MANU/SC/0731/2023

Equivalent/Neutral Citation: 2023(248)AIC 207, AIR2023SC 3484, 2023 (124) AC C 920, 2023(4)BLJ226, 2023C riLJ3611, 2023(3)C rimes10(SC ),
2023(3)C riminalC C 420, 301(2023)DLT66, 2023/INSC /596, 2023(4)MLJ(C rl)189, (2023)7SC C 461

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1741 of 2023 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2358 of 2023)
Decided On: 04.07.2023
Ramesh Kumar Vs. The State of NCT of Delhi
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S. Ravindra Bhat and Dipankar Datta, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: E.R. Sumathy, AOR
For Respondents/Defendant: Shreekant Neelappa Terdal and Sudhir Mendiratta, AORs
Case Category:
CRIMINAL MATTERS - CRIMINAL MATTERS RELATING TO BAIL/INTERIM
BAIL/ANTICIPATORY BAIL AND AGAINST SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE
JUDGMENT
Dipankar Datta, J.
1. Leave granted.
2 . A disquieting trend emerging over the years which has gained pace in recent times
necessitates this opinion. It has been found by us in multiple cases in the past several
months that upon First Information Reports being lodged inter alia Under Section 420 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("the IPC", hereafter), judicial proceedings initiated by
persons, Accused of cheating, to obtain orders Under Section 438 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("the Cr. PC", hereafter) are unwittingly being transformed
into processes for recovery of the quantum of money allegedly cheated and the courts
driven to impose conditions for deposit/payment as pre-requisite for grant of pre-arrest
bail. The present case is no different from the others and it is considered appropriate to
remind the high courts and the sessions courts not to be unduly swayed by submissions
advanced by counsel on behalf of the Accused in the nature of undertakings to keep in
deposit/repay any amount while seeking bail Under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and incorporating a condition in that behalf for deposit/payment as a pre-
requisite for grant of bail.
3 . The bare facts relevant for a decision on this appeal, gathered from the impugned
judgment of the Delhi High Court, are these. The Appellant before us is the owner of an
immovable property. With an intention to re-develop the same, he had entered into
three agreements with one Ashwani Kumar ("the builder", hereafter) dated 10th and
19th December, 2018 and 30th January, 2019. In terms of the agreement dated 19th
December, 2018, the builder was required to construct a multi-storied building in which
the Appellant would have ownership rights in respect of the 3rd floor and the upper
floor, apart from Rs. 55,00,000/- (Rupees fifty-five lakh) to be paid to him by the
builder, whereas the builder would have rights to deal with the 1st and the 2nd floors

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together with other rights as described therein. In pursuance of the aforesaid
agreement, the builder entered into an agreement to sell and purchase/bayana dated
14th December, 2018 with Vinay Kumar and Sandeep Kumar ("the complainants",
hereafter) in respect of the 2nd floor of the proposed building (without roof rights) but
other rights as described therein for a sum of Rs. 60,00,000/- (Rupees sixty lakh). The
complainants had allegedly paid to the builder Rs. 11,00,000/- (Rupees eleven lakh)
[Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh) as token money and Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees ten
lakh) as earnest money], at the time of execution of the agreement dated 14th
December, 2018. Thereafter, on the instructions of the builder, the complainants on
different dates allegedly made payments of additional amounts to the Appellant as well
as the builder, in cash as well as by cheques, totaling to Rs. 35,00,000/- (Rupees
thirty-five lakh).
4 . Allegedly, the complainants failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the
agreement dated 14th December, 2018 triggering institution of a civil suit by the builder
against the complainants seeking cancellation of such agreement and forfeiture of the
amount of Rs. 13,00,000/- (Rupees thirteen lakh). This was purportedly upon
invocation of Clause 8 of the said agreement. It is also a matter of record that the
builder has instituted another civil suit inter alia against the Appellant for specific
performance of the agreements dated 10th and 19th December, 2018. However, from
the materials on record, we have failed to ascertain the dates of institution of the civil
suits.
5 . The complainants were not handed over possession of the second floor which they
intended to purchase. As late as on 18th November, 2021, the complainants sought to
put the investigative machinery in motion by lodging a complaint with the Station House
Officer, Police Station Gulabi Bagh, Delhi. The said complaint was registered as FIR No.
322 of 2021 Under Sections 420/406/34 of the Indian Penal Code. Therein, the
Appellant, the builder and a broker were shown as Accused.
6 . It is worthwhile to note from the FIR that despite there being an agreement to sell
executed by and between the builder and the complainants, the complainants had made
payment of Rs. 17,00,000/- (Rupees seventeen lakh) by issuing cheques favouring the
Appellant allegedly on the instructions of the builder.
7. Since the complainants had effected payment of substantial amount of money to the
Appellant and the builder having failed to deliver possession of the second floor of the
proposed building, the complainants felt cheated and urged the police to investigate the
crime committed inter alia by the Appellant and the builder.
8 . Apprehending arrest, the Appellant moved the relevant criminal court [MACT-02
(CENTRAL)] seeking an order Under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Initially, on 30th November, 2011, the Presiding Officer granted interim protection from
arrest to the Appellant, subject to his cooperating with the investigating agency, upon
being informed by the investigating officer that no agreement was executed by and
between the Appellant and the complainants. However, for reasons assigned in the
subsequent order dated 18th January, 2022, the application was dismissed by the
Presiding Officer and interim protection earlier granted to the Appellant was withdrawn.
9 . In the background of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the Appellant
approached the High Court seeking an order Under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Similar approach was made by the builder. The High Court by its common
order dated 24th November, 2022 granted bail to the Appellant and the builder, subject

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to certain conditions. One of the conditions imposed by the High Court for grant of bail
reads as follows:
(e) as undertaken, the Petitioners/builder Ashwani Kumar shall deposit a sum of
Rs. 13,00,000/- (Rs. Thirteen lacs only) and the owner Ramesh Kumar shall
deposit a sum of Rs. 22,00,000/- (Rs. Twenty-two lacs), with the learned Trial
Court, in the form of FDR in the name of the Court initially for a period of one
year with an automatic renewal clause, within 4 weeks.
The undertaking referred to in the aforesaid extract is traceable to paragraph 6 of the
impugned judgment, reading as follows:
6.0. In rebuttal, Ld. Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that the Petitioners
are ready to join investigation and explain. Ld. Counsel also submitted that
without prejudice to their respective rights and contentions, the builder
undertakes to deposit a sum of Rs. 13 lacs within 8 weeks and owner Ramesh
Kumar is ready to deposit a sum of Rs. 22 lacs with the Court.
10. Expressing his difficulty in arranging for funds to deposit Rs. 22,00,000/- (Rupees
twenty-two lakh), the Appellant had applied before the High Court Under Section 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking extension of time to make the requisite deposit.
By an order dated 8th February, 2023, the said application was disposed of by the High
Court granting extension of time by 3 (three) days, failing which it was directed that
anticipatory bail granted to the Appellant shall automatically stand revoked.
11. The Appellant is aggrieved by the aforesaid condition [clause(e) of paragraph 9.0.
of the impugned judgment and order] imposed by the High Court and is now before us
seeking revocation of the same while urging that the other part of the order be
maintained.
12. According to counsel for the Appellant, the condition imposed is onerous and is not
called for having regard to the satisfaction recorded by the High Court in paragraph 8.0.
that the Appellant has joined investigation and that both the Appellant and the builder
are ready to provide any clarification/explanation for the purpose of completion of
investigation. It is further contended on behalf of the Appellant that he is a victim of a
conspiracy hatched by and between the builder and the complainants with the result
that he is still unable to enjoy his own property which was required to be redeveloped
by the builder within the time stipulated in the relevant agreement. Finally, it has been
contended on behalf of the Appellant that having regard to the decision of this Court in
Munish Bhasin v. State (NCT of Delhi) MANU/SC/0319/2009 : (2009) 4 SCC 45, the
impugned condition imposed for grant of bail requiring deposit of Rs. 22,00,000/-
(Rupees twenty-two lakh) in the form of FDR in the Trial Court is bad in law and liable
to be set aside.
1 3 . The appeal has been opposed by counsel for the State. According to him, the
impugned condition was imposed because the Appellant through his counsel had
volunteered to keep in deposit Rs. 22,00,000/- (Rupees twenty-two lakh) without
prejudice to his rights and contentions. Now that the High Court had proceeded to make
its order based on such undertaking and also that the Appellant had applied for
extension of time which was granted, it is not an appropriate case where this Court
should interfere in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
14. Having heard the parties and on perusal of the materials on record, there seems to
be little doubt that the Appellant had volunteered to deposit Rs. 22,00,000/- (Rupees

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twenty-two lakh) without prejudice to his rights and contentions and that he had also
applied for extension of time to make such deposit which was also granted; but having
failed to arrange for sufficient funds, he is questioning the condition imposed by the
High Court for grant of pre-arrest bail.
15. In course of hearing before the High Court, a status report had been submitted with
regard to the progress of investigation. Such report disclosed that the construction of
the proposed building had progressed only up to the 1st floor and obviously, therefore,
the 2nd and the 3rd floors were still not in existence. From such status report, it is
therefore clear that neither was the floor which the complainants intended to purchase
is complete nor the floors in respect whereof the Appellant could exercise his rights
were in existence.
16. A striking feature of the case is that although the Appellant through his counsel had
undertaken to deposit a sum of Rs. 22,00,000/- (Rupees twenty-two lakh) with the trial
court, the FIR version is that the Appellant had received separate cheques in his name
for a total amount of Rs. 17,00,000/- (Rupees seventeen lakh) [Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees
five lakh) on 20th December, 2018, Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakh) on 28th
December, 2018, Rs. 4,00,000/- (Rupees four lakh) on 28th December, 2018, Rs.
1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh) on 28th December, 2018, and Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees
five lakh) on 21st February, 2019]. That the Appellant had received through cheques a
total amount of Rs. 17,00,000/- (Rupees seventeen lakh) was also noticed by the
Presiding Officer while dismissing the Appellant's application by the order dated 18th
January, 2022. However, there can be no doubt that counsel on behalf of the Appellant
had submitted before the High Court that he was ready to deposit a sum Rs.
22,00,000/- (Rupees twenty-two lakh), which prima facie happens to be in excess of
what the Appellant is alleged to have received from the complainants by cheques drawn
in his favour on the instructions of the builder. We are not concerned at this stage with
alleged payments made by the complainants to the builder.
1 7 . Legality of the impugned condition is what we are now tasked to examine and
decide.
1 8 . It would be appropriate at this stage to note certain precedents in the field
governing the discretion of the courts to grant anticipatory bail.
1 9 . We start with Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Ors. v. State of Punjab
MANU/SC/0215/1980 : (1980) 2 SCC 565, a Constitution Bench decision of this Court.
It was held there as follows:
26. We find a great deal of substance in Mr. Tarkunde's submission that since
denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, the court should lean
against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438,
especially when no such restrictions have been imposed by the legislature in
the terms of that section. Section 438 is a procedural provision which is
concerned with the personal liberty of the individual, who is entitled to the
benefit of the presumption of innocence since he is not, on the date of his
application for anticipatory bail, convicted of the offence in respect of which he
seeks bail. An over-generous infusion of constraints and conditions which are
not to be found in Section 438 can make its provisions constitutionally
vulnerable since the right to personal freedom cannot be made to depend on
compliance with unreasonable restrictions. The beneficent provision contained
in Section 438 must be saved, not jettisoned. No doubt can linger after the

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 decision in Maneka Gandhi [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,
MANU/SC/0133/1978 : (1978) 1 SCC 248], that in order to meet the challenge
of Article 21 of the Constitution, the procedure established by law for depriving
a person of his liberty must be fair, just and reasonable. Section 438, in the
form in which it is conceived by the legislature, is open to no exception on the
ground that it prescribes a procedure which is unjust or unfair. We ought, at all
costs, to avoid throwing it open to a Constitutional challenge by reading words
in it which are not to be found therein.
20. This Court in Mahesh Candra v. State of U.P. (2006) 6 SCC 196 was dealing with a
case where the relevant high court had directed payment of Rs. 2,000/- (Rupees two
thousand) to be made to the victim (daughter-in-law) as a condition for grant of
anticipatory bail. It was ruled by this Court as follows:
3. As a condition for grant of anticipatory bail, the High Court has recorded the
undertaking of the Petitioners to pay the victim daughter-in-law a sum of Rs.
2000 per month and failure to do so would result in vacation of the order
granting bail. [...] We fail to understand how they can be made liable to deposit
Rs. 2000 per month for the maintenance of the victim. Moreover, while deciding
a bail application, it is not the jurisdiction of the court to decide civil disputes
as between the parties. We, therefore, remit the matter to the High Court to
consider the bail application afresh on merit and to pass an appropriate order
without imposing any condition of the nature imposed by the impugned order.
21. This Court in Munish Bhasin (supra), referred to by counsel for the Appellant, had
the occasion to observe as follows:
1 0 . It is well settled that while exercising discretion to release an Accused
Under Section 438 of the Code neither the High Court nor the Sessions Court
would be justified in imposing freakish conditions. There is no manner of doubt
that the court having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case can
impose necessary, just and efficacious conditions while enlarging an Accused
on bail Under Section 438 of the Code. However, the Accused cannot be
subjected to any irrelevant condition at all.
***
12. While imposing conditions on an Accused who approaches the court Under Section
438 of the Code, the court should be extremely chary in imposing conditions and should
not transgress its jurisdiction or power by imposing the conditions which are not called
for at all. There is no manner of doubt that the conditions to be imposed Under Section
438 of the Code cannot be harsh, onerous or excessive so as to frustrate the very object
of grant of anticipatory bail Under Section 438 of the code.
13. In the instant case, the question before the Court was whether having regard to the
averments made by Ms. Renuka in her complaint, the Appellant and his parents were
entitled to bail Under Section 438 of the Code. When the High Court had found that a
case for grant of bail Under Section 438 was made out, it was not open to the Court to
direct the Appellant to pay Rs. 3,00,000 for past maintenance and a sum of Rs. 12,500
per month as future maintenance to his wife and child. In a proceeding Under Section
438 of the Code, the Court would not be justified in awarding maintenance to the wife
and child.
22. Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) MANU/SC/0935/2013 : (2013) 15 SCC 570

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arises out of a decision of the High Court granting anticipatory bail but inter alia on the
condition that the Appellant, Accused of commission of offences punishable Under
Sections 420/467/468/471 of the Indian Penal Code, deposits an amount of Rs.
1,00,00,000/- (Rupees one crore) in fixed deposit in the name of the complainant. The
point that fell for consideration is captured in paragraph 6, which reads as follows:
6 . The only point for consideration in this appeal is whether the condition of
depositing an amount of Rs. 1,00,00,000 in fixed deposit for anticipatory bail is
sustainable in law and whether such condition is outside the purview of Section
438 of the Code?
After hearing the parties, this Court made the following pertinent observations:
11. While exercising power Under Section 438 of the Code, the court is duty-
bound to strike a balance between the individual's right to personal freedom
and the right of investigation of the police. For the same, while granting relief
Under Section 438(1), appropriate conditions can be imposed Under Section
438(2) so as to ensure an uninterrupted investigation. The object of putting
such conditions should be to avoid the possibility of the person hampering the
investigation. Thus, any condition, which has no reference to the fairness or
propriety of the investigation or trial, cannot be countenanced as permissible
under the law. So, the discretion of the court while imposing conditions must
be exercised with utmost restraint.
12. The law presumes an Accused to be innocent till his guilt is proved. As a
presumably innocent person, he is entitled to all the fundamental rights
including the right to liberty guaranteed Under Article 21 of the Constitution.
13. We also clarify that while granting anticipatory bail, the courts are expected
to consider and keep in mind the nature and gravity of accusation, antecedents
of the applicant, namely, about his previous involvement in such offence and
the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice. It is also the duty of the
court to ascertain whether accusation has been made with the object of injuring
or humiliating him by having him so arrested. It is needless to mention that the
courts are duty-bound to impose appropriate conditions as provided Under Sub-
section (2) of Section 438 of the Code.
14. Thus, in the case on hand, fixed deposit of Rs. 1,00,00,000 for a period of
six months in the name of the complainant and to keep the FDR with the
investigating officer as a condition precedent for grant of anticipatory bail is
evidently onerous and unreasonable. It must be remembered that the court has
not even come to the conclusion whether the allegations made are true or not
which can only be ascertained after completion of trial. Certainly, in no words
are we suggesting that the power to impose a condition of this nature is totally
excluded, even in cases of cheating, electricity pilferage, white-collar crimes or
chit fund scams, etc.
15. The words 'any condition' used in the provision should not be regarded as
conferring absolute power on a court of law to impose any condition that it
chooses to impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable
condition acceptable in the facts permissible in the circumstance and effective
in the pragmatic sense and should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are
of the view that the present facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant
such extreme condition to be imposed.

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23. We may next take note of two decisions of this Court of recent origin.
24. In Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh MANU/SC/0089/2021 : (2021) 2 SCC
779, this Court sounded a note of caution in the following words:
3. By imposing the condition of deposit of Rs. 41 lakhs, the High Court has, in
an application for pre-arrest bail Under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, virtually issued directions in the nature of recovery in a civil suit.
4 . It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this Court that criminal
proceedings are not for realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to
grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on the facts and
circumstances of the particular case. The factors to be taken into consideration,
while considering an application for bail are the nature of accusation and the
severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the
materials relied upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of
tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or
the witnesses; reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the Accused at
the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; character, behaviour and
standing of the Accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or the
Accused and larger interest of the public or the State and similar other
considerations. A criminal court, exercising jurisdiction to grant
bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the
dues of the complainant, and that too, without any trial.
25. Yet again in Bimla Tiwari v. State of Bihar MANU/SC/0051/2023, this is what the
Court said:
9 . We have indicated on more than one occasion that the process of criminal
law, particularly in matters of grant of bail, is not akin to money recovery
proceedings but what has been noticed in the present case carries the
peculiarities of its own.
10. We would reiterate that the process of criminal law cannot be utilised for
arm-twisting and money recovery, particularly while opposing the prayer for
bail. The question as to whether pre-arrest bail, or for that matter regular bail,
in a given case is to be granted or not is required to be examined and the
discretion is required to be exercised by the Court with reference to the material
on record and the parameters governing bail considerations. Putting it in other
words, in a given case, the concession of pre-arrest bail or regular bail could be
declined even if the Accused has made payment of the money involved or offers
to make any payment; conversely, in a given case, the concession of pre-arrest
bail or regular bail could be granted irrespective of any payment or any offer of
payment.
1 1 . We would further emphasize that, ordinarily, there is no justification in
adopting such a course that for the purpose of being given the concession of
pre-arrest bail, the person apprehending arrest ought to make payment.
Recovery of money is essentially within the realm of civil proceedings.
26. Law regarding exercise of discretion while granting a prayer for bail Under Section
438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure having been authoritatively laid down by this
Court, we cannot but disapprove the imposition of a condition of the nature under
challenge. Assuming that there is substance in the allegation of the complainants that

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the Appellant (either in connivance with the builder or even in the absence of any such
connivance) has cheated the complainants, the investigation is yet to result in a charge-
sheet being filed Under Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, not to speak
of the alleged offence being proved before the competent trial court in accordance with
the settled procedures and the applicable laws. Sub-section (2) of Section 438 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure does empower the high court or the court of sessions to
impose such conditions while making a direction Under Sub-section (1) as it may think
fit in the light of the facts of the particular case and such direction may include the
conditions as in Clauses (i) to (iv) thereof. However, a reading of the precedents laid
down by this Court referred to above makes the position of law clear that the conditions
to be imposed must not be onerous or unreasonable or excessive. In the context of
grant of bail, all such conditions that would facilitate the appearance of the Accused
before the investigating officer/court, unhindered completion of investigation/trial and
safety of the community assume relevance. However, inclusion of a condition for
payment of money by the applicant for bail tends to create an impression that bail could
be secured by depositing money alleged to have been cheated. That is really not the
purpose and intent of the provisions for grant of bail. We may, however, not be
understood to have laid down the law that in no case should willingness to make
payment/deposit by the Accused be considered before grant of an order for bail. In
exceptional cases such as where an allegation of misappropriation of public money by
the Accused is levelled and the Accused while seeking indulgence of the court to have
his liberty secured/restored volunteers to account for the whole or any part of the public
money allegedly misappropriated by him, it would be open to the concerned court to
consider whether in the larger public interest the money misappropriated should be
allowed to be deposited before the application for anticipatory bail/bail is taken up for
final consideration. After all, no court should be averse to putting public money back in
the system if the situation is conducive therefor. We are minded to think that this
approach would be in the larger interest of the community. However, such an approach
would not be warranted in cases of private disputes where private parties complain of
their money being involved in the offence of cheating.
27. Turning to the facts here, what we find is that the version in the FIR, even if taken
on face value, discloses payment through cheques of Rs. 17,00,000/- (Rupees
seventeen lakh) in the name of the Appellant and not Rs. 22,00,000/- (Rupees twenty-
two lakh). We have not been able to comprehend how the High Court arrived at the
latter figure as payable by the Appellant and why the Appellant's counsel as well agreed
with such figure. Prima facie, there appears to be some sort of a calculation error. Also,
prima facie, there remains some doubt as regards the conduct of the Appellant in
receiving cheques from the complainants without there being any agreement inter se.
Be that as it may, the High Court ought to have realized that having regard to the nature
of dispute between the parties, which is predominantly civil in nature, the process of
criminal law cannot be pressed into service for settling a civil dispute. Even if the
Appellant had undertaken to make payment, which we are inclined to believe was a last
ditch effort to avert losing his liberty, such undertaking could not have weighed in the
mind of the High Court to decide the question of grant of anticipatory bail. The tests for
grant of anticipatory bail are well delineated and stand recognized by passage of time.
The High Court would have been well-advised to examine whether the Appellant was to
be denied anticipatory bail on his failure to satisfy any of such tests. It does seem that
the submission made by counsel on behalf of the Appellant before the High Court had
its own effect, although it was far from being a relevant consideration for the purpose
of grant of bail.
28. It also does not appear from the materials on record that the complainants have

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instituted any civil suit for recovery of money allegedly paid by them to the Appellant. If
at all the offence alleged against the Appellant is proved resulting in his conviction, he
would be bound to suffer penal consequence(s) but despite such conviction he may not
be under any obligation to repay the amount allegedly received from the complainants.
This too is an aspect which the High Court exercising jurisdiction Under Section 438 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure did not bear in mind.
2 9 . Under the circumstances, we hold that the High Court fell in grave error in
proceeding on the basis of the undertaking of the Appellant and imposing payment of
Rs. 22,00,000/- (Rupees twenty-two lakh) as a condition precedent for grant of bail.
3 0 . We are not unmindful of the fact that the High Court was led by the Appellant
himself to an order granting bail with imposition of the impugned condition; hence, we
are inclined to remit the matter to the High Court in line with the approach adopted by
this Court in Mahesh Chandra (supra) and direct re-consideration of the application for
pre-arrest bail and a decision on its own merits in the light of the observations made
herein, as early as possible but preferably within 31st August, 2023. It is ordered
accordingly.
31. Till such time further orders are passed by the High Court, the Appellant's liberty
shall not be infringed by the investigating officer. In the meanwhile, however, the
Appellant shall be bound to cooperate with the investigating officer, as and when he is
called upon to do so.
32. Before concluding, we need to dispose of IA 94276 of 2023. It is an application for
intervention at the instance of the complainants, who seek to assist the Court on the
ground that any order passed on the appeal without giving opportunity of hearing to
them would cause grave prejudice.
33. We hold that at this stage, the complainants have no right of audience before this
Court or even the High Court having regard to the nature of offence alleged to have
been committed by the Appellant unless, of course, a situation for compounding of the
offence Under Section 420, Indian Penal Code, with the permission of the Court, arises.
3 4 . The appeal stands disposed of on terms as aforesaid. The application for
intervention stands dismissed.
35. There shall be no order as to costs.
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