Bache

7/20/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 37
VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 27, 1971 823

Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz
No. L-32409. February 27, 1971.
BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E.

SEGGERMAN, petitioners, vs. HON.JUDGE VIVENCIO
M. RUIZ,MISAEL P. VERA, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, ARTURO
LOGRONIO,RODOLFO DE LEON, GAVINO
VELASQUEZ,MIMIR DELLOSA,NICANOR
ALCORDO,JOHN DOE,JOHN DOE,JOHN DOE, and
JOHN DOE, respondents.
Remedial law; Search warrant; Procedure for the issuance

warrant; Examination of the complainant and witnesses by the
judge himself.—The examination of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, required by Art. 111, Sec. 1, par. 3, of
the Constitution, and Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules
of Court, should be conducted by the judge himself and net by
others. The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec.
4, Rule 126, is more emphatic and candid, for it requires the
judge, before issuing a search warrant, to personally examine on
oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce. Personal examination by the judge of the complainant
and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the
existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to Art.
111, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court, both of which prohibit the issuance of
warrants except “upon probable cause.” The determination of
whether or not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of
judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be
allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.
Same; Same; Deposition taken by Deputy Clerk of Court does

not comply with constitutional mandate.—The participa-
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824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
tion of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the

issuance of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was thus limited to
listening to the stenographer’s reading of her notes, to a few
words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to
administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This
cannot be considered as a personal examination. If there was an
examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the
one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But the Constitution
and the rules required a personal examination by the judge. It
was precisely on account of the intention of the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of the issuing judge
to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses that the
question of how much time would be consumed by the judge in
examining them came up before the Convention. The reading of
the stenographic notes to respondent judge did not constitute
sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate and the
rule; for by that manner respondent judge did not have
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his
witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which
the judicial mind, on account of its training, was in the best
position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound
inference on the all-important question of whether or not there
was probable cause.
Same; Same; Search warrant to issue for one specific offense.

—The Supreme Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule
122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart,
under the Revised Rules of Court, that “a search warrant shall
not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense.” Not satisfied with this qualification, the Supreme Court
added thereto a paragraph, directing that “no search warrant
shall issue for more than one specific offense.”
Same; Same; Particular description of things to be seized.—

Under Art. 111, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Court, the warrant should particularly
describe the things to be seized.
Same; Seizure; Seizure of records pertaining to all business

transactions not a particular description.—The warrants
authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether
the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned
the seizure of all records of the petitioners and corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit

command of the Bill of Rights—that the things to be seized be
particularly described —as well as tending to defeat its major
objective; the elimination of general warrants.
Same; Same; Purpose of particular description of things to
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VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 27, 1971 825
be seized.—A search warrant should particularly describe the

place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident
purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be
seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the
search warrant—to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that
“unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made,—that
abuses may not be committed.
Same; Same; Where there is a particular description of things

to be seized.—A search warrant may be said to particularly
describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact—not of law—by which
the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and
seizure; or when the things described are limited to those which
bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation
to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have
some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense;
and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in
handy merely to strengthen such evidence.
Special civil action; Certiorari; When motion for

reconsideration is not a prerequisite to the institution of petition
for certiorari.—When the questions raised before the Supreme
Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in and
passed upon by the court below, the filing of a motion for
reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in
the Supreme Court is no longer a prerequisite. The rule requiring
the filing of a motion for reconsideration before an application for
a writ of certiorari can be entertained was never intended to be
applied without considering the circumstances. The rule does not
apply where, the deprivation of petitioners’ fundamental right to
due process taints the proceeding against them in the court below
not only with irregularity but also with nullity.
Remedial law; Search and seizures; Right of corporation

against unreasonable searches and seizures.—A corporation is
entitled to immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures.
A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under
an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing
itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities
appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be taken without
compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of
law, and is protected against unlawful discrimination.
Same; Same; Who can contest legality of seizure.—It is well

settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only
826
by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that
the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal
and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently,
petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence
against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the
offices and premises of the corporations, since the right to object
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari,

prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin for
petitioners.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor
General Crispin V. Bautista, Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez
and Special Attorney Jaime M. Maza for respondents.
VILLAMOR, J.:
This is an original action of certiorari, prohibition and

mandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction. In their petition
Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., a corporation duly organized and

existing under the laws of the Philippines, and its
President, Frederick E. Seggerman, pray this Court to
declare null and void Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by
respondent Judge on February 25, 1970; to order
respondents to desist from enforcing the same and/or
keeping the documents, papers and effects seized by virtue
thereof, as well as from enforcing the tax assessments on
petitioner corporation alleged by petitioners to have been
made on the basis of the said documents, papers and
effects, and to order the return of the latter to petitioners.
We gave due course to the petition but did not issue the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for therein.
The pertinent facts of this case, as gathered from the
record, are as follows:
On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter
addressed
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VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 27, 1971 827

Bache & Co. (Phil), Inc. vs. Ruiz
to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the

issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for
violation of Section 46 (a) of the National Internal Revenue
Code, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof,
particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and
authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of
herein respondents, to make and file the application for
search warrant which was attached to the letter.
In the afternoon of the following day, February 25, 1970,
respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent Arturo
Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They
brought with them the following papers: respondent Vera’s
aforesaid letter-request; an application for search warrant
already filled up but still unsigned by respondent De Leon;
an affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before
respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of
respondent Logronio already accomplished and signed by
him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already
accomplished but still unsigned by respondent Judge.
At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain
case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk
of Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon
and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, respondent
Judge was informed that the depositions had already been
taken. The stenographer, upon request of respondent

Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter,
respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the
oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be
false and without legal basis, he could be charged for
perjury. Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leon’s
application for search warrant and respondent Logronio’s
deposition, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then signed by
respondent Judge and accordingly issued.
Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a
Saturday, the BIR agents served the search warrant on
petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation on Ayala
Avenue, Makati, Rizal. Petitioners’ lawyers protested the
search on the ground that no formal complaint or
transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The
agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which
yielded six
828

boxes of documents.
On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that the search
warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued,
that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that
the respondents be ordered to pay petitioners, jointly and
severally, damages and attorney’s fees. On March 18, 1970,
the respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an answer
to the petition. After hearing, the court, presided over by
respondent Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an order
dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search
warrant. In the meantime, or on April 16, 1970, the Bureau
of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on petitioner
corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not
entirely, based on the documents thus seized. Petitioners
came to this Court.
The petition should be granted for the following reasons:
1. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the
complainant and his witness.
The pertinent provisions of the Constitution of the
Philippines and of the Revised Rules of Court are:
“(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon

probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.” (Art. III, Sec. 1,
Constitution.)
“SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.—A search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice
of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
“No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense.
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VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 27, 1971 829

“SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant.—The judge or justice of

the peace must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine
on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to
the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.” (Rule
126, Revised Rules of Court.)
The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he

may produce, required by Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the
Constitution, and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court, should be conducted by the judge himself
and not by others. The phrase “which shall be determined
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,”
appearing in the said constitutional provision, was
introduced by Delegate Francisco as an amendment to the
draft submitted by the Sub-Committee of Seven. The
following discussion in the Constitutional Convention
(Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional
Convention, Vol. III, pp. 755-757) is enlightening:
“SR. ORENSE. Vamos a dejar compañero los piropos y vamos al

grano.
En los casos de una necesidad de actuar inmediatamente para
que no se frusten los fines de la justicia mediante el registro
inmediato y la incautación del cuerpo del delito, no cree Su
Señorńa que causarńa cierta demora el procedimiento apuntado
en su enmienda en tal forma que podrńa frustrar los fines de la

justicia o si Su Señorńa encuentra un remedio para estos casos
con el fin de compaginar los fines de la justicia con los derechos
del individuo en su persona, bienes etcetera, etcetera.
“SR. FRANCISCO. No puedo ver en la práctica el caso
hipotético que Su Señorńa preg unta por la siguiente razón: el que
solicita un mandamiento de registro tiene que hacerlo por escrito
y ese escrito no aparecerá en la Mesa del Juez sin que alguien
vaya el juez a presentar ese escrito o petición de sucuestro. Esa
persona que presenta el registro puede ser el mismo denunciante
o alguna persona que solicita dicho mandamiento de registro.
Ahora toda la enmienda en esos casos consiste en que haya
petición de registro y el juez no se atendrá solamente a sea
petición sino que el juez examinerá a ese denunciante y si tiene
testigos también examinerá a los testigos.
“SR. ORENSE. No cree Su Señorńa que el tomar le declaración
de ese denunciante po r escrito siempre requerirńa algún tiempo?
830

“SR. FRANCISCO. Serńa cuestión de un par de horas, pero por

otro lado minimizamos en todo lo posible las vejaciones injustas
con la expedición arbitraria de los mandamientos de registro. Creo
que entre dos males debemos escoger. el menor.
x x x x x
“MR. LAUREL. x x x The reason why we are in favor of this

amendment is because we are incorporating in our constitution
something of a fundamental character. Now, before a judge could
issue a search warrant, he must be under the obligation to
examine personally under oath the complainant and if he has any
witness, the witnesses that he may produce. x x x.”
The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec.

4, Rule 126, is more emphatic and candid, for it requires
the judge, before issuing a search warrant, to “personally
examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce x x x.”
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant
and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine
the existence or non-existence of a probable cause,
pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and
Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of
which prohibit the issuance of warrants except “upon
probable cause.” The determination of whether or not a
probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment

after a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be allowed
to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.
In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was
conducted by respondent Judge of the complainant
(respondent De Leon) and his witness (respondent
Logronio). While it is true that the complainant’s
application for search warrant and the witness’ printed-
form deposition were subscribed and sworn to before
respondent Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two
any question the answer to which could possibly be the
basis for determining whether or not there was probable
cause against herein petitioners. Indeed, the participants
seem to have attached so little significance to the matter
that notes of the proceedings before respondent Judge were
not even taken. At this juncture it may be well to recall the
salient facts. The tran-
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VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 27, 1971 831

script of stenographic notes (pp. 61-76, April 1, 1970,

Annex J-2 of the Petition) taken at the hearing of this case
in the court below shows that per instruction of respondent
Judge, Mr. Eleodoro V. Gonzales, Special Deputy Clerk of
Court, took the depositions of the complainant and his
witness, and that stenographic notes thereof were taken by
Mrs. Gaspar. At that time respondent Judge was at the
sala hearing a case. After respondent Judge was through
with the hearing, Deputy Clerk Gonzales, stenographer
Gaspar, complainant De Leon and witness Logronio went
to respondent Judge’s chamber and informed the Judge
that they had finished the depositions. Respondent Judge
then requested the stenographer to read to him her
stenographic notes. Special Deputy Clerk Gonzales
testified as follows:
“A And after finishing reading the stenographic notes, the

Honorable Judge requested or instructed them,
requested Mr. Logronio to raise his hand and warned
him if his deposition will be found to be false and
without legal basis, he can be charged criminally for
perjury. The Honorable Court told Mr. Logronio
whether he affirms the facts contained in his
deposition and the affidavit executed before Mr.
Rodolfo de Leon.
“Q And thereafter?
“A And thereafter, he signed the deposition of Mr.
Logronio.
“Q Who is this he?
“A The Honorable Judge.
“Q The deposition or the affidavit?
“A The affidavit, Your Honor.”
Thereafter, respondent Judge signed the search warrant.

The participation of respondent Judge in the
proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant
No. 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the
stenographer’s reading of her notes, to a few words of
warning against the commission of perjury, and to
administering the oath to the complainant and his witness.
This cannot be considered as a personal examination. If
there was an examination at all of the complainant and his
witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of
Court. But, as already stated, the Constitution and the
rules require a personal
832

examination by the judge. It was precisely on account of

the intention of the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention to make it a duty of the issuing judge to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses that
the question of how much time would be consumed by the
judge in examining them came up before the Convention,
as can be seen from the record of the proceedings quoted
above. The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent
Judge did not constitute sufficient compliance with the
constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner
respondent Judge did not have the opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the complainant and his witness, and to
propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial
mind, on account of its training, was in the best position to
conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound
inference on the all-important question of whether or not
there was probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one
specific offense.
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for “[v]iolation of

Sec. 46 (a) of the National Internal Revenue Code in
relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof
particularly Secs. 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209.” The question is:
Was the said search warrant issued “in connection with one
specific offense,” as required by Sec. 3, Rule 126?
To arrive at the correct answer it is essential to examine
closely the provisions of the Tax Code referred to above.
Thus we find the following:
Sec. 46 (a) requires the filing of income tax returns by
corporations.
Sec. 53 requires the withholding of income taxes at
source.
Sec. 72 imposes surcharges for failure to render income
tax returns and for rendering false and fraudulent returns.
Sec. 73 provides the penalty for failure to pay the income
tax, to make a return or to supply the information required
under the Tax Code.
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VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 27, 1971 833

Sec. 208 penalizes “[a]ny pers on who distills, rectifies,

repacks, compounds, or manufactures any article subject to
a specific tax, without having paid the privilege tax
therefore, or who aids or abets in the conduct of illicit
distilling, rectifying, compounding, or illicit manufacture of
any article subject to specific tax x x x,” and provides that
in the case of a corporation, partnership, or association, the
official and/or employee who caused the violation shall be
responsible.
Sec. 209 penalizes the failure to make a return of
receipts, sales, business, or gross value of output removed,
or to pay the tax due thereon.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least
four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the
violation of Sec. 46 (a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of
income tax returns), which are interrelated. The second is
the violation of Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at
source). The third is the violation of Sec. 208 (unlawful
pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the
violation of Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts,
sales, business or gross value of output actually removed or
to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their classification the
six above-mentioned provisions are embraced in two
different titles: Secs. 46 (a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II
(Income Tax); while Secs. 208 and 209 are under Title V
(Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).
Respondents argue that Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et
al., L-19550, June 19, 1967 (20 SCRA 383), is not
applicable, because there the search warrants were issued
for “violation of Central Bank Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code;” whereas, here Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for violation of only one
code, i.e., the National Internal Revenue Code. The
distinction is more apparent than real, because it was
precisely on account of the Stonehill incident, which
occurred sometime before the present Rules of Court took
effect on January 1, 1964, that this Court amended the
former rule by inserting therein the phrase “in connection
with one specific offense,” and adding the sentence “No
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense,” in what is
834

now Sec. 3, Rule 126. Thus we said in Stonehill:
“Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in

connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court
deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court that ‘a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense.’ Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing
that ‘no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense.’”
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the

things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized
are described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 in this
manner:
“Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals,

columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers);
receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and
securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and
coded messages; business communications; accounting and
business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits
and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the
years 1966 to 1970.”
The description does not meet the requirement in Art. III,

Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should
particularly describe the things to be seized.
In Stonehill, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, said:
“The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application

for the contested search warrants was compounded by the
description therein made of the effects to be searched for and
seized, to wit:
‘Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence,

receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements.’
“Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of

records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners
herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or il-
835
VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 27, 1971 835

legal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the

petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their
nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill
of Rights—that the things to be seized be particularly described—
as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of
general warrants.”
While the term “all business transactions” does not appear

in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70, the said warrant
nevertheless tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill
of Rights, i.e., the elimination of general warrants, for the
language used therein is so all-embracing as to include all
conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which, if
seized, could possibly render its business inoperative.
In Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil.
886, 896, this Court had occasion to explain the purpose of
the requirement that the warrant should particularly
describe the place to be searched and the things to be
seized, to wit:
“x x x Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec.
97) specifically require that a search warrant should particularly
describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The
evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the

things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described
in the search warrant—to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ may not be made,—that
abuses may not be committed. That this is the correct
interpretation of this constitutional provision is borne out by
American authorities.”
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively,

be defeated under the search warrant issued in this case.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe
the things to be seized when the description therein is as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People
vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384); or when the description expresses
a conclusion of fact—not of law—by which the warrant
officer may be guided in making the search and seizure
(idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to
the offense for which the warrant is feeing issued (Sec. 2,
Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein search
836

warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing tests. If

the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to
an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have
some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said
offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure
should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence.
In this event, the description contained in the herein
disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the
dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data
regarding the receipts of payments, certificates of stocks
and securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale,
messages and communications, checks, bank deposits and
withdrawals, records of foreign remittances, among others,
enumerated in the warrant.
Respondents contend that certiorari does not lie because
petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of
respondent Judge’s order of July 29, 1970. The contention
is without merit. In the first place, when the questions
raised before this Court are the same as those which were
squarely raised in and passed upon by the court below, the
filing of a motion for reconsideration in said court before
certiorari can be instituted in this Court is no longer a

prerequisite. (Pajo, etc., et al. vs. Ago, et al., 108 Phil., 905).
In the second place, the rule requiring the filing of a motion
for reconsideration before an application for a writ of
certiorari can be entertained was never intended to be
applied without considering the circumstances. (Matutina
vs. Buslon, et al., 109 Phil., 140.) In the case at bar time is
of the essence in view of the tax assessment sought to be
enforced by respondent officers of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue against petitioner corporation, on account of
which immediate and more direct action becomes
necessary. (Matute vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 26 SCRA
768.) Lastly, the rule does not apply where, as in this case,
the deprivation of petitioners’ fundamental right to due
process taints the proceeding against them in the court
below not only with irregularity but also with nullity.
(Matute vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra.)
It is next contended by respondents that a corporation is
not entitled to protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Again, we find no merit in the contention.
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VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 27, 1971 837

‘‘Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that
an officer of a corporation which is charged with a violation of a
statute of the state of its creation, or of an act of Congress passed
in the exercise of its constitutional powers, cannot refuse to
produce the books and papers of such corporation, we do not wish
to be understood as holding that a corporation is not entitled to
immunity, under the 4th Amendment, against unreasonable
searches and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an
association of individuals under an assumed name and with a
distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it
waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its
property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be
proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected, under
the 14th Amendment, against unlawful discrimination, x x x.”
(Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. ed. 652.)
“In Linn v. United States, 163 C.C.A. 470, 251 Fed 476, 480, it
was thought that a different rule applied to a corporation, on the
ground that it was not privileged from producing its books and
papers. But the rights of a corporation against unlawful search
and seizure are to be protected even if the same result might have
been achieved in a lawful way.” (Silverthorne Lumber Company,
et al. v. United States of America, 251 U.S. 385, 64 L. ed. 319.)
In Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al., supra, this Court

impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to object
against unreasonable searches and seizures, thus:
“As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have
no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants
and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever, the offices they
hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search
and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to
the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and
things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations
adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom
the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate
officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. x
x x.”
838

In the Stonehill case only the officers of the various

corporations in whose offices documents, papers and effects
were searched and seized were the petitioners. In the case
at bar, the corporation to whom the seized documents
belong, and whose rights have thereby been impaired, is
itself a petitioner. On that score, petitioner corporation
here stands on a different footing from the corporations in
Stonehill.
The tax assessments referred to earlier in this opinion
were, if not entirely—as claimed by petitioners—at least
partly—as in effect admitted by respondents—based on the
documents seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70.
Furthermore, the fact that the assessments were made
some one and one-half months after the search and seizure
on February 25, 1970, is a strong indication that the
documents thus seized served as basis for the assessments.
Those assessments should therefore not be enforced.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted.
Accordingly, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by
respondent Judge is declared null and void; respondents

are permanently enjoined from enforcing the said search
warrant; the documents, papers and effects seized
thereunder are ordered to be returned to petitioners; and
respondent officials of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
their representatives are permanently enjoined from
enforcing the assessments mentioned in Annex “G” of the
present petition, as well as other assessments based on the
documents, papers and effects seized under the search
warrant herein nullified, and from using the same against
petitioners, in any criminal or other proceeding. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, CJ., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,

Fernando, Teehankee and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs with Mr. Justice Barredo.
Castro, J., concurs in the result.
Barredo, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur.
839
VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 27, 1971 839

I agree with the ruling that the search warrants in

question violates the specific injunction of Section 3, Rule
126 that “No search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense.” There is no question in my mind that, as
very clearly pointed out by Mr. Justice Villamor, the phrase
“for violation of Section 46 (a) of the National Internal
Revenue Code in relation to all other pertinent provisions
thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209”
refers to more than one specific offense, considering that
the violation of Section 53 which refers to withholding of
income taxes at the sources, Section 208 which punishes
pursuit of business or occupation without payment of the
corresponding specific or privilege taxes, and Section 209
which penalizes failure to make a return of receipts sales,
business or gross value output actually removed or to pay
the taxes thereon in connection with Title V on Privilege
Taxes on Business and Occupation can hardly be absorbed
in a charge of alleged violation of Section 46 (a), which
merely requires the filing of income tax returns by
corporations, so as to constitute with it a single offense. I
perceive here the danger that the result of the search

applied for may be used as basis not only for a charge of
violating Section 46 (a) but also and separately of Section
53, 208 and 209. Of course, it is to be admitted that
Sections 72 and 73, also mentioned in the application, are
really directly related to Section 46 (a) because Section 72
provides for surcharges for failure to render returns and for
rendering false and fraudulent returns and Section 73
refers to the penalty for failure to file returns or to pay the
corresponding tax. Taken together, they constitute one
single offense penalized under Section 73. I am not and
cannot be in favor of any scheme which amounts to an
indirect means of achieving that which is not allowed to be
done directly. By merely saying that a party is being
charged with violation of one section of the code in relation
to a number of other sections thereof which in truth have
no clear or direct bearing with the first is to me
condemnable because it is no less than a shotgun device
which trenches on the basic liberties intended to be
protected by the unequivocal limitations imposed by the
Constitution and the Rules of Court on the privilege to
840

secure a search warrant with the aggravating circumstance

of being coupled with an attempt to mislead the judge
before whom the application for its issuance is presented.
I cannot close this brief concurrence without expressing
my vehement disapproval of the action taken by
respondent internal revenue authorities in using the
documents and papers secured during the search, the
legality of which was pending resolution by the court, as
basis of an assessment, no matter how highly motivated
such action might have been. This smacks of lack of
respect, if not contempt for the court and is certainly
intolerable. At the very least, it appears as an attempt to
render the court proceedings moot and academic, and
dealing as this case does with constitutionally protected
rights which are part and parcel of the basic concepts of
individual liberty and democracy, the government agents
should have been the first ones to refrain from trying to
make a farce of these court proceedings. Indeed, it is to be
regretted that the government agents and the court have
acted irregularly, for it is highly doubtful if it would be
consistent with the sacredness of the rights herein found to
have been violated to permit the filing of another

application which complies with the constitutional
requirements above discussed and the making of another
search upon the return of the papers and documents now in
their illegal possession. This could be an instance wherein
taxes properly due the State will probably remain
unassessed and unpaid only because the ones in charge of
the execution of the laws did not know how to respect basic
constitutional rights and liberties.
Petition granted.
Notes.—(a) Personal examination by judge.—The rule is

the same, and even more explicit as to warrants of arrest
where the law commands that “No warrant of arrest shall
be issued x x x unless he first examines the witness or
witnesses personally, and the examination shall be under
oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching
questions and answers (Section 87, Judiciary Act of 1948,
as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828). It has,
however, been held with respect to warrants of arrest
841
VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 27, 1971 841

that the law is complied with where the judge adopts as his
own personal examination the questions asked by the PC
or police investigator as appearing in the written
statements, which the judge read over again to the
witnesses whether said answers were theirs, and whether
said answers were true, to which the witnesses replied in
the affirmative, there being no prohibition in the law
against adoption by the judge of the previous investigator’s
questions (Luna vs. Plaza, L-27511, Nov. 29, 1968, 26
SCRA 310). But there is no compliance with the
requirement where the judge issuing the warrant of arrest
acted solely on the basis of affidavits of the complainant
and her one witness which were sworn to before another
judge, without personally examining the witnesses by
asking questions (Doce vs. Branch II of the the CFI of
Quezon, L-26437, March 13, 1968, 22 SCRA 1028).
(b) Particular description of the things to be seized.—
While it is true that the property to be seized under a
search warrant must be particularly described therein and
no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the
description is required to be specific only insofar as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow. Where, by the nature
of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather

general, it is not required that a technical description be
given as this would mean that no warrant could issue.
Thus, a description of the property to be seized as
“fraudulent books, invoices and records,” was held
sufficient (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384). In Alvarez vs.
Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, the
description “books, documents, chits, receipts, lists, and
other papers used by him in connection with his activities
as money-lender” was held sufficient. See also Yee Sue Koy
vs. Almeda., 70 Phil. 141.
-----O0O0O-----
842
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7/20/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 37

VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 27, 1971 823

No. L-32409. February 27, 1971.

BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E.

Remedial law; Search warrant; Procedure for the issuance

Same; Same; Deposition taken by Deputy Clerk of Court does

824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz

tion of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the

Same; Same; Search warrant to issue for one specific offense.

Same; Same; Particular description of things to be seized.—

Same; Seizure; Seizure of records pertaining to all business

whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit

Same; Same; Purpose of particular description of things to

VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 27, 1971 825

Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz

be seized.—A search warrant should particularly describe the

Same; Same; Where there is a particular description of things

Special civil action; Certiorari; When motion for

Remedial law; Search and seizures; Right of corporation

Same; Same; Who can contest legality of seizure.—It is well

826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari,

This is an original action of certiorari, prohibition and

Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., a corporation duly organized and

VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 27, 1971 827

to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the

taken. The stenographer, upon request of respondent

828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon

VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 27, 1971 829

“SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant.—The judge or justice of

The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he

“SR. ORENSE. Vamos a dejar compañero los piropos y vamos al

en su enmienda en tal forma que podrńa frustrar los fines de la

830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“SR. FRANCISCO. Serńa cuestión de un par de horas, pero por

x x x x x

“MR. LAUREL. x x x The reason why we are in favor of this

The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec.

probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment

VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 27, 1971 831

script of stenographic notes (pp. 61-76, April 1, 1970,

“A And after finishing reading the stenographic notes, the

Thereafter, respondent Judge signed the search warrant.

832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

examination by the judge. It was precisely on account of

Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for “[v]iolation of

VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 27, 1971 833

Sec. 208 penalizes “[a]ny pers on who distills, rectifies,

834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

now Sec. 3, Rule 126. Thus we said in Stonehill:

“Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in

3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the

“Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals,