The Congress 'System' in India

Author(s): Rajni Kothari

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 4, No. 12 (Dec., 1964), pp. 1161-1173
Published by: University of California Press
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THE CONGRESS 'SYSTEM' IN INDIA

RAJNIKOTHARI

In the studyof partysystems,attentionhas so farbeen given

to two oppositephenomena,the two partyor multi-party systemon the
one hand and the "one partysystem"on the other.Until quite recently,
discussionin thisfieldhas been dominatedby a dichotomous(or trichoto-
mous) divisionon theselines,the principalcriterionemployedbeingthe
availabilityof choicebetweenalternatives. The two-party systemprovides
such a choice,and so does themulti-party systemthoughin a morecom-
plicatedmanner;1theone partysystemdoes notprovidethischoice.That,
at any rate,is therationalization behindthewidelyprevalenttypologyof
partysystems.To be sure,thereis of late an attemptto lookmoreclosely
at theprecisefunctioning of the variouspartysystems,especiallyin some
of the new nationsof Africa.There are also attemptsat a "behavioural
analysis"of the Americanand Britishpartysystems.2 These studiesare
givingrise to new ways of lookingat partyphenomenaand have made
scholarsawareof theshortcomings of thepresenttypology.
Whilesucha discussion is goingon,it mightbe usefultolookat theIndian
experience withpoliticalparties,whichis one of themostsuccessfulparty
systemsin operationand yetis a systemthatcutsacrosstheusual stereo-
typesand also callsintoquestiontheverycriterion ofpoliticalperformance
usuallyemployedin theanalysisof partysystems.That it is the function
of politicsto offerchoicebetweenalternativesetsof policiesand personnel
mayindeedbe a grossoversimplification of politicalphenomena.Politicsis
notalwaysreducibleto whogetswhat,whenand how.We do not,however,
intendto go intothesemorefundamental questionsin thispaper.In what
* This articleis a condensed formof a chapterin the author'sforthcoming book
Politicsin India to be published
by Little,Brownand Co. In writingit I havedrawn
freelyfromthediscussions I havehad withBashirAhmed,HenryHart,GopalKrishna
and Ramashray Roy at theCentrefortheStudyof DevelopingSocieties, New Delhi.
I am grateful to each of them.I am further to BashirAhmedforreading
grateful
through thedraftmanuscript and makingvaluablesuggestionsand criticisms.
1 Neumann has introducedother distinctionsto differentiate the multi-partysystem
as it operateson the Continentin Europe. He distinguishesbetweenthe partyof action
and the party of platform,dependingupon the degree of proximityto power. To this
he adds a furtherdistinctionbetweenthe partyof programand the partyof personages,
broadly approximatingto the distinctionbetween institutionaland personal govern-
ment. See Sigmund Neumann (ed.), Modern Political Parties, Chicago: Chicago Uni-
versityPress,1956.
2 Samuel J. Eldersveld,Party System: A Behavorial Analysis,Rand McNally, 1964.
R. Rose, "Parties,Factions and Tendenciesin Britain,"Political Studies,Vol. 12, No. 1,
February 1964.
1161

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1162 THE CONGRESS 'SYSTEM' IN INDIA

follows,we tryto describethe partysystemas it has been functioning in

India.
Whiletheavailabilityofmultiplepartiesand thefreedom to formparties
gives an impression of similaritybetweenIndia and the West,and while
thereactuallyaresomesimilarities as wellas an elementofcommonheritage,
twodifferences mustbe notedat theoutset.In thefirstplace,the"Western"
model posits a criterionof alternationor replacement-theideal of a
"choicebetweenalternatives"and the assumptionthatthe choiceis exer-
cised in thatmanner-whichis not the criticalfactorin the workingof
thepartysystemin India. Secondly,thewesternsystemimpliesa relation-
shipbetweenthegovernment and thepartyorganization in whichthelatter
playsan instrumental and subsidiaryrolewhichis nottrueofIndia.3
The Indiansystemcan be describedas a systemof one partydominance
(which,it maybe noted,is verydifferent fromwhatis generallyknownas
a one partysystem).It is a competitive partysystembut one in whichthe
competing partsplay ratherdissimilarroles.It consistsof a partyof con-
sensus and partiesof pressure.The latterfunctionon the marginand,
indeed,the conceptof a marginof pressureis of greatimportance in this
system.Insidethemarginare variousfactionswithinthepartyofconsensus.
Outside the marginare several oppositiongroupsand parties,dissident
groupsfromtherulingparty,and otherinterestgroupsand important indi-
viduals.These groupsoutsidethemargindo not constitutealternatives to
the rulingparty.Their role is to constantlypressurize,criticize,censure
and influence it by influencingopinionand interests insidethemarginand,
above all, exerta latentthreatthatif therulinggroupstraysaway too far
fromthe balance of effective public opinion,and if the factionalsystem
withinit is not mobilizedto restorethe balance,it will be displacedfrom
powerby the oppositiongroups.Both the ideas of an in-builtcorrective
through factionalism withintherulingparty,and theidea ofa latentthreat
fromoutsidethe marginof pressureare necessarypartsof the one party
dominancesystem.It is an assumptionof the systemthat the partyof
consensus,whichis presumablythe only legitimateinstrument of power,
is sensitiveenoughto publicpressures and demands,buta safeguardis none-
thelessprovidedthroughtheoperationof thelatencyfactor,so thatthere
is always available an identifiable groupor groupswhichcan be called
intoactionforthepreservation of competition and externalcontrol,if the
normalmechanismprovidedby competingeliteswithinthe partyfailsto
respond.The sensitivity of the entiresystemdependson the sensitivity of
the marginof pressure,its flexibility and generalresponsiveness beinga
functionof the elbow roomit providesto factions,dissidentgroupsand
opposition partiesin themakingof criticalchoicesand decisions.
It is the consensussystemwhichoperatesthroughthe institution of a

3 Robert Mckenzie has popularized this formula. See his British Political Parties,
Second Edition (London: Heineman,1963).

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RAJNI KOTHARI 1163

partyof consensusthatis of centralimportance in thisschemeof politics.

In India, theCongress,whichis thepartyof consensus,functions through
an elaboratenetworkof factionswhichprovidesthe chief competitive
mechanismof the Indian system.We have consideredelsewherein some
detail the main featuresof the factionalsystemand the functions it per-
forms.4 We have showntherehowpoliticalchangetakesplace at each level
in thissystem,and how in the processnot onlynew mencome to power
but new kindsof men,bringing withthemnew attitudesand orientations
to power,and newstatesofideologyand issuearticulation. We can briefly
recapitulatethe arguments here.In 1947, the Congress,whichfunctioned
as a broad-basednationalistmovementbeforeindependence, transformed
itselfinto the dominantpoliticalpartyof the nation.Althougha number
of oppositionpartiescame intoexistence,it was recognizedthatthe Con-
gresswas thechiefparty,representing a historicalconsensusand enjoying
a continuing basis of supportand trust.Underthecircumstances, political
competition was internalizedand carriedon withinthe Congress.There
developedan elaboratesystemof factionsat everylevel of politicaland
governmental activity,and a systemof coordination betweenthe various
levelsthrough vertical"factionchains."5Originating on the basis of indi-
vidual competition betweenleaders,thesefactionswerethenbuiltaround
a functional networkconsisting of varioussocial groupsand leader-client
relationships.In theprocess,a systemof patronagewas workedout in the
countryside, traditionalinstitutionsof kin and caste weregraduallydrawn
and involved,and a structure ofpressuresand compromises was developed.
These were mediatedthroughtwo new tiersof politicalorganization, a
managerialclass of politiciansoccupyingcriticalorganizationalpositions
in the Stateand the DistrictCongresses,and a class of "linkmen" in the
field6 throughwhomtheyoperated.It was in the courseof the working
of this systemthat politicalcompetitionwas intensified, changes took
place,newcadresofleadershipdrawnfroma morediffuse socialbasis came
to power,and an intricatestructure of conflict,
mediation,bargainingand
consensuswas developedwithintheframework of theCongress.
The systemgotaggregated at the State levelwhereindividualswho had
risen to power in the Congressorganizationsometimesconstitutedthe
chief oppositionto the government, providedan alternativeleadership,
4 Rajni Kothari,"Party System,"The Economic Weekly,June3, 1961; Rajni Kothari,
"India's Political Take-Off,"The Economic Weekly,Special Number, July, 1962; also
see Myron Weiner, "Political Leadership in West Bengal," The Economic Weekly,
Special Number, July 1962; and W. H. Morris-Jones,"India's Political Idioms," in
C. H. Phillips (ed.), Politics and Society in India (London: George Allen & Unwin
Ltd., 1963).
5 Rajni Kothari and Ghanshyam Shah, "Caste Orientationof Political Factions:
Modasa Constituency-A Case Study," The Economic Weekly,Special Number (July,
1963).
6 F. G. Bailey, Politics and Social Change (Berkeley: Universityof CaliforniaPress,
1963). Bailey uses the term"brokers"to describethese men.

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1164 THE CONGRESS 'SYSTEM' IN INDIA

exercisedcontrolsand pressureson it, and in manyinstancesoverthrew it

frompowerand replacedit.7In thisprocess,electionsin the organization
played an important role,but also the generalelections,and the selection
of partycandidatesforthegeneralelections.Finally,thesystemof media-
tionand arbitration as wellas an inter-levelcoordination in theCongress8
ensuredactiveinvolvement of thecentralleadershipin the factionalstruc-
ture.More recently, startingsometimebeforeMr. Nehru'sdeath,we find
theoperationof thesamesystemat thetop,through theactivizationof the
centralexecutiveof theparty,and the latter'sfirmand successfulmedia-
tion in the determination of governmental successionafterNehru.9The
upshotof all thisis thecriticalimportance of thepartyorganization at all
levels,thecompetitive relationship betweenthe organization and the gov-
ernment, and betweenthefactionswithineach of them.
Structurally,sucha partysystemdisplaystwofeatures. Thereis plurality
withinthe dominantpartywhichmakes it morerepresentative, provides
and sustainsinternalcompetition.
flexibility, At the same time,it is pre-
pared to absorbgroupsand movementsfromoutsidethe partyand thus

7 The pattern of replacementof the governmentleaders by leaders controllingthe

party organizationin the State began in Madras when Mr. C. Rajagopalachari was
replaced as Chief Ministerby Mr. Kamaraj, the State CongressPresident,in 1953. In
U5.P. Mr. C. B. Gupta firstacquired controlof the P.C.C. and then managed to win
over supportof a majorityof the membersin the LegislatureParty and broughtabout
the fall of Chief MinisterSampurnaanandin 1961, much against the wishes of Prime
MinisterNehru. The Orissa Chief Minister HarekrushnaMahatab was similarlyre-
placed by Mr. Bijoyanand Patnaik in 1962, when the latter as Chief of the P.C.C.
virtuallyorganizedan agitationagainst the Congress-GantantracoalitionMinistrythat
the formerwas heading and forced the central leadershipto intervenein his favor.
Likewise in Gujarat and Mysore the leaders who had gained control of the P.C.C.s
took over as ChiefMinistersin 1963.
8 The Central leadershiphas been able to play a considerablerole in the rivalries
between Congressfactionsin the States throughsuch instrumentalities as the Central
ParliamentaryBoard, the sub-Committeesin the Working Committee that are ap-
pointed fromtime to time to look afterthe affairsof P.C.C.s where the conflictsare
acute, and throughthe systemof the "observer"appointed to supervise,on its behalf,
the organizationalelections in the States. Possessing vast powers, rangingfrom the
determination of the eligibilityof primarymembersto vote to the conduct of the poll
for electionof P.C.C. office-bearers, the "observers"have been able to help one or the
otherfactionto gain controlof the organizationat the State level. The High Commland
itselfhas in a few cases been able to tilt the balance one way or the other,or bring
about a rapprochementbetween rival factionsthroughdirectintervention,usually at
the requestof local groups.
9Mr. Kamaraj as Congress Presidentplayed an importantrole in the selectionof
the successorto Mr. Nehru. With Lal Bahadur Shastri,Morarji Desai and Jagjivan
Ram in the field the task of determiningthe degree of support each enjoyed among
the M.P.s, State Chief Ministersand P.C.C. Chiefs was entrustedto Mr. Kamaraj.
Aftermeetingthemall informallyhe conveyedto the ParliamentaryParty, over whose
meetinghe was requestedto preside,his findingthat Mr. Shastri enjoyed the support
of the majorityamong the M.P.s and among the other elementsin the party. The
ParliamentaryParty accepted this findingand elected Mr. Shastri as its leader by a
unanimousvote.

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RAJNI KOTHARI 1165

preventotherpartiesfromgainingin strength. It is a systemthatconcen-

tratesstrength withinthedominantpartyand thenbuildsinternalchecks
to limittheuse ofthisstrength. In thiswaythepartyrepresenting a histori-
cal consensusalso continuesto representthe presentconsensus.This en-
sures the legitimacyof the systemand of the institutionalframework
underwhichit operates.
The role of the Oppositionin such a partysystemhas alreadybeen
discussed.By posinga constantthreat,it ensuresthe mobilityand lifeof
the internalpowerstructure of the Congress.On the otherhand,its own
strength is continuously conditioned by thestrength of theCongress,gain-
ing wherethe latterloses,and sometimesgainingsubstantially whenthe
latterhas lostgripoverthesituationor its internalthermostat has failed.10
Such a positionhas its structural implications.Electorate-wise, theOpposi-
tioncan onlyhope to function effectivelyat the local and regionallevels.
Legislature-wise, however,it also functions at the nationallevel and per-
formsa veryusefulrole in the maintenanceof the system.It shouldbe
notedherethatthanksto the heritageof parliamentary traditions,which
are further reinforcedby theconventions establishedby theleadersof the
nationalmovement in the Indian Parliament,the Oppositionis givenan
importance whichis out of proportion to its size. This, in turn,helpssus-
tain the moraleand activityof the Oppositionin spite of therebeinga
slenderchanceof its comingto power.Also, certainimportant leadersof
the Oppositionare givenconsiderablepersonalimportanceby the ruling
group in the Congress,thus preventingfrustration and bitternessfrom
takingundesirable forms. At thesametime,thiscreatesa widegap between
the leadershipand the rankand filein theOpposition,shieldingand pro-
tectingtheformer fromtheradicalismof thelatter.
Apartfromthisrelationship withinthe nationalpoliticalelite,however,
theOpposition in India is, forall practicalpurposes,a regionalphenomenon.
Even the "national"partiesare loose coalitionsof State parties,which
explainthegreatheterogeneity withinoppositionparties,and theconstant
problemof enforcing disciplinefromabove. The secondstructuralimpli-
cation is that the Oppositionis fragmented and greatlydivided.Because
they are basicallynot partiesof consensusbut partiesof pressure,they
presentan inchoatefront.This is anotherimportant reasonwhysectional
parties,such as the D.M.K., the different tribalpartiesand variouslan-
guagepartiesand coalitions, and certainpartiesthatare essentially sectional
suchas theCommunists in Kerala and earlierin Andhra,and theJanSangh
and Swatantrain certainareas, are muchmoresuccessfulin opposition.
Again,however,boththepositivestimulation of parliamentary experience
and thenegativecontribution of Congressweakeningin partsof thecoun-
tryhas set up a corrective trendto sucha structure ofpressure:theOppo-
sitionpartiestoo are foundto containa wide varietyof social groups.
10 The analogy with the thermostatunderlinesthe absorbent,self-correctiveand
functionsof factionalism.
flexibility

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1166 THE CONGRESS 'SYSTEM' IN INDIA

Thereis also a greatersecularinvolvement of sectionalgroupswhichwill

helpin thearticulation of theOpposition."But theemergence of a second
partyof consensusis not anywherein the offing. We shall returnto this
pointwhenwe considerbelowtheemerging trends.
Whatwe have discussedso farprovidesno morethana tentativedefini-
tionand description of the one partydominancesystemas it operatesin
India. We do notproposein thispaper to suggestexplanatory hypotheses
fortheemergence and development of such a systemas we are morecon-
cernedherewiththelogicofits operationand its consequentimpacton the
framework in whichpoliticaland institutional development is takingplace.
However,we may touch brieflyupon the historicaland environmental
contextin whichthe systemhas developed,as thismay help in bringing
outitsmorepeculiarelements.
It is importantto bear in mindthattheCongresstookrootand came to
politicalpowernotas a politicalpartybut as a movement forindependence
and reform.What is importantis the long durationand organizationof
the movementand the formsit took. Establishedin 1885, and passing
througha longphase of intellectualagitationduringwhichits goals were
articulated,it was transformed duringthe nineteentwentiesand thirties
intoa massmovement thatacquireddepthand traditions. This meanttwo
things.Encompassingas it did all the major sectionsand interestsof
society,it acquireda stampof legitimacy and came to represent whatwe
have calleda "historicalconsensus."But thisalso meantthatits structure
was firmly laid out and theconditions of itscompetence determined. It was
as a distinctive politicalelite organizedin the formof a well-knitmove-
mentspreadinlargeareasand alonga hierarchy oflevels-district,Pradesh,
and all-India-that the Congressacquiredits identity.It is true that it
was not builtin the formof a modernbureaucracyas has been the case
withvarioussocialisticand communist parties,but it remainednonetheless
a powerful movement witha disciplineand a strongcommitment to goals.
It is thisthatdetermined theorganizational ideologyoftheCongress, which
stillcontinues,and of whichthe "Kamaraj Plan" is the latest and most
characteristic echo.
Secondly,theCongresswas fromthebeginning committed to a democratic
ideology,a stand fromwhichit neverwaveredin spite of a good deal of
"anti-Western" feelingand a certainspeculativenostalgiafora utopia in
the past. Even the latterunderlinedthe democraticinclinationsof the
leadership:it was nottraditional kingship, butpanchayatiraj (significantly
translatedlater on as "democraticdecentralization")that was the point
of reference.Similarly,freedomof speech and toleranceof opposition
(indeedthenecessityof opposition)werecardinalprinciplesof themove-
11 For an account of the movementin which caste associationsare gettinginvolved
articleby Rajni Kothari and Rushikesh
in the total politicalprocess,see the forthcoming
Maru, "Caste and Secularismin India: A Case Study of the Gujarat KshatriyaSabha,"
to be publishedin the Journalof Asian Studies.

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RAJNI KOTHARI 1167

ment'sideologyof politicalmodernization. Non-violentnationalismand

intellectualpacifismfurther underlinedthe same democraticorientation.
All thisensuredthedemocratic and competitive characteroftheintellectual
climatein whichthe partysystemdevelopedin India, again settingit
apart fromthe"one-party"modelsof manyothercountries.The modelof
a one-party statewas anathemato theCongressfromthebeginning.
Historicalreasonsare necessarybut not sufficient conditionsfor the
efficacy of a system.Thereis no doubtthatin its characterand depth,the
Congresswas an unparalleledmovementforindependence, and this has
significantly contributed to thepresentplace of theCongressorganization
in India. But it was theconsolidation thatfollowedindependence thatreally
determinedthe presentfeaturesof the system.Moreover,there were
peculiarenvironmental featuresthat not only confirmed the Congressin
positionof unrivalledpowerbut considerablyadded to its strengthand
crystallizedit in concreteterms.It is oftensaid thatwiththe comingof
independence, the Congressceased to be a movementand turnedinto a
politicalparty.This is a misreadingof the realityof the Indian political
situationfor even afterindependence,the Congresscontinuedto be a
movement.Having acquiredindependencefromforeignrule,it had now
to builda nation.It is thischarterofmodernization through nation-building
thathas determined manyofthepresentcharacteristics of theIndianparty
system.In this respect,it resemblesthe variousofficialand mouvement
partiesfoundin the communistand non-communist developingnations,
without,however,takingon theirauthoritarian features.It is in termsof
a movementbased on a consensusdevelopedthroughthe operationof
freeinstitutions, whileat thesame timerestraining theexcessesof partisan
struggle,thatthe Congresshas achievedits post-independence character.
Let us look briefly at themainfeaturesof thesystemas it operatestoday.
The Congress,when it came to power,assigneda positiveand over-
whelmingrole to government and politicsin the development of society.
Secondly,it made thepowerof thecentralauthority thechiefconditionof
nationalsurvival.This powerwas not onlyconsolidatedbut greatlyaug-
mented.Thirdly,it madelegitimacy theprincipalissueofpoliticsand gave
to the government and the rulingpartyan importanceof greatsymbolic
value. "Only the Congresscould be trusted."This is why only the Con-
gress was the party of consensus.The politicalsystemgot legitimized
through identificationwitha particularleadership,and its agentsand heirs.
This made the symbolismof the Congressso concreteand manifest.
Fourthly,the Congressin powermade fora concentration of resources,a
monopolyof patronageand a controlof economicpowerwhichcrystallized
the structure of its powerand madecompetition withit a difficultproposi-
tion. Fifthly,by adoptinga competitive model of development, it made
mobilizationand public cooperationa functionof politicalparticipation
ratherthanof bureaucratic controland policesurveillance. OnlytheCon-
gress,withits huge organizationallegacy,its leadershipand its control

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1168 THE CONGRESS 'SYSTEM' IN INDIA

of institutional
patronage, couldprovidesucha framework ofparticipation.
Similarly,thebroadening of thesocialand ideologicalbase of theIndian
politydependeduponthebroadening of opportunities withinthe Congress
as it wouldbe suicidalfornewsectionsand intereststo join an opposition
party and invitethe hostilityof the rulingparty.Indeed, it has been
repeatedlyobservedthat even whenthe grievancesof particularsections
have beensuccessfuly ventilatedthroughagitationslaunchedby the oppo-
sitionparties,the resulthas been thattheseelementshave been absorbed
intotheranksof theCongresswhichonlystoodto gain fromthebargain:
a trulytragicplightfor the Opposition.'2The fact that the consensus
represented by theCongresshas comenotonlyout of historicallegacybut
also a continuingaccommodation of interestsis not out of any intellectual
alertnessor breadthof visionon part of Congressmen. The Congresshas
beenhardon manygroups,has generallybeenconservative on thequestion
of admitting new recruits, has givenin onlywhenit must,and has usually
gainedin the bargain.But the situationis such thatit confirms the Con-
gressmoreand morein its positionof the partyof consensus.In places
whereit has failedto accommodateentrenched or newlyemergent groups,
it has not occupiedsuch a positionand has been defeatedby dissidentor
opposition groups.13
A significanttrendin politicaldevelopment in India is the growthof
built-inconstraints in thepoliticalsystemwhichhave led to a containment
ofconflictsat pointswhereexcessiveconflict is likelyto disrupttheintricate
balance on whichthe Congresssystemis based. An awarenessseems to
have grownin the leadershipthatwhereasthe mechanismof factionsto
whichthe Congresshas givenrise servesto make formobilityand leads
to a freshbalancewhenone is called for,neitherfactionalism norpartisan
strugglecan be allowedto becomeendemic,and shouldbe heldin restraint.
There has developedover the years a conciliationmachinerywithinthe
Congress, at variouslevelsand fordifferenttasks,whichis almostconstantly
in operation,mediatingin factionaldisputes,influencing politicaldecisions
in the States and districts,and not infrequently backingup one group
againstanotherand utilizingthe electoraland patronagesystemsin con-
firming theformer in a positionofpower.Apartfromresolution ofconflicts
and interferencein theoutcomeofconflicts, thereis also a growing tendency
12 Thus as a resultof the powerfulagitation for linguistic
states in Maharashtraand
Gujarat, new cadres of workerswere drawn into the political arena. Soon after the
successfulculminationof the agitation,however,the Congressabsorbed a large number
of the new entrantsand succeededin capturingfullinitiativein State politics.Similarly,
in Punjab Congressmenwho had left the party and organizeda new oppositiongroup
during the agitation against Chief Minister Kairon have re-joined it followingthe
formationof a new MinistryunderMr. Ram Kishen.
13 See, for instance,the articleson Amroha,
Farukkhabad and Rajkot constituencies
in which the Congresswas defeatedin 1963 bye-elections,in Myron Weiner and Rajni
Kothari (eds.), Voting Behaviour in India, to be punished shortlyby Firma K. L.
Mukhopadhyaya,Calcutta.

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RAJNI KOTHARI 1169

towardsavoidanceofconflicts fromtakingan expressformat certainlevels,

suchas theAll-IndiaCongressCommittee(A.I.C.C.) or thegeneralmeeting
of thePradeshCongressCommittee(P.C.C.). This has beenmadepossible
by thegrowthofseveralbuffers in theformofsmallerexecutivecommittees,
informal consultative committees, and "innergroups"in theleadership.
The trendis also noticeableoutsidetherulingparty.Thus thesignificant
developmentin the workingof the Indian Parliamentis the growingim-
portanceof the CongressParliamentary Party (C.P.P.) on the one hand
and variousfunctional committees of the Parliamenton theotherin legis-
lativeand politicaldecision-making. Consultation betweenleadersofvarious
partieson keybusinessissuesand thedevelopment of State Committees in
the C.P.P. are further extensionsof thepivotalroleof theCommitteesys-
tem in the makingof parliamentary consensus.Similarly,in the Council
of Ministersthelatesttrendis theappointment ofexpertsand "non-contro-
versial" figuresto key ministerialpositions.Even among the politician
ministers,conflictand controversy appear to have been restricted through
theemergence ofan innergroupin theformofa "collective"and theavoid-
ance of abstractissues throughthe eliminationof the "ideologues"from
important positions.In otherspheres,therehas eitheralreadytakenplace
or a demandis being made forautonomyand non-politicalfunctioning.
Thus in civil-military relationships, the militaryis givenmoreand more
autonomyon its internaladministration, as wellas in themakingof policy,
thus makingfora relationship of mutualconfidenceand trustand fora
high state of moraleand respectforcivilianauthority.Similarpleas for
autonomyand "professionalism" are being made for the PlanningCom-
missionand thenationalizedindustries. These are all developments leading
to a limitationof the sensitivezone of factionalpolitics,withoutany at-
temptto limitpoliticalparticipation, or restrictthe rightto criticizethe
government or articulatepublicopinionto censureit on particularfailures
or shortfalls.They constituteno morethanin-builtcorrectives to a highly
politicizedstructureof institutionsthroughwhich the Congresssystem
operates.
Such a positionof theCongresshas been further cementedby thepolicy
of neutralizing some of the moreimportantsourcesof cleavage and dis-
affection in the country.Thus the removalof feudalism,the linguisticre-
organizationof States,the energeticinfiltration by Congressmen of labor
unionscoupledwithprotectivelegislationforlabor,the removalof gross
social inequalitiesby grantof specialprivilegesto depressedsectionsof the
community, and the firmsuppressionof all acts of violence,secessionand
disaffection-allthis has succeeded in neutralizingpotentialsources of
politicaldisaffection. All of this has been part of the Congressdrivefor
legitimacyon the one hand and modernization on the other.Together,
thesefeaturesadd up to a considerablestrengthening of thepartyof con-
sensusand a correspondingly problematic positionfortheopposition parties.
On the otherhand, such an impressiveconsolidationof powerin the

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1170 THE CONGRESS 'SYSTEM' IN INDIA

handsof the Congresshas not led to authoritarianism becauseof the free

workingof the electoralprocess,the crystallization of the factionalstruc-
turewithinthe partyof consensus,the criticalpressuresexercisedby the
opposition,and the generaltendencyof the leadershipto preservedemo-
craticforms,to respectthe ruleof law, to avoid unduestrifeand to hold
variouselementstogether in somesortof a balanceof interests. The Con-
gresshas also showngreatsensitivity on thequestionof respectforminori-
ties,including accommodating
politicalminorities, themwhenever possible,
and in generalpursuinga broad-basedconsensuson nationalpolitics.We
have discussedthesepointsearlierand theyneed not be repeated,except
to onceagainemphasizethefactthatin thedevelopment and consolidation
ofthepartyofconsensus, theroleoftheoppositionhas also beenpreserved,
and thatIndia has categoricallyrejectedany authoritarian modelof the
partysystemin orderto avoid dissidenceand preserveunity.The oneparty
dominanceas foundin India is thus radicallydifferent fromthe one
partydominanceas foundin, say, Ghana.It is a dominancebased on con-
sensualauthority and notsimplyon civilormilitary power.
In givingto thecountryand itsinstitutions suchstrength and character,
a criticalrole was played by JawaharlalNehru,the firstPrimeMinister
ofIndia. Althoughit is easy to exaggeratehis roleand althoughit is doubt-
fulwhathe could have accomplished had he nothad thegreatinheritance
of the nationalmovementand its organizationto standupon,thereis no
doubtthatbut forNehruand his longtenurein office, it wouldhave been
difficultto consolidatethe gains of independence in the mannerin which
thishas been done.Nehru'srole has been two-fold.By the sheerforceof
hispersonality, he managedto holdthecountry together,to arrestdisruptive
forces, and to take to theroad ofmodernization. By symbolizing a nation's
unityin one man14 forsuch a long time,India avoided the painfulcon-
vulsionsthroughwhichless fortunate new nationshave had to pass. But
far moreimportantwas Nehru'sotherand moreconcreterole of having
givenrootsand legitimacyto the institutions adoptedby the countryas
well as to the modernpurposesto whichtheyare put. He patientlyand
doggedlyworkedto thisend. As we have arguedelsewhere,the contribu-
tionof Nehruwas not to have starteda revolutionbut to have givenrise
to a consensus.'5He providedthecountry'sinstitutions withsufficient time
to strikeroots,and himselfworkedto thatendbybeingtheirchiefoperator,
and made acceptableto his countrymen certaincriticalvalues-the value
of equality,the value of freedom,the value of the vote. Meanwhile,he
concentrated powerin himselfand in his partyand maintainedsomesort
ofbalance,pinninghis faithon theinstitutions of democracy butnotallow-
ing politicalconflictto take too sharpa form,in a sense drifting on and
14 Sisir Gupta, "Some Aspects of the Problem of National Integrationin India,
Studies,Vol. 8, Nos. 1 and 2, 1964.
Pakistan and Ceylon,"Parliamnentary
15Rajni Kothari, "The Meaning of Jawaharlal Nehru," The Economic Weekly,
Special Number (July 1964).

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RAJNI KOTHARI 1171

hopingforthingsto sort themselvesout ultimately.Nehru was perhaps

not too confident of theway thingswereshapingbuthis senseofpoweron
the one hand and a sincereconvictionabout the efficacyof democratic
institutionson the otherwere enough to allow India time to build a
foundation.
In a sense,theNehruperiodwas an exceptional periodin India's history,
one that was so necessary,but not so normal.This had its effecton the
workingof thepartysystem.Whilethe Congressgainedin strength owing
to the variousfactorsdescribedabove, Nehru in anotherway weakened
the partyby concentrating powerin his own hands and throughacting
as if onlyhe couldholdthecountrytogether. Nehruallowedthingsto take
theirownshapein theStatesand at lowerlevelswherethepartyorganiza-
tionoftenforcedits way,but at the nationallevel he stymiedthe growth
of the organization. Such a discrepancy organization,
in institutional how-
ever, could not last forever,especiallyin such a highlystructuredand
powerful organization as theCongress.Towardstheendofhis tenure,there-
fore,Nehru agreedto a proposalwhich,whileit confirmed his own un-
bridledpower,also restored powerand prestigeto theCongressorganization.
This proposalwas theKamaraj Plan.'6 Whilethisschemehas attracted
widespreadattention and has been,in turn,made thesubjectofpraiseand
ridicule,its real role has not been understood.To considerthe Kamaraj
Plan in termsof its formally declaredobjectivesis to misunderstand the
purpose,as observersand columnistswere not slow in seeingsoon after
announcement of thePlan.'7 At thesametime,however,to have considered
16 The Kamaraj Plan was adopted by the A.I.C.C. on August 10, 1963. The resolu-
tion incorporatingit was moved by Mr. K. Kamaraj, who was then the ChiefMinister
of Madras and secondedby Mr. S. K. Patil, the thenMinisterforFood and Agriculture
at the Center.The chiefidea of the plan was to secure the voluntaryrelinquishment
of their ministerialposts by senior Congressmento enable them to devote all their
time to the organizationalwork of the party so that the "unhealthytrend"noticeable
in the formationof groupsand factionsin the party and the consequent"looseningof
the Congressorganization"could be arrested.
Following the unanimousadoption of the resolution,all ministersat the Center and
the States submittedtheir resignationsto the Working Committeewhich authorized
Mr. Nehru to decide whichof the resignationswould be accepted.On 24thAugust,Mr.
Nehru submittedto the WorkingCommitteea list of names of six Central Cabinet
Ministersand six ChiefMinisterswho should be asked to take up organizationalwork.
The WorkingCommitteeacceptedhis suggestionand recommendedthat the resignation
of the 12 seniorleaders be accepted.The Central Cabinet Ministersto leave under the
Kamaraj Plan were Morarji Desai, Lal Bahadur Shastri,Jagjivan Ram, S. K. Patil, B.
Gopala Reddy and Dr. K. L. Shrimali.Among the six Chief Ministerswhose resigna-
tions the WorkingCommitteeaccepted were K. Kamaraj of Madras, Biju Patnaik of
Orissa,Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed of Kashmir,U.P.'s C. B. Gupta, Bihar's Binodanand
Jha and B. A. Mandloi of Madhya Pradesh.
17 K. Santhanam,"Can Kamaraj Plan Provide All the Answers,"Hindustan Times,
14, August 1963; Krishna Bhatia, "Congress Party Proposes a Major Toning Up,"
Statesman, August 15, 1963; "Go Back to the People," editorial,Eastern Economist,
Vol. 41, No. 10 (September 6, 1963); Romesh Thaper, "Congress Re-Birth or Hara
Kin?" The Economic Weekly,Vol. XV, No. 35 (August 31, 1963).

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1172 THE CONGRESS 'SYSTEM' IN INDIA

it simplyin termsof a leadershippurge,as was done by most of these

writers,is also to have missedthepointcompletely and to have takenan
equally formalposition.The importanceof the Kamaraj Plan lay not in
theimmediate actiontaken,but in thesequel to it. It was nottheremoval
"forpartywork"of CentralMinistersand ChiefMinistersbut the induc-
tionof partymanagersintopositionsof powerat thenationallevelwhich
provedof greaterconsequence.By puttingpartymanagersintopower,the
Kamaraj Plan not onlyrecognizedtheirimportance in nationalaffairsbut
also restoredto thecentralorganization theprestigeand importance it had
lostovertheyearsdue to Nehru'sdominating presence.Seen in thislight,
the Kamaraj Plan was no coup staged by adventurists;it was rathera
"restoration."
To thinkthatwiththereturnto the government of menwho had been
"kamarajed"the purposeof the plan is defeatedis to misunderstand the
natureof thesuccessionafterNehru; it is also to misunderstand thenature
of thechangethathas comeonce again in ministerial-organizational rela-
tionsat the Center.That important leadersshouldleave the government
and lookaftertheorganization was relevantin a situationwheretheorgani-
zationhad beenweakenedby thosewhowerein government. It is no longer
relevantwhenthe organizationis restoredto its previouspositionand is
grantedits due place in the decision-making processof politics.It is this
thathas now comeabout afterthe deathof Nehru.The strugglebetween
Lal Bahadur Shastriand Morarji Desai over the successionissue was at
the same timea strugglebetweentwoprinciplesof partyorganization. In
the outcome,the importance of theorganization(alongsidethe Ministry)
has beenestablishedas a cardinalprincipleof thesystem.It is a principle
thatis an essentialpart of the one partydominancesystemas it operates
in India, and one that distinguishes it fromboth the party systemof
westerndemocracies,and the one party systemsfoundin many of the
new nations,in bothof whichthe partyorganization is consideredinstru-
mentalto the executive.In the westerndemocracies,the subsidiaryrole
givento partyorganization ensuresunityin thepartyand is functional to
the two-party system.In the authoritarian and "solidarity"regimesalso
it ensuresunityof the regimeand keeps factionalism fromgoingtoo far.
In theIndian system,however,wherea strongand potentially monolithic
partymustprovideits owncorrectives to itspowerifit is to function demo-
cratically,thepositiverole of thepartyorganizationbecomesa necessity.
We havenowseenin detailthemainfeaturesof theonepartydominance
systemand the historicaland environmental conditionsunder whichit
developed.It is a systemthatprovides,amongotherthings, a comprehensive
mechanism of change (unlikethe Westernpartysystems,it is withinthe
sameparty;unlikethe"one-party systems," it is notthrough a coupd'etat),
a systemof conflictarticulationand resolution(throughthe operationof
themarginof pressure,bothinternaland external),and a systemof com-
munications betweensocietyand politics(throughthe factionalnetwork).

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RAJNI KOTHARI 1173

It has workedratherwell so far. It has its problemstoo, some of them

serious,for it is still an evolvingsystemand greatlydependentat the
presentstageon performance in otherspheres.As forthe trendsin opera-
tion,as mentionedearlier,it is quite possiblethat the oppositionparties
will gain fromthe Congressin certainareas, but thisis an inherentand
necessarypart of thesystem.Wherethe Congresshas reallylost grip,the
oppositionmay even be able to forma goverment in one or moreStates.
Only if thishappenson a largescale, and percolatesto the Center,how-
ever,can the systembe said to have undergonea major change.Even in
thatcase, thequestionremainswhetherthenewpartyor coalitionprovides
us withanotherpartyofconsensusor is just an expressionof accumulated
proteston thepartof the publiclikelyto witheraway aftera shorttime
in office.
Lastly,thereis the importanttheoreticalquestion:What constitutes a
stablepartysystem?If stillin transition, whendoes thereal take-offcome?
Is it necessarythat an "alternativegovernment" in the formof another
partyof consensusshouldemerge?Or is stabilizationof elitecompetition,
includingsmoothchangesin government, as foundin the Congresssystem
in India,also a satisfactoryconditionofpoliticalorganization?
The one partydominancesystemin India, with its factionsand its
supportand communications networks,may yetwell be a transitionalsys-
tem,suitedforthe specialperiodof nationalgrowth,but one thatwould
transform intoa more"normal"partysystemlateron. This can be leftas
an open question.Eitherthrougha purposivecoalitionof dissidentand
oppositiongroupsor throughsome sharp break withinthe Congress,or
perhapsthroughthe independentstrengthening of one of the opposition
parties,such a changemay come in the future.Or, forall we know,the
delicatebalanceon whichthelegitimacy and powerof theCongresssystem
rests may be rudelydisturbed,and a more authoritariansystemmight
emerge.Politicalsystemsdo changein theirnatureovertime,and thereis
no particularsanctityin one particularsystem.Meanwhile,the systemof
one partydominancedescribedby us hereis an interesting additionto the
presenttypology ofpartysystems, and onethatis also,on Indianexperience,
a viablemodelofpoliticalorganization.'8

18 For an earlierattemptat describingthis system,see the author's "Party System,"

op. cit. While sendingthis articleto press,however,we also notice that W. H. Morris-
Jones has developed a similarconcept of "one dominantparty." See his "Parliament
and Dominant Party: Indian Experience,"ParliamentaryAffairs,Vol. 17, No. 3 (Sum-
mer 1964). The analysispresentedby us, however,differsfromthat analysis in certain
respects,especiallyin the characterizationof the Congressas the party of consensus.

RAJNI KOTHARI is Director of the Center for the Study of Developing Societies,
New Delhi.

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