City Government of Makati vs. Odeña | G.R. No.

191661 | August 13, 2013

FACTS:
Respondent had been employed by petitioner as a teacher since 1980. She was a contractual
employee up to 30 July 1992 and a casual employee from July 1992 until November 1996.
Sometime in 1996, she held the position of Clerk I and was detailed at the Library Department
of the Makati High School.
It was the practice of respondent to sign an Attendance Sheet bearing her name and signature
to signify attendance, instead of using a Daily Time Record. In 2000, she was asked to explain
why she supposedly failed to report for work starting in November 1999. She explained that she
did not incur those alleged absences and presented the employees’ log book as proof of her
attendance. Her explanation was disregarded by then education consultant Priscilla Ferrolino.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Mayor Elenita S. Binay issued a Memorandum dropping respondent from the roll of employees,
in view of the latter’s absences without official leave (AWOL). Respondent moved for
reconsideration, but her motion was denied. Aggrieved, she appealed to the CSC.
The CSC ruled that the dropping of respondent from the roll of employees was not supported
by evidence. The CSC, by virtue of respondent’s illegal dismissal, directed petitioner to: (1)
reinstate her; and (2) to pay her back salaries from the time of her separation up to her actual
reinstatement.
The CSC, by virtue of respondent’s illegal dismissal, directed petitioner to: (1) reinstate her; and
(2) to pay her back salaries from the time of her separation up to her actual reinstatement.
Consequently, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. Aggrieved, it
filed a Rule 43 Petition appealing the findings of the CSC to the CA.
The CA denied the Petition and affirmed that respondent was illegally dismissed. The CA
affirmed the CSC Resolutions which ordered the reinstatement of respondent and payment of
back salaries, but subject to the modification that an illegally terminated civil service employee,
like respondent, is entitled to back salaries limited to a maximum period of five (5) years, and
not to full salaries from her illegal dismissal up to her reinstatement.
Petitioner filed a Petition with SC arguing that the CA committed serious error in ruling that the
respondent had been illegally dismissed. In its 2007 Decision, this Court dismissed the Petition
and affirmed the ruling of the CA in its entirety. This decision became final.
The directive to reinstate respondent was never complied with. Respondent instead opted to
avail herself of early retirement. Petitioner thereafter paid her the amount representing her
supposed back salaries and other benefits. In acknowledging receipt of this amount, she signed
in favor of petitioner a “Release, Quitclaim, and Waiver”.
Respondent filed Letter of Complaint to the CSC, asserting that the amount paid her did not
correspond to the entire amount she was legally entitled to. The CSC took cognizance of
respondent’s Letter-Complaint and directed petitioner to file her comment. In her comment
petitioner denied the allegations of respondent for being false and baseless.
The CSC ruled in favor of respondent, and directed petitioner to pay her backwages and other
benefits from the period of her illegal dismissal until her early retirement, or for a period of
seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-eight (28) days.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CSC denied the motion and affirmed CSC
Resolution. In Resolution, CSC stated that res judicata invoked by petitioner must give way to
the higher interest of justice.
Petitioner filed a Rule 43 Petition with the CA and argued that: (1) the CSC Resolutions were
violative of the doctrine of res judicata; and (2) the CSC erred in including respondent’s
retirement as a ground for her entitlement to full back salaries and other benefits, more than
what was granted by this Court in its 2007 Decision.
The CA dismissed the Rule 43 Petition. The CA regarded the CSC Resolutions, issued in relation
to respondent’s Letter-Complaint, as orders of execution of the final and executory 2007
Decision of this Court.44 Thus, petitioner’s recourse to a Rule 43 Petition was unavailing,
because orders of execution cannot be the subject of appeal, the proper remedy being a Rule
65 petition.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion and affirmed its previous
ruling.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner undertook an improper remedy when it filed a Rule 43 Petition with the CA
to question the Resolutions issued by the CSC.
RULING:
The general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable; otherwise, a case would never
end. The CA, however, failed to consider that there are exceptions to this rule. This Court in
Banaga v. Majaducon, enumerated the exceptions as follows: Even prior to the promulgation of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that no appeal lies from an order or writ directing
the execution of a final judgment, for otherwise a case will not attain finality, is not absolute
since a party aggrieved by an improper or irregular execution of a judgment is not without a
remedy. Thus, in Limpin v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court enumerated the exceptional
circumstances where a party may elevate the matter of an improper execution for appeal, to
wit: There may, to be sure, be instances when an error may be committed in the course of
execution proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a party. These instances, rare though they
may be, do call for correction by a superior court, as where — 1) the writ of execution varies
the judgment; 2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution
inequitable or unjust; x x x x 6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently
issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the
judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority.
The CSC grievously erred in taking cognizance of respondent’s Letter-Complaint which was
actually a prohibited appeal of the 2007 Decision that by then had long become final and
executory. It is axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer be attacked by any
of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.
As the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it, SC’s decision in any given
case constitutes the law of that particular case, from which there is no appeal. The 2007
Decision bars a further repeated consideration of the very same issues that have already been
settled with finality; more particularly, the illegal dismissal of respondent, as well as the amount
of back wages that she was entitled to receive by reason thereof. To once again reopen that
issue through a different avenue would defeat the existence of our courts as final arbiters of
legal controversies. Having attained finality, the decision is beyond review or modification even
by this Court. Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory
and unappealable. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of
the latter’s case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the “life of the
law.”
Immutability of Judgments; It is a fundamental rule that when a final judgment becomes
executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable; The only recognized exception is the
correction of clerical errors; or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party or when the judgment is void.
Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter it. Same;
After a judgment has been fully satisfied, the case is deemed terminated once and for all. It
cannot be modified or altered.