1.

Doctrine: Real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the

laws of the country or state where it is located. Thus, all matters
concerning the title and disposition of real property are determined
by what is known as the Lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe
the mode by which a title can pass from one person to another, or by
which an interest therein can be gained or lost.

Case Title: Orion Savings Bank vs. Suzuki; GR No. 205487; November 12,
2014

Facts: In the first week of August 2003, respondent Suzuki, a Japanese

national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a
condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong
City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean national and a
Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder. At the meeting, the parties
agreed to reduce the price to ₱2,800,000.00. On August 5, 2003, Suzuki
issued Kang a Bank of the Philippine Island (BPI) Check No. 83349 for
₱100,000.00 as reservation fee. On August 21, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang
another check, BPI Check No. 83350, this time for ₱2,700,000.00
representing the remaining balance of the purchase price. Suzuki and Kang
then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26, 2003 covering
Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki took possession
of the condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced the renovation of
the interior of the condominium unit.

Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the

titles to the properties, which were then allegedly in possession of
Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite
several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the documents. Suzuki later
on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the
status of the properties with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds.
Suzuki learned that CCT No. 9118 representing the title to the Parking Slot
No. 42 contained no annotations although it remained under the name of
Cityland Pioneer. This notwithstanding, Cityland Pioneer, through Assistant
Vice President Rosario D. Perez, certified that Kang had fully paid the
purchase price of both the unit and parking lot. The annotation of mortgage
in favor of Orion, was subsequently cancelled on June 16, 2000 by Entry
No. 73232/T. No. 10186. Despite the cancellation of the mortgage to Orion,
the titles to the properties remained in possession of Perez.

To protect his interests, Suzuki then executed an Affidavit of Adverse

Claim dated September 8, 2003, with the Registry of Deeds of
Mandaluyong City. Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles. Orion,
(through Perez), however, refused to surrender the titles, and cited the
need to consult Orion’s legal counsel as its reason.

RTC ruled in favor of Suzuki and ordered Orion to deliver the CCT Nos.
18186 and 9118 to Suzuki. The court found that Suzuki was an innocent
purchaser for value whose rights over the properties prevailed over Orion’s.
CA partially granted Orion’s appeal and sustained the RTC insofar as it
upheld Suzuki’s right over the properties. It deviated from the RTC ruling,
however, by deleting the award for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, expenses for litigation and cost of suit. Hence, Orion then
filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this Court.
Issue/s: Whether or not Korean Law prevails on the conveyance of the
conjugal property?

Held: No. The petition is lack of merit. Philippine Law governs the transfer
of real property.

It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively

subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located. The reason is
found in the very nature of immovable property — its immobility.
Immovables are part of the country and so closely connected to it that all
rights over them have their natural center of gravity there. Thus, all matters
concerning the title and disposition of real property are determined by what
is known as the Lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by
which a title can pass from one person to another, or by which an interest
therein can be gained or lost. This general principle includes all rules
governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and
the validity, effect and construction of wills and other conveyances. This
principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to
immovable property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument
will be ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is
incapacitated by the Lex loci rei sitae, even though under the law of his
domicile and by the law of the place where the instrument is actually made,
his capacity is undoubted.

On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed

principally by the national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking
the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law.
The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as
the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to
know only domestic or the law of the forum. To prove a foreign law, the
party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property

shall be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal
nature of the property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is
proven as a fact.

In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean
law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a
"Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the
existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient
proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it
was properly authenticated by the seal of his office, as required under
Section 24 of Rule 132. Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of
presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play,
i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven,
the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.

Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook
Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the
import from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the
properties as they are registered in his name alone, and that he is married
to Hyun Sook Jung. We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have
held that registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does
not negate the possibility of it being conjugal or community property. In
those cases, however, there was proof that the properties, though
registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or
community properties. Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid
Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal
consent.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of

merit. Costs against petitioner Orion Savings Bank.

2.

Doctrine: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication. (Art 2, NCC)

Case Title: NMSMI vs. DND, GR No. 187587; June 5, 2013

Facts: On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President

Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig,
Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military
reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley,
was later on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio). On 28 May
1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued
Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a
certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The
excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under
the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services –
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).

Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No.

2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangays
Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the
provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730. At the bottom of
Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum,
which reads: "P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan (SGD.) Ferdinand E.
Marcos". The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476
was published in the Official Gazette on 3 February 1986, without the
above-quoted addendum.

Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President

Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated
Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2
of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and
declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274
and 730.Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172,
was issued on the same day.

Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of
Fort Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus,
Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No. 1323
creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further unauthorized
occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort
Bonifacio. On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang
Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the
Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), where it was
docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the
following: (1) the reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3
of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and
disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of
the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and (3) the Land Management
Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona
fide occupants.

Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution granting the

Petition and declaring the portions of land in question alienable and
disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting.
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos
was an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore,
controlling. The intention of the President could not be defeated by the
negligence or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that
Proclamation No. 2476 was done while the former President was
exercising legislative powers, it could not be amended, repealed or
superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172
could not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as
the latter was issued on October 16, 1987 when President Aquino’s
legislative power had ceased.

In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar General

stressed that pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is
indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that when the provision of
the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court
to look into legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of
judicial addition or subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that the
Commission had no authority to supply the addendum originally omitted in
the published version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would be
tantamount to encroaching on the field of the legislature. Herein respondent
MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the
COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007.

Issue/s: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the subject lots were not
alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground
that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the
publication of the said law.

Held: Petitions were denied for lack of merit because their claims were
anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos alleging that
he intended to include Western Bicutan in the reclassification of public land
to alienable and disposable property. The resolution on whether or not
subject lots were reclassified to alienable and disposable property lies in
the determination of whether the handwritten addendum has the force and
effect of law.

Under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the requirement of publication is

indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise
provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a different
effectivity date other than after fifteen days. It is incorrect to say that the
publication may be dispensed with altogether because such would offend
due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that
are supposed to govern it.

Laws should refer to ALL LAWS and not only to those of general
application. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest
even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and not to the public as a whole. We hold therefore that all
statutes, including those of local application and private laws, SHALL BE
PUBLISHED as a condition for their effectivity.

We agree that the BE IN FULL or it is no publication at all since its purpose

is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby

DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in toto.
Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is hereby
LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is
DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

3.

Doctrine: Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory,
subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations. (Art. 14, NCC)

Case Title: Norma A. Del Socorro vs. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem,
GR No. 193707; December 10, 2014

Facts: Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan

Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25,
1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo
Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was
sixteen (16) years of age. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July
19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months
old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly

support to their son in the amount of 250 Guildene (which is equivalent to
Php17,500.00 more or less). However, since the arrival of petitioner and
her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son,
Roderigo. Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and
remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing
thereat. Respondent and his new wife established a business known as
Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan,
Cebu City. To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are
presently living in Cebu City.

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter

demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent refused to
receive the letter. Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a
complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against
respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for
the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.
Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also
submitted her reply-affidavit. Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu
City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the
crime charged against herein respondent. The information, which was filed
with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the
Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still
continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen
(14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in
economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.

Respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail. Petitioner also

filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which
respondent filed his Opposition. Pending the resolution thereof, respondent
was arraigned. Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the
application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2)
prescription of the crime charged. On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu
issued the herein assailed Order, dismissing the instant criminal case
against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information
do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating

respondent’s obligation to support their child under Article 195 of the Family
Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which
"equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support
their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order denying

petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling.
Thus:

x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those

advanced earlier in the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court
hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is
not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s
duty and obligation to give support to his child. Consequently, he cannot be
charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child.
Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner
who fails to give support to his child, notwithstanding that he is not bound
by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the
considered opinion of the court that no prima facie case exists against the
accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.

Issue/s: Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his

minor child under Philippine law?

Held: The Court find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully
agree with petitioner’s contentions.

Respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented

by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial
support. Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he
is not obligated to petitioner for any financial support. On this point, the
court agreed with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of
the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a
foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle
of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned,
specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only
applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to
family rights and duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family
rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of
his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give
support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. It
cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of
the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean
that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present
case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands
in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never
proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of
the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support
their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree),
because Llorente v. Court of Appeals, has already enunciated that: “True,
foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must
be alleged and proved.”

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands

in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this
doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards
the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the
instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing
the non-compliance therewith.

The Court likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the
national law of respondent states that parents have no obligation to support
their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law
would still not find applicability, in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT
and SA v. American Realty Corporation. Thus, when the foreign law,
judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of
the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and

those which have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country. The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the
principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single
cause of action.

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce
a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance
therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines
because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial
support when the latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no
longer liable to support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in
San Luis v. San Luis, to wit: As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino
wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to
the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines,

we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in
criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the
instant case. On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing
acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is
committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents
of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction
over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that
jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19,

2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of
the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on
the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.

4.
Doctrine: The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other
public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in
which they are executed.

Case Title: Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. Ma. Jopette Rebesencio et al. GR No.
198587; January 14, 2015

Facts: Petitioner SAUDIA is a foreign corporation established and existing

under the Royal Decree in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ("KSA"). Its
Philippine Office is located at 4/F Metro House Building, Sen, Gil J. Puyat
Avenue, Makati City (Philippine Office). Respondents were recruited and
hired by Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants with the accreditation and
approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. 5 After
undergoing trainings, respondents became Permanent Flight Attendants.
They then entered into Cabin Attendant contracts and continued their
employment with Saudia until they were separated from service on various
dates in 2006 allegedly because the termination was made solely because
they were pregnant.

Respondents allege that they had gone through the necessary procedures
to process their maternity leaves its management in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
had disapproved their maternity leaves. In addition, it required respondents
to file their resignation letters. Saudia anchored its disapproval and its
demand for their resignation on its "Unified Employment Contract for
Female Cabin Attendants" where the employment of a Flight Attendant who
becomes pregnant is rendered void.
Respondents filed a Complaint against Saudia and its officers for illegal
dismissal. The case was initially assigned to the Labor Arbiter in NLRC
NCR.
Saudia assailed the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. It claimed that all the
determining points of contact referred to foreign law and insisted that the
Complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of forum non
conveniens. The Executive Labor Arbiter dismissed respondents'
Complaint for lack of jurisdiction/merit. On respondents' appeal, the
National Labor Relations Commission's Sixth Division reversed the ruling of
Executive Labor Arbiter.

NLRC denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. CA denied

petitioners' Rule 65 Petition. CA denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, this Appeal was filed.

Issue/s: Whether the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations
Commission may exercise jurisdiction over Saudi Arabian Airlines and
apply Philippine law in adjudicating the present dispute

Held: Philippine law is definite as to what governs the formal or extrinsic

validity of contracts. The first paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that "[t]he forms and solemnities of contracts . . . shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed"(i.e., lex
loci celebrationis). In contrast, there is no statutorily established mode of
settling conflict of laws situations on matters pertaining to substantive
content of contracts. It has been noted that three (3) modes have emerged:
(1) lex loci contractus or the law of the place of the making; (2) lex loci
solutionis or the law of the place of performance; and (3) lex loci
intentionis or the law intended by the parties.

Given Saudia's assertions, of particular relevance to resolving the present

dispute is lex loci intentionis. In this jurisdiction, this court manifested
preference for allowing the parties to select the law applicable to their
contract that Philippine courts would do well to adopt the first and most
basic rule in most legal systems, namely, to allow the parties to select the
law applicable to their contract, subject to the limitation that it is not against
the law, morals, or public policy of the forum and that the chosen law must
bear a substantive relationship to the transaction. On the matter of
pleading forum non conveniens, we state the rule, thus: Forum non
conveniens must not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it
must be pleaded as such at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it
shall be deemed waived.

A case will not be stayed o dismissed on [forum] non conveniens grounds.

A number of factors affect the assessment of an alternative forum's
adequacy. The statute of limitations abroad may have run, of the foreign
court may lack either subject matter or personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. Occasionally, doubts will be raised as to the integrity or
impartiality of the foreign court (based, for example, on suspicions of
corruption or bias in favor of local nationals), as to the fairness of its judicial
procedures, or as to is operational efficiency (due, for example, to lack of
resources, congestion and delay, or interfering circumstances such as a
civil unrest). In one noted case, [it was found] that delays of 'up to a quarter
of a century' rendered the foreign forum... inadequate for these purposes.
The Court deem it more appropriate and in the greater interest of prudence
that a defendant not only allege supposed dangerous tendencies in
litigating in the Philippine jurisdiction; the defendant must also show that
such danger is real and present in that litigation or dispute resolution has
commenced in another jurisdiction and that a foreign tribunal has chosen
to exercise jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that first, petitioner Brenda J.

Betia is not solidarity liable with petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines, and
second, that petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is liable for moral and
exemplary damages. The June 16, 2011 Decision and the September 13,
2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113006 are
hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.

5.

Doctrine:

Case Title: Grace J. Garcia-Recio vs. Rederick A. Garcia, GR No. 138322;

October 2, 2001

Facts: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an

Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as
husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued
purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and
Editha on May 18, 1989.On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J.
Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church,
Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while
they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16,
1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia. Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on
the ground of bigamy on March 3,1998, claiming that she learned only in
November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.

Issue/s: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio

is admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and
absolved him of bigamy.

Held: The SC ruled that it cannot conclude that respondent, who was then
a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner
on January 12, 1994. It agreed with petitioner’s contention that the court a
quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent
with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the
very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

However, the Court may not declare the second marriage of a divorcee null
and void on the ground of bigamy where there is a possibility that, under
the foreign law, the divorcee was really capacitated to remarry as a result of
the divorce decree—the most judicious course is to remand the case to the
trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show the divorcee’s legal
capacity to remarry. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a
nullity of the parties’ marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already
in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in
the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the
other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code
allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
“validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.” A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws.

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof

are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. decrees that “aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law.” Therefore, before a
foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree
is a public document—a written official act of an Australian family court.
Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.
The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official
body or tribunal of a foreign country.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice,
we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving
evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the
ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.