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Milestones in Aircraft Structural Integrity

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 Milestone Aircraft Case Histories and
Continuing Developments

Russell Wanhill, Lorrie Molent, Simon Barter

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia)
 Overview

 INTRODUCTION : FATIGUE REQUIREMENTS

 DE HAVILLAND COMETS

CIVIL  BOEING 707

 BOEING 737

 BOEING B-47’S

MILITARY  GENERAL DYNAMICS F-111

 AERMACCHI MB-326H

 CASE HISTORIES: SUMMARY

 CONTINUING DEVELOPMENTS

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 2
 Evolution of civil aircraft fatigue
requirements

COMETS DAN - AIR ALOHA

1954 1977 1988

Fatigue (Safe-Life)
Yes
Either Inspection Impractical?
No
Fail-Safe
Damage Tolerance
Full-Scale Fatigue Test
LOV

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 3
 Evolution of military aircraft fatigue
requirements and techniques

B-47’S F-111 MB326H

1958 1969 1990

Fatigue (Safe-Life)
Static Strength USAF ASIP*
Both
Requirements
only Damage Tolerance
USAF
Quantitative Fractography (QF)
and ASIP*: DSTO/RAAF

*ASIP = Aircraft Structural Integrity Programme(s)

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 4
 BOAC De Havilland Comets 1954

BOAC De Havilland Comet Mark 1 G-ALYP : lost on January 10, 1954.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 5
 Comet Case Histories

 G-ALYP lost on January 10, 1954.

 G-ALYY lost on April 8, 1954.

 Investigations included pressurization testing of G-ALYU removed from

service: fatigue failure after only 1,825 test cycles from aft lower corner of
forward escape hatch, see slide 7.

 G-ALYP wreckage showed fatigue failure from R.H. aft corner of rear automatic
direction finding (ADF) window, see slides 8 −10.

 Early fatigue failures attributed to high local stresses, see slides 7,8,10.

 Cutouts in frames, slide 10, facilitated crack extension and fuselage rupture:
crack-stopper straps (tear straps) would have been needed.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 6
 Failure origin of test aircraft G-ALYU

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 7
 Failure origin of service aircraft G-ALYP: I

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 8
 Failure origin of service aircraft G-ALYP: II

Fuselage fragment recovered from the Mediterranean seabed: now in the

London Science Museum.
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 9
 Failure origin of service aircraft G-ALYP: III

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 10
 Lessons Learned

 Owing to analysis limitations, cracks can occur much earlier than anticipated
from Safe-Life fatigue design.

 Safety not guaranteed on a Safe-Life basis without imposing uneconomically

short service lives.

 Adoption of design principles : major structural areas must

sustain significant and easily detectable damage before safety is
compromised.

 However:
 some components, e.g. landing gear, are not amenable to Fail-Safe design
 no requirement as yet (see slide 12) to do Full-Scale Fatigue Testing.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 11
 Evolution of civil aircraft fatigue
requirements: I

COMETS
1954

Fatigue (Safe-Life)

Either

Fail-Safe

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 12
 DAN - AIR Boeing 707-321C 1977

DAN – AIR Boeing 707-320 passenger aircraft.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 13
 Boeing 707 Case History: I

 Dan - Air Boeing 707-321C G-BEBP air freighter lost the right-hand horizontal
stabilizer just before landing at Lusaka airport on May 14, 1977.

 The aircraft had accumulated 47,621 airframe flight hours and was past its
prime: the term ‘Geriatric Jet’ was introduced.
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 14
 Boeing 707 Case History: II
Failure origin of 707-321C G-BEBP
 Fatigue from a fastener hole in the upper chord of the rear spar.

Fastener − linked
chord elements
intended to be
:
damage should
have been easily
detectable before
final failure.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 15
 Causes of failure

 Fatigue:
 unanticipated high local stresses and oscillating loads owing to speed brake
deployment during normal landings.

 Lack of Fail-Safety:
 periodic inspection time less than 30 minutes, i.e. visual inspection
 visual inspection unable to detect partial failure of upper chord (see slide 15)
 once upper chord failed completely (visually detectable), the structure was
unable to sustain service loads long enough to enable detection.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 16
 Lessons Learned

design does not guarantee Fail-Safety: inspectability is equally

important.
 Essential to obtain accurate loads and load spectra for fatigue, fatigue crack
growth (i.e. ) and residual strength analyses.
 Horizontal stabilizer modification not checked by a Full-Scale Fatigue Test
(not yet required by regulations).

 All three lessons indicate the need to do Full-Scale Fatigue Testing.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 17
 Civil Aviation actions

 Introduction of , see slide 19.

 Airworthiness authorities began to reconsider the fatigue problems of

older (‘Geriatric’) aircraft. It became clear that some inspection methods
and schedules were inadequate and required supplementary programmes.

 However, there was still no requirement to do Full-Scale Fatigue Testing.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 18
 Evolution of aircraft fatigue
requirements: II

COMETS DAN AIR

1954 1977

Fatigue (Safe-Life)
Yes
Either Inspection Impractical?
No
Fail-Safe
Damage Tolerance

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 19
 Aloha Airlines Boeing 737-297 1988

Aloha Airlines Boeing 737-200 type aircraft.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 20
 Boeing 737 Case History: I

 Aloha Airlines Boeing 737-297 N73711 underwent explosive decompression at

cruise altitude on April 28, 1988. About 5.5m of the pressure cabin skin and
supporting structure was lost. Amazingly, the aircraft made a successful landing:

 The aircraft had accumulated 35,496 airframe flight hours and 89,680 (!) landings.
It was 19 years old and had operated with long-term exposure to warm sea air.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 21
 Boeing 737 Case History: II
Failure location of 737-297 N73711

Multiple Site fatigue

Damage (MSD) in
upper (outer) skin
began from rivet
hole knife edges.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 22
 Causes of failure: I

 Accident occurred due to three interrelated factors:

 skin splice design: cold-bonded and riveted to provide integral load

transfer; hence acceptance of relatively thin skins,
no doubler, and rivet hole knife edges

 bonding problems : early service history of 737 aircraft showed some

bonds susceptible to corrosion and disbonding

 maintenance lapse: Aloha Airlines neglected regular inspections and

any necessary repairs of skin splices.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 23
 Causes of failure: II

 Failure rationale (see slide 22 also):

 defective bonding allowed moisture into skin splice, causing corrosion and
disbonding of skin splice and Fail-Safe tear straps

 loss of skin splice integrity led to all load transfer via the rivets

 knife edges in upper skin caused MSD fatigue cracking in critical upper rivet row

 lack of maintenance allowed disbonding and cracking to remain undetected until

MSD cracks linked up rapidly

 disbonded tear straps could not provide Fail-Safety via controlled decompression

 explosive decompression with separation of major part of pressure cabin.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 24
 Lessons Learned

 Recognition that Widespread Fatigue Damage (WFD) in pressure cabins,

and also wings and empennage, can cause loss of Fail-Safety.

 Worldwide action to ensure safety and structural integrity of ageing aircraft:

 investigation, regulations and advisory circulars to cope with WFD
 more consideration of replacement or retirement instead of repetitive
inspections and necessary repairs
 corrosion control programmes for both civil and military aircraft.

 Requirements, see slide 26:

(Limit Of Validity) concept .

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 25
 Evolution of aircraft fatigue
requirements: III

COMETS DAN - AIR ALOHA

1954 1977 1988

Fatigue (Safe-Life)
Yes
Either Inspection Impractical?
No
Fail-Safe
Damage Tolerance
Full-Scale Fatigue Test
LOV*

*LOV = Limit Of Validity

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 26
 USAF Boeing B-47’s 1958

USAF Boeing B-47E Stratojet.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 27
 B-47 Case Histories

 Four catastrophic fatigue failures in early 1958:

Aircraft Date Failure location Flight hours

B-47B March 13 Centre wing, BL 45 2,077
TB-47B March 13 Left wing lower surface, BL 35 2,419
B-47E March 21 Disintegration 1,129
B-47E April 10 Aft wing-to-fuselage fitting, FS 515 1,265

 Critical areas, see slide 29:

 wing-to-fuselage area: Body Lines 35, 45, and Fuselage Station 515
 wing area: Wing Station 354.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 28
 Fatigue-critical areas (only R.H. side shown)

Critical wing-to-fuselage ‘Milk Bottle’ steel pins.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 29
 Strategic Air Command (SAC) and USAF
fleet actions

 SAC: flight restrictions, including gross weight, airspeed, manoeuvres, stalls,

buffet, flights in turbulence, touch-and-go’s, low-level flying.

 USAF Project Milk Bottle:

 emergency programme of inspection and repair May 1958 – June 1959,

involving more than 1600 aircraft.
– interim fix
– Boeing ‘ultimate’ fix, including oversize ‘Milk Bottle’ pins.

 Most of fleet modified by October 1958. By June 1959 only a few interim-fixed
aircraft still needed work.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 30
 Lessons Learned

 Adoption of design principles : need to control fatigue and

make accurately conservative life predictions based on analysis and testing.

 Project Milk Bottle:

 required development of a structural Integrity programme to assess the
B-47 service lives. This included Full-Scale Fatigue Tests.
 revealed many gaps in knowledge about high-performance aircraft.

 USAF Aircraft Structural Integrity Program (ASIP), see slide 32.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 31
 Evolution of aircraft fatigue
requirements and techniques: I

B-47’S
1958

Static Strength Fatigue (Safe-Life)

Requirements
only USAF ASIP

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 32
 USAF General Dynamics F-111 1969

RAAF General Dynamics F-111C with wings extended and swept back.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 33
 F-111 Case History: I

 USAF F-111A lost the left wing during low-level flight on December 22,
1969.

 Failure occurred after only 107 airframe flight hours and at about 3.5g, less
than 0.5 DLL (Design Limit Load).

 Crash-site investigation revealed a large flaw in the lower plate of the L.H.
wing pivot fitting, see slide 35. The plate and pivot fitting was made from a
high-strength steel.

 Flaw details (see slide 35 also):

 developed during manufacture of the steel plate
 undetected by pre-service inspections despite its considerable size
(23.4 mm Χ 5.9 mm)
 small amount of in-service fatigue before fast fracture of the plate.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 34
 F-111 Case History: II
Failure origin of F-111A 67-0049

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 35
 USAF actions and Lessons Learned

 Accident and airframe test problems led to a fracture control programme for
critical steel parts:
 aircraft periodically removed from service and proof tested at −40ºC*
 inspectable areas checked by standard non-destructive inspection (NDI).
*Steel fracture toughness and hence critical flaw/crack size less at low temperatures.

 Adoption of , see slide 37:

 flaws/cracks in new structure must be considered
 structures may be inspectable (Fail-Safe or slow flaw growth) or non-
inspectable (slow flaw growth)
 focus on safety rather than durability. However, after the ALOHA
accident (1988) durability increasingly linked to safety for older aircraft.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 36
 Evolution of aircraft fatigue
requirements and techniques: II

B-47’S F-111
1958 1969

Fatigue (Safe-Life)
Static Strength USAF ASIP
Both
Requirements
only Damage Tolerance
USAF

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 37
 RAAF Aermacchi MB-326H 1990

RAAF Aermacchi MB-326H A7-076: lost on November 22, 1990.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 38
 Aermacchi Case History: I

 A7-076 left wing separated during a 6.5g manoeuvre on November 22, 1990.

 Failure after 2188 airframe flight hours, only 70% of the Safe-Life derived
from Full-Scale Fatigue Testing in 1975.

 Wing loss due to fatigue and fracture of lower spar cap close to the centre
section attachment fitting. Fatigue began at a badly drilled bolt hole, see
slide 40.

 Further investigation of the failed spar revealed manufacturing flaws in

many holes, suggesting similar problems for the remainder of the fleet.

 Fleet-wide NDI found fatigue cracks growing from bolt hole manufacturing
flaws in four other wings, including the A7-076 right wing.

 However: detailed examination of the A7-076 right wing found many cracks
growing from normal quality structural details.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 39
 Aermacchi Case History: II
Failure origin of MB-326H A7-076

Fatigue from badly

drilled bolt hole:
fracture surface
markers important
for crack growth
measurements.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 40
 DSTO and RAAF actions: I

 Safe-Life reassessment:
 Teardown of nine high-life wings, NDI and (QF)
 QF data used to estimate ‘worst case’ fatigue crack growth lives
 conversion of fatigue crack growth lives into Safe-Life damage units used
for the Full-Scale Fatigue Test in 1975
 pooling the damage estimates and applying an appropriate scatter factor.

● Life limit 47% of original Safe-Life.

● Fleet recovery programme, slide 42.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 41
 DSTO and RAAF actions: II

 Fleet recovery programme:

 teardown of additional wing spars; NDI and destructive inspection of
more than 1000 bolt holes; QF of 103 cracks
 new and previous QF data used to estimate fleet-wide crack growth lives
 conversion of crack growth lives into Safe-Life damage units, as before:

● Life limit 52% of original Safe-Life.

● Wing replacements only feasible option: 30 new wing sets were purchased.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 42
 Lessons Learned

 RAAF structural integrity policy has changed similarly to the USAF’s after
the B-47 accidents in 1958. Since 1990 comprehensive ASIPs have been
established for each fleet. This was a major undertaking due to many types.

 Extensive research since 1990 (see slide 44) has shown that QF-based
fatigue crack growth analyses are essential for:
 Full-Scale (and component) Fatigue Tests
 structural integrity management of a fleet.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 43
 Evolution of aircraft fatigue
requirements and techniques: III

B-47’S F-111 MB326H

1958 1969 1990

Fatigue (Safe-Life)
Static Strength USAF ASIP
Both
Requirements
only Damage Tolerance
USAF
Quantitative Fractography (QF)
and ASIP: DSTO/RAAF

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 44
 Case Histories: Summary

 These case histories may be considered milestones in the development of

aircraft structural integrity.

 Lessons learned have been especially influential for:

 improving knowledge of problems in ensuring aircraft safety and
durability
 changing fatigue design approaches and requirements for both
manufacturers and operators.

 However, many other failures have contributed to developments in aircraft

structural integrity. These developments are continuing for the foreseeable
future, see slides 46−49.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 45
 Continuing Developments: I
Fatigue analyses of conventional airframes

 Short crack growth:

 many QF data obtained by DSTO since the Aermacchi MB326H accident
, including types and sizes of fatigue-initiating discontinuities
 analysis methods developed to use these data for life predictions and
reassessments, including the use of equivalent pre-crack sizes (EPS).

 Corrosion and fatigue:

 corrosion is an important source (initiator) of fatigue cracking

However
 corrosion in military aircraft appears to be predominantly ground-
based, while fatigue occurs mainly in flight. This needs further
investigation, since it can have a major impact on service life
management.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 46
 Continuing Developments: II
Material developments for airframes

 Civil and military transport aircraft:

 aluminium alloys generally about 60% of the structural weight
 exceptions are the Boeing 787 Dreamliner and Airbus A350 XWB, which use
50−53% composites and only 19−20% aluminium.

 Tactical aircraft:
 composites (35−40%) and lesser percentages of titanium, aluminium and steels.

 Helicopters:
 higher percentages of composites (up to 80−90%) owing to the importance of
weight savings for vertical lift aircraft.

● Modern trend is to design and build hybrid structures, for example slide 48

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 47
 Hybrid airframe example: Airbus A380

CFRP = Carbon Fibre Reinforced Plastic; GLARE = GLAss REinforced aluminium laminates; 2XXX, 6XXX,
7XXX = conventional aluminium alloys; Al-Li = Aluminium-Lithium alloys; LBW = Laser Beam Welding.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 48
 New materials structural integrity implications:
Comparisons with conventional aluminium alloys

 Al-Li alloys: virtually no changes

 GLARE: some differences, addressed by GLARE design ‘toolbox’

 CFRP: very different design principles required:

● difficult to predict failure in complex components
● susceptible to impact damage and subsequent fatigue
cracking and delamination
● sensitive to stress concentrations
● problematic inspection reliability
● repairs difficult to validate.

Safety currently ensured by over-designing with the ‘no growth’ Damage

Tolerance principle (FAA AC-20-107B, 2009 ; MIL-HDBK-17-3F, 2013).

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 49
 Selected Bibliography: I
1. P. Safarian, 2013, “Fatigue and Damage Tolerance Requirements of Civil Aviation,
Lesson 01 – Introduction, Winter 2014”, University of Washington, Seattle, USA.
2. R.G. Eastin and W. Sippel, 2011, The “WFD rule” − have we come full circle?, USAF
Aircraft Structural Integrity Conference 2011, November 29–December 1, 2011, San
Antonio, Texas.
3. E. S. Wilson, 1995, Developments in RAAF aircraft structural integrity management. In:
“Estimation, Enhancement and Control of Aircraft Fatigue Performance,” eds. J. M.
Grandage and G. S. Jost, Engineering Materials Advisory Services, Warley, UK, Vol. II,
pp. 959−970.
4. S. A. Barter, L. Molent and R.J.H. Wanhill, 2010, Fatigue life assessment for high
performance metallic airframe structures − an innovative practical approach. In:
“Structural Failure Analysis and Prediction Methods for Aerospace Vehicles and
Structures,” ed. S.-Y. Ho, Bentham E-Books, Bentham Science Publishers, Sharjah,
UAR, Chap.1, pp. 1-17.
5. T. Swift, 1987, Damage tolerance in pressurized fuselages. 11th Plantema Memorial
Lecture in: “New Materials and Fatigue Resistant Aircraft Design,’’ ed. D. L. Simpson,
Engineering Materials Advisory Services, Warley, UK, pp. 1–77.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 50
 Selected Bibliography: II
6. C. F. Tiffany, J. P. Gallagher and C. A. Babish, IV, 2010, “Threats to Aircraft Structural
Safety, Including a Compendium of Selected Structural Accidents/Incidents,”
Aerospace Systems Center Technical Report ASC-TR-2010-5002, Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, Dayton, Ohio.
7. J. M. Ramsden, 1977. The geriatric jet problem. Flight International, Vol. 112, pp. 1201–
1204, 1207.
8. I. C. Howard, 1986, Fracture of an aircraft horizontal stabilizer. In: ‘‘Case Histories
Involving Fatigue and Fracture Mechanics, ASTM STP 918,’’ eds. C. M. Hudson and T.
P. Rich, American Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, pp. 259–276.
9. Aircraft Accident Report, Aloha Airlines, Flight 243, 1989, Boeing 737-200, N73711, Near
Maui, Hawaii, April 28, 1988, NTSB report no. NTSB/AAR-89/03, National Transportation
Safety Board: Washington, DC.
10. U. G. Goranson, 1993, Damage tolerance—facts and fiction. 14th Plantema Memorial
Lecture in: “Durability and Structural Integrity of Airframes,’’ ed. A. F. Blom,
Engineering Materials Advisory Services, Warley, UK, Vol. I, pp. 3–105.
11. N. Athiniotis, S. A. Barter and N. T. Goldsmith, 1991, “Macchi aircraft safety-by-
inspection validation program - A7-076 starboard wing tear-down preliminary report,”
Defect Assessment & Failure Analysis Report No. M21/91, Defence Science and
Technology Aeronautical Research Laboratory, Melbourne, Australia.
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 51
 Selected Bibliography: III
12. S. A. Barter, L. Molent and R.J.H. Wanhill, 2012, Typical fatigue-initiating discontinuities
in metallic aircraft structures. International Journal of Fatigue, Vol. 41(1), pp. 11–22.
13. S. A. Barter and L. Molent, 2013, Service fatigue cracking in an aircraft bulkhead
exposed to a corrosive environment. Engineering Failure Analysis, Vol. 34, pp. 181−188.
14. R.J.H. Wanhill, 2013, Aerospace applications of aluminum-lithium alloys. In:
“Aluminum-Lithium Alloys, Processing, Properties and Applications,” eds. N. E.
Prasad, A. A Gokhale and R .J. H. Wanhill, Butterworth-Heinemann, Elsevier Inc.,
Oxford, UK, pp. 503-535.
15. T. Beumler, 2004, Flying GLAREⓇ, a contribution to aircraft certification issues in non-
damaged and fatigue damaged GLAREⓇ structures, Doctor’s Thesis, Delft University of
Technology, Delft, the Netherlands.
16. Federal Aviation Administration, 2009, Composite Aircraft Structure, Advisory Circular
FAA AC-20-107B, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, DC.
17. Military Composite Materials Handbook, Volume 3. Polymer Matrix Composites
Materials Usage, Design, And Analysis, 2013, MIL-HDBK-17-3F, U.S. Department of
Defense, The Pentagon, Virginia.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (Netherlands) and Defence Science and Technology Group DSTG (Australia) 25-9-2015 52
 Questions?

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 More questions?

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