GNSS Vulnerability & Mitigation Measures
in the European Maritime Environment
Presentation to RIN Technical Committee, 31 March 2004
Studies carried out on GNSS Vulnerability
U. S. DOT Volpe Center - Vulnerability to intentional and unintentional interference
of the US transportation infrastructure relying on GPS
U.S. DOT Radio-navigation Task Force Report
Work has also been carried out by ICAO, ESA - Galileo Project & UK RA
This study was carried out for the European Maritime Radio-navigation Forum
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Significance for marine traffic
• Less effect on maritime navigation than for aviation
• Man-made interference - land-based & line-of-sight
• However, waterborne or airborne jamming a possibility
Reasons for Vulnerability
• GNSS vulnerable because of very low signal level
• System failure likely to be a rare event
• Failure of individual GPS satellites not unusual
(Mean time to repair < 48 hours)
• Failure of shipborne equipment most likely cause
– power supply failure, receiver, antenna faults
(more than one receiver often fitted)
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Unintentional Sources of Interference
• Ionospheric Variability
• Solar Activity
• Spectrum Congestion
• Harmonics or Intermodulation Products
• Powerful Transmitters in other bands
Sources of Unintentional Man-Made Interference
• Television broadcasts
• Microwave communication links
• Consumer-grade equipment such as active TV Antennas
- TV Antenna Amplifier Incidents have affected entire Harbours
• Onboard satellite communications
- same band, latitude dependent, steerable dish antennas
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Jamming and Spoofing
• Low power levels make jamming easy, using low-cost equipment
• Jammers can operate on several frequencies simultaneously
• Counter-measures exist: directional antennas, tunable filters
• Spoofing more difficult, though simulators are readily available
• False signals, indistinguishable from real ones, are the danger
• Analogous to attacking computers with viruses
• GNSS service could be over the whole of an area e.g. Straits of Dover
Jamming
• Becomes more difficult as more frequencies and higher
power levels available
• Duration of jamming event is important
- brief interruptions are less serious
• Teams and resources may be available to deal with
jamming and interference problems
- need to be aware of threat to safety of life from interruption of GNSS
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Risk Analysis
• Identify threats
• Assess probabilities
• Consider consequences
• Determine mitigation difficulty/cost
Mitigation measures
• Increased radiated power
• Added frequencies
• Increased receiver sophistication
- receiver improvements: longer integration time; narrower loop
bandwidth; using L2C; external assistance.
- limitations: oscillator errors; tracking loop errors; user motion.
- antenna improvements: multiple antennas – cancellation,
polarization, spatial nulling, beam forming; signal processing –
spectral filters, space-time adaptive, space frequency adaptive.
- limitations: phase perturbations, dynamic range.
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Mitigation measures
• Awareness of the risk
• System vulnerability cannot be fully eliminated
• Adequate alternative systems are essential
• Integration with Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)
Integration with IMU
• Most effective method
• Loose-coupled
• Tight-coupled
• Deep integration
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Alternative Systems
• Redundant Systems
• Backup Systems
• Contingency Systems
Redundant Systems
• Equivalent Performance (e.g. Galileo)
• No change in procedures necessary (dual receivers)
• Similar Systems may have common failure modes
• Counter measures likely to be effective in future
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Backup Systems - terrestrial
• Loran:
Position Input compatible with electronic charts, timing reference, modern
receivers, ASF corrections
Suitable for coastal and ocean phases, but Loran receiver not a specific
carriage requirement
• Radar and Radar aids to Navigation:
Radar position not directly compatible input for electronic chart
Generally coastal only, but radar is a required fit on SOLAS Vessels
Vulnerability of backup systems
Loran-C
• Onboard power supplies
• Onboard equipment
• Ground infrastructure
• Ionospheric effects
• Power lines
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Vulnerability of backup systems
Radar
• Onboard power supplies
• Onboard equipment
• Rain & sea clutter
• Masking
Racon vulnerabilities
• Masking, clutter
• Interference nulls (multipath)
• Racon failures – power supplies, damage
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Contingency Systems
• Light and Buoys – case for their retention
• Radar in poor visibility
• Dead-reckoning – uses on-board instruments
• Inertial Navigation Systems - limited by rate of drift &
cost, at present
Vulnerability of contingency
systems
Lights & buoys
• Visibility
• Reliability of lights
• Maintenance
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Vulnerability of contingency
systems
Dead reckoning/depth sounders
• Onboard power supplies
• Onboard equipment
• Drift/cumulative errors
• Charting
Dependent Systems
• GNSS supplies position inputs to other systems
- AIS, ECDIS, GMDSS
• These systems are totally dependent on GPS at present
• Compatible backup needed for direct position input &
timing
• Increasing problem as dependence grows
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Conclusions
• Significant risk of losing GNSS
• Consequences of losing GNSS greater as reliance on it increases
• Galileo fully redundant system, similar vulnerabilities
• Future GNSS additional signals and higher powers
• Loran effective backup, but with its own vulnerabilities
• Radar limited backup
• Visual Aids limit safety consequences
• In poor visibility radar and dead-reckoning used
• Dependent systems (AIS, ECDIS) need compatible backup
Recommendations
• Options for backup systems & vulnerabilities
• Partnerships with other service providers
• Vulnerability Mitigation
• Transfer of Mitigation Technology
• Improved receiver performance
• Awareness about the Vulnerability of GNSS
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Questions?
Contacts: Duncan.Glass@thls.org
Nick.Ward@thls.org
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