CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY RESOLUTION

A.M. No. 22-09-01-SC - April 11, 2023

PREAMBLE
Ethics is the experiential manifestation of moral standards. The observance of these standards of conduct is
both a function of personal choice and formal compulsion. A lawyer is ideally ethical by personal choice. A
code of ethics expressly adopted represents society’s consensus and dictate to conform to a chosen norm of
behavior that sustains the community’s survival and growth.

The Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability, as an institutional imperative, is meant to

foster an environment where ethical conduct performs a dedicated role in the administration of justice. In
particular, the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability uniquely
address the characteristics of the Filipino lawyer as an amalgamation of influences and moorings, i.e.,
familial, cultural, religious, academic, political, and philosophical. Inherently a social being, the Filipino
lawyer inevitably develops and cultivates relations, preferences and biases. The conscious adoption of
ethical standards that accounts for such relationships and personal choices balanced against the demands of
right and justice is envisioned to govern and regulate these personal choices and make them consistent with
the institutional objectives.

The existence of a free and an independent society depends upon the recognition of the concept that justice
is based on the rule of law.

As a guardian of the rule of law, every lawyer, as a citizen, owes allegiance to the Constitution and the laws
of the land; as a member of the legal profession, is bound by its ethical standards in both private and
professional matters; as an officer of the court, assists in the administration of justice; and as a client’s
representative, acts responsibly upon a fiduciary trust.

An ethical lawyer is a lawyer possessed of integrity. Integrity is the sum total of all the ethical values that
every lawyer must embody and exhibit. A lawyer with integrity, therefore, acts with independence,
propriety, fidelity, competence and diligence, equality and accountability.

Failure to abide by the Code results in sanctions.

CANON I
INDEPENDENCE

The independence of a lawyer in the discharge of professional duties without any improper influence,
restriction, pressure, or interference, direct or indirect, ensures effective legal representation and is
ultimately imperative for the rule of law.

Section 1. Independent, accessible, efficient and effective legal service. — A lawyer shall make legal
services accessible in an efficient and effective manner. In performing this duty, a lawyer shall maintain
independence, act with integrity, and at all times ensure the efficient and effective delivery of justice.

Section 2. Merit-based practice. — A lawyer shall rely solely on the merits of a cause and not exert, or give
the appearance of, any influence on, nor undermine the authority of, the court, tribunal or other government
agency, or its proceedings.

Section 3. Freedom from improper considerations and external influences. — A lawyer shall not, in
advocating a client’s cause, be influenced by dishonest or immoral considerations, external influences, or
pressure.

Section 4. Non-interference by a lawyer. — Unless authorized by law or a court, a lawyer shall not assist or
cause a branch, agency, office or officer of the government to interfere in any matter before any court,
tribunal, or other government agency.

Section 5. Lawyer’s duty and discretion in procedure and strategy. — A lawyer shall not allow the client
to dictate or determine the procedure in handling the case.

Nevertheless, a lawyer shall respect the client’s decision to settle or compromise the case after explaining its
consequences to the client.
 [A.C. No. 13675. July 11, 2023.]
[Formerly CBD 19-6024]
MARY ROSE E. DIZON, RANDOLPH STEPHEN G. PLEYTO, and JONASH BELGRADE
C. TABANDA, complainants, vs. MAILA LEILANI TRINIDAD-RADOC, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM p:
This resolves the Complaint 1 filed on April 15, 2019 by Mary Rose E. Dizon (Mary Rose),
Randolph Stephen G. Pleyto (Randolph), and Jonash Belgrade C. Tabanda (Jonash), (collectively,
the complainants) against Atty. Maila Leilani B. Trinidad-Radoc (Atty. Trinidad-Radoc) for violating
Canon 16, Rules 16.01, and 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), praying for her
disbarment and for the return of the misappropriated amount of P450,000.00, as well as attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and cost of suit. CAIHTE
The Facts
The complainants are young business entrepreneurs who engaged the services of Atty. Trinidad-
Radoc in relation to a lease contract with a certain Mr. and Mrs. Nemesio Peralta, Jr. (Spouses Peralta).
Randolph and Jonash initially discussed with Atty. Trinidad-Radoc, through calls and text messages, the
circumstances of their transaction with Spouses Peralta. 2
On November 11, 2016, Atty. Trinidad-Radoc met with Jonash and Randolph informing them
that she had already drafted a complaint against the Spouses Peralta, and that she needs P50,000.00 as
acceptance fee and another P50,000.00 as "filing fee." 3 Jonash and Randolph paid Atty. Trinidad-
Radoc P20,000.00 in cash and an P80,000.00-check covering the total amount of her fees. 4
On November 15, 2016, Atty. Trinidad-Radoc showed Jonash and Randolph the printed copy of
the complaint and asked them to sign the Verification part. Atty. Trinidad-Radoc assured them that she
will file the signed complaint after their meeting that day. 5
Later on, Jonash texted Atty. Trinidad-Radoc to clarify the "attachment of properties" she had
claimed was the best remedy. Atty. Trinidad-Radoc informed him that it will cost P100,000.00 to file
such an "attachment case." On November 21, 2016 (Monday), Atty. Trinidad-Radoc texted Jonash that
she was "due to file an attachment on Wednesday. I was advised by the judge to file it even if they will
not declare bankruptcy so as to secure our demand to be given priority over other creditors." 6
On November 23, 2016 (Wednesday), Atty. Trinidad-Radoc texted Jonash that she had already
filed the "attachment case" and asked to be reimbursed the P98,000.00 she allegedly paid. 7
Sometime between November 23 and 29, 2016, Atty. Trinidad-Radoc called Jonash to set
another meeting to update them on the "attachment case" and reiterated the demand for payment of the
P98,000.00. On December 14, 2016, she reiterated her claim. After negotiations on the mode of
payment, Randolph deposited P49,000.00 as fifty percent (50%) downpayment at the PNB
Congressional Branch, Quezon City. 8
On December 20, 2016, Atty. Trinidad-Radoc messaged that she had filed a complaint with the
Bureau of Immigration (BI) to prevent the Spouses Peralta from leaving the country. The next day, she
demanded payment for a "Claims and Damages Fee." Randolph thus proceeded to the PNB
Congressional Branch to deposit P150,000.00. Atty. Trinidad-Radoc confirmed receipt of the payment
later that day, messaging via SMS: "Ok na. I was able to withdraw the 150k. My secretary is on her way
back to the city hall n. Will update you again. Tnx." 9
On February 1, 2017, Atty. Trinidad-Radoc notified the complainants that the decision in the
case has yet to be released but she is expecting it anytime. On February 3, 2017, she asked for another
P150,000.00 as additional "claims and damages fee." Randolph paid the amount accordingly. 10
On February 6, 2017, Atty. Trinidad-Radoc declared that the complainants won the case, and that
the court awarded P5 million in their favor. She added that the decision was already executory and that
they will schedule the "sheriff's sale." 11
On February 18, 2017, Atty. Trinidad-Radoc claimed that the "sheriff's sale" was successful, but
the property of the Spouses Peralta was only sold at P2.2 million and they had to wait for the second sale
to satisfy the P5 million judgment award. 12
On February 28, 2017, Atty. Trinidad-Radoc demanded another P200,000.00 as "buffer" money
for her bidder, "in case magkulang ang bid niya." The complainants, however, failed to deposit the
amount as they had no more money to give her. 13 aScITE
The complainants waited for days for feedback, but it was only on March 13, 2017, when Atty.
Trinidad-Radoc assured them that the release of the PHP5 Million judgment award was already being
processed and that she would make the appropriate motion for its execution and release. 14
In the succeeding days, the complainants would inquire for updates, however, Atty. Trinidad-
Radoc would only provide alibis. On May 19, 2017, Atty. Trinidad-Radoc claimed that the check
representing the judgment award was already prepared. For several days, the complainants pressed Atty.
Trinidad-Radoc on retrieving the check, but received no response. This prompted Jonash to proceed to
the Quezon City Hall to receive the check personally. When he verified the case through the Quezon
City Hall of Justice portal, he was surprised he could not find any case under their names, nor of the
Spouses Peralta. He messaged Atty. Trinidad-Radoc about it several times but again
received no reply. 15
Eventually, Atty. Trinidad-Radoc informed the complainants that the judgment award was
already credited to the BDO bank account of Jonash. However, when he inquired with the bank, Jonash
was surprised to learn that no such transaction existed. From May 22 to June 5, 2017, he repeatedly
messaged Atty. Trinidad-Radoc, but received no response. 16
On June 23, 2017, the complainants alleged that Atty. Trinidad-Radoc confessed that she
defrauded them by leading them to believe she filed the "attachment" and immigration complaints, that
the court had awarded them P5 million as damages, and that the amount was credited the bank account
of Jonash. She also confessed that she misappropriated the P450,000.00, or the aggregate amount she
received from the complainants. With remorse, she executed a handwritten Undertaking 17 to return the
money. 18
However, despite repeated demands, Atty. Trinidad-Radoc still failed to fulfill her undertaking.
The complainants thus proceeded to file a criminal complaint against her for Estafa. They were issued a
Certification 19 from the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City confirming, Atty.
Trinidad-Radoc's failure to file the civil complaint:
[B]ased on the civil records and e-court system of this office from November 2016 to
present, there is no civil case filed by RANDOLPH STEPHEN G. PLEYTO . . . against
NEMESIO S. PERALTA, JR. 20
The complainants likewise filed herein administrative case for the disbarment of Atty. Trinidad-
Radoc and prayed that she be directed to return the P450,000.00 she misappropriated, including interest,
as well as attorneys' fees, expenses of litigation, and cost of suit. 21
The Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
In his Report and Recommendation, 22 the IBP Investigating Commissioner Oliver A.
Cachapero (Investigating Commissioner) found Atty. Trinidad-Radoc guilty of violating Canons 15
and 16 of the CPR and recommended a suspension of three years. It was also observed that despite
orders to attend the mandatory conference and file her Answer, Atty. Trinidad-Radoc failed to do so.
Since the notices were not returned unserved, there was reason to believe that she received the copies of
the Complaint and the IBP orders. 23 DETACa
The Investigating Commissioner underscored that Atty. Trinidad-Radoc should have known that
having been engaged by the complainants, she owed fidelity to their cause and should have always been
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in her. She was also found to have violated Canon 16 of
the CPR for misappropriating funds entrusted to her by the complainants. 24
Further, the Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Trinidad-Radoc's failure to deny and
offer a disclaimer to the charges despite her receipt of the summons and the Complaint further
prejudiced and incriminated her. 25
On June 25, 2022, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Notice of Resolution 26 adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation that found Atty. Trinidad-Radoc administratively liable as
such:
RESOLUTION NO. CBD-XXV-2022-06-10
CBD Case No. 19-6024
Mary Rose E. Dizon, et al. vs.
Atty. Maila Leilani B. Trinidad-Radoc
RESOLVED, to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
imposition upon Respondent Atty. Maila Leilani B. Trinidad-Radoc of the penalty
of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS with STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely;
and
RESOLVED FURTHER, to recommend the imposition upon Respondent
of FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (Php5,000.00) each for disobeying the directives of the
Investigating Commissioner, i.e., — i) failure to file an Answer, ii) failure to file
Mandatory Conference Briefer, iii) failure to appear during the Mandatory Conference,
and iv) failure to submit his Position Paper, or a total of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(Php20,000.00). (Emphasis in the original)
 The Issue
Is Atty. Trinidad-Radoc guilty of violating the CPR?
The Ruling of the Court
The Court affirms the factual findings of the IBP but modifies the penalty imposed on Atty.
Trinidad-Radoc.
Time and again, the Court has repeatedly reminded that as a privilege bestowed by law through
the Supreme Court, one's membership in the Bar may be withdrawn where circumstances concretely
show the lawyer's lack of essential qualifications including honesty, fidelity, and integrity. 27 Lawyers
bear the responsibility to meet the profession's exacting standards and any transgression holds him or her
administratively liable and subject to the Court's disciplinary authority. 28
In a Resolution, dated April 11, 2023, the Court En Banc approved the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA), which became effective on May 29, 2023. 29 Section 1 of
its General Provisions provides that the CPRA shall apply "to all pending and future cases, except to the
extent that in the opinion of the Supreme Court, its retroactive application would not be feasible or
would work injustice, in which case the procedure under which the cases were filed shall govern." The
Court finds it apt to apply the CPRA as it would neither be infeasible nor work injustice.
Integrity, as embodied in the CPRA, is the sum total of all the ethical values that every lawyer
must embody and exhibit. A lawyer with integrity, therefore, acts with independence, propriety, fidelity,
competence and diligence, equality, and accountability. Atty. Trinidad-Radoc failed to live up to the
high moral standards required of her. The Court finds that her actions are flagrant violations of the
provisions of the CPRA: HEITAD
Canon 1
Independence
SECTION 1. Independent, Accessible, Efficient, and Effective Legal Service. — A
lawyer shall make legal services accessible in an efficient and effective manner. In
performing this duty, a lawyer shall maintain independence, act with integrity, and at all
times ensure the efficient and effective delivery of justice.
xxx xxx xxx
Canon IV
Competence and Diligence
A lawyer professionally handling a client's cause shall, to the best of his or her
ability, observe competence, diligence, commitment, and skill consistent with the
fiduciary nature of the lawyer-client relationship, regardless of the nature of the legal
matter or issues involved, and whether for a fee or pro bono.
SECTION 1. Competent, Efficient, and Conscientious Service. — A lawyer shall provide
legal service that is competent, efficient, and conscientious. A lawyer shall be thorough in
research, preparation, and application of the legal knowledge and skills necessary for an
engagement.
SECTION 2. Undertaking Legal Services; Collaborating Counsel. — A lawyer shall
only undertake legal services he or she can deliver. . . .
SECTION 3. Diligence and Punctuality. — A lawyer shall diligently and seasonably act
on any legal matter entrusted by a client. A lawyer shall be punctual in all appearances,
submissions of pleadings and documents before any court, tribunal or other government
agency, and all matters professionally referred by the client, including meetings and other
commitments.
SECTION 4. Diligence in All Undertakings. — A lawyer shall observe diligence in all
professional undertakings, and shall not cause or occasion delay in any legal matter
before any court, tribunal, or other agency. . . .
Atty. Trinidad-Radoc violated the CPRA by deceiving and defrauding her client
Atty. Trinidad-Radoc was engaged to file a civil case in favor of the complainants. She steered
the complainants to believe that she had filed a money claim against the Spouses Peralta, and asked for
the attachment of the latter's properties, convincing them to sign the complaint, and hastily demanded
payment for her services. At one point, she even convinced the complainants that filing an action to
attach the properties of the Spouses Peralta was based on a judge's advice, assuring them that their legal
concerns were attentively taken care of. To further the ruse, she claimed she had filed a case with the BI
to prevent the Spouses Peralta from leaving the country. Thereafter, she successfully convinced the
complainants that their phantom case had progressed and resulted in the trial court awarding them with
P5 million. However, when pressed for the proceeds, Atty. Trinidad-Radoc no longer replied.
Here, there is nary a doubt that Atty. Trinidad-Radoc hoodwinked the complainants to believe
their interests in their Sublease Agreement against the Spouses Peralta were being protected. Worse, she
led them to believe that the trial court had granted them a monetary award that she had deposited to the
complainant's bank account. These actions reflect a complete lack of integrity unbefitting of a member
of the Bar.
Atty. Trinidad-Radoc's failure to return her client's money is a CPRA violation
Sections 49 and 50, Canon III of the CPRA emphasizes a lawyer's fiduciary relationship with a
client by a strict mandate, thus: aDSIHc
SECTION 49. Accounting during Engagement. — A lawyer, during the existence of the
lawyer-client relationship, shall account for and prepare an inventory of any fund or
property belonging to the client, whether received from the latter or from a third person,
immediately upon such receipt.
When funds are entrusted to a lawyer by a client for a specific purpose, the lawyer
shall use such funds only for the client's declared purpose. Any unused amount of the
entrusted funds shall be promptly returned to the client upon accomplishment of the
stated purpose or the client's demand.
SECTION 50. Separate Funds. — A lawyer shall keep the funds of the clients separate
and apart from his or her own and those of others kept by the lawyer.
In Egger v. Atty. Duran, 30 the Court explained this highly fiduciary relationship between a
lawyer and client in this wise:
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes
on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship
imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or
received for or from his client. Thus, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds
held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he
has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality, as well as of professional
ethics. 31
Believing their interests were being protected, the complainants dutifully complied with Atty.
Trinidad-Radoc's demands for the payment of her legal fees. In sum, the complainants paid a total of
P450,000.00 in the following tranches:

November 11, : PHP20,000.00 cash

2016
PHP80,000.00 PSBank Check No. 0158342
December 14, : PHP49,000.00 through deposit to Atty. Trinidad-Radoc's account at PNB
2016 Congressional Branch
December 21, : PHP150,000.00 through deposit to Trinidad-Radoc's account at PNB
2016 Congressional Branch
February 3, 2017 : PHP150,000.00 through deposit to Atty. Trinidad-Radoc's account at PNB
Congressional Branch

Notwithstanding her eventual confession and undertaking to return said amount to the
complainants, as reported by the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Trinidad-Radoc has yet to return the
money.
In Belleza v. Atty. Macasa, 32 the Court decreed that a lawyer has the duty to deliver his or her
client's funds or properties as they fall due or upon demand. A lawyer's failure to return the client's
money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he or she has misappropriated it for his or her
own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him or her by the client. It is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal
profession and deserves punishment. 33
Undoubtedly, Atty. Trinidad-Radoc is also liable for violating Sections 49 and 50 of the CPRA.
The appropriate penalty is disbarment
The Court has repeatedly held that to justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of
must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. 34 An act to be considered grossly immoral shall be
willful, flagrant, or shameless, as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members
of the community. 35
In Manalang v. Atty. Buendia, 36 the Court ruled that it will not hesitate to mete out the grave
penalty of disbarment if a lawyer is found guilty of misrepresentation and deception of his or her client.
The Court disbarred the respondent lawyer who failed to file a case of annulment of marriage despite
 receipt of an acceptance fee of P270,000.00, and deliberately misled and deceived her client by
fabricating a court decision. ATICcS
In Madria v. Atty. Rivera, 37 the Court disbarred the respondent lawyer who guaranteed to his
client that he can obtain the decree of annulment without the petitioner appearing in court. Upon inquiry,
the petitioner found that her petition was actually dismissed and the signature in the alleged decision
presented by the respondent lawyer was forged. The Court explained in that case that his act "not only
violates the court and its processes, but also betrays the trust and confidence reposed in him by his
client." 38
Jurisprudence is likewise replete with similar cases where lawyers who misappropriated their
clients' money were meted with the ultimate penalty of disbarment from the practice of law. In CF
Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Torres, 39 the Court disbarred the respondent lawyer whose modus
operandi involved repeatedly requesting the issuance of checks purportedly for settling seafarers' claims
against the complainant's various principals, only to have such checks deposited to an unauthorized bank
account. In Arellano University, Inc. v. Atty. Mijares III, 40 the Court disbarred the lawyer for
misappropriating his client's money intended for securing a certificate of title on the latter's behalf.
Similarly, in Freeman v. Atty. Reyes, 41 the same penalty was imposed upon the lawyer who
misappropriated the insurance proceeds of her client's deceased husband.
As such, the Court modifies the penalty recommended by the IBP and finds that the acts of Atty.
Trinidad-Radoc as serious offenses under Section 33 (d) and (e), Canon IV of the CPRA:
SECTION 33. Serious Offenses. — Serious offenses include:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Gross negligence in the performance of duty, or conduct that is reckless and
inexcusable, which results in the client being deprived of his or her day in court;
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Misappropriating a client's funds or properties[.]
It likewise does not escape the Court that Atty. Trinidad-Radoc willfully disregarded the lawful
orders and processes of the IBP-CBD directing her to file her Answer, to attend the mandatory
conferences, and to file her position paper, despite due notice. This is an aggravating circumstance under
Section 38 (b) (7), Canon VI of the CPRA, which allows the Court to impose the penalties of suspension
or fine for a period or amount not exceeding double of the maximum prescribed thereunder. The
Supreme Court may, in its discretion, impose the penalty of disbarment depending on the number and
gravity of the aggravating circumstances. 42
All things considered, the Court finds that the actions of Atty. Trinidad-Radoc warrant the
imposition of the supreme penalty of disbarment. The Court cannot ignore the brazen and shameless
fraud perpetrated by Atty. Trinidad-Radoc, using her legal knowledge and skills to deceive and lead on
her clients to keep on claiming her legal costs to the point of their own bankruptcy.
Atty. Trinidad-Radoc is also directed to pay in full the amount of P450,000.00 to the
complainants within 10 days from notice, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, from
the finality of this decision until full payment.
On a final note, the Court reminds that lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice.
As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a
high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. In so doing, the people's faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. 43 Any deviation from this sworn duty warrants the Court's
disciplinary powers.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Maila Leilani Trinidad-Radoc is found GUILTY of Gross negligence in
the performance of duty, or conduct that is reckless and inexcusable, which results in the client being
deprived of his or her day in court, under Section 33 (d) and misappropriating a client's funds or
properties, under Section 33 (g) of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability. She
is DISBARRED from the practice of law and her name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately. ETHIDa
Moreover, Atty. Maila Leilani Trinidad-Radoc is ORDERED to RETURN to the complainants
the amount of P450,000.00, with interest of six percent (6%) per annum, reckoned from the date of
finality of this Decision, until full payment.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to her personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
Copies shall likewise be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and
guidance; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Dizon v. Trinidad-Radoc, A.C. No. 13675 (Resolution), [July 11, 2023]
 CANON II
PROPRIETY

A lawyer shall, at all times, act with propriety and maintain the appearance of propriety in personal and
professional dealings, observe honesty, respect and courtesy, and uphold the dignity of the legal profession
consistent with the highest standards of ethical behavior.

Section 1. Proper conduct. — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.

Section 2. Dignified conduct. — A lawyer shall respect the law, the courts, tribunals, and other government
agencies, their officials, employees, and processes, and act with courtesy, civility, fairness, and candor
towards fellow members of the bar.

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on one’s fitness to practice law, nor behave in a
scandalous manner, whether in public or private life, to the discredit of the legal profession.

Section 3. Safe environment; avoid all forms of abuse or harassment. — A lawyer shall not create or
promote an unsafe or hostile environment, both in private and public settings, whether online, in
workplaces, educational or training institutions, or in recreational areas.

To this end, a lawyer shall not commit any form of physical, sexual, psychological, or economic abuse or
violence against another person. A lawyer is also prohibited from engaging in any gender-based harassment
or discrimination.

Section 4. Use of dignified, gender-fair, and child- and culturally-sensitive language. — A lawyer shall
use only dignified, gender-fair, child- and culturally-sensitive language in all personal and professional
dealings.

To this end, a lawyer shall not use language which is abusive, intemperate, offensive or otherwise improper,
oral or written, and whether made through traditional or electronic means, including all forms or types of
mass or social media.

Section 5. Observance of fairness and obedience. — A lawyer shall, in every personal and professional
engagement, insist on the observance of the principles of fairness and obedience to the law.

Section 6. Harassing or threatening conduct. — A lawyer shall not harass or threaten a fellow lawyer, the
latter’s client or principal, a witness, or any official or employee of a court, tribunal, or other government
agency.

Section 7. Formal decorum and appearance. — A lawyer shall observe formal decorum before all courts,
tribunals, and other government agencies.

A lawyer’s attire shall be consistent with the dignity of the court, tribunal or other government agency, with
due respect to the person’s sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression.

Section 8. Prohibition against misleading the court, tribunal, or other government agency. — A lawyer
shall not misquote, misrepresent, or mislead the court as to the existence or the contents of any document,
argument, evidence, law, or other legal authority, or pass off as one’s own the ideas or words of another, or
assert as a fact that which has not been proven.

Section 9. Obstructing access to evidence or altering, destroying, or concealing evidence. — A lawyer

shall not obstruct another lawyer’s access to evidence during trial, including testimonial evidence, or alter,
destroy, or conceal evidence.

Section 10. Conduct in the presentation of a witness. — A lawyer shall avoid all forms of impropriety
when presenting or confronting a witness.

A lawyer shall not coach, abuse, discriminate against, or harass any witness, in or out of the court, tribunal,
or other government agency, or talk to a witness during a break or recess in the trial, while a witness is still
under examination. Neither shall a lawyer direct, assist, or abet any misrepresentation or falsehood by a
witness.

Section 11. False representations or statements; duty to correct. — A lawyer shall not make false
representations or statements. A lawyer shall be liable for any material damage caused by such false
representations or statements.
A lawyer shall not, in demand letters or other similar correspondence, make false representations or
statements, or impute civil, criminal, or administrative liability, without factual or legal basis.

A lawyer shall correct false or inaccurate statements and information made in relation to an application for
admission to the bar, any pleading, or any other document required by or submitted to the court, tribunal or
agency, as soon as its falsity or inaccuracy is discovered or made known to him or her.

Section 12. Duty to report dishonest, deceitful or misleading conduct. — A lawyer shall immediately
inform a court, tribunal, or other government agency of any dishonest, deceitful or misleading conduct
related to a matter being handled by said lawyer before such court, tribunal, or other government agency.

A lawyer shall also report to the appropriate authority any transaction or unlawful activity that is required to
be reported under relevant laws, including the submission of covered and suspicious transactions under
regulatory laws, such as those concerning anti-money laundering. When disclosing or reporting the
foregoing information to the appropriate court, tribunal, or other government agency, the lawyer shall not be
deemed to have violated the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality.

Any such information shall be treated with strict confidentiality.

A baseless report shall be subject to civil, criminal, or administrative action.

Section 13. Imputation of a misconduct, impropriety, or crime without basis. — A lawyer shall not,
directly or indirectly, impute to or accuse another lawyer of a misconduct, impropriety, or a crime in the
absence of factual or legal basis.

Neither shall a lawyer, directly or indirectly, file or cause to be filed, or assist in the filing of frivolous or
baseless administrative, civil, or criminal complaints against another lawyer.

Section 14. Remedy for grievances; insinuation of improper motive. — A lawyer shall submit grievances
against any officer of a court, tribunal, or other government agency only through the appropriate remedy and
before the proper authorities.

Statements insinuating improper motive on the part of any such officer, which are not supported by
substantial evidence, shall be ground for disciplinary action.

Section 15. Improper claim of influence or familiarity. — A lawyer shall observe propriety in all dealings
with officers and personnel of any court, tribunal, or other government agency, whether personal or
professional. Familiarity with such officers and personnel that will give rise to an appearance of
impropriety, influence, or favor shall be avoided.

A lawyer shall not make claims of power, influence, or relationship with any officer of a court, tribunal, or
other government agency.

Section 16. Duty to report life-threatening situations. — A lawyer who has reasonable grounds to believe
that a life-threatening situation is likely to develop in relation to any proceeding in any court, tribunal, or
other government agency shall immediately report the same to the proper authorities.

Section 17. Non-solicitation and impermissible advertisement. — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,
solicit, or appear to solicit, legal business.

A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, advertise legal services on any platform or media except with the
use of dignified, verifiable, and factual information, including biographical data, contact details, fields of
practice, services offered, and the like, so as to allow a potential client to make an informed choice. In no
case shall the permissible advertisement be self-laudatory.

A lawyer, law firm, or any of their representatives shall not pay or give any benefit or consideration to any
media practitioner, award-giving body, professional organization, or personality, in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity or recognition, to attract legal representation, service, or retainership.

Section 18. Prohibition against self-promotion. — A lawyer shall not make public appearances and
statements in relation to a terminated case or legal matter for the purpose of self-promotion, self-
aggrandizement, or to seek public sympathy.

Section 19. Sub-judice rule. — A lawyer shall not use any forum or medium to comment or publicize
opinion pertaining to a pending proceeding before any court, tribunal, or other government agency that
may:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
, or which tends to tarnish the court’s or tribunal’s integrity, or
(c) impute imprope(a) cause a pre-judgment, or
(b) sway public perception so as to impede, obstruct, or influence the decision of such court, tribunal, or
other government agency r motives against any of its members, or
(d) create a widespread perception of guilt or innocence before a final decision. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Section 20. Disclosure of relationship or connection. — A lawyer shall, at the first available opportunity,
formally disclose on record the lawyer’s relationship or connection with the presiding officer of any court,
tribunal, or other government agency, or any of its personnel, or the lawyer’s partners, associates, or clients,
that may serve as a ground for mandatory inhibition in any pending proceeding before such court, tribunal,
or other government agency.

Section 21. Prohibition against gift-giving and donations. — A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly give
gifts, donations, contributions of any value or sort, on any occasion, to any court, tribunal or government
agency, or any of its officers and personnel.

Section 22. No undue advantage of ignorance of the law. — A lawyer shall not take advantage of a non-
lawyer’s lack of education or knowledge of the law.

Section 23. Instituting multiple cases; forum shopping. — A lawyer shall not knowingly engage or
through gross negligence in forum shopping, which offends against the administration of justice, and is a
falsehood foisted upon the court, tribunal, or other government agency.

A lawyer shall not institute or advise the client to institute multiple cases to gain leverage in a case, to harass
a party, to delay the proceedings, or to increase the cost of litigation.

Section 24. Encroaching or interfering in another lawyer’s engagement; exception. — A lawyer shall not,
directly or indirectly, encroach upon or interfere in the professional engagement of another lawyer.

This includes a lawyer’s attempt to communicate, negotiate, or deal with the person represented by another
lawyer on any matter, whether pending or not in any court, tribunal, body, or agency, unless when initiated
by the client or with the knowledge of the latter’s lawyer.

A lawyer, however, may give proper advice and assistance to anyone seeking relief against perceived
unfaithful or neglectful counsel based on the Code.

Section 25. Responsibility of a solo practitioner. — A lawyer in solo practice shall ensure that all matters
requiring such lawyer’s professional skill and judgment are promptly and competently addressed.

Section 26. Definition of a law firm; choice of firm name. — A law firm is any private office, partnership,
or association, exclusively comprised of a lawyer or lawyers engaged to practice law, and who hold
themselves out as such to the public.

In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading, or assumed name shall be used. The continued use of the
name of a deceased, incapacitated, or retired partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its
communications that said partner is deceased, incapacitated, or retired.

Section 27. Partner who assumes public office. — When a partner assumes public office, such partner shall
withdraw from the firm and such partner’s name shall be removed from the firm name, unless allowed by
law to practice concurrently.

Section 28. Dignified government service. — Lawyers in government service shall observe the standard of
conduct under the CPRA, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
and other related laws and issuances in the performance of their duties.

Any violation of the CPRA by lawyers in government service shall be subject to disciplinary action,
separate and distinct from liability under pertinent laws or rules.

Section 29. Lawyers formerly in government service. — A lawyer who has left government service shall
not engage in private practice pertaining to any matter before the office where he or she used to be
connected within a period of one (1) year from his or her separation from such office. Justices, judges,
clerks of court, city, provincial, and regional prosecutors shall not appear before any court within the
territorial jurisdiction where they previously served within the same period.

After leaving government service, a lawyer shall not accept an engagement which could improperly
influence the outcome of the proceedings which the lawyer handled or intervened in, or over which the
lawyer previously exercised authority, while in said service.
Section 30. No financial interest in transactions; no gifts. — A lawyer in government shall not, directly or
indirectly, promote or advance his or her private or financial interest or that of another, in any transaction
requiring the approval of his or her office. Neither shall such lawyer solicit gifts or receive anything of value
in relation to such interest.

Such lawyer in government shall not give anything of value to, or otherwise unduly favor, any person
transacting with his or her office, with the expectation of any benefit in return.

Section 31. Prosecution of criminal cases. — The primary duty of a public prosecutor is not to convict but
to see that justice is done.

Suppressing facts, concealing of, tampering with or destroying evidence, coaching a witness, or offering
false testimony is cause for disciplinary action.

The obligations of a public prosecutor shall also be imposed upon lawyers in private practice who are
authorized to prosecute under the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor.

Section 32. Lawyers in the academe. — A lawyer serving as a dean, administrative officer, or faculty
member of an educational institution shall at all times adhere to the standards of behavior required of
members of the legal profession under the CPRA, observing propriety, respectability, and decorum inside
and outside the classroom, and in all media.

Section 33. Conflict of interest for lawyers in the academe. — A lawyer serving as a dean, administrative
officer, or faculty member of an educational institution shall disclose to the institution any adverse interest
of a client.

Upon discovery of any adverse interest of the lawyer’s client which directly affects any student who is
under his or her direct supervision and guidance, the lawyer shall likewise disclose the same to the
institution.

Section 34. Paralegal services; lawyer’s responsibility. — A paralegal is one who performs tasks that
require familiarity with legal concepts, employed or retained by a lawyer, law office, corporation,
governmental agency, or other entity for non-diagnostic and non-advisory work in relation to legal matters
delegated by such lawyer, law office, corporation, governmental agency, or other entity.

A lawyer must direct or supervise a paralegal in the performance of the latter’s delegated duties.

The lawyer’s duty of confidentiality shall also extend to the services rendered by the paralegal, who is
equally bound to keep the privilege.

Section 35. Non-delegable legal tasks. — A lawyer shall not delegate to or permit a non-lawyer, including
a paralegal, to:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(a) accept cases on behalf of the lawyer;

(b) give legal advice or opinion;
(c) act independently without the lawyer’s supervision or direction;
(d) to hold himself or herself out as a lawyer, or be named in association with a lawyer in any pleading or
submission to any court, tribunal, or other government agency;
(e) appear in any court, tribunal, or other government agency, or actively participate in formal legal
proceedings on behalf of a client, except when allowed by the law or rules;
(f) conduct negotiations with third parties unless allowed in administrative agencies, without a lawyer’s
supervision or direction;
(g) sign correspondence containing a legal opinion;
(h) perform any of the duties that only lawyers may undertake. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

These provisions shall not apply to law student practitioners under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court.

RESPONSIBLE USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

A lawyer shall uphold the dignity of the legal profession in all social media interactions in a manner that
enhances the people’s confidence in the legal system, as well as promote its responsible use.

Section 36. Responsible use. — A lawyer shall have the duty to understand the benefits, risks, and ethical
implications associated with the use of social media.
Section 37. Online posts. — A lawyer shall ensure that his or her online posts, whether made in a public or
restricted privacy setting that still holds an audience, uphold the dignity of the legal profession and shield it
from disrepute, as well as maintain respect for the law.

Section 38. Non-posting of false or unverified statements, disinformation. — A lawyer shall not
knowingly or maliciously post, share, upload or otherwise disseminate false or unverified statements,
claims, or commit any other act of disinformation.

Section 39. Prohibition against fraudulent accounts. — A lawyer shall not create, maintain or operate
accounts in social media to hide his or her identity for the purpose of circumventing the law or the
provisions of the CPRA.

Section 40. Non-disclosure of privileged information through online posts. — A lawyer shall not reveal,
directly or indirectly, in his or her online posts confidential information obtained from a client or in the
course of, or emanating from, the representation, except when allowed by law or the CPRA.

Section 41. Duty to safeguard client confidences in social media. — A lawyer, who uses a social media
account to communicate with any other person in relation to client confidences and information, shall exert
efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure or use of, or unauthorized access to, such an
account.

Section 42. Prohibition against influence through social media. — A lawyer shall not communicate,
whether directly or indirectly, with an officer of any court, tribunal, or other government agency through
social media to influence the latter’s performance of official duties.

Section 43. Legal information; legal advice. — Pursuant to a lawyer’s duty to society and the legal
profession, a lawyer may provide general legal information, including in answer to questions asked, at any
fora, through traditional or electronic means, in all forms or types of mass or social media.

A lawyer who gives legal advice on a specific set of facts as disclosed by a potential client in such fora or
media dispenses Limited Legal Service and shall be bound by all the duties in the CPRA, in relation to such
Limited Legal Service.

Section 44. Online posts that could violate conflict of interest. — A lawyer shall exercise prudence in
making posts or comments in social media that could violate the provisions on conflict of interest under the
CPRA.

[A.C. No. 8471. August 22, 2023.]

JUDGE RAY ALAN T. DRILON and ATTY. CORAZON P.
ROMERO, complainants, vs. ATTY. ARIEL D. MAGLALANG, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
In their Complaint-Affidavit 1 dated September 2, 2019, Judge Ray Alan T. Drilon (Judge
Drilon), and Clerk of Court V Atty. Corazon P. Romero (Atty. Romero), both of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 41, Bacolod City charged Atty. Ariel D. Maglalang (Atty. Maglalang) with fabrication of
Order 2 dated August 2, 2006 in Civil Case No. 206-16977 (Forged Order), a non-existent case, which
was supposedly docketed in their court. 3
The Forged Order, signed by "Presiding Judge ALAN RAY DRILON" declared the presumptive
death of Ruby S. Madrinian (Madrinian) apparently upon the petition of his wife, Jodee Andren
(Andren). 4 It stated:
As the Petitioner, strongly believes that her husband is now dead for legal
purposes, the Court put its wisdom on the same ground. Petition proved that the
[r]espondent has been absence [sic] for almost seven (7) years without any
communication. Such actuation cannot be tolerated by a normal individual, much with us
as Filipinos wherein close-family-ties has been deeply inflicted [sic] and has become our
social norms.
In accordance with Article 390 of the Civil Code, after an absence of seven years,
it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, except for those succession [sic].
WHEREFORE, premises considered, ORDER is hereby issued declaring
Respondent RUBY S. MADRINIAN as ABSENTEE and accordingly presume[d] dead
for all legal purposes [sic]. HTcADC
 Let a copy of this Order be served to the National Statistic Office [sic] and to the
Office of the Solicitor General. 5 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
Sometime in July 2008, Judge Drilon and Atty. Romero retrieved a copy of the Forged Order.
Upon verification, the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City issued a
Certificate 6 dated July 16, 2008 that there was no case docketed as Civil Case No. 206-16977,
entitled "Jodee P. Andren versus Ruby S. Madrinian." 7 They also made the following observations with
respect to the Forged Order:
a) The case number is not in consonance with the chronological numbering of cases with
the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC-Bacolod City;
b) The signature appearing on the forged order is not the signature of Judge Ray Alan T.
Drilon;
c) The full name of the Judge is RAY ALAN T. DRILON and not Alan Ray Drilon as
appearing in the fake court order;
d) The way the spurious court order is written is much different from the way Judge Ray
Alan T. Drilon writes his orders or resolutions; [and]
e) The heading and caption appearing in the fake order is different from the format the
court is using. 8
Thereafter, Judge Drilon and Atty. Romero sought the assistance of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter. 9
The NBI then submitted a report which contained, among others, the sworn statements of
Andren, and Nenita Kho-Artizano (Kho-Artizano). In her Sworn Statement 10 dated April 2, 2009,
Andren identified Atty. Maglalang as the person who gave her the Forged Order, viz.:
Q: I will show you a copy of an Order signed by Judge ALAN RAY DRILON dated
August 2, 2006, do you recognize this Order?
A: Yes, Sir because it is a copy of the Order given to me by my lawyer ATTY. ARIEL
MAGLALANG in November 2006. CAIHTE
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Will you please narrate the circumstances of [how Atty.] ARIEL MAGLALANG gave
you a falsified Order from Judge DRILON?
A: Sometime in the last week of February 2006, ATTY. ARIEL MAGLALANG was
referred to me by a friend to handle my annulment case as I was going to file an
annulment case against my former husband RUBY MADRINIAN. Sometime in
March 2006, I met ATTY. MAGLALANG and he told me that he will handle my
case [for Php100,000.00] (ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS) assuring me
that it will be approved in three months['] time. He asked for a fifty per cent down
payment but I could only afford [Php30,000.00] (THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS). I
gave him the [Php30,000.00] and he told me that he [would] take care of everything
and [that] there is no need for my personal appearance. After a month passed[,] I
made a follow-up and ATTY. MAGLALANG said that Judge DRILON is very
busy. He told me that he will arrange for me to [meet] with Judge DRILON so that I
can appeal to [him] to speed up my annulment case but the meeting never
happened. I kept on making follow-ups with ATTY. MAGLALANG but he [kept]
on making excuses. Sometime in August 2006[,] ATTY. MAGLALANG told me
that he knows somebody at NSO who can make [a] correction [on] my records and
that he can expedite for the amount of [Php70,000.00] (SEVENTY THOUSAND
PESOS). I [gave] him the [Php70,000.00] and he [gave] me an acknowledgement
receipt.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: After you have given the [Php70,000.00] to ATTY. MAGLALANG, what happened
next?
A: ATTY. MAGLALANG assured me that the NSO record is [okay] and set the date for
my marriage. He convinced me to have the wedding in Manila so that my
documents will be expedited and asked for [Php50,000.00] (FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS) package deal for the wedding and set the date for the wedding on August
22, 2006. On August 20, 2006[,] JOHN RAY WISKUS arrived and we got married
at Manila City Hall with ATTY. MAGLALANG also as one of the witnesses.
Q: After the wedding, which was facilitated by ATTY. MAGLALANG, what happened
next?
A: I asked for a copy of my annulment order from ATTY. MAGLALANG and after
many follow-ups he gave me my annulment order signed by Judge DRILON
 sometime in November 2006 and I then flew to Kuwait to join my husband there.
Sometime in March 2008[,] I was about to file my immigrant visa to the [United]
States and I asked Nanay NENITA ARTIZANO, who is my caretaker in the
Philippines, to get a copy of my corrected and updated record at NSO and to my
surprise it was neither corrected nor annulled despite of the assurances and the order
of annulment given to me by ATTY. MAGLALANG. I hired ATTY. BIMBO
LAVIDEZ to verify the validity of the annulment order signed by Judge DRILON
given to me by ATTY. MAGLALANG and it was then [that] I found out that the
order was fake and that no petition for annulment was filed by my lawyer
ATTY. MAGLALANG in the sala of Judge DRILON. aScITE
Q: At the moment we have nothing more to ask from you[. Is] there anything more that you
want to add, delete or correct in your statement?
A: Yes Sir, I would like to give you a copy of ATTY. [MAGLALANG's] photo taken after
the reception during my wedding in Manila. 11 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Andren identified the Acknowledgement Receipt 12 dated August 11, 2006 issued by Atty.
Maglalang for the PHP70,000.00 he received from her "for the correction of [her] public
records." 13 She also identified the photograph of herself and Atty. Maglalang taken at her wedding. 14
In her Sworn Statement 15 dated April 3, 2009, Kho-Artizano corroborated the statements of
Andren, thus:
Q: Ngaa ari ka diri sa opisina sang NBI Bacolod District Office? (Why are you here at the
NBI Bacolod District Office?)
A: Para maghatag sang akon salaysay sang paghatag ni ATTY. ARIEL MAGLALANG
kay JODEE ANDREN-WISKUS sang order halin kay Judge DRILON nga sang
ulihi amon nahibal-an nga fake gali. (To give my statement of how ATTY. ARIEL
MAGLALANG gave to JODEE ANDREN-WISKUS an order from Judge
DRILON which we later found out to be fake).
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Mahimo mo bala masaysay kun paano ginhatag kay JODEE ni ATTY. MAGLALANG
ang order halin kay Judge DRILON nga sang ulihi inyo nahial-an nga fake? (Will
you please narrate how ATTY. MAGLALANG gave to JODEE the Order from
Judge DRILON which was later found out to be fake?)
A: Sang Nobyembre 2006 nagkadto si ATTY. MAGLALANG sa balay ni JODEE sa Villa
Angela kag ginhatag niya kay JODEE ang Order halin kay Judge DRILON. Akon
gid nakita ang paghatag niya sang Order kay dira man ako naga-istar. Sang sunod
nga adlaw nag flight dayon si JODEE sa Kuwait. (On November 2006[,] ATTY.
MAGLALANG went to the house of JODEE at Villa Angela and he gave to
JODEE an Order from Judge DRILON. I saw him give the Order because I also live
in the house. The following day JODEE took a flight to Kuwait).
Q: Mahimo mo bala masaysay kun paano nadiskobrihan nga fake ang Order halin kay
Judge DRILON nga ginhatag ni ATTY. MAGLALANG kay JODEE (Will you
please narrate how the Order from Judge DRILON which ATTY. MAGLALANG
gave to JODEE was found out to be fake?) DETACa
A: Sang March 2008[,] ginsugo ako ni JODEE nga mag follow-up sa NSO sang iya
Marriage Contract kag didto ko nadiskobrihan [nga wala] [makoreksiyonan] ang iya
NSO record kay nagguwa pa ang iya daan nga kasal nga may Order na nga ginhatag
si ATTY. MAGLALANG halin kay Judge DRILON. (On March 2008[,] JODEE
asked me to follow-up at NSO her marriage contract and it was then that I
discovered that the NSO record was not corrected because that old marriage was
still there despite the Order from Judge DRILON which ATTY. MAGLALANG
[gave] to JODEE).
Q: Ano ang masunod nga natabo? (What happened next?)
A: Ginsugo ako ni JODEE nga mangita sang abogado para mag check sang papeles kag
ako gin refer kay ATTY. BIMBO LAVIDEZ. Ginpangita ni ATTY. LAVIDEZ ang
mga dokumento nahanungod sa Annulment ni JODEE apang nadiskobrihan nga
wala sang na file sa sala ni Judge DRILON kag wala man si Judge naka-hatag sang
Order tungod kay wala man kaso nga na file si ATTY. MAGLALANG sa iya
sala. (JODEE asked me to look for a lawyer to check the papers and I was
referred to ATTY. BIMBO LAVIDEZ. ATTY. LAVIDEZ looked for the
documents relative to the annulment of JODEE but he discovered that it was
not filed [in] the sala of Judge DRILON and Judge DRILON has not issued
any Order because no case for annulment was filed before his sala by ATTY.
MAGLALANG). 16 (Emphasis supplied)
 The National Statistics Office (NSO) issued a Certification 17 dated May 15, 2008 that as of
April 30, 2008, their records showed that Andren was married to one Ruby Sabandal Madrinian.
By Resolution 18 dated August 14, 2019, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. The IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) then required the parties to submit their mandatory conference briefs. Upon
receipt of the other party's mandatory conference brief, the parties were also given the opportunity to
submit a Reply. 19
In his Mandatory Conference Brief 20 dated March 7, 2021, Atty. Maglalang averred that he had
relocated to Manila for several years and had not received a copy of the complaint against him. 21 Too,
the documents submitted before the IBP-CBD were merely copies, and were blurred and
incomplete. 22 Finally, he claimed, among others, that: (a) he did not personally know Andren or Kho-
Artizano; and, (b) there was no engagement contract showing that Andren availed of his services for her
annulment case. 23
Neither party filed a Reply within the designated period. Considering the health risks brought by
the COVID-19 pandemic, the IBP-CBD deemed the mandatory conference terminated without need of
further hearing. 24 HEITAD
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In its Report and Recommendation 25 dated August 10, 2022, the IBP-CBD found that Atty.
Maglalang "resorted to [taking] short cuts" by "[making use of a] non-existent order and furnished his
client with the same." 26 In so concluding, the IBP-CBD considered:
1. The name of the judge was written "Alan Ray Drilon" rather than "Ray Alan Drilon";
2. The signature of the Complainant [Judge does] not appear to be his as can be gleaned on
all the documents presented;
3. The manner and style as to how the order was written was different from the style
traditionally adopted by the Complainant;
4. Certification issued by ILDEFONSO M. VILLANUEVA, JR., CLERK OF COURT VI
of the Regional Trial Court[,] 6th [J]udicial [R]egion attesting to the fact that the
office does not have any record in connection with Civil Case No. 206-16977
entitled Jodee P. Andren vs. Ruby S. Madrinian for Presumptive [D]eath; [and],
5. Certification issued by Corazon C. Pagulayan-Torres, Clerk of [C]ourt V of the same
Regional Trial Court, certifying that there "is no case filed in the office[."] 27
Consequently, the IBP-CBD recommended that a penalty of one year suspension be imposed
upon Atty. Maglalang for fabricating the Forged Order. 28
By Extended Resolution 29 dated May 8, 2023, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG)
resolved to adopt the factual findings of the IBP-CBD since Atty. Maglalang only interposed "pure
denial." 30 It however modified the recommended penalty to disbarment. 31 It found that suspension for
one year was too light a penalty for the "deplorable conduct of deceitful behavior in falsifying papers of
the [J]udiciary." 32 As well, the ultimate penalty of disbarment was meted out to lawyers who were
similarly found to have falsified court papers or decisions. 33
Our Ruling
We adopt the factual findings and conclusions of the IBP-CBD, and the penalty recommended
by the IBP-BOG.
The Court is constitutionally-mandated to discipline erring lawyers and purge the legal
profession of its unworthy members. 34 In exercising disciplinary power, the Court calls upon members
of the Bar to account for their actuations as officers of the Court with a view of preserving the purity of
the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice. 35 aDSIHc
Previously, a lawyer's worthiness to remain as such was measured against the Code of
Professional Responsibility which was promulgated on June 21, 1988. Thirty-four years later, or on
April 11, 2023, the Court promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Accountability (CPRA). 36 It took effect on May 29, 2023 37 and explicitly states that its provisions
shall be applied to all pending and future cases, except to the extent that its retroactive application would
not be feasible or would work injustice, in which case the procedure under which the cases were filed
shall govern. 38
The CPRA, like its precursor enjoins lawyers from performing improper acts, such as the
falsification of court decisions, 39 viz.:
 CANON II
Propriety
A lawyer shall, at all times, act with propriety and maintain the appearance of propriety
in personal and professional dealings, observe honesty, respect and courtesy, and uphold
the dignity of the legal profession consistent with the highest standards of ethical
behavior. (n)
SECTION 1. Proper Conduct. — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct. (1.01)
SECTION 2. Dignified Conduct. — A lawyer shall respect the law, the courts, tribunals,
and other government agencies, their officials, employees, and processes, and act with
courtesy, civility, fairness, and candor towards fellow members of the bar. (8a)
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on one's fitness to practice
law, nor behave in a scandalous manner, whether in public or private life, to the discredit
of the legal profession. (7.03a)
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 5. Observance of Fairness and Obedience. — A lawyer shall, in every
personal and professional engagement, insist on the observance of the principles of
fairness and obedience to the law.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 8. Prohibition against Misleading the Court, Tribunal, or Other Government
Agency. — A lawyer shall not misquote, misrepresent, or mislead the court as to the
existence or the contents of any document, argument, evidence, law, or other legal
authority, or pass off as one's own the ideas or words of another, or assert as a fact that
which has not been proven. (10.02a)
CANON III
Fidelity
Fidelity pertains to a lawyer's duty to uphold the Constitution and the laws of the land, to
assist in the administration of justice as an officer of the court, and to advance or defend a
client's cause, with full devotion, genuine interest, and zeal in the pursuit of truth and
justice. (n) x x x
SECTION 2. The Responsible and Accountable Lawyer. — A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land, promote respect for laws and legal processes,
safeguard human rights, and at all times advance the honor and integrity of the legal
profession. ATICcS
As an officer of the court, a lawyer shall uphold the rule of law and conscientiously assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. (12a)
As an advocate, a lawyer shall represent the client with fidelity and zeal within the
bounds of the law and the CPRA. (17a, 19a)
There is substantial evidence, i.e., "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion" 40 that Atty. Maglalang authored and used the Forged
Order. One. Andren and Kho-Artizano both identified Atty. Maglalang as the source of the Forged
Order. 41 Such fact was confirmed by the NBI in a Letter dated April 7, 2009, 42 viz.:
Confidential [i]nvestigation conducted by this Command disclosed that the fake or forged
order was given by ATTY. ARIEL D. MAGLALANG to JODEE P. ANDREN sometime
in November 2006. 43
In this regard, it is a well-settled rule that, in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one who is
found in possession of a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger. 44
Another. The Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City issued two
Certificates 45 dated July 16, 2008 and April 16, 2009, respectively, which both confirmed that Civil
Case No. 206-16977 was not filed nor docketed thereat.
Finally. Judge Drilon, under whose name the Forged Order was purportedly issued, disclaimed
any involvement in the preparation thereof. More important, Judge Drilon and Atty. Romero, who are in
the best position to know the procedures observed in their court, unequivocally stated that:
a) The case number is not in consonance with the chronological numbering of cases with
the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC-Bacolod City;
b) The signature appearing on the forged order is not the signature of Judge Ray Alan T.
Drilon;
 c) The full name of the Judge is RAY ALAN T. DRILON and not Alan Ray Drilon as
appearing in the fake court order;
d) The way the spurious court order is written is much different from the way Judge Ray
Alan T. Drilon writes his orders or resolutions; [and]
e) The heading and caption appearing in the fake order is different from the format the
court is using. 46 ETHIDa
In response, Atty. Maglalang merely denied the accusations against him. His cursory denial of
the allegations against him carries little weight 47 compared to the testimonial and documentary
evidence adduced by Judge Drilon and Atty. Romero. Indeed, Atty. Maglalang had multiple
opportunities to directly address the allegations against him, but he merely glossed them over. 48 Instead
of meaningfully refuting the allegations, he engaged in a perfunctory denial thereof. Said denial is
tantamount to a general denial because the matters involved are so plainly and necessarily within his
personal knowledge. 49 As such, he is deemed to have tacitly admitted the allegation that he was the
source of the Forged Order. 50
On this score, Atty. Maglalang's authorship and use of the Forged Order contravene Sections 1,
2, 5, and 8 of Canon II, and Section 2, Canon III of the CPRA. In Vasco-Tamaray v. Atty. Daquis, 51 the
Court ordained:
Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust
and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the
legal profession. By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished not only his
integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his
conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and
justice. 52 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indubitably, Atty. Maglalang's acts ultimately bring the legal profession into disrepute. 53 His
acts evince his disrespect for the rule of law and the courts. Further, his use of the Forged Order reflects
poorly on his fitness to practice law, and brings discredit upon the entire legal profession.
The Proper Penalty
Under the CPRA, falsification of documents such as court decisions or orders is considered a
serious offense. 54 Section 37 (b) of Canon VI of the CPRA provides that a respondent found guilty of a
serious offense may be sanctioned with any or a combination of the following penalties: (a) disbarment;
(b) suspension from the practice of law for a period exceeding six months; (c) revocation of notarial
commission and disqualification as notary public for not less than two years; or (d) a fine exceeding
PHP100,000.00.
In Reyes v. Atty. Rivera, 55 Taday v. Apoya, Jr., 56 Madria v. Rivera, 57 and Billanes v.
Latido, 58 all of which have similar facts as here, the Court disbarred respondent-lawyers for falsifying
court orders and decisions in relation to their clients' nullity of marriage cases.
So must it be.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds Atty. Ariel D. Maglalang GUILTY of violation of Sections
1, 2, 5, and 8 of Canon II, and Section 2 of Canon III of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Accountability. He is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ordered STRICKEN
OFF from the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately. TIADCc
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to the
personal records of respondent Atty. Ariel D. Maglalang, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts. cSEDTC
SO ORDERED.
||| (Drilon v. Maglalang, A.C. No. 8471, [August 22, 2023])
 [G.R. No. 227004. April 25, 2023.]
ABS-CBN CORPORATION AND JORGE CARIÑO, petitioners, vs. DATU ANDAL
AMPATUAN, JR., respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J p:
"Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an
unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm
of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-
skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts."
- Associate Justice George A. Malcolm, United States v. Bustos 1
Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to
a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure,
responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair
trial for, as well pointed out, "a responsible press has always
been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration, especially in the criminal field[.]"
- Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, People v. Teehankee, Jr. 2
Courts are not immune from public scrutiny. This is part of a democracy. However, owing to the
nature of the court and its ability to respond to criticism in real time when an utterance tends to
scandalize or disrespect the court, or where its administration of justice would be impeded, the court
may subsequently punish the speaker. As a measure of self-preservation, the courts may exercise its
inherent power to punish for contempt. 3 HTcADC
In the past, this Court has attempted to define sub judice. Today, this definition requires further
clarification given the context of public speech. A violation of the sub judice rule is considered
"improper conduct" and is punishable by indirect contempt. 4 This Court's indirect contempt powers are
broad and traverse all kinds of speech. Contemptuous speech is restricted for different reasons that affect
the administration of our justice. Jurisprudence prescribes different standards for punishing
contemptuous conduct of different participants in a judicial proceeding on a case-by-case basis. The lack
of clear cut rules on the limits of the exercise of speech with clear and present danger to our
administration of justice and well-defined boundaries as to when a speech can be punishable and when it
is privileged leads to confusion among the litigants, their counsels, members of the bench and bar, the
media, and the public. Thus, when these participants commit contemptuous conduct and are held
accountable, they invoke other favorable standards, even when they do not apply.
Adding to the confusion in the rules, we must recognize that contempt can be committed on the
internet, especially on social media. Speech on the internet can be weaponized to diminish public
confidence in the courts and even threaten the lives of judges. With the rise of disinformation, it is time
to rethink why we punish certain kinds of speech and recalibrate our rules to further protect our
independence in our decisions and integrity as an institution.
This case is an opportunity to prescribe the proper conduct and define the limits of speech of
participants in judicial proceedings and harmonize the rules when to impose the subsequent punishment
of indirect contempt. This will also help us to recognize and be more vigilant against any attempt to
weaponize our contempt powers to stifle dissent or suppress access to information on matters of public
interest.
As in this case, the media has the right to give legitimate publicity on matters of public interest
without prior restraint and subsequent punishment. Its broadcast and interview of a key witness in the
Maguindanao Massacre during the pendency of the criminal cases is a matter of grave public concern.
However, its duty to inform the public must be balanced with the court's interest in its administration of
justice as embodied in the sub judice rule. The qualified privilege of a fair and true report of a judicial
proceeding does not extend to a media interview of a potential witness regarding their personal
knowledge. This is true when the statement of the witness is relevant in determining the guilt of an
accused in a pending case, and the interview was done prior to their presentation in court.
This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari 5 filed by ABS-CBN Corporation
(ABS-CBN) and Jorge Cariño (Cariño) assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision 6 and
Resolution, 7 which affirmed the Regional Trial Court's refusal to dismiss 8 the indirect contempt
petition filed against ABS-CBN and Cariño by Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Andal).
 On November 23, 2009, dozens of armed persons stopped the convoy of Maguindanao
gubernatorial candidate Esmael Mangudadatu on its way to file his Certificate of Candidacy. At least 57
died in what is now known as the Maguindanao Massacre. 9 CAIHTE
Criminal cases for murder were filed against 197 persons, including Andal and some members of
his family. 10
On June 23, 2010, Cariño, a reporter for ABS-CBN, interviewed Lakmodin "Laks" Saliao
(Saliao), which aired on TV Patrol World. In the interview, Saliao narrated that he was present when the
Ampatuan family planned what became the Maguindanao Massacre. Saliao named the Ampatuan family
members who were present at the meetings. He also discovered that he was about to be killed for
knowing too much about the massacre. 11
On July 16, 2010, Andal filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt 12 against Saliao, ABS-CBN, and
Cariño. Andal claimed that Saliao's interview was "calculated to interfere with court proceedings to
serve Saliao's own interest without passing through the scrutiny of the police of the National Prosecution
Service if it indeed is to form part of or used as evidence in the murder cases aforesaid." 13 He averred
that Saliao's interview fell under contemptuous conduct punishable under Rule 71, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court. 14
Andal prayed that Saliao, ABS-CBN, and Cariño be cited for indirect contempt for their
respective participations in the interview and that they be prohibited from making further statements in
any forum or media during the pendency of the Maguindanao Massacre cases. 15
ABS-CBN and Cariño jointly filed their Answer with Counterclaims, 16 claiming that the
Petition for Indirect Contempt failed to state a cause of action. 17 They cited People v. Teehankee,
Jr. 18 in claiming that pretrial news about an ongoing criminal case is potentially prejudicial to an
accused only in a trial by jury, not in a trial by judge. 19 They asserted that the broadcast of Saliao's
interview was made in good faith and within the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. 20 They
prayed for the dismissal of the Petition and the grant of compulsory counterclaims of attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, costs of suit, and moral damages. 21
On February 14, 2011, ABS-CBN and Cariño filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing on
Affirmative Defense. 22
In its July 15, 2011 Resolution, 23 the Regional Trial Court denied ABS-CBN and Cariño's
motion. It directed the parties to file their respective position papers instead of conducting a preliminary
hearing. The trial court opined that this would result in the speedy disposition of cases and better serve
the administration of justice. 24 aScITE
On August 31, 2011, ABS-CBN and Cariño filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Alternative
Motion to Conduct Trial. 25 They asserted that this Court has repeatedly held that while the trial court
has the discretion in conducting a hearing on affirmative defenses, for practicality's sake, it should not
hastily deny a motion, especially if the ground raised as an affirmative defense is failure to state a cause
of action. 26 ABS-CBN and Cariño maintained that assuming a preliminary hearing is improper, the
indirect contempt charge against them should be tried on the merits and not merely based on position
papers. 27
On October 20, 2011, the Regional Trial Court granted 28 the Motion and reversed its July 15,
2011 Resolution. It thereafter set the preliminary hearing on ABS-CBN and Cariño's affirmative
defenses. 29
During the preliminary hearing, ABS-CBN and Cariño manifested that they will no longer
present evidence relative to their affirmative defenses and submitted the same for resolution. 30
In its June 8, 2012 Order, 31 the Regional Trial Court denied 32 the affirmative defenses
proffered by ABS-CBN and Cariño, thus:
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause free from the
constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules
must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. (Ginete v.
CA, G.R. No. 127596, September 24, 1998).
Considering the afore[]quoted pronouncement of the Supreme Court, finding the
Affirmative Defense bereft of merit, the same is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, let the
initial trial proceed as previously scheduled on 14 June 2012.
SO ORDERED. 33
On June 27, 2012, ABS-CBN and Cariño filed a Motion for Reconsideration 34 of the June 8,
2012 Order.
On August 14, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied 35 ABS-CBN and Cariño's Motion for
Reconsideration. It also denied the motion to declare Saliao in default since a summons has not yet been
served on Saliao, and thus, the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over him.
 On October 16, 2012, ABS-CBN and Cariño filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With
Applications for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) 36 before the Court
of Appeals. They asserted that the June 8, 2012, and August 14, 2012 Orders of the Regional Trial Court
were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 37
On March 24, 2015, the Court of Appeals dismissed 38 the Petition for Certiorari. It emphasized
that the merits of the Petition for Indirect Contempt against ABS-CBN and Cariño were not at issue.
Instead, the issue for resolution was whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to dismiss the Petition for Indirect Contempt. 39 DETACa
The Court of Appeals also held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the affirmative defenses of ABS-CBN and Cariño:
Public Respondent afforded [ABS-CBN and Cariño] all the avenues to prove their
assertions. Public respondent even granted [ABS-CBN and Cariño] a preliminary hearing
for their affirmative defense, even if it meant reversing his previous ruling when [ABS-
CBN and Cariño] moved for reconsideration therefor. It was only when [ABS-CBN and
Cariño] manifested, at this same preliminary hearing they earnestly implored for in the
first place, that they will no longer present evidence on their affirmative defenses and that
they submit the same for resolution that public respondent finally decided on it. 40
The Court of Appeals also pointed out the inconsistencies in ABS-CBN and Cariño's arguments:
ABS-CBN and Cariño stated that their ground for dismissal is purely legal, that is, failure to state a
cause of action, thus, "only the four corners of the Petition need to be examined to determine whether
the Petition is dismissible. [ABS-CBN and Cariño] do not need to present extraneous evidence to show
the Petition's insufficiency." 41 However, the Court of Appeals noted that in their Motion for
Reconsideration with Alternative Motion to Conduct Trial, ABS-CBN and Cariño asked for a
preliminary hearing on their affirmative defenses to present evidence and confront the witnesses against
them. 42
The Court of Appeals ruled that there was a need to proceed to trial where the parties could
thoroughly ventilate their issues and arguments. It also stated that a petition for certiorari was not the
proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to dismiss. 43
As for the application for injunctive relief, the Court of Appeals held that ABS-CBN and Cariño
were unable to prove a clear and unmistakable right to the relief prayed for, nor did they present
sufficient evidence to support their claim of extreme urgency and paramount necessity of the relief
prayed for. 44
Hence, ABS-CBN and Cariño filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari before this
Court.
In its January 9, 2017 Resolution, 45 this Court required respondent to file his comment.
However, this Resolution was not served on respondent's representative, Bai Shahara Ampatuan. Thus,
in a June 7, 2017 Resolution, 46 this Court required petitioners to provide the current address of
respondent's representative.
Petitioners submitted their Compliance manifesting that they could not find the current address
of respondent's representative. Instead, they informed this Court that Fortun and Santos Law Offices is
respondent's counsel on record in the criminal proceedings before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 221. 47 On October 4, 2017, this Court ordered that the Resolution requiring respondents
to comment on the Petition be sent to Fortun and Santos Law Offices. 48 HEITAD
On January 3, 2018, Fortun and Santos Law Offices requested a copy of the case rollo. 49
On January 12, 2018, Fortun and Santos Law Offices filed its Entry of Appearance and requested
an extension of 15 days to file its comment to the Petition. 50
On February 28, 2018, this Court noted the Entry of Appearance and granted the extension
prayed for, with a warning that no further extension would be given. 51
On June 25, 2018, respondent filed a Motion to Admit 52 the attached Comment 53 alleging that
since the Resolution granting the extension was only received on May 3, 2018, which was beyond the
period of extension prayed for, its lapse should not be attributed to respondent. In the interest of fairness
and justice, respondent prayed that his Comment be admitted on record. 54
On July 23, 2018, this Court granted respondent's Motion to Admit and noted his Comment. 55
On August 2, 2018, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File Opposition to Motion to Admit
Comment and Reply to Comment. 56 They allege that the Comment was filed 146 days from the lapse
of the extended period without any explanation for the delay. 57 Thus, they pray that the Comment be
expunged from the records. 58
On October 15, 2018, this Court noted petitioners' Motion for Leave and the Reply to the
Petition. 59
 Petitioners allege that the interview with Saliao is a fair and accurate report considered as
privileged communication, and thus outside the scope of the sub judice rule. 60 They invoke Fortun v.
Quinsayas, 61 where it was held that the Maguindanao Massacre was a matter of public interest and that
the media has the right to publish these matters. 62 They argue that freedom of speech and of expression
should prevail over the sub judice rule. 63 In sustaining the lower courts, they claim that there will be a
chilling effect on petitioners' future reports on matters of public interest. 64
Petitioners also argue that the Petition for Indirect Contempt should have been dismissed for its
failure to state a cause of action. They argue that the ultimate facts of a cause of action for indirect
contempt in relation to the sub judice rule are not alleged in the Petition. 65 Since contempt proceedings
are akin to criminal proceedings, baseless petitions should be dismissed immediately to avoid
unnecessary proceedings. 66 aDSIHc
Finally, petitioners insist that the Petition for Indirect Contempt should have been dismissed as it
had been rendered moot when Saliao testified in open court. The matters discussed in the interview
ceased to be sub judice after these were incorporated as evidence in the Maguindanao Massacre
cases. 67 Since respondent has been able to cross-examine Saliao in open court, petitioners claim that
the contempt charge lost its significance. 68
Meanwhile, respondent contends that the trial court judge did not gravely abuse his discretion in
issuing its decisions and orders. The judge gave petitioners ample opportunity to present evidence to
prove their affirmative defenses, but they manifested that they would no longer present witnesses. 69 He
asserts that the proper procedure is to go to trial to ventilate the indirect contempt case
thoroughly. 70 Respondent assails petitioners' invocation of Fortun since they did not raise it before the
trial court. Moreover, respondent asserts that the resolution of whether the trial judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion requires factual determination, such as an inquiry into the procedure before the lower
courts. 71
Petitioners filed their Opposition to Motion to Admit Comment, praying for its non-admission
because respondent filed the same 161 days from the extended period. 72
In their Reply, petitioners clarified that they were assailing the trial court's refusal to dismiss the
Petition despite its failure to state a cause of action. 73 Petitioners assert that the issue is a question of
law that this Court may resolve in a Rule 45 petition. 74 Petitioners insist that they correctly relied
on Fortun before the Court of Appeals as it was only promulgated during the pendency of their Petition
for Certiorari, adding that the Court of Appeals should have taken judicial notice of the Fortun decision
and granted their Petition. 75 Finally, petitioners assert that going to trial on a manifestly deficient
indirect contempt charge is inconsistent with justice and will have a chilling effect on media
practitioners. 76
The main issue for this Court's resolution is whether the lower courts committed grave abuse of
discretion in failing to dismiss the Petition for Indirect Contempt against petitioners ABS-CBN
Corporation and Jorge Cariño for failure to state a cause of action. Subsumed in this issue is the
determination of the required allegations sufficient to allege a cause of action for this Court to punish for
contempt. On the merits, we have to determine whether petitioner Jorge Cariño's interview of Lakmodin
"Laks" Saliao, an alleged witness to the planning of the Maguindanao Massacre, and petitioner ABS-
CBN Corporation's broadcast of the interview during the pendency of the criminal case violate the sub
judice rule.
To resolve the Petition, we must examine the basis of this Court's inherent power to punish, who
and what type of speech we can limit, and why we can punish certain kinds of speech as improper
conduct. This Court's contempt power is a form of subsequent punishment that restricts the freedom of
speech, of expression, and of the press. Hence, we should clearly delineate the limits of permissible
restriction and harmonize the rules governing different types of speech of those involved in judicial
proceedings, namely the litigants and their counsels, members of the bench and bar, the media, and the
public. ATICcS
In resolving the Petition, we lay down the framework of the decision and discuss this Court's
contempt power and how it relates to the competing fundamental rights of the sovereign people for their
participation in government and holding powers to account. Then, we reexamine the basis of this Court's
contempt powers, define what constitutes contemptuous speech, trace their evolution in jurisprudence,
and explain why we punish them. Afterwards, we discuss the limitations of this Court's contempt powers
through the different kinds of qualified privilege recognized not to be punishable. Next, we discuss the
foundations of our doctrines in free speech and why the current developments in jurisprudence challenge
our current framework. Finally, we will harmonize the different standards involved in the classes of
speech regulated by the court and balance them with the different interests involved in these types of
speech.
We grant the Petition.
 I
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the exercise of judicial power under Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. 77 It is vested in all courts from the moment of their creation. 78
The power to punish for contempt is indispensable to the administration of justice. 79 It is an
inherent power of courts "essential to the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their
authority[.]" 80 It has a twofold purpose: (1) to protect the dignity, authority, and administration of
justice through punishment of those who disrespect or seek to put them in disrepute, and (2) to compel
the performance of an act or duty which one refuses to perform. 81 It may also be exercised even
without a pending case. 82 Described to be "drastic and extraordinary in its nature," 83 its exercise must
be restrained and judicious and "used only in flagrant cases and with the utmost forbearance." 84
Contempt of court is defined as:
"[D]efiance of the authority, justice[,] or dignity of the court; such conduct as
tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere
with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation. It is defined as
disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It
signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders, but such
conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into
disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. 85 (Citations
omitted)
The Rules of Court distinguish direct from indirect contempt. 86 Rule 71, Section 1 provides
when a party is guilty of direct contempt: ETHIDa
SECTION 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. — A person guilty of
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to
subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily
adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial
Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred
pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court.
Direct contempt is committed in facie curiae or "in the face of the court" 87 which may occur
within or outside judicial proceedings. Any conduct "directed against or assailing the authority and
dignity of the court or a judge, or in the doing of a forbidden act" 88 is direct contempt and may be
punishable summarily without hearing. Declaring a person in direct contempt is summary and
requires no other proof to establish the contumacious act that the judge personally witnessed. 89
On the other hand, indirect contempt is limited in scope and application as provided in Rule 71,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After
a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or
counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt;
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or
in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a
court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or
attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given
to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings
of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without
authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; TIADCc
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an
officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
 Compared to direct contempt, indirect contempt is committed "out of the presence of the
court." 90 These acts are also beyond the personal knowledge or perception of a judge. 91 A separate
proceeding is necessary to punish indirect contempt, which may either be instituted motu proprio by a
judge or by a verified petition, with the respondent having the opportunity to be heard. 92
Contempt proceedings may either be criminal or civil in nature depending on the purpose for
which the court is exercising its inherent power:
A. As to the Nature of the Offense.
A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority
of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of
justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil
contempt consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil
action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against
the party in whose behalf the violated order is made.
A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court,
is an offense against organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense
against public justice which raises an issue between the public and the accused, and the
proceedings to punish it are punitive. On the other hand, the proceedings to punish a civil
contempt are remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of the right of private
persons. It has been held that civil contempt is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a
power of the court.
It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt,
and that no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it
clear that he intended to commit it. On the contrary, there is authority indicating that
since the purpose of civil contempt proceedings is remedial, the defendant's intent in
committing the contempt is immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to
violate the court's order is not a defense in civil contempt. cSEDTC
B. As to the Purpose for which the Power is Exercised
A major factor in determining whether a contempt is civil or criminal is the
purpose for which the power is exercised. Where the primary purpose is to preserve the
court's authority and to punish for disobedience of its orders, the contempt is criminal.
Where the primary purpose is to provide a remedy for an injured suitor and to coerce
compliance with an order, the contempt is civil. A criminal contempt involves no element
of personal injury. It is directed against the power and dignity of the court; private parties
have little, if any, interest in the proceedings for punishment. Conversely, if the contempt
consists in the refusal of a person to do an act that the court has ordered him to do for the
benefit or advantage of a party to an action pending before the court, and the contemnor
is committed until he complies with the order, the commitment is in the nature of an
execution to enforce the judgment of the court; the party in whose favor that judgment
was rendered is the real party in interest in the proceedings. Civil contempt proceedings
look only to the future. And it is said that in civil contempt proceedings, the contemnor
must be in a position to purge himself.
C. As to the Character of the Contempt Proceeding
It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be determined by
the relief sought, or the dominant purpose, and the proceedings are to be regarded as
criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is
primarily compensatory or remedial.
Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal
or quasi-criminal actions. They are punitive in nature, and the Government, the courts,
and the people are interested in their prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the power
and vindicate the authority and dignity of the court, and to punish for disobedience of its
orders. Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal proceedings or prosecutions,
even though the contemptuous act involved is also a crime. The proceeding has been
characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of both a civil and
criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt
proceedings should be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable
to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent with the summary nature of
contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal
prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be
afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that proceedings
under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal
proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial rights
of the accused are preserved. AIDSTE
 Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their
nature; that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a
remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required. As otherwise expressed, a
proceeding for civil contempt is one instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of a
private party to an action and to compel obedience to a judgment or decree intended to
benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is one for civil contempt, regardless of its
form, if the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a special
order made in behalf of the other party and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed, and
the purpose of the punishment is to aid in an enforcement of obedience. The rules of
procedure governing criminal contempt proceedings, or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily
are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings. It has been held that a proceeding for
contempt to enforce a remedy in a civil action is a proceeding in that action. Accordingly,
where there has been a violation of a court order in a civil action, it is not necessary to
docket an independent action in contempt or proceed in an independent prosecution to
enforce the order. It has been held, however, that while the proceeding is auxiliary to the
main case in that it proceeds out of the original case, it is essentially a new and
independent proceeding in that it involves new issues and must be initiated by the
issuance and service of new process.
In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party,
or his successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. In
criminal contempt proceedings, it is generally held that the State is the real prosecutor.
Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is
presumed innocent and the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond
reasonable doubt. In proceedings for civil contempt, there is no presumption, although
the burden of proof is on the complainant, and while the proof need not be beyond
reasonable doubt, it must amount to more than a mere preponderance of evidence. It has
been said that the burden of proof in a civil contempt proceeding lies somewhere between
the criminal "reasonable doubt" burden and the civil "fair preponderance"
burden. 93 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The power to punish for contempt "should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal, because
that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they
exercise." 94
However, attacks against a judge's personal security and safety relating to the exercise of their
judicial functions are also directed against the "court as an organ of the administration of
justice." 95 Contempt in these cases extends to this Court, as the protector of the Judiciary, who may
punish the personal attack in lieu of the judge. This Court's power to protect judges and officers of the
Court is rooted in our constitutional supervision of members of the judicial system. 96 This includes the
duty to uphold not only the dignity and authority of this Court as an institution but also the duty to
protect the personal safety and security of our judges, lawyers, and other personnel of this Court.
II
The premise of our republican democracy is that all power emanates from the people. 97 Public
officers "must, at all times be accountable to the people" because "public office is a public trust." 98 To
give effect to this mandate, a full discussion of public affairs is indispensable. 99 The Judiciary is not
exempt from public scrutiny because our administration of justice is a matter of public interest. This
Court's inherent contempt powers should not hinder fundamental freedoms that give meaning to our
democracy. SDAaTC
Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[n]o law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances."
The freedoms of speech, of expression, and of the press are distinct but complementary freedoms
occupying preferred status in the hierarchy of rights. 100 They are exercised to mobilize people based
on truth or an understanding of what the circumstances are. Following these fundamental freedoms are
the right to petition the government for redress of grievances and its cognate rights to freedom of
assembly and association.
Freedom of expression is the "means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth,
of securing participation by the people in social and political decision-making, and of maintaining the
balance between stability and change." 101 The exercise of one's self by an individual alone or in
association with those of similar interests is the least limitable right. 102 It guarantees the inherent
sovereignty of a person to be human and the "dignity of individual thought." 103
The external expression of a thought or idea by way of words, or some other action, is bound to
clash with competing ideas and interests.
Freedoms of speech and of the press are the most contentious liberties. These freedoms are
guaranteed to keep the power surrendered to government in check, and these freedoms are powerful
weapons of accountability. 104 Thus, freedoms of speech and press are "[liberties] to discuss publicly
and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment" to keep public debates
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 105
A free press is indispensable for a democracy to work. The media has the right to publish freely,
with access to information and circulation of its work to the public. 106 The media plays a crucial role in
keeping the citizens informed and the government accountable by publicizing matters of public
concern. 107
We have given the "broadest scope" 108 and "widest latitude" 109 to these freedoms:
The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is of course a fundamental
postulate of our constitutional system. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press . . . What does it embrace? At the very least, free speech and free
press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of
public interest without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous
restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits,
prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be
a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to
prevent. AaCTcI
The vital need in a constitutional democracy for freedom of expression is
undeniable whether as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the
truth, of securing participation by the people in social including political decision-
making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and change. The trend as
reflected in Philippine and American decisions is to recognize the broadest scope and
assure the widest latitude to this constitutional guaranty. It represents a profound
commitment to the principle that debate of public issue should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open. It is not going too far, according to another American decision, to view the
function of free speech as inviting dispute. "It may indeed best serve its high purpose
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are,
or even stirs people to anger."
Freedom of speech and of the press thus means something more than the right to
approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official
measures, to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public
consequence. So atrophied, the right becomes meaningless. The right belongs as well, if
not more, for those who question, who do not conform, who differ. To paraphrase Justice
Holmes, it is freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees
with us. 110 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
These freedoms are the heart of our democracy, working in conjunction with each other. One
cannot be exercised without the other. It is not enough that the exercise of these fundamental liberties is
free and unencumbered. It should also be meaningful. The right to public information gives significance
to the exercise of these fundamental freedoms.
The Constitution recognizes the right of people to information on matters of public
concern. 111 This right is a new addition to the 1973 Constitution that was not present in the 1935
Constitution. Baldoza v. Dimaano 112 explains that this addition shows the crucial role of free exchange
of information in a democracy:
The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to
information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official
records, as well as documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to
such limitations imposed by law. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a
recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy.
There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a
meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of
general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such
information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if
either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." However, restrictions on access
to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to control
civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of immediate and impending
danger that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain
order. 113 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) acEHCD
This right gives meaning to the people's exercise of their freedom of speech. It allows them to
intelligently participate in decision making, choosing their leaders and making them
accountable. 114 Access to information gives people a better perspective on the issues affecting the
country. 115
 There are recognized exceptions to the right to information and access to official records. These
are "(1) national security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking
transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information." 116 Nevertheless, the right to
public information empowers citizens:
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech
and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of
and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of
the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional
policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance
the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking
abuse in government. 117 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The press gives life to the public's right to public information. Mass media is the "chief source of
information on current affairs" 118 and the "most powerful vehicle of opinion on public
questions." 119 The press helps the public to be critical in their participation in matters that affect them.
At the same time, the internet and social media have become the dominant venue in discussions
of public affairs. In a concurring opinion in Rappler, Inc. v. Bautista, 120 the right to information
extends to all possible channels of expression, including the internet and social media:
Article II, Section 24 of the Constitution states that "[t]he State recognizes the
vital role of communication and information in nation building." Article III, Section 7
provides that "[t]he right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized." These provisions create a constitutional framework of opening all
possible and available channels for expression to ensure that information on public
matters have the widest reach. In this age of information technology, media has expanded
from traditional print, radio, and television. Internet has sped data gathering and
multiplied the types of output produced. The evolution of multimedia introduced
packaging data into compact packets such as "infographics" and "memes." Many from
this generation no longer listen to the radio or watch television, and instead are more used
to live streaming videos online on their cellular phones or laptops. Social media
newsfeeds allow for real-time posting of video excerpts or "screen caps," and engaging
comments and reactions that stimulate public discussions on important public matters
such as elections. Article IX-C, Section 4 on the Commission on Elections' power of
supervision or regulation of media, communication, or information during election period
is situated within this context. The Commission on Elections' power of supervision and
regulation over media during election period should not be exercised in a way that
constricts avenues for public discourse. 121 EcTCAD
III
The freedoms of speech, of expression, and of the press, while preferred civil liberties, are not
absolute. 122 Judicial independence is a compelling interest in a democracy, as important as the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press. 123 The administration
of justice is a vital public interest that allows certain permissible restrictions in the exercise of these
fundamental freedoms.
This Court has been entrusted the power to settle actual controversies and correct grave abuse of
discretion, and put them to rest. 124 As guardians, protectors, and final arbiters of the rule of law, people
rely on us "with substantial certainty [and] encourages the resolution of disputes in courtrooms rather
than on the streets." 125 This democratic order is dependent on the maintenance of the public's
confidence in judicial independence both in its decisions and in the institution as a whole:
Under the Judiciary's unique circumstances, independence encompasses the idea
that individual judges can freely exercise their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes,
while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the discharge of its constitutional
functions free of restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for those
imposed by the Constitution itself. Thus, judicial independence can be "broken down into
two distinct concepts: decisional independence and institutional independence."
Decisional independence "refers to a judge's ability to render decisions free from
political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable
law." On the other hand, institutional independence "describes the separation of the
judicial branch from the executive and legislative branches of government." Simply
put, institutional independence refers to the "collective independence of the judiciary as a
body."
In the case In re Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P.
Macasaet Published in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007, the Court
delineated the distinctions between the two concepts of judicial independence in the
following manner: SDHTEC
 One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on
each particular judge and seeks to insure his or her ability to decide cases
with autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of
independence when he can do his job without having to hear — or at least
without having to take it seriously if he does hear — criticisms of his
personal morality and fitness for judicial office. The second concept is
institutional judicial independence. It focuses on the independence of the
judiciary as a branch of government and protects judges as a class.
A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts
of independence are preserved — wherein public confidence in the
competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public
accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. An erosion of this confidence
threatens the maintenance of an independent Third Estate.
Recognizing the vital role that the Judiciary plays in our system of government as
the sole repository of judicial power, with the power to determine whether any act of any
branch or instrumentality of the government is attended with grave abuse of
discretion, no less than the Constitution provides a number of safeguards to ensure that
judicial independence is protected and maintained. 126 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
The maintenance of public confidence in judicial independence is necessary for the legitimacy of
judicial authority. 127 It is the "indispensable means for enforcing the supremacy of
the Constitution and the rule of law." 128
Courts exercise inherent contempt powers by restricting speech that tends to bring the court into
disrespect or scandalize the court, or where there is clear and present danger that would impede the
administration of justice. The utterance of this contemptuous speech affects judicial independence by
destroying both its decisional and institutional aspects, thus eroding public confidence in the competence
and integrity of the courts.
The court's inherent power to punish contemptuous speech for indirect contempt is a form of
subsequent punishment. Its exercise is a content-based restriction because the "communicative impact of
the speech" 129 is the subject of the regulation. Essentially, courts punish for contempt because the
content of the speech decreases the public's confidence in judicial independence. Strict scrutiny is
employed in the permissibility of restriction of speech that is based on content. Under this test,
restrictions on the legitimate exercise of citizens' rights are minimal and only to the extent necessary to
achieve the State's compelling interest. 130
Restricting speech that cannot be said against the courts should be strictly scrutinized. The
courts' contempt powers should be narrowly tailored to the communicative impact of the restricted
speech that should be prevented. As will be discussed below, courts exercise contempt powers to ensure
the decisional and institutional aspects of judicial independence. Maintaining these aspects of
independence is crucial in the administration of justice. HSAcaE
It must not be forgotten that our duty to protect and enforce constitutional rights through the
promulgation of rules is paramount. 131 The courts cannot be the first violator of fundamental and
cherished liberties of speech and the press. In protecting our administration of justice and defending our
integrity and independence, we must carefully lay down the basis of why we can punish certain types of
speech and narrowly define the restrictions on speech based on perceived instances of how it constitutes
"clear and present danger in our administration of justice." 132
This is not to say that there is only one test in determining the permissibility of our subsequent
punishment of contemptuous speech against the courts. Different types of speech enjoy varying levels of
protection, such that we have applied different tests to evaluate the permissibility of speech
restrictions. 133 Chavez v. Gonzales 134 instructs that the assessment of the validity of restrictions on
speech should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 135 It is not necessary that only a singular test or
standard be used in our assessment. 136
The courts restrain contemptuous speech by way of punishment for indirect contempt under Rule
71, Section 3 (d) of the Rules of Court. These types of speech, which are considered improper conduct,
include (1) violation of the sub judice rule; 137 (2) degrading comments or criticisms that put the courts
in disrepute; 138 and (3) publications violating the confidentiality of administrative proceedings. 139
Before dissecting the jurisprudential elements of our contempt powers, we have to understand
the competing public interests involved in our administration of justice and in criticisms of the courts.
This is necessary to understand the basis for the courts to restrict certain conduct and subsequently
punish them.
III (A)
Our judicial system is founded on the principle of open justice, where "justice should not only be
done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done." 140 A trial that is open to the public's
view has a prophylactic effect and an outlet to express public outrage against an injustice of shocking
nature and consequence:
When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public
protest often follows . . . . Thereafter, the open processes of justice serve an important
prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion.
Without an awareness that society's responses to criminal conduct are underway, natural
human reactions of outrage and protest are frustrated and may manifest themselves in
some form of vengeful "self help," as indeed they did regularly in the activities of
vigilante "committees" on our frontiers . . . It is not enough to say that results will alone
will satiate the natural community desire for "satisfaction." A result considered untoward
may undermine public confidence, and where trial has been concealed from public view
an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that the system at best has failed and at
worst has been corrupted. To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal
process "satisfy the appearance of justice" . . . and the appearance of justice can best be
provided by allowing people to observe it. 141 (Emphasis Supplied) AScHCD
Courts are generally open to the public's view since these encourage the conscientious
performance of duties of all the participants in a judicial proceeding, from the judge, the counsels, and
their witnesses. 142 A public trial is not a publicized trial:
A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the
court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a
courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe
the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to
distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to
report what they have observed during the proceedings. 143
The administration of justice is a matter of public concern to which the public has access and the
right to information. It is also an appropriate subject of public and proper comment: 144
Decisions and opinions of a court are of course matters of public concern or
interest for these are the authorized expositions and interpretations of the laws, binding
upon all citizens, of which every citizen is charged with knowledge. Justice thus requires
that all should have free access to the opinions of judges and justices, and it would be
against sound public policy to prevent, suppress or keep the earliest knowledge of these
from the public. Thus, in Lantaco Sr., et al. v. Judge Llamas, this Court found a judge to
have committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to furnish Lantaco, et al., a copy of
his decision in a criminal case of which they were even the therein private complainants,
the decision being "already part of the public record which the citizen has a right to
scrutinize."
Unlike court orders and decisions, however, pleadings and other documents filed
by parties to a case need not be matters of public concern or interest. For they are filed
for the purpose of establishing the basis upon which the court may issue an order or a
judgment affecting their rights and interests.
In thus determining which part or all of the records of a case may be accessed to,
the purpose for which the parties filed them is to be considered. 145 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Generally, the public's interest in judicial proceedings is limited to whether judges perform their
public duties and not the actual contents of the pleadings filed therein, nor the procedural incidents of a
pending case. 146
III (B)
Judicial independence does not exempt the courts from public scrutiny. In United States v.
Bustos: 147 HESIcT
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is
a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses
of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the
wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be
too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the
intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not
authorized defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must
expected criticism be born for the common good. Rising superior to any official, or set of
officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary — to any or all the
agencies of Government — public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and
democracy.
 The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize
judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern.
Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper
comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any
other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization
of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort. The
sword of Damocles in the hands of a judge does not hang suspended over the individual
who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely before any
official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to
assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all know of
any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public
officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish
them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed so largely to the law of libel.
"The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with
bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism." 148 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Constructive criticism is necessary in our reflection and resolution of cases. Debates on public
issues should be encouraged even if they include "vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials." 149 These help us make our decisions more responsive to
addressing inequalities and injustice in society. We cannot censor legitimate criticisms of our decisions'
propriety and public conduct. No justice or judge should be "too thin-skinned with reference to comment
upon [their] official acts." 150
Justices and judges are public officers subject to constant public scrutiny, 151 and stringent and
exacting standards of a judicial office bind them. 152 We are guided by strict propriety and decorum at
all times and activities. 153 AcICHD
It must be remembered that our inherent power to punish for contempt is not prior restraint but a
permissible subsequent punishment for those who abuse their constitutional freedoms of speech, of
expression, and of the press. Courts must exercise their contempt power within the context of these
constitutional guarantees. Before punishing contemptuous speech, courts must remember the public
interests in the administration of justice. Justices and judges must carefully weigh the public interest
against the purpose for punishing the act and consider all the relevant circumstances in the case. 154
Having explored the public interests involved in relation to the functions of the Judiciary, we
now examine the purpose of the punishment of contempt when the policies of the court for its
administration of justice have been violated.
IV
The sub judice rule generally restricts "comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial
proceedings." 155 Discussion on the merits of a pending case is generally prohibited. This includes the
contents of the actual pleadings filed, comments on the credibility of witnesses, assessment of the
evidence offered, the relevance of the evidence presented, and any other matter that is presented in the
trial for a judge's appreciation. 156
A violation of the rule on sub judice is punishable as indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 3
(d) of the Rules of Court. 157 It is treated as "improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice."
Canon II, Section 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability defines
the sub judice rule as regards lawyers:
SECTION 19. Sub-judice rule. — A lawyer shall not use any forum or medium to
comment or publicize opinion pertaining to a pending proceeding before any court,
tribunal, or other government agency that may:
(a) cause a pre-judgment, or
(b) sway public perception so as to impede, obstruct, or influence the decision of
such court, tribunal, or other government agency, or which tends to tarnish
the court's or tribunal's integrity, or
(c) impute improper motives against any of its members, or
(d) create a widespread perception of guilt or innocence before a final decision.
During the deliberations on this case, Associate Justice Maria Filomena Singh (Associate Justice
Singh) noted that Canon II, Section 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability is
formulated to complement the contempt power of this Court.
Court proceedings are matters of public discussion. 158 Free speech includes the right to know
and discuss judicial proceedings, but excluded from its guaranty are statements that are aimed to
influence judges in deciding a pending case. 159 caITAC
 Technological advancements increased mass media's influence on public and government
affairs. 160 Justices, judges, lawyers, and witnesses may be exposed to pressures outside judicial
proceedings when cases are discussed freely and publicly in mass media due to their pervasive presence
in everyday life. This is especially true in the age of the internet and social media.
Publicity of judicial proceedings is restricted because it may endanger the fairness of trial:
Witnesses and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude; able to
thrive in hardy climate, with every reason to presume firmness of mind and resolute
endurance, but it must also be conceded that "television can work profound changes in
the behavior of the people it focuses on." Even while it may be difficult to quantify, the
influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on them directly and through the
shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many
ways and in varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that such a coverage
may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated
but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield
to it. It might be farcical to build around them an impregnable armor against the influence
of the most powerful media of public opinion.
To say that actual prejudice should first be present would leave to near nirvana the
subtle threats to justice that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the calm and
deliberate dispensation of justice can create. The effect of television may escape the
ordinary means of proof, but it is not far-fetched for it to gradually erode our basal
conception of a trial such as we know it now. 161 (Emphasis supplied)
Courts and any party who wishes to resolve their disputes therein both have an interest in
ensuring "that courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law, should be immune from every extraneous
influence; that facts should be decided upon the evidence produced in court; and that the determination
of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies." 162
The rationale of the sub judice rule is to protect against the dangers of the publication to directly
influence a judge or indirectly through public opinion in resolving a particular case. 163 As Associate
Justice Singh pointed out during the deliberations, the importance of the sub judice rule is its protective
mechanism for judges against whom the opinion is directed do not have an opportunity to respond to the
criticisms. She emphasized that judges must be insulated from opinions that are not founded on evidence
presented before them since decisions should be based on records.
Aside from public discussions on the merits of a pending case, disclosures relating to pending
administrative cases of lawyers and judges are also restricted. 164 The policy of the confidentiality of
proceedings is to "protect the personal and professional reputation of attorneys and judges from the
baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and litigants." 165 TAIaHE
These judicial polices restricting certain kinds of speech apply "not only to participants in the
pending case, i.e., to members of the bar and bench, and to litigants and witnesses, but also to the public
in general, which necessarily includes the media." 166 The violation of the sub judice rule and the
confidentiality of administrative proceedings are punishable under Rule 71, Section 3 (d) of the Rules of
Court as "improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice."
The rules on sub judice evolved from jurisprudence. An examination of these cases is necessary
to distill the requirements of its violation.
The sub judice rule can be traced from In re Kelly, 167 the first case that recognized courts'
inherent power to punish for contempt. 168 In In re Kelly, it was held that a publication that criticizes
the court during the pendency of the proceedings is misbehavior that tends to obstruct the administration
of justice and is punishable with the inherent contempt power of courts:
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts[.]
The power to fine for contempt, imprison for contumacy, or enforce the
observance of order, are powers which cannot be dispensed with in the courts, because
they are necessary to the exercise of all others . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The summary power to commit and punish for contempt, tending to obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to the execution of
their powers and to the maintenance of their authority, is a part of the law of the land[.]
Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very
creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence and
submission to their lawful mandates, and as a corollary to this provision, to preserve
themselves and their officers from the approach of insults and pollution.
The existence of the inherent power of courts to punish for contempt is essential
to the observance of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments,
 orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of
justice[.] ICHDca
Any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, the
officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or tending to influence
the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable . . .
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause,
respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the
administration of justice and subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have
a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal,
uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal
interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the
courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion or
interference[.] 169 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In In re Kelly, the accused wrote and published a defamatory letter in a newspaper during the
pendency of the re-trial of his contempt conviction. In his published letter, he slandered judges who
convicted him of contempt and imprisoned him in Bilibid. 170
This Court found the letter contemptuous due to the following: (1) the content of the publication
referred to a pending matter; (2) the letter was willingly and deliberately published; (3) the publication
was intended to obstruct and interfere with the administration of justice; and (4) the publication of the
letter tends to directly affect and influence the action of this Court in the proceedings, which can destroy
public confidence and prevent the due administration of justice:
After a careful consideration of the petition or information furnished to this court
by the Honorable Ramon Avanceña, Attorney-General for the Philippine Islands, in
relation with the said publication which was made a part thereof, and the answer and
argument of the said Kelly, heard in open court on the 25th of March, 1916, in support of
his reasons why he should not be punished for contempt, and the matter having been
finally submitted for the consideration of this court on said date; and considering that said
publication was made of and concerning a cause which was then and there pending
before the Supreme Court; and considering that the said Amzi B. Kelly did, by said
publication, thereby willfully, maliciously, and deliberately intend and attempt to bring
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands and the members thereof into contempt and
ridicule and to lower the dignity, standing, and prestige of the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands and to hinder and delay the due administration of justice in the
Philippine Islands; and considering that the said Amzi B. Kelly, by his answer and oral
argument given in reply to said order to show cause, admitted in open court the
authorship of said publication; and considering that said publication was intended to
obstruct and interfere with, and tends directly to obstruct and interfere with and impede
the administration of justice in said pending proceedings in the Supreme Court, and said
motion made therein; and considering that the said Amzi B. Kelly, by means of said
publication intended and said publication does tend directly to affect and influence the
action of the Supreme Court in the said pending proceedings, and to bring the Supreme
Court into contempt and to destroy its usefulness in the Philippine Islands, and the
confidence of the people therein, and to hinder and prevent the due administration of
justice; it is hereby ordered and decreed: cDHAES
That by reason of said false, malicious, and defamatory charges contained in said
publication, a full copy of which is set out in the information of the Attorney-General,
that the said Amzi B. Kelly is hereby found guilty of contempt of this court, by virtue of
said publication, and he is hereby sentenced to be imprisoned in the insular prison
commonly known as Bilibid, located in the city of Manila, for a period . . . committed
until said fine is paid, not exceeding two months. Said imprisonment in lieu of fine shall
be in addition to the imprisonment of six months heretofore imposed. 171 (Emphasis
supplied)
The doctrine in In re Kelly became the basis for the Rules of Court provisions penalizing
improper conduct as contempt of court. 172 In exercising the power of contempt, the following elements
must be considered: the content of the speech, intent on bringing ridicule to the courts and delay the due
administration of justice, and the effect of the speech to destroy the courts' usefulness and public
confidence in its administration of justice.
In the case of In re Lozano and Quevedo, 173 this Court held that publications violating the
confidentiality of administrative proceedings are punishable by criminal contempt. In In re Lozano, an
article was published in a newspaper that contains inaccurate details about an administrative complaint
filed against a judge. The editor and reporter of the newspaper were declared to be in contempt of court:
We come now to a determination of the right of the court to take action in a case
of this character. It has previously been expressly held that the power to punish for
contempt is inherent in the Supreme Court . . . That this power extends to administrative
proceedings as well as to suits at law cannot be doubted. It is necessary to maintain
respect for the courts, indeed to safeguard their very existence, in administrative cases
concerning the removal and suspension of judges as it is in any other class of judicial
proceedings. TCAScE
The rule is well established that newspaper publications tending to impede,
obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts.
The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. It is also regarded as an interference with
the work of the courts to publish any matters which their policy requires should be kept
private, as for example the secrets of the jury room, or proceedings in camera . . .
xxx xxx xxx
With reference to the applicability of the above authorities, it should be remarked
first of all that this court is not bound to accept any of them absolutely and unqualifiedly.
What is best for the maintenance of the Judiciary in the Philippines should be the
criterion. Here, in contrast to other jurisdictions, we need not be overly sensitive because
of the sting of newspaper articles, for there are no juries to be kept free from outside
influence. Here also we are not restrained by regulatory law. The only law, and that judge
made, which is at all applicable to the situation, is the resolution adopted by this court.
That the respondents were ignorant of this resolution is no excuse, for the very article
published by them indicates that the hearing was held behind closed doors and that the
information of the reporter was obtained from outside the screen and from comments in
social circles. Then in writing up the investigation, it came about that the testimony was
mutilated and that the report reflected upon the action of the complainant to his possible
disadvantage.
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This
constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The court has heretofore given
evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under given evidence of its tolerant regard for
charges under the Liberal Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall
continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizen must be preserved in all of its
completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be
confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled
press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the
independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are
privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if such
persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of
confidential proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties and the courts.
In a recent Federal case (U.S. vs. Sullens [1929], 36 Fed. [2d], 230, 238, 239),
Judge Holmes very appropriately said: ASEcHI
"The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though
separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by
the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and
should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws,
from which the former receives its prerogative and the latter its
jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously
recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a
clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business
unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the
impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice,
this court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for
contempt. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"This court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of
its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an
impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of
self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced
tribunal. . . ."
As has been remarked, the parties plead ignorance in extenuation of their offense.
We accept as certain this defense. It is made known also that other newspapers,
particularly in the metropolis, have been guilty of similar acts. That likewise is
undoubtedly true, but does not purge the respondents of their contempt. All facts
considered, we desire on the one hand to proceed on the corrective and not on the
 retaliatory idea of punishment, while on the other giving due notice that practices of
which the respondents are guilty must stop.
It is the holding of the court that the respondents Severino Lozano and Anastacio
Quevedo are guilty of contempt of court, and it is the order of the court that they be
punished for such contempt by the payment of a nominal sum by each of them in the
amount of twenty pesos (P20), to be turned into the office of the clerk of court within a
period of fifteen days from receipt of notice, with the admonition that if they fail to
comply, further and more drastic action by the court will be necessary. 174 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
The confidentiality of administrative cases also extend to complaints filed against lawyers. In In
re Abistado, 175 the contempt powers of the court may also be used to protect the personal and
professional reputations of judges and lawyers against baseless complaints: cTDaEH
We find no merit in the respondent's answer to the petitions of the Attorney-
General and the orders to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. The
evidence shows that the resolution of this court of January 26, 1922, providing that all
proceedings looking to the suspension or disbarment of lawyers, and all proceedings
looking to the suspension or removal of judges of first instance, shall be considered
confidential in nature until the final disposition of the matter was published in "La
Vanguardia," "El Ideal," and the "Manila Times" on January 27, 1922, and in the "Manila
Daily Bulletin" on January 28, 1922. There can be no question as to the right of this court
to adopt such a resolution and to punish violations of it by contempt proceedings. The
matter was carefully considered in the case of In re Lozano and Quevedo (54 Phil., 801),
promulgated July 24, 1930. In the decision of that case it was held that newspaper
publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which
is summarily punishable by the courts; that the rule is otherwise after the cause is ended;
That the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and press must be protected
in its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should
not be confused with liberty in its true sense; that as important as is the maintenance of an
unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the
independence of the judiciary;
That the courts must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of their business
in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of their constitutional
functions. (U.S. vs. Sullens [1929], 36 Fed. [2d], 230.)
The purpose of the rule is not only to enable this court to make its investigations
free from any extraneous influence or interference, but also to protect the personal and
professional reputation of attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled,
vindictive, and irresponsible clients and litigants. The present charges are a case in point.
It was falsely stated in the issue of the "Union" for October 24th that the charges against
Attorney Sotelo had been referred to the Attorney-General for investigation. The truth is
that after considering the charges and the respondent's answer thereto, and the various
exhibits, and finding that there was apparently no merit therein, and that the complainant
had no interest in said charges and was actuated by the vindictiveness of a defeated
litigant, the court dismissed the charges. 176 (Emphasis supplied)
This Court clarified in In re Sotto 177 that "[m]ere criticism or comment on the correctness or
wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith
may be tolerated." 178 However, comments which tend to intimidate this Court's members into
influencing their decision in a pending case, and those attacking the honesty and integrity of this Court
for the apparent purpose of bringing justices into disrepute and degrading the administration of justice,
are punishable by contempt. 179 Subsequent punishment of contemptuous conduct is necessary for this
Court's orderly disposition of justice. ITAaHc
In In re Sotto, 180 this Court cited Atty. Vicente Sotto (Sotto) in contempt for publishing an
article criticizing this Court's members after promulgating its decision in the case of In re Parazo. 181 In
his article, Sotto used his seat in the Senate to intimidate the Court and influence its final disposition
of In re Parazo:
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good, faith may be
tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the
correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it
should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision. Had the
respondent in the present case limited himself to a statement that our decision is wrong or
that our construction of the intention of the law is not correct, because it is different from
what he, as proponent of the original bill which became a law had intended, his criticism
might in that case be tolerated, for it could not in any way influence the final disposition
of the Parazo case by the court; inasmuch as it is of judicial notice that the bill presented
by the respondent was amended by both houses of Congress, and the clause "unless the
court finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the State" was added or
inserted; and that, as the Act was passed by Congress and not by any particular member
thereof, the intention of Congress and not that of the respondent must be the one to be
determined by this Court in applying said Act.
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the
press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo
case, which was then and still is pending reconsideration by this Court upon petition of
Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the
presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members,
reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices from eleven to
seven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who
according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the
final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this
Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and
degrading the administration of justice, for in his above-quoted statement he
says: cSaATC
"In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately
committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an
end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To
this effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which I will
introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the
complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now the Supreme
Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy."
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in
favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and
not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during
the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade
the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is,
under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain
relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and
if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this
Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take
the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a
member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in
duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must
be protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the
citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the
maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the right of the citizen, is the
maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. As Judge Holmes very appropriately
said in U. S. vs. Sullens: "The administration of justice and the freedom of the press,
though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the
other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to
uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its
prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be
scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear
case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by
publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise
obstruct the administration of justice, this court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted
power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive
of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial
court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act
to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal[.]"
 It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special
obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be
removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant
misconduct[.] 182 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) CHTAIc
In In re Torres, 183 an editor of a newspaper article was cited in contempt after publishing the
name of the ponente of a decision, with a commentary on the probable voting of the members of this
Court:
The return made by the Editor of El Debate concludes with this statement: "If it is
a fact, therefore, that the decision in favor of the accused in the above-entitled case had
already been discussed and voted by this Honorable Tribunal, the information given by
the 'El Debate' can in no way obstruct, embarrass, or influence the administration of
justice because it deals with a consummated fact. It is nothing more than a simple scoop
of the paper." Within the knowledge of the members of the court, the foregoing quotation
is not true, for at the time of the publication in El Debate, the case in question had not
been discussed and voted, although even if it had been and even if the newspaper story
had been correct, would not be important. The proceedings of this court must remain
confidential until decisions or orders have been properly promulgated. The reason for
this is so obvious that it hardly needs explanation. In a civil case, for example, prior
knowledge of the result would permit parties to benefit themselves financially or to
compromise cases to the detriment of parties not so well informed. In criminal cases, for
example, advance advice regarding the outcome would permit the accused to flee the
jurisdiction of the court. The court must, therefore, insist on being permitted to proceed
to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference
obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of
justice. 184 (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, in In re Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law
Case Hurled by Atty. Leonard De Vera, 185 a lawyer was declared in contempt for his published
statement asking this Court to dispel rumors that it will vote against the constitutionality of the plunder
law in relation to the pending case of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and risk another series of
mass actions:
Clearly, respondent's utterances pressuring the Court to rule in favor of the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law or risk another series of mass actions by the public
cannot be construed as falling within the ambit of constitutionally protected
speech, because such statements are not fair criticisms of any decision of the Court, but
obviously are threats made against it to force the Court to decide the issue in a particular
manner, or risk earning the ire of the public. Such statements show disrespect not only
for the Court but also for the judicial system as a whole, tend to promote distrust and
undermine public confidence in the judiciary, by creating, the impression that the Court
cannot be trusted to resolve cases impartially and violate the right of the parties to have
their case tried fairly by an independent tribunal, uninfluenced by public clamor and other
extraneous influences. cHDAIS
It is respondent's duty as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice and
in the Supreme Court as the last bulwark of justice and democracy. Respondent's
utterances as quoted above, while the case of Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan was pending
consideration by this Court, belies his protestation of good faith but were clearly made to
mobilize public opinion and bring pressure on the Court. 186 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Aside from publications, other actions, such as picketing in front of the court's premises to
influence its decision in a pending case, may be punished with contempt.
In Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez, 187 union parties to a pending case before this Court set
up pickets in front of the gate of the Supreme Court. This Court issued show cause orders against the
union leaders and their counsels on record for direct contempt. Here, this Court need not refer to the test
on the limitation of the freedoms of speech and expression of the union parties. Picketing within the
vicinity of the Supreme Court is "intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one way
or the other on pending cases." While this Court dismissed the contempt charges against them, it issued
a stern warning against the litigants and their lawyers:
We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the
imposition of the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier. The
liberal stance taken by this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case
of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721, March 30, 1987, should not, however, be
considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the euphoria apparently
resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court will not hesitate in
 future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those
who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending
before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through
appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the
Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions
and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."
The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all
free governments. However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never
been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of
courts. For "it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and
juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous
influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies." EATCcI
Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in
court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every
citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to
have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law free from
outside coercion or interference." The aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not
only an affront to the dignity of this Court, but equally a violation of the above-stated
right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.
We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not
knowledgeable in her intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware
that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution,
any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right
amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection,
nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes
contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily
and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when
his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the
untenability of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all
members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly
apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice,
and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their
members. 188 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In People v. Alarcon, 189 this Court clarified that the power to punish for criminal contempt
ceases when a decision is no longer pending before a judge, "when and once the court has come upon a
decision and has lost control either to reconsider or amend it." In Alarcon, respondent Federico
Mañgahas was acquitted of criminal contempt because the case discussed in his published letter was
already elevated to the Court of Appeals. The majority of this Court held that "[n]ewspaper publication
tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit
or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts." 190
Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran (Chief Justice Moran) was the lone dissent in Alarcon. He
distinguished the two types of contemptuous speech and the rationale for which the court punishes
them: ISHCcT
Contempt, by reason of publications relating to court and to court proceedings,
are of two kinds. A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence
the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal
contempt which is summarily punishable by courts. This is the rule announced in the
cases relied upon by the majority. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to
destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into
disrepute constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. In
the language of the majority, what is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded
against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to
administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the
punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct
calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first,
there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which
might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the
contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the
court itself and its dignity. . . . Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them
is destroyed. 191 (Emphasis supplied)
 Chief Justice Moran contended that the publication did not pertain to pending cases that impede
the administration of justice. Instead, the article that describes the criminal trial as a farce and mockery
is an attack on the court that is "calculated to bring it into disfavor." Thus, this Court can punish such
attack for its self-preservation:
If the contemptuous publication made by the respondent herein were directed to
this Court in connection with a case already decided, the effect of the rule laid down by
the majority is to deny this Court the power to vindicate its dignity. The mischievous
consequences that will follow from the situation thus sought to be permitted, are both too
obvious and odious to be stated. The administration of justice, no matter how righteous,
may be identified with all sorts of fancied scandal and corruption. Litigants, discontented
for having lost their cases, will have every way to give vent to their resentment. Respect
and obedience to law will ultimately be shattered, and, as a consequence, the utility of the
courts will completely disappear. 192
The doctrine that contempt powers can only be exercised against the publication, which tends to
influence this Court's decision during the pendency of the proceedings, has been abandoned in People v.
Godoy. 193
In Godoy, this Court formally adopted Chief Justice Moran's dissent in Alarcon. Thus, the power
to punish for contempt of court not only extends to contemptuous speech relating to pending cases, but
also to publications after the finality of the decision. This Court also summarized the types of
contemptuous publications which may be punished even if a case has already been terminated:
The Philippine rule, therefore, is that in case of a post-litigation newspaper
publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed.
However, there may be a contempt of court, even though the case has been terminated, if
the publication is attended by either of these two circumstances: (1) where it tends to
bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the court; or (2) where
there is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice would be impeded.
And this brings us to the familiar invocation of freedom of expression usually resorted to
as a defense in contempt proceedings.
On the first ground, it has been said that the right of free speech is guaranteed by
the Constitution and must be sacredly guarded, but that an abuse thereof is expressly
prohibited by that instrument and must not be permitted to destroy or impair the
efficiency of the courts of the public respect therefor and the confidence therein. DHITCc
Thus, in State vs. Morril, the court said that any citizen has the right to publish the
proceedings and decisions of the court, and if he deems it necessary for the public good,
to comment upon them freely, discuss their correctness, the fitness or unfitness of the
judges for their stations, and the fidelity with which they perform the important public
trusts reposed in them; but he has no right to attempt, by defamatory publications, to
degrade the tribunal, destroy public confidence in it, and dispose the community to
disregard and set at naught its orders, judgments and decrees. Such publications are an
abuse of the liberty of the press; and tend to sap the very foundation of good order and
well-being in society by obstructing the course of justice. Courts possess the power to
punish for contempt libelous publications regarding their proceedings, present or past,
upon the ground that they tend to degrade the tribunals, destroy public confidence and
respect for their judgments and decrees, so essentially necessary to the good order and
well-being of society, and most effectually obstruct the free course of justice.
Then, in In re Hayes, it was said that publishers of newspapers have the right,
but no higher right than others, to bring to public notice the conduct of the courts,
provided the publications are true and fair in spirit. The liberty of the press secures the
privilege of discussing in a decent and temperate manner the decisions and judgments of
a court of justice; but the language should be that of fair and honorable criticism, and
should not go to the extent of assigning to any party or the court false or dishonest
motives. There is no law to restrain or punish the freest expressions of disapprobation
that any person may entertain of what is done in or by the courts. Under the right of
freedom of speech and of the press the public has a right to know and discuss all judicial
proceedings, but this does not include the right to attempt, by wanton defamation,
groundless charges of unfairness and stubborn partisanship, to degrade the tribunal and
impair its efficiency.
Finally, in Weston vs. Commonwealth, it was ruled that the freedom of speech
may not be exercised in such a manner as to destroy respect for the courts, the very
institution which is the guardian of that right. The dignity of the courts and the duty of the
citizens to respect them are necessary adjuncts to the administration of justice.
Denigrating the court by libelous attacks upon judicial conduct in an ended case, as well
as one which is pending before it, may seriously interfere with the administration of
justice. While such an attack may not affect the particular litigation which has been
terminated, it may very well affect the course of justice in future litigation and impair, if
not destroy, the judicial efficiency of the court or judge subjected to the attack.
Anent the second ground, the rule in American jurisprudence is that false and
libelous utterances present a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. To
constitute contempt, criticism of a past action of the court must pose a clear and present
danger to a fair administration of justice, that is, the publication must have an inherent
tendency to influence, intimidate, impede, embarrass, or obstruct the court's
administration of justice. It is not merely a private wrong against the rights of litigants
and judges, but a public wrong, a crime against the State, to undertake by libel or slander
to impair confidence in the judicial functions. CAacTH
Elucidating on the matter, this Court, in Cabansag vs. Fernandez, et al., held as
follows:
. . . The first, as interpreted in a number of cases, means that
the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be "extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before the utterance
can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the "substantive
evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly and
unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be
published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally
be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy
will harm the administration of justice.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, speaking of the extent and scope of the application of this
rule, the Supreme Court of the United States said: "Clear and present
danger of substantive evils as a result of indiscriminate publications
regarding judicial proceedings justices an impairment of the constitutional
right of freedom of speech and press only if the evils are extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high. . . . The possibility of
engendering disrespect for the judiciary as a result of the published
criticism of a judge is not such a substantive evil as will justify
impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press." . . .
No less important is the ruling on the power of the court to punish
for contempt in relation to the freedom of speech and press. We quote:
"Freedom of speech and press should not be impaired through the
exercise of the power to punish for contempt of court unless there
is no doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and imminent
threat to the administration of justice. A judge may not hold in contempt
one who ventures to publish anything that tends to make him unpopular or
to belittle him. The vehemence of the language used in newspaper
publications concerning a judge's decision is not alone the measure of the
power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an
imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice." . . .
And in weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts
by newspaper criticism against the free speech to determine whether such
criticism may constitutionally be punished as contempt, it was ruled that
"freedom of public comment should in borderline instances weigh heavily
against a possible tendency to influence pending cases." . . . cEaSHC
The question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree. . . .
Although Cabansag involved a contempt committed during the pendency of a
case, no compelling reason exists why the doctrines enunciated therein should not be
made applicable to vituperative publications made after the termination of the
case. Whether a case is pending or not, there is the constant and ever growing need to
protect the courts from a substantive evil, such as invective conduct or utterances which
tend to impede or degrade the administration of justice, or which calumniate the courts
and their judges. At any rate, in the case of In re Bozorth, it was there expressly and
categorically ruled that the clear and present danger rule equally applies to publications
made after the determination of a case, with the court declaring that a curtailment of
 criticism of the conduct of finally concluded litigation, to be justified, must be in terms of
some serious substantive evil which it is designed to avert.
Adverting again to what was further said in State vs. Shepherd, supra, let it here
be emphasized that the protection and safety of life, liberty, property and character, the
peace of society, the proper administration of justice and even the perpetuity of our
institutions and form of government, imperatively demand that everyone — lawyer,
layman, citizen, stranger, newspaperman, friend or foe — shall treat the courts with
proper respect and shall not attempt to degrade them, or impair the respect of the people,
or destroy the faith of the people in them. When the temples of justice become polluted or
are not kept pure and clean, the foundations of free government are undermined, and the
institution itself threatened. 194 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In People v. Castelo, 195 an article was published about an alleged extortion attempt in relation
to a pending criminal case. The presiding judge convicted the news editor for indirect contempt. This
Court reversed the conviction because the news article was a fair and true report of a police investigation
incidental to a pending case. To punish for contempt, it must be apparent from an objective reading of
the story that the ultimate purpose of its publication was to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice: IAETDc
It should however be noted that there is nothing in the story which may even in a
slight degree indicate that the ultimate purpose of appellant in publishing it was to
impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in connection with the Castelo
case. The publication can be searched in vain for any word that would in any way
degrade it. The alleged extortion try merely concerns a news story which is entirely
different, distinct and separate from the Monroy murder case. Though mention was made
indirectly of the decision then pending in that case, the same was made in connection
with the extortion try as a mere attempt to secure the acquittal of Castelo. But the
narration was merely a factual appraisal of the negotiation and no comment whatsoever
was made thereon one way or the other coming from the appellant. Indeed, according to
the trial judge himself, as he repeatedly announced openly, said publication did not in any
way impede or obstruct his decision promulgated on March 31, 1955. As this Court has
aptly said, for a publication to be considered as contempt of court there must be a
showing not only that the article was written while a case is pending but that it must
really appear that such publication does impede, interfere with and embarrass the
administration of justice . . . Here, there is no such clear showing. The very decision of
the court shows the contrary. 196 (Citations omitted)
In Cabansag v. Fernandez, 197 this Court discussed the two tests in determining the
maintenance of judicial independence vis-à-vis the right of the public for the redress of grievances:
Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting
rights of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first, as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be
"extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before the utterance can
be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the "substantive evil" sought to be
prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly and unfair administration of justice."
This test establishes a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to
what words may be published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot
constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such
advocacy will harm the administration of justice.
This rule had its origin in Schenck vs. U. S. (249) U. S. (47), promulgated in 1919,
and ever since it has afforded a practical guidance in a great variety of cases in which the
scope of the constitutional protection of freedom of expression was put in issue. In one of
said cases, the United States Supreme Court has made the significant suggestion that this
rule "is an appropriate guide in determining the constitutionality of restriction upon
expression where the substantial evil sought to be prevented by the restriction is
destruction of life or property or invasion of the right of privacy." CTIEac
Thus, speaking of the extent and scope of the application of this rule, the Supreme
Court of the United States said "Clear and present danger of substantive evils as a result
of indiscriminate publications regarding judicial proceedings justifies an impairment of
the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press only if the evils are extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. . . . A public utterance or
publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and
press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the courts, upon
the theory that in such a case it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair
administration of justice. . . . The possibility of engendering disrespect for the judiciary as
a result of the published criticism of a judge is not such a substantive evil as will justify
impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press."
No less important is the ruling on the power of the court to punish for contempt in
relation to the freedom of speech and press. We quote; "Freedom of speech and press
should not be impaired through the exercise of the power to punish for contempt of court
unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and imminent threat
to the administration of justice. . . . A judge may not hold in contempt one who ventures
to publish anything that tends to make him unpopular or to belittle him. . . . The
vehemence of the language used in newspaper publications concerning a judge's decision
is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles
must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice."
And in weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts by newspaper
criticism against the right of free speech to determine whether such criticism may
constitutionally be punished as contempt, it was ruled that "freedom of public comment
should in borderline instances weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence
pending cases."
The question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree[.]
The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in cases
where extreme difficulty is confronted in determining where the freedom of expression
ends and the right of courts to protect their independence begins. There must be a
remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule lies in that the freedom of
speech and of the press, as well as the right to petition for redress of grievance, while
guaranteed by the constitution, are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions and
limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts against contempt[.]
This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not
necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary
that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of
the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to
prevent. DcHSEa
"It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of
speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution does not
confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility,
whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that
gives immunity for every possible use of language, and prevents the
punishment of those who abuse this freedom. . . . Reasonably limited, it
was said by story in the passage cited this freedom is an inestimable
privilege in a free government; without such limitation, it might become
the scourge of the Republic.
xxx xxx xxx
"And, for yet more imperative reasons, a state may punish
utterances endangering the foundations of organized government and
threatening its overthrow by unlawful means. These imperil its own
existence as a constitutional state. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
". . . And the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial
because the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. The
state cannot reasonably be required to measure the danger from every such
utterance in the nice balance of a jeweler's scale. A single revolutionary
spark may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst into a
sweeping and destructive conflagration. It cannot be said that the state is
acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when, in the exercise of its judgment as
to the measures necessary to protect the public peace and safety, it seeks to
extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled the flame or
blazed into the conflagration. It cannot reasonably be required to defer the
adoption of measures for its own peace and safety until the revolutionary
utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or imminent and
immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its
 judgment suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency. In People vs.
Lloyd, supra p. 35 (136 N. E. 605), it was aptly said: 'Manifestly the
legislature has authority to forbid the advocacy of a doctrine until there is
a present and imminent danger of the success of the plan advocated. If the
state were compelled to wait until the apprehended danger became certain,
than its right to protect itself would come into being simultaneously with
the overthrow of the government, when there would be neither prosecuting
officers nor courts for the enforcement of the law.'" 198 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted) SaCIDT
This Court applied both the clear and present danger, and dangerous tendency tests in
determining the boundary between freedom of expression and judicial independence. In Cabansag,
Apolonio Cabansag (Cabansag) wrote a letter of complaint to the Presidential Complaints and Action
Commission due to the failure of the stenographers to transcribe the records. The trial judge ordered
Cabansag to show cause for contempt for sending the letter to the Office of the President, and he was
eventually declared to be in contempt. This Court reversed the trial court's decision, holding that there
was nothing in the letter that constitutes a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice,
nor can a dangerous tendency be inferred from the context of the letter:
The question then to be determined is: Has the letter of Cabansag created a
sufficient danger to a fair administration of justice? Did its remittance to the PCAC create
a danger sufficiently imminent to come under the two rules mentioned above?
Even if we make a careful analysis of the letter sent by appellant Cabansag to the
PCAC which has given rise to the present contempt proceedings, we would at once see
that it was far from his mind to put the court in ridicule and much less to belittle or
degrade it in the eyes of those to whom the letter was addressed for, undoubtedly, he was
compelled to act the way he did simply because he saw no other way of obtaining the
early termination of his case. This is clearly inferable from its context wherein, in
respectful and courteous language, Cabansag gave vent to his feeling when he said that
he "has long since been deprived of his land thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical
lawyer"; that the case which had long been pending "could not be decided due to the fact
that the transcript of the records has not, as yet, been transcribed by the stenographers
who took the stenographic notes"; and that the "new Judges could not proceed to hear the
case before the transcription of the said notes." Analyzing said utterances, one would see
that if they ever criticize, the criticism refers, not to the court, but to opposing counsel
whose "tactical maneuvers" has allegedly caused the undue delay of the case. The
grievance or complaint, if any, is addressed to the stenographers for their apparent
indifference in transcribing their notes.
The only disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has been the motivating
factor of the lodging of the contempt charge by the trial judge is the fact that the letter
was sent to the Office of the President asking for help because of the precarious
predicament of Cabansag. While the course of action he had taken may not be a wise one
for it would have been proper had he addressed his letter to the Secretary of Justice or to
the Supreme Court, such act alone would not be contemptuous. To be so the danger must
cause a serious imminent threat to the administration of justice. Nor can we infer that
such act has "a dangerous tendency" to belittle the court or undermine the administration
of justice for the writer merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the
government for redress of a legitimate grievance. SCaITA
The fact is that even the trial court itself has at the beginning entertained such
impression when it found that the criticism was directed not against the court but against
the counsel of the opposite party, and that only on second thought did it change its mind
when it developed that the act of Cabansag was prompted by the advice of his lawyers.
Nor can it be contended that the letter is groundless or one motivated by malice. The
circumstances borne by the record which preceded the sending of that letter show that
there was an apparent cause for grievance. 199 (Emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding the clear and present danger test, and the dangerous tendency test discussed
in Cabansag, the clear and present danger test has been associated with contempt powers of the
Court. 200
In Marantan v. Diokno, 201 this Court applied the clear and present danger test in determining
whether such utterance harms the administration of justice:
The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct
their business unhampered by publications and comments which tend to impair the
impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. As
important as the maintenance of freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the
independence of the Judiciary. The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid
in determining the proper constitutional boundary between these two rights.
 The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the
comment must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
an utterance can be punished. There must exist a clear and present danger that the
utterance will harm the administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not be
impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of court unless there is no doubt
that the utterances in question make a serious and imminent threat to the administration
of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat.
xxx xxx xxx
"A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection
of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still
pending in the courts, upon the theory that in such a case, it must necessarily tend to
obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice." By no stretch of the imagination
could the respondents' comments pose a serious and imminent threat to the administration
of justice. No criminal intent to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice
can be inferred from the comments of the respondents.
Freedom of public comment should, in borderline instances, weigh heavily
against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. The power to punish for
contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless
necessary in the interest of justice. In the present case, such necessity is
wanting. 202 (Emphasis supplied) cHECAS
In Marantan, ABS-CBN aired the interview of Atty. Jose Manuel Diokno (Diokno) and the
families of the victims in a homicide case filed against Police Superintendent Hansel M. Marantan
(P/Supt. Marantan). Previously, Diokno filed a petition praying that this Court reverse the resolution of
the Office of the Ombudsman downgrading of the criminal charges from murder to homicide. P/Supt.
Marantan filed a petition to declare the respondents in indirect contempt. This Court dismissed the
petition because respondents did not comment or make disclosures regarding the merits of a case but
only expressed their opinion. Their comments did not appear to attack or insult the dignity of this Court.
Moreover, the mere restatement of respondents' argument in their petition cannot, or did not even tend
to, influence this Court.
Aside from contemptuous speech that violates the sub judice rule and the confidentiality of
administrative cases, this Court also punishes speech that defames, scandalizes, or dishonors the courts.
V
The public has the right to criticize the decisions, proceedings, and the conduct of the members
of the Judiciary. 203 Criticisms against the courts may include, but are not limited to, the following:
[W]hile a citizen may comment upon the proceedings and decisions of the court
and discuss their correctness, and even express his opinions on the fitness or unfitness of
the judges for their stations, and the fidelity with which they perform the important public
trusts reposed in them, he has no right to attempt to degrade the court, destroy public
confidence in it, and encourage the people to disregard and set naught its orders,
judgments and decrees. Such publications are said to be an abuse of the liberty of speech
and of the press, for they tend to destroy the very foundation of good order and well-
being in society by obstructing the course of justice. 204
However, there is a boundary between legitimate criticism and speech that attacks the integrity
of the courts, damaging both their decisional and institutional independence:
But there is an important line between legitimate criticism and illegitimate attack
upon the courts or their judges. Attacks upon the court or a judge not only risk the
inhibition of all judges as they conscientiously endeavor to discharge their constitutional
responsibilities; they also undermine the people's confidence in the courts.
Personal attacks, criticisms laden with political threats, those that misrepresent
and distort the nature and context of judicial decisions, those that are misleading or
without factual or legal basis, and those that blame the judges for the ills of society,
damage the integrity of the judiciary and threaten the doctrine of judicial
independence. These attacks do a grave disservice to the principle of an independent
judiciary and mislead the public as to the role of judges in a constitutional democracy,
shaking the very foundation of our democratic government. aTHCSE
Such attacks on the judiciary can result in two distinct — yet related undesirable
consequences. First, the criticism will prevent judges from remaining insulated from the
personal and political consequences of making an unpopular decision, thus placing
judicial independence at risk. Second, unjust criticism of the judiciary will erode the
public's trust and confidence in the judiciary as an institution. Both judicial
independence and the public's trust and confidence in the judiciary as an institution are
vital components in maintaining a healthy democracy.
 Accordingly, it has been consistently held that, while freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all
costs for the sake of democracy, these freedoms are not absolute. For, if left unbridled,
they have the tendency to be abused and can translate to licenses, which could lead to
disorder and anarchy. 205 (Emphasis supplied)
Comments and criticisms that are unfair and illegitimate are malicious publications akin to libel
and may be subsequently punished for indirect contempt 206 under Rule 71, Section 3 (d) of the Rules
of Court. 207 These types of utterances are punishable regardless of whether the public speech was
uttered during the pendency of a case. 208 The purpose of punishing these utterances is to protect the
dignity of courts and to "vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into
disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them." 209
The right to criticize the courts should be done with respect, such that criticisms and comments
must be "bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety." 210 The nature and
manner of the criticism are relevant in determining whether this right has been abused. 211 The
personality of the speaker and their corresponding duty to the courts are relevant in determining whether
a speech may be subsequently punished.
The power to punish for contempt will generally not lie against a trustful, sincere, and respectful
statement of an opinion. 212 However, publication oldies against the courts is contemptuous speech.
The imposition of subsequent punishment against calculated falsehoods is a permissible restriction on
the freedom of speech. This is to prevent "the proliferation of untruths which[,] if unrefuted, would gain
an undue influence in the public discourse." 213
Publications that scandalize or put the courts in disrepute are not covered under the guarantees of
the freedom of speech and of the press. Freedom of the press is restricted and may be subject to
subsequent punishment: AHDacC
This brings to fore the need to make a distinction between adverse criticism of the
court's decision after the case is ended and "scandalizing the court itself." The latter is not
criticism; it is personal and scurrilous abuse of a judge as such, in which case it shall be
dealt with as a case of contempt.
It must be clearly understood and always borne in mind that there is a vast
difference between criticism or fair comment on the one side and defamation on the
other. Where defamation commences, true criticism ends. True criticism differs from
defamation in the following particulars: (1) Criticism deals only with such things as
invite public attention or call for public comment. (2) Criticism never attacks the
individual but only his work. In every case[,] the attack is on a man's acts, or on some
thing, and not upon the man himself. A true critic never indulges in personalities. (3)
True criticism never imputes or insinuates dishonorable motives, unless justice absolutely
requires it, and then only on the clearest proofs. (4) The critic never takes advantage of
the occasion to gratify private malice, or to attain any other object beyond the fair
discussion of matters of public interest, and the judicious guidance of the public taste.
Generally, criticism of a court's rulings or decisions is not improper, and may not
be restricted after a case has been finally disposed of and has ceased to be pending. So
long as critics confine their criticisms to facts and base them on the decisions of the
court, they commit no contempt no matter how severe the criticism may be; but when they
pass beyond that line and charge that judicial conduct was influenced by improper,
corrupt, or selfish motives, or that such conduct was affected by political prejudice or
interest, the tendency is to create distrust and destroy the confidence of the people in
their courts. 214 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Owing to the nature of judicial functions and the ability of justices and judges to respond to
criticism in real time when an utterance tends to undermine both aspects of their judicial independence,
defamatory criticisms against the courts may be restricted.
Criticisms against public officers are allowed "adequate margin of error by protecting some
inaccuracies." 215 Honest mistakes, by way of "[e]rrors or misstatements[,] are inevitable in any scheme
of truly free expression and debate." 216 A footnote in Philippine Journalists, Inc. v.
Thoenen 217 explains the difference in the treatment of defamation of a public officer and a private
individual: cAaDHT
Three reasons were advanced by Justice Powell for making a distinction between
private individuals on one hand and public officers and public figures in the other. First,
public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the
channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to
counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Private individuals
are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is
correspondingly greater. Second, an individual who decides to seek governmental office
must accept certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs. He runs
 the risk of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case. Those classed as
public figures stand in a similar position. For the most part those who attain this status
have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy
positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for
all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the
issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment. Third, this would
impose an additional difficulty on trial court judges to decide which publications address
issues of "general interest" and which do not. Even if the foregoing generalities do not
obtain in every instance, the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption
that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased
risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such assumption is
justified with respect to a private individual. He has not accepted public office or
assumed an "influential role in ordering society." He has relinquished no part of his
interest in the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more
compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood.
Thus, private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and
public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery. 218 (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)
When defamatory allegations are uttered against the courts, justices and judges cannot defend
themselves like other public officers. They have no political machinery to speak for and defend them,
and the courts can only rely on their officers, who may likewise not be capable of responding in real
time. Moreover, the filing of defamation cases is not available to them:
Under the American doctrine, to repeat, the great weight of authority is that in so
far as proceedings to punish for contempt are concerned, critical comment upon the
behavior of the court in cases fully determined by it is unrestricted, under the
constitutional guaranties of the liberty of the press and freedom of speech. Thus,
comments, however stringent, which have relation to judicial proceedings which are past
and ended, are not contemptuous of the authority of the court to which reference is made.
Such comments may constitute a libel against the judge, but it cannot be treated as in
contempt of the court's authority.
On this score, it is said that prosecution for libel is usually the most appropriate
and effective remedy. The force of American public opinion has greatly restrained the
courts in the exercise of the power to punish one as in contempt for making disrespectful
or injurious remarks, and it has been said that the remedy of a judge is the same as that
given to a private citizen. In such a case, therefore, the remedy of a criminal action for
libel is available to a judge who has been derogated in a newspaper publication made
after the termination of a case tried by him, since such publication can no longer be made
subject of contempt proceedings. IDSEAH
The rule, however, is different in instances under the Philippine doctrine earlier
discussed wherein there may still be a contempt of court even after a case has been
decided and terminated. In such case, the offender may be cited for contempt for uttering
libelous remarks against the court or the judge. The availability, however, of the power to
punish for contempt does not and will not prevent a prosecution for libel, either before,
during, or after the institution of contempt proceedings. In other words, the fact that
certain contemptuous conduct likewise constitutes an indictable libel against the judge of
the court contemned does not necessarily require him to bring a libel action, rather than
relying on contempt proceedings.
The fact that an act constituting a contempt is also criminal and punishable by
indictment or other method of criminal prosecution does not prevent the outraged court
from punishing the contempt. This principle stems from the fundamental doctrine that an
act may be punished as a contempt even though it has been punished as a criminal
offense. The defense of having once been in jeopardy, based on a conviction for the
criminal offense, would not lie in bar of the contempt proceedings, on the proposition that
a contempt may be an offense, against the dignity of a court and, at the same time, an
offense against the peace and dignity of the people of the State. But more importantly,
adherence to the American doctrine by insisting that a judge should instead file an action
for libel will definitely give rise to an absurd situation and may even cause more harm
than good.
Drawing also from American jurisprudence, to compel the judge to descend from
the plane of his judicial office to the level of the contemnor, pass over the matter of
contempt, and instead attack him by a civil action to satisfy the judge in damages for a
libel, would be a still greater humiliation of a court. That conduct would be personal; the
court is impersonal. In our jurisdiction, the judicial status is fixed to such a point that our
courts and the judges thereof should be protected from the improper consequences of
 their discharge of duties so much so that judicial officers have always been shielded, on
the highest considerations of the public good, from being called for questioning in civil
actions for things done in their judicial capacity.
Whenever we subject the established courts of the land to the degradation of
private prosecution, we subdue their independence, and destroy their authority. Instead of
being venerable before the public, they become contemptible; and we thereby embolden
the licentious to trample upon everything sacred in society, and to overturn those
institutions which have hitherto been deemed the best guardians of civil liberty. HCaDIS
Hence, the suggestion that judges who are unjustly attacked have a remedy in an
action for libel, has been assailed as being without rational basis in principle. In the first
place, the outrage is not directed to the judge as a private individual but to the judge as
such or to the court as an organ of the administration of justice. In the second place,
public interests will gravely suffer where the judge, as such, will, from time to time, be
pulled down and disrobed of his judicial authority to face his assailant on equal grounds
and prosecute cases in his behalf as a private individual. The same reasons of public
policy which exempt a judge from civil liability in the exercise of his judicial functions,
most fundamental of which is the policy to confine his time exclusively to the discharge
of his public duties, applies here with equal, if not superior, force. 219 (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted)
Justices and judges are restrained from engaging in any other forum except in the content of their
decisions. While they cannot be sensitive against legitimate criticisms of their public personalities,
courts are weak to correct when false information about them is circulated. Hence, the inherent contempt
powers of the court should be available to address the damaging effects of contemptuous speech.
Qualified privilege in libel cases can also be invoked in contempt proceedings, such that even if
a speech may be contemptuous, the utterance is not ordinarily subject to subsequent
punishment. 220 Fair comments and criticisms are allowed, no matter how severe they may
be. 221 In Manila Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Domingo: 222
It was evident that the statements as to the "lousy performance" and
"mismanagement" of Domingo cannot be regarded to have been written with the
knowledge that these were false or in reckless disregard of whether these were false,
bearing in mind that Batuigas had documentary evidence to support his statements.
Batuigas merely expressed his opinion based on the fact that there were complaints filed
against Domingo, among others. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on
established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as
it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
Moreover, these statements were but fair commentaries of Batuigas which can be
reasonably inferred from the contents of the documents that he had received and which he
qualified, in his 20 December 1990 article, to have been brought already to the attention
of the DTI, CSC, and the Ombudsman. Jurisprudence defines fair comment as follows:
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.
The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every
discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every
man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every
false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable
imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is
not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a
public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of
fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an
expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that
the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be
inferred from the facts. 223 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted) aCIHcD
Unless proven malicious, criticisms of the conduct of public officers, including the courts, should
not be punished. In Borjal v. Court of Appeals, 224 adopting New York Times v. Sullivan. 225
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and
constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment
means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed
false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and
every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable
imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
 supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then
it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably
be inferred from the facts.
xxx xxx xxx
This in effect is the strong message in New York Times v. Sullivan which the
appellate court failed to consider or, for that matter, to heed. It insisted that private
respondent was not, properly speaking, a "public official" nor a "public figure," which is
why the defamatory imputations against him had nothing to do with his task of
organizing the FNCLT.
New York Times v. Sullivan was decided by the U. S. Supreme Court in the 1960s
at the height of the bloody rioting in the American South over racial segregation. The
then City Commissioner L. B. Sullivan of Montgomery, Alabama, sued New York Times
for publishing a paid political advertisement espousing racial equality and describing
police atrocities committed against students inside a college campus. As commissioner
having charge over police actions Sullivan felt that he was sufficiently identified in the ad
as the perpetrator of the outrage; consequently, he sued New York Times on the basis of
what he believed were libelous utterances against him.
The U.S. Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
ruled against Sullivan holding that honest criticisms on the conduct of public officials and
public figures are insulated from libel judgments. The guarantees of freedom of speech
and press prohibit a public official or public figure from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not. AHCETa
The raison d'etre for the New York Times doctrine was that to require critics of
official conduct to guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions on pain of libel
judgments would lead to self-censorship, since would-be critics would be deterred from
voicing out their criticisms even if such were believed to be true, or were in fact true,
because of doubt whether it could be proved or because of fear of the expense of having
to prove it. 226 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In relation to publications attacking the Judiciary, In re Jurado 227 explains that the freedom of
the press to publish must be balanced with the right to the private reputation of the Judiciary. Journalists
must exercise bona fide efforts to ascertain the truth or falsity of their publications:
In the present proceeding, there is also involved an acknowledged and important
interest of individual persons: the right to private reputation. Judges, by becoming such,
are commonly and rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of
conduct which embody more stringent standards of honesty, integrity, and competence
than are commonly required from private persons. Nevertheless, persons who seek or
accept appointment to the Judiciary cannot reasonably be regarded as having thereby
forfeited any right whatsoever to private honor and reputation. For so to rule will be
simply, in the generality of cases, to discourage all save those who feel no need to
maintain their self-respect as a human being in society, from becoming judges, with
obviously grievous consequences for the quality of our judges and the quality of the
justice that they will dispense. Thus, the protection of the right of individual persons to
private reputations is also a matter of public interest and must be reckoned with as a
factor in identifying and laying down the norms concerning the exercise of press freedom
and free speech.
Clearly, the public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual
interest of judges (and for that matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of
private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other. And the point of
adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate interests is precisely found in
the norm which requires those who, invoking freedom of speech, publish statements
which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise
bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The norm does not
require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm
does prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating
defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof. That
this norm represents the generally accepted point of balance or adjustment between the
two interests involved is clear from a consideration of both the pertinent civil law norms
and the Code of Ethics adopted by the journalism profession in the Philippines.
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) 228 cHaCAS
In In re Jurado, a lawyer-columnist was punished for contempt after publishing numerous
articles scandalizing the integrity of judges and members of this Court, in gross and reckless disregard
for the truth or falsity of his statements. Here, this Court recognized the right of judges to private honor
and reputation even as they voluntarily subject themselves to stricter standards of integrity, honesty, and
competence than private individuals. The freedom of speech and of the press do not sanction abusing
these rights through false publications relating to public officers without bona fide effort in ascertaining
the truth. Such reckless disregard of truth also violates the Philippine Journalist's Code of Ethics.
Moreover, this Court held that the personalities of Emiliano Jurado as a member of the media
and as a lawyer cannot be separated, and the liability that may be imposed upon him for being an officer
of the court may be aggravated:
Jurado would have the Court clarify in what capacity — whether as a journalist,
or as a member of the bar — he has been cited in these proceedings. Thereby he
resurrects the issue he once raised in a similar earlier proceeding: that he is being called
to account as a lawyer for his statements as a journalist. This is not the case at all. Upon
the doctrines and principles already inquired into and cited, he is open to sanctions as
journalist who has misused and abused press freedom to put the judiciary in clear and
present danger of disrepute and of public odium and approbium, [sic] to the detriment
and prejudice of the administration of justice. That he is at the same time a member of the
bar has nothing to do with the setting in of those sanctions, although it may aggravate
liability. At any rate, what was said about the matter in that earlier case is equally cogent
here:
"Respondent expresses perplexity at being called to account for the
publications in question in his capacity as a member of the bar, not as a
journalist. The distinction is meaningless, since as the matter stands, he
has failed to justify his actuations in either capacity, and there
is no question of the Court's authority to call him to task either as a
newsman or as a lawyer. What respondent proposes is that in considering
his actions, the Court judge them only as those of a member of the press
and disregard the fact that he is also a lawyer. But his actions cannot be
put into such neat compartments. In the natural order of things, a person's
acts are determined by, and reflect, the sum total of his knowledge,
training and experience. In the case of respondent in particular, the Court
will take judicial notice of the frequent appearance in his regular columns
of comments and observations utilizing legal language and argument,
bearing witness to the fact that in pursuing his craft as a journalist he calls
upon his knowledge as a lawyer to help inform and influence his readers at
enhance his credibility. Even absent this circumstance, respondent cannot
honestly assert that in exercising his profession as a journalist he does not
somehow, consciously or unconsciously, draw upon his legal knowledge
and training. It is thus not realistic, nor perhaps even possible, to come to
any affair, informed and intelligent judgment of respondent's actuations by
divorcing from consideration the fact that he is a lawyer as well as a
newspaperman, even supposing, which is not the case — that he may
thereby be found without accountability in this matter. ScHADI
To repeat, respondent cannot claim absolution even were the Court
to lend ear to his plea that his actions be judged solely as those of a
newspaperman unburdened by the duties and responsibilities peculiar to
the law profession of which he is also a member." 229
In In re Macasaet, 230 bribery allegations against an associate justice of this Court who
supposedly received PHP10 million in consideration for ruling in favor of the accused were published
several times in a newspaper of general circulation. This Court found Amado Macasaet in contempt in
publishing defamatory articles, in reckless and wanton disregard of whether his publication was false or
not:
We have no problems with legitimate criticisms pointing out flaws in our
decisions, judicial reasoning, or even how we run our public offices or public affairs.
They should even be constructive and should pave the way for a more responsive,
effective and efficient judiciary.
Unfortunately, the published articles of respondent Macasaet are not of this genre.
On the contrary, he has crossed the line, as his are baseless scurrilous attacks which
demonstrate nothing but an abuse of press freedom. They leave no redeeming value in
furtherance of freedom of the press. They do nothing but damage the integrity of the High
Court, undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, and threaten the
doctrine of judicial independence.
A veteran journalist of many years and a president of a group of respectable
media practitioners, respondent Macasaet has brilliantly sewn an incredible tale, adorned
it with some facts to make it lifelike, but impregnated it as well with insinuations and
 innuendoes, which, when digested entirely by an unsuspecting soul, may make him throw
up with seethe. Thus, he published his highly speculative articles that bribery occurred in
the High Court, based on specious information, without any regard for the injury such
would cause to the reputation of the judiciary and the effective administration of justice.
Nor did he give any thought to the undue, irreparable damage such false accusations and
thinly veiled allusions would have on a member of the Court.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent has absolutely no basis to call the Supreme Court a court of "thieves"
and a "basket of rotten apples." These publications directly undermine the integrity of the
justices and render suspect the Supreme Court as an institution. Without bases for his
publications, purely resorting to speculation and "fishing expeditions" in the hope of
striking — or creating — a story, with utter disregard for the institutional integrity of the
Supreme Court, he has committed acts that degrade and impede the orderly
administration of justice. DACcIH
We cannot close our eyes to the comprehensive Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Committee. It enumerated the inconsistencies and assumptions of
respondent which lacked veracity and showed the reckless disregard of whether the
alleged bribery was false or not.
Indeed, the confidential information allegedly received by respondent by which
he swears with his "heart and soul" was found by the Investigating
Committee unbelievable. It was a story that reeked of urban legend, as it generated more
questions than answers. 231 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Re: News Report of Mr. Jomar Canlas in the Manila Times, 232 this Court severely
reprimanded Jomar Canlas (Canlas) for publishing a misleading article with grave accusations of bribery
of justices of this Court to rule in favor of the disqualification of Senator Grace Poe during the 2016
presidential elections. This Court declared Canlas guilty of indirect contempt for his misleading article
showing an intention to sensationalize, with grave allegations without showing that his sources had been
verified:
The substantive evil sought to be prevented to warrant the restriction upon
freedom of expression or of the press must be serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high. In the application of the clear and present danger test in relation to
freedom of the press, good faith or absence of intent to harm the courts is a valid defense.
Here, Canlas claimed that his article was written with good motives and for justifiable
ends.
We do not agree. Canlas reported about alleged attempts to buy off the Justices in
the Poe cases. The offer was allegedly P50 million for each vote to disqualify Poe. Canlas
claimed that he tried to get the side of the Justices on the alleged attempts but he was
unsuccessful. He did not elaborate on his attempts to verify the story. However, he
quoted an unnamed Justice who allegedly said that the Court will not bow to any pressure
in deciding the case in exchange for money. Canlas claimed that his article painted the
Court in a good light as it showed that the Court is incorruptible. We do not find his
explanation acceptable. aICcHA
First, the Court notes that the statement of the unnamed Justice did not confirm
the allegation of bribery; the unnamed Justice only stated that the Court will not allow
itself to be pressured by anyone. Second, the legitimacy of the news article is misleading
and has not been sufficiently established. Third, a reading of the article shows its
intention to sensationalize. The news article reports of grave accusations that were not
shown to have been verified. It imputed bribery charges against a female lawyer, who was
a former Malacañang lawyer and who supported the candidacy of Mar Roxas; a member
of the Liberal Party; and a businessman, who is close to Roxas and President Benigno
Aquino III. It gave a false impression against the Justices who did not vote in favor of
Poe. It compared the bribery attempts to the one that allegedly occurred during the
impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. The article, in full, emphasizes the bad
that overshadows the short disclaimer that the Justices refused the bribe. Again, because
of the close voting in the Poe cases, the article created a doubt in the minds of the readers,
against some of the Justices and in the process, the Court as a whole.
In In Re Emil P. Jurado, where Jurado was cited for contempt for publishing
serious accusations against members of the Judiciary without ascertaining their veracity,
the Court expressed that —
[F]alse reports about a public official or other person are not
shielded from sanction by the cardinal right to free speech enshrined in
the Constitution. Even the most liberal view of free speech has never
countenanced the publication of falsehoods, specially the persistent and
 unmitigated dissemination of patent lies. The U.S. Supreme Court, while
asserting that "[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a
false idea," and that "[h]owever pernicious an opinion may seem, we
depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on
the competition of other ideas" (citing a passage from the first Inaugural
Address of Thomas Jefferson), nonetheless made the firm announcement
that there is no constitutional value in false statements of facts," and "the
erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection
[although] x x x nevertheless inevitable in free debate." "Neither the
intentional lie nor careless error," it said, "materially advances society's
interest in 'unhibited [sic], robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues.
They belong to that category of utterances which 'are no[t] essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
the truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.'"
The Court is not immune from criticisms, and it is the duty of the press to expose
all government agencies and officials and to hold them responsible for their actions.
However, the press cannot just throw accusations without verifying the truthfulness of
their reports. The perfunctory apology of Canlas does not detract from the fact that the
article, directly or indirectly, tends to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice. 233 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Like criminal libel, the burden to prove actual malice or the reckless disregard of falsity in
criminal contempt proceedings belongs to the judge or any other person seeking to hold the speaker in
contempt: HSCATc
Based on these principles, this Court has imposed a higher standard for criminal
libel where the complainant is a public figure, particularly a public officer. Actual malice
— knowledge that the defamatory statement was false, or with reckless disregard as to its
falsity — must be proved. It is the burden of the prosecution to prove actual malice, not
the defense's to disprove. In Guingguing v. Court of Appeals:
We considered the following proposition as settled in this
jurisdiction: that in order to justify a conviction for criminal libel against a
public figure, it must be established beyond reasonable doubt that the
libelous statements were made or published with actual malice, meaning
knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to
whether or not it was true.
"Reckless disregard" is determined on a case-by-case basis. There is reckless
disregard if the accused was found to have entertained serious doubts of the truth of the
published statements, or if the statements were of a matter not determined to be a
legitimate topic in the area. Errors or misstatements by themselves are insufficient to be
considered reckless disregard, unless shown that the accused possessed a high degree of
awareness of the falsity. Mere negligence is not enough:
To be considered to have reckless disregard for the truth, the false
statements must have been made with a definite awareness that they are
untrue. That the accused was negligent of the facts is not enough. The
accused must have doubted the veracity of the statements that he or she
was making. Thus, errors and inaccuracies may be excused so long as they
were made with the belief that what was being stated is true.
To burden the accused with proving that allegations of official misconduct are
true, or that the allegations were made with good motives and justifiable ends, is
repugnant to the Constitution. 234 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
VI
Comments or criticisms of lawyers against the courts may be subject to greater limitation and
scrutiny, owing to the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability.
Similarly, the speech of judges is stringently restricted by the Code of Judicial Conduct. 235 Judges
should be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times and in all activities, whether in their
personal or official capacity. 236 EHaASD
The freedom of speech of lawyers is not absolute. Prior to its amendment, Canon 13 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility prohibits a lawyer from committing "any impropriety which tends to
influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court." 237 Canon 13, Rule 13.02 expressly
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending
to arouse public opinion for or against a party."
The Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability expands the responsibilities of
lawyers with respect to the sub judice rule. Rule 13.02 in the old Code has been incorporated under
Canon II on Propriety in the new Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability. Section 19 of
the same Code limits the public speech of a lawyer in relation to a pending proceeding that may have the
following effect:
a. cause a pre-judgment, or
b. sway public perception so as to impede, obstruct, or influence the decision of such court,
tribunal, or other government agency, or which tends to tarnish the court's or
tribunal's integrity,
c. impute improper motives against any of its members, or
d. create a widespread perception of guilt or innocence before a final decision.
Aside from compliance with the sub judice rule, lawyers are responsible for their use of social
media and "shall not knowingly or maliciously post, share, upload or otherwise disseminate false or
unverified statements, claims, or commit any other act of disinformation." 238
Lawyers do not shed their obligations to this Court regardless of the role they choose to
fulfill. 239 They are duty bound to comply with the ethical standards of the profession inside and outside
judicial proceedings. Hence, a lawyer, who is also a member of the press, cannot claim to exercise press
freedom at the expense of their obligations under the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Accountability. 240 While this Court has recognized the rights of a lawyer as an officer of the court and
as an ordinary citizen, 241 this Court also held that the duties attending these rights are not divisible and
cannot be invoked only when convenient. 242
Notwithstanding these professional responsibilities, this Court recognizes that criticism of its
decisions is an important aspect of a lawyer's work:
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work
of the lawyer. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In
articles written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal
pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for all to see the flaws and
inconsistencies of the doctrines[.] As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte
Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641: IDTSEH
"No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the
expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or
integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best
opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in
constant attendance on the courts. . . . To say that an attorney can only act
or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be
deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he
may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous
to be entertained. . . .
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may
abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official
conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a
citizen." HTcADC
"Above all others, the members of the bar have the best
opportunity to become conversant with the character and efficiency of our
judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has
as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench."
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is
to seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their
duty, to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the
merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound
silence."
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the
other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which
are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his
shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of
respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all
good fidelity . . . to the courts"; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to
observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." The first
 canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not
for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of
its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
". . . the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do
not by express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted
to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to
maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of
courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court
from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges
personally for their judicial acts."
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to
the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients'' rights,
lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up their
tempers. 243 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
However, there are limits to a lawyer's criticism of the courts:
[U]se of foul language which ridicules the high esteem for the courts, creates or
promotes distrust in judicial administration, or tends to undermine the confidence of the
people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade the administration of
justice by this Court; or offensive, abusive and abrasive language; or disrespectful,
offensive, manifestly baseless and malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter
addressed to the judge; or disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled for
remarks. 244 (Citations omitted)
In In re Almacen v. Yaptinchay, 245 Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen (Atty. Almacen) filed a petition
to surrender his lawyer's certificate of title to this Court for the alleged injustice done to his client. He
disclosed the contents of his petition to the press, which were also published in a newspaper of general
circulation. Atty. Almacen's petition originated from dismissing his motion for reconsideration in the
lower court for failing to include a notice of time and place of the hearing. His appeal to the Court of
Appeals was likewise dismissed for the same reason. Similarly, this Court also dismissed his appeal
by certiorari and the subsequent motions for reconsiderations filed through minute resolutions. Despite
his filing of the petition and its publication in the media, Atty. Almacen did not surrender his certificate
of membership to the bar. 246
Atty. Almacen was declared to be in contempt of court for his "vicious language used, and the
scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate
criticism." 247 Citing the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon, this Court held that
contemptuous speech may be punished even after the final disposition of a pending case:
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his
statements and actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in
his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor
as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable
for contempt for such post-litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the
tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here
presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn
duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the
disciplinary power inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard the morals and ethics
of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and
unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-
pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this
proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a
member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. 248
In Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 249 a motion for contempt of court was filed against Special
Prosecutor Raul M. Gonzalez (Special Prosecutor Gonzalez) in relation to his public statements
regarding the dismissal of this Court for the graft and corruption case against Antique Governor Enrique
Zaldivar. This Court issued a show cause order why Special Prosecutor Gonzalez should not be
punished for contempt and subjected to administrative liability. Special Prosecutor Gonzalez filed a
motion for inhibition of several justices of this Court for "lack of sobriety and neutrality" and to transfer
the hearing of the administrative complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, among others. This
Court held that when the speaker of a contumacious speech is a lawyer, they may be penalized for
contempt and administratively held liable at the same time:
 We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers
of the court and members of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as
regular and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over
attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's constitutional
mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to
regulate the practice itself of law. Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent
power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly
discharge of judicial functions. Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to
punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial
officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner
with a case before the Court. The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own
protection against an improper interference with the due administration of justice," "[it] is
not dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties litigant."
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases
like that before us here; the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the
contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is
broader that the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committed both
by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is
a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls
into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Where the respondent is a
lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into
play whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes
contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope
of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the
Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of
admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the
court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing
justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to
obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both
professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him and
contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court
has in the past penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary
sanctions, this Court is compelled to hold that the statements here made by respondent
Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary
authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the charge that the
Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decisions in the Consolidated
Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this Court betrayed their oath of office,
merely to wreak vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of
disrespect for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme
Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country.
That respondent's baseless charges have had some impact outside the internal world of
subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the filing of a complaint for impeachment of
thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14) incumbent members of this Court, a complaint
the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the appalling claim of respondent that this
Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the
respondent. 250 (Citations omitted)
In Zaldivar, this Court held that a lawyer's freedom of speech and of expression is limited. While
a lawyer can criticize the courts and its decisions, this must not transcend the bounds of decency and
propriety. The nature and manner of a lawyer's criticisms can show that they violated their solemn duty
to uphold and defend judicial independence and public confidence:
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized
the Court; it is addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and the
manner in which it was carried out.
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the court. The
subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or
misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and
plain import of his words and acts. It is, upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out
that respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and
exhibited no repentance.
Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the
judiciary has been shown, and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for
 Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and reiterated and amplified
that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the first place, proof of actual damage
sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a finding of contempt
or for the application of the disciplinary authority of the Court. Insofar as the
Consolidated Petitions are concerned this Court after careful review of the bases of its 27
April 1988 Decision, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof and
rejected the public pressures brought to bear upon this Court by the respondent through
his much publicized acts and statements for which he is here being required to account.
Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a particular case is not the only species
of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to prevent and redress. What is at stake in
cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the country in general and
of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such institutions might not be quantifiable
at a given moment in time but damage there will surely be if acts like those of respondent
Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust and confidence of
the general public in the courts, including the court of last resort, is not easily measured;
but few will dispute that a high level of such trust and confidence is critical for the
stability of democratic government. CAIHTE
Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggest[s] that punishment for contempt is not the
proper remedy in this case and suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to
libel suits against him. While the remedy of libel suits by individual members of this
Court may well be available against respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means an
exclusive remedy. Moreover, where as in the instant case, it is not only the individual
members of the Court but the Court itself as an institution that has been falsely attacked,
libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy. 251 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
VII
This Court has recognized several qualified privileges which exempt a contemptuous speech
from subsequent punishment.
In Castelo, this Court characterized contempt proceedings as akin to libel cases in relation to the
applicable limitations on the freedoms of expression and of the press. Hence, qualified privileged
communications that are defenses in libel cases found in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code also
apply in contempt proceedings. The provision reads:
ARTICLE 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive
for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of
any legal, moral, or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks,
of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other
act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Manuel v. Paño 252 expounds on these qualified privileged communications, which are
ultimately based on the freedom of expression and the right to information on matters of public interest:
The two exceptions provided for under Article 354 are based on the wider
guarantee of freedom of expression as an institution of all republican societies. This in
turn is predicated on the proposition that the ordinary citizen has a right and a duty to
involve himself in matters that affect the public welfare and, for this purpose, to inform
himself of such matters.
The vitality of republicanism derives from an alert citizenry that is always ready
to participate in the discussion and resolution of public issues. These issues include the
conduct of government functionaries who are accountable to the people in the
performance of their assigned powers, which after all come from the people themselves.
Every citizen has a right to expect from all public servants utmost fidelity to the trust
reposed in them and the maximum of efficiency and integrity in the discharge of their
functions. Every citizen has a right to complain and criticize if this hope is betrayed.
It is no less important to observe that this vigilance is not only a right but a
responsibility of the highest order that should not be shirked for fear of official reprisal or
because of mere civic lethargy. Whenever the citizen discovers official anomaly, it is his
duty to expose and denounce it, that the culprits may be punished and the public service
cleansed even as the rights violated are vindicated or redressed. It can never be
overstressed that indifference to ineptness will breed more ineptness and that toleration of
corruption will breed more corruption. The sins of the public service are imputable not
only to those who actually commit them but also to those who by their silence or inaction
permit and encourage their commission.
 xxx xxx xxx
The second exception is justified under the right of every citizen to be informed
on matters of public interest, which, significantly, was first recognized in the 1973
Constitution. Even if it were not, the right would still be embraced in the broader
safeguard of freedom of expression, for the simple reason that the right to speak
intelligently on "matters that touch the existing order" necessarily imports the availability
of adequate official information on such matters. Surely, the exercise of such right cannot
inspire belief if based only on conjectures and rumors and half-truths because direct
access to the facts is not allowed to the ordinary citizen.
This right is now effectively enjoyed with the help of the mass media, which have
fortunately resumed their roles as an independent conduit of information between the
government and the people. It is the recognized duty of the media to report to the public
what is going on in the government, including the proceedings in any of its departments
or agencies, save only in exceptional cases involving decency or confidentiality when
disclosure may be prohibited. To protect them in the discharge of this mission, the law
says that as long as the account is a fair and true report of such proceedings, and made
without any remarks or comment, it is considered privileged and malice is not presumed.
Its publication is encouraged rather than suppressed or punished.
This is one reason why the Court looks with disapproval on censorship in general
as an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of expression. Censorship presumes malice
at the outset. It prevents inquiry into public affairs and curtails their disclosure and
discussion, leaving the people in the dark as to what is happening in the public service.
By locking the public portals to the citizen, who can only guess at the goings-on in the
forbidden precincts, censorship separates the people from their government. This
certainly should not be permitted. "A free press stands as one of the great interpreters
between the government and the people," declared Justice Sutherland of the U.S.
Supreme Court. "To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves." 253 (Citations omitted)
The first type of qualified privilege is illustrated in Bustos, where a "complaint made in good
faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an
officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter," 254 does not constitute contempt of court:
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of
government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and
incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege.
"The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public
policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice,
though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an
immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.'"
Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not
concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie privilege
which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule is thus stated by Lord Campbell, C. J.
"A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if
made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained
criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable."
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint
made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public
official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the
matter. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for
belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege
may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be made under
an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not
necessary. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice
and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social
or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believe he is acting in pursuance
thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that
the communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of the law of
privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a
party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the
respective functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out
of the privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege
destroy that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The
 plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his
conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice.
A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination
to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the
protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that
of bona fides. 255 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Bustos, a criminal case for libel was filed against those who filed a complaint to the executive
secretary for the removal of a justice of the peace in Pampanga for malfeasance. This Court reversed the
conviction of the complainants, recognizing the right to criticize judicial conduct and the duty to assist
in the investigation of any misconduct of a public officer.
Complainants who ventilated their grievances against a judge in the proper forum will generally
not be held liable for contempt. 256 If the charges in the complaint are proven false, it is still not
punishable as long as the charges were "formed with a reasonable degree of care and on reasonable
grounds." 257 It is the burden of those who seek to punish for contempt to establish that the filing of the
complaint was done maliciously.
The second type of qualified privilege is a fair and true reporting of a proceeding or any of its
incidents. This was illustrated in Castelo:
But, even if it may have that effect, we however believe that the publication in
question comes well within the framework of the constitutional guaranty of the freedom
of the press. At least it may be said that it is a fair and true report of an official
investigation that comes well within the principle of a privileged communication, so that
even if the same is defamatory or contemptuous, the publisher need not be prosecuted
upon the theory that he has done it to serve public interest or promote public good. Thus,
under our law, it is postulated that "a fair and true report, made in good faith, without
any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which
are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in such
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions," is deemed privileged and not punishable.
The reason behind this privilege is obvious. As it was aptly said, "Public policy,
the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded
protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the
development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege." On another occasion it was
emphasized that "The doctrine of privilege communications rests upon public policy,
'which looks to the free unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental
result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant
slanderer[.]'"
While the present case involves an incident of contempt the same is akin to a case
of libel for both constitute limitations upon freedom of the press or freedom of expression
guaranteed by our Constitution. So what is considered a privilege in one may likewise be
considered in the other. The same safeguard should be extended to one whether anchored
in freedom of the press or freedom of expression. Therefore, this principle regarding
privileged communications can also be invoked in favor of appellant.
A circumstance that mitigates the behavior of appellant is his compelling duty as
he sees it to serve public opinion by reporting matters of public concern. He acted
imbued with this spirit and compelled by this duty. His main function is to gather news of
public interest for his newspaper from sources available to him which at times come
under adverse circumstances and this he has a perfect right to do provided that his
source comes within the realm of law. In legal parlance, we may say that this source
should be one not of confidential nature or not banned for publication. Otherwise, its
privileged nature is destroyed. He then becomes amenable to prosecution or disciplinary
action. 258 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The third kind of qualified privilege is fair commentaries on matters of public interest.
In Borjal, this Court recognized that Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code is not an exclusive
enumeration of qualified privilege. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are implicit in the
constitutional freedoms of speech and of the press:
Indisputably, petitioner Borjal's questioned writings are not within the exceptions
of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate court,
they are neither private communications nor fair and true report without any comments or
remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. To be sure,
the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged
communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise
privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation's
penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech
 and of the press. As early as 1918, in United States v. Cañete, this Court ruled that
publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional right cannot be
abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in the statute
punishing libels. aScITE
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press.
As held in Elizalde v. Gutierrez and reiterated in Santos v. Court of Appeals —
To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to petitioners
for the alleged offending publication without doing violence to the concept
of privileged communications implicit in the freedom of the press. As was
so well put by Justice Malcolm in Bustos: 'Public policy, the welfare of
society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded
protection of public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has
been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege.'
The doctrine formulated in these two (2) cases resonates the rule that privileged
communications must, sui generis, be protective of public opinion. This closely adheres
to the democratic theory of free speech as essential to collective self-determination and
eschews the strictly libertarian view that it is protective solely of self-expression which,
in the words of Yale Sterling Professor Owen Fiss, makes its appeal to the individualistic
ethos that so dominates our popular and political culture. It is therefore clear that the
restrictive interpretation vested by the Court of Appeals on the penal provision exempting
from liability only private communications and fair and true report without comments or
remarks defeats, rather than promotes, the objective of the rule on privileged
communications, sadly contriving as it does, to suppress the healthy efflorescence of
public debate and opinion as shining linchpins of truly democratic societies.
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and
constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment
means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed
false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and
every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable
imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then
it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be
inferred from the facts. 259 (Citations omitted)
In Borjal, a libel complaint was filed against a columnist for publishing a story about the alleged
anomalous publications of a conference organizer. At that time, the First National Conference on Land
Transportation was organized to draft a bill for long-term land transportation policy for presentation to
Congress. Although the organizer was unnamed in the column, respondent reacted to the articles and
filed several complaints against petitioner. This Court held that the articles pertained to matters of public
interest, which by its nature, invited scrutiny of the media on the purpose of the conference, its activities,
and the qualifications of its organizers:
The FNCLT was an undertaking infused with public interest. It was promoted as a
joint project of the government and the private sector, and organized by top government
officials and prominent businessmen. For this reason, it attracted media mileage and drew
public attention not only to the conference itself but to the personalities behind as well.
As its Executive Director and spokesman, private respondent consequently assumed the
status of a public figure.
But even assuming ex-gratia argumenti that private respondent, despite the
position he occupied in the FNCLT, would not qualify as a public figure, it does not
necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment even if he
was not a public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as he was
involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved or because in
some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The public's
primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and
the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity
or notoriety.
There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public
interest. A reading of the imputations of petitioner Borjal against respondent Wenceslao
shows that all these necessarily bore upon the latter's official conduct and his moral and
mental fitness as Executive Director of the FNCLT. The nature and functions of his
position which included solicitation of funds, dissemination of information about the
 FNCLT in order to generate interest in the conference, and the management and
coordination of the various activities of the conference demanded from him utmost
honesty, integrity and competence. These are matters about which the public has the right
to be informed, taking into account the very public character of the conference
itself. 260 (Citations omitted)
The privilege of fair commentaries on a matter of public interest has been invoked in
publications violating the confidentiality of administrative cases.
In Palad v. Solis, 261 this Court clarified that "as long as there is a legitimate public interest, the
media is not prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate news report of a disbarment
complaint." 262 In that case, the suspension of Atty. Raymund Palad, the counsel of Katrina Halili, who
was a victim of voyeurism, was published in several newspapers. This Court did not find the writers and
editors of the articles to be in contempt of court since they were reporting on a matter involving a public
issue:
As a general rule, disciplinary proceedings are confidential in nature until their
final resolution and the final decision of this Court. However, in this case, the
disciplinary proceeding against petitioner became a matter of public concern considering
that it arose from his representation of his client on the issue of video voyeurism on the
internet. The interest of the public is not in himself but primarily in his involvement and
participation as counsel of Halili in the scandal. Indeed, the disciplinary proceeding
against petitioner related to his supposed conduct and statements made before the media
in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility involving the controversy.
Since petitioner has become a public figure for being involved in a public issue,
and because the event itself that led to the filing of the disciplinary case against
petitioner is a matter of public interest, the media has the right to report the disciplinary
case as legitimate news. The legitimate media has a right to publish such fact under the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press. Respondents merely reported on the
alleged penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a year against petitioner, and
the supposed grounds relied upon. It appeared that the respondents, as entertainment
writers, merely acted on information they received from their source about the petitioner
who used to appear before the media in representing his actress client. Also, there
was no evidence that the respondents published the articles to influence this Court on its
action on the disciplinary case or deliberately destroy petitioner's reputation. Thus, they
did not violate the confidentiality rule in disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers. 263 (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, in Roque v. Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff, 264 this Court held that the
confidentiality of disbarment proceedings yields to the fundamental right of the public to
information. 265 In Roque, this Court declined to exercise its inherent power of contempt against a press
statement on the filing of a disbarment complaint that involves public interest:
The confidentiality in disciplinary actions for lawyers is not absolute. It is not to
be applied under any circumstance, to all disclosures of any nature.
As a general principle, speech on matters of public interest should not be
restricted. This Court recognizes the fundamental right to information, which is essential
to allow the citizenry to form intelligent opinions and hold people accountable for their
actions. Accordingly, matters of public interest should not be censured for the sake of an
unreasonably strict application of the confidentiality rule. Thus, in Palad v. Solis, this
Court dismissed claims that the confidentiality rule had been violated, considering that
the lawyer therein represented a matter of public interest:
A person, even if he was not a public official or at least a public
figure, could validly be the subject of a public comment as long as he was
involved in a public issue. Petitioner has become a public figure because
he is representing a public concern. We explained it, thus:
But even assuming . . . that [the person] would not qualify
as a public figure, it does not necessarily follow that he could not
validly be the subject of a public comment even if he was not a
public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as
he was involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public
or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely
because a private individual is involved or because in some sense
the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The
public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the
conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance
of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.
 As a general rule, disciplinary proceedings are confidential
in nature until their final resolution and the final decision of this
Court. However, in this case, the disciplinary proceeding against
petitioner became a matter of public concern considering that it
arose from his representation of his client on the issue of video
voyeurism on the internet. The interest of the public is not in
himself but primarily in his involvement and participation as
counsel of Halili in the scandal. Indeed, the disciplinary
proceeding against petitioner related to his supposed conduct and
statements made before the media in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility involving the controversy.
Indeed, to keep controversial proceedings shrouded in secrecy would present its
own dangers. In disbarment proceedings, a balance must be struck, due to the demands of
the legal profession.
In Fortun v. Quinsayas, despite recognizing that the disbarment complaint was a
matter of public interest, it still declared the complainant therein in contempt for violating
the confidentiality rule:
Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court both as a complainant in the disbarment case against petitioner
and as a lawyer. As a lawyer and an officer of the Court, Atty. Quinsayas
is familiar with the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings.
However, instead of preserving its confidentiality, Atty. Quinsayas
disseminated copies of the disbarment complaint against petitioner to
members of the media which act constitutes contempt of court. In Relativo
v. De Leon, the Court ruled that the premature disclosure by publication of
the filing and pendency of disbarment proceedings is a violation of the
confidentiality rule. In that case, Atty. Relativo, the complainant in a
disbarment case, caused the publication in newspapers of statements
regarding the filing and pendency of the disbarment proceedings. The
Court found him guilty of contempt.
The complainant in Fortun bears the distinction of having distributed the actual
disbarment complaint to the press. This case is different.
The confidentiality rule requires only that "proceedings against attorneys" be kept
private and confidential. It is the proceedings against attorneys that must be kept private
and confidential. This would necessarily prohibit the distribution of actual disbarment
complaints to the press. However, the rule does not extend so far that it covers the mere
existence or pendency of disciplinary actions.
Some cases are more public than others, because of the subject matter, or the
personalities involved. Some are deliberately conducted in the public as a matter of
strategy. A lawyer who regularly seeks attention and readily welcomes, if not invites,
media coverage, cannot expect to be totally sheltered from public interest,
himself. 266 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Roque, nothing in the press statement violated the confidentiality rule. The statement was
issued in relation to the official functions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in addressing a matter
of public concern, which was the "serious breach of security of a military zone." 267 The content of the
statement referred to a factual announcement that a disbarment case would be filed without discussing
the actual charges written in the complaint. It is the public disclosure of the proceedings, such as the
distribution of the actual disbarment complaint, which is punishable by contempt of court. 268
Qualified privilege is a matter of defense. Raising qualified privilege involves an implied
admission that improper conduct has been committed for which the speaker seeks exemption from
subsequent punishment. Thus, the one invoking this defense must prove why their speech should not be
subject to subsequent punishment. Once proven, the burden shifts to the judge or plaintiff seeking to
punish the publication for contempt to establish the existence of actual malice in the contemptuous
publication. 269 This is in the form of knowledge of the falsity or a reckless disregard for the falsity of
the statements. 270 The qualified privilege is prima facie only such that when actual malice has been
proven to exist, the privilege no longer applies. 271
VIII
In jurisprudence, this Court has started recognizing the importance of the internet. In 1998, Ople
v. Torres 272 cited the internet and its benefits in facilitating better governance:
Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is
not per se against the use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retrieve and
transmit data to improve our bureaucracy. Computers work wonders to achieve the
efficiency which both government and private industry seek. Many information systems in
 different countries make use of the computer to facilitate important social objectives,
such as better law enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more efficient
management of credit and insurance programs, improvement of telecommunications and
streamlining of financial activities. Used wisely, data stored in the computer could help
good administration by making accurate and comprehensive information for those who
have to frame policy and make key decisions. The benefits of the computer has
revolutionized information technology. It developed the internet, introduced the concept
of cyberspace and the information superhighway where the individual, armed only with
his personal computer, may surf and search all kinds and classes of information from
libraries and databases connected to the net. 273 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In 1999, in Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals, 274 the importance of the internet was seen as an
"electronic communications medium" in advertising. The internet has been described as paving the way
for "growth and expansion of the product by creating and earning a reputation that crosses over borders,
virtually turning the whole world into one vast marketplace." 275 W Land Holding, Inc. v. Starwood
Hotels and Resorts Worldwide, Inc. 276 reiterated that the internet is a commercial marketplace in
relation to its actual use of a trademark. In 2021, these cases were reiterated in Kolin Electronics Co.,
Inc. v. Taiwan Kolin Corp. Ltd., 277 which expanded the concept of the internet as an online
marketplace:
The industry for electronic equipment is no stranger to this phenomenon. Indeed,
consumers nowadays can readily access information on electronic equipment and
apparatus and easily and conveniently purchase electronic equipment online through the
simple click of a mouse or the tap of a screen. An enterprise which seeks to establish its
presence in the online marketplace and sell its products therein may do so by developing
its own website, which has a corresponding domain name — an identifier analogous to a
telephone number or street address. In turn, the modern day consumer frequently expects
that a website consisting of or encompassing a trademark used in the physical market is
sponsored by or associated with the owner of that trademark, and readily use domain
names as an indicator of the source or origin of the goods, i.e., a means of finding goods
and services from a preferred source. 278 (Citations omitted)
In 2008, in Chavez v. Gonzales, 279 this Court remarked that regulating digital technology on the
internet has the same rationale as regulating broadcast media. However, internet use remained largely
unregulated:
Parenthetically, these justifications are now the subject of debate. Historically, the
scarcity of frequencies was thought to provide a rationale. However, cable and satellite
television have enormously increased the number of actual and potential channels. Digital
technology will further increase the number of channels available. But still, the argument
persists that broadcasting is the most influential means of communication, since it comes
into the home, and so much time is spent watching television. Since it has a unique
impact on people and affects children in a way that the print media normally does not,
that regulation is said to be necessary in order to preserve pluralism. It has been argued
further that a significant main threat to free expression — in terms of diversity — comes
not from government, but from private corporate bodies. These developments show a
need for a reexamination of the traditional notions of the scope and extent of broadcast
media regulation.
The emergence of digital technology — which has led to the convergence of
broadcasting, telecommunications and the computer industry — has likewise led to the
question of whether the regulatory model for broadcasting will continue to be appropriate
in the converged environment. Internet, for example, remains largely unregulated, yet the
Internet and the broadcast media share similarities, and the rationales used to support
broadcast regulation apply equally to the Internet. Thus, it has been argued that courts,
legislative bodies and the government agencies regulating media must agree to regulate
both, regulate neither or develop a new regulatory framework and rationale to justify the
differential treatment. 280 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Two significant cases on the internet and the rights in cyberspace were decided in 2014.
First is Vivares v. St. Theresa's College, 281 where the right to privacy in social media in relation
to the writ of habeas data was examined. This Court delved into the details of the social media platform
Facebook to determine the expectation of online privacy. This Court looked at the various settings and
features of the platform. It concluded, "Facebook's proclivity towards user interaction and socialization
rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of individual user posts. In fact, it has
been said that [online social network] have facilitated their users' self-tribute, thereby resulting into the
'democratization of fame.'" 282 This Court introduced the concept of cyber responsibility but still
adhered to the norm of self-regulation and parental supervision for the online privacy of minors:
It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children's ears." This
means that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers in general is
 the best means of avoiding privacy rights violations. As a cyberspace community
member, one has to be proactive in protecting his or her own privacy. It is in this regard
that many OSN users, especially minors, fail. Responsible social networking or
observance of the "netiquettes" on the part of teenagers has been the concern of many due
to the widespread notion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally
lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public
forum.
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber
citizenship in its curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct may be most
timely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of schools and organizations have already
deemed it important to include digital literacy and good cyber citizenship in their
respective programs and curricula in view of the risks that the children are exposed to
every time they participate in online activities. Furthermore, considering the complexity
of the cyber world and its pervasiveness, as well as the dangers that these children are
willingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace,
the participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a
good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is
believed that "to limit such risks, there's no substitute for parental involvement and
supervision."
As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its
students to be responsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in
OSNs, when it enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook,
absent a showing that, in the process, it violated the students' rights.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever
they engage in cyberspace activities. Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to
control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion regarding how much information
about themselves they are willing to give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that,
by entering or uploading any kind of data or information online, they are automatically
and inevitably making it permanently available online, the perpetuation of which is
outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more importantly, information,
otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by
third parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online
dealings and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves
the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves
take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These
are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing
to place the matter within the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful
enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information
private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as those of
Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the
site's layout often. 283 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Second is Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 284 where this Court was directly confronted with the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 10175 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 as to the extent
of regulation of online speech, among other important issues in cyberspace. In the main decision, the
majority recognized that the "culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of print." 285
This Court sustained the constitutionality of cyberlibel as a crime punished in Section 4 (c) of
the Cybercrime Prevention Act. However, the related crimes of aiding or abetting cyberlibel and
attempted cyberlibel under Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the same Act were declared
unconstitutional for its chilling effect on online speech. In Disini, this Court examined how social media
and its usage among Filipinos to determine the possible chilling effect that these crimes have on the
exercise of online speech:
Aiding or abetting has of course well-defined meaning and application in existing
laws. When a person aids or abets another in destroying a forest, smuggling merchandise
into the country, or interfering in the peaceful picketing of laborers, his action is
essentially physical and so is susceptible to easy assessment as criminal in character.
These forms of aiding or abetting lend themselves to the tests of common sense and
human experience.
But, when it comes to certain cybercrimes, the waters are muddier and the line of
sight is somewhat blurred. The idea of "aiding or abetting" wrongdoings online threatens
the heretofore popular and unchallenged dogmas of cyberspace use.
According to the 2011 Southeast Asia Digital Consumer Report, 33% of Filipinos
have accessed the internet within a year, translating to about 31 million users. Based on a
recent survey, the Philippines ranks 6th in the top 10 most engaged countries for social
networking. Social networking sites build social relations among people who, for
example, share interests, activities, backgrounds, or real-life connections.
Two of the most popular of these sites are Facebook and Twitter. As of late 2012,
1.2 billion people with shared interests use Facebook to get in touch. Users register at this
site, create a personal profile or an open book of who they are, add other users as friends,
and exchange messages, including automatic notifications when they update their profile.
A user can post a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be made visible
to anyone, depending on the user's privacy settings. DETACa
If the post is made available to the public, meaning to everyone and not only to
his friends, anyone on Facebook can react to the posting, clicking any of several buttons
of preferences on the program's screen such as "Like," "Comment," or "Share." "Like"
signifies that the reader likes the posting while "Comment" enables him to post online his
feelings or views about the same, such as "This is great!" When a Facebook user "Shares"
a posting, the original "posting" will appear on his own Facebook profile, consequently
making it visible to his down-line Facebook Friends.
Twitter, on the other hand, is an internet social networking and microblogging
service that enables its users to send and read short text-based messages of up to 140
characters. These are known as "Tweets." Microblogging is the practice of posting small
pieces of digital content — which could be in the form of text, pictures, links, short
videos, or other media — on the internet. Instead of friends, a Twitter user has
"Followers," those who subscribe to this particular user's posts, enabling them to read the
same, and "Following," those whom this particular user is subscribed to, enabling him to
read their posts. Like Facebook, a Twitter user can make his tweets available only to his
Followers, or to the general public. If a post is available to the public, any Twitter user
can "Retweet" a given posting. Retweeting is just reposting or republishing another
person's tweet without the need of copying and pasting it.
In the cyberworld, there are many actors: a) the blogger who originates the
assailed statement; b) the blog service provider like Yahoo; c) the internet service
provider like PLDT, Smart, Globe, or Sun; d) the internet cafe that may have provided
the computer used for posting the blog; e) the person who makes a favorable comment on
the blog; and f) the person who posts a link to the blog site. Now, suppose Maria (a
blogger) maintains a blog on WordPress.com (blog service provider). She needs the
internet to access her blog so she subscribes to Sun Broadband (Internet Service
Provider).
One day, Maria posts on her internet account the statement that a certain married
public official has an illicit affair with a movie star. Linda, one of Maria's friends who
sees this post, comments online, "Yes, this is so true! They are so immoral." Maria's
original post is then multiplied by her friends and the latter's friends, and down the line to
friends of friends almost ad infinitum. Nena, who is a stranger to both Maria and Linda,
comes across this blog, finds it interesting and so shares the link to this apparently
defamatory blog on her Twitter account. Nena's "Followers" then "Retweet" the link to
that blog site.
Pamela, a Twitter user, stumbles upon a random person's "Retweet" of Nena's
original tweet and posts this on her Facebook account. Immediately, Pamela's Facebook
Friends start Liking and making Comments on the assailed posting. A lot of them even
press the Share button, resulting in the further spread of the original posting into tens,
hundreds, thousands, and greater postings.
The question is: are online postings such as "Liking" an openly defamatory
statement, "Commenting" on it, or "Sharing" it with others, to be regarded as "aiding or
abetting?" In libel in the physical world, if Nestor places on the office bulletin board a
small poster that says, "Armand is a thief!," he could certainly be charged with libel. If
Roger, seeing the poster, writes on it, "I like this!,'" that could not be libel since he did
not author the poster. If Arthur, passing by and noticing the poster, writes on it,
"Correct!," would that be libel? No, for he merely expresses agreement with the statement
on the poster. He still is not its author. Besides, it is not clear if aiding or abetting libel in
the physical world is a crime.
But suppose Nestor posts the blog, "Armand is a thief?" on a social networking
site. Would a reader and his Friends or Followers, availing themselves of any of the
"Like," "Comment," and "Share" reactions, be guilty of aiding or abetting libel? And, in
the complex world of cyberspace expressions of thoughts, when will one be liable for
aiding or abetting cybercrimes? Where is the venue of the crime?
 Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who
pressed Like, Comment and Share) are essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who
may think little or haphazardly of their response to the original posting. Will they be
liable for aiding or abetting? And, considering the inherent impossibility of joining
hundreds or thousands of responding "Friends" or "Followers" in the criminal charge to
be filed in court, who will make a choice as to who should go to jail for the outbreak of
the challenged posting?
The old parameters for enforcing the traditional form of libel would be a square
peg in a round hole when applied to cyberspace libel. Unless the legislature crafts a
cyber libel law that takes into account its unique circumstances and culture, such law
will tend to create a chilling effect on the millions that use this new medium of
communication in violation of their constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of
expression. 286 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Seven years from Disini, this Court promulgated Cadajas v. People 287 in 2021, involving an
applied challenge to the Cybercrime Prevention Act. In Cadajas, this Court was asked to review a
conviction of the cybercrime of child pornography. In the case, a child was induced to send photos of
her private parts online to her alleged boyfriend. The concept of the right to privacy in cyberspace was
expounded on in a concurring and dissenting opinion:
As early as Morfe v. Mutuc, we have recognized the increasing importance of the
protection of the right to privacy in the digital age. Such right is of particular importance
given the nature of the internet and our inescapable dependence on it despite the possible
disruption that it can bring. In my separate opinion in Disini v. Secretary of Justice, I
explained:
The internet or cyberspace is a complex phenomenon. It has
pervasive effects and are, by now, ubiquitous in many communities. Its
possibilities for reordering human relationships are limited only by the
state of its constantly evolving technologies and the designs of various
user interfaces. The internet contains exciting potentials as well as
pernicious dangers.
The essential framework for governance of the parts of cyberspace
that have reasonable connections with our territory and our people should
find definite references in our Constitution. However, effective
governance of cyberspace requires cooperation and harmonization with
other approaches in other jurisdictions. Certainly, its scope and continuous
evolution require that we calibrate our constitutional doctrines carefully:
in concrete steps and with full and deeper understanding of incidents that
involve various parts of this phenomenon. The internet is neither just one
relationship nor is it a single technology. It is an interrelationship of many
technologies and cultures.
xxx xxx xxx
While the Internet has engendered innovation and growth, it has
also engendered new types of disruption. A rioted expert employs an
"evolutionary metaphor" as he asserts:
[(Generative technologies] encourage mutations,
branchings away from the status quo — some that are curious dead
ends, others that spread like wildfire. They invite disruption —
along with the good things and bad things that can corm with such
disruption.
Addressing the implications of disruption, he adds:
Disruption benefits some while others lose, and the power
of the generative Internet, available to anyone with a modicum of
knowledge and a broadband connection, can be turned to network-
destroying ends . . . [T]he Internet's very generativity combined
with that of the PCs attached — sows the seeds for a "digital Pearl
Harbor."
The Internet is an infrastructure that allows for a "network of
networks." It is also a means for several purposes. As with all other
"means enhancing capabilities of human interaction," it can be used to
facilitate benefits as well as nefarious ends. The Internet can be a means
for criminal activity.
 Parallel to the unprecedented escalation of the use of the Internet
and its various technologies is also an escalation in what has been termed
as cybercrimes.
Privacy scholars explain that the right to informational privacy, to a certain extent,
requires "limitation on inspection, observation, and knowledge by others." Thus, it has
the following aspects: (1) to keep inalienable information to themselves; (2) to prevent
first disclosure; and (3) to prevent further dissemination in case the information has
already been disclosed. More recently, the European Union has paved the way for the
fourth aspect — the right to be forgotten, or the right to prevent the storage of data.
As regards the first component of the right to informational privacy, a person has
the right not to be exposed on the internet in matters involving one's private life, such as
acts having no relation to public interest or concern. Closely related to the first
component is the right to prevent first disclosure, allowing individuals to regulate the
extent, time, and manner of disclosure, if at all, of their information. In case the data have
been illegally disclosed, a person does not lose protection since they have the right to
prevent their further dissemination. In some cases, one has the right to prevent the storage
of their data, which gives one the right to be forgotten. Privacy scholars describe this
right as "forced omission," or the process of making the information difficult to find on
the internet.
Undue disclosure of digital information can already do damage even if deleted at
a later time. Anyone who gains access to such information can use it for their own
purpose. They can take it out of context and use it for a purpose contrary to what the
person originally intended. For instance, intimate photos of lovers shared through private
chats can be weaponized by a disgruntled lover. Applications that do not have end-to-end
encryption can also be intercepted by unscrupulous third persons.
Even an innocent posting of photos on social media can be dangerous and
consequential to a person's life. Take Vivares v. St. Theresa's College. Swimsuit photos
of graduating high school students were taken during a birthday party and uploaded on
Facebook. This seemingly inconsequential act gave cause for St. Theresa's College to
conduct disciplinary procedure, which in turn prevented these students from graduating
with their class.
Given the ease for which we can lose control of our information online, this
Court's warning on the vigilance in exposing oneself in cyberspace is relevant:
xxx xxx xxx
While the ponente cited the Spouses Hing v. Choachuy framework in assessing
violations of the right to privacy vis-à-vis one's expectation of privacy, the current
technological developments require us to reexamine our doctrine. Thus, in Subido
Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices v. Court of Appeals, I cautioned the
majority against the vulnerability of data and the necessity of redefining legitimate
expectation of privacy in this digital age:
The truth is that most of today's digital data is vulnerable to one
who is curious enough, exceedingly determined, skillful, and willing to
deploy the necessary time and resources to make discovery of our most
private information. Ubiquitous surveillance systems that ensure the
integrity as well as increase confidence in the security of the data kept in a
system are ever present. Copying or transferring digital data occurs
likewise with phenomenal speed. Data shared in cyberspace also tends to
be resilient and difficult to completely delete. Users of various digital
platforms, including bank accounts, are not necessarily aware of these
vulnerabilities.
Therefore, the concept of "legitimate expectation of privacy" as the
framework for assessing whether personal information fall within the
constitutionally protected penumbra need to be carefully reconsidered. In
my view, the protected spheres of privacy will make better sense when our
jurisprudence in the appropriate cases make clear how specific types of
information relate to personal identity and why this is valuable to assure
human dignity and a robust democracy in the context of a constitutional
order.
The need to protect this fundamental right is more imperative given the rise of
surveillance capitalism. Digital infrastructures and technological advancements are being
used to aggregate people and their choices as data objects. This is made possible with the
indiscriminate buying and selling of our personal data and other sensitive information
without regard to the informational aspect of privacy. Big technology companies and
 small startup businesses have been optimizing this model to predict and clandestinely
manipulate human behavior for monetary and other purposes. This impels us to
recalibrate how we view the right to privacy in cyberspace and how we can protect the
vulnerable. 288
Twenty-five years have passed since Ople 289 was promulgated in 1998 when this Court first
recognized the role of the internet in our democracy. Ten years ago, in Gonzales, this Court observed
that speech on the internet has been largely unregulated. The new Code of Professional Responsibility
and Accountability shifted the norm in online speech from self-regulation or parental supervision to
professional responsibility.
Canon II, Sections 36 to 44 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Accountability imposes the duty of lawyers to "uphold the dignity of the legal profession in all social
media interactions in a manner that enhances the people's confidence in the legal system, as well as
promote its responsible use." These provisions recognize that using social media has ethical
implications 290 regardless of the privacy setting, 291 and lawyers have the duty to safeguard their
client's confidence therein. 292 In their online presence, lawyers are prohibited from disseminating
disinformation, 293 using fraudulent accounts, 294 disclosing privileged information, 295 and
influencing government agencies in their duties. 296 Lawyers are advised to exercise prudence in their
interactions 297 and in giving legal information and advice online. 298
IX
The proponents of the protection of free speech base their objection against censorship or prior
restraint and subsequent punishment on the assumption that the best test of truth is its ability to gain
adherence in the marketplace of ideas:
Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of
ideas. This theory was articulated by Justice Holmes in that "the ultimate good desired is
better reached by [the] free trade in ideas":
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
The way it works, the exposure to the ideas of others allows one to "consider,
test, and develop their own conclusions." A free, open, and dynamic market place of
ideas is constantly shaping new ones. This promotes both stability and change where
recurring points may crystallize and weak ones may develop. Of course, free speech is
more than the right to approve existing political beliefs and economic arrangements as it
includes, "[t]o paraphrase Justice Holmes, [the] freedom for the thought that we
hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us." In fact, free speech may "best serve
its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." It is in this context that we should
guard against any curtailment of the people's right to participate in the free trade of ideas.
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) 299
More speech is preferred over suppression and censorship because of the assumption that those
with contrary views will vigorously and earnestly contest it to attain the truth. 300 Public discussions on
matters of public concern should be as accessible as possible because "[t]he interest of society and the
maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs." 301
The guarantee of free speech is the ability to appeal to one's reason through peaceful means:
Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and peaceable
assembly better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: "It
must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of the
Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to
reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to avert
force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that the
guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. But utterance in a context of
violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument
of force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution." What was
rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether verbal or printed,
being in a context of violence. It must always be remembered that this right likewise
provides for a safety valve, allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their views,
even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. For if the peaceful means of
communication cannot be availed of resort to non-peaceful means may be the only
alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the expression of dissent. It means more than
just the right to be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with
 things as they are. Its value may lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing
from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. There are, of course, well-
defined limits. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not advocate disorder
in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent.
The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort to
force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost cairn though is not
required. As pointed out in an early Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United
States v. Apurado: "It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the
public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary,
because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and
the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will
be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers." It bears
repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to
property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to one's destructive
urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by
intellectual liberty in our scheme of values. 302 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
This is why seditious speech or "advocacy of the use of force or of law violation . . . directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such action" 303 are excluded
from the guarantees of free speech. These are of little to no value to the exposition of truth. Unprotected
speech are: "libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting
or 'fighting words,' i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of peace and expression endangering national security." 304
In our marketplace of ideas, the Constitution affords the greatest protection to political speech of
citizens in their participation in government decision-making and demanding accountability from those
in power:
Speech that enlivens political discourse is the lifeblood of democracy. A free and
robust discussion in the political arena allows for an informed electorate to confront its
government on a more or less equal footing. Without free speech, the government robs
the people of their sovereignty, leaving them in an echo chamber of autocracy. Freedom
of speech protects the "democratic political process from the abusive censorship of
political debate by the transient majority which has democratically achieved political
power."
In The Diocese of Bacolod:
Proponents of the political theory on "deliberative democracy"
submit that "substantial, open, [and] ethical dialogue is a critical, and
indeed defining, feature of a good polity." This theory may be considered
broad, but it definitely "includes [a] collective decision making with the
participation of all who will be affected by the decision." It anchors on the
principle that the cornerstone of every democracy is that sovereignty
resides in the people. To ensure order in running the state's affairs,
sovereign powers were delegated and individuals would be elected or
nominated in key government positions to represent the people. On this
note, the theory on deliberative democracy may evolve to the right of the
people to make government accountable. Necessarily, this includes the
right of the people to criticize acts made pursuant to governmental
functions.
Speech with political consequences occupies a higher position in the hierarchy of
protected speeches and is conferred with a greater degree of protection. The difference
in the treatment lies in the varying interests in each type of speech. Nevertheless, the
exercise of freedom of speech may be regulated by the State pursuant to its sovereign
police power. In prescribing regulations, distinctions are made depending on the nature of
the speech involved. In Chavez:
Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the State
under its pervasive police power, in order that it may not be injurious to
the equal right of others or those of the community or society. The
difference in treatment is expected because the relevant interests of one
type of speech, e.g., political speech, may vary from those of another, e.g.,
obscene speech. Distinctions have therefore been made in the treatment,
analysis, and evaluation of the permissible scope of restrictions on various
categories of speech. HEITAD
This Court recognized in The Diocese of Bacolod that political speech occupies a
preferred rank within our constitutional order, it being a direct exercise of the sovereignty
of the people. In a separate opinion in Chavez, Associate Justice Antonio Carpio
 underscored that "if ever there is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political
expression would occupy the highest rank[.]"
In contrast, other types of speeches, such as commercial speech, are treated in this
jurisdiction as "low value speeches."
In Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, this Court has recognized that
"[c]ommercial speech . . . is not accorded the same level of protection as
that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression[.]" This
is because, as opined in that case, the protection accorded to commercial
speech is anchored on its informative character and it merely caters to the
market.
Since the value of protection accorded to commercial speech is only to the extent
of its channel to inform, advertising is not on par with other forms of expression.
In contrast, political speech is "indispensable to the democratic and republican
mooring of the state whereby the sovereignty residing in the people is best and most
effectively exercised through free expression." 305 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
The asymmetries in the marketplace of ideas do not make it truly accessible. The inherent
inequality of life affects the value of one's message and their ability to convey and influence their target
audience. 306 The liberty to speak per se is not important in deliberative democracy. Meaningful
participation requires quality of speech and the entire gamut of rights that is indispensable for its free
exercise:
Political speech is motivated by the desire to be heard and understood, to move people to
action. It is concerned with the sovereign right to change the contours of power whether
through the election of representatives in a republican government or the revision of the
basic text of the Constitution. The zeal with which we protect this kind of speech does not
depend on our evaluation of the cogency of the message. Neither do we assess whether
we should protect speech based on the motives of COMELEC. We evaluate restrictions
on freedom of expression from their effects. We protect both speech and medium because
the quality of this freedom in practice will define the quality of deliberation in our
democratic society. 307 (Emphasis supplied)
The freedom to publish political speech includes the duty to publish "truthfully according to
[one's] conscience." 308 One cannot exercise their freedoms in "utter contempt of the rights of others
and in willful disregard of the cumbrous responsibilities inherent in it." 309
In Badoy, Jr. v. Ferrer, 310 this Court upheld legislation on paid political advertisements
requiring representatives of the Constitutional Commission to also mention the names of their
opponents. This is in recognition of the greater benefit to the electorate who will ultimately decide who
is the better candidate:
The candidate, to enjoy the freedom, therefore has the concomitant duty to
campaign for himself truthfully according to his conscience. If he is not truthful, he
forfeits the freedom. His freedom of expression is not and should not be limited to his
own personal right to know the truth of the claims of the other candidates. A candidate is
prone to exaggerate his personal merits or qualifications. He invariably claims
qualifications superior to those of his opponents. One test of the truth of his own
pretensions as against those of his opponents is to require him to mention the names of
the other candidates so that the electorate will know how to judge all the candidates. If
the candidate omits the names of his opponents he is guilty of deception, which nullifies
his right to enjoy the liberty he invokes for himself. At any rate, he usually mentions his
opponents in an oral harangue. He must likewise do so in printed propaganda, so that the
voter can decide who is the better man who can best represent in the constitutional
convention their interests and articulate their longings and aspirations for an abundant
life. The intrinsic merit of the candidate as a person and of his proposed amendments, not
his wealth or lack of it, must be decisive. 311
Moreover, the right to publish one's political speech is not absolute, and it must not be abused to
have the effect of intruding on the privacy of its captive audience:
It is believed that, when so viewed, the limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the
right to free speech of the candidates themselves may be seen to be not unduly repressive
or unreasonable. For, once again, there is nothing in Section 11 (b) to prevent media
reporting of and commentary on pronouncements, activities, written statements of the
candidates themselves. All other fora remain accessible to candidates, even for political
advertisements. The requisites of fairness and equal opportunity are, after all, designed to
benefit the candidates themselves.
 Finally, the nature and characteristics of modern mass media, especially
electronic media, cannot be totally disregarded. Realistically, the only limitation upon
the free speech of candidates imposed is on the right of candidates to bombard the
helpless electorate with paid advertisements commonly repeated in the mass media ad
nauseam. Frequently, such repetitive political commercials when fed into the electronic
media themselves constitute invasions of the privacy of the general electorate. It might be
supposed that it is easy enough for a person at home simply to flick off his radio or
television set. But it is rarely that simple. For the candidates with deep pockets may
purchase radio or television time in many, if not all, the major stations or channels. Or
they may directly or indirectly own or control the stations or channels themselves. The
contemporary reality in the Philippines is that, in a very real sense, listeners and viewers
constitute a "captive audience."
The paid political advertisements introjected into the electronic media and
repeated with mind-deadening frequency, are commonly intended and crafted, not so
much to inform and educate as to condition and manipulate, not so much to provoke
rational and objective appraisal of candidates' qualifications or programs as to appeal to
the non-intellective faculties of the captive and passive audience. The right of the general
listening and viewing public to be free from such intrusions and their subliminal effects is
at least as important as the right of candidates to advertise themselves through modern
electronic media and the right of media enterprises to maximize their revenues from the
marketing of "packaged" candidates. 312 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
The cases on freedom of speech encouraging "more speech" against false ideas did not consider
disinformation in the marketplace and its ability to destroy the truth. The internet disrupts the
fundamental assumptions of free speech.
Before the digital age, mass media was the "chief source of information on current affairs" and
the "most powerful vehicle of opinion on public questions." 313 In performing their role to disseminate
information, the media has "the right to gather and the obligation to check the accuracy of [the]
information they disseminate." 314 Members of the press are bound by the high ethical standards of
their profession. 315
In 1988, several media organizations in the Philippines voluntarily agreed to the Philippine
Journalist's Code of Ethics. The first and most important ethical duty of a journalist is to "scrupulously
report and interpret the news, taking care not to suppress essential facts nor to distort the truth by
omission or improper emphasis." This includes the "duty to air the other side and the duty to correct
substantive errors promptly." 316 Journalists violate their Code when they fail to exercise "bona
fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish." 317 However, it must be clarified that
journalists do not guarantee the truth of what they publish in exercising their right to legitimate
publicity. 318 They are given sufficient leeway and tolerance to fulfill their crucial roles in a
democracy 319 by promptly correcting substantive errors.
However, the rise of the internet and the digital age have challenged the roles of the press.
Technology has shifted the main sources of information and public discussions from traditional media to
the internet, particularly in social media. It has removed costly barriers to publication such that anyone
may post their desired content to their target audience.
In his article, "Cheap Speech and What It Will Do," Professor Eugene Volokh (Volokh)
examined the effects of cheap speech in relation to the freedoms of speech, of expression, and of the
press. The lower distribution cost of information through technological advancements alters what is
available and how it is known to consumers. 320 Volokh explained that the social consequence of cheap
speech would "democratize the information marketplace" 321 and shift control of the information from
the distributors of information (i.e., broadcast, print media, and record labels) and empower the speakers
and listeners to create, publish, and select the information they want to consume. 322
The responsibilities involved in the creation, dissemination, and access to information in the
media were seemingly forgotten in the democratization of the information marketplace. The internet
removed traditional media's control over these processes, and the ethical standards in creating and
disseminating information were lost in the process. Since the general population did not bind themselves
to voluntary codes of ethics, information can be created, shared, and disseminated for any reason other
than the truth.
Similarly, Professor Richard Hasen, in his book "Cheap Speech," explores the foundational
principle of the marketplace of ideas in the digital age and voting behavior. His theory is that
information technologies have destroyed the gates to the marketplace of ideas where the ease and speed
of sharing information has inundated the market with disinformation, undermining democratic
institutions:
No doubt cheap speech has increased convenience, dramatically lowered the cost
of obtaining information, and spurred the creation and consumption of content from
radically diverse sources. But the economics of cheap speech have undermined the
 mediating and stabilizing institutions of American democracy, including newspapers and
political parties, a situation that has had severe social and political consequences for
American elections. In place of media scarcity we now have a media firehose that has
diluted trusted sources of information and led to the rise of "fake news" — falsehoods
and propaganda spread by domestic and foreign sources for their own political and
pecuniary purposes. The demise of local newspapers sets the stage for increased
corruption among state and local officials.
Rather than improving our politics, cheap speech makes political parties
increasingly irrelevant by allowing demagogues to appeal directly and repeatedly at
virtually no cost to voters for financial and electoral support, with incendiary appeals and
often with lies. Social media can both increase intolerance and overcome collective
action obstacles, allowing for peaceful protest but also supercharging polarization and
raising the danger of violence, as we saw with the January 6, 2021, insurrection.
The decline of the traditional media as information intermediaries has
transformed — and coarsened — social and political communication, making it easier
for misinformation and vitriol to spread. Political campaigns go forward under conditions
of voter mistrust and groupthink, increasing the potential for foreign interference and
domestic political manipulation through ever more sophisticated technological
tools. These dramatic changes raise important questions about the conditions of
electoral legitimacy and threaten to shake the foundation of democratic governance.
Cheap speech — speech that is both inexpensive to produce and often of
markedly low social value — raises deep concerns whether disseminated on social media,
search engines, news cable channels, or otherwise. Platform technology allows politically
and morally objectionable manipulation of the information used for voter choice. Viral
anonymous speech, spread partly through "bots" — automated programs that
communicate directly with users — lowers the accountability costs for sharing false
information and manipulated content. It deprives voters of valuable information to judge
the credibility of the messages directed at them. Platforms gather an unprecedented
amount of intrusive data on people's backgrounds, interests, and choices, which allows
campaigns to "microtarget" advertising, such as by sending one set of messages to older
white male voters and another to young African American women. The practice drives
profits for the platforms, but it can also fuel polarization and political manipulation.
Political operatives may deploy microtargeting for negative messaging intended to
depress voter turnout. The platforms' design may encourage extremism through the
algorithms used to offer voters additional, more worrisome content similar to what they
or their social media friends and contacts have chosen. Those who can control platform
content may help one candidate and hurt another. Platforms influence elections when
they make choices about whether to promote or remove content, including false
content. 323 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom
of opinion and of expression reported on the impact of disinformation on democratic institutions and
human rights. 324 While there is no universally accepted definition of disinformation, the rapporteur
referred to the European Commission's description of disinformation as "verifiably false or misleading
information that is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the
public, and may cause public harm." 325 The special rapporteur noted the information disorder in
cyberspace, namely misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation. 326 These are based on two
primary dimensions: the information's falsity and the intent to cause harm. 327 Disinformation lies in
the intersection of these factors, where false information is shared with intent to cause harm to its
audience. 328
On January 10, 2022, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Resolution countering
disinformation for the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The
Resolution expressed the concern of the General Assembly on the spread of disinformation on the
internet and affirmed the responsibility of states to counter the spread of disinformation through various
policy measures. 329
In social media, disinformation is created, shared, and amplified organically through the use of
technology, such as bots and algorithms, which are programmed to exploit the attentional and
confirmation bias of its users. These mechanisms make it appear that the information disorder is widely
shared in the same or similar social networks. 330 The age of disinformation has corrupted the
marketplace of ideas "by denying facts and maintaining division." 331 It appears that "more speech" is
not the remedy against false information. John Stuart Mill's assumption that contrary ideas will be
vigorously and earnestly contested to attain the truth is no longer true, especially in social media. The
speed at which information is shared, its volatility, and the reach of false information tend to drown out
the truth. Echo chambers in social media make it difficult for competing information to penetrate
personal circles, failing to lead to self-assessment and reflection as to the truth of their beliefs. Thus, an
imputation, much more a lie, in social media, when spread far and wide several times, is taken as the
truth.
Democracy entails the collective effort of the people. Political participation affects everyone in
some form or manner, as simple as speaking about the public interest. Words have power and can
influence, inspire, and move people to action. Thus, apart from the ability to speak freely, one must be
mindful of their effect on their peers, their community, or anyone who may be listening. In social media,
where everyone is an agent of information, either through their own invention or those of others, one has
the responsibility to be critical about their statements validating the truth of their factual assertions or the
soundness of their opinions. The power of political speech is assessed based on its ability to gain
adherence in the marketplace of ideas. Thus, the more influence a speaker has, the more powerful their
voice is, and necessarily, their responsibility to their audience and the information they share.
X
We summarize the permissible restrictions of the different participants in a judicial proceeding
and the rules that apply as regards their speech. As Associate Justice Amy Lazaro-Javier (Associate
Justice Lazaro-Javier) points out, the lengthy discussion summarizing the development of contempt
powers in relation to speech about the courts is not merely academic. Combing through jurisprudence is
necessary to demarcate the categories of speech and distill the applicable legal doctrines that apply to a
participant in a judicial proceeding. 332
The following general principles in exercising the contempt powers of courts apply when public
commentaries are made in relation to the courts, its processes, and its decisions. These are relevant in
assessing violation of the sub judice rule or when unfair or illegitimate criticisms are made against the
Judiciary, its judges and justices, and its decisions.
The sub judice rule has evolved from its first iteration in In re Kelly where a publication of
criticism of a party or court to a pending case is already considered misbehavior punishable with
contempt. Based on recent jurisprudence, a violation of the sub judice rule generally pertains to a
publicized utterance relating to the merits of a pending case intended to influence, interfere, or
intimidate the court to rule a certain way. There must be a showing of the serious and imminent threat of
an utterance on the court's administration of justice before it can be punished. 333
Ordinarily, "[m]ere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be
tolerated." 334 Fair and legitimate criticisms of the courts and its decisions are not punishable, but when
they transcend these limits amounting to defamation, scandalizing, or putting the court in disrepute, the
speaker may be subsequently punished for indirect contempt. 335
A violation of the sub judice rule and utterance of unfair and illegitimate criticisms against the
courts constitute criminal contempt of court where the intent is a necessary element. 336 There must be
a clear showing that the purpose of the contemptuous utterance is to impede, interfere, and embarrass the
administration of justice. 337 The jurisprudence discussed shows that intent can be inferred from the
language used and other relevant circumstances before and after the utterance was made. 338 Thus, the
context of the utterance is relevant. Moreover, before punishing speech that criticizes the courts for
exercising its functions, the effect of impairing the court's independence, integrity, or administration of
justice must be demonstrable from the circumstances of each case.
Finally, the clear and present danger of a substantive evil to the administration of justice should
be assessed based on the proximity of the speaker, the content of the speech, and the importance and
saliency of the information in relation to the stability of the Judiciary or the ability of such to craft an
impartial decision.
Notwithstanding the applicability of these general guidelines to the contemptuous conduct of
different participants in a judicial proceeding, there are standards which are category specific. Those in a
different category cannot invoke defenses available to a speaker belonging in another due to the
differences in their roles, their proximity to the court, and the relevant interests of the court in limiting a
particular type of speech.
Historically, this Court has regulated three classes of speech. Restrictions depend on the
proximity of the speaker to the courts and the interest of the courts on their speech.
The first class pertains to the speech of the litigants and their counsels, the second class to the
speech of members of the bar and bench, and the third class pertains to the speech of the press and the
public. Treatment of the respective speech of these actors in a judicial proceeding must necessarily be
different. 339 The fourth and most recent class pertains to online speech, whose regulation is
necessitated by the current exigencies of the proliferation of disinformation on the internet and social
media.
Courts are protected if we are clear about what constitutes the punishable conduct of various
constituents in a judicial proceeding. This will also inform them when their exercise of rights constitutes
abuse, making them accountable and responsible for their contemptuous speech.
X (A)
 Litigants and their counsels are in closest proximity to the courts as parties in judicial
proceedings. Their speech is subject to the greatest restriction because they voluntarily agree to abide by
the Rules of Court and the decorum required in judicial proceedings. In choosing to resolve their
disputes before the courts, they agree to its resolution through fair and impartial proceedings without
resorting to undue advantage other than arguing the merits of the case. 340
Under the first class, the court has restricted public speech that violates the sub judice rule, the
confidentiality of administrative proceedings, and illegitimate criticisms of litigants and their counsels
that defame the courts and put them into disrepute. Litigants and their counsels are absolutely bound to
comply with these policies, and their speech are subject to permissible restrictions for the courts' orderly
disposition of their cases.
The public speech of litigants and their counsel pertaining to the case should be assessed based
on a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that will affect the administration of justice. This will
be a matter for the court to assess based on the content of the speech, how it was delivered, and the
platform used. This Court is very much aware that defendants must protect and defend their reputation
when sued publicly and will give this the utmost consideration when they claim their freedom of speech.
However, the Court is also very aware of the unfortunate tendency of some lawyers and litigants
to use the excuse of litigation on a controversy that they hope will propel them the fame or notoriety at
the cost of their defendants and the administration of justice. This, too, may be considered in assessing
the impact of their speech on the administration of justice. Lawyer-litigants who choose to use their skill
to recklessly file cases to further their fame and notoriety rather than pursue the noble causes of justice
will be subject to the appropriate provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Accountability and their commitments under the Lawyers' Oath.
Litigants and their counsels who choose to speak publicly may not be punished if their speech is
limited to a fair and true commentary of the proceedings, 341 provided, however, that public discussion
was made in good faith and in furtherance of public interest. Counsels, owing to their duty of fidelity to
the courts, must clearly provide the necessity of the utterance.
Given the proximity of litigants and their counsel to the courts, additional rules are imposed on
their speech:
1. Lawyers can criticize the courts. However, the exercise of their freedom of speech as citizens
is burdened by their responsibilities as officers of the court. Their criticism must be
legitimate, and must support the administration of justice;
2. Counsels are responsible for advising their clients that in choosing the courts' forum, they are
not allowed to attack the integrity of the courts unless they have actual proof that can
sustain a disciplinary action, as in Bustos; and
3. Some cases are more public than others, owing to the public interest involved. A fair and true
reporting of a matter relating to a pending case will not amount to a violation of the sub
judice rule. Lawyers should also explain the arguments of the other party to give the
public a balanced understanding of the case without editorializing. Comments or
predictions as to how the courts will rule are not allowed.
X (B)
The second class of speech pertains to public commentaries of lawyers in general, specifically
those engaging in public discourse in relation to cases of other lawyers.
Lawyers are officers of the court. Even if they are not representing clients in court, their public
speech as regards the Judiciary are limited by their oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Accountability. This Court's disciplinary authority is broader than its contempt powers. 342 In their
public commentaries, lawyers must be careful not to exceed the limits of fair comment and criticism.
Moreover, lawyers cannot give an opinion on the services given by other lawyers in representing their
clients as part of their duty to give courtesy, fairness, and candor to their colleagues. 343 They also
cannot predict how the court will rule in a particular case. 344
The same, if not higher, ethical standards apply to justices and judges. They should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. 345 The Code of Judicial Conduct provides
that justices and judges "must be vigilant against any attempt to subvert the independence of the
judiciary." 346 They "should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary." 347 They are bound by stringent and exacting standards of a judicial
office. 348 At all times and in all activities, they are guided by strict propriety and decorum. 349
The exacting standards required of justices and judges also apply to public officials with quasi-
judicial functions. 350
X (C)
Contempt powers of the court can also be used to restrict the speech of the media and the public.
However, we must not broadly exercise such power as to deter the freedom of the press and its right to
give legitimate publicity to matters of public interest. 351 Our power to punish for contempt should
never be wielded to stifle comments on public interest. 352
Criticisms of judicial conduct are allowed because "[t]he administration of the law is a matter of
vital public concern." 353 These may either be based on facts or opinions. aDSIHc
In Kalalo v. Luz, 354 "[t]he generally recognized distinction between a statement of 'fact' and an
expression of 'opinion' is that whatever is susceptible of exact knowledge is a matter of fact, while that
not susceptible of exact knowledge is generally regarded as an expression of an opinion." 355 In other
words, a fact is a statement whose truth is not open to interpretation, 356 while an opinion usually
pertains to a "person's thought, belief, or inference." 357
Criticisms and comments are fair if they are grounded in truth and facts and, therefore, not
punishable by contempt. Criticisms amounting to defamation, or those based on "false and unfounded
allegations of fact," are not protected by any privileged communication: 358
Moreover the grounds of public policy upon which the so-called privilege of "fair
criticism" of the public acts of public officers, and of directing public attention to the
character and qualifications or lack of qualifications of candidates for office is
based, by no means justify or necessitate the extension of the privilege to false and
unfounded allegations of fact. The interests of society require that immunity should be
granted to the discussion of public affairs, and that all acts and matters of a public nature
may be freely published with fitting comments and strictures; but they do not require that
the right to criticize the public acts of public officers shall embrace the right to base such
criticisms upon false statements of fact, or to attack the private character of the officer,
or to falsely impute to him malfeasance or misconduct in office; and as to candidates for
office it has frequently been held in the United States that false allegations of fact even
when made in good faith and with probable cause are not privileged[.] 359 (Emphasis
supplied)
Mistakes in fact or in opinion should be distinguished from publications made with deliberate or
reckless falsehoods which are not protected under the guarantees of free speech and free press:
The use of calculated falsehood, however, would put a different cast on the
constitutional question. Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the
fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and
deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity. At the time
the First Amendment was adopted, as today, there were those unscrupulous enough and
skillful enough to use the deliberate or reckless falsehood as an effective political tool to
unseat the public servant or even topple an administration. That speech is used as a tool
for political ends does not automatically bring it under the protective mantle of
the Constitution. For the use of the known lie as a tool is at once with odds with the
premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner in which economic,
social, or political change is to be effected. 360 (Emphasis supplied)
Contemptuous speech may he published in various forms of media. 361 These include
newspaper and magazine publications and television and radio broadcasts. 362 Journalists and other
media practitioners are bound to comply with their Code of Ethics in giving publicity to that which the
public has a right to know about. 363 Subsequent punishment cannot be imposed on the exercise of
legitimate publicity as regards matters of public interest. 364 What is punishable is the abuse of the right
to publish through a deliberate or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the publication. 365
Qualified privileged communications are matters of defense which must be established by the
one claiming them. Once established, the burden of proof to show the existence of actual malice in the
publication or abuse of right of the members of the press is upon the court or person seeking to punish
the publication. 366
Associate Justice Lazaro-Javier points out that the deliberate or reckless disregard of truth or
falsity of the publication may also be a relevant mental element for members of the press. 367 While this
doctrine has been associated with comments that put the courts in disrepute, it may also apply in
contempt proceedings for violation of the sub judice rule. Moreover, publications with unverified grave
accusations against the courts are punishable with contempt. 368
As regards the public, they are spectators and consumers of public information. An ordinary
person, without knowledge of the rules of procedure and required court decorum, cannot be punished in
the exercise of their sovereign right to participate in public discussions of cases of public interest.
The courts have the least amount of interest in restricting this class of speech. Before their public
utterance can be punished, the court must show a clear and present danger of an ordinary person's speech
to the administration of justice. Such danger must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high." 369
The public's intemperate or false statements criticizing the conduct of courts or the propriety of
its decisions, by themselves, are not automatically punishable. The mental element of these utterances,
in order to be punishable, must amount to advocacy on the use of force or violation of law "directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such action." 370 This includes
holding or encouraging others to act violently against a judge or justice, or an incitement to affect the
administration of justice.
X (D)
The regulation of online speech on the internet is a gray area. Currently, only the speech of a
judge in social media has been the subject of jurisprudence. 371 What is clear, however, is that the right
to speak online is not absolute. Criticisms or comments against the courts in social media must also be
subject to the limits of fair criticism. This does not include malicious defamation against the courts, like
the standard for the public.
Internet publicity and the danger it presents in the administration of justice cannot be discounted.
A social media post can be shared infinitely and become viral in a matter of minutes. Organized
networks of disinformation thrive in anonymity and the lack of effective regulatory mechanism in social
media. The proliferation of fake news is a very significant threat on the courts' legitimacy, which is
anchored on the public's confidence in our administration of justice. The internet may be weaponized by
those who desire to defeat public confidence against a particular target, which may include the Judiciary.
We must recognize the dangers of unregulated speech against the Judiciary on the internet and in
various social media where truth suffers from decay, where facts and objective analysis are inundated by
false information. 372 This is a huge threat to democracy as it hampers the ability of citizens to make
informed decisions based on facts. 373
We illustrate this danger using the factual circumstances of In re Macasaet, except the
publication was done through social media.
Suppose person "A" maliciously publishes a thread exposing an unverified bribery incident
against an associate justice of this Court. Imagine the circumstances of the thread to contain allegations
like In re Macasaet, where in consideration of an acquittal, boxes of money amounting to PHP10
million were dropped off within the Supreme Court compound. The difference is that instead of
publishing the story in a newspaper, the accusation was published on Twitter, which became a trending
topic for several weeks, both in the Philippines and worldwide.
Judicial decorum restrains the ability of justices and judges to defend themselves fully in any
other place outside the proper forum. By the time the investigation and contempt proceedings are over, a
significant portion of the public who saw the tweet could have already lost confidence in the
independence of the Supreme Court, regardless of the truth or falsity of the statements. Worse, the tweet
can also be shared in other social media platforms and converted into different formats, which also gain
traction separately from the original post. Those who saw the tweet in some form or another in other
social media could have believed the disinformation, leading to further loss of public confidence.
There are two ways to address this and hopefully stop the cancerous spread of disinformation
online: either censor freedom of speech online, imposing that no criticisms against the Judiciary may be
allowed in the cyberspace, or, the better solution is to make it partly a responsibility of the online
speaker to validate the information they share online.
There is already a framework for holding journalists accountable for publications made in
reckless disregard for the falsity of the publication and penalizing the same for abuse of rights and a
violation of its ethical responsibility. 374
Apart from one's ability to speak, its exercise has the reciprocal duty to one's community. This
responsibility is the ability to validate the truth of one's speech that is shared for everyone's
consumption. The truth of these statements, however, should not be addressed to the courts for we are
not the arbiters of the truth.
Instead, the credibility of the information should be assessed prior to its creation, dissemination,
and amplification online. The Council of Europe, a leading regional human rights organization, provides
that aside from checking the veracity of the contents of an information or fact-checking, one may also
resort to source-checking:
Increasingly, when assessing the credibility of a piece of information, the source
who originally created the content or first shared it, can provide the strongest evidence
about whether something is accurate. Newsrooms, and people relying on social media for
information, need to be investigating the source, almost before they look at the content
itself. For example, routinely people should be researching the date and location
embedded in domain registration information of a supposed 'news site' to seeing whether
it was created two weeks ago in Macedonia. Similarly, people should be instinctively
checking whether a particular tweeted message has appeared elsewhere, as it could be
that the same message was tweeted out by ten different accounts at exactly the same time,
and six of them were located in other countries. Newsrooms in particular need more
powerful tools to be able to visually map online networks and connections to understand
how dis-information is being created, spread and amplified. 375 (Emphasis supplied)
 At the very least, a person who posts online must point to a valid source or basis for the
allegations made against the courts. A comment based on false information that tends to put the courts in
disrepute, even if proven to be false, should be punished only if there is a showing that the comment was
not formed with a reasonable degree of care and has no reasonable basis. 376 As an added qualification,
the clear and present danger of the online contemptuous speech to impair the administration of justice
may be assessed based on the reach of the post.
The more viral online content is, as assessed from the volume of people who saw the original
post or by way of shared posts within the same platform or cross-posting other social media, the greater
its effect and propensity to affect the public. The language employed may also be deliberately used to
infuriate the public to generate more public engagement. Thus, an influencer's speech is held to a greater
standard than an average social media user.
Finally, courts should also be wary about the importance of posts in social media as to the court's
administration of justice. There are posts that are so trivial in nature that should not be the concern of the
Judiciary. This is just noise that may distract the courts in the exercise of our mandate to the people.
XI
This Court applies the foregoing to the instant case.
Respondent contends that the Petition is not proper under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because
it involves factual determination of the procedure before the lower courts. 377
On the other hand, petitioners contend that the only issue in the Petition is whether the Court of
Appeals erred in refusing to correct the trial court's grave abuse of its discretion when it did not dismiss
the Petition for Indirect Contempt for failure to state a cause of action. 378 They claim that in a motion
for preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses, a trial court's duty is to decide whether to dismiss the
case and not simply to hold hearings. 379 Essentially, they are praying for the dismissal of the Petition
for Indirect Contempt for failure to state a cause of action. Thus, petitioners conclude that there
is no question of fact involved in the Petition. 380
We agree with petitioners.
At the outset, we note that a motion for preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses is a
prohibited motion under the 2019 Rules of Court. 381 Prior to its amendment, such motion was allowed
provided that a motion to dismiss had not been filed:
SECTION 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. — If no motion to
dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be
pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a
preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.
The dismissal of the complaint under this section shall be without prejudice to the
prosecution in the same or separate action of a counterclaim pleaded in the answer. 382
Holding an actual preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses is discretionary on the part of
the trial court. 383 When the affirmative defense raised is failure to state a cause of action, only the
allegations in the complaint are relevant. 384 As pointed out by Associate Justice Lazaro-Javier, if an
actual hearing is conducted, the same is not evidentiary. 385 The affirmative defense can be resolved by
checking only the allegations of ultimate facts in the complaint:
The trial court may indeed elect to hold a preliminary hearing on affirmative
defenses as raised in the answer under Section 6 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court It has
been held, however, that such a hearing is not necessary when the affirmative defense is
failure to state a cause of action, and that it is, in fact, error for the court to hold a
preliminary hearing to determine the existence of external facts outside the complaint.
The reception and the consideration of evidence on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action, has been held to be improper and impermissible. Thus, in a
preliminary hearing on a motion to dismiss or on the affirmative defenses raised in an
answer, the parties are allowed to present evidence except when the motion is based on
the ground of insufficiency of the statement of the cause of action which must be
determined on the basis only of the facts alleged in the complaint and no other. Section 6,
therefore, does not apply to the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action.
The trial court, thus, erred in receiving and considering evidence in connection with this
ground. 386 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
While a motion for preliminary hearing is filed in lieu of a motion to dismiss, both motions seek
the same legal effect: the dismissal of the action or petition.
In China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 387 this Court ruled that a motion to
dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action is a question of law:
The ground for dismissal invoked by petitioner is that the complaint of
JADEBANK before the trial court stated no cause of action, under Sec. 1, par. (g), Rule
16, [of] the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. It is well settled that in a motion to
 dismiss based on lack of cause of action, the issue is passed upon on the basis of the
allegations assuming them to be true. The court does not inquire into the truth of the
allegations and declare them to be false, otherwise it would be a procedural error and a
denial of due process to the plaintiff. Only the statements in the complaint may be
properly considered, and the court cannot take cognizance of external facts or hold
preliminary hearings to ascertain their existence. To put it simply, the test for determining
whether a complaint states or does not state a cause of action against the defendants is
whether or not, admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the
complaint, the judge may validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint.
In a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, there cannot be
any question of fact or "doubt or difference as to the truth or falsehood of facts," simply
because there are no findings of fact in the first place. What the trial court merely does is
to apply the law to the facts as alleged in the complaint, assuming such allegations to be
true. It follows then that any appeal therefrom could only raise questions of law or "doubt
or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts." Therefore, a decision
dismissing a complaint based on failure to state a cause of action necessarily precludes a
review of the same decision on questions of fact. One is the legal and logical opposite of
the other. 388 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In the present case, petitioners raised the affirmative defense of failure to state a cause of action.
In resolving the same, this Court is only required to look at the sufficiency of the Petition. We find that
the Petition is properly filed under Rule 45 and only questions of law are raised.
XII
Here, the Court of Appeals gravely erred that petitioners would have to go to trial to fully
ventilate the merits of the case. 389 An indirect contempt petition for violation of the sub judice rule is
criminal in nature. 390 A respondent in contempt proceedings, although sui genesis in character, is
entitled to due process to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. 391
The rules on criminal procedure and evidence apply in criminal contempt proceedings, where all
the elements of an offense must be stated in the information in order to sufficiently inform an accused of
the charges. 392 When it is clear that the information does not charge an offense, it must be dismissed
immediately because the accused need not be subjected to the "anxiety and inconvenience of a useless
trial." 393
Before punishing for contempt, courts must carefully consider the circumstances of the alleged
act and the purpose for which they are being asked to punish. 394 Courts must first examine the
allegations in an indirect contempt petition to determine whether there is sufficient basis to exercise its
power to punish for contempt. ATICcS
A complaint sufficiently states a cause of action when a hypothetical admission of the truth of
the allegations therein, the reliefs prayed for may be granted:
The familiar test for determining whether a complaint did or did not state a cause
of action against the defendants is whether or not, admitting hypothetically the truth of
the allegations of fact made in the complaint, a judge may validly grant the relief
demanded in the complaint. In Rava Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the
Court elaborated on this established standard in the following manner:
"The rule is that a defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the
ground of lack of cause of action is regarded as having hypothetically
admitted all the averments thereof. The test of the sufficiency of the facts
found in a petition as constituting a cause of action is whether or not,
admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the
same in accordance with the prayer thereof.
In determining the existence of a cause of action, only the
statements in the complaint may properly be considered. It is error for the
court to take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to
determine their existence. If the allegation in a complaint furnish sufficient
basis by which the complaint may be maintained, the same should not be
dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the
defendants.
Thus, in determining the existence of a cause of action, only the allegations in the
complaint may properly be considered. For the court to do otherwise would be a
procedural error and a denial of the plaintiff's right to due process. 395 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
The Petition for Indirect Contempt must sufficiently inform the respondent the basis for which
their speech or conduct is being sought to be punished. Moreover, the Petition must spell out the clear
and present danger of a speech to the court's administration of justice, identifying the interest of the
court that is violated and ought to be punished.
Here, petitioners were alleged to have violated the sub judice rule. The ultimate facts required to
be alleged in a petition for indirect contempt are as follows:
First, public statements were made regarding the merits of the case while it is pending before the
courts. The petition must clearly state the contemptible conduct and reproduce the content of the speech
ought to be punished.
Second, since intent is necessary in criminal contempt, 396 the required mental element of the
speaker who uttered the contemptuous speech in a judicial proceeding must be specifically alleged. It
must appear from the story that the "ultimate purpose" of its publication is to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice. 397 This is inferred from the totality of the story, the context of its
publication, the wording used, the manner of reporting, and other relevant factors which may be derived
from the story.
Third, the clear and present danger of the utterance to the court's administration of justice must
be alleged, specifically identifying the importance and saliency of the information on the ability of
courts to make an impartial decision. There must be a showing of the serious and imminent threat of an
utterance on the court's administration of justice for it to be subject to subsequent punishment. 398
Finally, the effect of the speech on the administration of justice must be shown, particularly, that
the utterance will influence the court's independence in ruling on a case, which will, in turn, affect public
confidence in the Judiciary.
Those accused of indirect contempt should not be compelled to proceed to trial when the charges
are grossly insufficient. This is consistent with the policy that the courts' inherent power of contempt
must be wielded judiciously, sparingly, and only when necessary in the interest of justice. 399 Courts
must examine the allegations of a petition for indirect contempt before giving due course to it. This will
allow the court to identify the speech and the limits of its power to subsequently punish for contempt.
The Petition for Indirect Contempt reads:
3. At about 7:00 p.m. on 23 June 2010, ABS-CBN, through its news program TV
Patrol World, aired an interview by Jorge Cariño with one Lakmodin alias "Laks "
Saliao. That program is broadcasted nationwide and has a viewership of about 1 Million
people.
Attached as Annex A is a video copy of said interview.
4. The interview by Cariño featured Saliao who claims to be a former "alalay"
(errand boy) of the Ampatuan family, which includes petitioner.
xxx xxx xxx
5. The Rules of Court punished as contemptuous conduct "any abuse of or any
unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under Section 1" of Rule 71. Saliao's interview clearly falls within this category
— it was calculated to interfere with court proceedings to serve Saliao's own interest
without passing through the scrutiny of the police or the National Prosecution Service if
it indeed is to form part of or used as evidence in the murder cases aforesaid.
6. To explain his belated revelation of the Ampatuans' alleged involvement in the
"Maguindanao Massacre," Saliao claims that he discovered that he was going to be killed
by the Ampatuans or their employees for he knew too much about that murder. Hence he
needed to make his expose before he was killed. Fact is, Saliao had been accused of
stealing personal effects of one of petitioner's sisters, Bai Ameerah Ampatuan-
Mamalapat, prompting him to disclose his unfounded stories to media to prevent
Ameerah and her family from chasing after him for the crimes he has committed on them.
The purpose of the interview now becomes apparent — it was a retaliatory move.
Saliao wants the theft charges file[d] against him by Ameerah Ampatuan-Mamalapat off
his back. He then presents himself to the media hoping for some sort of refiuge at the
expense of petitioner's right to a fair trial.
7. The criminal justice system is founded on a set of rules aimed at protecting the
rights of the accused. Any deviation from these rules may spell undue prejudice to the
right of the accused to the proper administration of justice. The Rules, for one, mandate
that witnesses be examined in open court, and under oath. A person who claims to have
witnessed a crime or to possess knowledge of facts relating to a pending case must
submit himself to the authority of the prosecutors, then the court, and abide by procedural
rules before he may be allowed to give statements relating to the case. There is a proper
forum for the disclosure of facts and evidence relating to a case and that is the
Courts. Any disclosure outside the confines of a courtroom, absent an opportunity for the
 other party to cross-examine the witness is an undue interference upon court processes
and proceedings.
8. All of Saliao's claims are evidentiary matters which directly affect and can be
used by the prosecution as evidence, if true (which is denied), in the aforesaid murder
cases. Pending the actual admission of those disclosures as evidence and the use thereof
in the resolution of the murder cases, those "disclosures" of respondent cannot be
broadcasted and talked about in interviews on national television. For, due process and
fair play dictates that criminal cases must be tried free from extraneous influence, bias,
prejudice or sympathies generated by media hype and irresponsible journalism which the
report of respondent Cariño, ABS-CBN, and Saliao had provided the viewing public.
9. There is a purpose for the Supreme Court's ban on media coverage of the
Maguindanao Massacre hearings — to even out the playing field between the Prosecutor
and the persons prosecuted.
10. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial
proceedings to avoid the public's prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or
obstructing the administration of justice.
11. Indeed, the easiest and most cost-efficient way of influencing the outcome of a
case is to generate a negative impression against a party. Here, respondent had created
an untrue story connected with "Maguindanao Massacre" to cover up for his offenses,
and to leverage his position so that the Ampatuans (including Ameerah) will go slow on
him or even forget his misdeeds. Public perception — though ideally extraneous to the
case — nonetheless finds its way into the psyche of the judge, thereby affecting the
possible outcome of the murder cases. This, we ought to prevent at all costs and the
Supreme Court has mandated it to be the right thing to do.
12. Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules punishes as indirect contempt "any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration
of justice."
13. Saliao's statements obstruct and impede the administration of justice. Those
statements and the conduct of the interview and its subsequent broadcast on nationwide
TV by respondents ABS-CBN and Cariño indirectly interferes with the administration of
justice. And when that interview is broadcasted nationwide (as was done on 23 June 2010
by respondents ABS-CBN and Cariño), those persons or entities responsible for such
dissemination are equally culpable for a violation of Section 3, Rule 71 as Saliao is.
The wanton disregard by respondents for the sub judice rule must not be tolerated.
14. The impact of media coverage on pending trials is a matter that has been
subject of a Supreme Court Resolution where its use was banned. Hence, in Re: Request
for TV/Radio Coverage of Plunder Case, the Supreme Court observed:
xxx xxx xxx
15. Thus, by agreeing to the interview and making disclosures of fact or fiction
which impact on the pending "Maguindanao Massacre" murder cases, Saliao has
committed indirect contempt upon this Honorable Court. So too, did ABS-CBN and
Cariño by broadcasting and conducting said interview and airing it on nationwide
television at about 7:00 p.m. on 23 June 2010 (Annex A). 400 (Emphasis supplied)
This Court finds that the complaint sufficiently informs petitioners of their conduct for which
their subsequent punishment is sought. Their acts of interviewing and broadcasting in national television
during the pendency of the criminal cases "without passing through the scrutiny of the police or the
National Prosecution Service if it indeed is to form part of or used as evidence" 401 supposedly violated
the sub judice rule.
The first and fourth required allegations are clearly stated in the Petition for Indirect Contempt.
Saliao's statements are evidentiary matters in the pending criminal cases. The interview was allegedly a
deliberate and calculated move to interfere with the court proceedings. A copy of the interview was also
attached to the Petition. 402 Respondent stated the effect of the interview and its broadcast to have
unduly prejudiced his right to a fair trial and the proper administration of justice in the pending criminal
cases. 403
However, the second and third required allegations have not been sufficiently alleged, which are
fatal to the Petition for Indirect Contempt.
The second required allegation pertains to the relevant mental element. Here, it is the reckless
disregard of the truth or falsity of the story since the participants being held liable are members of the
press. Since it is respondent's burden to prove the existence of actual malice or the deliberate or reckless
disregard of the truth or falsity of the statement, it must first be alleged in the Petition for Indirect
Contempt. As Associate Justice Lazaro-Javier points out, this mental element can be used to exercise
this Court's power to punish for contempt. 404
 In this case, however, the mental element was not sufficiently alleged. Respondent stated that in
agreeing to interview and make disclosures of fact or fiction that impact the pending criminal murder
cases, petitioners committed indirect contempt. 405 He also alleged that petitioners are guilty of
irresponsible journalism in creating media hype on Saliao's statements, notwithstanding the pendency of
the criminal cases. However, nowhere in the Petition for Indirect Contempt did respondent specifically
allege that petitioners recklessly disregarded the falsity of Saliao's statements or conducted bona
fide efforts to ascertain its truth. Contrary to Associate Justice Lazaro-Javier's reading of the Petition,
petitioners' supposed failure to pass through the scrutiny of the police or the National Prosecution
Service is not a sufficient allegation of deliberate or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of Saliao's
statements.
More importantly, there was no sufficient allegation of the clear and present danger of the
interview and its broadcast. The Petition states that Saliao created a false story that petitioners
disseminated to the public, generating a negative impression against the accused in the murder cases.
Respondent alleges that this sentiment will eventually find its way into the psyche of the judge, serving
as an extraneous influence and affecting the outcome of the murder cases. 406
This allegation shows the serious evil sought to be prevented by the sub judice rule. However, it
fails to allege its imminence as regards the court's administration of justice. The eventuality is
insufficient to show the imminence level required to satisfy the clear and present danger test. It is settled
that "[p]ublicity does not, in and of itself, impair court proceedings." 407 In Teehankee, Jr.:
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair
trial. The mere fact that the trial of the appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel
coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial
judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of
members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal
cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen
straight to our breakfast tables and to our bedrooms. These news form part of our
everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and
impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not
installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they
lose their impartiality. Criticisms against the jury system are mounting and Mark Twain's
wit and wisdom put them all in better perspective when he observed: "When a gentleman
of high social standing, intelligence, and probity swears that testimony given under the
same oath will outweigh with him, street talk and newspaper reports based upon mere
hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen who will swear to their own ignorance and
stupidity[.] Why could not the jury law be so altered as to give men of brains and honesty
an equal chance with fools and miscreants?" Our judges are learned in the law and trained
to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation.
Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect
their impartiality. 408 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Contrary to Associate Justice Lazaro-Javier's reading of the Petition for Indirect Contempt, a
substantial danger 409 is not a sufficient allegation for the court to exercise its contempt powers. The
test required in subsequent punishment for which contempt proceedings fall under is the clear and
present danger test.
Considering that the Petition for Indirect Contempt failed to state all the required allegations for
violating the sub judice rule, this Court is constrained to dismiss the Petition.
XIII
Had the Petition sufficiently stated a cause of action, petitioners would have been guilty of
indirect contempt in interviewing and broadcasting Saliao's statements which are relevant in the pending
criminal cases before he was even presented in court.
Undeniably, the media has a right to give publicity to matters of public interest. In Ayer
Productions v. Capulong: 410
The privilege of giving publicity to news, and other matters of public interest, was
held to arise out of the desire and the right of the public to know what is going on in the
world, and the freedom of the press and other agencies of information to tell it. 'News'
includes all events and items of information which are out of the ordinary humdrum
routine, and which have 'that indefinable quality of information which arouses public
attention.' To a very great extent the press, with its experience or instinct as to what its
readers will want, has succeeded in making its own definition of news, as a glance at any
morning newspaper will sufficiently indicate. It includes homicide and other crimes,
arrests and police raid[]s, suicides, marriages and divorces, accidents, a death from the
use of narcotics, a woman with a rare disease, the birth of a child to a twelve year old girl,
the reappearance of one supposed to have been murdered years ago, and undoubtedly
many other similar matters of genuine, if more or less deplorable, popular appeal.
 The privilege of enlightening the public was not, however, limited to the
dissemination of news in the sense of current events. It extended also to information or
education, or even entertainment and amusement, by books, articles, pictures, films and
broadcasts concerning interesting phases of human activity in general, as well as the
reproduction of the public scene in newsreels and travelogues. In determining where to
draw the line, the courts were invited to exercise a species of censorship over what the
public may be permitted to read; and they were understandably liberal in allowing the
benefit of the doubt." 411 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Fortun expressly declared that any matter related to the Maguindanao Massacre is considered a
matter of public interest. This Court upheld the right of the media to publish related matters, including
the disbarment complaint against Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, who became a public figure for his
representation of the accused in the Maguindanao Massacre criminal cases:
The Maguindanao Massacre is a very high-profile case. Of the 57 victims of the
massacre, 30 were journalists. It is understandable that any matter related to the
Maguindanao Massacre is considered a matter of public interest and that the
personalities involved, including petitioner, are considered as public figure. The Court
explained it, thus:
But even assuming a person would not qualify as a public figure, it
would not necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a
public comment. For he could; for instance, if and when he would be
involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general
interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private
individual is involved or because in some sense the individual did not
voluntarily choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is in
the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the
content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior
anonymity or notoriety.
Since the disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest, legitimate media had
a right to publish such fact under freedom of the press. The Court also recognizes that
respondent media groups and personalities merely acted on a news lead they received
when they reported the filing of the disbarment complaint. 412 (Emphasis supplied,
citation omitted)
Here, petitioners contend that their right to give legitimate publicity to matters of public interest
should prevail over the sub judice rule. 413 They argue that the Petition for Indirect Contempt should be
dismissed because the interview of Saliao is protected speech as it pertains to a matter of public interest,
citing Fortun. The interview and its broadcast were done in good faith and thus, fair, and true reporting
of Saliao's statements based on his personal knowledge. 414
This Court agrees but only in part. ETHIDa
Breaking down the qualified privilege of fair and true reporting under Article 354 of the Revised
Penal Code and applicable jurisprudence, its elements are as follows:
1. The report must be a true account of a newsworthy event;
2. The article is written fairly and balanced with the other side of the story where the subject of
the article is given the opportunity to tell their side or version of events; 415
3. The story must pertain to "judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature." This includes "any statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions";
4. There are no comments or remarks in the story; and
5. The article must be published in good faith and in furtherance of a public interest. 416
Qualified privileged communication is a matter of defense which must be established by the one
invoking it. A fair and true report is only qualified in its scope. The privilege refers to a reporting of a
proceeding, its incidents, and the acts performed by public officers. A statement, report, or speech must
be delivered in the judicial proceeding for the qualified privilege of fair and true reporting can apply.
The privilege does not extend to interviewing a witness and airing it on national television before they
were delivered in the judicial proceeding, as in this case, before the witness was presented in trial. Due
process requires that a witness testify in court where the opposing party may subject them to cross-
examination.
An examination of the transcript of petitioners' broadcast of Saliao's statements shows that they
represented Saliao's statements as testimony which they claim to be his personal knowledge directly
bearing upon the guilt of respondent in the pending criminal cases. The transcript reads:
KAREN DAVILA:
 Isang kasambahay ni Governor Andal Ampatuan Sr. ang bumaliktad ngayon
at tetestigo laban sa pamilya kaugnay ng Maguindanao Massacre.
Nagdesisyon ang kasambahay na tumakas sa pamilya matapos niyang malaman na
pati siya at ililigpit diumano para hindi na kumalat ang nalalaman niya tungkol sa
massacre.
Exclusive. Nagpapatrol, Jorge Cariño.
JORGE CARIÑO:
Marami nang testigo tungkol sa Maguindanao Massacre pero sa pagkakataong ito,
isang testigo ang buong tapang na inilantad ang kaniyang mukha — si Lakmodin
Saliao na dating katulong at alalay ni Maguindanao Governor Andal Ampatuan Sr.
Paliwanag ni Laks, sa bahay na ito ng matandang Ampatuan sa Barang[]ay Bagong
ng Shariff Aguak, unang nabuo ang plano. Ang sumunod na pulong ay sa bahay
naman ni ARMM Governor Zaldy Ampatuan.
LAKMODIN "LAKS" SALIAO:
Six days before the massacre. Ang pinag-uusapan nila that time kung saan-saan
pwede ilagay or magpoposisyon ng mga maghahawak or kung sino ang nandun sa
massacre na yun.
JORGE CARIÑO:
Idinetalye ni Laks kung sino ang mga anak na kasama sa pagpaplano.
LAKMODIN "LAKS" SALIAO:
Si Governor Andal Ampatuan Sr., pangalawa si Datu Unsay, Jr., pangatlo si Datu
Sajjid, pang-apat si Akmad Ampatuan. . . . Si Akmad Ampatuan atsaka si Anwar
Ampatuan atsaka yung mga kapatid niyang babae — si Bai Amira Ampatuan-
Mamalapat, si Bai Noria Ampatuan-Asim, si Bai Aloha Ampatuan-Ampatuan, si
Bai Shaidy Ampatuan-Abutasil, si Datu Digo Mamalapat yun . . . si Datu Zaldy ang
kasama nila.
JORGE CARIÑO:
Nang mangyari ang masaker, umaga ng veinte-tres sinabi ni Laks na rnagkatabi sila
ni Andal, Sr. . . . siya ang tagahatid ng tubig, ng pagkain. Siya rin ang tagasagot ng
cellphone ng matanda at dito niya umano narinig and mga pag-uusap nang tumawag
si Datu Andal "Unsay" Ampatuan, Jr. bago patayin umano ang mga biktima.
JORGE CARIÑO to LAKS:
Papano mo nadidinig yung usapan? Telepono?
LAKMODIN "LAKS" SALIAO:
Yung galing sa masaker na yan, I-com ang ginagamit nila. Sabi ng matanda: "Ano
bang gawin mo diyan"? Ano pang hinihintay mo? Titignan mo yung mga tao nay an
— andiyan ba si Toto"? Sabi ni Datu Unsay: "Wala. Si Bai Eden ang nandun atsaka
si . . . ang asawa ni Toto Mangudadatu."
"Kukunin mo silang lahat atsaka ang iba-iba pang mga taga-Buluan. Ang media i-
separate mo.
"Wag, Ama. Kapag patayin ko itong tao na ito, idadamay ko na rin ang media.
Walang isa man lang na mabubuhay. Kung mabuhay ang isang tao, yun ang
makakapahamak po sa atin."
JORGE CARIÑO:
Wala umanong nagawa ang matandang Ampatuan — nangyari ang malagim na
kagustuhan ni Datu Unsay. Limamput-pito ang patay kaya mismong ang matandang
Ampatuan ay natago at namundok. Hangga't dinampot ng mga awtoridad at
nakulong ang matandang Ampatuan. Hindi umano umalis si Laks kahit hindi na
siya sinuswelduhan.
Sa videong ito na ibinigay noon[] ng pamilya Ampatuan, makikitang kasama pa si
Laks sa nag-aalaga sa matandang Ampatuan.
Pero ang masakit umano, ayon kay Laks, minsan nadinig niya na plano na rin pala
siyang iligpit.
LAKMODIN "LAKS" SALIAO:
Alang-alang sa pagbubuhay nila sa akin, pinalaki nila ako, kayang-kaya ko hindi
sila mapahamak. Pero noong nalaman ko na pati ako papatayin nila atsaka si Atty.
 Pantojan po — sariling abogado namin papatayin nila para daw mapagbintangan
ang Mangudadatu, kaya nga po nagdesisyon na po akong umalis.
JORGE CARIÑO:
Personal na hiniling ni Laks na ilantad ko sa camera ang pagkatao niya. Gusto raw
niya ipamukha sa pamilya Ampatuan na hindi na takot sa kanila ang katulong na
lumalayas at ngayo'y tetestigo. Ito rin ang paraan niya upang patunayan sa publiko
na nagsasabi siya ng totoo. 417 (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioners usurped the role of the courts in receiving his testimony in allowing Saliao to state
matters of his personal knowledge relating to the murders on national television. It appears that at the
time the interview aired, the criminal cases were undergoing pre-trial. It does not appear that petitioners
secured leave from the prosecution to air the interview, notwithstanding the relevance of his statements
to the pending criminal cases. Petitioners cannot deny that Saliao's statements are evidentiary matters
relevant to the guilt of the accused in a pending case.
While petitioners are correct that the statement is a matter of grave public concern to which the
press may give publicity, they should not have presented him as a witness on national television. The
use of the term "tetestigo" in Saliao's presentation to the public removes the distinction between media
interviews and witness presentations in open court. Moreover, Cariño ended the interview in a manner
that bolstered the truth of Saliao's statements, again characterizing the interview as testimony. The
observation of Associate Justice Lazaro-Javier is relevant:
[T]he public interest character of a criminal proceeding does not justify petitioners' act to
interview "Laks" and broadcast his "testimony" as if their platform is the parallel and
shadow counterpart of the proceedings before the trial court and the prosecution. "Laks"
was not then even a witness against the accused in the Maguindanao Massacre criminal
cases but petitioners were already presenting hire as such. To recall, "Laks" was
interviewed on June 23, 2010, but he was only presented as a witness in People v. Datu
Andal "Unsay" Ampatuan, Jr., et al., from September 8, 2010 onwards. 418
As Associate Justice Lazaro-Javier points out, the public interest character of Saliao's statement
is not an excuse to disregard the sub judice rule. This is especially true in criminal cases pending before
the courts. Responsible journalism is said to be the "handmaiden of effective judicial administration,
especially in the criminal field[.] The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards
against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism." 419
In the exercise of their freedom to give publicity to the news, the press has the corresponding
duty to ensure that they are not infringing upon the rights of the accused to a fair trial. In Estrada v.
Desierto: 420
Petitioner again suggests that the Court should order a 2-month cooling off period
to allow passions to subside and hopefully the alleged prejudicial publicity against him
would die down. We regret not to acquiesce to the proposal. There is no assurance that
the so called 2-month cooling off period will achieve its purpose. The investigation of the
petitioner is a natural media event. It is the first time in our history that a President will
be investigated by the Office of the Ombudsman for alleged commission of heinous
crimes while a sitting President. His investigation will even be monitored by the foreign
press all over the world in view of its legal and historic significance. In other words,
petitioner cannot avoid the k[ie]glight of publicity. But what is important for the
petitioner is that his constitutional rights are not violated in the process of
investigation. For this reason, we have warned the respondent Ombudsman in our
Decision to conduct petitioner's preliminary investigation in a circus-free atmosphere.
Petitioner is represented by brilliant legal minds who can protect his rights as an
accused. 421 (Emphasis supplied)
This Court likewise denies petitioners' contention that actual prejudice is a required allegation in
an indirect contempt proceeding. Actual prejudice is relevant in prejudicial publicity, but it is not
applicable in contempt proceedings for violating the sub judice rule. While both have the same rationale,
their effects are different. An accused has ample remedies when there is a finding of prejudicial
publicity, including the invocation of the contempt powers of the courts:
Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may challenge the
validity of an adverse judgment arising from a proceeding that transgressed a
constitutional right. As pointed out by petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on move
for a change of venue, for continuance until the prejudice from publicity is abated, for
disqualification of the judge, and for closure of portions of the trial when necessary. The
trial court may likewise exercise its power of contempt and issue gag orders. 422
However, a finding of a violation of the sub judice rule is more limited in scope as indirect
contempt is punishable with either a fine, and/or imprisonment, 423 or the imposition of administrative
liability for a judge or lawyer. Moreover, in the exercise of contempt powers, the relevant test is clear
 and present danger, which does not require actual prejudice. Thus, to punish for contempt, it is not
necessary that the existence of actual prejudice be alleged or proven.
In criminal cases, courts have an interest in shielding themselves from extraneous influence as it
resolves a case that bears upon the life and liberty of an accused. 424 The sub judice rule is in place to
address the danger of publicity in judicial proceedings. However, the rule is not intended to curtail the
equally important right of the media to give legitimate publicity to newsworthy criminal investigations,
especially high profile criminal cases and heinous crimes. Matters of public concern must not only be
relevant, but also timely and reflective of what is happening in the society for which the attention of the
public is being called. This right is not absolute, and its exercise must be balanced with the equally
important duty of the court to administer justice and uphold its independence.
The judicial system does not operate outside of society. The Judiciary's inescapable exposure to
the flow of information and discussion of sensational cases does not automatically undermine its
impartiality. 425 The power to punish for contempt is not a weapon to stifle freedom of expression and
the right to information on matters of public interest. Without sufficiently stating a cause of action for
contempt, this Court is constrained to dismiss the Petition for Indirect Contempt.
Freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press have always been considered primordial and
fundamental by this Court, but it has never been cast as absolute. Certainly, it should not be selfishly
exercised at the expense of the fundamental right of others, to further injustice, to undermine the dignity
of the human person or their identities, and to undermine the ability of our courts to fully administer
justice.
Our Constitution has never imagined that everyone, in the exercise of their rights, will be
privileged against the rights of other individuals. In recognizing the rights of others, even as we claim
ours, we fulfill our responsibility towards what makes us true human beings: individuals who also know
that their survival depends on community and compassion.
After all, the Constitution did not imagine that only one person, or one class, or one identity will
lord over all the rest: it imagined a sovereignty composed of all our peoples.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The March 24, 2015
Decision and September 7, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 126985
affirming the challenged June 8, 2012 and August 14, 2012 Orders in SP. PROC. Case No. Q-10-67543
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Likewise, the Petition for Indirect Contempt is DISMISSED for
failure to state a cause of action. TIADCc
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M.V. Lopez, Gaerlan, J.Y. Lopez,
Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr. and Singh, JJ., concur.
Hernando * and Rosario, ** JJ., are on leave.
||| (ABS-CBN Corp. v. Ampatuan, Jr., G.R. No. 227004, [April 25, 2023])
 [A.C. No. 8399. June 26, 2023.]
MARIA LOYDA CAMACHO, complainant, vs. ATTY. GREGORIO SUBONG, JR.
and ATTY. JASON ANTONIO AMANTE, respondents.

[A.C. No. 9042. June 26, 2023.]

MARIA LOYDA CAMACHO, complainant, vs. ATTYS. GREGORIO SUBONG, JR.
and JASON ANTONIO AMANTE, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 26, 2023, which
reads as follows: HTcADC
"A.C. No. 8399 (Maria Loyda Camacho v. Atty. Gregorio Subong, Jr. and Atty. Jason Antonio
Amante); A.C. No. 9042 (Maria Loyda Camacho v. Attys. Gregorio Subong, Jr. and Jason Antonio
Amante). — The instant administrative case stemmed from two separate complaints 1 for disbarment
filed by complainant Maria Loyda Camacho (complainant) against respondents Attorneys Gregorio
Subong, Jr. (respondent Subong, Jr.) and Jason Antonio Amante (respondent Amante) for Gross
Misconduct and Gross Misconduct arising from falsification of Certificate of Service, respectively.
Antecedents
In the first complaint for Gross Misconduct (A.C. No. 8399), complainant narrated that she filed
a complaint against her neighbors for Unjust Vexation and Oral Defamation on 10 April 2006 with the
Marikina City Prosecutor's Office (MCPO). In November 2006, complainant heard word that her
complaint had been dismissed. Worried, she went to the office of respondent Amante, the City
Prosecutor of Marikina, to inquire if her complaint had indeed been resolved. Complainant alleged that
respondent Amante's secretary, Joan Lozendo (Lozendo), was rude towards her when the latter told her
that no resolution had been issued. Feeling offended, complainant admonished Lozendo and walked out,
prompting Lozendo to follow and loudly inform her that her complaint had been dismissed. A
confrontation between the two ensued, and when complainant questioned Lozendo's authority to make
such a declaration, the latter allegedly got furious and slapped her. 2
Respondent Subong, Jr., a public prosecutor at MCPO, came out of his cubicle after hearing the
commotion, and upon verifying the incident, allegedly arranged for complainant's arrest. Senior Police
Officer 4 Nenita Abanes accompanied complainant to the police station for inquest. 3
After the inquest was conducted, complainant was brought to respondent Subong, Jr. who was
then with respondent Amante. Complainant explained that she had no intention to flee. Thereafter,
respondent Subong, Jr. allegedly loudly retorted, "Nakakairita kang babae ka! Putang ina
ka!" Apparently, respondent Amante merely looked on and did not do anything but castigated
complainant by saying, "Kasi ayaw mo pang tumigil." 4
Respondent Subong, Jr. denied the charges against him and prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint. He claimed that on the day of the incident, complainant complained to him, talking
incessantly, without giving him the opportunity to explain, which he took as a clear display of contempt.
He denied having uttered the words, "Nakakairita kang babae ka! Putang Ina ka." And, even if he did, it
was only due to the grave provocation, impertinence, and disrespect displayed by complainant. 5
In his comment, 6 respondent Amante alleged that his act in trying to pacify respondent Subong,
Jr. is neither illegal nor unethical. Rather, it was a logical action to diffuse the situation. He uttered the
words, "Kasi ayaw mo pang tumigil," not to blame complainant but to stop her from further aggravating
the incident. The same is true with his act of asking assistance from the police to escort complainant
away. 7
The second complaint (A.C. No. 9042), upon the other hand, charged respondents Subong, Jr.
and Amante of Gross Misconduct arising from an alleged falsification of respondent Subong, Jr.'s
Certificate of Service. Allegedly, respondent Subong, Jr.'s the prosecutor assigned to Criminal Case No.
2003-2478-D-MK, was not present during the hearing thereof on 28 August 2006 on the premise that he
attended the Prosecutors' Convention. However, according to complainant, the said convention was held
in Cebu City on 18-25 August 2006. 8
Respondent Subong, Jr. was likewise allegedly absent during the hearing for Criminal Case No.
2006-8713-D-MK on 29 August 2006, and for Criminal Case No. 2006-221-D-MK. Despite the said
absences in court, respondent Subong, Jr.'s Certificate of Service showed that he rendered full-time
service when in fact he was absent on 28-30 August 2006 and did not officially file any leave of
absences. 9
Despite knowledge of said absences, respondent Amante, being the City Prosecutor of Marikina,
in conspiracy with respondent Subong, Jr. signed the latter's Certificate of Service which contained false
statements. 10
 Answering, respondent Subong, Jr. denied the allegations against him. He explained that on 28
August 2006, he, together with respondent Amante had just arrived in Manila from Cebu where he
attended the prosecutors' convention which was held from 25-27 August 2006. They were no longer
required to report for work anymore because they were still on travel or on "official time/business." He
denied however that he absented himself from work on 29 August 2006 but that he did not attend the
hearing because he was ill. However, he was present at the office, being the assigned inquest prosecutor.
He also denied that he was absent on 30 August 2006 and explained that the Presiding Judge for his
court was on leave. 11
Respondent Amante, for his part, denied that he committed any breach of his ethical duties and
prayed for the dismissal of the case. He argued that even if respondent Subong, Jr. was indeed absent on
the days mentioned, this does not necessarily prove that there was conspiracy between him and
respondent Subong, Jr. to assert falsehood in the latter's Certificate of Service. 12
Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
In his two separate Report and Recommendation 13 both dated 26 September 2012, Investigating
Commissioner (IC) Oliver A. Cachapero recommended the dismissal of the complaints.
In recommending the dismissal of the complaint for A.C. No. 8399, the IC found the same to be
unmeritorious. The IC held that while respondents' utterances may have been intemperate, abusive, or
disrespectful, complainant had given them provocation by making a scene at the prosecutor's office.
While the same cannot be made an excuse for such utterance, this could extenuate responsibility on
respondent Subong, Jr.'s part. Moreover, respondent Subong, Jr.'s act cannot qualify as gross or simple
misconduct as the utterance was not intentional or a deliberate violation of a standard of behavior.
Similarly, the charge against respondent Amante has no leg to stand on as well. It was clear that
he did not utter intemperate or disrespectful language and only explained what caused respondent
Subong, Jr. in venting his ire on her. The comment of respondent Amante does not heap disrespect,
contempt, or abuse of language. Said comment cannot be viewed as breach of his ethical duties as a
lawyer. 14
Upon the other hand, in recommending the dismissal of the complaint for A.C. No. 9042, the IC
held that the documents presented do not show or assert that respondent Subong, Jr. had committed
falsehood in his Certificate of Service and that respondent Amante had conspired with the former. The
complaint failed to prove any breach of ethical conduct by respondent Subong, Jr. The same goes to
respondent Amante who signed respondent Subong, Jr.'s Certificate of Service. There being no violation
in respondent Subong, Jr.'s Certificate of Service, respondent Amante could not have committed any
impropriety by signing or attesting to an accurately accomplished Certificate of Service by one of his
subordinates. 15
In its Resolution No. XX-2013-523 dated 16 April 2013, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to
reverse the Report and Recommendation of the IC in A.C. No. 8399, considering that respondents were
disrespectful to women. 16 Another Extended Resolution dated 31 July 2016 was issued by the IBP
Board of Governors for A.C. 8399, reprimanding respondents for being disrespectful to women. It held
that the IC found respondents' utterances inside the prosecutor's office to be intemperate, abusive, or
disrespectful. Thus, respondents are administratively liable for such utterances because such actuations
manifest utter disrespect for women. 17
Respondent Amante sought reconsideration, 18 which the IBP Board of Governors denied in its
Resolution No. XXII-2017-1304 19 dated 20 April 2017.
The case was thereafter transmitted to this Court for review. CAIHTE
Ruling of the Court
Prefatorily, it is noted that respondents are public prosecutors, and hence, government lawyers.
Earlier, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar because
the Court was considered bereft of jurisdiction to discipline misconducts committed in the discharge of a
lawyer's duties as a government official. 20 Recently, this doctrine was abandoned, and the Court
clarified that if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of one's oath as a
lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), then a government lawyer falls within the
disciplinary reach of the Court. 21
On 11 April 2023, the Court promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Accountability (CPRA) 22 which expressly repealed the CPR, including jurisprudential principles that
are inconsistent therewith. Likewise, it was made to apply to pending cases. 23
Canon VI, Sections 2 and 6 of the CPRA provides the filing of complaint against government
lawyers, thus:
SECTION 2. How Instituted. — Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or
discipline of lawyers may be commenced by the Supreme Court on its own initiative, or
upon the filing of a verified complaint by the Board of Governors of the IBP, or by any
person, before the Supreme Court or the IBP. However, a verified complaint against a
 government lawyer which seeks to discipline such lawyer as a member of the Bar shall
only be filed in the Supreme Court.
A verified complaint filed with the Supreme Court may be referred to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation, except when filed directly by the IBP, in
which case, the verified complaint shall be referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant or
such fact-finding body as may be designated.
Complaints for disbarment, suspension and discipline filed against incumbent Justices of
the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals and judges of lower courts,
or against lawyers in the judicial service, whether they are charged singly or jointly with
other respondents, and whether such complaint deals with acts unrelated to the discharge
of their official functions, shall be forwarded by the IBP to the Supreme Court for
appropriate disposition under Rule 140, as amended.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 6. Complaint Against a Government Lawyer. — When a complaint is filed
against a government lawyer, the Investigating Commissioner shall determine, within
five (5) calendar days from assignment by raffle, whether the concerned agency, the
Ombudsman, or the Supreme Court has jurisdiction. If the allegations in the complaint
touch upon the lawyer's continuing obligations under the CPRA or if the allegations,
assuming them to be true, make the lawyer unfit to practice the profession, then the
Investigating Commissioner shall proceed with the case. Otherwise, the Investigating
Commissioner shall recommend that the complaint be dismissed.
The complaints for disbarment were initially filed with the Court. On 03 August 2011, 24 the
Court resolved to refer A.C. No. 9042 to the IBP and consolidate it with A.C. No. 8399, which was
earlier referred to the latter a year before, or on 27 January 2010. 25
With the enactment of CPRA, the discipline of lawyers lies solely with the Court and referral of
the case to the IBP is optional. Considering that the cases were referred to the IBP long before the
passage of the CPRA, it is comprehensible why no determination was made, either by the Court or the
IBP, of whether the allegations in the complaint touch upon the lawyer's continuing obligations under
the CPRA or if the allegations, assuming them to be true, make the lawyer unfit to practice the
profession. The Court, nevertheless, can make such a determination now. Indeed, to refer the case to the
IBP anew, and direct it to make the determination required under Canon VI, Section 6 of the CPRA,
would only unduly prolong the case.
The complaint for disbarment in A.C. No. 8399 alleges that respondents committed grave
misconduct under Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, specifically for humiliating and orally
defaming her on 17 November 2006. According to complainant, respondents, as members of the Bar and
officers of the Court, are obliged to act with civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and
insolence. 26 On the other hand, the complaint for disbarment in A.C. No. 9042 alleges that respondents
committed gross misconduct and gross dishonesty in conspiring and maliciously making false assertions
in respondent Subong, Jr.'s Certificate of Service for the month of August 2006.
Assuming these allegations to be true pursuant to the provisions of Canon VI, Section 6 of the
CPRA, then respondents' alleged infractions clearly touch upon their continuing obligations under the
CPRA or make them unfit to practice the profession. Thus, the present disbarment complaints rightly
fall within the disciplinary powers of the Court.
Having settled the issue of jurisdiction, the Court now turns Its attention to the merits of the case.
Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the
administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause. It
generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose that tends to threaten the very existence of the system of administration of justice,
and should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public
officer. 27 As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest. 28
In A.C. No. 9042, complainant failed to prove any breach of ethical duty by respondent Subong,
Jr. Based on evidence, respondents attended the prosecutors' convention in Cebu from 25-27 August
2006. Both respondents were still on official travel a day after, having arrived in Manila on 28 August
2006 between 7:00 to 8:00 a.m. On 29 August 2006, while respondent Subong, Jr. did not attend the
court hearing, he was nonetheless in their office being the assigned inquest prosecutor on said date.
Respondent Subong, Jr. was also present on 30 August 2006, but the hearing was reset as the presiding
judge was on leave. As for respondent Amante, there can likewise be no breach of his ethical duty as he
merely signed an otherwise accurate certificate of service of his subordinate, respondent Subong,
Jr. 29 Clearly, complainant failed to prove that respondents are liable for Gross Misconduct, as the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule were
totally wanting in said case.
 Neither can they be held liable under the provisions of the CPRA relative to their alleged
falsification of respondent Subong, Jr.'s Certificate of Service. Incidentally, separate complaints for
misconduct (OMB-C-A-07-0558-L) and Violation of Sec. 3 (e) 30 of Republic Act No. 3019 31 (OMB-
C-C-07-0533-L) were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) relative to the said infraction.
The complaints were dismissed by the OMB in its orders both dated 31 January 2008 for insufficiency
of evidence.
In A.C. No. 8399, complainant likewise failed to prove that the same elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule were attendant in the case, to
hold respondents liable for Gross Misconduct. As for respondent Subong, Jr., he made the remarks
complained of due to complainant's grave provocation, impertinence, and disrespect. 32 It was not
intentional and was merely a consequence of complainant's unrelenting rude behavior and verbal
outbursts.
Notwithstanding, We find respondent Subong, Jr.'s utterances intemperate and improper,
contrary to the dignified speech and conduct required of members of the Bar. Canon 2, Section 4 of the
CPRA provides:
SECTION 4. Use of Dignified, Gender Fair, and Child- and Culturally-Sensitive
Language. — A lawyer shall use only dignified, gender-fair, child- and culturally-
sensitive language in all personal and professional dealings.
To this end, a lawyer shall not use language which is abusive, intemperate, offensive
or otherwise improper, oral or written, and whether made through traditional or
electronic means, including all forms or types of mass or social media.
Thus, We find it proper to admonish respondent Subong, Jr. for uttering emotionally-charged and
intemperate language against complainant.
As for respondent Amante, the Court resolves to dismiss the case against him. From the
circumstances attendant to the case, it would appear that respondent Amante attempted to pacify
respondent Subong, Jr. but complainant would not let up, which led to respondent Subong, Jr.'s
utterance of the unsavory remark. There is no showing, however, that respondent Amante's utterance
of "Kasi ayaw mo pang tumigil," directed to complainant was in any way intemperate, disrespectful nor
abusive, but a mere expression of exasperation. In fact, respondent Amante, to further cool things down
and to prevent further heated arguments, requested a police officer, then present in their office, to escort
complainant away. 33 Hence, respondent Amante cannot be held administratively liable for his remark.
We note, however, that the alleged infraction committed by respondent Subong, Jr. could also
constitute a violation of the Code of Conduct of Prosecutors promulgated by the Department of Justice
(DOJ). In particular, respondent Subong, Jr.'s use of intemperate and disrespectful language appears to
violate Rule 5.1 of said Code, which states that, "[a] prosecutor should, at all times, observe courtesy
and proper decorum. He/she should not use abusive, offensive, foul, or otherwise improper language in
the conduct of an inquest proceeding, summary or preliminary investigation and should not act in a
solicitous or over-friendly manner towards the parties and their counsels."
Under Canon II, Section 28 of the CPRA, "[a]ny violation of the CPRA by lawyers in
government service shall be subject to disciplinary action, separate and distinct from liability under
pertinent laws or rules. 34 Considering this, the Court deems it proper to furnish the DOJ with a copy of
the complaint, which is the subject of A.C. No. 8399, and the Court's Resolution for its appropriate
action against respondent Subong, Jr., vis-a-vis its own Code of Conduct of Prosecutors.
WHEREFORE, the disbarment complaints against respondents Atty. Gregorio Subong, Jr. and
Atty. Jason Antonio Amante in A.C. No. 9042 and A.C. No. 8399 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
However, respondent Atty. Gregorio Subong, Jr., is hereby ADMONISHED for his use of
intemperate or otherwise improper language. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
the personal record of Atty. Gregorio Subong, Jr., and to the Department of Justice, along with the copy
of the complaint in A.C. No. 8399, for its appropriate action against said respondent vis-a-vis its
own Code of Conduct of Prosecutors. aScITE
SO ORDERED."
||| (Camacho v. Subong, A.C. Nos. 8399 & 9042 (Notice), [June 26, 2023])
 [A.C. No. 8219. August 29, 2023.]
[Formerly CBD Case No. 18-5708]
OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF CAVITE, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, complainant, vs. ATTY. LEONUEL N. MAS, respondent.
DECISION
DIMAAMPAO, J p:
This administrative controversy has its provenance in the disbarment suit 1 lodged by the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Department of Justice, through then Provincial Prosecutor
Emmanuel Y. Velasco (Prosecutor Velasco), against Atty. Leonuel N. Mas (Atty. Mas) before this Court
for deceit, gross misconduct, dishonesty, and violation of the lawyer's oath and the oath of office as a
prosecutor. HTcADC
Essentially, the Complaint-Affidavit 2 asseverates that —
xxx xxx xxx
2. LEONUEL MAS . . . is an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor for the Province of
Laguna and currently on detail with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite;
3. As Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, it is Respondent MAS' duty, among others,
to conduct preliminary investigation of cases filed with our Office;
xxx xxx xxx
5. As Provincial Prosecutor, the undersigned implements a strict policy and drive
against corruption within the Office. To this end, notices are prominently posted inside
and within the immediate premises of the Office where they can reach via text message
this representation if they have any complaint with regard to any irregularity in the
resolution of their cases;
6. On 23 March 2009; between 5:00 to [sic] 10:00 o'clock PM, the undersigned
received a complaint, via text message (SMS), from certain ANABELLE SARTE GAÑA
and LAURO SARTE regarding an incident wherein Respondent MAS unlawfully
demanded and received the amount of PESOS FIFTY-EIGHT THOUSAND
(PHP58,000.00) from them and their aunt, ELVIRA SHIBUYA;
7. SARTE and GAÑA are the complainants in the case entitled Lauro Sarte vs.
Sylvia Dayrit, et al., docketed as I.S. No. IV-03-INV-09A-0419, for Estafa. The said case
was raffled and assigned to Respondent MAS for preliminary investigation;
8. Thus, the undersigned immediately inquired from GAÑA and SARTE if they
are willing to execute a Complaint-Affidavit describing in detail the factual
circumstances of the alleged offense.
9. On 24 March 2009, GAÑA and SARTE presented unto the undersigned their
handwritten Complaint-Affidavit. CAIHTE
10. A thorough and careful perusal of the hand-written complaint as well as the
records of the case Lauro Sarte vs. Sylvia Dayrit, et al., furnished by the complainants
revealed the following:
10.1. That LAURO SARTE is 47 years old, married, and is a
resident of 46 Anabu II-B, Imus, Cavite, while ANABELLE SARTE
GAÑA is 30 years old, married, is likewise a resident of 46 Anabu II-B,
Imus, Cavite. Another relative is ELVIRA SHIBUYA, aunt of SARTE;
10.2. That SARTE received a Subpoena from Respondent MAS,
directing him to appear at the Preliminary Investigation to be conducted
by the latter at the Provincial Prosecutor's Office on 19 March 2009, at
9:00 o'clock in the morning;
10.3. That SARTE and GAÑA, appeared during the scheduled
preliminary investigation accompanied by their aunt, SHIBUYA, who was
then vacationing from Japan;
10.4. At the Prosecutor's Office, SARTE handed over to someone
named "Sam" (Respondent MAS' Secretary) the subpoena. Thereafter,
Respondent MAS called them and inquired as to: (1) what were the events
of the previous hearing; (2) what happened to the money involved in the
Estafa case under investigation; and (3) why it took them almost two (2)
years to file the case;
10.5. SARTE and GAÑA responded that this is the first time they
appeared considering that they just received the subpoena;
 10.6. Respondent MAS then made assurances unto SARTE,
GAÑA and SHIBUYA: (1) not to worry; (2) that he will resolve the
case immediately; (3) that he will immediately issue a warrant of
arrest, and (4) that within six (6) months the case will be resolved;
10.7. Respondent MAS further told SARTE, GAÑA and
SHIBUYA that he will resolve the case in their favor and with dispatch;
10.8. Respondent MAS then inquired whether they can pay the
required "docket fees" which supposedly will reach the amount of PESOS
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND (PHP150,000.00);
10.9. SARTE, GAÑA and SHIBUYA sensed that something was
wrong because they already paid beforehand the assessed docket fee in the
amount of PESOS SIX THOUSAND (PHP6,000.00) as supported by
Official Receipt Number 2100286 (dated January 28, 2009), copy of
which is heretofore attached as ANNEX "B''. However, SARTE, GAÑA
and SHIBUYA could not complain because Respondent MAS was
pressuring them to pay said "docket fee" for him to resolve favourably
their complaint;
10.10. In an attempt to further induce SARTE, GAÑA and
SHIBUYA to pay the "docket fee" as told to them by Respondent MAS,
the latter even went through the motion of supposedly calling (in the
presence of SARTE, GAÑA and SHIBUYA) through his cellphone the
cashier of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, supposedly to haggle for
the reduction of said "docket fee";
10.11. That, thereafter, Respondent MAS told SARTE, GAÑA and
SHIBUYA that he was able to convince the cashier that they need to pay
only the amount of PESOS FIFTY-EIGHT THOUSAND (PHP58,000.00);
10.12. Convinced, persuaded and relying on this representation of
Respondent MAS, SARTE, GAÑA and SHIBUYA undertook to return
the next day 20 March 2009, and bring along with them the "docket fee"
in the amount of PESOS FIFTY-EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS
(PHP58,000.00); aScITE
10.13. Respondent MAS then instructed SARTE, GAÑA and
SHIBUYA not to talk to anyone in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
for the reason their opponent is supposedly "well connected." Respondent
MAS falsely represented that he would not like his fellow prosecutors to
negotiate with him to rule in favor of their opponent in the subject estafa
complaint;
10.14. On 20 March 2009 SARTE, GAÑA and SHIBUYA with
the PESOS FIFTY-EIGHT THOUSAND (PHP58,000.00) on hand and
placed inside an envelope proceeded to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor. Respondent MAS met with them and escorted them to the
Preliminary Investigation Room (P.I. Room);
10.15. Respondent MAS then made SHIBUYA and SARTE take
an "oath" and thereafter received the PESOS FIFTY-EIGHT THOUSAND
(PHP58,000.00) from ANABELLE SARTE GAÑA;
10.16. That with the cash in his hand, Respondent MAS walked
SARTE, GAÑA and SHIBUYA out of the preliminary investigation room;
10.17. That since then Prosecutor MAS did not communicate with
them anymore and neither did they get the receipt for the PESOS FIFTY-
EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (PHP58,000.00);
10.18. That it was then that the complainants sought an audience
with the undersigned and inquired as to the propriety of Respondent MAS'
actions.
11. Clearly, Respondent MAS had committed several administrative and criminal
infractions. There was no need to demand the FIFTY-EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS
(PHP58,000.00) for the following reasons: a) he is not the authorized collecting officer of
this Office; b) the docket fee for the said estafa complaint in the amount of PESOS SIX
THOUSAND PESOS (PHP6,000.00) had already been paid at the time of the filing of the
said case; c) Respondent MAS clearly took the money for his own personal use and gain;
and, d) Respondent MAS used his position in order to unlawfully extort the money from
SARTE, GAÑA and SHIBUYA. 3
 On June 22, 2009, the Clerk of Court ordered Atty. Mas to comment 4 on the petition but he
failed to comply despite receipt of the resolution, which was re-sent to him as directed in the November
25, 2009 Resolution. 5 This was followed by another Resolution 6 requiring him to show cause why he
should not be disciplined or held in contempt for such failure. The said resolution was eventually
returned with the notation "RTS-Moved-Out." 7 DETACa
Accordingly, the Court instructed the Prosecutor Velasco to submit the correct and present
address of respondent. 8 As Atty. Mas' whereabouts remained unknown, the Court thereafter adjured the
Office of the Bar Confidant to coordinate with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to determine
the present location of respondent. 9
In the Compliance/Explanation 10 filed by NBI Director Dante Gierran, he avouched that upon
receipt of the directive from the Court, he immediately instructed the Bureau's Deputy Directors for
Regional Operations Services (DDROS), Investigative Services (DDInvS), and Intelligence Service to
conduct surveillance operations to locate respondent and to check whether he obtained a recent NBI
Clearance, to no avail. Atty. Mas provided an inexistent address in his NBI Clearance and witnesses
averred that he no longer resided in his Cavite, Muntinlupa, and Olongapo addresses. Due to
insufficiency of leads, the NBI found it hard to ascertain respondent's current location. HEITAD
Ensuingly, the administrative case was referred 11 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation, docketed as CBD Case No. 18-5708. 12
On January 15, 2019, IBP Investigating Commissioner Eldrid C. Antiquiera (Investigating
Commissioner) issued his Report and Recommendation, 13 the pertinent portion of which reads:
Respondent indeed committed the acts complained of to warrant disbarment. It
must be noted that lawyers should obey the law and do no falsehood. They are dutybound
to promote respect for the law and legal processes, must not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct.
The acts of respondent in extorting money from the litigants in exchange for a
favorable resolution of the case is plain extortion. It is highly deceitful and scandalous in
the highest order. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct. Considering, however,
that respondent is serving his disbarment in A.C. No. 8010, there can be no second
disbarment to speak of. Hence, whatever penalty the CBD may recommend in this case is
now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is recommended that the
complaint be DISMISSED for being moot and academic.
Respectfully submitted. 14
On November 28, 2020, a Resolution 15 was passed by the IBP Board of Governors, as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. CBD-2020-11-14
CBD Case No. 18-5708
(Adm. Case No. 8219)
Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor Cavite vs.
Atty. Leonuel N. Mas
RESOLVED to APPROVE and ADOPT in PART, as it is hereby APPROVED and
ADOPTED in PART, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
in the above-entitled case insofar as it found respondent liable for deceit, gross
misconduct and dishonesty, after finding the report to be fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification on the recommendation
from dismissal for being moot and academic to DISBARMENT, if and when the
disbarment of Atty. Leonuel N. Mas had been lifted. 16
Discernibly, the pith of the issue lies in whether respondent should be disbarred anew.
Upon judicious rumination, the Court gives imprimatur to the findings of fact of the IBP but
must modify the penalty imposed in view of respondent's previous disbarment.
Prefatorily, the Court shall pass upon the issue that leaps to the eye — Was respondent properly
given notice of the disbarment proceedings against him?
The Court echoes with approbation the pronouncement in Stemmerik v. Mas 17 where herein
respondent was previously disbarred for embezzling his alien client in the total amount of PHP4.2
million, viz.:
Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from his disappearing act. He
can neither defeat this Court's jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor
evade administrative liability by the mere ruse of concealing his whereabouts. Thus,
 service of the complaint and other orders and processes on respondent's office was
sufficient notice to him.
Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of notice on him impossible, the
notice requirement cannot apply to him and he is thus considered to have waived it. The
law does not require that the impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile. The law
obliges no one to perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way
that they are in accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicality. aDSIHc
In this connection, lawyers must update their records with the IBP by informing
the IBP National Office or their respective chapters of any change in office or residential
address and other contact details. In case such change is not duly updated, service of
notice on the office or residential address appearing in the records of the IBP National
Office shall constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for purposes of administrative
proceedings against him. 18
Lamentably, in the Stemmerik case, respondent did not file any answer or position paper, nor did
he appear during the scheduled mandatory conference, as in this case. His whereabouts remained a
mystery after he abandoned his last known address in Imus and Dasmariñas, Cavite and his law office in
Olongapo City. For his failure to update his records with the IBP, the service of notice on his office or
residential address appearing in the records of the IBP National Office shall constitute sufficient notice
to him for purposes of administrative proceedings against him.
Delving now into the merits of the case, time and again has the Court reminded the bench and
bar that the practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege subject to the inherent regulatory power of
the Court. It is a privilege burdened with conditions. As such, lawyers must comply with its rigid
standards, which include mental fitness, maintenance of highest level of morality, and full compliance
with the rules of the legal profession. 19
Jurisprudence defines misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. Withal, to
constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct connection to and be related with the discharge
of the person's official duties. 20 Case law teaches Us that for misconduct to be deemed grave, the act
must entail any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to transgress the law, or to
disregard established rules, which must be validated by substantial evidence. Succinctly, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or blatant nonobservance of an established rule must be
apparent in a charge of grave misconduct. 21
In Neri v. Office of the Ombudsman, 22 the Court demystifies the term "corruption" in this
wise: ATICcS
Corruption is an "act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses [their] station or character to procure some benefit for [them]self or for
another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others." 23
Dishonesty, on the other hand, is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. 24
The Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA)25 pertinently provides:
CANON II
Propriety
A lawyer shall, at all times, act with propriety and maintain the appearance of
propriety in personal and professional dealings, observe honesty, respect and courtesy,
and uphold the dignity of the legal profession consistent with the highest standards of
ethical behavior.
SECTION 1. Proper Conduct. — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
SECTION 2. Dignified Conduct. — A lawyer shall respect the law, the courts,
tribunals, and other government agencies, their officials, employees, and processes, and
act with courtesy, civility, fairness, and candor towards fellow members of the bar.
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on one's fitness to
practice law, nor behave in a scandalous manner, whether in public or private life, to the
discredit of the legal profession. ETHIDa
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 28. Dignified Government Service. — Lawyers in government service
shall observe the standard of conduct under the CPRA, the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and other related laws and issuances in the
performance of their duties.
 Any violation of the CPRA by lawyers in government service shall be subject to
disciplinary action, separate and distinct from liability under pertinent laws or rules. 26
It cannot be stressed enough that public service demands utmost honesty and discipline; a public
servant must constantly demonstrate an utter sense of rectitude. 27 No less than Section 1, Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution enshrines the principle that a public office is a public trust. It mandates that public
officers and employees, who are servants of the people, must at all times be accountable to them, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.
Here, there is no question as to respondent's guilt. It is clear from the records that he extorted
money from unsuspecting litigants and concocted a web of lies in order to deceive them. This is an
unlawful behavior by a public officer in the discharge of his official duties. He unlawfully and
wrongfully used his station to procure benefit for himself. Undoubtedly, this is not the first time that he
did the same. Atty. Mas not only failed to uphold his duty as a prosecutor but also failed to uphold his
lawyer's oath and ran afoul the provisions of the CPRA.
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed upon respondent, Section 42, Canon VI on
Accountability under the CPRA is explicit —
SECTION 42. Penalty When the Respondent Has Been Previously
Disbarred. — When the respondent has been previously disbarred and is subsequently
found guilty of a new charge, the Court may impose a fine or order the disbarred lawyer
to return the money or property to the client, when proper. If the new charge deserves the
penalty of a disbarment or suspension from the practice of law, it shall not be imposed
but the penalty shall be recorded in the personal file of the disbarred lawyer in the Office
of the Bar Confidant or other office designated for the purpose. In the event that the
disbarred lawyer applies for judicial clemency, the penalty so recorded shall be
considered in the resolution of the same.
Notably, this Court had already imposed upon respondent the ultimate penalty of disbarment
in Stemmerik. 28 While indeed his condemnable acts in this case merit the penalty of disbarment, the
Court cannot disbar him anew for in this jurisdiction We do not impose double disbarment. 29 The
reason is obvious: "[o]nce a lawyer is disbarred, there is no penalty that could be imposed
regarding his privilege to practice law." 30
Nonetheless, while the Court can no longer impose the penalty upon the disbarred lawyer, it can
still give the corresponding penalty only for the sole purpose of recording it in his personal file with the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), which should be taken into consideration in the event that the
disbarred lawyer subsequently files a petition for reinstatement. 31
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Leonuel N. Mas is hereby found GUILTY of violating his oath
of office, the Lawyer's Oath, and the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability, which
warrants the imposition of the maximum penalty of disbarment. However, considering that he has
already been previously disbarred, the penalty of disbarment anew can no longer be imposed.
Nonetheless, in view of his earlier disbarment and being a repeat offender, he is adjudged to
be ineligible for judicial clemency.
Respondent Leonuel N. Mas is ORDERED to return to Anabelle Sarte Gaña, Lauro Sarte, and
Elvira Shibuya the amount of PHP58,000.00, which he unlawfully demanded and received from them,
with legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from his receipt of this Decision until full payment.
Respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court the proof of payment of
the amount within 10 days from payment. TIADCc
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator. The Office of the Court
Administrator is DIRECTED to circulate this Decision to all courts in the country, for information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite v. Mas, A.C. No. 8219, [August 29, 2023])
 [A.C. No. 12650. August 9, 2023.]
ROY and EMILY V. YANSON, complainants, vs. ATTY. JUN MAXELL C.
ORLINA, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated August 9,
2023, which reads as follows:
"A.C. No. 12650 (Roy and Emily V. Yanson v. Atty. Jun Maxell C. Orlina). — This
Complaint 1 was filed by Roy V. Yanson (Roy) and Emily V. Yanson (Emily) (collectively,
complainants) against respondent Atty. Jun Maxell C. Orlina (Atty. Orlina). Complainants seek the
disbarment of Atty. Orlina from the practice of law as he allegedly committed violations of the Lawyer's
Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), and the Code of Professional Ethics. 2
Antecedents
Complainants allege that they are officers of Vallacar Transit, Inc. (VTI), a domestic
transportation company. 3 Roy is the President of VTI, while Emily is the Head of Administration and
Corporate Secretary. 4 Their other siblings also occupy positions therein: (1) Ma. Lourdes Celina
Yanson-Lopez (Celina) is the Head of Finance/MIS, and the Company Treasurer; and (2) Ricardo V.
Yanson, Jr. (Ricardo Jr.) is the Vice President for Maintenance. 5 Complainants, together with Celina
and Ricardo, Jr., collectively own 61.16% of the outstanding capital stock of VTI. 6
Previously, on 07 July 2019, a Special Board Meeting (07 July 2019 Special Board Meeting) was
held where the Board of Directors (BOD) of VTI removed Atty. Orlina's client and one of the siblings of
complainants, Leo Ray Yanson (Leo), as President of VTI. 7 Allegedly, this was due to loss of trust and
confidence in Leo. 8 To replace Leo, Roy was designated as the President of VTI, as reflected in its
General Information Sheet (GIS). 9 HTcADC
Despite his removal, complainants claim that Leo continued to usurp the functions of the
President. 10 He still issued inter-office company memoranda and circulars, conducted press releases as
VTI's President, and acted as such before the employees and the public. 11
To prevent the implementation of the Resolutions passed during the 07 July 2019 Special Board
Meeting, Leo filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the said meeting and all Resolutions
supposedly approved therein, which was docketed as Commercial Case No. 19-118. 12 He also applied
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI)
in the same case. 13 In response, complainants, together with Celina and Ricardo Jr., filed a Petition for
Injunction to enjoin Leo and his group from interfering with the functions of the BOD. 14 This was
docketed as Commercial Case No. 19-120, and was jointly heard with Commercial Case No. 19-118
before Branch 53 of Regional Trial Court (RTC) Bacolod. 15
On 26 July 2019, Branch 53 of RTC Bacolod denied Leo's application for
TRO. 16 Complainants asserted that until that time, there has been no court order issued reinstating Leo
as President or declaring his removal as invalid. 17 This notwithstanding, Leo, as President, issued a
Notice of Special Stockholders' Meeting to Elect New Board of Directors and Officers which was
conducted on 19 August 2019 (19 August 2019 Special Stockholders' Meeting). 18 During the said
meeting, Atty. Orlina was named as Acting Corporate Secretary by the remaining 38.832% minority
shareholders of VTI. 19 Purportedly, this meeting did not meet the required quorum to conduct business
under the Revised Corporation Code (RCC). 20
Complainants now argue that Atty. Orlina consented to his appointment despite knowledge that
it needed the consent of complainants, Celina, and Ricardo Jr., who constituted the majority of the
shareholders of VTI. 21 Thus, they assert that Atty. Orlina's designation as Acting Corporate Secretary
was illegal and of no effect. 22 Complainants add that after the 19 August 2019 Special Stockholders'
Meeting, Atty. Orlina even flaunted the result of their illegal actions before the public at a press
conference. 23
For his part, Atty. Orlina raises that complainants are fugitives from justice. 24 Apparently,
Warrants of Arrest have been issued against complainants, but their counsels have continued to condone
and tolerate their flight from the pending cases against them. 25 CAIHTE
He adds that the 19 August 2019 Special Stockholders' Meeting was conducted in the presence
of the stockholders owning at least a majority of the outstanding capital stock, based on VTI's Stock and
Transfer Book. 26 After the election of the members of the BOD of VTI, the majority of the BOD
formally organized and elected their corporate officers, namely: (1) Leo as President; (2) Charles
Dumancas as Vice President; (3) Olivia Yanson as Corporate Secretary; and (4) Ginette Dumancas as
Treasurer. 27
 With the foregoing, Atty. Orlina maintains that he acted within the bounds of the law, as he
merely accepted his designation as Acting Corporate Secretary in accordance with the wishes of the
stockholders owning majority of VTI's outstanding capital stock. 28
On 27 November 2019, the Court issued a Resolution referring the Complaint to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. 29
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In its Report and Recommendation, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, (CBD) found that
the Complaint has substantial merit, thus recommending the suspension of Atty. Orlina: 30
Having all the affidavits and position papers together with the evidence presented,
herein respondent, Atty. Jun Maxell Orlina is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE (1) year in
the Practice of Law and on his Notarial Services, subject for reinstatement after showing
of good behavior within the said period of suspension. 31
The IBP CBD referred to the GIS of VTI, which provides that complainants, Celina, and Ricardo
Jr., collectively own majority of the shares of stock in VTI, equivalent to 61.16% of its outstanding
capital stock. 32 It found that the 07 July 2019 Special Board Meeting where the BOD of VTI removed
Leo as President and designated Roy in his stead was a valid exercise of corporate powers, as the
members of the BOD present at the time constituted a quorum. 33
Hence, the 19 August 2019 Special Stockholders' Meeting has no effect since it was called by
Leo as President despite his removal. 34 Therein, Atty. Orlina was designated as the Acting Corporate
Secretary, even without meeting the required quorum under Section 51 of the RCC. 35 Thus, the IBP
CBD stated that Atty. Orlina purposely made false statements regarding the shareholdings of VTI, and
falsely certified the existence of a quorum in the 19 August 2019 Special Stockholders'
Meeting. 36 Worse, he brandished the result of the said illegal actions to the public during a press
conference. 37
In sum, the IBP CBD found that Atty. Orlina's actions constituted violations of the lawyer's oath,
Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 of the CPR and the Code of Professional Ethics. 38 As to Atty. Orlina's
allegation that complainants are fugitives from justice, the IBP CBD clarified that this cannot overcome
the pivotal issue of whether or not he should be held administratively liable. 39 aScITE
On 12 November 2022, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution approving and adopting
the Report and Recommendation of the IBP CBD, viz.:
RESOLVED, to APPROVE and ADOPT, as it is hereby APPROVED and
ADOPTED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to
impose upon Respondent Atty. Jun Maxell C. Orlina the penalty of SUSPENSION from
the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR. 40
Issue
The primordial issue is whether or not Atty. Orlina should be held administratively liable.
Ruling of the Court
The Court adopts the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
Canon 1 of the CPR states that a lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land,
and promote respect for law and legal processes. Rule 1.01 thereof provides that "A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
In this regard, lawyers can be held administratively liable for gross misconduct, defined as "any
inexcusable, shameful or flagrantly unlawful conduct on the part of the person involved in the
administration of justice, conduct that is prejudicial to the rights of the parties, or to the right
determination of the cause." 41 Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves beyond reproach, whether
dealing with clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal
profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty. 42
Relatedly, Rule 1.02, Canon 1 states that "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." As such, it has been held that the
privilege to practice the law cannot be used as a means to gloss over loopholes in legislation, defeat
legal processes, and manipulate the decisions of those not familiar with the law. 43 As members of the
legal profession, lawyers are expected to respect and uphold the law at all times. 44
Notably, A.M. No. 22-09-01-SC, or the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability
(CPRA), was recently issued by the Court on 11 April 2023. Section 1 of its General Provisions
provides that "the CPRA shall be applied to all pending and future cases, except to the extent that in the
opinion of the Supreme Court, its retroactive application would not be feasible or would work injustice,
in which case the procedure under which the cases were filed shall govern." DETACa
While the illegal actions imputed to Atty. Orlina were allegedly committed before the issuance
of the CPRA, the Court fords that the retroactive application of the same is feasible, and will not cause
injustice. Section 1, Canon II of the CPRA mirrors Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, stating that "A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct." 45 Likewise, similar to
Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the CPR, Section 2, Canon III of the CPRA, enjoins lawyers to uphold the rule of
law by laying down the duties of a responsible and accountable lawyer, viz.:
SECTION 2. The responsible and accountable lawyer. — A lawyer shall uphold
the constitution, obey the laws of the land, promote respect for laws and legal processes,
safeguard human rights, and at all times advance the honor and integrity of the legal
profession.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer shall uphold the rule of law and
conscientiously assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
As an advocate, a lawyer shall represent the client with fidelity and zeal with the
bounds of the law and the CPRA.
The Court finds that Atty. Orlina violated the abovementioned provisions.
Section 51 of the RCC states that unless otherwise provided in the Code or in the by-laws of the
company, "a quorum shall consist of the stockholders representing a majority of the outstanding capital
stock or a majority of the members in the case of nonstock corporations." Verily, the By-Laws of VTI
include a provision on quorum during stockholders' meetings:
III. STOCKHOLDERS' MEETINGS
xxx xxx xxx
QUORUM: — A majority in the number of shares of subscribed capital stock
issued, outstanding and entitled, to vote shall be sufficient to constitute a quorum
for the election of Directors or for the transaction of any business of the Corporation,
excepting in those cases where, under the Corporation Law, a greater number is
required. 46
Here, the 2018 GIS of VTI provides that complainants, together with Celina and Ricardo Jr.,
collectively own 61.16% of the shareholdings of VTI. 47 On 09 July 2019, Emily, as the Corporate
Secretary of VTI, executed a Secretary's Certificate indicating that a meeting of the BOD was held on 07
July 2019, where a quorum was present, designating the following in replacement of the previous
corporate officers: 48
ROY V. YANSON — President and Head of Operations
EMILY V. YANSON — Head of Administration
MA. LOURDES CELINA Y. LOPEZ — Head of Finance/MIS
RICARDO YANSON JR. — Vice-President for Maintenance
JOSE JONATHAN EALDAMA — Vice-President for Legal 49
Notably, the 2019 GIS of VTI was filed reflecting the new set of officers. Therein, it is still
indicated that complainants, together with Celina and Ricardo, Jr., own 61.16% of the shareholdings of
the company. 50 HEITAD
Thereafter, as President of VTI, Leo sent a Notice of Special Stockholders Meeting to Elect New
Board of Directors and Officers informing the stockholders of a meeting to be held on 19 August
2019. 51 Part of the agenda is the appointment of an Acting Corporate Secretary. 52 Markedly, Ma.
Susan Yanson and Juan Manuel Lopez, stockholders of VTI collectively owning 0.00725% of the shares
thereof, 53 both sent Letters to Leo expressing their refusal to participate in the 19 August 2019 Special
Stockholders' Meeting. 54
Submitted as part of the evidence are numerous articles regarding the 19 August 2019 Special
Stockholders' Meeting, whereby a new set of BOD was elected, with Leo as President and Atty. Orlina
as Acting Corporate Secretary. 55 Significantly, Atty. Orlina does not deny that the said meeting was
indeed conducted. 56 Instead, he insists that the 19 August 2019 Special Stockholders' Meeting was
done in the presence of the stockholders owning at least a majority of the outstanding capital stock in
accordance with VTI's stock and transfer book. 57 Further, he raises that there are pending cases filed by
Leo against complainants, 58 including one seeking to declare the nullity of the 07 July 2019 Special
Board Meeting where he was removed as President. 59
The arguments of Atty. Orlina cannot be given credence.
Atty. Orlina participated in the 19 August 2019 Special Stockholders' Meeting and was
designated as Acting Corporate Secretary therein despite knowing that it was being conducted in
violation of the RCC and the By-Laws of VTI. While he was referring to VTI's stock and transfer book,
he failed to support his allegations with evidence. To make matters worse, Atty. Orlina participated in a
press conference held immediately after the said meeting, to publish the results of the election of the
new set of BOD. 60
As regards the other cases supposedly pending between the parties, the Court deems these
immaterial to the resolution of the present issue regarding Atty. Orlina's administrative liability.
 It has been repeatedly emphasized that being a lawyer is a privilege burdened with
conditions. 61 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or connives in violating the law
should be subjected to disciplinary action. 62 Before practicing law, Atty. Orlina took an oath to obey
the laws of the land, and refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of the court. 63 Even with the
revised lawyer's oath under the CPRA, Atty. Orlina is still called to promote the rule of law and
do no falsehood. 64 Unfortunately, he failed to faithfully perform his duties as a lawyer. aDSIHc
With the foregoing, the Court finds that the complainants were able to prove with substantial
evidence their allegations against Atty. Orlina. 65 It is evident that he violated the lawyer's oath, and
failed to exhibit proper conduct in accordance with Section 1, Canon II of the CPRA. Similarly, he fell
short of his duty to be a responsible and accountable lawyer in accordance with Section 2, Canon III of
the CPRA. All told, his participation in the illegal acts amounts to gross misconduct. 66
In this regard, Section 33, Canon VI of the CPRA treats "gross misconduct, or any inexcusable,
shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct" as a serious offense. Section 37 thereof provides that any of the
following sanctions, or a combination thereof, shall be imposed: (1) disbarment; (2) suspension from the
practice of law for a period exceeding six months; (3) revocation of notarial commission and
disqualification as notary public for not less than two years; or (4) a fine exceeding P100,000.00.
Consistent with Section 37, Canon VI of the CPRA, Atty. Orlina is imposed with the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one year. The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors is
thus adopted.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent ATTY. JUN MAXELL C. ORLINA is
hereby found GUILTY of violating the lawyer's oath, Section 1, Canon II and Section 2, Canon III of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability. Accordingly, the Court resolves
to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with more severely.
The suspension in the practice of law shall take effect immediately upon receipt of this
Resolution by respondent. He is DIRECTED to REPORT the date of his receipt of this Resolution to
enable this Court to determine when the penalties shall take effect.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended
to ATTY. JUN MAXELL C. ORLINA's personal record as attorney. Likewise, let copies of this
Resolution be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts in the country for their information and guidance. ATICcS
SO ORDERED."
||| (Yanson v. Orlina, A.C. No. 12650 (Notice), [August 9, 2023])