ADOPTION

1. Republic vs. Bobiles, 205 SCRA 356

FACTS:

Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and
who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old. Salvador Condat,
father of the child, and the social worker assigned was served with copies of the order finding
that the petition was sufficient in form and substance. The copy was also posted on the
bulletin board of the court. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. The judgment declared
that surname of the child is changed to “Bobiles”.

ISSUE:

WON the petition to adopt Jason should be granted considering only Zenaida filed the
petition.

RULING:

Yes. In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the interests and
welfare of the child are of primary and paramount consideration. The welfare of a child is of
paramount consideration in proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its
adoption by another, and the courts to which the application for adoption is made is charged
with the duty of protecting the child and its interests and, to bring those interests fully before
it, it has authority to make rules to accomplish that end. Ordinarily, the approval of the
adoption rests in the sound discretion of the court. This discretion should be exercised in
accordance with the best interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the parents over
the child are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of grave abuse, the exercise of this
discretion by the approving official will not be disturbed

Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition
for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her
petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her
filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot
be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be
for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. The
representative of the Department of Social Welfare andDevelopment unqualifiedly
recommended the approval of the petition for adoption and the trial court dispensed with the
trial custody for several commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living
with the adopting parents since infancy. Further, the said petition was with the sworn written
consent of the children of the adopters.

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 2. Lahom vs. Sibulo, 406 SCRA 135

FACTS:

A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972, the
trial court grantedthe petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the
name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose MelvinLahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to
rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of her
husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in
all his dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went
into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of
adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference,
ingratitude and lack of care and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in
December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5,
1972. When Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically
R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it
was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject to
rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes
provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s action
prescribed.

RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of
RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By
then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil
Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption
decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer
be pursued.Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is
subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter
would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise
of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements
of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the
enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due
process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is
protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the
context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created
by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it
may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption,
including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject
to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at
any time before it has been exercised. But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal

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ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits
otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will and
testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his
estate.

3. In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim, 588 SCRA 98

FACTS: 
Monina and Primo Lim were married. Two children whose parents were unknown and whose
whereabouts were unknown were brought to them. They reared and took care of the two kids.
Primo died in 1998 but Monina got married to Angel Olario, an American citizen. When the
children were brought to them, they registered them making it appear that they were the
natural parents. Monina decided to adopt the two (2) children by availing of the amnesty
under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child, hence, she filed the
petition on April 24, 2002. Michelle was 25 years old and already married at the time of the
filing of the petition. Michael was 18 years old. The husband of Michelle gave his consent to
the adoption. The DSWD issued a certification that they were abandoned children. After trial,
the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the husband of Monina did not join her in
the petition as required by Section 7(c), Article III, RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family
Code. She filed a Motion for reconsideration as she did not fall under any of the exceptions
provided for by the law. (Sec. 7(c), Article III, RA 8552). It likewise ruled that the contention
that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable because, under the law, there
are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification, which the
husband, who was not even made a party in this case, must comply.

As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for
the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for
the purpose of exercising parental authority because an emancipated child acquires certain
rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.

Hence, she filed a petition with the Supreme Court raising the sole issue of whether or not
petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

She contended that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the
court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted.
She argued that the legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” is not applicable to adoption cases. She
argued that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions
were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already 18
years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated
having attained the age of majority.

ISSUE: Is the petition proper?

HELD: The answer is in the negative. The husband and wife should have jointly filed
the petition for adoption. The principle of dura lex sed lex is applicable as the law is
explicit that the husband and wife shall jointly adopt.

The use of the word “shall” means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child
which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate

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child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses. (Rep. v. Toledano, G.R. No. 94147, June 8, 1994, 233 SCRA 9).
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were
filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, the trial court was correct in
denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First,
the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband.
Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and
her husband are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that her husband gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that her husband must comply
being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552
such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous
years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency
until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country;
and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child.
None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

4. Santos vs. Aranzanso, 16 SCRA 344

Facts: A petition for adoption of Paulina, 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old, was
filed by Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes in the CFI of Manila. It was alleged that both
parents of the minors have long been unheard from and could not be found in spite of diligent
efforts to locate them; that since the war said minors have been abandoned; and that for years
since their infancy, said children have been continuously been in petitioners’ care and
custody. The consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by
the Court. After due publication and hearing, the adoption court granted the petition for the
adoption.

Subsequently – eight years later – Juliana Reyes died intestate. Simplicio Santos filed a
petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the former, stating among other things that
the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos. He also asked
that he be appointed administrator of the estate.

Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging to be the first cousin of the deceased, filed an opposition to the
petition for appointment of administrator, asserting among others that the adoption of Paulina
and Aurora Santos is void ab initio for want of the written consent of their parents, who were
then living and had not abandoned them.

Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise to be the first cousin of the deceased and mother of
Paulina opposed also the petition of Simplicio and adopted the pleadings filed by Aranzanso.

The Court of Appeals sustained respondent-oppositors right to make a collateral attack

Issue: WON a decree of adoption could be assailed collaterally in a settlement proceeding.

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Held: No. Firstly, consent of the parents is not an absolute requisite if child was abandoned,
consent by the guardian ad litem suffices.

Second, in adoption proceedings, abandonment imports “any conduct on the part of the
parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims to the child.” It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of
care and support which parents owe to their children.”

Third, the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal depends upon
the existence of a fact to be established before it, the determination of that fact by the tribunal
cannot be questioned in a collateral attack upon its order. Hence, the CA erred in reviewing
under a collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that the parents of the
adopted children had abandoned them.

5. Cang vs. CA 296 SCRA 128

FACTS:

Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were married and begot three children,
namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph
Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.

Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Cebu, upon learning of her husband’s extramarital affairs Wilma Soco, a family
friend of the Clavanos, which the trial court approved. Petitioner sought a divorce from Anna
Marie before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada which issued the
divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie,
reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places to petitioner.

Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, the brother and sister-in-law of Anna
Marie, filed Special Proceedings for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that
her husband had evaded his legal obligation to support his children and that because she
would be going to the United States to attend to a family business, leaving the children would
be a problem

Petitioner contest the adoption, alleging that, although were financially capable of supporting
the children while his finances were too meager compared to theirs, he could not in
conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children.

The petition was granted by the lower court which the Court of Appeals affirmed stating
Article 188 of the Family Code which requires the written consent of the natural parents of
the child to be adopted. It has been held however that the consent of the parent who has
abandoned the child is not necessary.

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Herbert elevated the case to the Court on the ground that he didn’ abandone his children

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has abandoned his children and the latter be legally
adopted without his written consent.

RULING:

No, petitioner has not abandoned his children and the latter cannot be legally adopted without
his written consent.

The act of abandonment imports any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child. It means neglect or
refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe
their children

In this case, however, petitioner did not manifest any conduct that would forego his parental
duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment.
Physical abandonment alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to
abandonment. While petitioner was physically absent, he was not remiss in his natural and
legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. The Court find pieces of
documentary evidence that petitioner maintained regular communications with his wife and
children through letters and telephone, and send them packages catered to their whims.

6. DSWD vs. Belen, 275 SCRA 440

Facts:

The spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized
American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell
Bernardo Ibea, which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 5830 of the Regional Trial
Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, and assigned to Branch 38 thereof. In due time, respondent
Judge Belen granted the petition in a decision dated June 25, 1992, after finding that
petitioner spouses were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own. However, when the
minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD
in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the department uncovered what it
considered as an anomalous adoption decree regarding said minor. It turned out that the
DSWD did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was never
any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to conduct a Home and Child Study Report
in the case. Furthermore, there was no directive from respondent judge for the social welfare
officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports
for said minors adoption.
As the adoption never passed through the DSWD, it filed the present administrative
complaint against respondent judge charging him with violating Article 33 of Presidential
Decree No. 603 which requires, inter alia, that petitions for adoption shall be granted only
after the DSWD has conducted and submitted a case study of the adoptee, the natural parents
and the adoptive parents. 

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Issue: WON the repondent judge is guilty with violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree
No. 603 otherwise known as The Child and Youth Welfare Code, and the corresponding
Supreme Court circular.

Held:

Yes. By respondents failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in
jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under
consideration. Adoption, after all, is in a large measure a legal device by which a better future
may be accorded an unfortunate child like Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case. the proper
course that respondent judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about
the commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830 so that the corresponding case study
could have been accordingly conducted by said department which undoubtedly has the
necessary competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make
the proper recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge should never have merely presumed
that it was routinary for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the
adoption.

7. Bartolome vs. SSS, 740 SCRA 78

FACTS:

                John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He
was enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died
due to an accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and
unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and,
allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits.

                SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as
the parent of John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is
Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.

                According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the
restoration of the parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.

HELD:

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FIRST ISSUE: Yes.

                The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a
significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be
deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account
Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral
relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the
adopter passed away?

                The Court also applied by analogy,  insofar as the restoration of custody is
concerned, the provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted,
the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is
still a minor or incapacitated.

                The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the
grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the
adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the
biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to
fend for himself at such a tender age.

                From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of
succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits
arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the
adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the
policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to
receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of
the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the
exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s
adoptive parent.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

                The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive
petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent
parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by
adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program
shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary.

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