( P.

525 )
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ZAMBIA SCZ.JUDGMENT No. 22 of 2008
HOLDEN AT LUSAKA SCZ/8/270/2005
(Civil Jurisdiction) Appeal No. 39/2006

BETWEEN:
GEORGE LIPIMILE 1ST APPELLANT
ZAMBIA COMPETITION COMMISSION 2ND APPELLANT
AND
MPULUNGU HARBOUR MANAGEMENT RESPONDENT
LIMITED
Coram: Chibesakunda, Mushabati JJs and Kabalata AJS on 2nd August, 6th
September, 2006 and 23rd July, 2008
For the Appellants: Mr. L.M. Mukande, L.M. Mukande and Company and Mr.
M. Chipanzhya, Legal Counsel, ZCM
For the Respondent: Mr. E. Silwamba, SC, Eric Silwamba and Company and
Mr. M. Mundashi, Mulenga Mundashi and Company.
JUDGMENT

Kabalata , AJS., delivered the judgment of the court.

1
 (P.526)

Cases referred to:

This is an appeal against a ruling of a High Court judge who held that the High
Court of Judicature for Zambia enjoys extra-territorial jurisdiction to try a
Zambian citizen resident in Zambia for an act of contempt of court allegedly
Committed in a foreign jurisdiction, namely, France. The facts, which were
Common cause, are that this matter initially came up for defence on 1st
September, 2005. On application by the appellants advocates, the matter was
adjourned to 14th September, 2005 to enable them obtain further instructions on
the e-mail contained in the Notice of intention to produce documents filed by the
Respondents’ Advocates on 1st September, 2005. When the matter came up on

14th September, 2005 the Appellants’ Advocates raised a preliminary point of law

as to:

2
 (P.527)

‘whether the High Court of Judicature for Zambia enjoys

extra-territorial jurisdiction to try a Zambian citizen

resident in Zambia for an act in contempt of court

allegedly committed in a foreign jurisdiction, namely,

Paris, France.’

After listening and considering the submissions by Counsel on either side, the

learned trial judge answered the preliminary issue raised in the affirmative.

The learned trial judge pointed out that whether contempt proceedings are based

on section 116 (1) of the Penal code or Order 52 of Rules of the Supreme Court,

The end result is the same. He further stated that in both situations, punishment

is either imprisonment or a fine if the alleged contemptuous conduct is proved.

According to the learned trial judge, it was immaterial that the contempt

proceedings before him were commenced under Order 52 of the Rules of the

Supreme court and not Section 116(1) of the Penal code. He found solace in our

decision in Sebastian Saizi Zulu vs. The People1 where we said at page 66 that:

“It is clear therefore, that in reality the learned trial

3
 (P.528)

judge derived his power from Order 52

which…….empowers the High Court and Supreme Court

to punish for contempt of court. The courts’ powers under Order 52 are

wider than those provided for under section 116(1)(a)

and 2 of the Penal Code in the sense

that there is no limitation on the court to dispose of

contempt on the same day that it arises”

Dissatisfied with the learned trial judge’s decision, the appellant now appeals to

this court and has advanced four grounds of appeal namely:

1. That the Learned trial judge erred in law when he held that the High

Court of judicature for Zambia enjoys extra-territorial jurisdiction to

try a Zambian

2. citizen for an act in contempt of court allegedly committed in a

foreign jurisdiction.

3. That the Learned trial judge erred in law when he imported the

provisions of section 7 of the Penal

4
 (P.529)

4. Code (Amendment) Act, 1970 into the cause herein, which was

otherwise a civil matter.

5. That the learned trial judge misdirected himself in law when he held

that there is no distinction between criminal and civil contempt of

court.

6. That the learned trial judge misdirected himself in law when he held

that it was immaterial that the

contempt proceedings herein were commenced

under Order 52 of the Rules of the Supreme Court

and not section 116(1) of the Penal Code when in fact

there’re was neither an application nor an order for

the combination of the aforesaid order 52 and

section 116(1).

The parties filed written heads of argument augmented by oral submissions based

on the four grounds of appeal.

5
 (P.530)

The gist of the written heads of argument on ground one is that the High Court of

judicature for Zambia does not enjoy extra – territorial jurisdiction and that it

therefore lacks the power to try an act in contempt of court alleged to have been

committed in foreign land namely Paris, France. It was submitted that the

jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature for Zambia only extends to and over

the state territory of Zambia i.e. the land within the boundaries of Zambia,

including Islands and no more. Cases like Miyanda vs. High Court2 ; Zambia

National Holdings Limited and United National Independence Party vs. The

Attorney General3 and The People vs. Roxburgh4 were cited in support of the

arguments in ground one. It was further submitted that a perusal of the

Constitution of Zambia Cap. 1 of the Laws of Zambia or the High Court Act, Cap 27

of the Laws of Zambia will show that there are no provisions in the Laws which

constitute the High Court of Judicature for Zambia which clothe it with extra –

territorial jurisdiction.

The summary of the written heads argument in ground two is that the learned

trial judge erred in law when he imported the provisions of section 7 of the Penal

Code (Amendment) Act, 1970 into the cause herein, which was otherwise a civil

6
 (P.531)

matter. It was submitted that the matter at hand was a civil one on the

commercial list of the High Court and the first appellant had not been charged

with any offence under the Penal Code and therefore it was wrong for the court

below to refer to the provisions of section 7 of the Penal Code (Amendment) Act

or at all.

It was further submitted that although the offence of contempt of court exists in
the Penal Code, there is an elaborated procedure to support it set out in the

Criminal Procedure Code among which is the requirement for the Director of
Public Prosecutions to issue a fiat before the commencement of a prosecution.
There has been no such fiat issued in the present case.
It was further submitted that the application for leave to apply for committal

proceedings for contempt of court was pursuant to the provisions of Order 52 of

the Rules of the Supreme Court.

The gist of the written heads of argument on ground 3 is that the learned trial

judge misdirected himself in law when he held that there is no distinction

between criminal and civil contempt of court. It was submitted that in as much as

7
 (P532)

the punishment for both criminal contempt and civil contempt might be the same,

the two types of contempt are clearly distinguishable. Halsbury’s Laws of

England 4th Edition, Volume 9 paragraph 2 was cited in support of this argument.

The case of Jennison vs. Baker5 was also cited in support of this argument.

The summary of the written heads of argument in ground 4 is that the contempt

proceedings were commenced pursuant to the provisions of Order 52 of the Rules

of the Supreme court and not section 116 (1) of the Penal Code. It was further

submitted that in casu, there was neither an application for an order of court to

combine or merge the provisions of Order 52 of the Rules of the Supreme Court

and the provisions of Section 116(1) of the Penal Code, Cap 87 of Laws of Zambia

nor was such an order granted at all.

It was further submitted that although the case of Sebastian Saizi Zulu vs. The

People1 recognizes the power of the court to order a combination of Order 52 of

the Rules of the Supreme Court and Section 116(1) of the Penal code this can only

be on an application by a party and not by the court on its own motion.

8
 (P.533)

The summary of the written response to ground one is that the first Appellant was

charged with contempt of court contrary to section 116(1) of the Penal Code Cap.

87 of the Laws of Zambia and that at subsection 3 it is provided that the

provisions of Section 116 of the Penal Code Cap. 87 of the Laws of Zambia are to

be deemed to be in addition to and not in derogation from the power of a court to

punish for contempt of court. It was further submitted that the committal

proceedings are also invoked pursuant to the provisions of Order 52 of the Rules

of the Supreme Court and the decision by this court in the case of Sebastian

Saizi Zulu vs. The People1.

It was further submitted that the charge against the accused follows the grant of

leave granted to the Plaintiff by the High Court on 9th March 2005 for an order of

committal against George Lipimile on the ground that he had disregarded the

order of injunction dated 10th February 2005 which restrained the Defendants

“Whether individually, severally or through their agents whosoever from

interfering in the Plaintiff’s operations and presenting a paper at a

conference for the organization for Economic Co-operation and

9
 (P.534)

Development on the Plaintiff’s operations scheduled for 17th February

2005 until final determination of this matter or further order of this

court.”

We have carefully considered the ruling of the learned trial judge in the court

below and the submissions of Counsel on the 4 grounds of Appeal. This Appeal,

as we see it, succeeds or fails depending on what view we take of the arguments

and submissions on ground one. We also do not propose to consider the case of

Roxburgh4 which is a High Court decision and is not binding

We wish to observe that this is a very unique situation. A Defendant is served

with a court order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in Zambia and he

decides that it is competent to disobey it as long as he crosses the Zambian border

and that he is only oblidged to obey it in Zambian jurisdiction. This, in our view, is

the import of this appeal.

We wish to state and remind the Appellant that the Zambian legislature has

addressed this issue in section 6 of the Penal Code Cap. 87 of the Laws of Zambia.

This section reads as follows: section 6;

10
 (P.535)

“6(1) Subject to subsection (3), a citizen of Zambia who does any

act outside Zambia which, if wholly done within Zambia,

would be an offence against this Code, may be tried and

punished under this Code in the same manner as if such act

had been wholly done within Zambia

(2)When an act which, if wholly done within Zambia, would be an

offence against this Code, is done partly within and pertly outside

Zambia, any person who within does any part of such act may be

tried and punished under this Code as if such act had been wholly done

within Zambia.

Nothing in subsection (1) shall render any person liable to be tried and

punished under the Code in respect of any act done outside Zambia

which, if wholly done within Zambia, would be an offence against this

Code if such person has been convicted and punished outside Zambia in

respect of the same act, but, save as aforesaid, any such conviction, for

the purposes of any law including this Code, be deemed to be a

conviction for the said offence against this Code.

11
 (P.536)
Further more section 65 of the Criminal Procedure Code Cap. 87 of the Laws of
Zambia provides as follows:
“65. Every court has authority to cause to be brought before it any
person who is within the local limits of its jurisdiction, and is
charged with an offence committed within Zambia, or which,
according to law, may be dealt with as if it has been committed
within Zambia, and to deal with the accused person according to its
jurisdiction.”
It is common cause that contempt is a criminal offence under section 116 of the
Penal Code. The contemnor in this case is a Zambian citizen and as such Zambia

Courts have jurisdiction for criminal acts committed by Zambians anywhere in the
world. We wish to affirm what we said in Sebastian Saizi Zulu vs. the People1,
Elias Kundiona vs. The People6, Authur nelson Njovu and Dr. Jacob Mwansa vs.
Alshma Building Materials Company Limited and Jayesh Shah7 that contempt
proceedings can be combined under section 116 of the Penal Code and Order 52
of the Rules of the Supreme Court. This is what we said in the Zulu Case:-
“It is clear therefore, that in reality the learned trial judge derived his
power from order 52 which empowers the High court and Supreme Court
to punish for contempt of Court. The court’s powers under Order 52 are
wider than those provided for under Section 116 (1) of the Penal Code in
the sense that there is no limitation on the court to dispose of contempt of
court on the same day that it arises.”

We note that this has been conceded by the Appellant except that their view is
that there must be an application by a party and not by the court on its own
12
 (P.538)
motion. We do not appreciate that argument as it is not only misleading and flies
in the teeth of what we said in the Zulu case.

In our considered view therefore, the learned trial judge was on firm ground in
finding that his court had extra territorial jurisdiction over the contemnor. On our
part we cannot agree more by stating that it would be a disaster for the
administration of justice in this country if this appeal was allowed. Having
decided in the manner that we have done, it would be otiose to consider grounds
2,3 and 4.
We therefore find that this appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed with costs
to the Respondents.

L.P. Chibesakunda C.S. Mushabati

T.A. Kabalata
ACTING SUPREME COURT JUDGE

13