VILLAMOR vs COMELEC and AMYTIS
Facts:
In 2004, petitioner Villamor was proclaimed as mayor by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBC) in the elections over his opponent, respondent Amytis De Dios-Batao.
Respondent filed a petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner alleging as grounds the
illegal composition of the MBC and its proceedings. Subsequently, or on May 24, 2004,
respondent filed an election protest with the RTC.
In the meantime, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued on May 9, 2005 a
Resolution on SPC No. 04-083 in favor of the petitioner which is the dismissal of the petition
to annul the proclamation of petitioner for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether the trial court prematurely admitted respondent's election protest pending a
pre-proclamation controversy.
Held:
As a general rule, the proper remedy after the proclamation of the winning candidate
for the position contested would be to file a regular election protest or a petition for quo
warranto. The filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the
subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment of one
earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the
title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation. The reason is that once the
competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the case itself and not in
another proceeding. This procedure will prevent confusion and conflict of authority.
Moreover, not all actions seeking the annulment of proclamation suspend the running of the
period for filing an election protest or a petition for quo warranto. For it is not the relief prayed
for which distinguishes actions under 248 from an election protest or quo warranto
proceedings, but the grounds on which they are based.
CITY OF MANILA, Petitioner, VS. MELBA TAN TE, Respondent
FACTS:
The Petitioner, City of Manila enacted on February 3, 1998 Ordinance No. 7951,
authorising the mayor to acquire by negotiation or expropriation pieces of real property along
Maria Clara and Forbes Streets where low-cost housing could be built and awarded to bona-
fide residents therein. One of those included was the property of the Respondent Melba Tan
Te, a 475-square meter property, which she acquired from one Emerlinda in 1996, and it
was already occupied by several families whose leasehold rights have already expired. The
RTC dismissed the first compliant. The Petitioner was thereby compelled to file the
complaint, after depositing in trust with the Land Bank of the Philippines P1,000,000.00 in
cash, representing the just compensation required by law.
The Petitioner then moved to be allowed to enter the proper, but the RTC dismissed
the complaint filed by the Petitioner in this wise: First, the trial court held that while petitioner
had deposited with the bank the alleged P1M cash in trust for respondent, petitioner
nevertheless did not submit any certification from the City Treasurer’s Office of the amount
needed to justly compensate respondent for her property.
The appellate court denied the appeal, hence the Petitioner elevated its case to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent is required to file an answer instead of motion to dismiss.
HELD:
Yes. The present rule requires the filing of an answer as responsive pleading to the
complaint; The defendant in an expropriation case who has objections to the taking of his
property is now required to file an answer and in it raise all his available defenses against
the allegations in the complaint for eminent domain; Failure to file the answer does not
produce all the disastrous consequences of default in ordinary civil actions, because the
defendant may still present evidence on just compensation.—The Supreme Court, in its en
banc Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803 dated April 8, 1997, has provided that the revisions
made in the Rules of Court were to take effect on July 1, 1997. Thus, with said amendments,
the present state of Rule 67 dispenses with the filing of an extraordinary motion to dismiss
such as that required before in response to a complaint for expropriation. The present rule
requires the filing of an answer as responsive pleading to the complaint. Section 3 thereof
provides: x x x The defendant in an expropriation case who has objections to the taking of
his property is now required to file an answer and in it raise all his available defenses against
the allegations in the complaint for eminent domain.
B. H. BERKENKOTTER & CO
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The property has an area of 10,640 square meters and belongs to B. H. Berkenkotter &
Co., the herein petitioner. On June 18, 1982, Vicente Viray, president of the said school, sent the
B. H. Berkenkotter & Co., owner of a parcel of land, a written offer to buy the land in line with the
5-year expansion program of ARASOF. In reply, Berkenkotter expressed its willingness to sell at
P50.00 per square meter payable in cash. At Viray's request, the Provincial Appraisal
Committee, Office of the Provincial Assessor, Batangas City, appraised the land and fixed its
market value at P32.00 per square meter. Viray then wrote Berkenkotter another letter and
offered to buy the property at the said price. The latter stuck to its original valuation; later it said
that the property had in fact appreciated to as much as P100.00 per square meter. Further
negotiations failed to resolve, thus, expropriation proceedings were commenced against the
petitioner by the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of ARASOF.
ISSUE: W/N CA erred court setting aside the compensation fixed by the trial court and ordered
that the subject property be paid for at the rate of P19.18 per square meter?
HELD:
NO. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to
be expropriated. To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market
value of the property, to which should be added the consequential benefits which may arise from
the expropriation. If the consequential benefits exceed the consequential damages, these items
should be disregarded altogether as the basic value of the property should be paid in every case.
The price demanded by the petitioner from the Republic of the Philippines is more than 4
times the price it willingly accepted from the private vendees. It is also noteworthy that the
individual buyers bought the land for their own private purposes only and not for the public
purpose invoked by the Republic and admitted by the petitioner itself. And no less importantly,
the petitioner has not even made any efforts to differentiate the subject property from the lands
sold at the lower rate, to justify
the increase in its price by more than 300%.
Republic vs BPI
G.R. No. 203039, September 11, 2013
FACTS:
On 12 Feb 1998, the DPWH filed a case for expropriation against portions of the
properties of BPI and of Bayani Villanueva situated in Pamplona, Las Pinas City. DPWH needed
281 square meters of BPI’s lot and 177 square meters from Villanueva’s
lot for the construction of the Zapote-Alabang Fly-Over.Neither BPI nor Villanueva objected to the
propriety of the expropriation, hence the trial court constituted a Board of Commissioners to
determine the just compensation. The Board recommended the amount of P40,000 per square
meter as the fair market value.
Meanwhile, BPI filed a Motion for Partial New Trial to determine the just compensation of
its building, which was not included in the Decision that fixed the just compensation for the
parcels of land. The trial court held that just compensation for the building as due and ordered
petitioner to pay BPI the amount of P2,633,000, which later was lowered to P1,905,600 after
recommendation of the petitioner’s commissioner.
ISSUE: Whether the award of additional just compensation for BPI’s building in the
amount fixed therefor is unfounded and without legal basis?
HELD:
No, with legal basis. Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as sovereign,
to take private property for public use upon observance of due process of law and payment of
just compensation. The State’s power of eminent domain is limited by the constitutional mandate
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be
expropriated. The general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of the
condemned property is entitled to is the market value. The general rule however, is modified
where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In such case, the owner is not restricted to
compensation for the portion actually taken, he is also entitled to recover the consequential
damage, if any, to the remaining of the property.
JOSE MA. ANSALDO vs.
FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR.
FACTS:
Two lots of private ownership were taken by the Government and used for the widening
of a road more than forty-three years ago, without benefit of an action of eminent domain or
agreement with its owners, albeit without protest by the latter. The lots belong to the petitioners,
Jose Ma. Ansaldo and Maria Angela Ansaldo, are covered by title in their names and have an
aggregate area of 1,041 square meters. These lots were taken from the Ansaldo’s sometime in
1947 by the Department of Public Work Transportation and Communication and made part of
what used to be Sta. Mesa Street and is now Ramon Magsaysay Avenue at San Juan, Metro
Manila. Said owners made no move whatever until twenty-six years later. They wrote to ask for
compensation for their land on January 22, 1973.
The Acting Chairman ruled that "the amount of compensation to be paid to the claimants
is to be determined as of the time of the taking of the subject lots.
ISSUE:
Whether or not just compensation should be fixed as of the time of actual taking of possession by
the expropriating entity or only after conveyance of title to the expropriator pursuant to
expropriation proceedings duly instituted
HELD:
In the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, there is a "taking" when
the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical
destruction or a material impairment of the value of his property or when he is deprived of the
ordinary use thereof.
There is a "taking" in this sense when the expropriator enters private property not only for
a momentary period but for a more permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting the property
to a public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof. Clearly, then, the value of the Ansaldos' property must be ascertained as of the year
1947, when it was actually taken, and not at the time of the filing of the expropriation suit, which,
by the way, still has to be done. The value, once fixed, shall earn interest at the legal rate until
full payment is effected, conformably with other principles laid down by case law.
NAPOCOR VS SPS. FLORIMON V. ILETO and ROWENA NOLASCO
Facts:
On October 7, 1997, the National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a complaint, which
was subsequently amended, seeking to expropriate certain parcels of land in Bulacan, in
connection with its Northwestern Luzon Transmission Line project. As a consequence, the
Court hereby allows the NAPOCOR to remain in possession of the aforementioned areas
which it had entered on December 16, 1997 and further orders it to pay the respective
owners thereof the following just compensation, with legal interest from the taking of
possession (Sec. 10, Rule 67 of [the] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), and after deducting the
sums due the Government for unpaid real estate taxes and other charges.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation purportedly for
the acquisition of the property despite the fact that the NPC acquired only an aerial
easement of right of way over the agricultural lands of respondents
HELD:
The determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function
addressed to the discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other branch or
official of the government. We already established in Export Processing Zone Authority v.
Dulay that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as
guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not
substitute the courts' own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive
at such amount
Gaviba Maglucot Aw, et.al vs. Leopoldo Maglucot, et.al
Facts:
Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D (subject
lot). Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of
subject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying rental therefor. Said
respondents-built houses on their corresponding leased lots. They paid the rental amount of
P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs of Roberto Maglucot,
petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest. In December 1992, however, said respondents stopped
paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot.
Petitioners thus filed the complaint a quo. Petitioners maintain that Lot No. 1639 was
mutually partitioned and physically subdivided among the co-owners and that majority of
them participated in the actual execution of the subdivision. Petitioners further contend that
respondents admitted in their tax declarations covering their respective houses that they are
"constructed on the land of Roberto Maglucot.
Issue:
Whether or not there has been a valid oral partition
Held:
Yes. The records of the case show that sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral
agreement to tentatively partition Lot No. 1639. By virtue of this agreement, the original co-
owners occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639. It was only in 1952 when the petition to
subdivide Lot No. 1639 was filed because two of the co-owners, namely Hermogenes Olis
and heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to have said lot subdivided and have separate certificates
of title. Significantly, after the 1952 proceedings, the parties in this case by themselves
and/or through their predecessors-in-interest occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in
accordance with the sketch plan.
Felicidad Dadizon vs. Socorro Bernadas
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners to compel the partition of the one-
half conjugal share of the properties left by their late father. During trial, the counsel of
respondents filed a Project of Partition, however, the same was not signed by all of the heirs.
Thereafter, RTC ordered petitioners to submit their comment thereon within 15 days, but the
Petitioners did not file any comment. The RTC issued an Order approving the Project of
Partition, without considering the extrajudicial partition agreed upon by the parties.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was
denied because according to the RTC, the petitioners failed to file any comment on or
objection to the Project of Partition despite previously being ordered to do so. Hence, this
Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in approving the Project of Partition, without considering the
extrajudicial partition agreed upon by the parties.
HELD:
YES. A careful study of the records of this case reveals that the RTC departed from
the procedures mandated by Rule 69.
Even if petitioners did manifest in open court to the RTC that they have already
agreed with the respondents on the manner of partition of the subject properties, what is
material is that the Project of Partition did not bear the signatures of all the heirs. Hence, the
RTC had no authority to approve the Project of Partition which did not bear all of the
signatures of the parties, on the premise that they had all agreed to the same.
TIONGCO VS. SALAO A.M. No. RTJ-06-2009 July 27, 2006
FACTS:
Complainant Jose B. Tiongco charges respondent Judge Evelyn E. Salao, with gross
ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, grave abuse of judicial power amounting to
vindictiveness and unlawful imprisonment, arising from the respondent Judges Order dated
17 March 2003, citing him in direct contempt, sentencing him to ten (10) days imprisonment,
and ordering the police to place him in prison immediately.
Complainant alleged that after the prosecutor had argued against the motions, he
stood up to argue in support of the same, but he was prevented because the respondent
Judge declared the motions submitted for resolution. When he vehemently objected to the
respondent Judges order and protested his being prevented from speaking, the respondent
Judge cited him for direct contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Order finding complainant guilty of direct contempt is
immediately executory.
HELD:
NO. An order of direct contempt is not immediately executory. Evidently, respondent
Judge erred in ordering the immediate imprisonment of the complainant after declaring him
in direct contempt of court. She should have given complainant the opportunity to avail
himself of the remedies provided by law.
LU YM v. MAHINAY
FACTS:
Petitioner was allowed to manage all the properties of Cayetano and was able to
convince his siblings and Gertrudes to execute an alleged simulated last will and testament
to evade payment of excessive inheritance tax. After the death of Cayetano, the will was
probated. Gertrudes and her children allegedly gave their consent thereto because they
were made to believe that the same was for the purpose of keeping the properties intact.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but the respondent denied the motion.
Since no TRO/injunction was issued by the appellate courts, the proceedings before
the trial court continued. Petitioner was declared in default and plaintiffs were allowed to
present evidence ex parte. On March 16, 2005, respondent Judge rendered a decision
holding that the plaintiffs are entitled to their share in the properties of Cayetano; and for
which reason, petitioner should make an accounting of said properties. Invoking the decision
in G.R. No. 161309, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the March 16,
2005 decision of the trial court be set aside. However respondent Judge denied the motion
for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents are guilty of indirect contempt.
HELD:
We rule in the negative. Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court
by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful
disregard or disobedience of the court’s orders, but such conduct which tends to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to
impede the due administration of justice.
In the present case, the assailed acts of respondents do not constitute disobedience
to, or defiance of the decision in G.R. No. 161309. The Court never stated therein that the
March 16, 2005 decision of respondent Judge, or any judgment on the merits rendered
pending decision of the Court, should be set aside.
