SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 95229. June 9, 1992.]

CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG , petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN, respondents.

Lorenzo G. Timbol for petitioner.

Jose P. Bondoc for E. Cuyugan.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JOINDER OF ACTIONS; PROPER IN

ACTION TO COMPEL RECOGNITION AND THE OTHER TO CLAIM INHERITANCE. —
Petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely
alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is
actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be
considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of action, one
to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one
complaint is not new in our jurisprudence. As early as 1922, we had occasion to rule
thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al., wherein we said: "The question whether a person in
the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex action to
compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief
in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must be answered
in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the
two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In other words, there
is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should
have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in
which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly,
there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require
that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other
cases. . . . . "The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly
formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior
decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be
considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel
acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain
partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs . . .; and
the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of
his deceased natural father, or mother . . . . In neither of these situations has it been
thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution
proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court;
and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings."

2. CIVIL LAW; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; PATERNITY AND FILIATION;

ACTION FOR RECOGNITION OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD UNDER THE FAMILY CODE;
RULE. — Under Article 175 of the Family Code, therefore, if the action is based on
the record of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of
the child's filiation in a public document or in a private handwritten signed
instrument, then the action may be brought during the lifetime of the child.
However, if the action is based on the open and continuous possession by the child
of the status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws, the view has been expressed that the action must be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (Sempio-Diy, The Family Code of
the Philippines, 1989 ed., 249.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE WHETHER THE RIGHT OF A MINOR CHILD TO FILE
THEREOF IS A VESTED RIGHT OR NOT; CASE AT BAR. — Article 256 of the Family
Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether the right of the
minor child to file an action for recognition is a vested right or not. Under the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the
minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime
of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. (The Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988, pursuant to the clarification in Memorandum Circular
No. 85 of the Office of the President, dated November 7, 1988.) We herein adopt
our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
(l5 G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992.) where we held that the fact of filing of the
petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same
proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and
such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY STATUTORY CHANGE IN MATTERS OF

PROCEDURE. — Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the
Family Code in question is procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in
matters of procedure may affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the
language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so pervasive that it may
be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effect, since
procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of
procedure arises especially where vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly,
Article l75 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it
will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially,
of the minor child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of
the complaint in court. The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions
of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of
action has not yet prescribed.

DECISION

REGALADO, J : p
The instant petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, entitled "Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Hon.
Norberto C. Ponce, Judge, Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga and
Emilie Dayrit Cuyugan," promulgated on May 10, 1990, and its resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 2 Said decision, now before us for review,
dismissed petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction on the ground that the denial of the motion to dismiss Civil Case No.
7938 of the court a quo is an interlocutory order and cannot be the subject of the
said special civil action, ordinary appeal in due time being petitioner's remedy.

In said Civil Case No. 7938, herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother
and legal guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint
denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix
of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. The operative allegations in said
complaint are as follows:

"2. Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad
Cuyugan, by the father of the defendant, the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; and
the defendant is the known administratrix of the real and personal
properties left by her deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo, who died
intestate in Angeles City on September 28, 1983;

"3. Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for
several years now and during which time, plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo
had illicit amorous relationship with each other that, as a consequence
thereof, they begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in
accordance with the ardent desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo;

"4. Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was
born in Angeles City on October 5, 1980 had been sired, showered with
exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative father for being
his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of
the late Atty. Ocampo to herein plaintiff, excerpts from some of which are
hereunder reproduced:

'. . . Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself for me alone
and for me all the time. As I have now I shall save my heart to you and
to Chad.'

'. . . Please take good care and pray to Sto. Niño for our sake
and for the child sake.'

'. . . Keep him. Take good care of him.'

'. . . I'm proud that you are his mother . . . I'm proud of him and
you. Let me bless him by my name and let me entitle him to all what I
am and what I've got.'

'. . . I have vowed to recognize him and be my heir.'

'. . . How is CHAD and you . . .'

 '. . . Why should we not start now to own him, jointly against the
whole world. After all we love each other and CHAD is the product of
our love."

"5. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless

entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by his deceased father, Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs;

"6. The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the
owner of real and personal property, located in Baguio City, Angeles City and
in the province of Pampanga with approximate value of several millions of
pesos;

"7. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been inventoried
by the defendant and the inheritance of the surviving heirs including that of
said Chad has not likewise been ascertained;

"8. The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo are his children, namely: Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O.
Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in whose behalf this
instant complaint is filed;

"9. Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the
charity of friends and relatives for the sustenance of her son, Chad, such
that it is urgent, necessary and imperative that said child be extended
financial support from the estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo;

"10. Several demands, verbal and written, have been made for
defendant to grant Chad's lawful inheritance, but despite said demands,
defendant failed and refused and still fails and refuses to satisfy the claim for
inheritance against the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo:" 3

xxx xxx xxx

Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering

defendant to render an inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties
left by Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to determine and deliver the share of the minor child
Chad in the estate of the deceased; and to give him support pendente lite.

Petitioner, as defendant therein, filed her answer with counterclaim on June 3,

1987, disputing the material allegations in the complaint. She maintained by way
of affirmative defenses, inter alia, that the complaint states no cause of action; that
the action is premature; that the suit is barred by prescription; that respondent
Cuyugan has no legal and judicial personality to bring the suit; that the lower court
has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and that there is improper joinder
of causes of action. 4

After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds asserted as affirmative
defenses, the trial court issued the following order on October 20, 1987:

xxx xxx xxx

"The Court is of the considered opinion that there is a need of further

proceedings to adduce evidence on the various claims of the parties so as
to hear their respective sides.

"WHEREFORE, resolution on the preliminary hearing which partakes of the

nature of a motion to dismiss requiring additional evidence is in the
meantime held in abeyance. The Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied and the
case is set for pre-trial . . ." 5

With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on November 19,
1 9 8 7 , 6 petitioner filed on December 10, 1987 a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 13464,
which was granted by the Sixth Division of respondent court on August 2, 1989 and
enjoined respondent judge to resolve petitioner's motion praying for the dismissal of
the complaint based on the affirmative defenses within ten (10) days from notice
thereof. 7

In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and
thereafter denied the motion to dismiss, which had been pleaded in the affirmative
defenses in Civil Case No. 7938, in an order dated October 24, 1989, resolving the
said motion in the following manner:

xxx xxx xxx

"The Court now resolves:

No. 1. The complaint sufficiently shows that a cause of action exists in

favor of the plaintiff. A cause of action being the 'primary right to redress a
wrong' (Marquez vs. Valera, 48 OG 5272), which apparently on the face of
the complaint, plaintiff has a right to enforce through this case. Defendant's
protestation that there is no sufficient cause of action is therefore
untenable.

No. 2. The present action, despite the claim of defendant is not

premature. It is exactly filed in order to prove filiation, and then recognition.
To go about the step by step procedure outlined by the defendant by filing
one action after another is definitely violative of the prohibition against
splitting a cause of action.

No. 3. It is not the plaintiff that is now bringing the case before the
Court. It is (her) spurious child that she represents as natural guardian that
is instituting the action.

No. 4. Prescription has not set in if we consider that a spurious child

may file an action for recognition within four years from his attainment of
majority (New Civil Code, Art. 285, No. 2). Whether the letters of the putative
father, Atty. Ocampo, is evidence, that should be inquired into in a hearing
 on the merits.

No. 5. Several causes of action may be joined in one complaint as was

done in this case. The defendant's claim that there was a misjoinder is
untenable.

No. 6. The Court being a court of general jurisdiction, and of special

jurisdiction, such as a probate court has capacity to entertain a complaint
such as the one now before it.

"The nature of the case 'CLAIM FOR INHERITANCE' does not control the
body of the complaint.

"From all the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint is sufficient in
form and substance and, therefore, the motion to dismiss could not be
granted until after trial on the merits in which it should be shown that the
allegations of the complaint are unfounded or a special defense to the action
exists.

"WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED." 8

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order was denied by the trial court on
January 30, 1990. 9 As a consequence, another petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner on March 12, 1990 with
respondent court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, praying that the orders dated
October 24, 1989 and January 30, 1990 of the trial court be annulled and set aside
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

On May 10, 1990, as earlier stated, respondent court promulgated its decision
dismissing the petition, and likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration
in a resolution dated September 5, 1990, hence the present petition for review on
certiorari.

In elevating the case before us, petitioner relies on these grounds:

"a. The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in UTTER DISREGARD OF APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT providing clear exceptions to the
general rule that interlocutory orders may not be elevated by way of the
special civil action of certiorari;

"b. Respondent Court refused to resolve certain issues raised by

Petitioner before the Regional Trial Court and before Respondent Court of
Appeals involving QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE not theretofore determined
by this Honorable Court, such as the interpretation and application of Art.
281 of the Civil Code requiring judicial approval when the recognition of an
illegitimate minor child does not take place in a record of birth or in a will; of
Art. 175, Par. 2, in relation to Art. 172, Par. 2 of the Family Code, providing
for the prescriptive period with respect to the action to establish illegitimate
filiation; and of Art. 285 of the Civil Code, providing for the prescriptive
 period with respect to the action for recognition of a natural child; and

"c. Respondent Court has sanctioned a DEPARTURE by the Regional Trial

Court from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings." 10

Petitioner contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein private
respondent in behalf of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature and the
complaint states no cause of action. She submits that the recognition of the minor
child, either voluntarily or by judicial action, by the alleged putative father must
first be established before the former can invoke his right to succeed and participate
in the estate of the latter. Petitioner asseverates that since there is no allegation of
such recognition in the complaint denominated as "Claim for Inheritance," then
there exists no basis for private respondent's aforesaid claim and, consequently, the
complaint should be dismissed.

The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs. Paulino, et al ., 11 wherein the
petitioner, as plaintiff, brought an action against the private respondents, as
defendants, to compel them to give her share of inheritance in the estate of the late
Marcos Paulino, claiming and alleging, inter alia, that she is the illegitimate child of
the deceased; that no proceedings for the settlement of the deceased's estate had
been commenced in court; and that the defendants had refused and failed to deliver
her share in the estate of the deceased. She accordingly prayed that the defendants
therein be ordered to deliver her aforesaid share. The defendants moved for the
dismissal of her complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action and that,
even if it does, the same is barred by prescription.

The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at bar is that at the
time of the filing of the complaint therein, the petitioner in that case had already
reached the age of majority, whereas the claimant in the present case is still a
minor. In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and
successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to
the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the
putative father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because
such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There
being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel
recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The
ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for
failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but
the prescription of the action.

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends
that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor
Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for
inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to
compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of action, one to compel
recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is
not new in our jurisprudence.

As early as 1922, we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al., 12 wherein
we said: llcd

"The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in
any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child
and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one
which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative,
provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct
causes of action are present in the particular case. In other words, there is
no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment
should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior
to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the
character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to
compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied
different from that generally applicable in other cases. . . . .

"The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by

this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions.
Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be
considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel
acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may
maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his
coheirs . . . ; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the
distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother . . . . In
neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to
show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that
in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might
take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is
appropriate to such proceedings."

The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel recognition has
prescribed. cdphil

Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel
recognition, private respondent's cause of action has prescribed for the reason that
since filiation is sought to be proved by means of a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent concerned, then under paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family
Code, the action to establish filiation of the illegitimate minor child must be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged putative father. In the case at bar, considering
that the complaint was filed after the death of the alleged parent, the action, has
prescribed and this is another ground for the dismissal of the complaint. Petitioner
theorizes that Article 285 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar and,
instead, paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code should be given retroactive
effect. The theory is premised on the supposition that the latter provision of law
being merely procedural in nature, no vested rights are created, hence it can be
made to apply retroactively.

Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:

 "Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the
following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which
case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from
the attainment of his majority;"

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:

"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent."

Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record
of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's
filiation in a public document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then
the action may be brought during the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is
based on the open and continuous possession by the child of the status of an
illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws, the view has been expressed that the action must be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent. 13

Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the
complaint should have been filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing
which the same must be dismissed on the ground of prescription. Private
respondent, however, insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling and,
since the alleged parent died during the minority of the child, the action for filiation
may be filed within four years from the attainment of majority of the minor child. cdrep

Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine
whether the right of the minor child to file an action for recognition is a vested right
or not.

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of
action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court
under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. 14
We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court
of Appeals, et al. 15 where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already
vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no
longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in
question is procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of
procedure may affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the
act excludes them from its operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used to
validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effect, since procedure
must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure
arises especially where vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of
the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it will
ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of
the minor child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of
the complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the provisions
of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of
action has not yet prescribed. LibLex

Finally, we conform with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the questioned
order of the court below denying the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot
be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The exceptions to this rule invoked by
petitioner and allegedly obtaining in the case at bar, are obviously not present and
may not be relied upon.

WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution
of respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Nocon, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Asaali S. Isnani, with the concurrence of Associate

Justices Oscar M. Herrera and Luis L. Victor; Rollo, 119-124.

2. Rollo, 142.

3. Rollo, 43-45.

4. Ibid., 48-52.

5. Ibid., 68.

6. Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, 64.

7. Ibid., id., 65-68.

8. Rollo, 69-70.

9. .bid., 81-83.

10. Ibid., 8-9.

11. 3 SCRA 730 (1961).

12. 43 Phil. 763 (1922).

13. Sempio-Diy, The Family Code of the Philippines, 1989 ed., 249.

14. The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, pursuant to the clarification in
Memorandum Circular No. 85 of the Office of the President, dated November 7,
1988.

15. G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992.