Sat SDSD

SECURITY TRAINING FOR SEAFARERS WITH
DESIGNATED SECURITY DUTES

COURSE HANDOUT
(IMO Model Course 3.26/STCW A-VI/1)
Copyright © Director General of Shipping

(Ministry of Shipping, Government of India)
www.dgshipping.gov.in
Doc No.: STSDSD- A
SECURITY TRAINING FOR

SEAFARERS WITH DESIGNATED Issue No :00 Date:01-Feb-2018
SECURITY DUTES Revision: 00 Date:
A: Content Approved By : DG
Page 1 of 1
CONTENT
Section Details Pages Revision Date
A Content 1 00 01-Feb-2018
B Revision Record 1 00 01-Feb-2018
C Course Outline 1-3 00 01-Feb-2018
D Introduction 1 00 01-Feb-2018
01 Introduction to STSDSD 1-3 00 01-Feb-2018
02 Maritime Security Policy 1-6 00 01-Feb-2018
03 Security Responsibilities 1-3 00 01-Feb-2018
04 Ship Security Assessment 1-4 00 01-Feb-2018
05 Security Equipment 1 00 01-Feb-2018
06 Threat Identification, Recognition, and
1-8 00 01-Feb-2018
Response
07 Ship Security Actions 1-14 00 01-Feb-2018
08 Emergency Preparedness, Drills & Exercises 1-10 00 01-Feb-2018
09 Security Administration 1 00 01-Feb-2018
10 Anti- Piracy 1-4 00 01-Feb-2018
11 Pirate Attack 1-8 00 01-Feb-2018
12 The Release Process 1 00 01-Feb-2018
13 Sea Farers Family 1 00 01-Feb-2018

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SECURITY TRAINING FOR SEAFARERS

WITH DESIGNATED SECURITY DUTIES Issue No :00 Date: 01-Feb-
2018 Revision: 00 Date:
B: Revision Record Approved By :DG
Page 1 of 1
Section Details of Revision Revision No. Date

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SEAFARERS WITH DESIGNATED Issue No :00 Date: 01-Feb-2018
Revision: 00 Date:
SECURITY DUTIES
C: Course Outline Approved By: DG
Page 1 of 3
SECURITY TRAINING FOR SEAFARERS WITH DESIGNATED SECURITY

DUTIES
COURSE OUTLINE/SYLLABUS
Sr Subject Hours
No Theory Practical Film
1 Introduction
1.1 Course Overview
1.2 Competencies to be achieved 1.0
1.3 Currently security threats and
patterns
1.4 Ship and port operations
2 Maritime Security Policy
2.1 Familiarity with relevant international
conventions, codes, and recommendations 0.75
2.2 Familiarity with relevant government
Current Security
legislation threats & Patterns
and regulations
Ship & Port operations and conditions
2.3 Definitions
2.4 Handling sensitive security-related
information and communications
3 Security Responsibilities
3.1 Contracting Governments
3.2 Recognized Security Organizations
3.3 The Company
3.4 The Ship 1.25
3.5 The Port Facility
3.6 Ship Security Officer
3.7 Company security officer
3.8 Port facility security officer
3.9 Seafarers with designated security
duties
3.10 Port Facility personnel with
designated security duties
3.11 Other personnel
4 Ship Security Assessment
4.1 Assessment tools 1.0
4.2 On-scene security surveys
Assessment tools
On-scene security surveys
Security assessmentCopyright
documentation
© Director General of Shipping
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SECURITY DUTIES
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5 Security equipment
5.1 Security equipment and systems 1.0 0.25
5.2 Operational limitations of security
equipment and systems
5.3 Testing, calibration and maintenance
of security equipment and systems
6 Threat identification, recognition, and

response
6.1 Recognition and detection of weapons, 1.0 0.5
dangerous substances and devices
6.2 Methods of physical searches and
non-intrusive inspections
6.3 Execution and coordination of
searches
6.4 Recognition, on a non-discriminatory
basis, of persons posing
Potential security risks
6.5 Techniques used to circumvent
security measures
7 6.6 Crowd
Ship management
security actions & control
techniques
7.1 Actions required by different security
levels 0.5 0.25
7.2 Maintaining security of ship/port
interface
7.3 Familiarity with declarations of
security
7.4 Reporting security incidents
7.5 Execution of security procedures
8 Emergency preparedness, drills &
exercises 1.0
8.1 Execution of contingency plans
8.2 Security drills & exercises
8.3 Use citadel where provided onboard
9 Security Administration
Document & Records 0.5

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10 Anti – Piracy
Risk Awareness:- Prior to entering area of
risk 1.5
10.1 Appraise the strength and
vulnerabilities of crew and ships
10.2 Know the anti-piracy measure
10.3 Understanding the content of the
best management practices
10.4 Pirates business module
11 Pirate attack
11.1 Examine the implication of piracy 2.0
attack
11.2 Assess how to defend the crew and
the ship
11.3 Coping in hostage situation
12 The release process
12.1 Discuss the additional danger 0.5
associated with the release process
13 Sea Farers Family

13.1 Enables seafarers to consider what 0.5
they may wish to share with their family
concerning the risk of piracy 0.5
13.2 Discussion with participants and
assessment
Total 13.0 1.0
Grand Total 14.0

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D: Course Introduction Approved By: DG
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1. Aim
This model course is intended to provide the knowledge required for seafarers with
designated security duties in connection with a Ship Security Plan (SSP) to perform
their duties in accordance with the requirements of Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS 74 as
amended, the ISPS Code, and section A-VI/6 of the STCW Code, as amended.
2. Objectives
Those who successfully complete the course should be able to demonstrate
sufficient knowledge to undertake the duties assigned under the SSP. This
knowledge shall include, but is not limited to:
1. Knowledge of current security threats and patterns;
2. Recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;
3. Recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis of characteristics and behavioral
patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security;
4. Techniques used to circumvent security measures;
5. Crowd management and control techniques;
6. Security related communications;
7. Knowledge of emergency procedures and contingency plans;
8. Operation of security equipment and systems;
9. Testing, calibration and at-sea maintenance of security equipment and
systems;
10. Inspection, control, and monitoring techniques; and
11. Methods of physical searches of persons, personal effects, baggage, cargo,
and ship stores.
3. Entry Standards
It is assumed that those attending this course will be serving seafarers or other
shipboard personnel and are likely to have designated security duties in
connection with the Ship Security Plan.
4. Required Attendance
100% attendance is required for successful completion of the course.

Doc No.: STSDSD-01

WITH DESIGNATED SECURITY DUTES Issue No :00 Date: 01-Feb-2018
Revision: 00 Date:
01: Introduction to STSDSD Approved By: DG
Page 1 of 3
1 .Introduction
1.1 This course deals with
Maritime Security Policy
Security Responsibilities
Vessel Security Assessment
Security Equipment
Threat Identification, Recognition and Response
Vessel Security Actions
Emergency Preparedness, Drills and Exercises and
Security Administration.
1.2 At the end of this course the seafarer will have an understanding of and be
able to deal with the topics indicated above.
1.3 Presently the maritime transportation industry faces threats from piracy and
armed attacks, terrorism, contraband smuggling, stowaways and refugees, cargo
theft and collateral damage.
Piracy and Armed Attacks consist of any illegal acts of violence or detention
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship on the
high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board
such ships. Today, the deteriorating security situation in the seas off war- torn
Somalia and the Gulf of Aden are at the heart of the problem,.
Another threat to the maritime transportation industry is from terrorism which

refers to those violent acts that are intended to create fear( terror), and are
perpetrated for religious, political or, ideological reasons and which Deliberately
target or disregard the safety of civilians and seafarers. Terrorism is practiced by a
broad array of political organizations for furthering their own objectives. The use of
similar tactics by criminal organizations for protection rackets or to enforce a code
of silence is usually not labeled terrorism though these same actions may be
labeled terrorism when done by a politically motivated group.
Contraband Smuggling –which is the clandestine transportation of illegal goods or

persons, across international borders, in violation of applicable laws and
regulations is another scourge that plagues the maritime transportation industry.
There are various motivations to smuggle. These include participation in any illegal
trade, such as the drug trade, in illegal immigration ,or illegal emigration, tax
evasion etc.

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Stowaways and Refugees – A stowaway is someone who hides on a train, bus,

plane, or ship in the hope of travelling for free. There are a number of reasons to
stowaway on board a craft, ranging from illegal immigration to a dare. As a general
rule, stowaways can be extremely dangerous, both to themselves and to the craft
they stowaway on mainly if they are armed; besides, they can also carry serious
legal and financial repercussions if they are caught- especially for the craft on
which they arrive.
Refugees are persons who are outside their country of origin or habitual residence
because they have suffered persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
political opinion, or because they are a member of a persecuted ‘social group’.
Such person may be referred to as asylum seekers.
Cargo theft- Frauds that occur most commonly in marine world are thefts on
ships and other ocean going vessels. Stealing of cargo, especially during times of
high fuel cost is common. Such thefts can be appropriated by the owner or the
client either way, as frauds and thefts continue to get more technical and
treacherous the good thing is that the vigilance for these has also been increasing
immensely.
Cargo theft- can be mediated by the owners, crew and sometimes by persons
outsides the ambit of both. There have even been cases where the entire ship with
its crew and cargo has been diverted to a third country for monetary gain and
thereafter disappeared completely.
Collateral damage- is damage to people or property that is unintended or

incidental to the intended outcome. The phrase is prevalently used as a
euphemism for civilian casualties of a military action which can take place if, for
example, military action is taken to rescue person or craft held hostage by pirates
or terrorists. Collateral damage is damage aside from that which was intended.
Since the dawn of precision guided munitions, military “targeters” and operations
personnel are often considered to have gone to great lengths to minimize collateral
damage.
1.4 Vessels, port operations and conditions in connection with the intermodal
nature of transport and the interfaces between vessels and other modes.
Seaports and maritime transportation infrastructure face myriad threats from the
vessels, people, and cargo that move through them.
Shipping is perhaps the most international of all the world’s industries. Every year
more than 20Q million sea cargo containers move among the world’s major
seaports.

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Unfortunately, shipping is also extremely vulnerable to crime and terrorism. A

terrorist attack on a port or other strategic maritime asset could prove potentially
catastrophic to the entire economy of a nation, For companies and authorities
involved in international maritime commerce, urgent improvements in port and
ship security are now vital.
The September 11th attacks in USA were horrific in terms of the loss of human life
and financial damage inflicted, yet they were not the worst-case scenario that
many security experts, believe could befall us in future, either in terms of the
numbers of casualties or specifically in the use of new weapons of Mass
Destruction.
With the formation of extensive global terrorist infrastructures and the increased
reach of fundamentalist terrorist groups, the spectra of Suicide Terrorism now
threatens Europe and North America and India.
Modern suicide bombing was introduced by the Shlite terrorist organization

Hizballah in 1983 in Lebanon, and it was in Lebanon that this modus operandi
was refined throughout the 1980’s. There have now been well over 300 suicide
attacks carried out in 14 countries by 17 terrorist organizations. All this makes it
mandatory for a Maritime Security Policy to be put in place, for seafarers with
designated security duties to be aware of the hazards involved and the need for
heightened security.

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2 Maritime Security Policy

2.1 International conventions, codes and recommendations Piracy attacks
constitute one of the principal security risks to commercial shipping in certain
regions of the world. Despite international awareness and concerted efforts to
combat piracy and armed robbery at sea, piracy attacks against commercial
vessels resulting in the disruption of trade have increased exponentially.
Modern pirates are not romantic figures. These ruthless mercenaries utilize small,
maneuverable, swift vessels with the ability to overtake commercial ships travelling
established trade routes on the high seas. The modern pirates are armed with
machine guns and rocks propelled grenades. They imperil commercial traffic and
hamper maritime commerce along various trade routes in –the world, seeking the
payment of ransom and holding crews hostage. Modern piracy has become a large
business enterprises that threatens the stability of maritime trade.
The IMO, which is an agency of the United Nations with 168 member states, is
located in the United Kingdom. On November 17, 1983, the IMO adopted
Resolution A. 545(13)- “ Measures to Prevent Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships”. Further amended by “ The Safety of Ships And The Security of
Their Passengers And Crews”
Piracy is a crime of “ universal jurisdiction”. Accordingly, any country which

apprehends a pirate has not only the right, but a duty to prosecute the
perpetrator. This grant of universal jurisdiction to sovereign nations to prosecute
individuals committing acts of piracy is incorporated into several international
conventions such as The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) and The High Seas A Convention among others.
2.2.2 The Post -9/11 Response of the Maritime Community to 4 Piracy One of the
first responses was The Model National Law on Acts of Piracy and Maritime
Violence.
The threat of marine piracy and its detrimental impact upon maritime trade
become the collective focus of the Comite Maritime International (“CMI”), the Baltic
and International Maritime Counsel (“BIMCO”), the International Chamber of
Shipping (“ICS”), Interpol, the International Group of P &I Clubs (“IGP&I”), the
ICCC International Maritime Bureau(“IMB”), the International Maritime
Organization (“IMO”) and the United Nations (Office of Legal Affairs/Division for
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea.)

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The IMO January 22,2002 Resolution

On November 20, 2001, two months after 9/11 , an assembly of T the 22nd
Session of the IMO adopted 22/Resolution 924 entitled Review of Measures and
Procedures to Prevent Acts of Terrorism which Threaten the Security of Passengers
and Crew and the Safety of Ships. The assembly urgently emphasized the
importance and priority of security measures A to protect ships, passengers and
crew on the high seas from A terrorism and pirate attacks, and to suppress
terrorist acts directed at ports and court personnel. On January 22, 2002, the
resolution was passed and published.
Convention for the Suppression of illegal Acts Against the Safety at Maritime
Navigation.
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime : The Palermo

Convention the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
( Palermo Convention) was promulgated “to promote cooperation to prevent and
combat organized crime more effectively.” To date, there are 147 signatories. The
United States signed the convention on Dec 13, 2000, and ratified it on 3 Nov
2005. 39. The Palermo Convention focuses on the profiteering of piracy attacks.
Over the past few years, well organized criminal cartels have begun sponsoring and
funding the burgeoning business of piracy attacks.
Piracy has evolved into the equivalent of racketeering or a Mafia-like industry. It is
reputed that pirates creating have in the Gulf of Aden are now receiving
intelligence on 1 shipping routes, cargo, crews, and vessel schematics from
accomplices in London via satellite telephone. This advance planning now aided by
sophisticated communications technology transforms piracy attacks into the
equivalent of military operations. Moreover, technology gives the pirates an
enormous advantage and adds an additional transnational element to their
attacks.
2.1.3 SOLAS Chapter XI and the contents of the ISPS Code SOLAS Chapter XI
deals with special measures to enhance maritime safety. New regulations have
come into force; The existing SOLAS Chapter XI ( Special measures to enhance
maritime safety) has been renumbered as Chapter XI-1.
Regulation XI-1/3 is modified to require Ships’ identification numbers to be
permanently marked in a visible place either on the ship’s hull or superstructure.
Passenger ships should carry the marking on a horizontal surface visible from the
air. Ships should also be marked with their ID numbers internally.
And a new regulation XI-1/5 requires ships to be issued with a Continuous

Synopsis Record (CSR) which is intended to provide an on-board record of the

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history of the ship. A brand new Chapter XI-2 . Special measures to enhance
maritime security is after the renumbered Chapter XI-1 .This chapter applies to
passenger ships and cargo ships of 569 gross tonnage and upwards, including
high speed craft, mobile offshore drilling units and port facilities serving such
ships engaged on international voyages.
Regulation XI-2/2 of the new chapter enshrines the International Ship and Port
Facilities Security Code (ISPS Code). Part A of this Code is mandatory and part B
contains guidance as to how best to comply with the mandatory requirements.
Regulation XI-2/8 confirms the role of the Master in exercising his professional
judgment over decisions necessary to maintain the security of the ship. It says he
shall not be constrained by the Company, the charterer or any other person in this
respect.
Regulation XI-2/6 requires all ships to be provided with a ship security alert
system, according to a strict timetable that will see most vessels fitted by 2004 and
the remainder by 2006. When activated the ship security alert system shall initiate
and transmit a ship to shore security alert to a competent authority designated by
the Administration, identifying the ship, its location and indicating that the
security of the ship is under threat or it has been compromised. The system will
not raise any alarm on-board the ship. The ship security alert system shall be
capable of being activated from the navigation bridge and in at least one other
location.
Regulation XI-2/10 covers requirements for port facilities, providing among other
things for Contracting Governments to ensure that port facility security
assessments are carried out and that port facility security plans are developed,
implemented and reviewed in accordance with the ISPS Code. The ISPS Code is
implemented through chapter XI-2 Special measures to enhance maritime security
in the International Convention for the minimum requirements for security of
ships and ports. Part A provides mandatory requirements. Pat B provides guidance
of implementation.
The ISPS Code applies to ships on International Voyages ( including passenger

ships, cargo ships of 500 GT and upwards, and mobile offshore drilling units) and
the port facilities serving such ships.
The main objectives of the ISPS Code are:

 To detect security threats and implement security measures
 To establish roles and responsibilities concerning maritime security for

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governments, local administrations, ship and port industries at the national and
international level.
 To collate and promulgate security-related information.
 To provide a methodology for security assessments so as to have in place plans
and procedures to react to changing security levels
2.2 Familiarity with the Indian Government legislation and regulations Bill No 108
of 2004 introduced in the Indian Parliament amends the relevant section of the
Merchant Shipping Act 1958 such that the insertion of the word security mean
maritime security and includes any measure to protect ports or ships or any
person or thing relating directly or indirectly to maritime organization.
2.2.1 the Central Government or such other authority as may be designated by it

shall promulgate such rules which conform to the relevant scheme formulated by
the international Maritime Organization.
2.3.1 Accordingly as per the Indian Merchant Shipping Act, and in order to comply
with SOLAS Chapter YI and the ISPS Code it is mandatory for every vessel to
develop implement and maintain a Vessel Security Plan.
A Vessel Security Plan is one which addresses, the requirements laid down in
paragraph 9.4 of the Code.
Company Security Officer – A Company Security officer (GSO) has the

responsibility of ensuring that a Ship Security Plan (SSP) is prepared and
submitted for approval.
Vessel Security officer or Ship Security Officer-

Duties and Responsibilities- without effective ship Security, a vessel is vulnerable
to attack. This threat can be minimized by having a knowledgeable Ship Security
requires planning, coordination and new responsibilities. The Ship Security officer
is an essential element to ISPS code Compliance.
Port facility means a location within a port at which commercial maritime activities
occur ships covered by these measures.
Facility Security Officer (FSO) is a person designated as responsible for the

development, implementation, revision and maintenance of the facility security
plan and for liaison with the Company and Vessel Security Officers.
Recognized Security Organization- Under the provisions of ISPS Code, Indian

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Register of Shipping (IRS) has been nominated as the Recognized Security

Organization (RSO) for the purpose of Port Facility Security Assessment and
preparation of port Facility Security Plan as permitted under section 15,16 Part A
of the ISPS Code.
Security Incident is an act threatening the security of a vessel or terminal. Security

Level A security level under the ISPS code describes the current scenario related to
the security threat to the country and its coastal region including the ships visiting
that country.
As soon as the security level has been decided as per the ISPS code, it is displayed
prominently on board vessel at the entrance of the ship.
The Three different Security Levels
LEVEL 1- Normal Level
- In normal level, both ships and port operations are carried out in general way.
- Minimum security measures are always maintained on board and in port.
- Ship and port operation are carried out as per ship and port facility security plan.
- Port facility ensures to keep the ' no access' areas under surveillance at all times.
- Ship and port authority mutually supervise loading and unloading operation of
cargo and stores, ensuring access control and other minimum security criteria.
- Minimum access in the ship is maintained at all times
LEVEL 2- Heightened Risk.

- In Level 2, the threat to the security is higher than the normal level.
- All the routine and cargo operations are carried out with an increase in security
measures in both ships and ports.
- Look- outs in no access zone and waterside area is to be increased by port and
ship authorities.
- Access control is maintained all the time with escorting the visitors and use of
security equipment like metal detector etc.
- Communication between port authority and ship administration is always
maintained in case of increase in security level.
- Preparing a full or partial search operation of ship.
- A declaration of security is undertaken between port state and ship
administration.
LEVEL 3- Imminent danger

Level 3 is imposed when the probability of security threat to ship or port
authorities are highest or imminent and specific protective measures are to be
maintained.

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- In Level 3, all ship and port operations are stopped and frequent security rounds
and duties are carried out by both ship staff and port authorities. Boat petrol are
done by port state on the water side.
- Main propulsion plant is always kept ready for moving the ship out of port if
require.
- No personal is allowed to access the ship without the authorization of port state
official.
- Only one access point is maintained on board at all time.
- Preparing a full search operation of ship or under water hull search operation
with port facility.
- Preparation for evacuation of ship by its staff.
A declaration of security is undertaken between port state and ships
administration
2.4. Handling sensitive security related information and communications

1 defines security- sensitive information and the importance of keeping it
confidential Sensitive Security information or SSI is sensitive but unclassified
information obtained or developed in the conduct of security activities, the public
disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy, reveal
trade secrets or privileged or confidential information, or be detrimental to the
security of transportation. It is not a form of classification. SSI is not classified
national security information in the sense of Top Secret, Secret or Confidential.
Information designated as SSI cannot be shared with the general public, and it is
exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

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3. Security Responsibilities
Security Responsibilities The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS)
Code is an amendment to the Safety of Life at Sea ( SOLAS) Convention (1974/
1988) on minimum security arrangements for ships, ports and government
agencies.
3.1 Contracting Governments

Under SOLAS chapter X 1-2 and part A of the Code, Contracting Governments can
establish designated authorities within the government to undertake their security
responsibilities under the Code. Governments or designated authorities may also
delegate the Undertaking of certain responsibilities to Recognized Security
Organizations (RSOs) outside government.
3.3 The Company- obligations and responsibilities

1 The Company, owners and operators have the primary responsibility for ensuring
the safety and security of their ships. Although companies are to comply with the
relevant requirements of the ISPS Code, they need not be certified as such.
The Company must appoint a Company Security Officer (CSO) for the company
and a Ship Security Officer (SSO) for each of its ships.
The Company shall ensure that the Ship Security Plan contains a clear statement
emphasizing the master's authority.
3.4 The Vessel or ship means a passenger ship including high- speed passenger
craft regardless of size; cargo ship including high- speed cargo craft of at least 500
gross tons; and mobile offshore drilling units engaged in international voyages.
Every vessel must have a Ship Security Plan which indicates the minimum
operational and physical security measures the ship shall take at all times.
3.6 Ship or Vessel Security Officer (SSO)
SSO means the person on board the ship, accountable to the master, designated
by the Company as responsible for the security of the ship, including
implementation and maintenance of the ship security plan, and for liaison with the
company security officer and port facility security officers.
The duties and responsibilities of the SSO shall include- Maintaining and
supervising the implementation of the SSP onboard ( including any amendments
to the plan)

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- Proposing modifications to the SSP

- Co- ordinating the implementation of the SSP with the SCO and the relevant
PFSO.
- Carrying out regular security inspections of the ship to ensure appropriate
security measures are maintained.
- Co- coordinating the security aspects of the handling of cargo and ship's stores
with other crew and the relevant PFSO
- Promoting security awareness and vigilance among the crew members
- Reporting all security incidents.
- Ensuring adequate crew training is carried out
- Ensuring that security equipment is properly operated, tested, calibrated and
maintained
- Reporting to the CSO any deficiencies and non- conformities and implementing
any corrective actions onboard.
3.7 Company Security officer (CSO)

1 The CSO is a person designated by the Company for ensuring that ship security
assessment is carried out, that a ship security plan is developed, submitted for
approval, and thereafter implemented and maintained, and for liaison with port
facility security officers and the ship security officer.
1. The duties and responsibilities of the CSO include:

- Ensuring sufficient attention and resources are allocated to security and
advising the level of threats likely to be encountered by the ship.
- Ensuring that the Ship Security Assessment are carried out by person with
appropriate skills to evaluate the security of a ship.
- Modify the SSP to correct deficiencies and satisfy the security requirement of the
individual ship.
- Ensuring adequate security training for personnel responsible for the security of
the ship.
- Arranging for internal audits and reviews of security activities.
3.8 Port Facility Security Officer, (PFSO) is responsible for the development
implementation, revision and maintenance of the port facility security plan and for
liaison with the ship security officers and company security officers.
3.9 Vessel personnel with specific security duties

1. Vessel personnel with specific security duties shall be assigned security duties
in support of the Facility Security Plan and should have sufficient knowledge and
ability to perform their assigned duties, including as appropriate, - knowledge of
current security threats and patterns; - recognition and detection of weapons,

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dangerous substances and devices; - recognition of characteristics and behavioral

patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security; - techniques used to
circumvent security measures;
- crowd management and control techniques;
- security related communications;
- Knowledge of the emergency procedures and contingency plans.
3.10 Facility Personnel with Specific Duties

1 Facility Personnel other than the FSO may be assigned specific security duties
supporting the Facility Security Plan and should have
- working knowledge of maritime security terms and definitions
- knowledge of international maritime security policy and responsibilities of
Governments/ Designated Authorities,
- RSOs, port facilities security officer and designated persons
- Knowledge of maritime security levels and their impact on security measures and
procedures in the port facility and aboard ships
- Knowledge of security reporting procedures
- Knowledge of procedures for drills and exercises
- Knowledge of procedures for conducting inspections and surveys and for the
control and monitoring of security activities specified in a port facility security plan
- Knowledge of security- related contingency plans and the procedures for
responding to security incidents, including provisions for maintaining critical
operations of port facility and ship/ port interface
- Knowledge of procedures for handling security- related information and security-
related communications
- Knowledge of security documentation including the Declaration of Security
3.11 Other personnel

1 Besides the VSO and PFSO, other vessel and facility personnel may have a role
in the enhancement of maritime security and should have knowledge and receive
training, in some or all of the following, as appropriate.

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4. Ship Security Assessment

4. A Ship or Vessel Security Assessment (VSA) is an analysis that examines and
evaluates the vessel and its operations taking into account possible threats,
vulnerabilities, consequences, and existing protective measures, procedures and
operations.
This Assessment (VSA) shall be carried out for each Indian- registered ship
Covered by the ISPS Code and is an essential and integral part of the process of
developing and updating the Ship Security Plan.
4.2 On- scene Security Surveys

1 Preparations required prior to an On- scene Survey.
Since on-scene (i.e. on board) security survey covers the security aspects of the
vessel being surveyed, it is vital that the items to be surveyed are kept in
readiness.
The On-Scene Security Survey is an integral part of any SSA that examines and
evaluates existing shipboard protective measures, procedures and operations.
4.3 Security aspects of vessel layout

In order obtain and record the information required for conducting a security
assessment, it is necessary to refer to the general layout or general arrangement
plan of the ship from which one can know
- The location of areas which should have restricted access, such as navigation
bridge, machinery spaces and other control stations
- The location and function of each actual or potential access point to the ship;
- Cargo spaces and stowage arrangements;
- The locations of the ships stores and where essential maintenance equipment is
stored;
- The locations where unaccompanied baggage is stored;
- Location of the emergency and stand-by equipment to maintain essential
services;
- Existing security and safety equipment for the protection of passengers and ships
personnel;
- Escape and evacuation routes and assembly stations which have to be
maintained to ensure the orderly and safe emergency evacuation of the ship ;
lighting, access control and other appropriate systems.
5. Divided the survey into the following sections:-

- Physical Security
- Structural Integrity

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- Personnel Protection Systems

- Procedural Policies
- Radio and Telecommunication Systems
- Other Areas
6 Structural integrity for vessels and other structures

The subdivision of passenger ships into watertight compartments must be such
that after assumed damage to the ship's hull the vessel will remain afloat and
stable.
Requirements for watertight integrity and bilge pumping arrangements for

passenger ships are also laid down as well as stability requirements for both
passenger and cargo ships.
7. Components and operations of systems to protect vessel personnel
In order to protect ships personnel and the vessel from attack it is necessary to
keep a watch for and prevent the bringing of instruments of destruction on board.
Further, it is likely that the attacker will try to smuggle his weapons on board. If,
for instance, a gun is smuggled on board in a dismantled condition it is unlikely
that normal crew on board will be able to recognize it. It is therefore important that
the ship's personnel have a basic knowledge of these weapons and what they look
like.
8. Role of proper procedures in preventing and mitigating security incidents.

When there is a security threat, the ship may be advised of security level by the
Administration where the port facility is located. If the ship is operating at security
level 1 and the master or SSO considers that there exists a security threat,
appropriate action must be taken to mitigate the threat. The master or SSO should
also report the threat to the Administration and Contracting Government of the
port facility.
Where there is a breach of security, the master should:

- Activate ship security alert system,
- Have the crew on emergency stations,
- Report to the Contracting Government of the port facility,
- Prepare to abandon ship,
- Prepare to leave the port
- Follow the Contingency Response Plan for whatever the threat is, for example
Hijack, Bomb Threat, Unidentified Object/ Explosive on Ship, Bomb Threat/
Damage, Destruction to Port Facility, Pirate or Stowaway or whatever.

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9 Use of information technology and communications systems in vessel operations

and in maintaining security with regard to ISPS, communication between the ship
and outside stations can be done by ship security alert system whereby an alert is
sent directly to the company or a competent authority designated by the
Administration. Such an alert would indicate the ship's identity, its location and
that her security is under threat or has been compromised. The security alert is
not sent to other ships, does not raise any alarm on-board the ship and continues
until deactivated and/ or reset.
The ship security alert system shall:

 Be capable of being activated from the navigation bridge and in at least one
others location; and
 Conform to performance standards not inferior to those adopted by the
Organization.
 Shall be so designed so as to prevent the inadvertent initiation of the security
alert.
The requirement for a ship security alert system may be complied with by using
the radio installation fitted for compliance with the requirements of SOLAS
provided all requirements of the ISPS Code are complied with. When an
Administration receives notification of a ship security alert, that Administration
shall immediately notify the State (s) in the vicinity of which the ship is presently
operating.
When a Contracting Government receives notification of a ship security alert from

a ship which is not entitled to fly its flag, that Contracting Government shall
immediately notify the relevant Administration and, if appropriate, the State (s) in
the vicinity of which the ship is presently operating.
Additionally, there is GMDSS is installed on board as communication system.

There is also a portable transceiver for on board communication. Communication
may be made verbally, or by using load speaker and transceiver. For security
related communication, the master can specify the frequency to be used.
10 Areas that may, if damaged or used for illicit observation, pose a risk to
persons, property, or operations aboard the vessel or within a port facility. If a ship
is at a port of a State which this Code does not apply or, is interfacing with fixed or
floating platforms or a mobile drilling units on locations outside the purview of this
code or, is interfacing with a port or port facility which is not required to comply
with chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code, the ship can come across areas that
may, if damaged or used for illicit observation, pose a risk to persons, property, or

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operations within the ship or the port facility.
11 Identification of vulnerabilities in the above areas and the preparation of

counter measures to address them
12 The importance of having in place emergency plans to deal with contingencies.

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5. Security Equipment
1 Security equipment and systems

Before, the only method of ensuring security was physical examination of people
and baggage and cargo etc. with large and quick movement of persons and cargoes
now taking placing and the increasingly sophisticated methods of smuggling
contraband into ships and planes. It is no more possible to ensure security
through physical inspection alone. In order to detect and nab today's smugglers
highly sophisticated detection equipment is necessary. Besides sniffer dogs, there
are electronic sniffing devices, x-ray machines, walk through arches, explosive
detection systems (eds) and other baggage and container screening devices used at
port and airport entry points.
5.3 Testing, calibration and maintenance of security equipment and systems.
 The SSO is responsible for the storage, testing, calibration, maintenance of and
control of all shipboard security equipment.
EXPLOSIVE DETECTION SYSTEMS (EDS)
EXPLOSIVE DETECTION SYSTEMS (EDS)

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6. Threat Identification, Recognition, and Response
6.1 Recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices.

Threats to a ship can be varied and change of rapidly. The ship's location, the time
of the day, or international events can dramatically alter the threat to a ship. It is
therefore necessary for the SSO to regularly monitor events to determine potential
threats during the passage of a ship from port to port.
1. To preempt a terrorist attack it is necessary that the instruments of destruction
are prevented from getting on board. It is likely that the terrorist may try to
smuggle them in an unrecognizable dismantled condition so it is necessary that
the personnel on board have at least a basic knowledge of these instruments and
what they look like. An AK 47 assault rifle is a particular favorite with terrorists
and this is what it looks like
AK 47 ASSAULT RIFLE
6.2 Physical searches and non- intrusive inspections Physical Searches are best
carried out in booths as privacy minimizes embarrassment and increased
effectiveness. People being searched should not be given the opportunity of
selecting a particular searcher. One person (a supervisor) should observe people
waiting and note suspicious behavior and allocate passengers to available
searchers to ensure no over- loading.
Baggage Screening. Metal detectors are of little use for screening baggage and
personal belongings since most bags and brief-cases have locks, hinges and other
metal components which would result in a very high alarm rate. Moreover, hand-
held detectors have a limited depth of effective penetration.

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AK 47
AK 56

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HAND GRENADES
CARBINE

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DETONATORS
EXPLOSIVE POWDER
6.3 Execution and coordination of searches
1. The importance of planning a search and the practice of carrying out searches
as a drill.
A ship’s security plan should incorporate a search procedure aimed at ensuring
that the vessel can be searched quickly and effectively when this is considered
necessary. The master of each ship, together with the ship’s security officer, should
be responsible for establishing search procedures.

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In the interests of good security, as well as good ship husbandry as much gear as
possible should be stowed away.
3 Equipment the search team should carry for conducting a search.
The search team should be familiar with the list of basic equipment that may be
employed in conducting searches. This list includes
 Flashlights and batteries;
 Screwdrivers, wrenches and crowbars;
 Mirrors and probes;
 Gloves, hard hats, overalls and non-slip footwear;
 Plastic bags and envelopes for collection of evidence;
 Forms on which to record activities and discoveries.
5 Places of concealment on board a vessel Searches should bear in mind that

weapon and other dangerous devices may be intentionally placed to match its
context as a means of disguise, such as a toolbox in an engine room. Participants
in the search should be acquainted with the fact that there are many places on
board a vessel where weapons, dangerous substances, and devices can be
concealed.
Some of these are
Within cabins and offices
Companionways
Toilet and showers
Deck
Engine room
Galleys and Stewards’ stores
6.4 Recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of persons posing potential
security risks
1. General characteristics and behavioral patterns of persons who are likely to
threaten security Ship’s personnel should learn to recognize suspicious patterns of
behavior, while realizing the importance of Examples of suspicious behaviors
include;

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 Unknown persons photographing vessels or facilities.

Unknown persons attempting to gain access to vessels or facilities.
 Individuals establishing businesses or roadside food stands either adjacent
or in proximity to facilities.
 Unknown persons loitering in the vicinity of vessels or port facilities for
extended periods of time.
 Vehicles with personnel in them loitering and perhaps taking photographers
or creating diagrams of vessels or facilities.
 General aviation aircraft operating in proximity to vessels or facilities.
 Persons who may be carrying bombs or participating in suicide squad
activities.
 Unknown persons attempting to gain information about vessels or facilities
by walking up to personnel or their V families and engaging them in a
conversation.
 Vendors attempting to sell merchandise.
 Workmen trying to gain access to vessels to repair, replace, service, or install
equipment.
 E-mails attempting to obtain information regarding vessels, personnel, or
standard operating procedures.
 Package drop-offs/attempted drop-offs.
 Anti-national sentiments being expressed by employees or vendors.
 Anti-national pamphlets or flyers distributed to employees or placed on
windshields in parking lots.
 Out-of-the-ordinary phone calls.
 Recreational boaters or persons aboard refugee craft posing as mariners in
distress to attract assistance from other vessels.
2. In order that the points above are noticed and suspicious persons recognized
as such it is of utmost importance that the ship’s personnel be observant
continuously.
6.5 Techniques used to circumvent security measures
1. Summarizes the techniques that may be used to circumvent security
measure Ship’s personnel must be made aware that no security equipment or
measure is infallible. They should also know that there are techniques that can
be employed to evade, security systems and controls, and circumvent security

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measures such as the disabling of alarm systems, picking of locks, jamming of

radio signals, etc.
6.6 Crowd management and control techniques
1. Basic psychology of a crowd in a crisis situation
A crowd is a large gathering of personnel at a specific place with one singular
point of attraction or aim. Ports and passenger ships will at times be faced with
situations where they are required to deal with crowds. Unorganized movement
of a crowd could endanger the safety of the vessel, crows members and property
and individuals in the vicinity.
Therefore it is absolutely necessary that crowds are 1 controlled. Facility crowd
management therefore, has the primary responsibility for assuring safe
conditions in compliance with applicable statutes and reasonable standards.
Cruise ships are places where people gather in hordes. And this huge milling
causes unwanted problems and situations. The concept of crowd control has
emerged as a solution to this problem and crowd control management
essentially forms a part of the effective management of risks and emergencies
involved in cruise ships.
Crowd safety, is not just about trying to merely control the crowd, it involves
using the right kind of communication and effectuating proper leadership skills
to manage a crowd. This is why the crowd control safety program has been
recommended by the STCW stipulations.
Inform Passengers in Case of Emergency
Information to passengers must be given high priority
Officers and crew must be prepared for stress reactions from passengers and
crew members
The information must be controlled
The crew must be better informed than the passengers.
Officers and crew must never lose their credibility
They must introduce themselves (name and title) and keep their voices under
control.

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They must talk slowly and clearly and inform without being talkative.
Technical language must be avoided.
The messages must agree with what the passengers themselves are
experiencing.
Report everything that the passengers can perceive or understand themselves.
Do not make light of real risks. Passengers may suspect that the truth is being
kept from them. Therefore, tell what has happened
 Give them an appraisal of the situation
 Give details about what measures have been taken
 State the expected outcome
 State whether the situation has been reported ashore
 Point out that the crew is trained for the task and that the passengers must
follow their instructions
 Give information frequently
- Every 10 to 15 minutes during an active phase.
- Every half hour or hour during a more stable phase.
- Restrict yourself to instructions and information only.
- Specify the precise time for the next announcement and keep the time
punctually.
- Repeating previous information is also informative.
- Uncertainly is the worst state.
- Help passengers find their relatives and travel companions.

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7. Ship Security Actions

7.1 Actions required by different security levels
There are three security levels
Security Level 1 means the level for which minimum appropriate protective
security measures shall be maintained at all times.
Security Level 2 means the level for which appropriate additional protective
security measures shall be maintained for a period of time as a result of
heightened risk of a transportation security incident.
Security Level 3 means the level for which further specific protective security
measures shall be maintained for a limited period of time when a transportation
security incident is probable or imminent, although it may not be possible to
identify the specific target.
1 The three security levels and the actions required for each level.
LEVEL 1-- NORMAL LEVEL
- In normal level, both ships and port operations are carried out in general
way.
- Minimum security measures are always maintained on board and in port.
- Ship and port operations are carried out as per ship and port facility security
plans.
- Port facility ensures to keep the ‘no access’ areas under surveillance at all
times.
- Ship and port authorities mutually supervise loading and unloading
operations of cargo and stores, ensuring access control and other minimum
security criteria.
- Minimum access in the ship is maintained at all times.
LEVEL 2 – Heightened Risk

In level 2, the threat to the security is higher than the normal level.
All the routine and cargo operations are carried out with an increase in security
measures in both ships and ports.
Look outs in no access zones and waterside areas are to be increased by port and

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ship authorities.
Access control is maintained all the time with escorting the visitors and use of
security equipment like metal detector etc.
Communication between port authority and ship administration is always
maintained in case of increase in security level.
Preparing a full or partial search operation of ship.
A declaration of security is undertaken between port, state and ship
administration.
LEVEL 3 – Imminent danger
Level 3 is imposed when the probability of a security threat to the ship or port
authority is at the highest or imminent and specific protective measures are to be
maintained.
In level 3 all ship and port operations are stopped and frequent security rounds
and duties are carried out by both ship staff and port authorities. Boat patrols are
done by port state on the water side.
Main propulsion plant is always kept ready for moving the ship out of port if
required.
No personnel is allowed to access the ship without the authorization of port state
official.
Only one access point is maintained on board at all times.
Preparing a full search operation of ship or under water hull search operation with
port facility.
Preparation for evacuation of ship by its staff.
A declaration of security is undertaken between port state and ships
administration.
7.2 maintaining security of the vessel/port interface
1 Prior to entering a port, the ship shall confirm that the port is subject to the IPS
code and hold the Port Facility Security Plan. When the port has a Port Facility
Security Plan, the CSO or SSO shall liaise with the PFSO and confirm the security
level of both side. When a Declaration of Security is required by Contraction

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Government or PFSO, the master shall instruct SSO to prepare this Declaration of
Security. When the ship has a higher security level than that of the port facility,
the master shall inform this fact * Contraction Government and PFSO, and require
him to prepare a Declaration of Security to coordinate the appropriate Security
actions. When the port does not hold Port Facility Security Plan the ship shall
liaise with Contracting Government, inform them the ship’s Security level, and
require appropriate security measures. The ship shall request the port to prepare a
Declaration of Security.
A ship has to give her security level (SL 1,2 or 3) 24 hours before arrival in port. It
is the designated authority of the government of the flag state that decides about
the SL of its ships. The master of the ship can take extra security measures if he
wants, but he cannot put his SL on a higher level. Only emergency safety
measures can overrule he security measures provided in the SSP (ship Security
Plan). If the SL of the port facility is higher than that of the ship, then the SSO
(Ship Security Officer) has the obligation to equalize the security level of the ship
when the ship has a higher security level than that of the port facility, the SSO
together with the PFSO (Port Facility Security Officer) have to make up a DOS
(Declaration of Security).
It is the designated authority of the government f the port that decides about the
SL of the port facilities in the port area. The Security measures for each SL are
written in the PFSP (Port Facility Security Plan).
The security measures are more severe when the SL is higher and also depend on
the risk that can be encountered at the port facility. For instance a dangerous
goods terminal, a passenger terminal or a container terminal will be fenced and
guarded. An open bulk terminal, with no dangerous commodities, will only be
fenced and guarded on the ship/shore interface when we have an SL 2 or 3. At
security level 1 we have business as usual, without any economic constraints.
Requirements Unique to the United States
In THE United States, the Coast Guard requires that each vessel and port facility
owner or operator ensure procedures are established for requesting a DoS and for
handling DoS requests from the interfacing entity. A DoS must be completed with
regard to any interface involving a cruise ship or a manned vessel carrying Certain
Dangerous Cargoes in bulk. For interfaces involving a cruise ship or a manned
vessel carrying Certain Dangerous Cargoes in bulk , the security needs and
procedures are to be coordinated and agreed prior to arrival and the DoS is to be
signed by both the ship and the port facility or another vessel prior to

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commencement of passenger embarkation/disembarkation or cargo operation. At

Maritime Security (MARSEC) level 2 or 3, the security needs and procedures are to
be coordinated and agreed prior to arrival and the DoS is to be signed by other the
ship and the port facility or another vessel for all interfaces involving a manned
vessel and either a port facility or another vessel. The port facility owner or
operator must ensure that, in the event of a charge in the MARSEG level, any
ships moored at the facility and any ships scheduled to arrive within 96 hours are
promptly notified of change and that the DoS are revised as necessary.
Control Measures
Failure of the ship to complete a DoS when it has interfaced with a port facility or
other ship subject to, but in violation of, the ISPS Code or Chapter XI-2 of the
SOLAS convention constitutes clear grounds for a port state control official of a
Contracting government to exercising control measures with regard to the ship.
Control measures utilized must proportionate, but may involve:
(1) Inspection of the ship:4
(2) Delaying the ship;
(3) Detention of the ship;
(4) Restriction of operations, including movement within the port; or
(5) Expulsion of the ship from port. For ships intending to enter a port of a
Contracting Government, where there are clear grounds for believing that the
ship is in violation of the ISP XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention, the port state
control officials may:
(a) Require rectification of non-compliance prior to entry;
(b) Require that the ship proceed to a specified location in the territorial sea or
internal waters of the nation;
(c) Inspect the ship in the territorial sea of the nation; or
(d) Deny entry into the port. If control measures are exercised, the port state
control officials must forthwith inform in writing the flag Administration of
the control measures imposed and the reasons there of. The port state
control officials must also inform the recognized security organization (RSO),
if any, and the international Maritime organization (IMO) when control
measures have been imposed.
Denial of entry into port or expulsion from port may only be imposed where the
port state control officials have clear grounds to believe that the ship poses an
immediate threat to the security or safety of personas or of ships or other

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property and there are no other appropriate means for removing that threat.
Summary
Proper use of the DoS is important, not only as a means of coordinating
security arrangements between ships and port facilities, but also as a method
of documenting appropriate implementation of the ISPS code and related
maritime security requirements. This becomes crucial when a ship calls at a
port facility that is not in full compliance with the ISPS Code and does not have
and an approved security plan. A ship calling at such a port facility must not
only institute additional security measures (as provided for in the ISPS Code
and its ship security plan), but it must also to demonstrate to port state control
officials at subsequent , port call that it took the appropriate steps. The way to
demonstrate this full compliance with the ISPS code is to complete and retain
on board a DoS fully documenting the ship’s security measures while at this
non-compliant port facility. Welcome to the new world of security through
paperwork.
7.4 Execution of security procedures
1 Vessel Security Officer to carry out regular security Inspections which shall
include, but are not limited to:
 Maintaining and supervising the implementation of the Ship Security
plan, including any amendments to the plan; (Sample of Ship Security
Plan conform to ISPS Code).
 Co-coordination the security aspects of the handling of cargo and ship’s
stores with other shipboard personnel and with the relevant PFSO;
 Proposing modifications to the Ship Security Plan;
 Reporting to the CSO any deficiencies and non-conformities identified
during internal audits, periodic reviews, security inspections and
verifications of compliance and implementing any corrective actions;
The SSO should address the following elements on board or within the ship:
- Physical Security;
- Structural Integrity;
- Personnel Protection Systems;
- Procedural Policies;
- Radio and telecommunication system, including computer system and

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networks; and
- Other areas that may, if damaged or used for illicit observation, pose a risk
to
- Persons, property, or operations on board the ship or within a port facility.
Ensure the performance of all vessel security duties.

2 Security measures and procedures at the three security levels
Access to the ship
At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to control
access to the ship, where the following may be applied:
1 check the identity of all persons seeking to board the ship and confirm their
reasons for doing so by checking, for example, joining instructions, passenger
tickets,
2 in liaison with the port facility the ship should ensure that designated secure
areas are established in which inspections and searching of persons, baggage
(including carry-on items), personal effects, vehicles and their contents can take
place;
3 in liaison with the port facility the ship should ensure that vehicles destined to
be loaded car carriers, ro-ro and other passenger ships are subjected to search
prior to loading, in accordance with the frequency required in the SSP;
4 segregate checked persons and their personal effects from unchecked persons
and their personal effects;
5 segregate embarking from disembarking passengers;
6 identify access points that should be secures or attended to prevent
unauthorized access;
7 secure, by locking or other means, access to unattended spaces adjoining areas
to which passengers and visitors have access; and
8 provide security briefings to all ship personnel on possible threats, and establish
procedures for reporting suspicious persons, objects or activities and emphasize
the need for vigilance.
At security level 1, all those seeking to board a ship should be liable to search. The
frequency of such searches, including random searches, should be specified in the

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approved SSP and should be specifically approved by the Administration. Such

searches may best be undertaken by the port facility in close proximity to it.
Unless there are clear security grounds for doing so, members of ship’s personnel
should not be required to search their colleagues or their personal effects. Any
such search shall be undertaken in a manner which fully takes into account the
human rights of the individual and preserves their basic human dignity.
At security level 2, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied to
protect against a heightened risk of a security incident to ensure higher vigilance
and tighter control, which may include:
1 assigning additional personnel to patrol deck areas during silent hours to deter
unauthorized access;
2 limiting the number of access points to the ship, identifying those to be closed
and the means of adequately securing them;
3 deterring waterside access to the ship, in liaison with the port facility, providing
boat patrols;
4 establishing a restricted area on the shore – side of the ship, in close co-
operation with the port facility;
5 increasing the frequency and detail of searches of persons, personal effects, and
vehicles being embarked or loaded onto the ship;
6 escorting visitors on the ship;
7 providing additional specific security briefings to all ship personnel on any
identified threats, re-emphasizing the procedures for reporting suspicious persons,
objects, or activities and stressing the need for increased vigilance; and
8 carrying out a full or partial search of the ship.
Security Level 3
At security level 3, the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those
responding to the security incident or threat. The SSP should detail the security
measures which could be taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those
responding and the port facility, which may include:
 Limiting access to a single, controlled, access point;
 Granting access only to those responding to the security incident or threat;
 Directing of persons on board;

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 Suspension of embarkation or disembarkation;

 Suspension of cargo handling operations, deliveries etc;
 Evacuation of the ship;
 Movement of the ship; and
 Preparing for a full or partial search of the ship.
Embarkation of persons and their effects

 Searches of personnel seeking to board ship are conducted at the discretion
of the SSO, in accordance with the applicable Security level. Persons
refusing to comply with this policy will be denied access to the ship.
Searches can be random and shall be undertaken by the port facility in
close cooperation with the ship and in close proximity to it.
(Note: The Company should set a frequency for these searches at each
Security Level.
 All items brought on board the ship are/subject to control, monitoring,
inspection and search.
Persons refusing to comply with this policy will be denied access to the ship.
 Everyone boarding the ship, including visitors, contractors, and crew are
subject to be checked for the carriage of weapons, ammunition, incendiaries
and explosives, narcotics and paraphernalia.
 Carry-on articles will be inspected in accordance with the applicable
Security Level.
 A designated secure area on board or in liaison with a port facility is
established to conduct inspections and screening of people, baggage
(including carry-on items), personal effects, vehicles and the vehicles
contents.
 Ship personnel are not required to engage or be subjected to screening, or
the person or of personal effects, by other ship personnel, unless security
clearly requires it. Any such screening must be conducted in a way that
takes into full account individual human rights and preserves the
individual’s basic human dignity.
 In liaison with the port facility, ensure a defined percentage of vehicles to be
loaded aboard car carriers, RO-RO and passenger ships are screened prior
to loading {The company should assign what percentage is appropriate}
 Checked persons and personal effects are segregated from unchecked

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persons and personal effects.

 In liaison with the port facility, ensure that all unaccompanied vehicles to be
loaded on passenger ships are screened prior to loading.
 Monitor restricted areas to ensure only authorized persons have access.
Restricted areas shall only be accessed by ship’s company;

Restricted areas shall only be accessed by ship’s company shore staff, contractors,
vendors, and other visitors as authorized by the Master. All restricted areas are
secured by means of door lock keypad, the combination of which is changed
quarterly and after every dry and wet dock availability period. Combinations are
only issued to personnel authorized access to these restricted spaces. All other
areas without such locks are to be secured by means of key lock. Access to keys is
permitted to only authorized personnel.
Monitor deck areas and areas surrounding the vessel The ship should have the
capability to monitor the ship, the restricted areas on board and areas
surrounding the ship.
Such monitoring capabilities may include use of:
 Lighting;
 Watch-keepers, security guards and deck watches including patrols; and
automatic intrusion detection devices should activate an audible and/or
visual alarm at a location that is continuously attended or monitored.
The SSP should establish the procedures and equipment needed at each
security level and the means of ensuring that monitoring equipment will be
able to perform continually, including consideration of the possible effects of
weather conditions or of power disruptions.
Security Level 1
At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied
which may be a combination of lighting, watch keepers, security guards or use of
security and surveillance equipment to allow ship’s security personnel to observe
the ship in general, and barriers and restricted areas in particular.
The ship’s deck and access points to the ship should be illuminated during hours
of darkness and periods of low visibility while conducting ship\port interface
activities or at a port facility or anchorage when necessary. While underway, when
necessary, ships should use the maximum lighting available consistent with safe

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navigation, having regards to the provisions of the International Regulations for the
Prevention of Collisions at Sea in force. The following should be considered when
establishing the appropriate level and location of lighting:
 The ship’s personnel should be able to detect activities beyond the ship, on
both the shore side and the waterside;
 Coverage should include the area on and around the ship;
 Coverage should facilitate personnel identification at access points; and
 Coverage may be provided through coordination with the port facility.
Security Level 2
At security level 2, the SSP should establish the additional security measures to be
applied to enhance the monitoring and surveillance capabilities, which may
include:
 Increasing the frequency an detail of security patrols;
 Increasing the coverage and intensity of lighting or the use of security and
surveillance and equipment;
 Assigning additional personnel as security lookouts; and
 Ensuring coordination with waterside boat patrols, and foot or vehicle
patrols on the shore-side, when provided.
Additional lighting may be necessary to protect against a heightened risk of a

security incidents. When necessary, the additional lighting requirements may be
accomplished by coordinating with the port facility to provide additional shore side
lighting.
Security Level 3
responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the
security measures which could be taken by the ship, in close co-operation with
those responding and the port facility, which may include:
 Switching on of all lighting, or illuminating the vicinity of the ship;
 Switching on of all on board surveillance equipment capable of recording
activities, or in the vicinity of the ship;
 Maximizing the length of time such surveillance equipment can continue to
record;

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 Preparation for underwater inspection of the hull of the ship; and initiation
of measures, including the slow revolution of the ship’s propellers, if
practicable, to deter underwater access to the hull of the ship.
Security aspects of cargo handling and of vessel stores.

The security measures relating to cargo handling should:
 Prevent tampering; and
 Prevent cargo that is not meant for carriage from being accepted and stored
on board the ship.
The security measures, some of which may have to be applied in liaison with the
port facility, should include inventory control procedures at access points to the
ship. Once on board the ship, cargo should be capable of being identified as having
been approved for loading onto the ship. In addition, security measures should be
developed to ensure that cargo, once on board, is not tampered with.
Security Level 1
At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied
during cargo handling, which may include
 Routine checking of cargo, cargo transport units and cargo spaces prior to,
and during, cargo operations;
 Checks to ensure that cargo being loaded matches the cargo documentation;
 ensuring, in liaison with the port facility, that vehicles to be loaded on board
car carriers, ro—ro and passenger ships are subjected to search prior to
loading, in accordance with the frequency required in the SSP; and
 checking of seals or other methods used to prevent tampering Checking of
cargo may be accomplished by the following means:
 visual and physical examination; and
 using scanning/detection equipment, mechanical device, or
dogs.
When there are regular, or repeated, cargo movements the CSO or SSO may, in
consultation with the port facility, agree arrangements with shippers or others
responsible for such cargoes covering off- site checking, sealing , scheduling,
supporting documentation, etc. Such arrangements should be communicated to
the agreed with the PFSO concerned.
Security Level-2
At security level 2, the SSP should establish the additional security measures to be
applied during cargo handling, which may include:

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 detailed checking of cargo, cargo transport units and cargo spaces;

 intensified checks to ensure that only the intended cargo is loaded;
 intensified searching of vehicles to be loaded on car- carriers, ro-ro and
passenger ships; and
 increased frequency and detail in checking of seals or other methods used to
prevent tampering.
Detailed checking of cargo may be accomplished by the following means:
 increasing the frequency and detail of visual and physical examination;
 increasing the frequency of the use of scanning/detection equipment,
mechanical devices, or dogs; and
 co-ordinating enhanced security measures with the shipper or other
responsible party in accordance with an established agreement and
procedures.
Security Level 3
At security level3 , the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those
 suspension of the loading or unloading of cargo; and
 verifying the inventory of dangerous goods and hazardous substances
carried on board, if any, and their location.
The security measures relating to the delivery of ship’s stores should:
 ensure checking of ship’s stores and package integrity;
 prevent ship’s stores from being accepted without inspection;
 prevent tampering ; and
 prevent ship’s stores form being accepted unless ordered. For ships
regularly using the port facility it may be appropriate to establish
procedures involving the ship, its suppliers and the port facility covering
notification and timing of deliveries and their documentation. There
should always be some way of confirming that stores presented for
delivery are accompanied by evidence that they have been ordered by
the ship.
Security Level 1
At security level1 , the SSP should establish the security measures to be
applied during delivery of ship’s stores, which may include:
 checking to ensure stores match the order prior to being loaded on board;
and
 ensuring immediate secure stowage of ship’s stores.

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Security Level 2
At security level 2, the SSP should establish the additional security measures
To be applied during delivery of ships stores by exercising checks
Prior to receiving stores on board and intensifying inspections.
Security Level 3
 subjecting ship’s stores to more extensive checking;

 preparation for restriction or suspension of handing of ship’s stores; and
 refusal to accept ship’s stores on board the ship.
Security Communication must be readily available

Procedures and equipment for communicating responses to security threats and
communicating with port, port state, and flag State must be readily available at all
times Security Personnel must have ready access to communications to transmit
electronic notices of arrival, crew lists, certificates and records, as well as
maintenance of a continuous ship to port security communications to various
authorities ship to flag, ship to shore, SSO to security personnel etc. Appropriate
and timely communication is essential during an emergency. The ERP( Emergency
response Plan) should identify clear communication channels within the ship and
externally. As part of your ERP, the vessel should maintain internal and external
notification lists that contain information on all appropriate entities to be
contacted, including their names, titles, mailing addresses, e-mail addresses, all
applicable land line and cellular phone numbers, and these lists should be
updated as necessary. In a major event ( e.g. a terrorist attack), it may not be
possible to use normal channels of communication.
Provisions need to be made for an efficient and fail-safe form of communication to

be available during conditions when the use of normal means may not be possible.
An effective two-way communication system with the CSO is to be provided so that
any unlawful act against the ship or person can be reported immediately using the
appropriate format and must provide the following information:
 Location of ship ( Lat/ Long/ Time)

 Name 7 Nationality/ Dates and Place of Birth of Victim
 Name /Nationality/Dates and Place of Birth of Person(s) committing

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unlawful act.
 Nature and extent of severity of injuries sustained ,if any.
 VHF radios are employed as the primary means of communication, with ship
intercom/phone used as a backup
Maintain radio contact during operations:

 Within the ship---- radio contact will be maintained between bridge or
control room for al ingress and egress points.
 Between ships--- radio contact will be maintained between ships in port at
all times to relay security concerns.
 Between ship and port---radio contact will be maintained between Port
personnel and Company Representatives at all times to relay security
concerns.
Privately owned, hand held radio communication devices are not authorized for
use on board this ship. Failure to comply will result in confiscation and retention
of radio.
Distress and Duress: Procedures for indicating that the SSO or Security Officer is
in distress, or is communicating under duress are the responsibility of the SSO.
Appropriate ship’s personnel are trained in these procedures.
Communications with terminal operator’s personnel will be coordinated through
the ship’s agent with preference given to VHF radio and/or telephone. For security
purposes, direct communications links are established between ship personnel
and the security personnel in the port facility.
Those links are subject to periodic testing and failure to maintain communication
is to be reported to the SSO.
SSOs communicate directly with the CSO, via telephone or e-mail as necessary to
co-ordinate shipboard security operations and support requirements, and provide
updated port contact information.
 Ship’s Call Sign

 Satcom Numbers: Telephone:
 Fax: Telex:
 IMO No:

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8. Emergency Preparedness, Drills and Exercises
General----- Drills and exercises must test the proficiency of vessel personnel in
assigned security duties at all Security Levels and the effective implementation of
the Ship Security (SSP). They must enable the Ship Security Officer( SSO) to
identify any related security deficiencies that need to be addressed.
 The SSO must ensure that at least one/ security drill is conducted at least
every 3 months, except when a vessel is out of service due to repairs or
seasonal suspension of operation, provided that in such cases a drill must
be conducted within one week of the vessel’s reactivation. Security drills may
be held in conjunction with non-security drills where appropriate.
8.1 Execution of contingency plans
Contingency Planning. An essential part of security is the preparation of

contingency plans in response to incidents which could occur and the planning of
measures introduced in response to any increase in the level of threat. These plans
need to cover different levels of response from the company (operator/ owner) and
the master, officers and crew. They might also encompass the establishment of a “
Threat Level” procedure, identifying various measures which might be adopted by
vessels in response to the perceived level of threat to the vessel in a vessels in
response to the perceive level of threat to the vessel in a particular place, at a
particular time.
1 Action in case of a breach of security
Respond to security threats or breaches of security and maintain critical ship

and ship-to-facility interface operations, including:
 Prohibit entry into affected area;
 Deny access to the ship, except to those responding to the emergency;
 Stop cargo-handling operations; and I
 Notify shore side authorities or other ships of the emergency;
2 Contingency plans for :
Hijacking-is the forcible seizure of a means of transport by terrorist or criminal

group as a way of furthering their cause, reaching their objective, making good

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their escape or even using the ship itself, and/or its cargo, as a threat or as
weapon. Aircraft have been hijacked by a single person armed only with
imitation weapons and, in the right place one armed person could be enough on
a ship. However, a planned terrorist hijack of a vessel is much more likely to
involve a group with real weapons. The major task facing the would—be
hijackers is to board the vessel with their weapons, and security measures
aimed at preventing this should be introduced when the threat level warrants it.
Measures devised in respect of threats from piracy or armed robbery should be
appropriate.
The key objective must be to prevent unauthorized access to the vessel.

Although in most parts of the world the threat of this kind of action is low,
shipping companies and masters need to have a range of measures available to
introduce as and when the threat level warrants it. Terrorists may seek to board
a vessel by infiltration, ruse or assault. In each case the best defenses for both
the deterrence and prevention of unauthorized access are crew awareness and
control of access to the vessel and to key points on the vessel such as the
bridge, engine room and communication facilities.
In port, if the threat warrants it, access points should be manned, in certain
circumstances by two persons, who should be fully briefed on their duties, the
action to take in the event of an incident or emergency and the planned
response to an alarm. They need to be provided with a torch, a whistle to
summon assistance and communications to remain to touch with the Duty
Officer. They need to hold a full list of all crew members, shore officials and
expected visitors. All visitors should be asked to identify. Strangers should be
challenged. Vessels at anchor should regularly check anchor cables and hawse
pipe covers. At sea, hijackers may try to gain access to the vessel, particularly
close to land or in narrow waters where maneuverability is limited. Attempts
Could be mounted from small boats, dhows, junks, fishing , boats that appear
to have broken down or by any means that relies on the traditional assistance
which seafarers offer each other. The best protection against this sort of ruse is
an awareness of the possibilities and keeping a sharp look-out for small
behaving suspiciously or approaching. Should a master decide to allow people
to board, this should be one at a time , each one searched if necessary, while a
good look-out is maintained on the other side of the ship. Particular care needs
to be exercised during the hours of darkness when a surreptitious approach
could be carried out more easily. When underway. If there is any doubt about
the identity or motive of craft attempting to attract attention, their actions
should be ignored. If it is safe to do so, and circumstances warrant it, speed

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should be increased and/or navigation lights and upper deck lighting

extinguished. Attempts should be made to identify or photograph any craft
behaving strangely and details reported ashore by the speediest means
available. If another vessel approaches the ship at sea in a suspicious or
threatening manner:
 Increase speed and alter course if sage to do so: give no opportunity for
the other vessel to come alongside and make no response to messages by
radio, light or loud hailer.
 Keep personnel clear of the upper deck.
 Note details of the other vessel and photograph it if possible.
 At night, direct searchlights at the approaching vessel and switch off
upper deck lighting: if safe to do so, navigation lights should also be
switched off.
Report details of any harassment to the company and, if appropriate, to a

representative of the government claiming authority over the area. A terrorist
assault is more likely to occur in harbor than at sea. If the measures recommended
for controlling assess are in force and prove inadequate, it will demonstrate the
determination and ruthlessness of the terrorists involved. Unless the terrorists are
very poorly armed and equipped, no attempt should be made to resist an armed
terrorist assault.
If despite all efforts at deterrence and prevention a vessel is hijacked, the master
and crew should try, wherever possible, to prevent any loss of life.
 Bomb threat
Ships are vulnerable to explosive or incendiary devices:
 In accompanied passenger cars, freight vehicles or coaches
 In unaccompanied vehicles, export cars or semi- trailers
 In misdeclared cargo
 Carried on board by current passengers, or by those from a previous sailing
leaving a timed device
 In luggage placed in a baggage trolley
 In ship's stores
 In the post
 Carried on board by shore workers in port
 Carried on board by contractor's personnel.
Travelling as a foot passenger, the saboteur has to contend with customs and

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immigration authorities, and with being challenged by ship's staff if he attempts to

disembark prior to sailing. There is also the possibility that a determined terrorist
may plant a device and remain on board.
In addition to bomb threats, the potential use of radiological, biological and

chemical weapons against ships and the people on them, although unlikely,
should also be considered.
 Unidentified objects/ explosives on vessel

 Covert entry and quick- plant device.
 The saboteur wishing to attack a ship alongside to cause specific damage or
immobilize particular equipment may wish to board the ship undetected, plant
an explosive or incendiary device and disembark before it detonates. Sabotage
attacks differ from
 Hostage- taking attacks in that there are no negotiations over demands. If

publicity is the saboteur's aim, it is likely that the incident will be "claimed"
after the event.
Sabotage attacks of this sort are likely to be directed at the ship of a particular
nationality, against the shipping company's policies, or the justification may be
entirely local. Since saboteurs on this type of mission need to board and leave the
ship without being detected, access control arrangements may not always deter
them. To guard against this type of attack, vulnerable compartments should be
locked and watch-keeping personnel should make random visits to look for signs of
tampering. A saboteur need not only use explosive or incendiary devices, he may
try to damage the vessel's machinery. Extra vigilance is needed immediately, prior
to sailing, or following a bomb warning. Crew members should immediately be
suspicious of unexpected objects in unusual places.
 Sabotage by remotely controlled or delayed action device-

The saboteur may use some convenient means of concealing and smuggling on
board delayed- action bombs or incendiary devices in passenger's or crew's
baggage, in deliveries of ship's stores or as misdeclared cargo. Crew members
should be warned not to accept packages from strangers and made aware that
devices could be introduced in seemingly innocent receptacles. Gas cylinders or
oxygen bottles, for example, make ideal containers for explosive devices. Deliveries
which have been cleared could be bound with colored tape for departmental
identification, or automatically strapped using polypropylene strapping tape.

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Damage to/ destruction of facility
External sabotage- Major damage to a ship and facility can also be caused by a
saboteur reaching the hull, either from another vessel or underwater and placing
an explosive device in a vulnerable area. The saboteur's objectives in mounting
such attacks can be block berths or narrow channels, or to immobilize a particular
vessel or damage a facility. Such attacks require considerable knowledge and
technical skill and lie within the capability of only fairly sophisticated terrorist
groups. To be effective, some precision is required in placing the charges and this
requires trained swimmers..
Preparedness and contingency planning measures to provide protection include:-
 Over-the- side lighting giving an even distribution of light on the whole hull and
waterline;
 Keeping a good watch from the deck, to look out for bubbles (divers), floating
refuse ( which may hide swimmers) or small boats. All approaching boats
should be challenged. If unidentified, they should be prevented from coming
alongside;
 A boat patrol, carried out at frequent but irregular intervals and towing barbed
wire or fish hooks, is an effective defense against frogmen or swimmers;
 If the ship is known to be under attack from swimmers, turning propellers
ahead and astern turbulence in the water and makes swimming more difficult;
 If it is thought likely that a device has been fixed to the outside of the hull below
the water-line, the assistance of local authorities should be sought.
Some of the above measures may seem fanciful or far-fetched, but they have all
been used in the past with some success and are included to show the sort of
protective measures which are needed when the threat demands it.
 Piracy and other depredations
The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) requires ships
security assessments (SSA) and ships security plans (SSP) to be periodically
reviewed, audited, and amended in response to experience or changing
circumstances.
Recognizing that civilian and commercial vessels operating in pirate infested

waters off Somalia or in the Gulf of Aden constantly take risk- based measures to
mitigate the threat of pirate attacks and boarding's, it is recommended that as
Counter Piracy Action Measures

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 Vessels in those areas operate at their fastest speeds ( those operating under 16
knots with a low freeboard (less than six meters) should consider themselves at
extremely high risk.
 Vessels that are unable to out run pirate vessels should change course
repeatedly (consistent with safe navigation) and conduct night time transits.
 Vessels should take measures including, where necessary, changing their
operational procedures to make it more difficult for pirates to board their
vessels while underway.
 Obstacles should be placed in the way to prevent or delay the pirates gaining
vessel control in the event that pirates board the vessel.
Examples may include safe- areas for crews to muster and physical barriers to
control areas.
 Vessels to use appropriate non- lethal measures such as netting, wire, electric
fencing, long- range acoustical devices, and fire hoses to prevent boarding.
 Vessels should take on properly certified unarmed security consultants on
vessels transiting the region. Such consultants should be encouraged to provide
security measures, including intelligence reports for vessels in transit, on-board
training and non- lethal use of force capabilities, and night vision equipment.
 Vessels, in appropriate circumstances take on properly screened and certified
third- party security providers with firearms, operating in compliance with
applicable coastal, port, and flag State laws to provide an effective deterrent to
pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa. Other self- protection measures to avoid
detection, attack, boarding and hijack by pirates can be to:
Stay outside high threat area, Navigate in rough seas, Continuous area- wide
threat awareness, Circumnavigation, AIS and LRIT switched on, Military
Convoy, Massive water Curtain, Speed > 18 knots, Razor wire/ Spikes Group
transit, Ejectable obstacles (e.g. timber)
Extra lookouts, Freeboard > 8 m Towed obstacles ( alongside/ aft of ship), water
HOSES Night Vision Goggles, Evasive Maneuvers, Laser guns, Sound blasters,
Dummy lookouts, Restrict access, CCTV' Restrict movements inside, Personal
Protection Gear Deny use of ship's tools, Deploy smokescreen inside Report
movements to authorities Stowaways Ship owners and Masters face the
problem of identifying the presence of stowaways before a ship leaves port or
preventing their boarding the vessel in the first place.
However, most stowaways are only discovered once a vessel has sailed. Dealing

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with an incident involves the Master and owner in time consuming negotiations
with club, agents and authorities. The cost alone from disruptions to the ship's
schedule alone can be considerable.
There are a number of preventive measures the Master and crew can take before
the ship enters port, during the stay in port and after departure. Therefore a
thorough risk assessment should be considered; identifying the potential hazards
present in the ship's area of operation, the physical surroundings of the ship upon
loading! Discharging and potential hazards present on board the ship Vessel's
surroundings and port areas Normally the ship owner has little or no influence on
port security and has to concentrate on preventing stowaways from gaining access
to the ship. Stowaways are typically able to gain access to the ship due to
inadequate security and watch keeping, or, are hidden in containers which are
subsequently loaded on board, while these are at the terminal.
As far as security and watch keeping inadequacy are concerned, a number of

measures can be taken depending on the potential risk of stowaways in the
particular port. The core strategy is to ensure that no unauthorized personnel are
able to gain access to the ship, and that all those who have been authorized to
board disembark before sailing. Given the pressure often put on watchmen, the
best solution is to have two watch keepers at each entrance. However, with the
small numbers of crew serving on modern ships this is usually not a feasible
alternative, the choice being either to recruit local guards, or to arrange for the
temporary attachment to the ship of a professional maritime security officer.
Engaging guards or a maritime security officer may seem extravagant. However, if

the threat is considerable the costs involved could well be justified. Repatriation of
stowaways also gain access to ships by hiding in containers, cars or other types of
cargo units subsequently loaded on board. If the voyage is short the unit will
probably be unloaded undisturbed, but more frequently the stowaways are
discovered and ways have to be found to provide them with food and of releasing
them.
The chances of discovering stowaways secreted away in cargo stored at the

terminal will depend on the time available to undertake a thorough search and the
amount of money the owner is prepared to spend.
Obviously not every container or car can be checked. Whilst soft top containers
can be inspected quite easily, this is not the case with standard steel top
containers.

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Sophisticated equipment is available to search for stowaways in containers;

however, these gadgets are expensive and will normally be used by the port
security authorities as opposed to ship owners and operators.
Port security- Many ports have adequate security; whilst at others security is
non- existent. Whatever the circumstances, it is not recommended to rely solely
on port security. The stowaway business is so financially attractive that to rely on
local security staff merely offers an easy path for a potential stowaway. It is
sensible, however, to ensure that the agent knows of your full intention not to sail
with stowaways on board, and that he is repeatedly asked to ensure that all safety
measures available at the port are mare to work in the interest of the ship.
The crew has little or no influence on port security and has to focus on preventing
stowaways from gaining access to the ship. The high risk threat is from ports and
terminals where the ISPS Code is not being implemented in a thorough manner.
The task of preventing the stowaways from coming on board in these ports is more
difficult and it is here that Masters and ship owners must focus their efforts.
Crews should be issued the correct instructions and A procedures to enable the
ship to provide a determined deterrent, and stopping stowaways from boarding.
Reducing the risk - port area
 Given the myriad of people who often surge on board when a ship arrives in
port, a pass system can be of valuable assistance.
 Ask the agent if the port is capable of providing adequate security. If not, the
agent can be asked to arrange additional protection.
Risk assessment and preventive measures
 If there are doubts as to the efficiency of locally supplied guards in ports where
a large number/ of stowaways are known to board vessels, the short- term
employment of a professional maritime security officer should be considered.
If stowaways are discovered during the search, the immigration authorities should
be notified immediately in order that the stowaways can be removed from the ship.

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Reducing the risk- Access points
Review procedures to ensure that there is a watchman on duty at every access

point which have to remain unlocked whilst the vessel is in port and that this
watchman is familiar with the procedures when visitors, repairmen, stevedores
etc., wish to come on board. The simple rule is: " no unauthorized personnel come
on board, and all authorized personnel disembark before sailing". Check to ensure
that all locks are locked and that places which cannot be locked are sealed with
tamper- proof or wire seals.
Different harbors and ports have different access points that are commonly used.
In general; some access point entries can be:
 Climbing the mooring ropes,
 Climbing from the sea using hooks,
 Boarding the vessel as stevedores with fake dock identification papers. At some
ports stevedores are supposed to wear special clothing with branded overalls
and helmets. Bear in mind that stowaways may have access to these overalls
and helmets too.
Recent stowaway interviews have revealed that crew on board have also been
involved in the safe passage of stowaways. On A some ships stowaways have had
to pay a "ticket" to one of the crew on board. Consider offering financial rewards to
those crew members who discover and prevent stowaway incidents and ensure
that all crew members are aware of the advantages of preventing stowaways sailing
with the ship. Check security equipment, close- circuit television, alarms and
locks.
8.2 Security drills and exercises
1 Requirement for conducting drills and exercises.

 The Company Security Officer and The Ship Security Officer must have
knowledge and have received training, taking into account the guidance given
in Part B of the ISPS code.
Drill and exercise requirements
 General- Drills and exercises must test the proficiency of vessel personnel in
assigned security duties at all Security Levels and the effective implementation
of the Ship Security Plan (SSP). They must enable the Ship Security Officer
(SSO) to identify any related security deficiencies that need to be addressed.

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Examples of drills include unauthorized entry to a restricted area, response to

alarms, and notification of law enforcement authorities.
 If the vessel is moored at a facility on the date the facility has planned to
conduct any drills, the vessel may, but is not required to, participate in the
facility is scheduled drill.
 Drills must be conducted within one week whenever the percentage of vessel
personnel with no prior participation in a vessel security drill on that vessel
exceeds 25%.
Drills and Training for Rest of Ship's Crew

In addition to the specific training for personnel that are involved in implementing
security actions, all of the ship's crew should receive security awareness training
as part of their general orientation and training activities. This awareness training
should issues such as:
 Limiting discussion about specifics of the ship ( e.g., cargo, routes, equipment,
crew size) with non---company personnel to those personnel that need to know
in order to service the ship
 Reporting suspicious acts or behavior related to the ship both on/near the ship
and when personnel are on shore leave
 Protection of company---supplied identification cards or other documentation A
high level of awareness by company personnel of these simple measures can
help prevent the ship from becoming an easy target.

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9. Security Administration
9.1 Documentation and records
Records should be available to duly authorized officers of Contracting
Governments to verify that the provisions of the Ship Security Plans are being
implemented.
Records may be kept in any format but should be protected from unauthorized
access or disclosure. 1 documents that shall be available on board at all times
Records of the following activities addressed in the Ship Security Plan must be
kept on board at all times and be made available to the government authorities
upon request for at least the time frame covering the previous 10 ports of call.
--Training , drills and Exercises;
--security threats and security incidents;
--breaches of security
--changes in security level;
Communications relating to the direct security of the ship such as specific threats
to the ship or to port facilities the ship is in, or has been;
--internal audits and reviews of security activities;
--periodic review of the Ship Security Assessment;
--periodic review of the Ship Security Plan;
--implementation of any amendments to the plan; and
--maintenance, calibration and testing of security equipment, if any including
testing of the ship security alert system.
 Annual internal audits of the SSP. For each annual audit, a letter certified by
the SSO stating the date the audit was completed
--Annual periodic reviews of the SSA and the SSP maintained.
--Required security records must be protected from unauthorized access or
disclosure.
--Records must be kept in the working language or languages of the ship or
translation in either English, French or Spanish.
--Security related records required under the international requirements and
any additional records specified by a classification society shall be kept for 5
years to allow ‘ internal audit review and to provide evidence of program
compliance for periodic verification.

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Revision: 00 Date:
10: Anti - Piracy Approved By: DG
Page 1 of 4
10. Anti - Piracy
Risk Awareness: - Prior to entering area of risk
10.1 Appraise the strength and vulnerabilities of crew and ships
Prior to transiting the high Risk Area, ship operators and Masters should carry
out a through Risk Assessment to assess the likelihood and consequences of
piracy attacks to the vessel, based on the latest available information. The output
of the Risk Assessment should identify measures for prevention, mitigation and
recovery, which will mean combining statutory regulations with supplementary
measures to combat piracy. It is important that the Risk Assessment is ship and
voyage specific, and not generic.
10.2 Know the Anti-Piracy Measure

Factors to be considered in the Risk Assessment should include, but may not be
limited to, the following:
10.2.1- Crew Safety
 The primary consideration should be to ensure the safety of the crew. Care
should be taken, when formulating measures to prevent illegal boarding and
external access to the accommodation, that crew members will not be
trapped inside and should be able to escape in the event of another type of
emergency, such as, for example fire.
 Careful consideration should be given to the location of a Safe Muster Point
of Citadel. ( See Section 8.13 )
 Consideration should also be given to the ballistic protection afforded to the
crew who may be required to remain on the bridge during a pirate attack,
recognizing that pirates increasingly fire at the bridge of a vessel to try to
force it to stop. ( See section 8.3)
10.2.2 – Freeboard
 It is likely that pirates will try to board the ship being attacked at the lowest
point above the waterline, making it easier for them to climb onboard. These
points are often on either quarter or at the vessel’s stern.
 Experience suggests that vessels with a minimum freeboard that is greater
than 8 metres have a much greater chance of successfully escaping a piracy
attempt than those with less.
 A large freeboard will provide little or no protection if the construction of the

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ship provides access to pirates seeking to climb onboard, and thus further
protective measures should be considered.
10.2.3-Speed
 One of the most effective ways to defeat a pirate attack is by using speed to
try to outrun the attackers and /or make it difficult to board.
 To date, there have been no reported attacks where pirates have boarded a
ship that has been proceeding at over 18 knots. It is possible however that
pirate tactics and techniques may develop to enable them to board faster
moving ships.
 Ships are recommended to proceed at Full Sea Speed, or at least 18 knots
where they are capable of greater speed, throughout their transit of the High
Risk Area.
 It is very important to increase to maximum safe speed immediately after
identifying any suspicious vessel and as quickly as possible in order to try to
open the CPA ( Closest Point of Approach) from any possible attackers and
/or make the vessel more difficult to board.
 If a vessel is part of a ‘Group Transit’( see section 7.9 for further details of
Group Transits) within the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor(
IRTC), speed may be required to be adjusted.
 It is recommended that reference should be made to the MSCHOA, NATO
Shipping Centre and MARLO websites for the latest threat guidance
regarding pirate attack speed capability.
10.2.4 – Sea State

 Pirates mount their attacks from very small craft (skiffs), even where they are
supported by larger vessels or Motherships which tends to limit their
operations to moderate sea states.
 It is likely to be more difficult to operate small craft effectively in sea state 3
and above. A large freeboard alone may not be enough to deter a pirate
attack.
10.3 Understanding the contents of the Best Management Practices( BMP)

The purpose of the Industry Best Management Practices ( BMP) is to assist ships to
avoid , deter or delay piracy attacks in the High Risk Areas. Experience and data
collected shows that the practices content in the BMP can and will make a
significant difference in preventing a ship becoming a victim of piracy. The
potential consequence of not following BMP can be severe. There have been
instance of pirates subjecting their hostages to violence and other ill treatment.
The average length of a hijacking of vessel and her crew is over 7 months.

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For the purposes of the BMP the term piracy includes all acts of violence against
ships, her crew and cargo. This includes armed robbery and attempts to board and
take control of the ship, wherever this may take place. Somali pirates have to date,
sought to hijack a vessel, her cargo and crew and hold them until a ransom
demand is paid. Not all ship Protection Measures discussed in BMP4 may be
applicable to every ship type.
Some of the salient points to remember as per BMP:-

1) Do not be Alone:- Use the Internationally recommended Transit corridor (
IRTS) and group transit scheme or independent convoy & keep AIS turned
on.
2) Do not be detected :- Keep track of NAVWARNS and visit relevant websites
for known pirate operating location. Use navigation lights only.
3) Do not be Surprised :- Increased vigilance-lookouts, CCTV and Radar
4) Do not be Vulnerable :- Use visible ( deterrent) and physical (preventive) ship
protection measures. These could include: Razor wire, use of water foam etc.
Provide additional personal protection to bridge teams.
5) Do not be Boarded : - Increase to maximum speed & maneuver vessel.
6) Do not Controlled :- Follow well practiced procedures and drills. Deny use of
tools, equipment, access routes
10.4 Pirates business module
 The pirates always carry out surprise attacks and catch the vulnerable
vessels unaware when such vessels are under prepared to repel pirate
attacks. Commonly, two small high speed (up to 25 knots) open boats or
‘Skiffs’ are used in attacks, often approaching from either quarter or the
stern. Skiffs are frequently fitted with 2 outboard engines or a larger single
6hp engine.
 Pirate Action Groups operate in a number of different boat configurations. To
date whatever the configuration the attack phase is carried out by skiffs.
Pirate Action Group boat configurations include:
 Skiffs only- usually two
 Open whalers carrying significant quantities of fuel often towing 2 or
more attack skiffs.
 Motherships which have included the very largest of merchant ships,
fishing vessels and dhows.
 These Motherships have been taken by the pirates and usually have their
own crew onboard as hostages. Motherships are used to carry pirates,
stores, fuel and attack skiffs to enable pirates to operate over a much
larger area and are significantly less affected by the weather. Attack skiffs

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are often towed behind the Motherships. Where the size of the Mothership
allows it, skiffs are increasingly being carried onboard and camouflaged to
reduce chances of interdiction by Naval/ Military forces.
 Increasingly, pirates use small arms fire and Rocket Propelled
Grenades(RPGs) in an effort to intimidate Masters of ships to reduce speed
and stop to allow the pirates to board. The use of these weapons is
generally focused on the bridge and accommodation area. In what are
difficult circumstances, it is very important to maintain Full Sea Speed,
increasing where possible, and using careful maneuvering to resist the
attack
 Somali pirates seek to place their skiffs alongside the ship being attacked
to enable one or more armed pirates to climb onboard. Pirates frequently
use long lightweight ladders and ropes, or a long hooked pole with a
knotted climbing rope to climb up the side of the vessel being attacked.
Once onboard the pirate ( or pirates) will generally make their way to the
bridge to try to take control of the vessel. Once on the bridge the
pirate/pirates will demand that the ship slows/stops to enable further
pirates to board.
 Attacks have taken place at most times of the day. However, many pirate
attacks have taken place early in the morning, at first light. Attacks have
occurred at night, particularly clear moonlit nights, but night time attacks
are less common.
 The majority of piracy attacks have been repelled by ship’s crew who have
planned and trained in advance of the passage and applied the BMPs.

Doc No.: STSDSD-11

Revision: 00 Date:
11: Pirate Attack Approved By: DG
Page 1 of 8
11 Pirate Attack
11.1 Examine the implication of piracy attack
If the crew of a vessel suspects that it is coming under a pirate attack there are
specific actions that are recommended to be taken during the approach stage
and the attack stage. It should be noted that the pirates generally do not use
weapons until they are within two cables of a vessel, therefore any period yup
until this stage can be considered as ' approach', and gives a vessel valuable
time in which to activate her defenses and make it clear to pirates that they
have been seen and the vessel is prepared and will resist. Once under pirate
attack with a fear of siege the crew may face following situation:-
 Extreme fear, shock and panic

 Sense of physical vulnerability
 Fight amongst crew members
 State of Shock
Statistics have been gathered to understand how people have reacted in crisis
situation in all walks of life. There is no specific research currently available for
piracy related incidents but it is envisaged that reactions experienced are likely to
be broadly similar. It is stated that in an emergencies, human behavior may be
categorized in three groups:-
 Group 1 :- 60% may do little, or may engage in appropriate behaviors,
whilst awaiting the initiatives of others.
 Group 2 :- 25% may act rationally, perhaps attacking the threat, closing
doors or warning others.
 Group 3 :- 15% may be almost totally paralyzed by the seriousness of the
situation.
11.2 Assess how to defend the crew and the ship
11.2.1 Watch keeping and Enhanced Vigilance
Prior to entering the High Risk Area, it is recommended the preparations are made
to support the requirement for increased vigilance by:
 Providing additional lookouts for each Watch. Additional lookouts should be
fully briefed.
 Considering a shorter rotation of the Watch period in order to maximize
alertness of the lookouts.

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 Ensuring that there are sufficient binoculars for the enhanced Bridge Team,
preferably anti glare.
 Considering use of night vision optics.
 Maintaining a careful Radar Watch.
Well constructed dummies placed at strategic locations around the vessel can give
an impression of great numbers of people on watch
11.2.2 Enhanced Bridge Protection

The bridge is usually the focus for any pirate attack. In the initial part of the
attack, pirates direct weapons fire at the bridge to try to coerce the ship to stop. If
they are able to board the vessel the pirates usually try to make for the bridge to
enable them to take control. The following further protection enhancements might
be considered:
 Kevlar jackets and helmets available for the bridge team to provide a level of
protection for those on the bridge during an attack. (If possible, jackets and
helmets should be in non-military color).
 While most bridge windows are laminated, further protection against flying
glass can be provided by the application of security glass film, often called
Blast Resistant Film.
 Fabricated metal, (steel/aluminum), plates for the side and rear bridge
windows and the bridge wing door windows, which may be rapidly secured
in place in the event of an attack.
 The after part of both bridge wings, (often open), can be protected by a wall
of sandbags.
 The sides and rear of the bridge, and the bridge wings, may be protected
with a double layer of chain link fence which has been shown to reduce the
effect of an RPG round. Proprietary anti-RPG screens are also available.
11.2.3 control of Access to Bridge, Accommodation and Machinery Spaces

It is very important to control access routes to deter or delay pirates who have
managed to board a vessel and are typing to enter accommodation or machinery
spaces. It is very important to recognize that if pirates do gain access to the upper
deck of a vessel they will be tenacious in their efforts to gain access to the
accommodation section and in particular the bridge. It is strongly recommended
that significant effort is expended prior to entry to the High Risk Area to deny the

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pirates access to the accommodation and the bridge.

 All doors and hatches providing access to the bridge, accommodation and
machinery spaces should be properly secured to prevent them being opened
by pirates.
 Careful consideration should be given to the means of securing doors and
hatches in order to afford the ship the maximum protection possible.
 Where the door or hatch is located on an escape route from a manned
compartment, it is essential that it can be opened by a seafarer trying to exit
by that route. Where the door or hatch is locked it is essential that a key is
available, in a clearly visible position by the door or hatch.
 It is recommended that once doors and hatches are secured, a designated
and limited number are used for routine access when required, their use
being strictly controlled by the door or hatch.
 Consideration should be given to blocking or lifting external ladders on the
accommodation block to prevent their use, and to restrict external access to
the bridge.
 Where doors and hatches are required to be closed for watertight integrity,
ensure all clips are fully dogged down in addition to any locks. Where
possible, additional securing such as with wire strops may enhance hatch
security.
 Pirates have been known to gain access through portholes and windows. The
fitting of steel bars to windows will prevent this even if they manage to
shatter the window.
 Prior to entering the High Risk Area procedures for controlling access to
accommodation, machinery spaces and store rooms should be set out and
practiced.
11.2.4 Physical Barriers

Pirates typically use long lightweight hooked ladders, grappling hooks with rope
attached and long hooked poles with a climbing rope attached to board vessels
underway. Physical barriers should be used to make it as difficult as possible to
gain access to vessels by increasing the height and difficulty of any climb for an
attacking pirates.
 Razor Wire
Razor wire (also known as barbed tape) creates an effective barrier but only

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when carefully deployed. The barbs on the wire are designed to have a
piercing and gripping action. Care should be taken when selecting
appropriate razor wire as the quality (wire gauge and frequency of barbs) and
type will vary considerably. Lower quality razor wire is unlikely to be
effective. Three main types of razor wire are commonly available:
 Unclipped (straight strand)
 Spiral (like a telephone cord) and
 Concertina (linked spirals).
11.2.5 Water Spray and Foam Monitors

The use of water spray and/or foam monitors has been found to be effective in
deterring or delaying pirates attempting to board a vessel. The use of water can
make it difficult for a pirates skiff to remain alongside and makes it significantly
more difficult for a pirate to try to climb onboard. Options include:
 Fire hoses and foam monitors - Manual operation of hoses and foam
monitors is not recommended as this is likely to place the operator in a
particularly exposed position and therefore it is recommended that hoses
and foam monitors (delivering water) should be fixed in position to cover
likely pirate access routes. Improved water coverage may be achieved by
using fire hoses in jet mode but by utilizing baffle plates fixed a short
distance in front of the nozzle.
 Water cannons - These are designed to deliver water in a vertical sweeping
arc thus protecting a greater part of the hull. Many of these have been
developed from tank cleaning machines.
 Ballast pumps – Where possible to do so ships may utilize their ballast
pumps to flood the deck with water thus providing a highly effective water
curtain over the ship’s side. This may be achieved by allowing ballast tanks
to over-flow on to the deck, by using existing pipework when in ballast
condition, or by retrofitting pipe work to allow flooding of the decks whilst in
loaded condition. Care must be taken to ensure that ballast tanks are not
over-pressurized causing damage to the hull and tanks, or vessel stability
compromised. If in doubt it is recommended that the relevant Classification
Society be contacted for advice.
 A Steam – Hot water, or using a diffuser nozzle to produce steam has also
been found to be very effective in deterring attacks.
 A Water spray rails – some ships have Installed spray rails using a Glass

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Reinforced Plastic (GAP) water main, with spray nozzles to produce a water
curtain to cover larger areas.
 A Foam can be used, but it must be in addition to a vessel’s standard Fire
Fighting Equipment (FEE) stock. Foam is effective as it is disorientating and
very slippery making it difficult to climb through.
The following points are also worthy of note:

 Once rigged and fixed in position it is recommended that hoses and foam
monitors are in a ready state, requiring just the remote activation of fire
pumps to commence delivery of water.
 Where possible no maintenance should be carried out on the vessel’s sea
water systems whilst on passage in the High Risk Area. Note that in order to
utilize all pumps additional power may be required and therefore these
systems should also be ready for immediate use.
 Practice, observation, and drills will be required in order to ensure that the
results achieved by the equipment, provide effective coverage of vulnerable
areas.
11.2.6 Alarms
Sounding the ship’s alarms/whistle serves to inform the vessel screw that a piracy
attack has commenced and, importantly, demonstrates to any potential attacker
that the ship is aware of the attack and is reacting to it. If approached, continuous
sounding of the vessel’s foghorn/whistle distracts the pirates and as above lets
them know that they have been seen. It is important to ensure that:
 The piracy alarm is distinctive to avoid confusion with other alarms,
potentially leading to the crew mustering at the wrong location outside the
accommodation.
 Crew members are familiar with each alarm, Including the signal warning of
an attack and an all clear, and the appropriate response to it.
 Exercises are carried out prior to entering the High Risk Area.
10.2 H) Maneuvering Practice

Practicing maneuvering the vessel prior to entry into the High Risk Area will be
very beneficial and will ensure familiarity with the ship’s handling characteristics
and how to effect anti-piracy maneuvers whilst maintaining the best possible

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speed. (Waiting until the ship is attacked before practicing this is too late!)
11.2.7. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)
Once an attack is underway and pirates are firing weaponry at the vessel, it is
difficult and dangerous to observe whether the pirates have managed to gain
access. The use of CCTV coverage allows a degree of monitoring of the progress of
the attack from a less exposed position:
 Consider the use of CCTV cameras to ensure coverage of vulnerable areas,
particularly the poop deck.
 Consider positioning CCTV monitors at the rear of the bridge in a protected
position.
 Further CCTV monitors could be located at the Safe Muster Point/Citadel
(see section 8.13)
 Recorded CCTV footage may provide useful evidence after an attack
11.2.8. Upper Deck Lighting

It is recommended that the following lights are available and tested:
 Weather deck lighting around the accommodation block and rear facing
lighting on the poop deck, consistent with Rule 20(b) of the international
Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea.
 Search lights for immediate use when required.
 It is, however, recommended that ships proceed with just their navigation
lights illuminated, with the lighting described above extinguished. Once
pirates have been identified or an attack commences, illuminating the
lighting described above demonstrates to the pirates that they have been
observed.
 Navigation lights should not be switched off at night.
11.2.9. Approach Stage – If not already at full speed, increase to maximum to open
the distance. Try to steer a straight course to maintain a maximum speed. Initiate
the ship’s pre-prepared emergency procedures.
 Activate the Emergency Communication plan
 Sound the emergency alarm and make a ‘Pirate Attack’ announcement in
accordance with the Ship’s Emergency Plan.
 Report the attack Immediately to authorities ashore.

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 Activate the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS). Which will alert your
Company Security officer and Flag State. Make a ‘Mayday’ call on VHF Ch.
16.
11.2.10. Attack stage

 Reconfirm that all ship’s personnel are in a position of safety.
 As the pirates close in on the vessel, Masters should commence small
alteration of helm whilst maintaining speed to deter skiffs form lying
alongside the vessel in preparation for a boarding attempt. These
maneuver’s will create additional wash to impede the operation of the skiffs.
 Substantial amounts of helm are not recommended, as these are likely to
significantly reduce a vessel’s speed.
11.3 Coping in a hostage situation

11.3.1 Deny Use of Ship’s Tools and Equipment
Pirates generally board vessels with little in the way of equipment other than
personal weaponry. It is important to try to deny pirates the use of ship’s tools or
equipment that may be used to gain entry into the vessel. Tools and equipment
that may be of use to the pirates should be stored in a secure location.
Protection of Equipment Stored on the Upper Deck Small arms and other
weaponry are often directed the vessel and are particularly concentrated on the
bridge, accommodation section and poop deck.
 Consideration should be given to providing protection, in the form of
sandbags or Kevlar blankets, to gas bottles (i.e. oxy-acetylene) or containers
of flammable liquids that must be stored in these locations.
 Ensure that any excess gas bottles or flammable materials are landed prior
to transit.
11.3.2 If the Pirates take Control

 Try to remain calm.
 Before the pirates gain access to the bridge, inform UKMTO. Ensure that the
SSAS has been activated, and ensure that the AIS is switched on.
 Offer no resistance to the pirates once they reach the bridge. Once on the
bridge the pirates are likely to be aggressive, highly agitated, and possibly
under the influence of drugs (including khat, an amphetamine like

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stimulant), so remaining calm and cooperating fully will greatly reduce the
risk of harm.
 If the bridge/engine room is to be evacuated the main engine should be
stopped and all way taken off the vessel if possible (and if navigationally safe
to do so). All remaining crew members should proceed to the designated Safe
Muster Point with their hands visible.

Doc No.: STSDSD-12

Revision: 00 Date:
12: The Release Process Approved By: DG
Page 1 of 1
12. The Release Process

12.1 Discuss the additional danger associated with the release process.
 On Board
 The ship will sail to a safe port where criminal debriefing and other debriefs
will be conducted.
 The Master or his replacement should take command of the vessel.
 The seafarers need to resume their normal onboard routines and duties.
 Seafarers should have direct communication with family members as soon
as possible for just a short time which will allow all crew to call quickly.
 During this call seafarers should be encouraged not to talk about the piracy
incident but about themselves and their families.
 Seafarers should receive medical care and be prescribed appropriate
medication.
 The ship should be provided with disinfectants, cleaning materials and
toiletries remembering to encourage the crew not to clean away forensic
evidence.
 The seafarers should be provided with clothing.
 The Master should encourage crew to talk and share their feelings amongst
themselves and if possible to make notes.
 Post-Release Response Ashore

The company should consider:
 Gathering together the crew.
 Providing interim hotel accommodation for the crew.
 Providing practical support such as haircuts, personal hygiene and clothing.
 Providing medical and emotional support.
 Arranging operational debriefs.
 Allowing further communication with families.
 Making available personnel trained to provide practical and emotional
support.

Doc No.: STSDSD-13

Revision: 00 Date:
13: Sea Farers Family Approved By: DG
Page 1 of 1
13. Sea Farers Family

13.1 Enables seafarers to consider what they may wish to share with their
family concerning the risk of piracy
 The seafarers Family Possible Reactions during a Crisis are Confusion,
Uncertainty, Worry, Fear, Anxiety, Shock, Anger, Distrust etc, Including
concerns regarding financial situation, Family strife and loss of trust with
the company.
 The reactions of the family following an attack or during a hostage situation
are very similar to those of the seafarer. There will be a confusion fo
information as for the first few days there may be little or no communication
from the ship. This will lead to feeling of uncertainty, worry, fear, anxiety,
shock, anger and loss of faith with the company. There will be need for
credible information from the company and other support. It is important
that the seafarers family is in contact and is supported by the
company/agent at this time.
 Ensure that the family has the correct contact details of the company in the
event of a piracy attack. Ensure that the company has the up-to –date
family contact details.
 Seafarers and their families need to ensure that they have contact details of
the company in the case of a piracy attack. They also need to make sure
that the company has up to date family contact details.
 Seafarers should know of their legal rights and contractual entitlements
during and after a period of piracy.
13.2 Discussion with participants and assessment.

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SECURITY TRAINING FOR SEAFARERS WITH

DESIGNATED SECURITY DUTES

Copyright © Director General of Shipping

SECURITY TRAINING FOR

Copyright © Director General of Shipping

SECURITY TRAINING FOR SEAFARERS

B: Revision Record Approved By :DG

Section Details of Revision Revision No. Date

Copyright © Director General of Shipping

SECURITY TRAINING FOR

SECURITY TRAINING FOR SEAFARERS WITH DESIGNATED SECURITY

SECURITY TRAINING FOR

6 Threat identification, recognition, and

Copyright © Director General of Shipping

SECURITY TRAINING FOR

13 Sea Farers Family

Copyright © Director General of Shipping

SECURITY TRAINING FOR

100% attendance is required for successful completion of the course.

Copyright © Director General of Shipping

SECURITY TRAINING FOR SEAFARERS

01: Introduction to STSDSD Approved By: DG

Another threat to the maritime transportation industry is from terrorism which

Contraband Smuggling –which is the clandestine transportation of illegal goods or

Copyright © Director General of Shipping

SECURITY TRAINING FOR SEAFARERS

01: Introduction to STSDSD Approved By: DG

Stowaways and Refugees – A stowaway is someone who hides on a train, bus,

Collateral damage- is damage to people or property that is unintended or

Copyright © Director General of Shipping

SECURITY TRAINING FOR SEAFARERS

01: Introduction to STSDSD Approved By: DG

Unfortunately, shipping is also extremely vulnerable to crime and terrorism. A

Modern suicide bombing was introduced by the Shlite terrorist organization

Copyright © Director General of Shipping

SECURITY TRAINING FOR SEAFARERS

02: Maritime Security Policy Approved By: DG

2 Maritime Security Policy

Piracy is a crime of “ universal jurisdiction”. Accordingly, any country which

Copyright © Director General of Shipping

SECURITY TRAINING FOR SEAFARERS

02: Maritime Security Policy Approved By: DG

The IMO January 22,2002 Resolution

United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime : The Palermo

And a new regulation XI-1/5 requires ships to be issued with a Continuous

Copyright © Director General of Shipping

SECURITY TRAINING FOR SEAFARERS

02: Maritime Security Policy Approved By: DG

The ISPS Code applies to ships on International Voyages ( including passenger

The main objectives of the ISPS Code are:

Copyright © Director General of Shipping

SECURITY TRAINING FOR SEAFARERS

02: Maritime Security Policy Approved By: DG

2.2.1 the Central Government or such other authority as may be designated by it

Company Security Officer – A Company Security officer (GSO) has the

Vessel Security officer or Ship Security Officer-

Facility Security Officer (FSO) is a person designated as responsible for the