Justice Isagani
A. Cruz
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Posts Tagged ‘Sub Judice rule’
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, JUDICIARY, SUB JUDICE RULE, SUPREME COURT
Contempt of court, March 26, 1995
In 1995 on October 24, 2015 at 12:48 am
WHAT is contempt of court? Every so often we read of a person being punished for contempt of
court and ordered to pay a fine or suffer imprisonment or both. What is this offense and why is it
called contempt of court?
There are two kinds of contempt of court: direct and indirect. Direct contempt is misbehavior in the
presence of or near a judge or court that interrupts or obstructs the proceedings before it, such as
disrespect towards the court of offensive conduct toward others. Indirect contempt is not committed
in the presence of or near a judge or court and includes disobedience to a lawful order of the court
and “any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice.”
Such acts are called contempt of court because they evince a lack of the deference toward the court
that is expected from the public in the interest of the proper administration of justice. By committing
any of these acts, the person manifests his disdain for or contempt of the court or judge.
It is easy to understand the reason for punishing direct contempt of court since it is committed before
or near a judge and constitutes disrespect for him or disturbs the proceedings he is conducting. That
is why the judgment is summary and is unappealable except when rendered by a municipal court.
It is in the case of indirect contempt that more care is taken before the respondent is declared guilty
and punished. A hearing is necessary and the judgment is appealable. This is especially necessary
where the charge is that the improper conduct tends “directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice.”
Some cases are easily remembered. Ramon Tulfo was fined by the Supreme Court for calling its
members “isang katutak na bobo” in connection with the checkpoints case. Anders Hultman was
similarly punished for “throwing all my rotten eggs at the Supreme Court” because of the alleged
delay in the Teehankee case. More recently, Judge Harriet Demetriou imposed a P1,000 fine on
Acting Justice Secretary Demetrio Demetria for predicting the conviction of Mayor Sanchez.
In all these cases, the respondents were found to be disrespectful toward the court in a manner that
tended to “degrade the administration of justice.”
I can understand punishing indirect contempt when it consists of, say, disobedience to a court
decision or order as this is a clear defiance of lawful processes. I have second thoughts, though, about
considering as indirect contempt criticisms tending to degrade the administration of justice.
The rule on criticism of official conduct was laid down by Justice Malcolm in United States v.
Bustos:
“Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech.
The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer
under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound may be assuaged by the balm of a clear
conscience. A public official must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official
acts.”
This rule has even been extended to cover the private lives of public men, on the ground that the
people have a right to expect and demand from them propriety in even their private acts. By judicial
dictum, however, the judiciary has been insulated and shielded from public comment by an exception
to that rule. The exception would warn the public to be more careful, and more deferential, when
commenting on judicial conduct.
This doctrine was laid down in People v. Alarcon, when a columnist was punished for reprinting a
letter complaining against the unjust decision of a trial court in a tenancy case. In the course of its
decision, the Court said:
“Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is
summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. “
But even if these is no pending case, a person may still be guilty of contempt of court, as Justice
Moran emphasized in his dissent, for disrespectful language or conduct toward the court. Hence, one
may be punished by the court for (1) publicly commenting on a pending case or one that is sub
judice, and (2) commenting disrespectfully on judicial conduct even if there is no pending case.
I have reservations about this doctrine.
On the first ground, I do not see why public comment on a pending case will obstruct or impede the
administration of justice. By punishing the indiscreet critic, the judge is impliedly admitting that he
may be influenced by the irrelevant remarks although he is supposed to be removed from popular
passions or persuasions and to decide only according to his own lights. In the case of Demetria, for
example, I am sure his remarks could not have affected the decision in the Sanchez case but he was
punished just the same.
On the second ground, I do not see why judges, as public officials, should be handled with kid gloves
when their colleagues in the public service, including the president of the Philippines himself and the
members of the Congress, can be criticized with impunity and without liability. The reason for the
special rule is the need to preserve the people’s faith in the judiciary. But don’t we also have to
preserve the people’s faith in the president of the Philippine and Congress? Is it not necessary to
preserve the people’s faith not only in the Supreme Court and the other courts, but in the whole
Republic?
I also notice that an act is punishable if it “tends” to directly or indirectly impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice. Under the rule now observed by the Supreme Court, an act may
be punished only if it results in clear and present danger to society and not if it only tends toward
that evil. The dangerous tendency rule as a test of free speech was abandoned by the Supreme Court
in 1947.
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