283. INVESTMENTS, INC.
V CA
FACTS: This case originated from a civil case instituted by Investments on July 7, 1978 in the CFI of Manila against
respondent, Tobacco Industries. The action was for the annulment of a chattel mortgage executed by Investments in TIP’s
favor covering 5 cigarette-making machines, which were about to be sold on the foreclosure of the latter. Initially, a TRO
was issued by the court but was subsequently lifted after a reconsideration of the order. Investments brought the
questioned order to the CA by way of certiorari and prohibition.
1st resolution: issuance of writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the auction sale by filing of P75,000 bond.
2nd resolution: lifted the injuction.
3rd resolution (motion for recon): issued TRO w/ increased bond of P650,000. Investments argued that the hearing on the
merits of the civil case is about to be terminated.
The CA issued a resolution declaring without prejudice to the early conclusion of the case in the trial court, it deemed the
proceedings before it terminated because it had stopped the sale of the machines until final judgment is rendered in the
civil case. The Clerk of Court caused entry of judgment in the CA case but entered the dispositive portion of the 2nd
resolution dismissing the petition for certiorari and made no reference to the other resolutions.
Trial in the civil case continued and resulted in a judgment dismissing the Investment’s complaint for lack of merit.
Investments appealed the decision to the CA. TIP filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal and with
the CA in the previous CA case a motion to lift the writ of preliminary injunction. Investments opposed both motions
contending that the injunction issued by the CA against the holding of the auction sale was meant to subsist until “final in
the civil case” and since the decision rendered in said case was not yet “final and executory” the injunction was still in
force. . CA however, relied on the erroneous judgment entered by the Clerk of Court and dismissed the motion whereby
TIP caused the mortgaged chattels to be sold by the Sheriff at a public auction.
Investments filed with the CA a motion for contempt and for annulment of the sale. The CA issued a TRO stopping TIP
from taking possession of the machines and commanding it to return the machines to Investments. Subsequently, another
resolution was issued by the CA denying Investments’ plea for nullification of the sale and an adjudication of TIP’s liability.
IN the same resolution, the CA sustained TIP’s position that the TRO enjoining the sale had lapsed upon the rendition of
the final judgment irrespective of the appeal taken. The Court also declared valid the auction sale and dissolved the
restraining order in the previous CA resolution (the 1st CA case) stating that the TRO was intended as a temporary
measure pending the determination of the status of the civil case. Therefore, the CA dismissed the contempt charges and
found TIP’s counterbond in lieu of returning the machines substantial compliance of the 1st resolution commanding them
to return the machines to Investments.
ISSUE: Whether the life of the preliminary injunction ceased when judgment was made by the Trial Court?
HELD: YES. The concept of "final" judgment, as distinguished from one which has "become final" (or "executory" as of
right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A “final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the
evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is
in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground for instance, of res juridicata or prescription.
Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of
the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties' next move (which
among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and
ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes "final" or, to use the established and more
distinctive term, "final and executory."
Now, a "final judgment" in the sense just described becomes final "upon expiration of the period to appeal if no appeal has
been duly perfected" or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment of the appellate tribunal in turn becomes
final and the records of the case are returned to the Court of origin. The "final" judgment is then correctly categorized as a
"final and executory judgment" in respect to which, as the law explicitly provides, "execution shall issue as a matter of
right." It bears stressing that only a final judgment or order, i.e., "a judgment or order that finally disposes of the action of
proceeding" can become final and executory.
There is no showing that the parties and their counsel intended to give the term "final judgment" a special signification, a
meaning other than that accorded to it by law and established usage. Their agreement must therefore be construed to
mean exactly what it says, that upon rendition by the Trial Court. On December 9, 1981 of its judgment on the merits, i. e.,
its "final judgment," the life and effectivity of the preliminary injunction came to an end, regardless of the appealability of,
or the actual taking of an appeal from said judgment.
