V. INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES MUSTANG LUMBER, INC. VS.

COURT OF APPEALS
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION VS. NTC 257 SCRA 430, G.R. NO. 104988
131 SCRA 200, G.R. NO. L-63318 18 JUNE 1996
18 AUGUST 1984 DAVIDE, JR., J.
MAKASIAR, J. FACTS: Acting on an information that a huge stockpile of
narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the
FACTS: After the petitioner, the private respondent, and lumberyard of the petitioner, the SAID organized a team
the Solicitor General filed their respective comments and of foresters and policemen to conduct a surveillance of
memoranda, the decision sought to be reconsidered was the lumberyard. They saw petitioner’s truck loaded with
promulgated, annulling and setting aside the challenged lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and
decision and order. The decision promulgated on dimensions. The team seized the truck with its cargo and
November 25, 1983 interprets the rule-making authority impounded them The team then secured a search
delegated in Section 2 of P.D. No. 217 to the then warrant which enabled them to seize from the petitioner’s
Department of Public Works, Transportation and lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings,
Communication as mandatory, which construction is not and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and
supported by the actual phraseology of said section, approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of
which reads” various species including almaciga and supa.
ISSUES: Whether or not the rule-making authority Respondent Robles filed with the DOJ a complaint
delegated in Section 2 of P.D. No. 217 is mandatory against petitioner’s president and general manager for
violation of section 68 of P.D. No. 705 penalizes the
RULING: The basic canon of statutory construction is cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest
that the word used in the law must be given its ordinary products without a license. The DOJ handed down a
meaning, unless a contrary intent is manifest resolution for the filing of an information against the
from the law itself. Hence, the phrase “may be petitioner. In quashing the information charging a person
promulgated” should not be construed to mean “shall” or with violation of said provision, the trial court held that the
“must”. It shall be interpreted in its ordinary sense as subject matter of the charge sheet is “lumber,” which is
permissive or discretionary on the part of the delegate- neither “timber” nor “other forest products.” The case was
department or the Board of Communications then, now appealed to the Court of Appeals which dismissed the
the NTC. There is nothing in P.D. No. 217 which petitioner’s appeal for lack of merit. As to the claim that
commands that the phrase “may be promulgated” should possession of lumber under the said provisions it held
be construed as “shall be promulgated.” that since wood is included inthe definitions of forest
products, lumber is necessarily included. Hence, this the Daily Record. Thereafter, the Manila Herald
appeal. Publishing Co., Inc. and Printers, Inc., filed separate
third-party claims, alleging that they were the owners of
ISSUES: Whether or not the word “lumber” is included in the property previously attached by the plaintiffs.
the word “timber” as the latter is used in Sec. 68 of Unsuccessful in their attachment, the latter commenced a
P.D.No. 705. joint suit against the sheriff to enjoin the defendants from
RULING: In reversing the ruling of the trial court, the the proceedings with the attachment of the properties
Supreme Court held that the trial court gravely erred in and prayed for damages. Whereas case No. 11531 was
quashing the information because lumber is included in being handled by Judge Sanchez, case No. 12263 fell in
the term timber. The court explained that lumber is a the branch of Judge Pecson. The latter then issued a writ
processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, of preliminary injunction to the sheriff directing him to
the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common desist from proceeding with the attachment of the said
usage. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent properties. After the issuance of which, Antonio Quirino
to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute filed an ex parte petition for its dissolution but was denied
should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage by Judge Ramos, to whom the case had been
meaning. Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 as amended makes transferred, saying that it was “unnecessary, superfluous,
no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither and illegal.”
should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere ISSUES: Whether or not Judge Ramos has authority to
debemus. dismiss case No. 122263 at the stage it was thrown out
of court.

MANILA HERALD VS. RAMOS RULING: Section 14 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court
which prescribes the steps to be taken when property
88 PHIL 94, G.R. NO. L-4268 attached is claimed by a person other than the defendant
18 JANUARY 1951 or his agent, contains a proviso that “nothing herein shall
prevent such third person from vindicating his claim to
TUASON, J. the property by any proper action.” To the argument that
the phrase “proper action” limits the third party’s remedy
FACTS: Respondent Antonio Quirino filed a libel suit
to intervene in the action in which the writ of attachment
against Aproniano Borres, Pedro Padilla, and Loreto
was issued, the Court said that the word “action” has
Pastor, managing editor and reporter, respectively, of the
acquired a well-defined, technical meaning as an
Daily Record, a daily newspaper published in Manila,
“ordinary suit in a court of justice by which one party
asking for damages. Plaintiff secured a writ of preliminary
prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a
attachment upon certain office and printing equipment at
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong,” while the COMELEC held that the petition for recall be granted
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court states that a “civil and its oppositions dismissed. It maintains that the
action may be commenced by filing a complaint with the process of recall starts with the filing of the petition for
proper court.” In employing the word “commencement”, recall and ends with the conduct of the recall election.
the rule clearly indicates an action which originates an Thus, the recall was validly initiated outside of the one-
entire proceeding and puts in motion the instruments of year period. Petitioner contends that the term “recall” in
the court calling for summons, answers, etc. and not any Sec. 74 (b) refers to a process, in contrast to the term
intermediary step taken in the course of proceeding “recall election” found in Sec. 74 (a) which obviously
whether the parties themselves or by a stranger. The refers to an election.
Court further elucidated that it would be strange indeed if
the framers of the Rules of Court should have employed ISSUES: Whether or not the first limitation regarding the
the term “proper action” instead of intervention or one year period in Sec. 74 of the Local Government
equivalent expression if the intention had been just that. Code embraces the entire proceedings or only the recall
It was all the easier, simpler, and the more natural thing election.
to say intervention if that had been the purpose, since the RULING: In answering the issue that “recall” refers only
assisted right of the third party claimant necessarily flows to the recall election and not those proceedings prior
out of the pending suit. thereto, which may take some time, the Court construed
CLAUDIO VS. COMELEC the word “recall” in relation to Sec. 69 of the Code to the
effect that “the power of recall… shall be exercised by the
331 SCRA 388, G.R. NO. 140560 registered voters of a local government unit to which the
local elective official belongs.” The Court stated that
4 MAY 2000 “since the power vested on the electorate is not the
MENDOZA, J. power to initiate recall proceedings” but the power to
elect an official into office, the limitations in Sec. 74
FACTS: Petitioner Jovito O. Claudio was the duly- cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall
elected mayor of Pasay City. Sometime after his election, proceedings.
the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered to
discuss the possibility of filing a petition for recall against GARCIA VS. COMELEC
Mayor Claudio for loss of confidence. A resolution was 237 SCRA 279, G.R. NO. 111230
adopted to initiate the recall of Claudio for loss of
confidence. The petition was then filed in the COMELEC. 30 SEPTEMBER 1994
Oppositions to the petition were filed by Claudio, Rev.
Ronald Langub, and Roberto Angeles alleging procedural PUNO, J.
and substantive defects in the petition. In its resolution,
FACTS: The Sangguniang Bayan of Marong, Bataan any ordinance.” The Constitution clearly includes not only
agreed, through its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, to ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a
the inclusion of the municipality of Marong to the Subic local initiative. Contrary to the submission of the
Special Economic Zone. Petitioners, headed by Garcia, respondents, the subsequent enactment of the Local
filed a petition to the Sangguniang Bayan to change the Government Code did not change the scope of its
said resolution which decrees that Marong shall form part coverage. It merely defines the concept of local initiative
of said zone on certain conditions. Since the as the legal process whereby the registered voters of a
Sangguniang Bayan did not act upon the petition, local government unit may directly propose, enact, or
petitioners used their power on initiative and solicited the amend any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with the
number of signatures required. The COMELEC denied subjects or matters that can be taken up in a local
the petition of the petitioners through referendum since initiative. The word or provision should not be given a
the subject was only a resolution and not an ordinance. meaning that will restrict or defeat, but should instead be
construed to effectuate, what has been intended in an
It is claimed that since a resolution is not included in this enacting law
definition, then the same cannot be the subject of an
initiative. LIGGETT & MYERS TOBACCO VS. COLLECTOR OF
INTERNAL REVENUE
ISSUES: Whether or not a local resolution of a municipal
council can be the subject of an initiative and 101 PHIL 106, G.R. NO.
referendum.
22 APRIL 1957
RULING: In rejecting this claim, the Supreme Court ruled
that such a narrow and literal reading of the provision will FACTS: On or about September 28, 1954, the petitioners
subvert the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the received a shipment of several cartons of King Size L&M
provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 on Filter Cigarettes. The Collector of Customs required the
initiative and referendum. The Constitution requires that petitioners to pay specific tax on said cigarettes. This was
the legislative shall provide for a system of initiative and paid by petitioners. Thereafter, the petitioners, through
referendum, whereby the people can directly approve or counsel, filed a formal claim for a partial refund which
reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the was denied by the Deputy Collector of Internal
Congress, or local legislative body. Congress thereafter Revenue.The case revolves around the construction of
enacted R.A. No. 6735 which includes resolutions as Sec. 137 of the National Internal Revenue Code. The
among the subjects of initiative. However, the Local provision stated that “if the length exceeds seventy- one
Government Code, a later law, defines local initiative as millimeters or if the weight per thousand exceeds one
“the process whereby the registered voters of a local and one-fourth kilos, the tax shall be increased by one
government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend hundred per centum.” The petitioner contends that the
term “cigarettes as used in this section will mean only the decision in petitioner’s favour. On May 2, 1996, The
part containing the tobacco and not the filters. The CTA, COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board
however, rendered an adverse decision stating that the of Election Telelrs and Board of Canvassers of Barangay
law did not distinguish between cigarettes with filters and San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of petitioner I n
those without. the even she own in the election which she did win. She
was not proclaimed the winner by said order of the
ISSUES: Whether or not the law distinguishes between COMELEC. Thereafter, the Board proclaimed petitioner’s
filter and non-filter cigarettes for purposes of taxation. adversary as the winner to which the petitioner seeks to
RULING: The Court ruled that the law not having annul the order of the COMELEC disqualifying her.
distinguished between filter cigarettes and non-filter ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner who was over 21 but
cigarettes, neither the executive department nor the court below 22 years of age was qualified to be an elective SK
may distinguish one form the other, hence, the tax should member.
be paid as fixed under the provision. As long, however,
as the law does not distinguish between filter cigarettes RULING: The Supreme Court held that the petitioner is
and non-filter cigarettes, and said Sec. 137 does not do ineligible for being over 21 years of age. Sec. 424 of the
so, neither the executive department nor the courts may Local Government Code provides that a member of the
distinguish one from the other for purposes of taxation. Katipunan ng Kabataan must not be more than 21 years.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Sec. 428 of the same Code provides that an elective
official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more
GARVIDA VS. SALES than 21 years of age on the day of his election, adding
271 SCRA 767, G.R. NO. 124893 the phrase “on the day of his election” as an additional
qualification. The Court clarified that there is a distinction
18 APRIL 1997 between the maximum age of a member in the Katipunan
PUNO, J. ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK
official. For the former, Sec. 424 sets the maximum age
FACTS: The SK elections nationwide was scheduled to at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to when
be held on May 6, 1996. On March 16, 1996, petitioner the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the
applied for registration as member and voter of the other hand, Sec. 428 qualifies that the member may be
Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day
denied her application because petitioner was already 21 he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan.
years and 10 months old saying that she had exceeded The elective official, however, must not be more than 21
the age limit set forth by the COMELEC in resolution. years old on the day of election. The distinction is
However, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered a understandable considering that the Code itself provides
more qualification for an elective SK official than for a penalty to imprisonment of 6 months and a fine of P1000
member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The courts may without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. A
distinguish when there are facts and circumstances motion for reconsideration was denied by the same court.
showing the legislature intended a distinction or Hence, this petition.
qualification. Of things dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar.
Dissimilum Dissimilis est ratio.
ISSUES: Whether or not solicitations for religious
purposes are within the ambit of P.D. No. 1564.

CENTENO VS. VILLALON-PORNILLOS

RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court said that
236 SCRA 197, G.R. NO. 113092 used the statutory construction rule of expression unius
est exclusion alterius, the express mention of one
1 SEPTEMBER 1994 person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others.
REGALADO, J. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
FACTS: The officers of the Samahang Katandaan ng construction be extended to others. The rule proceeds
Nayon ng Tikay had a fund drive for the purpose of from the premise that the legislature would not have
renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malalas, Bulacan. made specific enumerations in a statute had the intention
Petitioner Martin Centeno with Vicento Yeo solicited from been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to
Judge Angeles a contribution of P1,500. The solicitation those expressly mentioned. That these legislative
was made without a permit from the Department of Social enactments specifically spelled out “charitable” and
Welfare and Development. Due to the complaint of Judge “religious” in an enumeration, whereas P.D. No. 1564
Angeles, an information was filed against petitioners with merely stated “charitable or public welfare purposes,”
Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yeo for the violation of P.D. only goes to show that the framers of the law in question
No. 1564. Petition filed a motion to quash claiming that never intended to include solicitations for religious
P.D. No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no
charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made reason why it would not have stated so expressly.
for a religious purpose. On December 29, 1992 the trial
court convicted the petitioners and sentenced them to CARANDANG VS. SANTIAGO
each pay a fine of P200. Accused Centeno appealed to 97 PHIL 94, G.R. NO. L-8238
the RTC of Malolos. However, Judge Villalon-Pornillos 25 MAY 1955
affirmed the decision of the lower court but changed the LABRADOR, J.
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari against RULING: The Court ruled that the term “physical
Vicente Santiago, Judge of the CFI of Manila to annul injuries” should be understood to mean bodily harm or
his case entitled Carandang vs. Valenton wherein the injury, such as physical injuries, frustrated
latter was found guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide, or even death. Said the court: “The article in
homicide committed against the person of the former. question uses the words ‘defamation,’ ‘fraud’ and
Petitioner filed a complaint to receive damages. ‘physical injuries.’ Defamation and fraud are used in
After defendants submitted their answer, they their ordinary sense because there are no specific
presented a motion to suspend the trial of the civil provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms
case, pending the termination of the criminal case. as means of offenses defined therein, so that these
The judge ruled that the trial on the civil action must two terms must have been used not to impart to them
await the result of the criminal case on appeal. A any technical meaning. It is evident that the term
motion for reconsideration was submitted but the ‘physical injuries’ could not have been used in its
court denied the same. The offended party predicates specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised
his action on Article 33 of the Civil Code which Penal Code for it is difficult to believe that the Code
provides that “[i]n cases of defamation, fraud, and Commission would have used terms in the same
physical injuries, a civil action for damages entirely article—some in their generic and another in its
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be technical sense. In other words, the term ‘physical
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall injuries’ should be understood to mean bodily
proceed independently injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the
of the criminal prosecution and shall require only a term used with the latter are generic terms.
preponderance of evidence.” Respondent, on the other
hand, claims that the term “physical injuries” does PEOPLE VS. SANTIAGO
not include frustrated homicide because the term 5 SCRA 231, G.R. NO. L-17663
refers to the specific crime of physical injuries as 30 MAY 1962
defined in the RPC and should be understood in its CONCEPCION, J.
technical or legal sense, and not in its ordinary or FACTS: On October 5, 1959, the accused alleged
generic sense of bodily injury. Mayor Arsenio Lacson of raping two women in the
course of a political speech delivered to a crowd of
ISSUES: Whether or not an offended party can file a around a hundred persons through an amplifier
separate and independent civil action for damages system. A motion was filed against him for libel but
arising from physical injuries during the pendency of the defendant moved to quash the information filed
the criminal action for frustrated homicide. against him on the ground that the crime he
committed is oral defamation which had already
prescribed. The CFI of Manila granted this motion. if it does not, it is nevertheless a “gift enterprise”
Hence, this appeal by the prosecution. which is equally banned in the postal law.

ISSUES: Whether defamatory statements through ISSUES: Whether or not the proposed “Caltex Hooded
the medium of an amplifier system constitutes Pump Contest” violates the Postal Law.
oral defamation or libel.
RULING: In ru l i n g i n t h e n e g a ti ve , th e C o u rt
RULING: In rejecting the argument, the court ruled that established that where the word “lottery” is defined as
the word “radio” should be considered in relation to a game of chance, one of the elements of which is
the terms with which it is associated—writing, consideration, the term “gift enterprise” and “scheme” in
printing, etc.—all of which, unlike an amplifier the provision of the Postal Law making unmailable
system, have a common characteristic, namely, their “any lottery, gift, enterprise, or scheme for the
permanent nature as a means of publication which is distribution of money or any real or personal property
not present in utterances through an amplifier. by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind” means such
enterprise as will require consideration as an
CALTEX PHILS., INC. VS. PALOMAR element. Under the prohibitive provision of the Postal
18 SCRA 247, G.R. NO. L-19650 Law, gift enterprises and similar schemes
29 SEPTEMBER 1966 therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like
CASTRO, J. lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.
FACTS: In 1960, Caltex conceived a groundwork Because there is none in the contest herein in
promotional scheme to drum up patronage for its oil question, the
products denominated “Caltex Hooded Pump appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for
Contest”. Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails purposes thereof. The Court also had occasion to
not only as amongst the media for publicizing the define Construction as “the art or process of
contest but also for transmission of communications discovering and expounding the meaning and
thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the intention of the authors of the law with respect to its
postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in application to a given case, where that intention is
advance for mailing. The then Acting Postmaster rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the
General opined that the scheme falls within the purview fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for
of the Postal law and declined to grant the requested in the law.”
clearance. The Postmaster General maintained his
view that the contest involves consideration, or that, MUTUC VS. COMELEC
36 SCRA 228, G.R. NO. L-32717
 26 NOVEMBER 1970
FERNANDO, J. RULING: In answering in the negative, the Court
FACTS: Petitioner, after setting forth his being a applied the well-known principle of ejusdem generis,
resident of Pampanga and his candidacy for the where general words following any enumeration
position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention, being applicable only to things of the same kind or
alleged that respondent Commission of Elections class as those specifically referred to. It is quite
informed him that his certificate of candidacy was apparent that what was contemplated in the
given due course but prohibited him from using jingles Constitution Convention Act was the distribution of
in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
loud speakers, an order which petitioner says is inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the
violative of his constitutional right to freedom of candidate responsible for its distribution. Where an
speech. The Supreme Court adopted a resolution act makes unlawful the distribution of electoral
which required respondent to file an answer. propaganda gadgets, pens, lighters, fans, flashlights,
Respondent does not deny the allegations of the athletic goods or material “and the like,” the term “and
petitioner but justifies the prohibition on the the like” does not embrace taped jingles for
Constitutional Convention Act which proscribes campaign purposes, the said term being restricted only
candidates “to purchase, produce, request or to thing s o f the same kind or cl ass as tho se
distribute sampleballots, or electoral propaganda specifically enumerated.
gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever VERA VS. CUEVAS
nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, 90 SCRA 379, G.R. NOS. L-33693-94
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, 31 MAY 1979
cigarettes, and the like, DE CASTRO, J.
whether of domestic or foreign origin.” It is the FACTS: Petitioner Commissioner of Internal
respondent’s contention that the jingle proposed to be Revenue sought private respondents to withdraw from
used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a the market all of their filled milk products which do not
singer and therefore a tangible propaganda bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the
material, under the above statute subject to Tax Code within fifteen days from receipt of the
confiscation. It is prayed that the petition be denied order with the explicit warning that failure of private
for lack of merit. respondents to comply with said order will result in the
institution of the necessary action against any
ISSUES: Whether or not the jingles of petitioner are violation of the aforesaid order. The lower court held
embraced within the phrase “and the like” and thus that the products in question were correctly labeled
articles prohibited from being distributed. and restrained the CIR from requiring the private
respondents to print on the labels of their filled milk CORTES, J.
products the words, “This milk is not suitable for FACTS: Chairman Jovito Salonga created the New
nourishment for infants less Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft Boardin
than one year of age” or words of similar import as order to investigate the unexplained wealth and
required by the Tax Code. corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired
ISSUES: Whether or not filled milk is synonymous with and in service. Lt. Col Troadio Tecson was required by
skimmed milk and thus subject to the application and the board to submit his explanation/comment
prohibitions found in the Tax Code on proper together with his supporting evidence based on an
labelling. information received by the Board alleging the
acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income. Private
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It respondent failed to produce evidence of his
cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section innocence and the board proceeded with its
169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk. The investigation. It thereafter recommended that private
term “skimmed milk” in a statute which requires that respondent be prosecuted and tried for violation of
“all condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever The Anti-Graft Act in relation to Executive Order Nos.
form” “shall be clearly and legibly marked on its 1 and 2 authorizing the PCGG to recover ill-gotten
immediate containers” “with the words: ‘This milk is wealth of the former President’s “subordinates and
not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one close associates” “during his administration.”
year of age,’” restricts the phrase “all milk in
whatever form” and excludes with its scope, filled ISSUES: Whether or not the PCGG has the jurisdiction
milk. Since skimmed milk and filled milk are different to investigate the former military officer for being in the
from each other due to the presence of fatty part in service during the administration of the former
the former while absence of such in the latter. President and was therefore his subordinate.
Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled
milk but to skimmed milk because of the use of the RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court said that
words “skimmed milk” in the headnote and text of said the term “subordinate” refers only to one who enjoys
section which would restrict the scope of the general close association or relation with the former
clause thereof referring to “all milk, in whatever President and/or his wife, and not to any government
form”, applying the rule of ejusdem generis. officer during the former President’s administration, the
term “close associates” having restricted the
REPUBLIC VS. MIGRINO meaning of “subordinates.”
189 SCRA 289, G.R. NO. 89483
30 AUGUST 1990 U.S. VS. SANTO NINO
 13 PHIL 141, G.R. NO. 5000 In this case, the proviso of the Act clearly indicates that
11 MARCH 1909 in the view of the legislature, the carrying of an
WILLARD, J. unlicensed revolver would be a violation of the Act.
FACTS: On August 16, 1908, defendant Victor Santos By the proviso, it manifested its intention to include in
was seen to have carried a deadly weapon. It is one the prohibition weapons other than armas blancas
iron bar, 15 inches in length with an iron ball at one therein specified.”
end and a string on the other to tie to the wrist. This is
designed and made for fighting. Due to this, he was ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP VS. SSC
charged for violation of Act No. 1786, which provides 1 SCRA 10, G.R. NO. L-15045
that “It shall be unlawful for any person to carry 20 JANUARY 1961
concealed about his person any bowie, knife, direck, GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.
dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: Provided, That FACTS: On September 1, 1958, the Roman
this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in the Catholic Archbishop of Manila filed with the Social
possession of person who have Security Commission (SSC) a request that “catholic
secured a license therefore or who are entitled to Charities, and all religious and charitable institutions
carry the same under the provisions of this act.” It is and/or organizations, which are directly or
argued that following the rule of ejusdem generis, indirectly,
the phrase “other deadly weapon” does not include wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Catholic
an unlicensed revolver. Archbishop of Manila,” be exempt from compulsory
coverage of R.A. No. 1161 otherwise known as the
ISSUES: Whether or not the carrying of an unlicensed Social Security Act of 1954. The SSC denied the
revolver concealed in the person comes under the petitioner’s request. After a request for
phrase “other deadly weapon” thus constituting a reconsideration, the Commission again denied the
violation of Act No. 1786. exemption. In invoking the rule of ejusdem generis, the
petitioner claims that it is not included in the term
RULING: In rejecting this argument, the Court said that “employer” as statutorily defined as “any person,
the rule of ejusdem generis “is resorted to only for the natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carried in
purpose of determining what the intent of the the Philippines any trade, business, industry,
legislature was in enacting the law. If that intent undertaking, or activity of any kind and sued the
clearly appears from the other parts of the law, and services of another person who is under his order as
such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to the regard the employment, except the Government and
result which would be reached by the application of any of its political subdivisions, branches or
the rule of ejusdem generis, the latter must give way. instrumentalities, including corporations owned or
controlled by the government.” It is contended that the and again the petition was denied on the ground that the
term “employer” should be limited to those who carry respondent judge had power and authority to rule on the
an “undertaking or activity which has the element of question raised therein. After the steps taken by the
profit or gain” because the phrase “activity of any prosecution to foil the attempt to prove the alleged
kind” in the definition is preceded by the words “any decree of divorce by oral evidence proved futile, the
trade, business, industry, undertaking.” private prosecution filed the present petition for
declaratory relief.
ISSUES: Whether or not the term “employer” should be
limited to activities for profit or gain only, thus exempting ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner have the
the petitioner from compliance with R.A. No. 1161. necessary personality and interest to file the
petition under question.
RULING: In rejecting the petitioner’s contention, the
Court held that the “rule of ejusdem generis applies only RULING: In answering in the affirmative, the Court said
where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the that pursuant to the rule that a person who is
plain purpose and intent of the legislature would thereby interested “under a deed, will, contract, or other
be hindered and defeated.” The definition is “sufficiently written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a
comprehensive to include religious and charitable statute or ordinance, may bring any question of
institutions or entities not construction or validity arising under the instrument or
organized for profit,” and “this is made more evident by statute and for a declaration of his rights or
the fact that it contains exceptions in which said duties thereunder,” the subject matter of such action
institutions or entities are not included.” must refer to a deed, will, contract or other written
LERUM VS. CRUZ instrument, or to a statute or ordinance, and not to
87 SCRA 652, G.R. NO. L-2783 other matters, in order to warrant declaratory relief,such
29 NOVEMBER 1950 other matters not being mentioned therein being deemed
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J. excluded. This is under the principle of expressio unius
FACTS: A case for bigamy was filed against Nello Roa. est exclusio alterius.
In the course of the trial, respondent former judge Roman
Cruz was placed on the witness stand by the defendant VERA VS. FERNANDEZ
to prove that his wife Elena Muñoz had already secured a 89 SCRA 199, G.R. NO. L-31364
divorce decree against him. The prosecution moved for 30 MARCH 1979
the striking out of some portions of the testimony of the DE CASTRO, J.
Judge Cruz but was denied. The prosecution again
brought the case to the Supreme Court through certiorari FACTS: A motion representing the indebtedness to the
Government of the late Luis Tongoy for deficient payment same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral
of income taxes to which was attached a Proof of Claim expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the
was filed. The Administrator opposed the motion solely decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent,
on the ground that the claim was barred must be filed within the time limit in the notice, otherwise
under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.Finding they are barred forever,” are deemed excluded from the
the opposition well-founded, the respondent operation of the rule, and such taxes can still be
Judge dismissed the motion for allowance of claimfiled by recovered even though the same are not presented as
the petitioner Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal claims against the estate within the prescribed period in
Revenue. A motion for reconsideration was filed but later the notice, so long as they have not prescribed under the
on denied. Hence this appeal on certiorari. Tax Code.
MANABAT VS. DE AQUINO
ISSUES: Whether or not the statute of nonclaims bars 92 PHIL 1025, G.R. NO. L-5558
claim of the government for unpaid taxes still within the 29 APRIL 1953
period of limitation of the National Internal Revenue BENGZON, J.
Code. FACTS: Sued on a promissory note, Enrique Manabat
and his wife denied liability and alleged usury. Having
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the court said that the failed to appear and present evidence at the hearing,
National Internal Revenue Code as well as the Rules of they were ordered to pay the amount plus interest to the
Court makes no mention of claims for monetary plaintiffs. Notified of the decision, the Manabats sent their
obligations of the decedent created by law, such as taxes notice of appeal by registered mail together with a
which is entirely of different character from the claims for postal money order payable to the justice of the peace.
monetary obligations of the decedent created by law, However, the Roxas couple submitted a motion to
such as taxes which is entirely of different character from dismiss the appeal of the Manabats on the ground that
the claims expressly enumerated therein. Under the the appeal documents had been received by the inferior
familiar rule of expressio court two days after the expiration of the time prescribed
unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing by law for appeals from that court and that the appeal
impliesthe exclusion of another thing not mentioned. was frivolous, interposed obviously for delay. It is the
Thus, if a statute enumerates the things upon which it is contention of the petitioners that Section 1 Rule 27
to operate, everything else must necessarily, and by should be applied and thus the appeal has been
implication be excluded from its operation and effect. reasonably perfected. The respondents, on the other
Taxes due the government, not being mentioned inthe hand, contend that Rule 27 is not applicable because it is
rule that “all claims for money against the decedent, not mentioned in Section 19 Rule 4 and thus, inclusio
arising from contracts, express or implied, whether the unius est exclusio alteriusapplies.
 Acting Governor Datumanong. Escribano was charged of
ISSUES: Whether or not the appeal has been perfected having said in a broadcasted spiel by a radio station,
within fifteen days as required by Section 2 Rule 40 of that “Mr. Pendatun is the worst animal that ever livedin
the Rules of Court. this province.” Petitioner now questions Avila’s authority
to conduct a preliminary investigation since the latter said
RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative. It said that that he has power to do such. Escribano filed the instant
where the rule enumerates the provisions which special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition praying
are applicable to proceedings in municipal trial courts in Avila’s decision to be set aside. No restraining order was
cases falling within their jurisdictions, the fact that the issued. He then filed a supplemental petition to annul that
provision making the date of mailing a pleading as shown order. Judge Avila ordered the arrest of Escribano and a
by the post office registry receipt as the date of filing in warrant was issued and the city fiscal filed an information
court is not one of those enumerated does not mean that for libel. This Court then issued a resolution restraining
it is not applicable to proceedings in municipal trial Judge Avila from proceeding with the arraignment of
courts. The reason for this is that there are Escribano.
circumstances indicating that the enumeration is not
intended to be exclusive, as shown by the fact that to ISSUES: Whether or not the CFI of Cotabato is invested
exclude the provision and others not mentioned therein with authority to conduct a preliminary investigation.
would be
productive of undesirable consequences not intended by RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court said that the
its framers, and disruptive of the principle that uniformity maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterious does notapply
of rules is designed to simplify procedures in all courts. where the omission of something which is otherwise
The appeal has thus been filed well within the within the statute has nothing to do with the purpose of
prescriptive period. the amendment. The maxim cannot be applied in this
case because as shown, the CFI is not mentioned in the
ESCRIBANO VS. AVILA amendment, as being empowered to conduct
85 SCRA 245, G.R. NO. L-30375 apreliminary investigation in cases of written defamation,
12 SEPTEMBER 1978 has nothing to do with the purpose of the amendment. It
AQUINO, J. should be stressed that in construing a law, the court
FACTS: Congressman Salipada Pendatun, governor- must look in to the object to be accomplished, the evils
elect of Cotabato, filed directly with the CFI of that and mischief sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be
province a complaint for libel against Mayor Escribano of subserved, and it should give the law a reasonable or
Cotabato sworn before Judge Avila and supported by liberal construction which will best effect its purpose
rather than one which will defeat it. It is reasonable to
surmise that the CFI was not mentioned due to be counted from the date of promulgation of judgment or
inadvertence. That oversight is not unusual since from the receipt of the notice of judgment
preliminary investigations are usually conducted by
municipal courts and fiscals. In practice, a preliminary RULING: In holding that the 15-day period should be
investigation by the CFI is the exception, not the general counted from the promulgation and not from receipt of
rule. Where the legislative intent shows that the copy of the judgment, the court used a variation of the
enumeration is not exclusive, the maxim does not apply. doctrine of last antecedent: the rule of reddendo singula
PEOPLE VS. TAMANI singulis. The maxim means referring each to each;
55 SCRA 153, G.R. NOS. L-22160 & L-22161 referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate
21 JANUARY 1974 object, or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the
AQUINO, J. words should be taken distributively. It further said that
FACTS: This is an appeal of defendant Teodoro Tamani the word “promulgation” in Section 6 should be construed
from the decision of the CFI sentencing him to life as referring to “judgment;” while the word “notice” should
imprisonment for the murder of Jose Siyang. The be construed as referring to “order.” Such a construction
Solicitor General filed a petition to dismiss the appeal on is sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula singulis.
the ground that it was 47 days late. A decision was
promulgated convicting Tamani and his FORES VS. MIRANDA
motion for reconsideration was denied. The wife received 105 PHIL 266, G.R. NO. L-12163
the order on July 13 and was never brought to the 4 MARCH 1959
attention of defendant’s counsel only on September 7 REYES, J.B.L., J.
averring that the wife must have lost the envelope FACTS: Respondent was one of the passengers on a
containing the order. The trial court opined that the tardy jeepney. While the vehicle was descending the Sta.
appeal be given due course. After considering the gravity Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of speed, the driver lost
of the two penalties imposed, the trial court gave due control, causing the vehicle to swerve and hit the bridge
course to bthe appeal without prejudice of the Solicitor wall. Five passengers were injured including the
General to “raise the question of jurisdiction on the respondent. The driver was charged with serious physical
ground of a very much belated appeal.” Section 6, Rule injuries through reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty
122 of the Rules of Court provides that “an appeal must and was sentenced accordingly. It is the contention of the
be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or petitioner that a day before the accident happened, she
notice of the judgment or order appealed from.” allegedly sold the passenger jeep to a Carmen
Sackerman. This is attacked by the respondent, saying
ISSUES: Whether the 15-day period within which to that such requires the approval of the Public Service
appeal a judgment of conviction in a criminal action is to Commission (PSC). This is based on the fact that
approval by the PSC of the sale of a public service FERIA, J.
vehicle was not necessary because of the proviso in FACTS: This is an appeal by certiorari by the petitioner
Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 146 was rejected, of the Manila Electric Company on the decision of the
said Section 20 reading in part that “it shall be unlawful Court of Industrial Relations holding that they are liable
for any public service vehicle or for the owner, lessee or for additional compensation though the former grants a
operator thereof, without the previous approval and one day vacation leave with pay to every workingman,
authority of the Commission previously had x x x to sell, Sundays and holidays must be observed for purposes of
alienate, x x x its property, franchise, certificate, privilege, religion and rest. The appellant contends that the said
or right, or any part therof; x x x Provided, however, That decision is against the provisions of Commonwealth Act
nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent No. 444.
the transaction from being negotiated or completed
before its approval or to prevent the sale, alienation, or ISSUES: Whether or not Manila Electric Co., which is a
lease by any public service of any of its property in the public utility company supplying electricity, is liable to pay
ordinary course of business.” an additional compensation of twenty- five per centum of
the regular remuneration in favour of those employees
ISSUES: Whether or not the approval of the PSC is required to work during Sundays and legal holidays.
necessary for the sale of a public service vehicleeven RULING: In resolving the case in the negative, the court
without conveying therewith the authority to operate the held that “said Section 4 consists of two parts: the first,
same. which is the enactment clause, prohibits a person, firm or
corporation, business establishment or place or center of
RULING: The Supreme Court held that “the proviso x x x labor from compelling an employee or laborer to work
means only that the sale without the required approval is during Sundays and legal holidays, unless the former
still valid and binding between the parties” and the pays the latter an additional sum of at least twenty-five
“phrase in the ordinary course of business x x x could not per centum of his regular remuneration; and the second
have been intended to include the sale of the vehicle part, which is an exception exempts public utilities
itself, but at most may refer only to such property that performing some public service x x x from the prohibition
may be conceivably disposed of by the carrier in the established in the enactment clause. As appellant is a
ordinary course of its business, like junked equipment.” public utility that supplies electricity and provides means
of transportation to the public, it is evident that the
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. PUBLIC UTILITIES appellant is exempt from the qualified prohibition
EMPLOYEES established in the enactment clause, and may compel its
79 PHIL 409, G.R. NO. L-1206 employees or laborers to work during Sundays and legal
30 OCTOBER 1947 holidays without paying them said extra compensation.
The second portion of Section 4 is in reality an exception, Such other additional compensation, whether in cash
and not a proviso although it is introduced by the word or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July
‘provided,’ and it is elemental that an exception takes out 1, 1989, not integrated into the standardized rates shall
of an enactment, something which would otherwise be a continue to be authorized.” Petitioner now contends
part of it that by virtue of the second sentence, they are
entitled to receive the benefit. The COA contends that
VI. STATUTE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE the entirety of Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 6758 in relation to
subparagraphs 5.4 to 5.6 of CCC No. 10 shows that
NATIONAL TOBACCO ADM. VS. COMMISSION ON there is no legal basis for such because the benefit is
AUDIT 311 SCRA 755, G.R. NO. 119385 included in the catch- all phrase of the first sentence of
5 AUGUST 1999 Sec. 12. Proper interpretation of the first sentence of
PURISIMA, J. Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 6758, which states that “such
FACTS: Officials and employees of the NTA have other compensation not otherwise specified herein as
been enjoying Mid-Year Social Amelioration Benefit maybe determined by the DBM shall be deemed
to encourage its beneficiaries to pursue graduate included in the standardized salary rates herein
studies and to finance the schooling of their children prescribed,” and the second sentence of said Sec. 12,
even before Congress passed R.A. No. 6758 which provides that “Such other additional
and its implementing rule CCC No. 10. T h e a u d i t o r compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being
o f t h e N T A i s s u e d a n o t i c e o f Disallowance of received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not
payment of the benefit which was in turn affirmed by integrated into the standard salary rates shall continue
the Commission on Audit stating that the NTA had no to be authorized.”
statutory authority to grant such an
incentive. Sec. 12 of said law provides: “Consolidation ISSUES: Whether or not educational assistance
of Allowances and Compensation—All allowances benefit given to individuals prior to enactment of R.A.
except for representation and transportation No. 6758 should continue to be received by them.
allowances; clothing and laundry allowances;
subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on RULING: The Court ruled that the first sentence is a
board government vessels and hospital personnel; “catch-all provision” that refers to allowances, while the
hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel second sentence refers to benefits in the nature of
stationed abroad; and such other additional financial assistance and not allowance. Cardinal is the
compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be rule in statutory construction that the particular words,
determined by the DBM shall be deemed included in clauses and phrases should not be studied as
the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part of the statute must be considered in averred by the Solicitor General is that articles 12(20 and
fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code “complement each
produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so other”; that the application of article 68 takes place only
construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its when the court has to render judgment and impose a
provisions whenever possible. And the rule— that penalty upon a minor who has been proceeded against in
statute must be construed as a whole—requires that accordance with article 80 and who has misbehaved or is
apparently conflicting provisions should be found incorrigible, and that article 80 must be applied first
reconciled and harmonized, if at all possible. It is before article 68 can come into operation, and the Court
likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that can not apply the latter article in total disregard of the
the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in former. In short, what article 80 does not touch, article 68
the interpretation of the subject statute. With these can not touch as well.
rules and the foregoing distinction elaborated upon,
it is evident that the two seemingly irreconcilable ISSUES: Whether or not the appellant, being 17 years of
propositions are susceptible to perfect harmony. age at the time of the commission of the crime, was
Accordingly, the Court concludes that under entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance
the aforesaid “catch-all provision,” the legislative contemplated in article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
intent is just to include the fringe benefits which are in RULING: In ruling in the affirmative, the Court held that
the nature of allowances and since the benefit under Article 68 is not dependent on article 80, nor do these
controversy is not in the same category, it is safe to articles complement each other if by complement is
hold that subject educational assistance is n o t o n e meant that they are two mutually completing parts so that
o f t h e f r i n g e b e n e f i t s w i t h i n t h e contemplation article 68 could not stand without article 80. It is more
of the first sentence of Section 12 but rather, of the appropriate to say that article 68 merely adjusts itself to
second sentence of Section 12, in relation to article 80 but is, in all other respects, self-sufficient and
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6758. independent of the latter. Parts of one system of
penology and working in coordination with each other,
PEOPLE VS. GARCIA they pursue different ends. It is to be noticed that article
85 PHIL 651, G.R. NO. L-2873 79 falls under section 2 of Chapter IV entitled “Application
of Penalties,” while article 80 comes under section 1 of
28 FEBRUARY 1950 Chapter V entitled “Execution and Service of Penalties.”
Two different subjects are these. All parts of a statute are
TUASON, J. to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be
FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the given to each and every part thereof, and conflicting
decision of the Supreme Court where the main theme as intentions in the same statute are never to be supposed
or so regarded, unless forced upon the court by an original jurisdiction of the RTC. The Court of Appeals set
unambiguous language. In amending article 80 of the aside the order of dismissal of the RTC.
RPC by R.A. No. 47, there is no clear intention on the
part of Congress to amend article 68. Indeed, the rational ISSUES: Whether or not in cases involving claims for just
presumption in that if there had been such an intention, compensation under the Comprehensive Agrarian
the lawmakers should have said so expressly, instead of Reform Law, an appeal from the decision of the
leaving the change to influence. provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must first be made
before a landowner can resort to the Regional Trial Court
Under Sec. 57.
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS RULING: In affirming the decision of the Court of
Appeals, the Court held that it is true that § 50 grants the
263 SCRA 758, G.R. NO. 122256 DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
30 OCTOBER 1996 “agrarian reform matters” and exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and
MENDOZA, J. Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
FACTS: Private respondent Acil Corporation owned Thus Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial
several hectares of land in Linoan, Montevista, Davao del Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over
Norte, which the government took pursuant to the two categories of cases, to wit: (1) “all petitions for the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). determination of just compensation to landowners” and
Private respondent rejected the government’s offer (2) “the prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A.
arguing that the nearby lands planted the same crops No. 6657”. The provision of §50 must be construed in
were valued at the higher price of P24,717.40 per harmony of just compensation and criminal cases for
hectare. On December 12, 1992, private respondent filed violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the
a Petition for Just Compensation in the RTC of Davao del plenitude of power conferred on the DAR.
Norte. The RTC dimissed the petition on the ground that SAJONAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS
private respondent should have appealed to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board 258 SCRA 79, G.R. NO. 102377
(DARAB). Private respondent moved for a 5 JULY 1996
reconsideration but it was denied. A petition for certiorari
was filed in the Court of Appeals by private respondent TORRES, JR., J.
contending that a petition for just compensation under
R.A. No. 6657 § 56-57 falls under the exclusive and FACTS: The case is for the cancellation of the inscription
of a Notice of Levy on Execution from a Certificate of
Title covering a parcel of real property. The inscription a word or phrase is considered with those with which it is
was caused to be made by the private respondent on associated. In ascertaining the period of effectivity of an
TCT No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, inscription of adverse claim, we must read the law in its
issued in the name of the spouses Ernesto Uychocde entirety. Construing the provisions as a whole would
and Lucita Jarin and was later carried over to and reconcile the apparent inconsistency between the
annotated on TCT No. N- 109417 of the same registry portions of the law such that the provisions on
issued in the name of the spouses Alfredo and Conchita cancellation of adverse claim by verified petition would
Sajones who purchased the parcel of land from the serve to qualify the provision on the effectivity period.
Uychocdes and are now the petitioners in this case. The law, taken together, simple means that the
Petitioners argue that the lower court erred in holding that cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to
the rule on the 30-day period for adverse claim under render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain
section 70 of P.D. No. 1529 is absolute inasmuch as it annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property.
failed to read or construe the provision in its entirety and For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be
to reconcile the apparent inconsistency within the effective upon the lapse of said period, its cancellation is
provision in order to give wffect ot it as a whole. Private no longer necessary and the process of cancellation
respondent further maintains that the notice of adverse would be a useless ceremony.
claim was annotated on August 27, 1984, hence, it will be
effective only up to September 26, 1984, after which it
will no longer have any binding force and effect pursuant PARAS VS. COMELEC
to Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529.
264 SCRA 49, G.R. NO. 123169
ISSUES: What period an adverse claim annotated at the
back of transfer certificate of title is effective, which in 4 NOVEMBER 1996
turn depends upon the interpretation of Sec. 70 of P.D. FRANCISCO, J.
No. 1529.
FACTS: Petitioner Danila E. Paras is the incumbent
RULING: The Court held that in construing the law, care Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won
should be taken that every part thereof be given effect during the last regular barangays election in 1994. A
and a construction that could render a provision petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by
inoperative should be avoided and inconsistent the registered voters of the barangays. Acting on the
provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as petition for recall, public respondent Commission on
parts of a harmonious whole. For taken in solitude, a Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition.
word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the
different from the one actually intended and evident when petition, well above the 25% required by law. The
COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view avoided under which a statute or provision being
of petitioner’s opposition. The COMELEC set anew the construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed,
recall election. To prevent such, the petition filed before nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained
the RTC a petition for injunction and latter issued a TRO. away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative,
After conducting a summary hearing, the RTC lifted the or nugatory.
TRO, dismissed the petition and required petitioner to
explain why he should not be cited for contempt for MANILA LODGE NO. 761 VS. COURT OF APPEALS
misrepresentation. In a resolution, the COMELEC 73 SCRA 162, G.R. NO. L-41001
rescheduled the recall election for a third time. Hence,
the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction. 30 SEPTEMBER 1976
Petitioner insists that the recall election scheduled for CASTRO, C.J.
January 13, 1996 is now barred as the SK election on the
first Monday of May 1996 is a regular election under Sec. FACTS: The CA affirmed the decision of the CFI of
74(b) of R.A. No. 7160. Manila which declared the reclaimed land formed by the
Luneta extension as part of the public park or plaza and,
ISSUES: Whether or not the phrase “regular local therefore, part of the public domain. Consequently, the
election” includes the SK election which is set by R.A. lower court declared that sale of the subject land by the
No. 7808. City of Manila to Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was null
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court held that to and void. Hence, the present petition for review on
construe the phrase “regular local election” as including certiorari.
SK elections, no recall election can be conducted ISSUES: Whether or no the reclaimed land is patrimonial
rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local land or of public dominion intended for public use.
Government Code. It would be more in keeping with the
intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe RULING: The Court held if the land is patrimonial, it can
regular local election as one referring to an election be disposed of without statutory authorization. The act
where the office held by the local elective official sought uses the phrase “is hereby authorized.” To authorize
to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the means to empower, to give a right to act, and “hereby”
electorate. This construction is in accordance with the means “by means of this statute or action.” To hold that
rule that in the interpretation of a statute, the Court the reclaimed land is patrimonial property, which can be
should start with the assumption that the legislature disposed of without statutory authorization, is to render
intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is the provision of the law to the effect that the City of
not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment Manila “is hereby authorized to lease or sell” a portion
of a statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be thereof superfluous. And to so construe the statute as to
render the phrase superfluous would violate the bids. For the improvements of Davao Metropolitan
elementary rule of legal hermeneutics that effect must be Waterworks, Iloilo Waterworks System and Manila and
given to every word, clause, and sentence of the statute Suburbs Waterworks System. Plaintiff filed supplemental
and that a statute must be so interpreted that no part complaints seeking to restrain NAWASA from continuing
thereof becomes inoperative. the projects on the ground that these projects violate R.A.
No. 912. The trial court rendered a decision pending and
C&C COMMERCIAL CORP. VS. NAWASA conducting that the act of NAWASA constituted violations
21 SCRA 984, G.R. NO. L-27275 of the provisions of R.A. No. 912

18 NOVEMBER 1967 ISSUES: Whether or not NAWASA Should be included

with the term “government” as sued in R.A. No. 912
ANGELES, J. Whether or not R.A. No. 912 and C.A. No. 138 requires
FACTS: On July 19, 1965, a complaint was filed alleging that preponderance be made in the purchase and use of
that NAWASA had started to negotiate for direct Filing made in the purpose and use of Philippine-made
purchase of centrifugally cast iron pipes for the materials and products.
improvement of the San Pablo Waterworks section in RULING: In ruling in the affirmative, the Court held that
violation of the provisions of R.A. No. 912 which provides Sec. 2 of the RAC defining the term “government” which
that “in construction or repair work undertaken by the is heavily relied upon by the appellant to cognize an
Government, whether done directly or through contract exception: “when a different meaning for the word or
awards, Philippine-made materials and products, phrase is given a particular statute or is plainly to be
whenever available, practicable, and usable and will collected from the context of connection where the term
serve the purpose as equally well as foreign- made is used.” In this be construed in its implied sense and not
products or materials, shall be used in said construction in the strict signification of the bar “Government of the
or repair work.” Philippines” as the political entity through which other
The plaintiff C&C alleges also that it violates the bidding political authority is exercised. The Court further said that
law because it excludes the said corporation from the they being statutes in pari material, they should be
bidding which can supply instead asbestos cement construed to attain the same objective—to give
pressure pipes which are available, practicable, and preference to locally produced materials in purchases,
usable and serve the purpose of the aid of project at a works or projects of the Government—the
much lower cost. The trial court rendered a partial accomplishment of which will be defeated if government-
decision which dismissed the complaint and dissolved owned or controlled corporations are excluded from the
the preliminary injunction issued. The partial decision operation of R.A. No. 912.
became final. On several occasion, NAWASA called for
 BUTUAN SAWMILL, INC. VS. CITY OF BUTUAN and special purposes”; and that its taxing power was
enlarged and extended by the Local Autonomy Law, R.A.
16 SCRA 755, G.R. NO. L-21516 No. 2264 and that said statutory enactments gave the
29 APRIL 1966 city the authority to impose 2% tax on the gross sales or
receipts of the business of electric light, heat, and power
REYES, J.B.L., J. of herein petitioner appellee.
FACTS: Butuan Sawmill, Inc., petitioner-appellee, was ISSUES: Whether or not herein respondent-appellant is
granted a legislative franchise by virtue of R.A. No. 399, empowered under its charter to provide for the levy and
for an electric light, heat and power system at Butuan, collection of taxes against Butuan Sawmill, Inc.
Cabadbaran, Agusan, subject to the terms and conditions
established in Act 3636, as amended by C.A. No. 132 RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court held that the
and the Constitution. It was also issued a certificate of inclusion of the franchised business of Butuan Sawmill,
public convenience and necessity by the Inc. within the coverage of the questioned taxing
ordinances is beyond the broad power of taxation of the
Public Service Commission on March 18, 1954 city under its charter; nor can the power therein granted
Ordinance No. 7, which took effect on October 1, 1950, be taken as an authority delegated to the city to amend
imposes a tax of 2% on the gross sales or receipts of any or alter the franchise, since its charter did not expressly
business operated in the city, payable monthly within the nor specifically provide any such power. Be it noted that
first 20 days of the following month, and provides the franchise was granted by act of the legislature on
penalties thereof. This ordinance was amended by June 18, 1949 while the city’s charter was approved on
Ordinance No. 11 by enumerating the kinds of business June 15, 1950. Where there are two statutes, the earlier
required to pay the tax, and further amended by special and the later general—the terms of the general
Ordinance No. 131 by modifying the pena provision, and broad enough to include the matter provided for in the
still further amended by Ordinance No. 148 by including special the fact that one is special and the other general
within the coverage of taxable businesses “Those creates a presumption that the special is to be
engaged in the business of electric light, heat and considered as remaining an exception to the general, one
power”. as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a
Herein respondent-appellant, City of Butuan, maintains particular case.
the stand that the franchise of petitioner- appellee is The maxim generalia specialibus non derogant , is
subject to an “amendment, alteration or repeal by the therefore applicable in this case since a special law must
National Assembly” as per Section 12 of Act 3636, as be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the
amended; that the city is empowered under its charter to general law in the absence of special circumstances
“provide for the levy and collection of taxes for general forcing a contrary conclusion.
 Hence, the petitioner filed this instant petition for review
on certiorari.
BAGATSING VS. RAMIREZ
ISSUES: Whether or not the Local Tax Code is
74 SCRA 306, G.R. NO. L-41631 controlling over the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
17 DECEMBER 1976 as in the instant case, hence, post-publication is already
sufficient to hold the validity of a taxing ordinance.
MARTIN, J.
RULING: In ruling in the affirmative, the Court held that
FACTS: On June 12, 1974, the Municipal Board of Ordinance No. 7522 was validly enacted. There is no
Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522 which regulates the question that the said Charter is a special act while
operation of public markets and prescribing the fees for
the rentals of stalls and other penalties for the violation the Local Tax Code is a general law, and that the rule
thereof. Subsequently, respondent Federation of Manila commonly said is that a prior special law is not ordinarily
Market Vendors, Inc. filed a civil case before the CFI of repealed by a subsequent general law. The fact that one
Manila presided by respondent Judge Pedro Ramirez, is special and the other general creates a presumption
seeking the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 that the special is to be considered as remaining an
primarily because the publication requirement under exception to the general, one as general law of the land
Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and the other as the law of a particular case. However,
has not been complied with. Under the said Charter, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special
each proposed ordinance shall be published in 2 daily statute refers to a subject in general, which the general
newspapers of general circulation in the city within 10 statute treats in particular. In the instant case, Section 17
days after its approval. of the Charter speaks of “ordinance” in the general,
irrespective of the nature and scope thereof whereas
After due hearing on the merits, respondent Judge Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to “ordinances
rendered its decision declaring the nullity of Ordinance levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges” in
No. 7522 for the non-compliance with the requirement of particular. In regard therefore to ordinances in general,
publication. Petitioners moved for reconsideration the Charter is dominant but that dominant force loses its
alleging that only post-publication is required under continuity when it approaches the realm of “ordinance
Section 43 of the Local Tax Code, to wit: “within ten days levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges” in
after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, particular. There, the Local Tax Code controls. This is
city, municipality, and barrio ordinances levying or especially true where the law containing the particular
imposing taxes, fees, or other charges shall be published provision was enacted later than the one containing the
for three consecutive days in a newspaper x x x.” general provision. Here, as always, the general provision
However, the respondent Judge denied the motion. must give way to a particular provision. The Charter
prescribe es a rule of the publication of “ordinance” in responsibility of the cities and mayors whenever damage
general, while the Local Tax Code establishes a rule for or even death is caused by poor roads, streets, bridges,
the publication of “ordinance levying or imposing taxes, public buildings and other public works under their
fees, or other charges” in particular. In fact, there is no supervision. The City further contends that it is not liable
rule which prohibits the repeal even by implication of a because there was no negligence on its part to ensure
special or specific act by a general or broad one. A safety (the cover was claimed to have been stolen) and
subsequent general law similarly applicable to all cities the incident happened on a national highway. The Court
prevails over any conflicting charter provision, for the of Appeals held that the City of Manila is liable and
reason that a charter must not be inconsistent with the should pay Teotico P6,750.
constitution, general laws, and public policy of the state.
ISSUES: Whether or not the City of Manila is liable for
the damages based on Article 2189 of the Civil Code or
not liable under R.A. No. 409.
CITY OF MANILA VS. TEOTICO
RULING: In ruling that the City is liable, the Court held
22 SCRA 267, G.R. NO. L-23052 that while the Civil Code is a general and R.A. No. 409 is
29 JANUARY 1968 a special one, both speak of liabilities. While the former
speaks of liabilities arising form the poor condition of the
CONCEPCION, C.J. infrastructures that the cities are responsible, the latter of
FACTS: Genaro Teotico was waiting for a jeepney under liabilities arising from negligence in general. Due to the
the loading and unloading zone one night. As a jeepney specificity of the Civil Code provisions, it shall prevail.
stopped and he approached it, he fell into a manhole Though the usual rule is that the general law gives way to
resulting in the shattering of his glass and wounding of a specific law, this case is an exception because the
his left eyelid. He also received several contusions in the special speaks of a more general aspect while the
process. He was taken to the Philippine General Hospital general law speaks of a more specific aspect of liability.
but further treatment for anti-tetanus was required with a
private doctor. This cost him P1,400 plus P50 for his
absence from work for twenty days, along with the VII. STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
ridicule of his co-members in circles of which he is a part, AZARCON VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
and was worried for the support of his minor children.
The City of Manila cited section 4 of R.A. No. 409 268 SCRA 747, G.R. NO. 116033
removing the liability of the city and mayor for their
negligence. It was countered by Article 2189 of the Civil 26 FEBRUARY 1997
code which substantially provides that it is the PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated depository cannot be stretched to include the power to
an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore. His appoint him as a public officer.
services were contracted by the Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines at its concession in Article 222 of the RPC reads: “Officers included in the
Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur. Occasionally, he engaged preceding provisions.—The provisions of this chapter
the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose shall apply to private individuals who, in any capacity
trucks were left at the former’s premises. From this set of whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial, or
circumstances arose the present controversy. It appears municipal funds, revenues, or property and to any
that a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was administrator or depository of funds or property attached,
issued by the main office of the BIR addressed to the seized or deposited by public authority, even if such
Regional Director or his authorized representative of property belongs to a private individual. The language of
Revenue Region 10, Butuan City commanding the latter the foregoing provision is clear. A private individual who
to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other has in his charge any of the public funds or property
personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of enumerated therein and commits any of the acts defined
accused Azarcon and, a delinquent taxpayer. The in any of the provisions of Chapter Four, Title Seven of
Warrant of Garnishment was received by accused the RPC, should likewise be penalized with the same
Azarcon on June 17, 1985. Petitioner Azarcon, in signing penalty meted to erring public officers. Nowhere in this
the “Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things Seized provision is it expressed or implied that a private
Under Authority of the National Internal Revenue along individual falling under said Article 222 is to be deemed a
with his co- accused Jaime Ancla were charged before public officer.
the Sandiganbayan of the crime of malversation of public COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS.
funds or property under Article 217 in relation to Article COURT OF APPEALS
222 of the Revised Penal Code.
303 SCRA 508, G.R. NO. 107135
ISSUES: Whether or not a private person can be
considered a public officer venue as a depository of 23 FEBRUARY 1999
distrained property, so as to make the conversion thereof PURISIMA, J.
the crime of malversation falling within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. FACTS: Petitioner (private respondent CENVOCO) is a
manufacturer of edible and coconut/coprameal cake and
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court held that such other coconut oil related or subject to the millers tax
there is no provision in the NIRC constituting such person of 3%. In 1986, herein petitioner purchased a specified
a public officer by reason of such requirement. The BIR’s number of containers and packaging materials for its
power authorizing a private individual to act as a edible oil from its suppliers and paid the sales tax due
thereon. An investigation conducted by the respondent RULING: The Court ruled that the proviso should be
Revenue Examiner found out that there was deficiency in strictly construed to apply only to raw materials and not to
the assessment of the petitioner’s miller tax amounting to containers and packaging materials which are not raw
P1,575,514.70. Thus respondent was sent an materials; hence, the miller is entitled to a tax credit.
Assessment Notice informing and requesting the
petitioner to pay the assessment tax deficiency, Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as
notwithstanding the letter filed by the petitioner a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably
contending that the final provision of Section 168 of the construed. They extend only so far as their language
Tax Code does not apply to sales tax paid on containers fairly warrants, and all doubts should be
and packaging materials, hence, the amount paid resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the
therefor should have been credited against the miller’s exception. Where a general rule is established by statute
tax assessed against it. with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former nor
Dissatisfied with the adverse action taken by the BIR, add to the latter by implication.
CENVOCO filed a petition for review with the The exception provided for in Section 168 of the old Tax
Court of Appeals which ruled in favor of CENVOCO. Code should be strictly construed. Conformably, the
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari from the sales, miller’s and excise taxes paid on all other materials
judgment of the Court of Apepals. (except on raw materials used in the milling process),
such as the sales taxes paid on containers and
The BIR claims that there should be no tax credit packaging materials of the milled products under
pursuant to the proviso of Sec. 168 of the Tax Code consideration, may be credited against the miller’s tax
which reads: “Provided, finally, That credit for any sales, due therefor. It bears stressing that tax burdens are not
miller’s or excise taxes and raw materials or supplies to be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed beyond
used in the milling process shall not be allowed against what the statute expressly and clearly imports, tax
the miller’s tax due, except in the case of a proprietor or statutes being construed strictissimi juris against the
operator of a refined sugar factory as provided government.
hereunder.”
ISSUES: Whether or not containers and packaging
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS.
materials can be credited against the miller’s COURT OF APPEALS
deficiency tax. 271 SCRA 605, G.R. NO. 115349
18 APRIL 1997
PANGANIBAN, J. RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court agreed with
the argument of the CIR in that the income received by
FACTS: YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, the organizations enumerated in Section 27 (now Section
which conducts various programs and activities that are 26) of the NIRC is, as a rule, exempted from the payment
beneficial to the public, especially the young people, of tax “in respect to income received by them as such,”
pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable the exemption does not apply to the income derived “…
objectives. from any of their properties, real or personal, or from any
In 1980, private respondent earned, among others, an of their activities conducted for profit; regardless of the
income of P676,829.80 from leasing out a portion of its disposition made of such income…” Because taxes are
premises to small shop owners, like restaurants and the lifeblood of the nation, the Court has always applied
canteen operators, and P44,259 from parking fees the doctrine of strict interpretation in construing tax
collected from non-members. On July 2, 1984, the CIR exemptions. Furthermore, a claim of statutory exemption
issued an assessment to private respondent in the total from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from
amount of P415,615.01 including surcharge and interest, the language of the law on which it is based. Thus, the
for deficiency income tax, deficiency expanded claimed exemption “must expressly be granted in a
withholding taxes on wages. Private respondent formally statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken.”
protested the assessment and, as supplement to its basic
protest, filed a letter dated October 8, 1985. In reply, the
CIR denied the claims of YMCA. Contesting the denial of CENA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
its protest, the YMCA filed a petition for review at the
CTA. In due course, the CTA ruled in favor of the YMCA. 211 SCRA 179, G.R. NO. 97419
Dissatisfied with the CTA ruling, the CIR elevated the 3 JULY 1992
case to the Court of Appeals. The CA initially decided in
favor of the CIR and disposed of the appeal. Finding MEDIALDEA, J.
merit in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the FACTS: Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena’s government
YMCA, the CA reversed its earlier decision, thus service started on November 16, 1978 at the Law
affirming the CTA’s. The internal revenue commissioner’s Department of Caloocan City. His last appointment was
own Motion for Reconsideration was denied by on July 16, 1987 with the Register of Deeds of Malabon,
respondent court. Hence, this petition for review. and stayed there until he reached the compulsory
ISSUES: Whether or not the income derived from rentals retirement age of 65 years on January 22, 1991. By then,
of real property owned by the YMCA is subject to income he would have rendered a total government service of 11
tax under the NIRC and the Constitution. years, 9 months and 6 days. He requested for an
extension of service before his 65th birthday so as to
complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him Land Registration Authority, was thereby provided the
to retire with full benefits of old-age pension under discretion to allow the petitioner to complete the 15 years
Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. No. 1146 (Revised of government service.
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977). His request,
as well as his subsequent motions for reconsideration, ABELLA VS. NLRC
was denied by respondent CSC, and was only given an 152 SCRA 140, G.R. NO. L-71813
extension of 1 year, pursuant to CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 27, series of 1990. 20 JULY 1987

ISSUES: Whether or not a government employee who PARAS, J.

has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, FACTS: On June 27, 1960, herein petitioner Rosalina
but who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of
government service, may be allowed to continue in the Perez Abella leased a farm land in Ponteverde, Negros
service to complete the 15-year service requirement to Occidental, known as Hacienda Danao-Ramona, for a
enable him to retire with the benefits of an old-age period of ten years, renewable, at her option for another
pension under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. No. 1146. ten years.
RULING: In ruling in the affirmative, the Court held On August 13, 1970, she opted to extend the lease
contract for another ten years. During the existence of
that the rule on limiting the extension of service under the lease, she employed the herein private respondents,
CSC MC No. 27 to only 1 year for an employee who has Ricardo Dionele Sr., and Romeo Quieto.
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but
has less than 15 years of service, cannot be accorded Upon the expiration of her leasehold rights, petitioner
validity. It cannot be extended to embrace matters not dismissed private respondents and turned over the
covered by P.D. No. 1146 which, with its par. (b) Section hacienda to the owners thereof on October 5, 1981, who
11, does not limit nor specify the maximum number of continued the management, cultivation, and operation of
years the retiree may avail of to complete the 15 years of the farm.
service.
On November 20, 1981, private respondents filed a
The Court, applying a liberal approach in interpreting complaint against the petitioner at the Ministry of Labor
P.D. No. 1146, held that the completion of the 15-year and Employment for overtime pay, illegal dismissal, and
service requirement under Section 11 par.(b) partakes reinstatement with back wages.
the nature of a privilege given to an employee who has
ISSUES: Whether or not private respondents are entitled
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years but
has less than 15 years of service. Mr. Cena’s agency, the to separation pay.
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court held that it is
well-settled in the implementation and interpretation of
the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing
regulations, the workingman’s welfare should be the
primordial consideration. It is the kind of interpretation
which gives meaning and substance to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article
4 of the New Labor Code which states that “all doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code including its implementing
rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of
labor.” The policy is to extend the applicability of the
decree to a greater number of employees who can
avail of the benefits under the law, which is in
consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give
maximum aid and protection to labor.
The purpose of Article 284 as amended is obvious—
the protection of the workers whose employment is
terminated because of the closure of establishment and
reduction of personnel. Without said law, employees
like private respondents will lose the benefits to
which they are entitled for the thirty-three years of
service in the case of Dionele and fourteen years in
the case of Quitco. Although they were absorbed by the
new management of the hacienda, in the absence of
any
showing that the letter has assumed the responsibilities
of the former employer, they will be considered as new
employees and the years of service behind them would
amount to nothing