmit-
ting classified matter out of the surveyed unit to include responsibility and
accountability. )
Recommendation (s)
i. Normal Destruction: (Narrate in detail procedure employed for ac-
complishing normal destruction of classified matter and waste; include
responsibility, records, etc.)
Recommendation (s)
j. Emergency Evacuation and Destruction of classified material:
(Narrate in detail what measures are established to include plan in effect,
personnel assigned specific duties, etc.)
Recommendation (s)
11. Security of Personnel :
a. Key Personnel :
(1) The (enter title of individual who heads the surveyed unit; i.e.,
commanding officer, branch chief, section chief, etc.) of the installation is
(enter title or rank, first name, middle initial, last name, branch of service,
service, social security number or GS rating in case of civilians). He (or
she) has occupied this position since (date).
(2) The Security Officer of this installation is (enter title or rank,
first name, middle initial, last name, branch of service, social security
number or GS rating in case of civilians). He has occupied this position
since (date) upon orders issued by (identify authority and date).
(3) The officer having staff responsibility for crime prevention at this
installation is the Provost Marshal (or appropriate title), (enter rank,
first name, middle initial, last name, branch of service, and social security
account number). He has occupied this position since- (enter date) upon
orders issued by (identify authority and give date of orders).
(4) (Use additional subparagraphs, as needed, to identify other indi-
viduals in surveyed unit who are considered to be "key" personnel and
show the degree of clearance and time each has held his present position.)
Recommendation (s)
b. Clearance Program: (Describe in detail the procedure used for ob-
taining clearance for assigned personnel and describe accuracy of the
clearance roster.)
Recommendation ( s )
c. Security Education: (Describe in detail the security education pro-
gram that is established and conducted ; include responsibility, frequency of
security lectures, subjects covered, attendance records, effectiveness, etc.)
Recommendation ( s )
d. Labor Turnover, Absentee Rate, Morale: (Describe how these factors
affect the security of surveyed unit.)
Recommendation (s)
12. Physical Security: (Describe in detail the controls, systems, facilities,
and utilities identified in the following subparagraphs. If the unit being
surveyed already has on record a Physical Security Survey (PSS) per-
formed by MP personnel, a statement in this paragraph referring to the
report is deemed sufficient, provided those deficiencies noted which directly
affect the security of classified documents and material have been corrected.
If this has not been accomplished, appropriate recommendations should be
made. If there is no record of a PSS and the MP representatives are un-
able to perform the physical security portion while the CI Survey is being
conducted, this portion will be accomplished by counterintelligence person-
nel, if directed to do so, following the format outlined below (chap 10).
a. Perimeter Barriers:
post fences, gates, locks, key control, perimeter lighting;
building building surfaces, doors, locking devices, key control,
windows, protective lighting;
office wall surfaces, doors, locking devices, key control
windows.
Recommendation ( s )
b. Guards and Guard Systems:
post type and number of guards, their procurement train-
ing, their employment and supervision, equipment
and communications ;
building same as above;
office same as above.
Recommendation ( s )
c. Personnel Control and Identification: Control of assigned personnel
by post, in building, and in office; control of visitors by post, in building,
and in office.
Recommendation ( s )
d. Vehicular Control and Identification : Vehicles of assigned personnel,
their registration, identification and control on post; visiting vehicles and
their control.
Recommendation ( s )
e. Anti-Intrusion Alarms Systems:
Recommendation ( s )
/. Firefighting Facilities:
post fire department and its personnel, type and number,
procurement and training, employment and supervi-
sion ; equipment and its inspection ; communications ;
reserve fire fighting personnel;
building fire plan; fire marshal and wardens, equipment and
its inspection; communications; training and educa-
tion of personnel ;
office same as for building.
Recommendation ( s )
g. Communication Facilities : Primary, alternate, and emergency facili-
ties that are available on post and to surveyed unit; personnel employed
to operate and maintain communications facilities to include their type
and number, procurement and clearance, employment and supervision.
Recommendation ( s )
h. Utilities :
(1) Electrical Power.
(Source, emergency provisions, protection, etc.)
(2) Water Supply.
 (Source, emergency provisions, safeguard, etc.)
(3) Heat and Fuel.
(Facilities and type, source of fuel, emergency provisions, safe-
guards, etc.)
Recommendation (s)
Section IV. COMMENTS
13. (Use this section to record weaknesses and any other comments con-
sidered pertinent. As a part of the survey, inquiries into the following
areas will also be made and if they are found to be adequate, appropriate
remarks to that effect will be made in this section.
а. An evaluation of the completeness and correctness of the unit's se-
curity SOP.
б. Examination of sensitive areas, classified conference rooms and po-
tential or actual restricted areas, to include their actual designation as
such or the requirement for a counterintelligence technical service. If these
areas are found to be inadequate from the standpoint of published regula-
tions, directives, and implementation thereof, the discussion should be
placed in section III, above, followed by appropriate recommendation (s).
When weaknesses as described in chapter 10 are noted, discussion and rec-
ommendation (s) will appear in this section.)
Section V. EXIT BRIEFING
14. All findings and recommendations were discussed during an exit brief-
ing on ( ) for the following unit representatives:
(List as necessary using rank or title, first name, middle initial, last
name, and position.)
SIGNATURE BLOCK
(Signature of authorized group
representative, not necessarily
the Agent-in-Charge. )

EXAMPLE 2
(CLASSIFICATION)
REPORT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TECHNICAL SERVICE
OF
(UNIT AND LOCATION)
(Requestor Control Number) (Date)
Section I. INTRODUCTION
1. ( ) A counterintelligence technical (survey/inspection assistance) was
conducted during the period by the following repre-
sentative (s) of Region , ( ), MI Group.
(List as necessary using title, first name, middle initial, and last name.)
2. ( ) The serviced area was considered by the requester to be a (enter
secure conference facility, or other sensitive area). A description of the
area is contained in EXHIBIT I.
3. ( ) An examination of records regarding previous counterintelligence
technical services in the area reveal that: (check as appropriate)
( ) There is no record of a previous technical service.
( ) A counterintelligence technical (identify) was completed on
 (CLASSIFICATION)
(date of service and unit that conducted it).
Section II. SCOPE
4. (U) The scope of this technical service is outlined in EXHIBIT II.
Section III. LIMITATIONS
5. (U) The limitations of this service are outlined in EXHIBIT II.
Section IV. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6. ( ) Repeated or uncorrected findings: (enter here any repeated or
uncorrected findings. If there were none, enter, none).
7. ( ) (If technical surveillance devices were not detected and no techni-
cal security hazards were found, state : "The service did not locate or indi-
cate the presence of technical surveillance devices or technical surveillance
security hazards.")
8. ( ) (If technical surveillance devices were not detected, but technical
security hazards were found, state as follows:
a. The service did not locate or indicate the surveillance devices.
b. The serviced area does not meet the criteria for sensitive areas and
is not considered secure for the discussion of sensitive classified informa-
tion until corrective action is taken on the following technical security
hazards :
(1) Finding: (Record findings and follow each with an appropriate
recommendation. Paragraph citations will be indicated at the end of each
finding. When an appropriate finding cannot be attributed to an appropriate
directive, a parenthetical caveat (NONCITABLE HAZARD) will be en-
tered at the end of such findings. )
(2) Finding:
( Recommendation : )
Section V. COMMENTS
9. ( ) (Use this section to record any additional pertinent explanatory
remarks that do not properly fit into any of the other sections).
Section VI. EXIT BRIEFING
10. ( ) All findings, recommendations, and limitations of the service were
discussed during an exist briefing on for the following
unit representatives:
(List as necessary using rank or title, first name, middle initial, last
name, and position.)
SIGNATURE BLOCK
(Signature of authorized group
representative, not necessarily
the Agent-in-Charge.)
REPORT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TECHNICAL SERVICE
OF
DESCRIPTION OF SERVICED AREA
1. ( ) Primary use of serviced area-highest classification and frequency
of discussion of classified defense information.
(CLASSIFICATION)
 (CLASSIFICATION)
2. ( ) Brief, general description of the area to include construction of
walls, floors, ceilings, penetrations of those structural members, and the
relationship of the area to all (including above and below) adjacent areas :
3. ( ) Security controls in effect to restrict access to the serviced area
both during duty and nonduty hours:
4. ( ) Security controls of janitorial and service personnel ; to include
indication of clearance or lack of clearance for nonescorted personnel :
5. ( ) Brief, general description of heating, ventilation, electrical, and
communications equipment or systems that service or penetrate the serv-
iced area :
EXHIBIT I Page 1
SCOPE OF TECHNICAL SERVICE ( )
1. (U) Unless otherwise indicated, this service was conducted to detect
the presence of technical surveillance equipment; to determine the exist-
ence of technical security hazards which would permit the employment of
such equipment; and to recommend technical security measures designed
to prevent the successful employment of technical surveillance monitoring
systems.
2. ( ) This service consisted of selected application of comprehensive
visual, physical, audio, electronic, and radio frequency checks and included
an examination of the factors checked below:
( ) a. All exterior building surfaces, utility poles, wires, and other
associated paraphernalia.
( ) b. Vulnerability of hostile visual surveillance.
( ) c. All areas adjacent to the serviced area including those areas
above and below.
( ) d. The interior of room areas to include wall, floor, and ceiling
mounted items, furniture, artifacts, and equipment.
( ) e. The interior and exterior surfaces and internal structure of
walls, floors, ceilings, and other structural objects.
( ) f. All electric or electronic equipment or circuits and component
parts of accessories thereof, to include detailed examination of all wiring
and utility channels or recesses.
( ) g. Other:
EXHIBIT II Page 1 of 2 pages
LIMITATIONS OF TECHNICAL SERVICE (U)
Counterintelligence technical services of the type conducted indicate the
technical security status of the area or equipment examined at the conclu-
sion of the examination, within the capabilities of the equipment utilized
and the operational techniques employed. Attention is invited to the fact
that the security afforded by this service WILL BE IMMEDIATELY
NULLIFIED BY:
a. Admission to the serviced area of persons who do not have the proper
security clearance or who are not under proper escort.
b. Failure to maintain continuous and effective surveillance and control
of the serviced area.
(CLASSIFICATION)
 (CLASSIFICATION)
c. Allowing repairs or alterations to or within the serviced area without
the supervision of qualified and responsible personnel.
d. The introduction of new furnishings or equipment into the serviced
area prior to a thorough inspection of such items.
e. Other limitations:
EXHIBIT II Page 2

(CLASSIFICATION)
 FM 30—17

APPENDIX D

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEY CHECKLIST

Note. The Provost Marshal's role in security is related to the prevention of

unauthorized entry, control of entry, circulation and exit of personnel and vehicles,
perimeter barriers and approach areas, protective lighting and alarm systems, pass
and badge systems, and prevention and detection of crime. To accomplish this
responsibility, Physical Security Surveys (PSS) are conducted periodically by Military
Police personnel. A copy of a PSS may be attached to the report of counterintelligence
survey, and appropriate references to the PSS should be incorporated into the report.
When the time lapse is extensive, or when there is no record of a prior PSS,
arrangements should be made to have a PSS conducted concurrently with the
counterintelligence survey (chap 10). In the event that this is not possible, FM 19-30,
contains a checklist that should be used by counterintelligence personnel conducting
the physical security portion of the survey.

Section I. PRELIMINARY CHECK

D—1. Topography ideologies not consistent with the best interest of

the United States or of the nations with which
Check the natural topographic features existing
at the periphery of the installation. the US enjoys an amicable relationship.
(4) Determine the crime rate. What types of
a. Determine whether these natural features
crimes predominate? Do these criminal acts pre-
have an adverse effect on the security of the in- sent threats to the security of the installation ?
stallation. Explain.
b. Check the area surrounding the installation
b. Determine whether these features can be uti- for any organization which may present threats
lized as deterrents to unauthorized entry. What to the security of the installation. Determine
additional physical security measures are neces-
whether there are any political, labor, fraternal,
sary for these features to be of value as bar- or social organizations which are engaged in ac-
riers ? tivities inimical to the best interests of our gov-
c. Determine whether potential intruders or ernment. Identify officials and members of such
espionage/sabotage agents can utilize these topo- organizations. What is their platform? Are they
graphic features as possible cover and conceal- supported by subversive organizations?
ment. What measures are necessary to deny use c. Check the industries essential to the function
of these features by potential intruders ?
of the installation ?

D—2. Surrounding Area ( 1 ) Are any of the industries essential to the

function of the installation?
a. Check the population surrounding the instal-
(2) Determine whether strikes and riots will
lation to determine whether there is any aspect
have adverse effects on the operations and secur-
that would have an adverse effect on the security
ity of the installation and how.
of the installation.
(1) Determine the ethnic derivation of the d. Check places of entertainment such as bars,
population. Do these people present any threat to restaurants, nightclubs located in the proximity
the security of the installation? of the installation.
(2) Determine whether there are any racial ( 1 ) Determine whether these places of enter-
problems. Will racial riots have adverse effects tainment are frequented by personnel of the in-
upon the security of the installation? stallation.
(3) Determine whether any group favors (2) Determine which of these establish-

D—1
FM 30-17

ments, if any, are known to cater to individuals (3) Determine whether these areas have
who harbor ideologies inimical to the best inter- been designated as restricted areas or off-limits
ests of our government. areas.
(3) Determine whether there have been
b. Determine the location of the motor pools.
known incidents in these establishments to solicit
information concerning the installation and/or its (1) Check whether they are properly safe-
activities. guarded. Are any areas designated for authorized
(4) Monitor establishments to determine personnel only?
whether military personnel discuss defense infor- (2) What types of vehicles are located in the
mation while on the premises. motor pools? Are vehicles frequently checked for
possible mechanical sabotage ?
D—3. Critical Areas
c. Determine whether airstrips and/or heli-
a. Determine the locations of such critical ports have been established.
areas as the communication centers, power trans-
former stations, fuel storage sites, POL dumps, (1) Check whether the installation has as-
and ammunition dumps. signed aircraft and pilots.
(1) Check the measures taken to protect (2) Are aircraft properly safeguarded?
these areas. (3) Are airstrips and/or heliports clearly
(2) Determine their relationship to, and dis- designated? If there are neither, determine
tance from, sensitive areas. whether there are large enough areas.

Section II. HISTORY AND SENSITIVITY OF THE INSTALLATION

D—4. D-7.
a. Examine the history of the installation. Consider the vulnerability of the location of the
installation and what effect the surrounding ele-
b. Check the history of the installation as it
ments have upon its security, based on factors de-
pertains to the construction of tunnels, caves,
veloped in section I above.
sewers, underground facilities, entrances and
exits, or any other construction that would have
D-8.
an adverse effect on the security of an installa-
tion. Consider the classification of the information
stored, used, and created at the installation.
D-5.
WTiat is the mission of the installation being sur- D—9.
veyed? Is it classified or unclassified, and is it of Determine the number of like installations that
long or short duration? How does the mission are capable of absorbing the functions of the sur-
contribute to the defense effort? Is the mission veyed installation if it were destroyed.
extremely sensitive or nonsensitive?
D—10.
D—6.
Determine the overall importance of the installa-
Determine the cost of replacement. tion commander and examine higher command or
DA policy to establish a partial basis for the de-
a. What would it cost in terms of money, man-
termination. Evaluate items in paragraphs 4
power, material, and time to replace this installa-
through 9, above. It is extremely important that
tion if it were destroyed ?
this determination be made prior to the survey so
b. How would this affect the defense effort? that feasible recommendations may be rendered.
 FM 30-17

Section III. SECURITY OF INFORMATION

D—11/ Amount of Classified Documents and protection as required for at least the highest cat-
Material egory of information in any of the containers?
Consider the overall classification of a compila-
many linear feet of each category of classi-
tion of the material that would be available to
fiec| information are stored in the surveyed instal-
anyone gaining access to the record of combina-
lation ?
tions.
D— ll?. Message Center f. Has the dissemination of combinations been
held to the minimum consistent with efficient op-
Is a message center used for distribution of all in-
erations? Explain.
coming'.correspondence and dispatch of all outgo-
ing correspondence? If so : g. Is a properly completed part 1 of DA Form
727 (Classified Container Information) affixed to
a. How many personnel are employed in the
the outside of each container in which classified
message center?
information is stored? Check for accuracy.
b. In relation to the classification of informa-
h. Are all personnel listed on part 1 of DA
tion handled, are the message center personnel
Form 727 currently responsible for the security
adequately cleared ?
of the container on which the form is posted ?
c. Is the message center declared a Restricted
i. Is part 2 of DA Form 727 properly executed
Area? If so who is authorized access? What
and attached to an envelope containing the com-
identification system is used?
bination recorded on part 3 of DA Form 727?
d. What storage facilities are available in the Have these been filed in a central location at the
message center? next higher echelon ? Where ?
f. How much information of a classified nature j. Is part 3 of DA Form 727 placed in an
is stored in the message center ? opaque envelope? Is it possible to read the combi-
nation through the envelope? Is the envelope
D—13. Storage Facilities sealed?
a. How are SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL k. Is part 3 of DA Form 727 classified at least
materials stored? Describe the containers to in- as high as the highest category of defense infor-
clude size, weight, type of locking device, and ap- mation stored in the container? Consider the
proximate delay time. need for a higher classification due to the effect
of a compilation of the information in the con-
b. If containers with steel locking bars and
tainer.
hasps are used (as an interim measure until re-
quired containers are received), are the hasps ad- I. Is the envelope containing part 3 of DA
equately secured to the containers? Are the lock- Form 727 marked with the same classification as
ing bars attached to the containers in such a way the form inclosed?
that material cannot be removed from the draw-
m. What procedure is followed to insure that
ers when the container is locked ?
combinations are not written on calendar pads or
c. If a field safe is used for storage, is it se- carried in wallets?
cured to the building or guarded to prevent unau- n. Is a properly executed DA Form 672 (Safe
thorized removal? Describe the safe and locking or Cabinet Security Record) affixed to each con-
device. tainer in which classified information is stored?
d. When, or under what circumstances, are Check for accuracy. (Note any discrepancies
combinations to combination locks used on classi- found on DA Form 672.)
fied containers changed ? o. Is an entry made on DA Form 672 each time
e. Is an up-to-date record of all safe combina- the container is opened and closed? Do the ini-
tions maintained in a central location, together tials in the "UNLOCKED BY" column coincide
with information necessary to identify and locate with the names listed on part 2 of DA Form 727
all containers? If so, where? Who has access to as having knowledge of the combination?
the combinations? Are the combinations afforded p. Is the person who checked the container at

D—3
FM 30-17

the end of the day different from the person who /. Does the register indicate how documents en-
locked the container? tered therein were disposed of (receipt, dispatch,
downgrading, destruction) ?
q. Is the container checked every working day,
even if it has not been opened? g. Is the register current and accurate? Spot
check 5 to 20 percent of the documents entered.
r. If a container remains open, is it attended by
a properly cleared, responsible person? Explain. h. Are all documents originated by the unit en-
tered in the register and is there disposition indi-
s. When a container equipped with combination
cated ?
padlock (interim arrangement) remains open
during duty hours, how is the padlock safe-
D— 15. Receipting
guarded ?
Is SECRET material, CONFIDENTIAL ma-
t. Are containers in which classified informa- terial, if required (local policy will dictate proce-
tion is NOT to be stored clearly marked with in-
dure), covered by a receipt? Explain the system
structions to this effect if prescribed by local se- used.
curity SOP? Explain.
b. What receipt form is used? Is a file copy re-
u. Are personnel aware of the action required
tained for all classified documents sent out of the
when a container is found open and unattended unit?
after duty hours or classified material is found
unattended and out of a container? Query per- c. Is the unit making proper use of DA Forms
sonnel and report results. 631 (Classified Multiple Document Receipt or
Tracer), 1203 (Classified Document Mail Control
v. When removed from the installation is clas- Record and Receipt), and 1204 (Classified Docu-
sified material kept under personnel physical con- ment Receipt and/or Tracer) ? Explain.
trol of authorized personnel at all times or se-
cured in the type of storage facility required by d. Do receipt forms contain any classified infor-
the particular classification? mation ? Spot check.
w. How is information annotated "FOR OFFI- e. If all receipt forms have not been returned
CIAL USE ONLY" stored? for documents sent out of the unit, have they
been traced through use of proper forms? Report
x. Are NATO, CENTO, or SE ATO documents results of any tracers sent out since the last sur-
clearly identified and segregated from US docu- vey of inspection.
ments in storage?
f. Are receipt forms being disposed of in ac-
D—14. Classified Document Register cordance with AR 340-18-series (file # 504-08)
a. Is a classified document register maintained or AR 340-2 (file # 501- ) ? Explain.
for classified material charged to the unit sur- g. Who is designated to receipt for classified
veyed? (Dependent on local policy, a register material that is received by surveyed units?
may or may not be maintained for CONFIDEN-
TIAL and SECRET material.) Describe the reg- D-16. Dissemination
ister utilized for such material.
a. Are supervisory officials taking proper steps
b. Does the register bear an overall classifica- to prevent unauthorized dissemination of classi-
tion based on the presence of classified informa- fied information? Explain.
tion contained therein rather than on the pres-
b. Is a conscious effort made by holders of clas-
ence of references to classified information? Spot
check for accuracy. sified documents to insure that requesters have
proper clearance and a bona fide need-to-know?
c. Are individual pages of the register classi-
c. Do requesters of classified information in-
fied according to the classification of long titles
sure that they have a proper clearance and ac-
contained thereon? Spot check for accuracy.
tually need the information in the performance
d. Do the entries fully identify the documents? of their official duties?
Cross check the register entries with documents.
d. Are classified document cover sheets used to
e. Who is responsible for maintaining the reg- cover classified documents when they are out of
ister? Who has access to the register? containers and not being used?

D—4
 FM 30-17

e. How are requirements for safeguarding cer- sion are used? (Mail, courier. Armed Forces Cou-
tain documents from foreign nationals being im- rier Service, State Department?)
plemented ?
b. What receipt form is used? How are docu-
/. Is classified material removed from contain- ments accounted for while in transit?
ers at night for work purposes? If so, what prov-
c. If classified material is mailed, is the double
isions for proper safeguarding are in effect?
envelope system properly used? Is a file of Post
g. Are individuals within the unit required to Office Department Registry receipts maintained?
leave a receipt for classified information they re- d. If a courier is used to transmit classified ma-
move from containers? If so, what receipt form terial, does he have a clearance at least as high as
is used? Who controls the documents within the the information entrusted to him?
various offices of the unit?
e. Is the classified material adequately pro-
D—17. Preparation of Reproduction tected from view when carried by the courier?
How?
a. Is any classified material originated in the
unit surveyed? If so, do responsible officials have /. How is material prepared for transmittal by
written authority to classify? Include details. Armed Forces Courier Service or State Depart-
ment diplomatic pouch?
b. Are persons using, extracting from, reprod-
ucing, incorporating, or responding to informa- D-19. Classification and Marking
tion already classified, carrying out their obliga-
tions to apply the classification decisions deter- a. Do files or groups of physically connected
mined by the originating authority? Explain. documents bear the overall classification of the
highest classified components? Consider the ef-
c. Are documents classified according to their fect of a compilation on the overall classification.
own content?
b. Are letters of transmittal classified as high
d. Are cotton, rayon, silk, and paper typewriter as the highest classified inclosure? If the letter
ribbons properly handled when used to prepare of transmittal contains no classified information,
classified material? How? are regarding instructions included?

e. Are stencils containing classified information c. Are extracts or portions of classified docu-
properly handled? How? ments properly marked with the security classifi-
cation? Spot check.
/. If Verifax, Thermo-Fax, or photostatic re-
producing processes are used for classified infor- d. Is the defense classification of paragraphs,
mation, what precautions are taken to insure that sections, chapters, indorsements, annexes, inclo-
master copies, negatives, waste, etc. are properly sures, subjects or titles properly indicated? Spot
protected ? check.

g. If a printing press is used for reproducing e. Is the defense classification of documents

classified material, how are matrices, master cop- properly indicated? Spot check.
ies, excess copies, waste, etc., protected from un- /. Are documents and paragraphs containing
authorized disclosure? RESTRICTED DATA or FORMERLY RES-
TRICTED DATA properly marked? Spot check.
h. What protective measures are in effect to in-
sure that carbon paper used in preparing classi- g. Do the prescribed special handling notices
fied information is properly stored and pro- appear on documents that must not be released to
tected ? foreign nationals? Spot check.
i. Are drafts of documents containing classified h. How are photographs, films, recordings,
information properly protected? Explain in de- charts, maps and drawings containing classified
tail. information marked?
i. How is the classification indicated on mate-
D—18. Transmission rial, products, or their containers?
a. Is classified material transmitted outside the j. How is material for training purposes
unit surveyed? If so, what methods of transmis- marked? Spot check.

D—5
FM 30-17

k. Do ail reproductions of classified material i. Note any discrepancies found in the destruc-
bear the same markings as the original? Spot tion certificates.
check. j. How is classified material destroyed?
I. Are transmitíais of investigative reports con-
taining counterintelligence information annotated D—22. Emergency Plan
in accordance with AR 381-130 if transmitted a. Destruction (in overseas areas).
outside intelligence channels? Spot check.
(1) Are these provisions for emergency de-
struction of classified material stored by the unit
D—20. Regrading and Dedassification
surveyed? Explain.
a. What procedure is being used for prompt re- (2) Have specific responsibilities been as-
view of all classified documents for regrading signed to individuals for implementation of the
purposes? emergency destruction plan? Identify the person-
b. Are regrading instructions placed on all nel. Are they aware of their responsibilities and
classified documents? the provisions of the emergency plan?
c. How are holders of classified documents in- (3) What facilities are available for emer-
formed of nonautomatic regrading instructions? gency destruction?
d. Have documents been properly regraded ac- (4) Where are the collection points located?
cording to the automatic or nonautomatic regrad- (5) Is a system of priority marking of docu-
ing instructions? Spot check 5 to 20 percent of ments and material utilized in the unit? Explain.
the documents on hand. b. Evacuation.
e. Do regraded or declassified documents bear ( 1 ) Are there provisions for emergency evac-
proper authentication when required? Spot uation of classified material stored by the unit
check. surveyed ? Explain.
/. If the unit has regraded or declassified origi- (2) Have specific responsibilities been as-
nal document, are recipients of the original dis- signed to individuals for implementation of the
tribution notified? How? emergency evacuation? Identify the personnel.
Are they aware of their responsibilities and the
g. How is authority obtained for regrading doc-
provisions of the emergency plan?
uments deemed incorrectly classified?
(3) What vehicles or facilities are available
h. How is material designated FOR OFFICIAL
for emergency evacuation ?
USE ONLY marked?
(4) Where are the collection points located?
(5) Is a system of priority marking of docu-
D—21. Destruction
ments and material utilized in the unit? Explain.
a. Who is the person authorized to destroy clas-
sified material? Cite the authority. D—23. Procedure for Handling TOP SECRET
b. Who is selected to serve as a disinterested The following will apply only if the unit sur-
witness to destruction? Is he truly disinterested? veyed stores or handles TOP SECRET informa-
Explain. tion or material.
c. Do the destruction officer and witness meet а. Have a Top Secret Control Officer and an Al-
the criteria established by AR 380-5? ternate Top Secret Control Officer been appointed
d. Is the witness for SECRET destruction on competent orders? Identify them and cite the
named on orders? paragraph number, orders number, date, and
e. Are appropriate records of destruction main- issuing headquarters.
tained? Who keeps them? Is the authority for б. Does the Top Secret Control Officer maintain
destruction cited?? a current roster of all personnel authorized ac-
/. Cross check the certificates of destruction cess to TOP SECRET material ? Include a copy if
with the classified documents register to see that available.
they are accurate. Does the register reflect all de- c. How is transfer of accountability accom-
structions ? plished upon change of Top Secret Control
g. Is a record made of destruction of CONFI- Officer?
DENTIAL material? Explain. d. Does the Top Secret Control Officer maintain
h. If a classified title is used, does the certifi- a permanent register of DA Form 2133 (TOP
cate of destruction bear the proper marking? SECRET Control Record) or DA Form 455 (Mail

D—6
 FM 30-17

and Document Register), as appropriate, reflect- (Note. Personnel on orders, such as the TOP SE-
ing receipt, dispatch, downgrading, or destruction CRET custodian, do not have to sign the form since access
of all TOP SECRET material for which he is res- is assumed.)
ponsible? Check all for accuracy. r. Explain in detail any discrepancies revealed
in the last annual inventory of TOP SECRET
e. Using the register, account for all TOP SE-
material.
CRET material in the unit.
f. How is the transfer or receipt of TOP SE- D—24. Procedures for Handling Registered
CRET material documented? Documents and Material
g. Are all copies of TOP SECRET documents a. Has a custodian of registered documents
properly numbered for accounting purposes? Ex- been appointed on competent orders? Does he
plain. possess a TOP SECRET clearance? Identify the
custodian and cite the paragraph, orders number,
h. Are results of annual inventory reported
date, and issuing headquarters of the orders ap-
through channels to the major command or DA
pointing him.
agency on or about 1 April each year? How is
this accomplished? Check file copy(ies). b. If an alternate custodian is appointed, in-
clude the same information as required for the
i. How is TOP SECRET material transmitted
in the clear? How is it transmitted when en- custodian.
crypted ? c. If there has been a change in custodians, has
a transfer certificate been accomplished? Spot
j. How is the TOP SECRET material stored?
Explain. check.

k. If a guard is used, is he properly cleared? d. Was an annual report of possession made as

How is he armed? of 1 April ? Check file copy.
e. Are references to registered documents in re-
I. Does the TOP SECRET register reflect de-
struction of any TOP SECRET material? If so, ports of destruction by short title, register num-
ber, and date, only? Spot check all documents.
are the number and date of the destruction certif-
icate included? /. Is DA Form 454 (Semiannual
m. How is the TOP SECRET material de- Inventory/Report of Transfer of non-Army Reg-
istered Documents) used for all transfers, or re-
stroyed ?
ports of semiannual inventory of registered docu-
n. Who destroys the TOP SECRET material? ments ?
Who witnesses the destruction? Do these person-
nel meet the requirements established by AR g. Are the DA Forms 454 properly executed
and distributed? Check all of them.
380-5? Is the witness named on orders? Explain.
h. Is a proper receipt of DA Form 454 in the
o. Is each TOP SECRET document entered in-
place of any registered document charged to the
dividually on the destruction certificate? Are the
unit but not physically present?
destruction certificates serially numbered in an-
nual series for accounting purposes? Are DA i. Do all documents in which a long title ap-
Forms 546 (Destruction of Classified Records) pears bear a classification equivalent to the de-
and 1207 (Record of Destruction for Classified fense information contained in the long title?
Messages) used to record the destruction of TOP Spot check.
SECRET documents? j. Are registered documents destroyed on re-
p. Do all TOP SECRET documents have proper ceipt of authority from the Adjutant General?
instructions regarding reproduction? Is proper k. Are copies of destruction certificates fur-
authority obtained prior to extracting material nished the office of record?
from a TOP SECRET document? Explain.
I. How are registered documents stored? Must
q. Are all TOP SECRET documents covered by be stored according to security classification as
a properly executed DA Form 969 (Top Secret prescribed in AR 380-5.
Document Record)? Does the DA Form 969
clearly identify the document to which attached? m. Conduct a check to insure that all pages of
Does the DA Form 969 reflect the names of ALL registered documents are physically present.
persons having access to the document and the n. Did the last semiannual inventory reveal any
date of such access? discrepancies? If so, explain in detail.

D—7
FM 30-17

D—25. Procedures for Handling RESTRICTED c. Are all RESTRICTED DATA or FOR-
DATA MERLY RESTRICTED DATA classified at least
The following will apply only if the unit sur- CONFIDENTIAL?
veyed stores or handles RESTRICTED DATA.
d. How are the RESTRICTED DATA docu-
a. Are semiannual physical inventories of TOP
SECRET documents containing RESTRICTED ments marked?
DATA submitted as of 30 June and 31 Decem-
ber? Check to be sure. e. Is each paragraph containing RESTRICTED
b. What action will be taken in the event of DATA or FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
compromise or possible compromise? properly annotated?

Section IV. PERSONNEL SECURITY

D—26. Key Personnel e. Are clearances properly executed on DA

Form 873 (Certificate of Clearance and/or Secur-
a. Identify (name, rank/grade, SSN) the key
ity Determination under ED 10450) ? Spot check.
personnel, to include the commander, deputy com-
mander, and any staff officers whose functions f. Who executes the clearance certificates?
have a direct bearing upon security. Show the de-
g. Does the person authorized to grant clear-
gree of clearance and time each has held his pre-
ances possess a TOP SECRET clearance him-
sent position.
self?
b. Identify any other persons considered essen-
h. Does the "Remarks" section of clearance
tial to the efficient operations of the unit, includ-
certificates reflect the results of any reviews con-
ing the person's qualifications, degree of clear-
ducted ?
ance, and time in this position.
i. How frequently are clearances reviewed?
c. Identify the Installation Intelligence Officer
(HO) and the Installation Security Control j. Is a security oath attached to each interim
Officer (SCO). and final cryptologie clearance certificate?
(1) Indicate the date, paragraph number, k. What criteria or prerequisites must be met
and issuing headquarters of the orders appoint- for issuance of a clearance? Spot check 5 to 20
ing the IIO and the SCO. percent of the personnel records to substantiate
(2) What are the qualifications of the IIO that appropriate investigation was conducted in
and SCO? accordance with AR 604-5.

(3) Do the IIO and the SCO have additional I. Is a copy of the request for clearance or re-
duties that tend to hinder or interfere with the quest for PSI maintained in the personnel rec-
performance of their duties as IIO or SCO ? If so, ords of the individuals concerned to prevent du-
explain them. plicate requests?
(4) Identify the IIO and SCO assistants, to m. What system is used to insure cancellation
include qualifications and time in the position. of investigations when the SUBJECT is trans-
ferred, discharged, or for any reason has no need
D—27. Personnel Security Clearances for a clearance?
Administration n. Are final and interim clearances entered on
a. Who maintains the roster of cleared person- the appropriate form in the individual's person-
nel? nel records? (DA Forms 20 and 66)
b. What information is included in the roster? o. Are the clearances in accordance with exist-
ing policies and directives?
c. List any personnel who have access pending
p. Are separate name files maintained on mili-
clearance. Indicate the degree of access and na-
tary and civilian personnel on whom investiga-
ture of their duties.
tions are pending under AR 604-10 and AR
d. Who maintains certificates of clearance? 690-1, respectively?

D—8
 FM 30-17

q. Is there a checklist or SOP to insure proper j. Does the debriefing process incorporate posi-
handling or processing of security risks? De- tive instructions to preclude release of classified
scribe it. defense information to unauthorized persons?
r. Are all records of military personnel consid- k. Is a copy of the Attorney General's list of
ered a security risk properly flagged ? Who main- organizations whose interests are in conflict with
tains the DA Forms 268 (Report for Suspension those of the United States posted conspicuously?
of Favorable Personnel Action) ?
I. Are all appropriate personnel receiving a
s. Are the records of all newly assigned person- SAEDA orientation? (AR 381-12)
nel screened to insure a valid DD Form 98
m. Are all appropriate military and DAC per-
(Armed Forces Security Questionnaire) ? Spot
sonnel receiving an orientation on the threat
check.
posed by, and procedure to counter, use of clan-
t. Is the number of clearances in excess of the destine listening devices by hostile agencies?
minimum consistent with the needs of the com- (AR 381-14)
mander concerned to carry out his mission?
D—29. Emergency Plan
D—28. Security Education Does the installation have an emergency plan
Is there a formal training program for security? with provisions for action in case of enemy at-
If so: tack, disaster, dispersion, evacuation, blackout,
air raid, riots, or civil disturbances?
a. How often is training conducted? Who con-
ducts the training? a. Are all personnel familiar with the provi-
sions of this plan?
b. What subjects are included in security train-
ing? b. Have practice alerts been held to test the ef-
fectiveness of the plan and the proficiency of per-
c. What is the average length of the training
sonnel in implementing it? When was the last
lecture ?
practice alert? What were the results?
d. Is attendance mandatory at security training
c. Is there an SOP for dissemination of air raid
lectures? How is attendance insured?
warning messages? Explain.
e. Is a current and correct local security policy
d. Are personnel familiar with this SOP and
in published form available to all personnel ?
the audible air raid signal?
Does it contain sufficient details and references?
Are all personnel required to read and become fa- e. Does the emergency plan include procedures
miliar with the policy? How is this enforced? for maintaining security during an emergency?
f. Are security posters available ? If so :
D—30. Morale
(1) Are they adequate in number and em-
phasis? Where are they used? a. Based upon interviews and observations, is
there any indication of low morale? Explain.
(2) Do the posters contain "eye appeal"?
b. If there are indications of low morale, deter-
(3) How frequently are security posters
mine the cause or source.
changed ?
c. Has there been any trouble of a racial, reli-
(4) Where are security posters produced?
gious, labor or political nature traceable to any
g. Are personnel required to read Army Regu- source or reason of security significance? Ex-
lations pertaining to security periodically? How plain.
often? Hpw is this enforced?
d. Is there a labor union or organization repre-
h. What type security orientation is given sented by employees of the installation? If so, in-
newly hired or assigned personnel? Who con- dicate the name and address of the local head-
ducts this orientation? quarters.
i. What debriefing program is utilized for per- e. Have there been any instances which appear
sonnel terminating their assignment or employ- to involve intentional or deliberate work delays
ment? by personnel ? If so, explain in detail.

D-9
FM 30-17

f. Is a record maintained of continuous or re- b. What is the organization of the

peated spoilage, negligence, errors in judgment, installation/activity? (Include a chart if applica-
or similar instances that may cover subtle sabo- ble.)
tage? Include an explanation of any such occur-
rences on record. ' c. How many foreign nationals are
employed/assigned to the installation/activity?
g. Are there any records of indications of dis-
affection? Explain and give details. (1) Do any foreign nationals engage in clas-
sified work or have access to classified informa-
h. Is there an excessive amount of absenteeism tion? How many?
among civilian employees? If so, what is the
cause? (2) Indicate the date, degree of access, and
approving authority of the authorization for ac-
i. Is a record kept of monthly absenteeism? cess.
Spot check to determine if any individual is ab-
sent an excessive amount of time. (3) Are any of the foreign nationals em-
ployed members of or in sympathy with subver-
j. Is the monthly turnover excessive? If so, is sive organizations or activities? If so, give de-
it traceable to any reason or source of security tails.
significance? Explain.
d. Have requirements of AR 604-20 been met
D—31. Personnel Security, General for individuals engaged in information and edu-
cation work? Spot check.
a. How many personnel are employed/assigned
at the installation/activity? Give a breakdown of e. Have requirements of AR 50-3 been met for
officers, enlisted men, and civilians. individuals with nuclear weapon responsibilities?

Section V. C<

D—32. Cort|munications System connecting boxes, cables, etc., protected and fre-
quently inspected for indications of wiretapping?
a. What is the primary means of communica-
How?
tions utilized on the installation?
(12) Is auxiliary power available in the event
b. What additional systems are used? of a power failure? Explain.
D—33. Security Measures (13) Are auxiliary parts available for re-
pairs?
a. Does the installatiôn have its own telephone
system or does it use a commercial system? If it (14) What measures are taken to prevent dis-
has its own system : cussion of classified information over the tele-
phone ?
( 1 ) Where are switchboards located ?
b. Is there an approved circuit on the installa-
(2) Are switchboards adequately guarded?
tion?
(3) Have switchboards been declared Res-
( 1 ) Who was the approving authority ?
tricted Areas ?
(2) Describe the approved circuit.
(4) Are operators civilian or military?
(3) What parties are connected by the cir-
(5) If civilian, how are they procured?
cuits?
(6) Are operators cleared? To what degree?
(4) When and by whom is the circuit in-
(7) Are maintenance personnel civilian or spected for sabotage or tapping?
military?
(5) What preventive measures are taken to
(8) If civilian, how are they procured? secure the circuit?
(9) Are maintenance personnel cleared? To c. If the installation uses a commercial tele-
what degree ?
phone system :
(10) Are lines overhead or underground? ( 1 ) What company provides the service ?
(11) Are open wires, terminal boxes, cross (2) What measures are taken to prevent dis-

D—10
 FM 30-17

cussion of classified information over the tele- (3) Has the message center been declared a
phone? Restricted Area? Give details.
(3) What measures are taken to prevent or (4) Are message center personnel military
detect wiretapping? or civilian? If civilian, where and how are they
(4) When were previous CI technical sur- procured ?
veys or inspections conducted ? (5) Are the message center personnel
cleared? To what degree? Is this sufficient for
d. Does the installation/activity have radio the category of information handled?
communications? If so :
(6) Is someone on duty in the message center
(1) What type information is sent by radio? all times? Give details.
If classified, are code systems available? Has it
been approved by USASA ? (7) What category of classified information
is handled in the message center?
(2) Are the operators familiar with security
requirements of radio transmissions ? (8) What storage facilities are available?
(9) How is distribution made by the message
e. Is teletype or telegraph used on the installa- center? Individual pickup, courier, delivery sys-
tion ? If so : tem?
( 1 ) Where is it located ?
j. Does the installation/activity utilize a courier
(2) What security measures are taken to in- service ?
sure that classified information is not sent in the
(1) Are the couriers military or civilian?
clear?
(2) Are the couriers cleared? To what de-
/. What measures are taken to insure that op- gree?
erators are adequately cleared ?
(3) What category of classified material is
g. When are inspections conducted by USASA? carried by the couriers?
(4) Are couriers armed? With what
h. Describe other communications media used
weapon ?
on the installation. Include the safety precautions
exercised to prevent unauthorized disclosure of (5) What transportation is utilized by the
classified information. couriers ?
(6) Are couriers familiar with procedures to
i. Does the installation/activity have a message
be followed in an emergency, such as an at-
center ? If so :
tempted or actual theft of classified material, ve-
( 1 ) Where is the message center located ? hicular accident, or other incident(s) ?
(2) Give a detailed description of the mes- k. What provisions for communications in the
sage center, including measures taken to secure it event of an emergency have been made ? Describe
from unauthorized access. in detail.

Section VI. UTILITIES

D—34. Electricity power received sufficient to provide an ample re-

serve beyond the peak load demand ?
a. What is the source of the electrical power
for the installation/activity ? (4) Where is (are) the primary transformer
station(s) ? How are they protected?
b. If purchased from a commercial source : (5) Where are substations? How are they
(1) Does power enter the installation protected ?
through underground cable or overhead lines? (6) Who is responsible for maintenance of
Where do the lines enter the installation ? the power system ?
(2) What measures are taken to protect the (7) How frequently and by whom is the
power lines from tampering or sabotage? power system checked and inspected ?
(3) What is the peak load demand? Is the c. If power is generated on the installation :

D—11
FM 30-17

(1) Where is (are) the powerhouse(s) ? e. What is the water demand on the installa-
(2) How are they protected from unautho- tion?
rized access/sabotage ? f. Is the source adequate when compared to the
(3) Is the amount of power generated suffi- demand?
cient to provide an ample reserve beyond the
peak load demand ? g. What is the water pressure on the mains?
(4) Where are the substations? How are h. Are pumping stations protected? How?
they protected ? Where are they located ?
(5) Who is responsible for maintenance of 1 Are the pumps frequently inspected? When?
the power system ? By whom ?
(6) When and by whom is the power system j. Are mains, control valves, by-pass valves
checked and inspected ? protected ? How ?
(7) Explain any other measures to protect
k. How often is water tested for purification?
the power system from sabotage.
By whom ? How is the test made?
d. What is the emergency power supply? Can I. Is an emergency water source available? De-
it be actuated immediately? scribe it to include location, capacity, potability.
(1) What activities are supplied with emer-
m. What type sewer system is used? Does it
gency power? Is the emergency source sufficient
appear adequate for the needs of the
to provide the key facilities with electricity ?
installation/activity ?
(2) Who is responsible for emergency
power? Include maintenance and inspection. D-36. Heat
(3) Is the emergency power source located in
a. What is the source of heat for activities on
a secure area? Describe.
the installation/activity?
e. Is there a main blackout switch on the b. Is central heating provided? If so, where are
installation/activity? Who controls it? How is it the plants located and how are they protected ?
protected ? Where is it located ?
c. Is the heating system periodically inspected?
When, by whom ?
D—35. Water
d. Who is responsible for the heating system?
a. What is the source of water for the
Are maintenance personnel cleared if they are to
installation/activity ?
have access to sensitive areas?
b. Is the source reasonably safe ? Explain. e. Is there an emergency heating system? De-
c. If a public source is used, what is the diame- scribe it in detail.
ter of the main and where does it enter the /. Where is fuel procured ? Is it inspected to de-
installation/activity ? tect contamination? When, by whom? How is it
d. If a private system, reservoir, or tank is stored ? Where ?
used, what is its capacity, water level, pressure, g. If rooms are individually heated, what pre-
and condition? How is it secured? cautionary measures are taken to prevent fires?

Section VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

D—37. Recommendations to continue, and solutions must be presented to

Careful consideration must be given to recom- correct them. Positive and concrete recommenda-
mendations that are presented to the commander tions as opposed to suggestions should always be
during the final briefing and when written in the used.
Counterintelligence Survey Report. Recommenda-
tions must be feasible, realistic, and consistent D-38. Inspections
with the overall sensitivity and importance of the
installation or activity. Deficiencies in security All items listed under Security of Information
should be concisely stated in pointing out what and Personnel Security may be used in a Counter-
effect they may have on the command if allowed intelligence Inspection.

D—12
 FM 30-17

APPENDIX E

NARCOTIC AND DRUG ABUSE GUIDE

E—1. General of time. Amphetamines are prescribed for over-

weight patients, to reduce their appetites ; in
Narcotic investigations should only be handled by
cases of narcolepsy, a disorder characterized by
Criminal Investigators of the USACIDC within
an overwhelming desire for sleep; for Parkin-
the Army establishment except under exceptional
son's disease ; and in some cases of minor mental
circumstances which involve high level national
depression. Because the body develops a tolerance
security. Such instances should be coordinated at
to amphetamines, abusers increase their dosages
the highest practical level to determine if the
gradually, which exaggerates the normal effects of
case should continue under military intelligence
these drugs and results in excitability, talkative-
jurisdiction, military police jurisdiction, or joint
ness, and can cause dryness of mouth, bad breath,
auspices.
tremor of the hands, enlarged pupils and heavy
perspiration. Delusions and hallucinations can
E—2. Application occur if used in a large quantity. In serious cases,
The most common instances when military intel- a drug psychosis resembling schizophrenia devel-
ligence Special Agents will require some knowl- ops with a psychic or emotional dependence on
edge of narcotics are : these drugs. Continued abuse of amphetamines can
cause a person to exhibit dangerous, aggressive,
a. Inductees who have qualified their DD Form
antisocial behavior. Its physiological effects in-
398 as pertaining to the use of narcotics.
clude high blood pressure, abnormal heart rhy-
b. When polygraph tracings indicate the use of thms, and even heart attacks.
a narcotic.
b. Depressants. This group includes the barbi-
c. In routine or complaint type investigations turates, the most widely abused among the de-
where witnesses indicate the subject has used pressants. Barbiturates depress the central ner-
drugs and a subject interview becomes necessary. vous system and are prescribed in small doses to
d. When a human source has unexplained relieve tension or to induce sleep. They are also
lapses of memory or other peculiar characteris- valuable in cases of acute anxiety, hyperthyroid-
tics are demonstrated. ism, epilepsy, and high blood pressure. Because
of their sedative but nonanalgesic effects, barbitu-
e. During the conduct of a special investigation rates are used in treating both physical and men-
involving unexplained affluence or indebtedness tal illnesses. Continued and excessive dosages of
of a person in a sensitive or critical position re- barbiturates result in slurring of speech, stagger-
quiring a security clearance. ing, loss of balance and falling, quick temper, di-
lated pupils, and a quarrelsome disposition. Over-
E—3. Pharmacology of Drugs doses, particularly when taken in conjunction
Drugs are normally subdivided into four basic with alcohol result in unconsciousness and death,
categories—depressants, stimulants, hallucino- unless given proper medical treatment. While an
gens and narcotics—and each have general char- unsteady gait and speech problems mây be signs
acteristics of their own within these basic group- of neurological disorders, such as multiple sclero-
ings. sis, such diseases are uncommon among young
men. Usually, the appearance of drunkenness
a. Stimulants. This group of drugs, which in- without an alcoholic breath indicates barbiturate
cludes the amphetamines, directly stimulates the intoxication but it must also be noted that many
central nervous system, producing excitation, diseases will manifest such an appearance ; there-
alertness, increased initiative and activity, and an fore, this should only be used as an indicator. Al-
ability to go without sleep for protracted periods though physical dependence does not develop

E—1
 FM 30-17

with the dosages normally used in medical prac- panic. This variability of hallucinogenic drug ef-
tice, it does occur with the excessive doses used fect is a definite danger to users. The spontaneous
by drug abusers. A tolerance is also developed. occurrence of "flash backs" of prior hallucina-
Withdrawal symptoms usually are far more dan- tions is another harmful effect of certain hallu-
gerous than those resulting from narcotics with- cinogens, particularly LSD.
drawal. In addition to the strictly depressant
drugs, another group of drugs, tranquilizers, par- d. Narcotics. This group of drugs consists of
ticularly those in the phenothiazine derivative opium, coca leaves, as well as any preparation,
group, are frequently sought after and abused. salts and compounds of these, and synthetics de-
While they will not cause sleep except in high rived from these basic drugs. Narcotics are used
dosages, and are not purely depressive or stimula- medically to relieve pain and produce sleep or
tory, they will impair an individual's judgment drowsiness. Heroin and codeine, both of which
even to the point of complete disregard for any are derivatives of opium, are the most common
applicable security requirements. drugs in this category. Heroin is found in varying
shades from snow white to light brown, is odor-
c. Hallucinogens. This group consists of the less, and has a bitter taste; however, suspicious
so-called psychotomimetic agents, and are so white powders should not be tasted by any Spe-
named because they may produce hallucinations cial Agent as a check on the narcotic. Heroin is
or illusions of the various senses. When experi- usually taken intravenously (mainlined) but it
encing an hallucination or illusion, a person's can also be taken orally or by inhalation. An ad-
ability to perceive is based not upon objective re- dict or user who mainlines normally will have in
ality but upon distortion or imagination. Most of his possession, or accessible, the "paraphernalia"
the hallucinogenic drugs, such as lysergic acid necessary for mainlining. This normally includes
diethylamide (LSD), in illicit channels of distri- a spoon with a bent handle, matches, medicine
bution are manufactured in clandestine laborator- dropper, hypodermic needle, and maybe a rubber
ies. Legitimate chemical manufacturers do prod- tube which he will use as a tourniquet to make
uce some of the hallucinogenic drugs, but only for his vein stand out for easier injections. Dosage
investigational purposes. Some of these drugs can begin as small as 2mg a day and work up to
have been diverted to the illicit market through 450mg a day. The mere possesssion of parapherna-
thefts of illegal purchases. Although openly and lia will give civilian police and CIDC "probable
irresponsibly promoted as a means of expanding cause" to detain the suspect. An addict or user on
consciousness, the hallucinogens have yet to be heroin can manifest the following symptoms:
proven valuable medically. Hence, there are nei- lethargy, drowsiness, constricted pupils, itchi-
ther standard dosage forms nor markings which ness, constipation, upset stomach, watering eyes,
make visual identification possible. Illicit labora- runny nose. With hard narcotics, there are four
tories produce hallucinogens in the form of cap- " factors which will cause addiction. These factors
sules, tablets, powders, or liquids, which peddlers are :
and users often disguise in common personal ( 1 ) Compulsion—desire for the drug.
items, such as sugar cubes, candy, paper, aspirin,
(2) Tolerance—the increasing limits of con-
jewelry, liquor, cloth, or even postage stamps.
sumption.
Usually hallucinogens distort or intensify the
user's sense perceptions and lessen his ability to (3) Physical—the craving for the drug
discriminate between fact and fantasy. A user which will result in withdrawals when taken
may speak of "seeing" sound and "hearing" col- away.
ors. He will appear to be in a trance-like state, (4) Psychological—the belief that the drug
and will have an increase in heart rate, blood is necessary.
sugar and blood pressure. His pupils are dilated
and sensitive to light. Perceptual changes in all E-4. Indicators
senses may occur, and he may become fearful and a. Since drugs are found in common usage in
experience terror. Restlessness and sleeplessness solid, powder, and liquid forms, and taken in var-
are common until the drug wears off. The user ious forms, an investigation of a purely drug use
can have nausea, chills, flushing, irregular brea- case should be performed by qualified personnel
thing, sweating and trembling hands. Mental ef- from the local CIDC office. The CIDC has auto-
fects of the drugs are unpredictable and include matic jurisdiction over drug use, which is a crim-
illusions, exhilaration, withdrawal from society, inal offense, unless security matters override,
'ideas of violence or self-destruction, or sheer which should be rare. Indications are that be-
I
E-2
 FM 30-17

cause of the control problems presented by an ad- to 10 hours and may be detected by various tests.
dict or user, hostile intelligence services will not One of the tests is a urinalysis. However, in addi-
recruit a user except on a one-time job. However, tion, there are field test kits which can be pur-
to determine if a person might be a security chased for testing of a suspicious liquid or sub-
threat as a result of drug use, the following indi- stance, but these kits will not prove the existence
cators are given : of a particular drug. They will only indicate the
(1) The physical characteristics as described possibility of its existence. Also, the average life
under each category above. expectancy of some kits is only 30 to 90 days.
(2) When a person hides pills or liquids Other drugs, like LSD, will floresce when sub-
which appear to be legitimate. jected to ultraviolet light. Special training is
needed before becoming qualified to depend on the
(3) Old prescription bottles are suspect.
various tests as accurate indicators for detection
^ (4) A name different from the suspect's on a of drugs in the body
prescription bottle.
(5) Strong odors emulating from cigarettes. E—6. Marihuana
(6) "Tracks" or tatoo appearing scars on the
arms, wrists, feet or hands which could be a re- Marihuana and cocaine are both classed as nar-
sult of mainlining. cotics from a lawenforcement standpoint and will
impose a psychological dependence on the abuser,
(7) A redness or swelling in the partition of
the nose. but marihuana is a hallucinogen while cocaine is
a stimulant for all practical purposes. Neither
(8) A sallow complexion, trembling hands,
are known to cause physical dependence or de-
dilated eyes, going on the nod or sleeplessness.
velop a tolerance; however, both are dangerous if
(9) Long periods of time in the latrine at
abused. Marihuana can cause hallucinations simi-
regular intervals, such as every 4 or 8 hours.
lar to LSD, and can produce symptoms such as
(10) Wearing of sunglasses. distortion of depth and time perception. While
(11) Sloppy appearance. under the drug, the eyes may become pink. Abu-
(12) Uncontrollable temper. sers are difficult to identify unless under the in-
(13) Long shirt sleeves on hot days. fluence of the drug. Under the influence, they
(14) Indebtedness. may appear animated and hysterical which may
(15) Unexplained affluency. be expressed by loud talk and laughter. Mari-
(16) Theft. huana will cause a loss of coordination, distortion
of visual and auditory sensations, impairment of
(17) Constant borrowing of money from co-
judgment and memory, confusion and delusions.
workers.
Hashish is a concentrated marihuana which has
(18) Inattention to dress or personal hygiene.
been created by obtaining the resin from the
(19) Association with drug users. growing plant or a similar method. Marihuana
(20) Personality changes. the drug is obtained from the plant Cannabis sa-
(21) Gaiety followed by marked depression. tiva L., and consists of the leaves, flowers, stems,
(22) Cold skin. and seeds but not the stalk. Marihuana plants are
(23) Possession of blank or undated prescrip- bisexual, and can be positively identified under a
tion forms. microscope since it is profusely covered with fine
hair, but better identification can be made from
b. It must be remembered at all times that the leaves, seeds, and seed hull even if the plant
some individuals have a legitimate need and use has been finely crushed. The most distinctive
for drugs such as a diabetic, or an individual identification is the cystolith hair on the upper
with thyroid problems. Any suspicious activity on
side of the leaflet consisting of a stalectic and a
the part of an employee or soldier where doubt
gradular hair. Visually, identification can be
still remains should not be investigated by mili-
made by inspecting the plant. Basically, the
tary intelligence but by the CIDC.
leaves are compound, and normally consist of
from five to eleven leaflets with seven an average.
E—5. Detection
The stalk will grow from 3 to 16 feet in height
Drugs in the usual dosages taken by addicts will with an average height of 4 to 6 feet. The leaves
remain within the individual's system for about 8 are jagged in appearance.

E—3
 FM 30-17

INDEX

Paragraph Page Paragraph Pane

"ABC" method of surveillance 11-2, 11-1,
(fig 4-1) 4-276 4-18 12-1 le 12-8
"AB" method of surveillance Theater 2-7o 2-3
(fig 4-2) 4-276 4-18 Arrest, authority — 3-8 3-7
Accreditation of special agent 1-2 1-1 ASCOM (area support command) :
Accused person, Rights of 3-6 3-2 MI Company (CI) (fig 2-6) .. 2-12 2-7
Administration of oaths _ 3-27 3-11 MI Detachment (CRF) (fig
Administrative proceedings 3-2b, 3-4, 3-1,3-2, 2-5) 2-10 2-5
3-66,4-3e 4-2 MI Group (CI) (fig 2-3) 2-8 2—4
Admissions 3-6, 5-12 3-2, 5-8 HQ MI Group (CI) (fig 2-4) . _ 2-9 2-4
Adverse information 8-19 8-5 Audio surveillance (fig 5-1, 5-2)... 5-2a, 5-3 5-1, 5-2
Advising of rights 3-6, 3-16, 3-2, 3-9, Equipment 5-4,11-2 5-2,11-1
4-12, 4-8, Augmentation :
5-20d 5-10 Civil police 12-10o 12-6
Tactical troops 12-10o 12-6
Advocating overthrow of US
Government 9-19 9-7 Background Investigations :
Affidavit app B B-l Components 8-4 8-1
Agent: Scope 8-3 8-1
Notes app B B-l Bad credit 8-16 8-4
Report 7-5, app B 7-2, B-l Barbiturates app E E-l
Special 1-2 1-1 Blacklist 12-9a, 12-5,
Agreement : 12-116 12-8
Delimitations . l-4a 1-2 Block control 13-66 13-5
Status of forces l-4c 1-2 Border :
Aiding the enemy 9-15 9-6 Control 13-6 13-3
Air reconnaissance and Security 12-16e, 12-16,
surveillance 2-9d 2-5 14-lli 14-4
Allied forces 6-15c 6-4 Base camp security 13-10 13-5
Amphetamines app E E-l "Bugging" 5-5 5-4
Announced counterintelligence Casual source 6-46 6-2
inspections 1.0-16a 10-8 Central Intelligence Agency
Apprehension 3-8, 3-14, 3-7, 3-8, (CIA) 1 8-156 8-4
4-17ti! 4-13
Central records facility (fig 2-5) _. 2-10 2-5
Approach : Characterization 7-8 7-3
To elicitation 4-21 4-14 Individual app B B-l
To interviews 4-9 4-6 Organization app B B-l
Area: Checklist 10—4, 10-2,
Army, organization 2-4 2-1 11-4, 11-2,
Coverage 12—5a-, 13-9 12-3,13-5 app D D-l
Rear 2-7 2-3 Checkpoint 4-27o 4-22
Area support: Mobile 12-16e, 12-16,
Command 2-8 2-4 14-1Ifc 14-4
Group 2-8a. 2-4 Surveillance 4-27c 4-22
MI Company (CI) (fig 2-6) .. '2-12 2-7 Static (fig 12-2) 12-16c, 12-16,
MI Detachment (CRF) (fig 14-1Ifc 14-4
2-5) 2-10 2-5 Circulation control 14-lly 14-4
MI Group (CI) (fig 2-3, Citizenship 8-13 8-4
2-4) 2-8 2-4 Civil affairs 2-7, 2-9, 2-3, 2-4,
Army: 12-9, 12-5,
Area organization 2-4 2-1 12—12a 12-10,
Field 2-76 2-4 12-16, 12-12,
Security Agency 4-326, 4-27, 14-1, 14-1,
10-ld, 10-1, 14-2 14-3,
10-12d, 10-7, 14-8

lndex-1
FM 30-17

ParajCTaph Pape Paragraph Page

Civil disturbances 12-125, 12-11, Inspection 10-14 10-7
14-1Ij 14-4 Interrogations — 3-6«, 3-2,
Civil police, augmentation . _ . _. 12-1 Oa 12-6 12-11 12-7
Civil security ... 12-35, 12-1, Interviews 4-7, 4-10, 4-5, 4-6,
14-7 14-2 4-12, 4-8,
Clandestine listening devices 11-7 11-3 app B B-l
Clearances, indigenous labor force 2-9« 2-4 Investigations _ 1-3«, 4-1, 1-1, 4-1,
Close surveillance 4-25« 4-15 4-16, 4-12,
Cocaine app E E-l 12-12« 12-10,
Codes 4-26/, 4-325 4-18, app E E-l
4-27 J urisdiction 1-3 1-1
Collection of physical evidence _ _ _. 4—31 4-27 Limitations 1-4 1-2
Combat counterintelligence Mission — 1-3 1-1
Offensive — l-5e 1-3
interrogations 12-11 12-7
Combination surveillance . 4-255, 4-27e 4-15, Officer 1-2 1-1
. Organization 2-2 2-1
4-22
Principles 1-5 1-2
Communications .... 4-26/, 4-276 4-18
Personnel 1-2 1-1
Communications security 10-l<i 10-1
Services — 1-36 1-2
Complaint investigation : Special operations 1-3«; 1-2
Categories 9-3 9-1 Spot reports 7-11 7-3
Conduct 9-7, 9-10, 9-2, 9-4, Stability operations 13-1 13-1
9-12, 9-16, 9-6, Survey 10-1, 10-1,
9-21 9-7 app C, C-l,
Incident 9-2« 9-1 app D D-l
Personal 9-26 9-1 Tactical operations 12-3, 12-6 12-1, 12-4
Components of a Background Target lists .. 12-4« 12-2
Investigation 8-4 8-1 Technical inspection . 11-16 11-1,
Compromise of surveillance . 4-285. 4-25 ll-2d, 11-2
Confessions 3-6, 3-14 3-2, 3-8, 11-36
3-16c, 3-9, Technical surveys 11-1«, 11-1,
4-17/ 4-14, ll-2c, 11-2
5-12 5-8 11-3«
Confidential source 6-5 6-2 Countersabotage 9-7 9-2
Consent search (fig 3-1) 3-75 3-5 Countersubversion 9-23 9-8
Consolidation operations 14-14« 14-4 Credit, bad — 8-16 8-4
Conspiracy, seditious 9-18 9-7 Crime:
CONUS (Continental United Definition 3-3 3-1
States) Prevention surveys 10-3, 10-2,
Military Intelligence group 10-6, 10-3,
(fig 2-2) 2-4 2-1 app D D-l
National agencies 6-13 6—4 Criminal Investigation Command,
Special counterintelligence US Army 6-15c, 6-4,
units 2-6 2-3 10-6, 10-3,
Tactical counterintelligence app E E-l
elements .... 2-5 '2-2
Conventional source .. 6—4, app B 6-1, B-l Depressant 5-15d, 5-9,
Conversation 4-22 4-15 app E E-l
"Convoy" 4-29« 4-26 Derogatory information :
Cordon and search operations Loyalty 8-196 8-5
(fig 13-1, 13-2, 13-3) 13-106 13-6 Suitability 8-19« 8-5
Assistance from PSYOP 14-146 14-4 Rebutted _ 3-13« 3-8
With military police ... 14-116 14—4 Detecting surveillance — 4-29 4-25
Counsel, refusal of 3-6d 3-3 Detection equipment 1.1-5 11-2
Counterespionage : Directives, National Security ... . 1-46 1-2
Conduct 9-12 9-4 Disaffection 9-24 9-8
Investigations ... 9-10 9—4 Disclosure of official information .. 4-11 g 4-7
Counterintelligence : Discreet surveillance . 4-25« 4-15
Area coverage _ 12-5«, 13-8 12-3, Document :
13-5 Security 10-10 10-5
Augmentation 12-10 12-6 Transfer 12-4« 12-2
Employment 1-3, 2-3 1-1, 2-1 Documentary :
Indications 12-lle, 12-8, Evidence 4-32 4-27
12-16 12-12 Source 6-6 6-2

Index—2
 FM 30-17

Paragraph Page Paragraph . Page

Targets 12-8a, 12-4, Female, interview 4-12d, 4-8,
12-10c 12-7 4-17d 4-13
Documentation, false 5-2<i, 5-10 5-2, 5-7 Files :
DOD affiliated: Counterintelligence 2-10, 2-5,
Organizations l-5d 1-3 12-13 12-12
Persons, arrest of 3-8d 8-7 Evacuation of 1'2-lOc 12-7
Persons, definition l-5d 1-3 Fixed surveillance 4-256, 4-16,
.Drugs 5-15d, f, 5-9, 4-27a 4-18
app E E-l Foreign travel 8-156 8-4
Education, security 10-19 10-9 Format:
Electronic Security 10-ld 10-1 Agent Report (fig B-l—
Elicitation : B-6) app B B-l
Approach 4-21 4-14 Report of Investigation (ROI)
Preparation for 4-20 4-14 (fig B-8) app B B—1
Eluding surveillance 4-30 4—26 Summary of Information
Entry, surreptitious 5-25, 5-6 5-1, 5-5 (SOI) (fig B-9—B12) app B B-l
Equipment, detection 11-5 11-2 Survey and inspection reports. 10-17, 10-9,
Escort officer 10-5 10—3 10-18, C-l
Espionage 9-8 9-3 app C
Incident to a crime 14-llfc 14—4 Sworn Statement (fig 3-2—
Investigative guide 9-10 9—4 3-4) 3-12, 3-8,
Statutes 9-9 9-3 app B B-l
Evaluation of witness 4-15 4-12 Technical Survey and Inspec-
Evidence 3-2,4-31, 3-1,4-27, tion Reports 11-8, 11-3,
4-33 4-28 app C C—1
Administrative proceedings .. 3-26, 3-4 3-1 Foward areas 12-4 12—2
Affidavit . 4-3a, app B 4-2, B-l Frontier Control 13-6 13—3
Collection — 4-3e 4-2 Gray list 12-9a, 12-6,
Documentary ... 4-32 4—27 12-116 12-8
Illegal search and seizure 3-7u, 3-5, Group Military Intelligence (fig
3-10 3-8 2-2, 2-3) 2-4, 2-8 2-1,2-4
Involuntary 3-66 3-5 Group, target 12-9 12-5
Lawfully obtained 3-26 3-1 Guidelines, espionage investiga-
Photography 5-8 5-7 tions 9-10 9-4
Physical (fig 4-4) 4-31 4-27
Release of 4-35 4-29 Hallucinogens app E E—1
Rules of 3-4 3-1 Harbor security 12-16d, 12-16,
Search for 3—7c, 3-14 3-7, 3-8 14-11/ 14-3
Statement app B B-l Hashish app E E—1
Testimonial 4-37 4-31 Hearsay information app B B—1
Transmittal of 4-34c 4-29 Host country 6-15c, 6—4,
Unlawfully obtained 3-9 3-8 13-106 13-6
Examination of records 4-4, app B 4—2, B-l Human sources 6-3 6—1
Access 4—46, 4-6 4-2, 4-4 Illiterates, interviews of 4-40 4-32
Reliability 4—4c 4-2 Imagery interpretation 2-9d, 2-5,
Types 4-4u, 4-5, 4-2, 13--9 14-15 14-4
13-13 Incident complaint investigations . 9-2« 9—1
Exhibits app B B-l Incidental source 6—4a 6—1
Exit briefing . 10-13 10-7 Indicators, counterintelligence 12-116, 12-8,
Explanation of Rights: 12-16, 12-12,
Acknowledgment of 3-6e, 3—4, 13—1c, 13-1
5-20d 5-10. 13—4c, 13-2,
By undercover agents 3-16d 3-9 app E E-l
Failure to give 3-6a 3-2 Indigenous persons as surveillants. 4—26d 4-17
How given 3-&e 3-3 Attitudes 14-5 14-1
Improper 3-&i 3-5 In an insurgency 13-56 13-3
Manner in which given 3-66 3-2 Investigations 12-12 12—10
To whom given 3-6, 3-16, 3-2, 3-9, Loyalties 14-4 14-1
4-12 4-8 Procurement and recruitment 14-6 14-2
Waiver of 3-6o 3-2
Information :
False documentation 6-2d, 5-10 5-2, 5-7 Classified release of 4-38d 4—31
Federal Bureau of Investigation Derogatory 8-19 8-5
(FBI) l-4a, 4-13a 1-2, 4-9 Hearsay app B B-l

lndex-3
 FM 30-17

Paragraph Page Paragraph Page

Obtained from Government Disaffection 9-24 9-8
Agencies 6-156, &-4, Indigenous persons 12-12o, 12-10,
app B B-l 14—4 14-1
Official disclosure of 4-1 lg 4—7 Limitations of 1—4 1-2
Security of 10-10, 10-5, Mutiny 9-20a 9-7
13-4 13-2 National Agency Check 8-2, 8-5 8-1, 8-2
Infrastructure 14-4c 14-1 Personnel Security 8-1, 13-3, 8-1, 13-2,
Inspection : app E E-l
Announced 10-16a 10-8 Riots and civil disturbances .. _ 12-126 12-11
Counterintelligence 10-14 10-7 Security l-3a 1-1
Penetration 10-16c 10-8 Seditious conspiracy 9-118, 9-7
Reports 10-17, 10-9, 9-206
11-8, 11-3, Treason 9-16 9-6
app C C—1 Investigative :
Technical 11-16, 11-1, Agencies 6-15 6-4
11—2d 11-2 Guides 9-10 9^1
11-36 Jurisdiction _ l-5d, 1-3,
Unannounced 10-166 10-8 13-9 13-5
Installation : Legal principles 3-1 3-1
Target 12-9 12-5 Photography 5-2c, 5-7 5-1, 5-5
Sensitivity 10-8 10—4 Plan 4-2 4-1
Security 13-10 13-5 Procedures 9-7, 9-12, 9-2, 9-4,
Intelligence: 9-16, 9-6,
Agencies 6-13, 6-15 6-4 9-121 9-7
Command (fig 2-1) 2-4, 2-9e 2-1, 2-5, Reports app B B-l
11-5 11-2 Techniques 4-3 4-1
Technical 6—11, 6-3, Involuntary evidence 3-6 3-2
14-15 14-4 Involuntary statement 3-6 3-2
Collection potential of Civil
Affairs 14—8 14-3 Judge Advocate General (JAG) .. 3-46, 3-6 3-2
Police, reciprocal 14-lla, 14-12 14-3, Jurisdiction __ 1-3,13-2, 1-1,13-1,
14-4 13-9 13-5
Interpreters 3-24, 3-11,
4-39, 4-32, Key Sheet (fig B-7) app B B-l
5-18, 5-10, Lawfully obtained evidence 3-26, 5-2e 3-1, 5-1
12-12a, 12-10, Lead 4-1 li, 4-7,
13-11 13-9 app B B-l
Interrogation 4-16 4-12 From Government agencies .. 6-156, 6-4,
Accused and suspects 3-6, 4-17, 3-2, 4-12, app B B-l
5-12, 5-8,
9-76 9-2 From records 4-3a 4-1
Combat 12-11 12-7 Jurisdictional app B B-l
Conduct of 4-17e 4-14 Sheet app B B-l
Detailed 12-11? 12-10 Subsidiary app B B-l
Preparation for 4-17d 4-13 "Throw Offs" app B B-l
Screening 12-11/ 12-9 Legal principles 3-1 3-1
Halting of 3-6? 3-4 Liaison 4-66, 4-6,
Interviews 4-7, 4-10 4-5, 4-6 6-12 6-3
Approach 4-9 4-6 Allied forces 6-15c, 6—4,
Attempts app B B-l 14-1 14-1
Females 4-12<i 4-8 Civil affairs 14-1, 14-2 14-1
Preparation for 4-8 4-5 CONUS agencies 6-13, 6-14 6-4
Rapport 4-9? 4-6 Host country 6-15c 6-4
Subject 4-12 4-8 Imagery interpretation 14-15 14-4
"Walk-ins" 4-13 4-9 Military police 14-1, 14-1,
Witness 4-14 4-10 14-10 14-3
Illiterates 4-40 4-32 Order of battle . 14-15 14-4
Investigation : Overseas agencies 6-15 6—4
Background __ 8-2 8-1 Psychological warfare 14-1, 14-3 14-1
Complaint 9-1, app E 9-1, E-l Signal intelligence 14-15 14-4
Counterespionage 9-10, 9-12 9-4 Technical intelligence . 14-15 14-4
Counterintelligence _ _ 4-1 4—1 "Third agency rule" ... 6-156 6-4
Countersabotage 9-7 9-2 Limitations, Counterintelligence _. 1-4 1-2
Countersubversion 9-23 9-8 Local agency check 8-11 8-3

lndex-4
 FM 30-17

Paragraph Page Paragraph Page

Lysergic acid diethylamide Principles 2-2 2-1
(LSD) app E E-l Special elements 2-6 2-3
Target 12-9 12-5
Marijuana - app E E-l Theater Army 2—7a 2-3
Material sources 6-10 6-3 US Army Intelligence Com-
Material targets 12-9 12-5 mand (fig 2-1) 2-4 2-1
Media analysis 14—14d 14-1 Pattern :
Military Intelligence Battalion — 2-9 2-4 Analysis 13-12 13-9
Military Intelligence Group: Behavorial 12-56 12-3
CONUS (fig 2-2) 2-4 2-1 Penetration inspections 10-16e 10-8
ASCOM (fig 2-3) 2-8 2-4 Personnel :
Military Police 2-9a, 2-4, Complaint investigation 9-26 9-1
10-4a, 10-2, Document source 6-9 6-3
10-12, 10-7, Personnel :
13-10, 13-5, Blacklist 12-9a 12-5
14-1, 14-1, Counterintelligence 1-2 1-1
14-10, 14-3, Gray list 12-9a 12-5
14-11, Indigenous 12-12a 12-10
app C, C—1, Security Investigation 4-1, 8-1, 4-1, 8-1,
app D, D-l, 13-3 13-2
app E E-l Selection for surveillance tar-
Mission, Counterintelligence 1-3 1-1 get 4-26a, 4-16,
Misuse of Counterintelligence 12-8a 12-4
personnel - 5-6a 5-5 White list 12-9a 12-5
Mixed surveillance - 4-255, 4-16, Personnel Security Investigations
4-27c 4-22 (PSI) 8-1 8-1
Moving surveillance - 4-276 4-18 Components of . _. 8-4 8-1
Mutiny 9-20a 9-7 In stability operations 13-3 13-2
Narcotics 5-15d, 5-9, Indigenous personnel 12-12a- 12—10
app E E-l Request for app B B-l
National Agency Check 8-2, 8-5 8-1, 8-5 Scope — 8-3 8-1
National Security Check 7-10 7-3 Sworn Statements in app B B-l
National Security Directives 1—46 1-2 Photography, investigative (fig
Naval Investigative Service l-4<i 1-2 5-3) 5-2«, 5-7, 5-1, 5-5,
Negative information 4-4« 4-2 5-8 5-7
Notes: Physical evidence (fig 4-4) 4-31 4-27
Agent app B B-l Physical security 10-12, 10-7,
Taking - - 4-11, 4-7, 11-3, 11-2,
4-136 4-9 12-16d, 12-16,
13-5, 13-5,
Oaths, administration of 3-25, 3-127 3-11 14-116, 14-4,
Offensive counterespionage l-5e 1-3 app D D-l
Office of Special Investigation Planning :
(OSI) 1-4 1-2 Investigation 4-2 4-1
Officer, Counterintelligence 1-2 1-1 Tactical operations ... 12-7,13-1 12-4,13-1
Official sources _ 6-4e, 6-2, Political apparatus study 13-lc 13-1
6-lSe 6-4 Polygraph 4-18, 4-14,
One vehicle/man method of sur- 5-2«, 5—2,
veillance (fig 4-3) 4-276 4-18 5-12, 5-8,
Operations : app E E-l
Defensive l-5e 1-3 Populace control . _ 13-6, 13-3,
Offensive - l-5e 1-3 14-146 14-4
Other 12-6 12-4 Port security 12-16(f 12-16
Screening 12-16 12-12 Private document source 6-9 6-3
Special l-3o 1-2 Priority target 12-8 12-4
Stability 13-1 13-1 Progressive surveillance 4-27d 4-23
Tactical 12-4, 12-2, Propaganda :
12-5, 12-3, Black 14-14/ 14-4
12-15 12-12 Grey — 14-14/ 14-4
)rder of Battle liaison 14—15 14—4 Subversive l^-Hp 14—4
Irganization : Protection of :
ASCOM 2-8 2-4 Of investigative reports 744, 11-3 7-2, 11-2
CONUS 2-4,2-5 2-1,2-2 Of sources 644,6-5, 6-1,6-2,
Field Army 2-76 2-4 i app B B-l

Index—5
FM 30-17

Paragraph Page Paragraph Page

Provost Marshal 10-lc, 10-1, Characterization—Organiza-
10-36, 10-2, tion (fig B-ll) app B B-l
10-4o, 10-7, Classification of 7-4, 11-3 7-2, 11-2
10-12, 11-1 Types 7-2 7-1
11-2, 12-11, Resources, Control of 13-6a 13-3
12-126 Riots 12-126 12-11
app C, C-l, Rights, explanation of:
app D D-l Acknowledgment of 3-6e, 3-4,
Psychological Warfare I^-IO, 12-12, 5-20d 5-10
14-1, 14-1, By undercover agents 3-16d 3-9
14-66, 14-2, Failure to gtfve 3-6o 3-2
14-13 14-4 How given 3-6o 3-3
Publicity, avoidance 1-56 1-3 Improper 3-6i 3-5
Raids and searches 4-3d, 4-2, Manner in which given 3-66 3-2
14-llfc 14-4 To whom given 3-6, 3-16, 3-2, 3-9,
Rapport 4—Op 14-6 4-12 4-8
Rear area security 12-5, 12-3, Waiver of 3-6a. 3-2
14-1le 14-3 Rules of evidence 3-4 3-1
Records : Sabotage 9-5 9-2
Access to 4-46, 4-6 4-2, 4-4 Investigative procedures 9-7 9-2
Birth 8—6 8-2 Types of 9-6, 9-2,
Credit 8-16 8-4 14-lla 14-3
Criminal 8-11 8-3 Scientific source 6-8 6-3
Diverse 8-18 8-6 Scope:
Education 8-7 8-2 Counterintelligence activities . 1-3 1-1
Employment 8-8 8-3 Counterintelligence inspec-
Evacuation of 12-10e 12-7
tions 10-15 10-8
Examination of 4-4, 4-2, Personnel security investi-
app B B-l gations 8-3 8-1
Foreign 4-5^ 4-3 Indigenous investigations 14-4 14-1
Legal aspects of 4-4d 4-2 Technical surveys and inspec-
Limitation 4-5/ 4-3 tions 11-2 11-1
Military hospital 4-5i 4—4 Screening (fig 12-1) 12-11/, 12-9,
Military service — 4-5i, 4-4,
12-16 12-12
8-12 8-3
Organizational 8-17 8—4 Search :
Reliability of 4—4c 4-2 Authority 3-11 3-8
Travel 8-13, 8-15 8-4 Consent (fig 3-1) 3-76 3-5
Types 4-4a, 4-5, 4-2, Covert 3-11 3-8
13-13 13-9 Illegal 3-7a, 5-2c, 3-5, 5-1,
US Social Security Admin- 5-5 5-4
istration 4-5/ 4-3 Legal 3-76, 3-7e 3-5, 3-7
Refugee screening (fig 12-1) 12-16, 12-12, Procedures 3-7c 3-7
14-1Id 14-3 Report of app B B-l
Refusal of counsel 3-6d 3-3 Seizure 3-7/ 3-7
Reeducation 14-14c 14—4 Warrant 3-7c, d 3-7
Release of evidence 4-35 4-29 Secret writing 4-32c, 5-2d, 4-27,
Reliability of records 4-4o 4-2 5-106 5-2,5-7
Request for, and Results of, Per- Security:
' sonnel Security Action 7-9 7-3 Agency, US Army 4-326,10-ld, 4-27,
Request for National Agency 10-12d, 11-2, 10-1,
Check 7-10 7-3 12-lle 10-7,
Request for personnel security 11-1,12-8
action 7-9 7_3 Base camp 13-10 13-5
Report of Investigation (ROI) 7-7, app B 7-2, B-l Border 12-16e, 14-lli 12-16,
Reports 7-1 7-1 • 14-4
Investigation 12-13, 12-12, Civil 12-36 12-1
app B B-l Clearance program 10-lla 10-6
Services 10-17, 10-9, Directives, National 1-46 1-2
11-8, 11-3, Document and information 10-10,13-4 10-5,13-2
app C C-l Education 10-19 10-9
Spot 7-11 7-3 Forces 13-10a 13-5
Characterization—Individual Installation 13-10 13-5
(fig B-10, B-12) app B B-l Investigations l-3a, 13-3 1-1,13-2

Index—6
 FM 30-17

Paragraph Pape Paragraph Paere

Personnel 10-11, app E 10-6, Other than direct testimony _. 3-20 3-10
E-l Preparation of 3—13,3-13, 3-8,
Physical ----- 10-12,11-2, 10-7, 3-22,3-28 3-10—
12-16íf, 11-1, 3-12
13-5 12-16,13-2 Unsigned - 3-27 3—11
Port and harbor 12-16eí, 14-11/ 12-16, Unsworn _ 3-26,4-17 3-11,4—12
14-3 Use of 3—14 3—8
Rear area 12-55 12-3 Statutes :
services 1-36 1-2 Espionage - 9-9 9—3
Special weapons 12-36,12-12d 12-1, Liaison 9-14 9—5
12-12 Stimulant 5-15d, app E 5-9,
Troop movement 12-12c 12-11 E-l
Sedition 9-17, 9-206 9-6,9-7
Seditious conspiracy 9-18 9-7 Subject Interview 3-6a, 4-12 3-2,4-8
Seizure. 3-76, 3-8e, 3-5, 3-7, Subversive activity 9-23,14—4c, 9-8,
3-10, 3-8, B-l 14-5,14-116, 14-1,
14—14e, 14-3,
app B
Selection, target 12-8 12-4 14—14# 14-4
Sensors, unattended ground 12-35 12-1 Suitability 1 8-19a 8—5
Sheet, key (fig B-7) app B B-l Summary of Information (SOI) :
Signal: Format (fig B-9) 7-8, app B 7-3, B—1
Intelligence 14-15 14—4 Characterization—Individual
Security 10-12d 10-7 (fig B-10, B-12) app B B—1
Social Security Administration, Characterization—Organiza-
US 4-5/ 4-3 tion (fig B-ll) _. app B B—1
Sources : Surreptitious entry 5-26,5—6 5—1,5—5
Casual 6-46 6-2 Survey, counterintelligence 10-1 10-1
Confidential 6-5 6-2 Checklist 10-4, app D 10-2, D-l
Conventional 6-4, 7-7, 6-1, 7-2, Initiation 10-2 10-1
app B B-l Preparation 10—3 10-2
Documentary 6-6,13-136 6-2,13-11 Report 10—17, app C 10—9,
Human 6-3 6-1 C-l
Incidental 6—4a 6-1 Surveillance 4-23 4-15
Mass media 6-7 6-2 ABC method (fig 4-1) 4-276 4-18
Material 6-10 6-3 AB method (fig 4-2) 4-276 4-18
Official 6-4c, 13-136 6-2, Audio 5—2a, 5—3 5—1, 5—2
13-11 Checkpoint 4-27d 4-18
On drugs _ _ app E E-l Close i 4—25a 4—15
Personnel document 6-9 6-3 ■ Combination or mixed 4-256 4-16
Political , 13-136 13-11 Communications 4-26/ 4—18
Private documents 6-9 6-3 Compromise 4-285 4-25
Religious 13-136 13-11 Detecting 4-29 4-25
Scientific 6-8 6-3 Discreet 4—25a 4—15
Technical 6-8,6-10 6-3 Eluding 4-30 4-26
Unwitting 6—4a 6-1 Encounters with friends 4-28c 4-23
Walk-ins 4-13a 4-9 Equipment 5—4 5—2
Special : Fixed 4—256, 4—26a 4—16
Agent 1-2,4-36 1-1,4-30 Moving 4-256, 4—26a ,4—16
Counterintelligence units 2-6 2-3 Objectives 4-24 4—15
Operations ... l-3c, 12-16d 1-2, One-man/vehicular method 4-276 4-18
12-16 Personnel selection ^ - 4-26« 4-16
Special weapons security 12-36,12-12d 12-1, Preparation for 4-26 4—16
12-12 Progressive 4-27d 4—23
Specialist, Counterintelligence 1-2 1-1 Team commander 4-26d 4-17
Spot Report 7-11 7-3 Technical 4-256 4-16
Spying 9-11 9-4 Techniques 4-2$ 4-23
Stability operations 13-1 13-1 Types 4—25 4—25
Standard Operating Procedures Use of indigenous personnel _ 4-26d 4-17
(SOP) 13-5 13-2 Vehicular (fig 4-1, 4-2, 4—3) _ 4-276 4—18
Statement, sworn i 3-12, 4-14 3-8, 4-10 Survey, physical security app D D-l
Contents 3-15 3-8 Survey, technical:
Formal (fig 3-2, 3-3, 3-4) .. _ 3-18 3-10 Conduct of 11-3 11-2
In foreign countries 3-23, 3-24 3-11 Equipment ----- 11—5 11—2
Opinions and conclusions 3-21 3-10 Report app C C-l

Index—7
FM 30-17

Paragraph Pagre Paragraph Page

Suspect: Theater Army 2-7», 2-8» 2-3, 2-4
Interrogation 4-17,9-76 4-12,9-2 "Third Agency Rule" 6-156, app B 6-4, B-l
Rights of 3-6,4-12a 3-2,4-8 "Throw-offs" 4-1 Ii, app B 4-7, B-l
Civilian 3-6d 3-3 Tranquilizers - app E E-l
Military 3Sd 3-3 Transfer of documents 12—4» 12-2
Sworn Statement 3-12,4-14 3-8,4-10 Translators:
Contents 3-15 3-8 Qualifications and use of 12-12» 12-10
Formal (fig 3-2, 3-3, 3-4) 3-18 3-10 Used with statements 3-24 3-11
In foreign countries 3-23,3-24 3-11 Working with 13-11 13-9
Opinions and conclusions 3-21 3-10 Transmittal of evidence 4-34c 4-29
Other than direct testimony .. 3-20 3-10 Treason — 9-13 9-5
Preparation of 3-13, 3-18, 3-8, Troop Movement Security 12-12c 12-11
3-22, 3-10— Type:
3-28 3-12 Records 4—4», 4-5, 4-2,
Unsigned 3-27 3-11 13-13 13-9
Unsworn 3-26,4-17 3-11,4-12 Sabotage 9-6 9-2
Use of 3-14 3-8 Surveillance 4-24 4-15
Tactical operations 12-4, 12-5, 12-2— Unattended ground sensors 12-36 12-1
12-6,12-15 12-4, Units, special counterintelligence . 2-6 2-3
12-12 Unannounced counterintelligence
Tactical troop augmentation 12-10» 12-6 inspection 10-166 10-8
"Tapping" 5-5 5-4 Units, special counterintelligence _ 2—6 2-3
Target, counterintelligence : Unlawfully obtained evidence 3-9 3-8
Document and material 12-9<i 12-6 Unwitting source 6-4» 6-1
Files 12-10c 12-7 US Army Security Agency 4-326,10-ld, 4-27,
Installation 12-96 12-5 10-12d, 11-2, 10-1,
Lists 12—4» 12-2 12-lle 10-7,
Organization and group 12-9c 11-1,12-8
Personalities 12-9», 12—116 12-5, US Government, advocating over-
12-8 throw 9-19 9-7
Records 12-10» 12-7 Waiver 3-6», 3-6/, 3-2,3—4,
Selection and priorities _ _ 12-8 12-4 3-17, 3-9,
Technical : 4-17d 4-13
Inspection 11-16, ll-2d, 11-1, "Walk-ins" 4-13», 6-4» 4-9,6-1
11-36 11-2 Warrant, search:
Intelligence 6-11, 14-15 6-3,14-4 Civilian 3-7d 3-7
Source 6-8,6-10 6-3 Military 3-7c 3-7
Surveillance 4-256 4-16 White list 12-9», 12-5,
Survey 11-1», ll-2c, 11-1, 12-116 12-8
11-3» 11-2 Witness :
Technicians, counterintelligence _ _ 1-2 1-1 Arrangements for 5-17c 5-9
Techniques : Evaluation 4-15 4-12
Investigative 4-3 4-1 Interview 4-14 4-10
Surveillance 4-28 4-23 Special Agent 4-36, 4-38 4—30, 4-31
Termination of interview — 4-136 4-9 Writing, secret 4-32c, 5-2d, 4-27,
Testimony 4-37 4-31 5-106 5-2,5-7

lndex-8
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

W. C. WESTMORELAND,
General, United States Army,
Official : Chief of Staff.
VERNE L. BOWERS,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

Distribution :
To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11 requirements for Counterintelligence Op-
erations, Intelligence Corps, US Army.

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1972—714-212/5088

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