45th AIAA/ASME/ASCE/AHS/ASC Structures, Structural Dynamics & Materials Conference AIAA 2004-1785

19 - 22 April 2004, Palm Springs, California

Evolution of Structures Design Philosophy and Criteria

Michael Mohaghegh, Ph.D., S.E.*

7E7-Enabling Technology
Boeing Commercial Airplanes

Nomenclature
AC Advisory circular FEM Finite element method
AD Accidental damage FRF Fatigue reliability factor
BCA Boeing Commercial Airplanes HSLA High strength low alloy
BMS Boeing material specifications IPT Integrated product teams
BVID Barely visible impact damage IWS Integrated work statement
Cd Cadmium JSF Joint Strike Fighter
CFD Computational fluid dynamics KBE Knowledge Base Engineering
CPCP Corrosion Prevention and Control Program LOV Limit of Validity
DBT Design/build team MED Multiple element damage
DPA Digital pre-assembly MLG Main landing gear
DSO Design service objective MSD Multiple site damage
ED Environmental damage NDI Non-destructive inspection
FAA Federal Aviation Administration SS Stainless steel
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations VID Visible impact damage
FD Fatigue damage WFD Widespread fatigue damage

I. Introduction
The challenge in airframe structure design has always been to provide an optimum solution satisfying the
competing requirements for safety, performance and cost. To achieve this goal effectively the designer today works
within a clearly established philosophy and well defined criteria which have evolved over more than fifty years,
through often painful service experience, emerging technology and the recognition of new evolving critical design
parameters.
This paper reviews the critical elements of the current philosophy and discusses the authors’ perspective of some
of the most significant events since the 1950’s which have shaped today’s approach to structural design.
It concludes with some thoughts on future challenges we must face to enhance safety, utilize technology
improvements intelligently, and provide airline operators with the most user-friendly airplanes possible, while at the
same time learning to use our design resources more efficiently.
Future programs will see increased emphasis on design/build global partnerships to draw upon the best available
engineering and manufacturing talents worldwide. The potential benefits to cost, quality, and cycle time are
considerable. Realization will depend upon unprecedented levels of seamless cooperation.
As we meet these challenges successfully, we can expect the next generations of commercial airplanes to offer
the airline passenger even safer and more comfortable travel at lower cost while having minimum impact on the
environment.

II. The Structural Design Challenge

The perennial and on-going challenge in airframe structural design is simultaneously to satisfy three major
competing and disparate requirements in one optimum solution.
They are, (1) to provide maximum inherent safety, (2) to achieve superior structural performance in terms of
weight and durability and (3) deliver an airframe with minimum realistic costs of production and long-term
ownership by the operator. They must always be mutually and efficiently satisfied to bring real value to the flying
public, our only reason for existence.
The essential requirement for structural performance (weight control) has challenged design safety factors more
than in any other branch of engineering. In turn this demands the use of high strength materials and relatively high
design and operating stresses. Also, as commercial airplane usage and life spans have increased so has the need for

*
AIAA Associate Fellow, Boeing Technical Fellow

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Copyright © 2004 by Michael Mohaghegh. Published by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., with permission.
more robust, durable, damage tolerant and corrosion resistant structures. Consequently airframe designers are
always operating within exacting constraints, which leave essentially no margin for error. Success requires an
intimate knowledge and understanding of the operating environment, structural and material behavior, and the
proper tools for accurate prediction. A clearly established philosophy and well-defined criteria are essential to this
success.
Today this philosophy and associated criteria exist
and are essentially universally accepted to govern
current design practices. This framework has enabled
designers to develop near-optimum solutions for safety,
weight efficiency, reliability and a reasonable cost of
ownership throughout service lives of 20, 30 or more
years. It has slowly evolved over more than fifty years,
shaped by often painful experience, emerging
technology and the recognition of new critical design
parameters as airplanes have flown faster, farther,
higher and in ever greater numbers. Fig. 1 shows the Figure 1 Continuous feedback process
continuous feedback process which is used to update
the regulatory and Boeing design requirements.
This process has been enhanced by increasing cooperation between manufacturers, regulators, and operators
worldwide as shown in Fig. 2.
The principal structural design requirements consist of ten core elements shown in Fig. 3. This figure also acts as
a roadmap to the next level of detail in the structures design requirements and criteria. It can be used as a check list
by the designer to make sure that all requirements for a given design have been met.
This paper reviews the present philosophy governing
design for safety, performance and cost, their inter
relationships and some of the significant events over the
past fifty years which have shaped today’s approach to
structural design. It concludes with a discussion of some
of the new challenges we can expect and must embrace
in the future. They include the impact of new technology
advances, increased maintenance efficiency for the

Figure 2 Cooperation between manufacturers,

regulators, and operators

operator, better management of our design and

manufacturing resources, and a growing use of global
design/build partnerships.
While this paper focuses mainly on Boeing
commercial experience it is thankfully acknowledged
that the industry in general, both commercial and
military, has contributed vastly to today’s understanding
and practices of structural design. Figure 3 Structures design criteria

III. SAFETY
Commercial airplane design philosophy has always been to deliver a safe airframe based on state-of-the-art
understanding of the operating environment and structural behavior. Initially this was achieved primarily by
designing for strength and stiffness.

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A. Flutter
The airplane must be free from flutter, divergence,
control reversal, and any undue loss of stability and
control as a result of structural deformation. Flutter is a
self-excited, often destructive, in-flight structural
oscillation of the airplane that derives its energy from
the air stream. The structural modes of vibration of the
airplane, combined with the aerodynamic forces and the
flight control system control laws, are the important
parameters involved in the prediction of flutter
(aeroservoelastic) characteristics. Structural,
aerodynamic, and system analytical models are
developed for the dynamic aeroelastic stability solution.
Figure 4 shows an example of flutter failure that did not
result in the catastrophic failure of the airplane.

B. Static Strength
Static strength of structure is predicted by analysis
methods validated by cumulative and collective
experience. Figure 4 Example of structural failure caused by
Validation testing is conducted where sufficient flutter
confidence does not exist for the analysis or if specific
validation testing is required for certification (FAR
25.307). Figure 5 shows the deflected shape of the 777
airplane wing just before static ultimate failure. Static
failure of metallic airplane structures has been predicted
by an increasing high level of accuracy.
However with increased service experience and
more sophisticated performance demands, many other
influencing factors have become increasingly important
to a successful design. These factors have been steadily
incorporated into industry and regulatory requirements
to arrive at today’s philosophy and practices.
Some of the key events and milestones are discussed
here.

C. Evolution of Design Requirements

In the USA since 1927 the Federal Government has
taken the responsibility for establishing structural design
criteria, among many other standards. The original
Bureau of Air Commerce became the Civil Aeronautics
Administration in 1938, and later became today’s
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Similar
Figure 5 Wing static strength test
organizations in Europe and other countries perform the
same safety related functions as the FAA, with a high
degree of mutual cooperation.
The early requirements focused on flight and ground
load conditions to be considered, and the requirement to
demonstrate adequate limit and ultimate strength and
sufficient stiffness to prevent flutter and divergence.
However some dramatic events in service led to
additional and more sophisticated requirements.
These events include the Comet accidents in the
1950’s, which led to the universal recognition of the
need to design for fatigue performance and fail safety Figure 6 Comet accident
(see Fig. 6).

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 Later, the failure of a 707
stabilizer showed that fail-safe
design, while necessary, may not
always be sufficient (see Fig. 7). In
turn this led to the damage tolerance
requirements incorporated in 1978.
At about the same time, as large
fleets of commercial airplanes were
approaching and exceeding 20 years
of service use, the concern for an
understanding of potential
widespread undetected fatigue (see
Fig. 8) damage was emerging. The
Aloha 737 fuselage failure
concentrated this concern worldwide
with the result that regulatory actions
were established to mandate
adequate full-scale fatigue testing of
new airframe designs to preclude
WFD in service. At the same time
more emphasis was placed on
maintenance and inspection actions
Figure 7 707 horizontal stabilizer rear spar failure to enhance ongoing safety. While
these requirements have been
promulgated by the regulatory agencies, they have generally been crafted by cooperative action with industry.
The evolution of FAR 25.571 shown in Table 1
shows how design requirements for fail/safety and
damage tolerance emerged as a result of the service
experience described above. These additional
requirements profoundly influence airframe design
today, and each warrants a brief review here to
understand its particular influence.

D. Fail Safety
Fail safety is the ability to fly and land safely with
significant structural damage. Fail safe designs provide
inherent robustness in the event of damage from many
possible sources including fatigue cracking, corrosion,
accidental damage, maintenance errors and discrete
events such as engine bursts.
Fail safety has been a fundamental design
requirement since the 707. All primary flight loaded Figure 8 Aloha incident
structure must be designed to be fail-safe. The general
Table 1 FAR 25.571 Amendments Related to Fail Safety and Damage Tolerance
Amendment Title Summary of Changes to FAR 25.571
Level & Date
25-0 Fatigue evaluation of (c) Fail safe strength.
(12/24/64) flight structure. “It must be shown by analysis, tests, or both, that catastrophic failure or excessive deformation, that
could adversely affect the flight characteristics of the airplane, are not probable after fatigue or obvious
partial failure of a single PSE.
25-45 Damage-tolerance (b) Damage-tolerance (fail-safe) evaluation.
(12/1/78) and fatigue “The evaluation must include a determination of the probable locations and modes of damage due to
evaluation of fatigue, corrosion, or accidental damage. The residual strength evaluation must show that the remaining
structure. structure is able to withstand loads corresponding to ...”
25-96 Damage-tolerance (b) Damage-tolerance evaluation, for WFD
(4/30/98) and fatigue Initial flaw of maximum probable size from manufacturing defect or service induced damage used to set
evaluation of inspection thresholds; sufficient full scale fatigue test evidence must demonstrate that WFD will not
structure for WFD. occur within DSO (no airplane may be operated beyond cycles equal to ½ the cycles on fatigue test
article until testing is completed).

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 requirement is to be able to sustain limit load with any major element failed or an obvious partial failure of a multi-
element panel. This has led to the familiar discretely stiffened wing and fuselage panel concepts and the multiply-
redundant two and three piece primary bulkheads, major fittings and cutout reinforcements. Traditionally for
panelized construction, Boeing has elected to design for limit load capability with a two bay crack and a fail central
stiffener or frame (Fig. 9). Also the need for damage arrest capability has often influenced material choices.
The main intent is the safe damage arrest and containment for a single high load event when significant damage
may exist. The premise is that the damage will be obvious in flight or readily detected by normal visual inspections
on the ground following the event. Confidence is obviously enhanced when the potentially critical areas are easily
inspectable.
1. In-service Incidents Involving Structural Failure
Fail-safe structure has always been a fundamental
design feature on Boeing commercial jet transports. This
design philosophy has resulted in robust structure that
can withstand a great deal of damage in service and still
allow an airplane to land safely. Continued attention to
fail-safe structural features is critical to continuously
improving the level of safety on Boeing airplanes
There have been over 40 incidents of failed structure
on heritage Boeing and non-Boeing airplanes. They
include incidents where fail-safe features allowed the
airplane to survive with significant damage. Incidents are
also included where catastrophic failure occurred in the
absence of sufficient fail-safe features.
This compilation is by no means all-inclusive, but
does provide a broad range of examples. Damage sources
Figure 9 Two bay crack in the wing lower surface test include fatigue, corrosion, improper maintenance,
panel manufacturing defects, and discrete events such as engine
burst, bombs, bird strike, tire burst, and tail strike. Fail-
safe features were summarized into the following categories:
• alternate/intermediate/adjacent members that pick up load from failed members (e.g. typical frames)
• crack arrest features (e.g. tear straps)
• boundaries of components and sub-components (e.g. major joints)
• substantial boundary members (e.g. heavy frames)
• material toughness and slow crack growth characteristics
• low stress levels
Service experience around the world has shown that the fail-safe philosophy has made a vital contribution to
structural safety. Dozens of incident has demonstrated safe flight and landing with considerable structural damage.
Two examples for fuselage and wing are given in Figs. 10 and 11. However, fail-safe design by itself does not
always ensure failures will be obvious and safe for further operation. Damage must be both detectable and detected
to ensure continuing safety. This fact was dramatically
illustrated in 1977 with the loss of a 707 near Lusaka, Table 2 Damage tolerance regulation comparison
Zambia. This accident resulted from fatigue failure of a Analysis FAR 25.571 FAR 25.571
horizontal stabilizer rear spar which had a fail-safe “mid (before 1978) (after 1978)
cord” as part of the design configuration (See Fig. 5). Residual • Single element • Multiple active cracks
There were many contributing factors to the accident, but strength of obvious failure
lack of a timely inspection that would have detected Crack • No analysis • Extensive analysis
damage to the upper cord was a prime factor. This was growth required required
one of the significant events that initiated supplemental
structural fatigue inspections to address continuing
airworthiness concerns for aging jet transports. Inspection • Based on • Related to structural
program service history damage
Damage Tolerance characteristics and
• FAA air carrier
Regulatory requirements were revised in 1978 to past service history
approval
mandate use of damage tolerance methodologies as part • Initial FAA engineering
of the Amendment 45 Changes to FAR 25.571 (Table 2). and air carrier
approval

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 Figure 10 Safe fuselage decompression examples
Damage tolerance is the ability to sustain operating
loads (up to limit load) in the presence of unknown
fatigue, corrosion or accidental damage until such Figure 11 Example of safe wing penetrations
damage is detected through inspections or safe
malfunction, and then repaired (Fig. 12). All primary flight loaded structure must be designed to be damage tolerant.
This requires that the structure has sufficient damage growth properties and detection characteristics so that if
damage were to develop at single or multiple sites, normal specified airline inspections would ensure that the
damage is found before it reduces the residual strength capability below limit load. This requirement, in conjunction
with the fail-safe requirement, is essential to provide the most comprehensive assurance of continued safety
throughout the service life of an airplane.
With continued safety reliant upon inspection, it is essential to know where to look and how large a crack or
damage may be missed. To aid in developing reliable inspection programs, tear downs of older airplanes and fatigue
test articles and large scale component tests have been conducted to develop fundamental data to calibrate fracture
mechanics techniques. In this way it has become possible to relate detectable damage, damage growth and critical
damage size to establish the proper inspection methods
and frequency required to maintain safe operation up to
and beyond the original design service objective. Boeing
published damage tolerance standards in 1979 and
applied them to the design of the 757, 767, 777 and the
next generation 737’s. Use of these techniques during
design has significantly influenced structural
arrangements, materials, working stress levels,
accessibility, inspectability, and repairability.
Airplane structures are grouped into various
categories as shown in Table 3. Secondary structures
such as fairings are designed for safe separation.
Primary Structures are designed for damage obvious or
malfunction evident to the largest extent possible. The
remaining structure is designed for damage detection by
planned inspection. Structures that cannot practically be
designed to be damage tolerant are designed to be safe
life. Table 3 also shows analysis requirements and
structural examples for all categories. Figure 12 Strength requirements for damage tolerant
structure
E. Fatigue (Durability)
Durability (the avoidance of fatigue damage) has long been a prime goal of the designer, it being essential to
provide the customer with a long-life trouble-free airplane, with reasonable maintenance costs. Full-scale fatigue
tests have been conducted by Boeing on nearly all models since the 1950’s as an economic measure, with the intent
of discovering any unanticipated fatigue problems caused by design or manufacturing processes, fixing them and

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 Table 3 Structural classifications for damage tolerance
Analysis Structural
Structural category Required design attributes
requirements examples
Other structure c Design for loss of Continued safe flight Flap track canoe fairings
Secondary structure component or safe (safe separation or safe loss
separation or segment)
d Design for failure or partial • Residual strength Wing fuel leaks
Damage obvious or failure of a principal
malfunction evident structural element with
continued structural
integrity
Primary structure e Inspection program matched • Residual strength All primary structure not
(Structurally significant Damage detection by to structural characteristics • Crack growth included in categories and
items or principal planned inspection
• Inspection program
structural elements)
f Design for conservative Fatigue analysis Landing gear structure
Safe life design fatigue life (damage tolerant verified by test
design is impractical)
continuing to one or more design service lives to validate the airframe long-term durability. However with the 757
and 767 Boeing elected to test full-scale airframes to 100,000 flights, or twice the design service objective. This was
done in recognition of the fact that many airlines would want to operate these aircraft well beyond 50,000 flights or
20 years, and that the test data gathered in the second lifetime could be invaluable in building confidence for
extended life and also exposing any potential “aging” problems.
With an increasing awareness of potential widespread fatigue damage as a safety issue, it was decided to expand
the 777 fatigue test to three times the design service objective. No occurrence of any WFD occurred in any of the
three tests. Tests of all three airplanes incorporated damage tolerance cycling for crack growth and validation of
proposed inspection procedures. The recent FAA requirements for fatigue testing of new designs to two lifetimes as
an element of safety validation is essentially in line with Boeing practice for the past 20 years, and is welcomed.

F. Aging Fleet
In the mid 1980’s it became obvious that jet transport owners, seeking economic efficiency balance between use
of existing airplanes and their maintenance costs, were in many cases starting to operate aircraft beyond the initial
design service objectives. Consequently,
Boeing initiated an aging fleet survey
program in 1986 to gain a better
understanding of continued operation of
older airplanes. Surveys were conducted to
ascertain the condition of structures and
systems, and observe the effectiveness of
corrosion-prevention features. Prompted by
the explosive decompression of a 737
fuselage over Hawaii in 1988, industry
working groups took extensive actions to
address aging fleet structural airworthiness Figure 13 Aging fleet programs
concerns, including (see Fig. 13):
1. Mandatory structural modifications to lessen dependence on structural inspections
2. Development of mandatory Corrosion Prevention and Control Program (CPCP)
3. Development of structural repair assessment procedures to address hidden cracking concerns.
4. Development of new inspection requirements to address widespread fatigue damage (WFD) concerns in
similarly stressed and configured details.

G. Widespread Fatigue Damage

As more and more aircraft approach and exceed their original design service objectives, the threat of widespread
fatigue damage becomes more acute. Widespread fatigue damage is characterized by multiple cracking in adjacent
similarly loaded elements and details to the point that the structure will no longer meet its damage tolerance
requirements (i.e. maintaining the required residual strength after a partial failure or crack linkup).
Two distinct types of WFD can occur (Fig. 14):

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1. Multiple site damage (MSD) is the simultaneous
presence of fatigue cracks in the same structural
element or panel.
2. Multiple element damage (MED) is the simultaneous
presence of fatigue cracks in adjacent independent
structural elements.
WFD is most likely in pressure designed fuselage
structure with hundreds of adjacent similar details
operating at essentially the identical stress each and every
flight.
Traditional fail-safe structural arrangements cannot
fully guarantee safety in the presence of WFD. Therefore
WFD simply cannot be allowed to occur. Regulators and
Industry are still considering the most reliable actions to
preclude its occurrence. As previously stated several
options are already in place.
Full-scale fatigue tests to multiple anticipated service
lifetimes may either pinpoint the anticipated onset of
WFD, or if none occurs on test, a conservative threshold
can be reasonably predicted. Likewise, special intense in-
service inspections of high time airplanes can be
conducted as well as tear down inspections of high time
out-of-service airplanes. Ultimately, however, it may be Figure 14 Local versus widespread MSD or MED
that safety can only be guaranteed by structural
modifications or even retirement from service. One of the new requirements is a concept called Limit Of Validity
(LOV). The LOV is a point in the structural life or an airplane where there are significantly increased uncertainties
in structural performance and increased probability of development of WFD. Additional fatigue test evidence and
validation of the maintenance program for effectiveness against WFD is required to extend an established LOV.

IV. PERFORMANCE
To be successful in the marketplace, a new airplane must offer superior performance as well as unquestionable
safety. The Structures contribution to this goal is vital and mandates delivery of the most weight efficient design,
coupled with robustness, durability and ease of maintenance. Once the design service objective (years and flights) is
established the designer must begin the optimization process to achieve the most balanced design which
simultaneously satisfies all safety and performance goals, both regulatory and self-imposed. Fortunately the design
task is made a little easier today because of the experience and legacy of the past 50 years, which has brought about
a wealth of skills, comprehensive data bases, material options and design analysis tools. These all facilitate accurate
and discriminating assessments of competing issues and enable the most informed and optimum balanced solutions.
They permit a lean design in which all requirements are met with a minimum weight, complexity and cost, with no
sacrifice in safety or quality.
Principally these assets include:
1. A thorough understanding of the operating environment
2. Accurate external and internal loads prediction capability
3. Availability of high performance materials tailored for specific needs
4. Refined techniques for predicting fatigue and fracture behavior, validated by comprehensive test programs
5. Capability for reliable corrosion prevention and control
6. The critical role of maintenance and shared service experience
Each has contributed greatly to today’s essentially seamless design approach for the best possible structural
performance. A brief review of some of the key advances is appropriate to appreciate the tremendous progress made
in the last half century.

H. Loads
1. External Loads
The ability to correctly predict the airplane loads environment has increased dramatically over the last 50 years.
This has led to improvements in safety, while benefiting our customers with enhanced performance and increased
levels of passenger comfort. In the early days of jet transport, tools used to predict loads were relatively simple

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(often based upon computational power that was available), and simplified assumptions about the operating
environment of the aircraft were used. Conservative assumptions were used in order to assure safety, resulting in
less than optimal airplane performance in the form of increased structural weight. Over the years, as the knowledge,
tools, and requirements have matured, the airlines and the flying public have both benefited, not only from the
increased levels of safety, but from lighter, more durable airplanes which provide better levels of passenger comfort.
The knowledge base of jet aircraft and their operational environment has evolved over time using a mixture of
independent research, government sponsored projects, industry databases, and Boeing’s own internal efforts.
Lessons learned from fleet incidents have been gathered and utilized to enhance safety by new criteria and
methodologies as well as new design practices. Collections of in-service fleet data have allowed us to validate or
improve our design assumptions. Compilations of fleet utilization statistics and airline reliability and maintainability
data have permitted us to greatly improve our durability analysis by focusing on critical flight segments and
targeting critical components.
Boeing design loads requirements are derived from both internal criteria and from the regulatory agency
standards. Early design requirements were more straightforward than today. They had their roots in a philosophy
that mandated criteria that had historically been shown to provide a level of passenger safety. These requirements
were continually augmented by additional criteria that were found to be necessary due to accidents, incidents, or
new features on the airplanes. Today’s trend is towards an increasing reliance on a more probabilistic approach,
where fleet statistics are utilized to derive criteria that will produce expected load levels, such as limit load, the
maximum load expected in service. An example of this is evident in the recent development of new gust regulations,
where new gust intensities have been derived from thousands of hours of in-service airline data.
Improvements in methodologies for loads predictions have evolved simultaneously with the increases in
knowledge and computing capabilities. From simple beam models using strip theory for an aeroelastic solution, to
highly complex, total airplane finite element models and Computational Fluid Dynamic (CFD) applications,
increased computer power has allowed for dramatic advances in how loads are calculated (see Fig. 15). The
improvements in the accuracy of the tools, the ability to solve more complex problems, and a better understanding
of the important parameters, has allowed for optimized structural solutions for performance, while maintaining or
improving stringent safety levels. Aerodynamics, mass properties, and structural representations have all been
improved. Input data such as aerodynamics, which used to be taken strictly from wind tunnel testing have been
augmented by running CFD, allowing for greater accuracy in the final results. The tools and methods have been
validated using data collected during flight testing on the 777 and 737NG programs. These new methods, which
allow for better, more accurate loads analysis, are also being used to develop advanced airfoil designs to further
benefit aircraft performance. The increase in requirements and the complexity of the analysis has caused a large
increase in work required, computing power, and has fed downstream customers with increased numbers and variety
of load conditions they have to consider in structural design. The number of design conditions has escalated from
less than 100 on early Boeing models to numbers in the thousands on more recent projects.

(a) FEM Model (B) Beam Model

Figure 15. External Loads Model
Boeing continues to lead the aerospace industry in developing advanced computing processes, methods and tools
for the design and response prediction of complex aerospace vehicles subjected to static, dynamic, stochastic and
thermal load environments. The tools, coupled with advanced computing systems, have been used to generate
solutions to engineering and scientific problems that were previously not attainable. A wealth of technologies is
accommodated in the structural optimization processes that include strength, stability, flutter, aeroelastic static and
dynamic loads, acoustic loading, thermal loads, load transfer at joints, and structural manufacturing constraints for

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advanced composite and metallic structural concepts. This optimization holds the promise of even greater gains in
airplane performance as we move into the future.
The same high speed computational capabilities, which have permitted improvements in loads predictions and
structural optimization, have also been utilized on the airplane itself to improve airplane performance through flight
control technology. Modern fly by wire systems weigh less and are easier to maintain than their predecessors. These
devices have allowed for reduced pilot workload, have been used as load reduction devices to decrease airplane
weight, and have been used to improve ride quality. Today’s flight controls offer airlines important enhancements
from passenger comfort to reduced cost and weight, but must be reviewed extensively by the loads analysts in order
to assure safety requirements are met, both in normal operation and in degraded conditions.
Advancements in technology, new methodologies, and an increase in knowledge of today’s operational
environment, have all provided for an improved levels of safety in modern jet aircraft, while allowing for better
performance and higher levels of passenger comfort. The next generation of airplanes will continue to benefit from
new materials and technologies, better airfoils, and increased application of flight controls, all of this requiring
diligence on the part of the loads engineer in order to also assure passenger safety levels continue to improve.
2. Internal Loads
The objective of performing ”Internal Loads Analysis” is to predict the load levels internal to structural
components of an aircraft, due to a set of critical flight, ultimate, fatigue, fail-safe, landing, ground-handling and
selected payload-arrangements. The internal loads are then used to predict operating stress/strain levels in the
detailed structural components in calculating the respective margins of safety relative to the appropriate design
stress/strain allowables.
Aircraft have presented some extremely difficult structural design problems in meeting the relentless objective of
minimum weight structure, coupled with maximum safety. To this end, aircraft structural engineers have pioneered
the development of high-strength, lightweight alloys and have led the research that resulted in refined methods of
structural analysis. By the early 1940’s, ingenious analytical methods that were based primarily on the truss and
frame analysis techniques were available for handling both static and dynamic problems. However, with the advent
of jet-powered aircraft with swept wings, the available analysis methods proved to be inadequate.
During the early 1950’s, digital computers were being developed, along with advances in matrix algebra
representation of the governing equations of equilibrium. During that time, M. J. Turner led a small group at The
Boeing Company to address the topic of representing the stiffness of a delta-wing structure in performing structural
dynamics calculations. The resulting technical publication in 1956 by M. J. Turner, R. W. Clough, H. C. Martin and
L. J. Topp is regarded as a key contribution to the modern day finite element method.
Intense development efforts ensued during the 1960’s and 1970’s to create special purpose finite element
formulations for static and dynamic response, buckling, and material and geometric nonlinearities, which were then
incorporated into “general purpose” computer programs for performing structural analysis. The resulting
computational systems have evolved and are now extensively available and used throughout the industry.
Application of the FEM (Finite Element Method) during the past 50 years is illustrated in Table 4.
The distribution of external loads through complex Table 4 Application of FEM on Boeing Commercial
airplane structure is considered internal loads. In the
Airplanes
early days of jet transports, simple models of portions
Timeframe Airplane Extent of Application
of an airplane were used due to solution size
1950’s 707 None
constraints. Improvements in computing power and
1960’s 727, 737, Verification only (after drawing
methods have allowed Boeing not only to better 747 release)
optimize structure for improved performance and Early 747SP Drawing release of selected
safety, but also to eliminate expensive testing, from 1970’s components
components to full-scale airplanes. Early analysis Late 757, 767 Configuration development thru
models were built by hand, had only major load paths 1970’s airplane certification of most
primary structure
and used overlapping assumptions to assure safety,
1990’s 777, 737X Configuration development thru
adding a certain amount of conservatism in the form of certification for all primary
additional structural weight. As times have progressed, structure
and computing capacity has increased, finite element
modeling has become more complex and the accuracy has increased significantly. Today, total airplanes can now be
modeled and solved with significant levels of detail. This has given the engineer tools to accurately size structure
without having to add conservatism, ensuring both safety and airplane performance. Also, major highly complex
components can be more accurately modeled in order to determine detail stresses for ultimate, fatigue or damage
tolerance problems, often eliminating expensive structural tests. Modeling has become increasingly automated and
in the future will be tied more closely to the design tools than today. Other increased capabilities in present day

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finite element tools such as non-linear analysis have
allowed solutions of extremely difficult structural
problems that may have previously only been resolved
by some form of test.
The need to predict detailed stresses in regions of
major cutouts such as access and cargo doors, and in
areas of structural discontinuity in the vicinity of the
747 wing/body juncture necessitated the use of
complex, redundant methods of stress analysis. This
analysis required a representation of the wing root
structure and the adjacent body structure as shown in
Figure 16.
Further analysis of this structural region resulted in
the early development of substructured analysis
techniques, where a substructure was limited to a
maximum of approximately 6,000 degrees of freedom Figure 16 The 747 wing body interaction model
(equations) that could be accommodated on the CDC 6600 mainframe computer at that time! This problem is
illustrated in Fig. 17.
Credibility in using the FEM for major structural analysis was developed by validating analysis results with test
data such as shown in Fig. 18.
Over time, computing
capacity has increased, finite
element tools have been
enhanced, structural idealizations
have improved, and increasing
acreage of the airplane structure
have been covered. These trends
have allowed Boeing not only to
optimize structure for improved
performance and safety, but also
to eliminate some expensive
testing.
More recently, the FEM
Figure 17 The 747 wing-body interaction analysis presented a large models used to perform
computing problem aeroelastic analysis and to predict
internal loads within major components of an airplane
are exemplified by the 777 model shown in Fig. 19.
In today’s structural design environment, major,
highly complex components and mechanisms can be
more accurately modeled in order to determine detailed
stresses for ultimate, fatigue or damage tolerance
requirements, often eliminating what previously had to
be done by expensive structural tests. Furthermore,
much of the pre and post processing of the analytical
models has become increasingly automated and in the
future will be tied more closely to the design tools than
today.

I. Materials
The need for lighter structure has driven the
development of higher-strength alloys.
3. Aluminum Development Figure 18 Validation of wing center section stresses
Since the 1940s, many aluminum alloys--some
successful, some less so--have been applied to airplane structure. Figure 20 shows the common aircraft alloys along
with the year of first flight for the commercial airplane on which they were introduced.

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 Figure 20 Introduction of new aluminum alloys
Since 1965, several advancements in aluminum
technology have taken place, some of which have been
implemented, and some of which are still to be brought
to market. Figure 21 shows a graphical representation
of the aluminum technology advancement over time.
Boeing, in conjunction with the major aluminum
companies in the U.S., developed Alloys 2224, 2324,
Figure 19 The 777 airplane internal loads model and 7150 in the late 1970s. The application of these
depicts realism alloys led to a 6 percent more efficient wing structure
on the 757 and the 767/747-400 airplanes when
compared to previous Boeing model airplanes.
Another major step in the evolution of aluminum
was the introduction of the -T77 temper which is a
three-step aging treatment that produces very good
corrosion properties without the strength drop normally
associated with T7 type tempers. The application of the
T77 temper to alloy 7150 made possible the use of this
high-strength alloy also in the fuselage structure as body
stringer material on the 777 airplane. The fuselage skin
on the 777 is made from another ‘clean’ version of
2024, designated 2524. The 2524 alloy has the same
strength as 2024, but the high-damage tolerance of 2524
saves structural weight by making possible the
elimination of tear straps. Figure 21 Aluminum alloy evolution
Improved knowledge about the Al-Zn-Mg system,
combined with the -T77 temper development was taken advantage of for the 777 wing upper surface. The Alcoa
developed alloy, 7055-T77, is a high zinc alloy, 8 percent stronger than 7150, and more corrosion resistant than
7150-T651.
4. Steel Development
There are two other alloy systems used extensively on commercial titanium alloys and steels; some Ni-based
alloys are also used, but these are used for specialized applications in the nacelle area and for high strength fasteners.
The steel alloys used today are pretty much the same as those used on the first Boeing commercial transport, the
707. They include the 300 series stainless steels (SS), the precipitation hardened SS (15-5PH, 17-7PH, 17-4PH and
PH13-8Mo) and the high strength low alloy (HSLA) steels (4330, 4330M and 4340M), which range in strength from
75 to 280 ksi minimum ultimate tensile strengths. The
highest usage by weight would be 15-5PH and 4340M
with 15-5PH use increasing significantly in the 1980s
starting with the 757. The biggest usage of the high
strength alloys is in the landing gear and flap track areas
but they are used throughout the aircraft (see Fig. 22).
There has been a lot of activity in the past few years Figure 22 737 HSLA flap tracks and landing gear
in the development of higher strength stainless steels.
The SS with their high corrosion resistance offer some significant advantages over the HSLA steels. The machining
of an alloy such as 4340M is highly controlled due to the potential for the formation of untempered martensite,
which significantly reduces the ductility and toughness. Boeing is about to develop an “ultra-high” strength SS
capable of a minimum tensile of 280 ksi. This would be used in replacement of 4340M and eliminate the corrosion
problems inherent with the high-strength, low-alloy steels. It could make a significant contribution in reducing life

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cycle costs of these high-strength, low-alloy steels,
particularly in structures such as landing gear. It would
also be better for the environment with the elimination
of Cd plating for corrosion protection. The gains
anticipated for these alloys in terms of strength and
fracture toughness can be seen in Fig. 23.
5. Titanium Development
Numerous titanium alloys are also used on
commercial aircraft. These are attractive for aerospace
applications due to their high strength, low density,
elevated temperature capabilities and corrosion
resistance, but their use has always been restricted by
their high cost relative to the aluminum and steel alloys.
They have traditionally been used in corrosion prone Figure 23 Strength toughness goals for high steel
areas requiring high strength, such as landing gear alloys
support structure, wing actuation devices and floor
support structure in the galley and lavatory areas. Similar to the 2024 and 7075 Al alloys, one of the first alloys
developed was annealed Ti-6Al-4V in the 1950s, and it has been the dominant alloy through the years. Figure 24
illustrates the strength-toughness combinations available with titanium alloys.
If the carbon fibers were to come into contact with
the aluminum in an aqueous environment a galvanic
corrosion would be set up which would corrode away
the aluminum. There are corrosion protection schemes
to isolate the aluminum from the graphite, but in
critical structure, which is difficult to inspect and
replace such as the empennage attachment fittings on
the 777, beta-annealed titanium is used.
Over the years several near-beta and metastable-
beta alloys have been developed because of their
higher strength capabilities and, in some cases,
processing advantages. Ti-10V-2Fe-3Al is a high
Figure 24 Evolution of titanium alloys
strength-forging alloy that was used extensively on the
777 landing gear, replacing almost all of the 4340M
except for the inner and outer cylinders and axles on the
main landing gear (Fig. 25).
6. Composite Material Development
All of the early airplanes utilized various forms of
composites from spruce spars to doped fabric skins. It
took a major catastrophe to eliminate the last vestige of
the original structural composites in airplanes. “On
March 31, 1931 a TWA wood and fabric Fokker tri-
motor went down in Kansas killing all aboard including
the legendary Notre Dame football coach Knute Rockne.
Up to that time there had been a fierce debate over
whether wood or metal was the better material for
building airplanes. When wood rot was found in the
wing of the Rockne airplane the debate was over and all
subsequent airplanes were made of metal.”
Figure 26 graphically illustrates the timeline of the
composite materials on Boeing commercial airplanes.
The first composites used were “wet lay-up” which
impregnated dry fiber with polyester resin, much like
boats. Wet layup required considerable skill and once the
resin was mixed, a short fused process. The Stratocruiser
achieved a 20 percent weight savings over metal ducting
Figure 25 Titanium forgings for 777 MLG
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 by using fiberglass composite. Supplier pre-
impregnated fabrics (prepregs), which provide
consistent resin content and eliminated the messy
process of wet layup, were first utilized in 1961. The
727 utilized a first-generation fiberglass reinforced
250F cure epoxy composite. This material was used on
radomes and fairing panels. The 737 used both a first
generation 350F cure fiberglass reinforced cure epoxy
in the hot areas and a second-generation fiberglass
reinforced 250F cure epoxy (rubber toughened/self
adhesive) on radomes, fairings and control surface
cover panels. These materials were mainly used with
honeycomb core. The 747 used the same materials in
the same locations, only on a much larger scale. The
747 rudder cover panels made with a second-generation
Figure 26 Introduction of new composite materials fiberglass reinforced 250F cure epoxy, was the biggest
composite part Boeing had flown up to that point.
The first Boeing Heritage airplane to use carbon fiber was the 767. The control surfaces (inboard ailerons,
elevators and rudders) used the same form of material and design as the NASA ACEE 727 elevator. The spoilers
and outboard ailerons used much of the design demonstrated by the NASA ACEE 737 spoilers. The doors and
fairings used carbon fiber/aramid fiber reinforcement with a second-generation 250F epoxy. Engine nacelles used a
similar carbon/aramid hybrid, only impregnated with a 350F epoxy resin.
The 350F cure resins used in prepregs at that time were designed to make laminates, not thin skinned, cocured
honeycomb structure. The majority of the composite parts on Boeing airplanes at that time were of the latter design.
The 757 program, in conjunction with Hexcel developed a material system specifically for cocuring with
honeycomb; the Boeing Materials Specification BMS8-256 was the outcome. This material has become the de facto
standard for secondary structure on nearly all models. Many of the parts originally made with BMS8-212 have been
converted over to BMS8-256.
The 777 program, in conjunction with Toray, developed an intermediate modulus carbon fiber (42 msi) prepreg,
BMS8-276, for the primary structure. This material was
used for the horizontal and vertical stabilizer torque box
and the passenger deck floor beams. In addition to the
higher modulus, this prepreg had significantly better
impact resistance.
Composites have excellent fatigue and corrosion
resistance. Development of new materials and processes
for fabrication of large structure as well as improvement
to the design and analysis tools is ongoing. The most
significant coupon tests to evaluate critical performance
of composite materials consist of hot/wet compression
and compression after impact damage. Figure 27 shows
the developments of open hole residual compression
strength versus compression after impact strength for
various generations of composite materials. Figure 27 Composite matrix improvements

J. Fatigue
The minimum design service objective (DSO) for all structure is 20 years with 95% reliability and 95%
confidence. Boeing Structures policy for primary structure is to impose a minimum Fatigue Reliability Factor (FRF)
of 1.5 to the 20 year minimum DSO. Hence, all primary airframe structure must be designed with a design service
objective to remain essentially crack-free for 20 years of service with greater than 95% reliability. This provides for
a design service objective of 30 years incurring only minor economic repair, with 95% reliability for typical primary
structure.
The design service objectives for Boeing Commercial Airplanes are given in Table 5.

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 Table 5 Boeing Commercial jet fleet summary Fatigue and consequent cracks have been a
challenge for the airplane industry since the time of
the Wright brothers. Improvements in static strength
design and analysis outpaced understanding of
fatigue performance. After World War II, as military
planes were converted to airliners, the typical
number of flight cycles increased, causing fatigue
Total Minimum service design High time concerns. Early repeated load testing, such as on the
objectives airplanes
airplanes Comet I in 1950, yielded important lessons. Fatigue
Model (active) Flights Hours Flights Hours
failures in the fleet could occur at less than a quarter
707 734 20,000 60,000 39,800 96,900
of the test-demonstrated life. These fatigue failures
720 153 30,000 60,000 45,000 69,300
led to gradual changes in design practices.
727 1,823 60,000 50,000 87,700 93,700
Methods used for fatigue assessments throughout
737 4,407 75,000 51,000 96,500 97,500
the 1950s and mid-1960s were a life-oriented
747 1,333 20,000 60,000 39,100 116,50
0 analysis procedure which had limited success. The
757 1,038 50,000 50,000 34,800 71,700 analysis was complex and generally resulted in post-
767 908 50,000 50,000 39,600 78,800 drawing-release modification. The end results were
777 459 44,000 60,000 16,300 34,700 numerous design improvement changes, service
737NG 1,311 75,000 51,000 13,800 34,800 bulletins, and structural repairs.
As of 11/30/03 In 1970, Boeing developed a fatigue design
method that could be applied directly to detail
design, was generally stress oriented, and easily
understood by every design and stress engineer
involved in new airplane design (see Fig. 28). The
method had to relate to fleet experience and provide the
design working tools in a form that was usable in the
early layout stages of details.
Background information was obtained from all
major fatigue test programs (707, 727, and 747 fatigue
tests; component tests of flaps, landing gears,
stabilizers, and nacelles). Service experience from all
707, 727, 737, and 747 models was cataloged to
provide the historical database. At the time, 30 million
commercial flight hours of fatigue design experience
had been accumulated, which provided a wealth of Figure 28 Durability design evaluation
experience to be retained and considered for future design activity.
The success of this program became evident during the cycling of the 757 and 767 programs which exhibited
significantly less fatigue cracking in service (see Fig. 29).
Over a decade later, the 777 full-scale fatigue test showed improvements compared to the 767 fatigue test (see
Fig. 30).
Today the durability system serves as a corporate memory of past design. The method has been cross-checked
and continually updated by fatigue tests and service experience. Fleet surveys continuously provide information that
is summarized in terms of service demonstrated fatigue lives of various components. Early experiences showed that
incompatibility between operating stresses and fatigue
allowables caused a majority of the fatigue problems
encountered in service. Standardizing the fatigue
analysis process allows the service requirement analysis
to be conducted independently of and prior to structural
capability analysis. To achieve fatigue reliability and
meet design service objectives, Boeing now requires
every structural engineer to consider durability in the
design of structure.
A step-by-step procedure for finding the fatigue
margin has been developed, along with relevant
definitions such as the ground-air-ground stress. Based
Figure 29 Ten-year comparison of service bulletin
on a survey of operating loads and the resulting
labor hours (727, 737, and 757)
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 required detail fatigue rating, an indication of high
margin by inspection may be adequate. A fatigue
margin must be determined for all metallic structure.
Composite primary structure to date has been
designed using the no-detrimental-damage-growth
approach (see FAA AC 20-107A, section 7a). For most
composite wing and empennage primary structure, tests
have demonstrated negligible damage onset in
undamaged structure and the lack of detrimental damage
growth in structure containing accidental damages of
sizes less than or equal to those considered for
regulatory residual strength evaluations.

K. Corrosion
Figure 30 Comparison of 767 and 777 fatigue test Corrosion control is an important structural
findings performance requirement similar to fatigue, damage
tolerance, or ultimate strength. Historically, corrosion problems result from exposure to moisture either from the
weather, condensation, or accidental spills combined with designs that trap this moisture in crevices. Improper
material selection in addition to inadequate finishes, sealing, drainage, and corrosion inhibiting compound
application all contribute to these problems. Areas of the airplane that are particularly prone to corrosion include the
leading and trailing edge cavities of the wing, lower lobe fuselage structure, floor structure under lavatories, galleys,
and doorways, wheel wells, and exterior skins at splices and fasteners.
The responsibility for corrosion prevention starts
with the designer recognizing the importance of
material selection, drainage, finishes, sealants, and the
application of corrosion inhibitors for structural
durability (see Fig. 31). In addition, it is essential that
the designer consider whether the details of a design
may affect other areas of the airplane. A thorough
design effort will use an envelope of worst case
scenarios to define the environment for each part and
assembly being designed.
Corrosion control begins with initial design and
manufacturing and continues through the operation and
maintenance of the airplanes. Unlike fatigue, which is Figure 31 Design features for corrosion prevention
cycle dependent, corrosion is primarily time, environment, and usage dependent. The fatigue life of an airplane is
designed into the structure, and cracks are predictable. Corrosion, on the other hand, is predictable only in that the
operator knows it will occur sometime during the life of the airplane. However, the time of initiation and rate of
progression is unpredictable, and its presence need not be a life limiting phenomenon like fatigue.
Proper maintenance programs - and in particular, a good corrosion prevention program - can contain corrosion to
an acceptable level well beyond the predicted economic life of the airplane and need not become an airworthiness
issue. A maintenance corrosion control philosophy was developed by the FAA, airframe manufacturers, and the
operators in the early 199 0s to achieve this end.
Airplane designs are continually improved based on operator feed back. As an example, Fig. 32 shows design
improvements made on the 747 model to minimize in-service corrosion problems.
Typically aluminum alloys comprise some two-thirds of a commercial airframe. Their strength and light weight
has been a boon for the industry. Unfortunately their propensity for corrosion has been a serious headache for the
designer and the operator alike. Corrosion detection and repair in service has been probably been more of an
economic burden for the operator than fatigue. In fact it is reasonable to believe that corrosion avoidance could be
the most compelling reason for greater use of composites in future airplanes. Areas particularly prone to corrosion
include the leading and trailing edge cavities of the wing, lower load fuselage structure, floor structure under
lavatories, galleys and doorways, wheel wells and exterior skins at splices and fasteners.

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 Figure 32 747 corrosion prevention design improvements
It has long been recognized that unchecked corrosion damage, especially in combination with repeated loads, can
eventually lead to serious strength degradation. Therefore, designing for corrosion avoidance and control is another
critical design goal requiring well-defined criteria and procedures, elements of which are:
1. Recognition of the corrosion inducing environment for each component of the airframe
2. Selection of the least corrosion sensitive alloys suitable for their function
3. Scrupulous attention to drainage, sealing and finishes in the delivered airplane
4. Implementation of comprehensive corrosion prevention and control programs in service.
Today’s understanding and practice of design and maintenance for corrosion control has not come easily. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to cover in detail all the painstaking step-by-step improvements achieved through
several generations of modern commercial airplanes. However, a few major contributors deserve mention here.
The focus on better drainage and effective sealing where appropriate; the elimination of stress-corrosion through
careful alloy selection; development of tough and tenacious primers and finishes; and use of fay-surface sealants and
corrosion inhibitors to deter moisture ingress. Finally, the in-service corrosion control programs developed jointly
by Industry, Regulators and Operators and mandated for incorporation early in each airplane’s life will reduce the
burden of unplanned maintenance on the operator and will provide increased confidence in long-term safety.
In summary, responsibility for corrosion avoidance starts with the designer, continues with a quality build
process and finally rests with the operator through dedicated surveillance and maintenance. Unless we invent a
totally corrosion resistant alloy, all three elements will continue to demand our diligence. Even with greater use of
composites some of these issues will remain, especially at dissimilar interfaces, and will require their own special
solutions.

L. Maintainability and Maintenance

In addition to defeating corrosion, prudent inspection and maintenance is also vital to detect and enable timely
repair of fatigue cracking or accidental damage from a variety of potential causes. While corrosion onset and growth
is mostly time dependent, fatigue damage is a function of flight cycles and flight length.
The dramatic growth in airplane utilization poses yet another challenge for both the designer and the operator.
Airplanes only pay for themselves when in revenue use. It is common for an airplane to operate ten to twelve hours
a day (with as many as ten flights per day), seven days a week for 300 or more days per year. Airplanes like the 757
and 737 log as many as 2,500 to 3,000 flights per year.
These high utilization rates have a double impact. First, any damage from whatever source will accumulate more
quickly. Second, the readily available down-time for scheduled inspection is limited. To ensure that (1) scheduled
inspection and maintenance is reliable and effective, (2) that surprise unscheduled maintenance is minimized and (3)
that the airplane structure remains highly safe and functional, the designer and operator have implemented a 3-point
approach:
At the outset the structures designer, recognizing the time constraints on the operator’s maintenance team, now
places very heavy emphasis on accessibility and inspectability of all critical structure. Access and ease of inspection
is always verified by physical or digital mockups, and by factory visits to existing similar airplanes. Every effort is
made to minimize hidden critical structure and maximize the reliable use of visual inspection. Design details will

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often be tailored so that if damage occurs, it will most likely occur first in a readily visible area, thus signposting the
way for wider follow-on inspections. Development and full-scale tests are used to validate expected behavior; the
proposed in-service inspection techniques are used in these tests to confirm they are appropriate.
For each new model, the working group from the Manufacturer, the Customer Airlines and the Regulators works
for a year or more before certification to establish a comprehensive maintenance program satisfying the structural
needs and the operators’ maintenance facilities and resources. A basic program addressing accidental, environmental
and potential fatigue damage is approved by all parties and mandated by the regulators. This program specifies
inspection locations, types and intervals and is instituted by each operator at service entry. It typically applies to
every airplane of that model in each operator’s fleet. At the same time the working group establishes special directed
inspection options for potentially critical fatigue areas, to be incorporated on all airplanes as they approach a high
percentage of the design service objective (typically 75%).
The third element involves open communication between the three parties. All potentially unsafe findings are
reported immediately to the manufacturer and to the regulatory authority. The manufacturer will advise all operators
of the finding with appropriate remedial recommendations. The regulator may issue mandatory corrective actions,
either further inspections or modifications. Finally, the manufacturer usually convenes an All-Operators Meeting
once a year for each model to discuss everyone’s concerns. The agenda is mutually set by the manufacturer, the
airlines and the engineering and maintenance branches of the regulatory agency.
Again, the responsibility for long-term success relies on everyone. The Manufacturer must deliver an airframe
which is reasonably simple to inspect and maintain. The Operator must maintain it diligently. And the Regulator
must monitor the fleet to ensure that all the jointly-developed requirements are being met consistently.

V. COST (ACQUISITION AND OWNERSHIP)

The economics of air transport today are heavily influenced by the purchase and/or leasing costs of the fleet. As
the fleet ages, inspection and overhaul costs begin to climb and add additional financial burdens to the operator.
Decisions made by the modern structures design team must address both the purchase price of the vehicle (recurring
and amortized non-recurring costs) and the lifecycle costs, while still meeting the performance targets for the stated
mission. To meet today’s cost goals requires a design team working in a collaborative environment which includes
all elements of the design, build and end user community.

M. Design Environment
The design environment is a key element in reducing the overall costs associated with an airframe. In recent
years manual drawings have been replaced by electronic datasets, physical mockups by electronic mockups, and
function organizations by multi-disciplinary teams as
shown in Fig. 33.

N. Integrated Product Teams

The advent of Integrated Product Teams (IPT),
advances in computing tools and global collaboration
all play a role in this environment (see Fig. 34). The
cost of an airframe (up to 90%) is established in the
initial design. Selection of manufacturing processes,
materials and airplane configuration dictate that cost
structure. For many years, engineers worked diligently
at optimizing their portion of the airplane, usually along
narrowly defined functional specialties. Often the
structures design proceeded along one schedule while
the systems design followed another. This led to the
need to release engineering definition multiple times for
each component, adding cost and flow time to the
design effort. This in turn had the downstream impact of
causing expensive rework to tooling or fabricated parts.
Figure 33 Design tools and processes have changed

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 Figure 34 Design/build teams (DBT and IPT) produce concurrent product definition
In an IPT environment the design engineer is an integral part of a product team. Responsible for all design, build
and support aspects of the program, these teams bring together the expertise of all functions to ensure the best
possible balance of performance, cost and in-service functionality. Membership includes the component
manufacturer and may include representation from potential airline customers. The teams work to ensure all aspects
of the product (materials, finishes, part designs, tooling approach, manufacturing plans and systems installations) are
integrated prior to the initial release of the engineering drawings. This concurrent work pays off in reduced
disruption during the manufacture of the product and in the end reduces the time to market. The team works in a
digital environment in which the design team prepares 3-D representation of all parts (see Fig. 35). These models are
shared across the team to enable virtual fabrication,
assembly and maintenance operations. These
simulations facilitate optimization of the design prior
to manufacture.
Global collaboration is also key in reducing time
to market. IPT’s are becoming increasingly global
and tools are now in place to enable continuous
design work, allowing around the clock productivity
on the product. The sharing of digital data sets almost
instantaneously allows designers at the prime
manufacturer to work with their partners around the
world on various aspects of the design.
Improvements in web based virtual meeting and e-
collaboration tools will further enhance the ability to Figure 35 Digital product definition enables engineers
share design responsibility around the world. to validate assembly before cutting metal

O. Knowledge Based Engineering

Among the methods available to the designer are Knowledge Based Engineering (KBE) tools. These tools allow
key features to be defined based on manufacturing considerations, basic structural design requirements and
geometric constraints of the configuration. Once established, these parametric models allow for the rapid changes to
the product definition to meet changes in configuration. Knowledge Based Engineering (KBE) is a proven
technology and is an integral part in the development of new and derivative airplanes in BCA. The use of KBE
technologies enables various engineering disciplines to support the BCA initiatives of reducing:

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• Cycle Time – The development and implementation of KBE applications allows for a significant reduction in
the design cycle of an airplane program. The tools accomplish the reduction by automating numerous tasks
including spatial and analytical integration. Both structural and system engineering disciplines realize this
benefit.
• Variability – Variability in the design is minimized by the programmatic application of design and
manufacturing rules. These rules are external to the KBE applications and can be modified to satisfy a given
design constraint.
• Non-recurring Cost –The deployment of the KBE tools reduces the manpower requirements to complete the
airplane design thus reducing cost. Cost is also reduced by the use of routines that search for existing designs
that satisfy the design constraints removing the need to manage new designs.
Redesign due to changes in loads, manufacturing preferences, and even derivative configurations can all be
accomplished in rapid fashion, reducing the product definition time and speeding the product to market. At the
Boeing Company KBE process development continues, as demonstrated in Fig. 36, morphing from a detail design
aid to an integrated product design tool of the future.

Figure 36 KBE evolution/implementation history

But what about the product? The design philosophy today is evolving towards one where fewer, more
structurally integrated parts are brought together as simply as possible. One must remember that from a cost
perspective all designed parts, from the simple clip or bracket to the wing skin panel, require rigorous control of
materials, finishes, manufacturing plans, in order to conform to the type and production certificates. Simply reducing
the number of parts reduces the costs associated with maintaining the design data.

P. Material Selection
Material selection is critical in providing value to the end user. The designer must carefully consider raw
material costs, processing costs, vehicle build plans, structural performance and lifecycle costs when making these
decisions. Selection philosophy may include:
• Material and Processing – Selection of the lowest cost materials and processes which adequately meet the
performance targets and tolerances required in the build plan. Selection of materials is critical to further
integration of the structure into large monolithic bonded assemblies or machined parts. A well balanced decision
must also consider commonality of materials and processes, particularly for composites, across the vehicle to
further reduce raw material costs and to simplify maintenance for the operator.
• Vehicle Build Plans – Balance cost of detail part fabrication against downstream assembly and installation costs.
Criteria can include evaluation of tooling plans, producibility evaluations and integrated structural approaches.
• Structural Performance – Performance has many measures but the evaluation must include ability to meet weight
and cost targets for a given component.
• Lifecycle Costs – Modern materials and finishes, combined with carefully designed details, have delayed the
onset of corrosion and fatigue in traditional aircraft structure. Selection of correct materials must include

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 appropriate understanding of damage tolerance, durability and corrosion. Repair philosophy must also be
considered for in service incidental damage.
As the use of composite materials grow, the potential exists to design and build a composite fuselage structure
which would essentially eliminate traditional corrosion and fatigue concerns with the airframe. This has the potential
to significantly extend the life of an airframe and substantially reduce overhaul and maintenance costs.

Q. Determinant Assembly
One aerospace executive is well known for his goal
of making airplane assembly as simple as “Fisher Price
toys on Christmas morning.” To achieve this, built-up
structures, containing dozens of mechanically fastened
parts, are being replaced with monolithic machined or
integrated structures (see Fig. 37). In the area of
metals, improvements in high speed machining,
advances in laser beam welding and the development
of friction stir welding all potentially lead to a
reduction in the costly work involving drilling holes Figure 37 Advanced metallic structures
and filling them with fasteners. Less obvious but equally important is the improvement in accuracy for these
components, particularly for high speed machined parts, and fewer hand fit operations involved which reduces the
often hidden costs associated with errors and rework. When applying monolithic and welded integrated structures,
great care must be taken to ensure that durability, damage tolerance, and fail safety considerations are thoroughly
understood and evaluated. But when used properly, these structures have the potential to greatly reduce the labor
involved in fabrication and assembly.
A related trend in design philosophy is the move towards self indexing parts. Traditional aircraft assembly
methods involve large and expensive fixtures to maintain part to part alignment during assembly. Modern design
practice looks to locate parts relative to each other based on carefully defined index and datum systems. The result is
simpler, more flexible tooling, with shorter lead times, to support the airplane assembly.

VI. FUTURE CHALLENGES

Today’s commercial airplanes are modern marvels of engineering science and the industry can rightfully be
proud of its achievements. But it cannot be satisfied with the status quo. The flying public deserves airplanes which
are even safer, more comfortable and with lower ticket prices. Every facet of the industry must contribute to achieve
these goals; the manufacturer, the regulators, the airline operators and the world’s airport facilities.
The structures community contribution must be to meet the challenges of providing improved safety; more
efficient structural performance; reduced costs of production and ownership; shorter, more agile development flow
times; and fully productive use of our resources in-house and with our partners and suppliers. The challenge is often
stated as: “Do a better job, for half the cost, in half the time and with half the people!”

R. Composite Structures
Commercial aircraft fiberglass composite structures have been used in secondary structures since the 1960s. In
the 1970s, carbon-fiber composite structures were initially applied to Boeing commercial aircraft through a series of
NASA-funded demonstration programs. These programs involved 737 spoilers, 727 elevators, and 737 horizontal
stabilizers. In 1984 the 737 stabilizers were the first certified composite primary structure on commercial aircraft. As
a result of these NASA programs, and with the experience with certifying the composite control surfaces on the 757
and 767 airplanes, the FAA issued AC 20-107A, Composite Aircraft Structure, in 1984. The certification of
composite primary structures has followed the guidelines contained in AC 20-107A. For damage tolerance,
composite structure certification has been based on demonstrating the “no-growth” of damage of sizes up to the
damage limit. Environmental degradation caused by temperature, humidity, etc. must be considered. The residual
strength versus damage size criteria is shown in Fig. 38. The airplane is designed for barely visible damage at
ultimate level, significant damage at limit load and large damage at 70% of limit maneuver loads and levels of other
loads representing get home loads.

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 The quest for lighter, more durable and more
forgiving structures will not be easy. The low-hanging
and much of the mid-height fruit has been harvested
already. While some further advances in traditional
metallic materials can be expected, they are likely to be
modest and evolutionary rather than revolutionary. The
most promising avenues will likely be composite
structures, in their many emerging forms. Satisfactory
service experience with primary structure components
over more than ten years has validated the potential for
significant weight reduction, corrosion avoidance and
operator acceptance. It is now entirely feasible to
pursue composites for both wing and fuselage
Figure 38 Residual strength versus damage size or structures. If we can get beyond the “black aluminum”
notch length mindset we should be able to realize their structural
advantages and damage tolerance properties at
competitive production and maintenance costs.

S. Health Management
Boeing is investigating use of a variety of monitoring techniques for airplane structures. The primary motivation
is to reduce the effort required for inspect and repair. Structures Health Management applications under
investigation include:
• Moisture and corrosion monitoring – Corrosion inspections require a large amount of effort throughout the life of
an airplane. Electronic monitoring capability could eliminate the need to gain access to an area for inspection
(which often takes much longer than the actual inspection), and minimize the extent of the repair (by detecting
the problem earlier). One potential monitoring approach uses a fiber optic sensing technique.
• Accidental damage detection – Accidental damage occurs from a number of sources, such as vehicles
maneuvering around the airplane at the gate. Monitoring techniques could determine if an area of structure has
been impacted, and the extent of the resulting damage. One potential technique is via use of an array of Piezo-
electric sensors; arrays such as this have been shown to detect location and magnitude of an impact, and the
location and severity of damage (such as a delamination)
• Load and exceedence monitoring - Load monitoring techniques have been applied to fighters and some other
military airplane for years. For commercial airplanes, benefits are expected in some areas, including exceedence
monitoring. Load monitoring could characterize each exceedence (such as a hard landing), to focus the
inspection effort to areas where there could be potential damage. Load monitoring has traditionally been
accomplished primarily with physical strain sensors, but there is increasing evidence that much of this can be
accomplished via calculations based on existing airplane parameters (inertial, air data, flight control surface
positions, etc).
These approaches will be considered for their ability to reliably identify potential structural issues and reduce
maintenance costs.

T. Tools and Processes

Today’s design and validation practices are far more sophisticated than they were in the 1950’s, resulting in far
fewer surprises in service. But the cost in engineering resources has seemingly increased exponentially. We must
find and implement ways to reduce design and development flow times and manpower resources to bring new
airplanes to market without any sacrifice in design integrity.
Computer aided design and analysis tools continue to be improved and will be an essential element in achieving
these reductions. The design and analysis disciplines will become more integrated through the use of parametric
CAD/CAE processes. Rapidly increasing computing power allows increasingly complex design and analysis
operations to be performed in acceptable times. Analysis tools for composite structures are being developed which
will allow the analyst to evaluate the strain environment at the lamina level reducing the time and expense of point
design testing. Knowledge base engineering has been usesd extensively for the last ten years and will continue to
reduce routine design work allowing the designer to focus much more on innovation. The caveat is that these tools
must never be allowed to supercede intelligent thinking.

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 There is considerable effort being applied to probabilistic analysis and design methods for structures, similar to
those used for systems design. If validated this approach may lead to structures which are both lighter and safer at
the same time.

U. Global Partnership
These are tough and exciting technical challenges. They will be met with the same aggressive and dedicated
efforts characteristic of the past fifty years, and solutions will be found. There is, however, one additional major
challenge facing us which is more cultural than technical. This is the challenge to establish successful and effective
design partnerships worldwide to produce our next generation airplanes. An example showing the Tier 1 airframe
partners for the 7E7 program is shown in Fig. 39. Our industry will become increasingly dependent on these
partnerships with many customer countries that have mature or developing engineering capabilities. Success will
demand a great deal of mutual effort from all parties; respect and trust, communication, education and well thought
out strategies. And the responsibility to achieve this success will rest primarily on the day-to-day efforts and
attitudes of the structures engineers involved.

Figure 39 7E7 Airframe Partners

As this is written, we are celebrating 100 years of powered flight. Commercial aviation, with its many
technological breakthroughs, has had a profound practical and cultural impact on society throughout the world. It is
tragically ironic that this milestone is occurring at the same time as the industry’s biggest downturn, with staggering
losses for manufacturers, operators and the supporting infrastructure. We must believe that the world’s economies
and international stability will improve, and that the demand for commercial air travel will start to grow once more.
Our success in meeting the challenges described here will play a significant role in the degree and rate of that
growth. We must meet them!
Acknowledgements:
The author would like to thank Mr. Timothy Adams, Mr. Tom Avery, Dr. Sven Axter, Dr. Rod Boyer, Mr. Doug
Caton, Dr. Rod Dreisback, Mr. Pete Harradine (retired), Mr. Jack McGuire, Dr. Matthew Miller, Mr. Jon Pryor, Mr.
Jim Simmons, and Mr. Jose Ramos of Boeing Commercial Airplanes for reviewing the entire manuscript and
making valuable contributions.

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