Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs. Sesante

11/25/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 798

G.R. No. 172682. July 27, 2016.*

SULPICIO LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. NAPOLEON
SESANTE, now substituted by MARIBEL ATILANO,
KRISTEN MARIE, CHRISTIAN IONE, KENNETH
KERRN and KARISNA KATE, all surnamed SESANTE,
respondents.
Civil Law; Substitution of Heirs; Due Process; Substitution by

the heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due
process.—Substitution by the heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction,
but a requirement of due process. It protects the right of due
process belonging to any party, that in the event of death the
deceased litigant continues to be protected and properly
represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal
representative of his estate. The application of the rule on
substitution depends on whether or not the
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.

460
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs. Sesante
action survives the death of the litigant. Section 1, Rule 87 of

the Rules of Court enumerates the following actions that survive
the death of a party, namely: (1) recovery of real or personal
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000175ff29a64b311bfc9f003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/34
property, or an interest from the estate; (2) enforcement of liens

on the estate; and (3) recovery of damages for an injury to person
or property. On the one hand, Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court lists the actions abated by death as including: (1) claims for
funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent;
(2) judgments for money; and (3) all claims for money against the
deceased, arising from contract, express or implied.
Same; Common Carriers; Contract of Carriage; A contract of
carriage generates a relation attended with public duty, neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier’s employees and gives ground for an
action for damages.—A contract of carriage generates a relation
attended with public duty, neglect or malfeasance of the carrier’s
employees and gives ground for an action for damages. Sesante’s
claim against the petitioner involved his personal injury caused
by the breach of the contract of carriage. Pursuant to the
aforecited rules, the complaint survived his death, and could be
continued by his heirs following the rule on substitution.
Same; Same; Vicarious Liability; Article 1759 of the Civil
Code does not establish a presumption of negligence because it
explicitly makes the common carrier liable in the event of death or
injury to passengers due to the negligence or fault of the common
carrier’s employees.—Article 1759 of the Civil Code does not
establish a presumption of negligence because it explicitly makes
the common carrier liable in the event of death or injury to
passengers due to the negligence or fault of the common carrier’s
employees. It reads: Article 1759. Common carriers are liable
for the death or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees,
although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of
their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers. This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon
proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employees. The
liability of common carriers under Article 1759 is demanded by
the duty of extraordinary diligence required of common carriers in
safely carrying their passengers. On the other hand, Article 1756
of the Civil Code lays down the presumption of negligence against
the

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VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 461

common carrier in the event of death or injury of its

passenger, viz.: Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
Same; Same; Presumption of Negligence; The presumption of
negligence applies so long as there is evidence showing that: (a) a
contract exists between the passenger and the common carrier; and
(b) the injury or death took place during the existence of such
contract.—Clearly, the trial court is not required to make an
express finding of the common carrier’s fault or negligence. Even
the mere proof of injury relieves the passengers from establishing
the fault or negligence of the carrier or its employees. The
presumption of negligence applies so long as there is evidence
showing that: (a) a contract exists between the passenger and the
common carrier; and (b) the injury or death took place during the
existence of such contract. In such event, the burden shifts to the
common carrier to prove its observance of extraordinary diligence,
and that an unforeseen event or force majeure had caused the
injury.
Same; Same; Fortuitous Events; For a common carrier to be
absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough
that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event. The common
carrier must still prove that it did not contribute to the occurrence
of the incident due to its own or its employees’ negligence.—A
common carrier may be relieved of any liability arising from a
fortuitous event pursuant to Article 1174 of the Civil Code. But
while it may free a common carrier from liability, the provision
still requires exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury
or loss. Else stated, for a common carrier to be absolved from
liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident
was caused by a fortuitous event. The common carrier must still
prove that it did not contribute to the occurrence of the incident
due to its own or its employees’ negligence.
Same; Same; Breach of Contracts; Damages; Moral Damages;
Moral damages may be recovered in an action upon breach of
contract of carriage only when: (a) death of a passenger results, or
(b) it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith,
even if death does not result.—We agree with the petitioner that
moral damages may be recovered in an action upon breach of
contract of

462

carriage only when: (a) death of a passenger results, or (b) it

is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith, even if
death does not result. However, moral damages may be awarded
if the contractual breach is found to be wanton and deliberately
injurious, or if the one responsible acted fraudulently or with
malice or bad faith.
Same; Same; Contract of Carriage; Damages; Moral Damages;
The totality of the negligence by the officers and crew of M/V
Princess of the Orient, coupled with the seeming indifference of the
petitioner to render assistance to Sesante, warranted the award of
moral damages.—The totality of the negligence by the officers and
crew of M/V Princess of the Orient, coupled with the seeming
indifference of the petitioner to render assistance to Sesante,
warranted the award of moral damages. While there is no hard-
and-fast rule in determining what is a fair and reasonable amount
of moral damages, the discretion to make the determination is
lodged in the trial court with the limitation that the amount
should not be palpably and scandalously excessive. The trial court
then bears in mind that moral damages are not intended to
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer, or to enrich the plaintiff at
the expense of the defendant. The amount of the moral damages
must always reasonably approximate the extent of injury and be
proportional to the wrong committed. The Court recognizes the
mental anguish, agony and pain suffered by Sesante who fought
to survive in the midst of the raging waves of the sea while facing
the immediate prospect of losing his life. His claim for moral and
economic vindication is a bitter remnant of that most infamous
tragedy that left hundreds of families broken in its wake. The
anguish and moral sufferings he sustained after surviving the
tragedy would always include the memory of facing the prospect
of his death from drowning, or dehydration, or being preyed upon
by sharks. Based on the established circumstances, his survival
could only have been a miracle wrought by God’s grace, by which
he was guided in his desperate swim for the safety of the shore.
But even with the glory of survival, he still had to grapple with
not just the memory of having come face to face with almost
certain death, but also with having to answer to the instinctive
guilt for the rest of his days of being chosen to live among the
many who perished in the tragedy. While the anguish, anxiety,
pain and stress experienced by Sesante during and after the
sinking cannot be quantified, the moral damages to be awarded
should at least approximate the reparation of all
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VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 463

the consequences of the petitioner’s negligence. With moral

damages being meant to enable the injured party to obtain the
means, diversions or amusements in order to alleviate his moral
and physical sufferings, the Court is called upon to ensure that
proper recompense be allowed to him, through his heirs. For this
purpose, the amount of P1,000,000.00, as granted by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA, is maintained.
Same; Same; Diligence Required of Common Carriers; The
law requires the common carrier to observe the same diligence as
the hotel keepers in case the baggage remains with the passenger;
otherwise, extraordinary diligence must be exercised.—The rule
that the common carrier is always responsible for the passenger’s
baggage during the voyage needs to be emphasized. Article 1754
of the Civil Code does not exempt the common carrier from
liability in case of loss, but only highlights the degree of care
required of it depending on who has the custody of the belongings.
Hence, the law requires the common carrier to observe the same
diligence as the hotel keepers in case the baggage remains with
the passenger; otherwise, extraordinary diligence must be
exercised. Furthermore, the liability of the common carrier
attaches even if the loss or damage to the belongings resulted
from the acts of the common carrier’s employees, the only
exception being where such loss or damages is due to force
majeure.
Same; Same; Same; By allowing him to board the vessel with
his belongings without any protest, the petitioner became
sufficiently notified of such belongings. So long as the belongings
were brought inside the premises of the vessel, the petitioner was
thereby effectively notified and consequently duty-bound to observe
the required diligence in ensuring the safety of the belongings
during the voyage.—In YHT Realty Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 451 SCRA 638 (2005), we declared the actual delivery of
the goods to the innkeepers or their employees as unnecessary
before liability could attach to the hotelkeepers in the event of
loss of personal belongings of their guests considering that the
personal effects were inside the hotel or inn because the
hotelkeeper shall remain accountable. Accordingly, actual
notification was not necessary to render the petitioner as the
common carrier liable for the lost personal belongings of Sesante.
By allowing him to board the vessel with his belongings without
any protest, the petitioner became sufficiently notified of such

belongings. So long as the belongings were brought inside the
premises of

464

the vessel, the petitioner was thereby effectively notified and

consequently duty-bound to observe the required diligence in
ensuring the safety of the belongings during the voyage. Applying
Article 2000 of the Civil Code, the petitioner assumed the liability
for loss of the belongings caused by the negligence of its officers or
crew. In view of our finding that the negligence of the officers and
crew of the petitioner was the immediate and proximate cause of
the sinking of the M/V Princess of the Orient, its liability for
Sesante’s lost personal belongings was beyond question.
Same; Same; Damages; Temperate Damages; Temperate
damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but the amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proven with certainty.—Temperate damages may be recovered
when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty.
Article 2224 of the Civil Code expressly authorizes the courts to
award temperate damages despite the lack of certain proof of
actual damages. Indubitably, Sesante suffered some pecuniary
loss from the sinking of the vessel, but the value of the loss could
not be established with certainty. The CA, which can try facts and
appreciate evidence, pegged the value of the lost belongings as
itemized in the police report at P120,000.00. The valuation
approximated the costs of the lost belongings. In that context, the
valuation of P120,000.00 is correct, but to be regarded as
temperate damages.
Same; Same; Diligence Required of Common Carriers; The
petitioner, as a common carrier, was required to observe
extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of its passengers and
their personal belongings.—In fine, the petitioner, as a common
carrier, was required to observe extraordinary diligence in
ensuring the safety of its passengers and their personal
belongings. It being found herein short of the required diligence
rendered it liable for the resulting injuries and damages
sustained by Sesante as one of its passengers.
Same; Damages; Exemplary Damages; In contracts and quasi-

contracts, the Court has the discretion to award exemplary
damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner.—In contracts and quasi-
contracts, the Court has the discretion to award exemplary
damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent

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manner. Indeed, exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a

matter of right, and it is left to the court to decide whether or not
to award them. In consideration of these legal premises for the
exercise of the judicial discretion to grant or deny exemplary
damages in contracts and quasi-contracts against a defendant
who acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner, the Court hereby awards exemplary damages
to Sesante.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Arthur D. Lim Law Office for petitioner.
Alexander L. Bansil for respondents.

BERSAMIN, J.:

Moral damages are meant to enable the injured party to
obtain the means, diversions or amusements in order to
alleviate the moral suffering. Exemplary damages are
designed to permit the courts to reshape behavior that is
socially deleterious in its consequence by creating negative
incentives or deterrents against such behavior.

The Case

This appeal seeks to undo and reverse the adverse
decision promulgated on June 27, 2005,1 whereby the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 91, in Quezon City
holding the petitioner liable to pay temperate and moral

damages due to breach of contract of carriage.2
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 49-59; penned by CA Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios

(retired/deceased), with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino (retired)
and Vicente S.E. Veloso (retired), concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 64-76.

466

Antecedents

On September 18, 1998, at around 12:55 p.m., the M/V
Princess of the Orient, a passenger vessel owned and
operated by the petitioner, sank near Fortune Island in
Batangas. Of the 388 recorded passengers, 150 were lost.3
Napoleon Sesante, then a member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) and a lawyer, was one of the
passengers who survived the sinking. He sued the
petitioner for breach of contract and damages.4
Sesante alleged in his complaint that the M/V Princess
of the Orient left the Port of Manila while Metro Manila
was experiencing stormy weather; that at around 11:00
p.m., he had noticed the vessel listing starboard, so he had
gone to the uppermost deck where he witnessed the strong
winds and big waves pounding the vessel; that at the same
time, he had seen how the passengers had been panicking,
crying for help and frantically scrambling for life jackets in
the absence of the vessel’s officers and crew; that sensing
danger, he had called a certain Vency Ceballos through his
cell phone to request him to inform the proper authorities
of the situation; that thereafter, big waves had rocked the
vessel, tossing him to the floor where he was pinned by a
long steel bar; that he had freed himself only after another
wave had hit the vessel;5 that he had managed to stay
afloat after the vessel had sunk, and had been carried by
the waves to the coastline of Cavite and Batangas until he
had been rescued; that he had suffered tremendous hunger,
thirst, pain, fear, shock, serious anxiety and mental
anguish; that he had sustained injuries,6 and had lost
money, jewelry, important documents, police uniforms and

the .45 caliber pistol issued to him by the PNP; and that
because it had committed bad faith in allowing the vessel
to sail despite the storm signal, the petitioner should pay
him
_______________
3 Id., at p. 49.
4 Records, pp. 1-5.
5 Id., at pp. 2-3.
6 Id.

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VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 467

actual and moral damages of P500,000.00 and

P1,000,000.00, respectively.7
In its defense, the petitioner insisted on the
seaworthiness of the M/V Princess of the Orient due to its
having been cleared to sail from the Port of Manila by the
proper authorities; that the sinking had been due to force
majeure; that it had not been negligent; and that its officers
and crew had also not been negligent because they had
made preparations to abandon the vessel because they had
launched life rafts and had provided the passengers
assistance in that regard.8

Decision of the RTC

On October 12, 2001, the RTC rendered its judgment in
favor of the respondent,9 holding as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

plaintiff Napoleon Sesante and against defendant Sulpicio Lines,
Inc., ordering said defendant to pay plaintiff:
1. Temperate damages in the amount of P400,000.00;
2. Moral damages in the amount of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00);
3. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.10
The RTC observed that the petitioner, being negligent,

was liable to Sesante pursuant to Articles 1739 and 1759 of
the Civil Code; that the petitioner had not established its
due diligence in the selection and supervision of the vessel
crew;
_______________
7 Rollo, pp. 51, 68.

8 Id., at p. 65.
9 Id., at p. 76.
10 Id.

468

that the ship officers had failed to inspect the stowage of

cargoes despite being aware of the storm signal; that the
officers and crew of the vessel had not immediately sent a
distress signal to the Philippine Coast Guard; that the ship
captain had not called for then “abandon ship” protocol;
and that based on the report of the Board of Marine
Inquiry (BMI), the erroneous maneuvering of the vessel by
the captain during the extreme weather condition had been
the immediate and proximate cause of the sinking.
The petitioner sought reconsideration, but the RTC only
partly granted its motion by reducing the temperate
damages from P500,000.00 to P300,000.00.11
Dissatisfied, the petitioner appealed.12 It was pending
the appeal in the CA when Sesante passed away. He was
substituted by his heirs.13

Judgment of the CA

On June 27, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed
decision. It lowered the temperate damages to P120,000.00,
which approximated the cost of Sesante’s lost personal
belongings; and held that despite the seaworthiness of the
vessel, the petitioner remained civilly liable because its
officers and crew had been negligent in performing their
duties.14
Still aggrieved, Sulpicio Lines moved for
15
reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion.
Hence, this appeal.
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 77-80.

12 RTC Records, pp. 292-293.
13 CA Rollo, p. 229.
14 Id., at pp. 54-58.
15 Id., at pp. 77-80.

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VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 469

Issues

The petitioner attributes the following errors to the CA,
to wit:
I
THE ASSAILED DECISION ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE
AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES, AS THE INSTANT CASE IS
FOR ALLEGED PERSONAL INJURIES PREDICATED ON
BREACH OF CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE, AND THERE BEING
NO PROOF OF BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF SULPICIO.

II
AMOUNT OF MORAL DAMAGES AWARDED, THE SAME
BEING UNREASONABLE, EXCESSIVE AND
UNCONSCIONABLE, AND TRANSLATES TO UNJUST
ENRICHMENT AGAINST SULPICIO.

III
AWARD OF TEMPERATE DAMAGES AS THE SAME CANNOT
SUBSTITUTE FOR A FAILED CLAIM FOR ACTUAL
DAMAGES, THERE BEING NO COMPETENT PROOF TO
WARRANT SAID AWARD.

IV
THE AWARD OF TEMPERATE DAMAGES IS UNTENABLE AS
THE REQUISITE NOTICE UNDER THE LAW WAS NOT
GIVEN TO SULPICIO IN ORDER TO HOLD IT LIABLE FOR
THE ALLEGED LOSS OF SESANTE’S PERSONAL

BELONGINGS.

V
THE ASSAILED DECISION ERRED IN SUBSTITUTING THE
HEIRS OF RESPONDENT SESANTE IN THE INSTANT CASE,
THE SAME BEING A PERSONAL ACTION WHICH DOES NOT
SURVIVE.

470

VI
THE ASSAILED DECISION ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE
1759 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AGAINST SULPICIO SANS A
CLEAR-CUT FINDING OF SULPICIO’S BAD FAITH IN THE
INCIDENT.16

In other words, to be resolved are the following, namely:
(1) Is the complaint for breach of contract and damages a
personal action that does not survive the death of the
plaintiff? (2) Is the petitioner liable for damages under
Article 1759 of the Civil Code? and (3) Is there sufficient
basis for awarding moral and temperate damages?

Ruling of the Court

The appeal lacks merit.

I
An action for breach of contract of carriage
survives the death of the plaintiff

The petitioner urges that Sesante’s complaint for
damages was purely personal and cannot be transferred to
his heirs upon his death. Hence, the complaint should be
dismissed because the death of the plaintiff abates a
personal action.
The petitioner’s urging is unwarranted.
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court lays down the
proper procedure in the event of the death of a litigant, viz.:
Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel.—Whenever a

party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the
court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof,
and to give the name and address of his legal represen-
_______________
16 Id., at p. 15.

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VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 471

tative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his

duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may
appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
x x x x

Substitution by the heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction,
but a requirement of due process.17 It protects the right of
due process belonging to any party, that in the event of
death the deceased litigant continues to be protected and
properly represented in the suit through the duly
appointed legal representative of his estate.18
The application of the rule on substitution depends on
whether or not the action survives the death of the litigant.
Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
following actions that survive the death of a party, namely:
(1) recovery of real or personal property, or an interest from
the estate; (2) enforcement of liens on the estate; and (3)
recovery of damages for an injury to person or property. On
the one hand, Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court lists
the actions abated by death as including: (1) claims for
funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the
decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3) all claims for
money against the deceased, arising from contract, express
or implied.
A contract of carriage generates a relation attended with
public duty, neglect or malfeasance of the carrier’s
employees and gives ground for an action for damages.19

Sesante’s claim
_______________
17 Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te, G.R. No. 175910, July 30, 2009, 594 SCRA
410, 429.
18 Id.; see also Sumaljag v. Literato, G.R. No. 149787, June 18, 2008,
555 SCRA 53, 59-60.
19 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. V, p. 314 (1992), citing
Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate

472

against the petitioner involved his personal injury caused

by the breach of the contract of carriage. Pursuant to the
aforecited rules, the complaint survived his death, and
could be continued by his heirs following the rule on
substitution.

II
The petitioner is liable for
breach of contract of carriage

The petitioner submits that an action for damages based
on breach of contract of carriage under Article 1759 of the
Civil Code should be read in conjunction with Article 2201
of the same code; that although Article 1759 only provides
for a presumption of negligence, it does not envision
automatic liability; and that it was not guilty of bad faith
considering that the sinking of M/V Princess of the Orient
had been due to a fortuitous event, an exempting
circumstance under Article 1174 of the Civil Code.
The submission has no substance.
Article 1759 of the Civil Code does not establish a
presumption of negligence because it explicitly makes the
common carrier liable in the event of death or injury to
passengers due to the negligence or fault of the common
carrier’s employees. It reads:
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death

or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful
acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may

have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of
the orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof
that they exercised all the diligence of a good
_______________
Court, 153 SCRA 521 (1987) and Sabena Belgian World Airlines v. Court
of Appeals, 171 SCRA 620 (1989).

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VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 473

father of a family in the selection and supervision of their

employees.

The liability of common carriers under Article 1759 is
demanded by the duty of extraordinary diligence required
of common carriers in safely carrying their passengers.20
On the other hand, Article 1756 of the Civil Code lays
down the presumption of negligence against the common
carrier in the event of death or injury of its passenger, viz.:
Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,

common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.

Clearly, the trial court is not required to make an
express finding of the common carrier’s fault or
negligence.21 Even the mere proof of injury relieves the
passengers from establishing the fault or negligence of the
carrier or its employees.22 The presumption of negligence
applies so long as there is evidence showing that: (a) a
contract exists between the passenger and the common
carrier; and (b) the injury or death took place during the
existence of such contract.23 In such event, the burden
shifts to the common carrier to prove its observance of
extraordinary diligence, and that an unforeseen event or
force majeure had caused the injury.24
_______________
20 Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers

safely as far as human care and diligence of very cautious persons, with a
due regard for all the circumstances.
21 Diaz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149749, July 25, 2006, 496 SCRA
468, 472.
22 Light Rail Transit Authority v. Navidad, G.R. No. 145804, February
6, 2003, 397 SCRA 75, 81.
23 Aquino and Hernando, Essentials of Transportation and Public
Utilities Law, pp. 63-64, 2011.
24 Light Rail Transit Authority v. Navidad, supra.

474

Sesante sustained injuries due to the buffeting by the

waves and consequent sinking of M/V Princess of the
Orient where he was a passenger. To exculpate itself from
liability, the common carrier vouched for the seaworthiness
of M/V Princess of the Orient, and referred to the BMI
report to the effect that the severe weather condition — a
force majeure — had brought about the sinking of the
vessel.
The petitioner was directly liable to Sesante and his
heirs.
A common carrier may be relieved of any liability arising
from a fortuitous event pursuant to Article 117425 of the
Civil Code. But while it may free a common carrier from
liability, the provision still requires exclusion of human
agency from the cause of injury or loss.26 Else stated, for a
common carrier to be absolved from liability in case of force
majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by a
fortuitous event. The common carrier must still prove that
it did not contribute to the occurrence of the incident due to
its own or its employees’ negligence.27 We explained in
Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation v. Transport
Venture, Inc.,28 as follows:
In order to be considered a fortuitous event, however, (1) the

cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure
of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent
of human will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which
constitute the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen it must be

impos-
_______________
25 Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or

when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible
for those events which, could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
were inevitable.
26 Perla Compania De Seguros, Inc. v. Sarangaya III, G.R. No. 147746,
October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 191, 200; Yobido v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
113003, October 17, 1997, 281 SCRA 1, 9.
27 Bachelor Express, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85691,
July 31, 1990, 188 SCRA 216, 222-223.
28 G.R. No. 150255, April 22, 2005, 456 SCRA 557.

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VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 475

sible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it

impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in any manner;
and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
[T]he principle embodied in the act of God doctrine

strictly requires that the act must be occasioned solely
by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to
be excluded from creating or entering into the cause
of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part
the result of the participation of man, whether due to
his active intervention or neglect or failure to act,
the whole occurrence is then humanized and
removed from the rules applicable to the acts of
God.29 (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

The petitioner has attributed the sinking of the vessel to
the storm notwithstanding its position on the
seaworthiness of M/V Princess of the Orient. Yet, the
findings of the BMI directly contradicted the petitioner’s
attribution, as follows:
7. The Immediate and the Proximate Cause of the Sinking

The Captain’s erroneous maneuvers of the M/V Princess of the
Orient minutes before she sunk [sic] had caused the accident. It
should be noted that during the first two hours when the ship left
North Harbor, she was navigating smoothly towards Limbones
Point. During the same period, the ship was only subjected to the
normal weather stress prevailing at the time. She was then inside
Manila Bar. The waves were observed to be relatively small to
endanger the safety of the ship. It was only when the M/V
Princess of the Orient had cleared Limbones Pt. while navigating
towards the direction of
_______________
29 Id., at p. 566.

476

the Fortune Island when this agonizing misfortune struck the

ship.
Initially, a list of three degrees was observed. The listing of the

ship to her portside had continuously increased. It was at this
point that the captain had misjudged the situation. While the ship
continuously listed to her portside and was battered by big waves,
strong southwesterly winds, prudent judgement [sic] would
dictate that the Captain should have considerably reduced the
ship’s speed. He could have immediately ordered the Chief
Engineer to slacken down the speed. Meanwhile, the winds and
waves continuously hit the ship on her starboard side. The waves
were at least seven to eight meters in height and the wind
velocity was a[t] 25 knots. The M/V Princess of the Orient being a
close-type ship (seven decks, wide and high superstructure) was
vulnerable and exposed to the howling winds and ravaging seas.
Because of the excessive movement, the solid and liquid cargo
below the decks must have shifted its weight to port, which could
have contributed to the tilted position of the ship.
Minutes later, the Captain finally ordered to reduce the speed of

the ship to 14 knots. At the same time, he ordered to put ballast
water to the starboard-heeling tank to arrest the continuous
listing of the ship. This was an exercise in futility because the

ship was already listing between 15 to 20 degrees to her portside.
The ship had almost reached the maximum angle of her loll. At
this stage, she was about to lose her stability.
Despite this critical situation, the Captain executed several

starboard maneuvers. Steering the course of the Princess to
starboard had greatly added to her tilting. In the open seas, with
a fast speed of 14 knots, advance maneuvers such as this would
tend to bring the body of the ship in the opposite side. In
navigational terms, this movement is described as the centripetal
force. This force is produced by the water acting on the side of the
ship away from the center of the turn. The force is considered to
act at the center of lateral resistance which, in this case, is the
centroid of the underwater area of the ship’s side away from the
center of the turn. In the case of the

477
VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 477

Princess, when the Captain maneuvered her to starboard, her

body shifted its weight to port. Being already inclined to an angle
of 15 degrees, coupled with the instantaneous movement of the
ship, the cargoes below deck could have completely shifted its
position and weight towards portside. By this time, the ship being
ravaged simultaneously by ravaging waves and howling winds on
her starboard side, finally lost her grip.30

Even assuming the seaworthiness of the M/V Princess of
the Orient, the petitioner could not escape liability
considering that, as borne out by the aforequoted findings
of the BMI, the immediate and proximate cause of the
sinking of the vessel had been the gross negligence of its
captain in maneuvering the vessel.
The Court also notes that Metro Manila was
experiencing Storm Signal No. 1 during the time of the
sinking.31 The BMI observed that a vessel like the M/V
Princess of the Orient, which had a volume of 13.734 gross
tons, should have been capable of withstanding a Storm
Signal No. 1 considering that the responding fishing boats
of less than 500 gross tons had been able to weather
through the same waves and winds to go to the succor of
the sinking vessel and had actually rescued several of the

latter’s distressed passengers.32

III
The award of moral damages and
temperate damages is proper

The petitioner argues that moral damages could be
meted against a common carrier only in the following
instances, to wit: (1) in the situations enumerated by
Article 2201 of the Civil Code; (2) in cases of the death of a
passenger; or (3) where there was bad faith on the part of
the common carrier.
_______________
30 RTC Records, p. 172.

31 Id., at p. 161.
32 Id., at p. 163.

478

It contends that none of these instances obtained herein;

hence, the award should be deleted.
We agree with the petitioner that moral damages may
be recovered in an action upon breach of contract of
carriage only when: (a) death of a passenger results, or (b)
it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad
faith, even if death does not result.33 However, moral
damages may be awarded if the contractual breach is found
to be wanton and deliberately injurious, or if the one
responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad
faith.34
The CA enumerated the negligent acts committed by the
officers and crew of M/V Princess of the Orient, viz.:
x x x. [W]hile this Court yields to the findings of the said

investigation report, yet it should be observed that what was
complied with by Sulpicio Lines were only the basic and minimal
safety standards which would qualify the vessel as seaworthy. In
the same report however it also revealed that the immediate and
proximate cause of the sinking of the M/V Princess of the Orient
was brought by the following: erroneous maneuvering command

of Captain Esrum Mahilum and due to the weather condition
prevailing at the time of the tragedy. There is no doubt that under
the circumstances the crew of the vessel were negligent in
manning it. In fact this was clearly established by the
investigation of the Board of Marine Inquiry where it was found
that:
The Chief Mate, when interviewed under oath, had

attested that he was not able to make stability calculation
of the ship vis-à-vis her cargo. He did not even know the
metacentric height (GM) of the ship whether it be positive
or negative.
_______________
33 Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. Curso, G.R. No. 157009, March 17, 2010, 615
SCRA 575, 585; Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 118126, March 4, 1996, 254 SCRA 260, 273-274.
34 Air France v. Gillego, G.R. No. 165266, December 15, 2010, 638
SCRA 472, 483.

479
VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 479

As cargo officer of the ship, he failed to prepare a detailed

report of the ship’s cargo stowage plan.
He likewise failed to conduct the soundings (measurement) of
the ballast tanks before the ship departed from port. He readily
presumed that the ship was full of ballast since the ship was fully
ballasted when she left Cebu for Manila on 16 September 1998
and had never discharge[d] its contents since that time.
Being the officer-in-charge for emergency situation (sic) like
this, he failed to execute and supervise the actual abandonship
(sic) procedure. There was no announcement at the public address
system of abandonship (sic), no orderly distribution of life jackets
and no orderly launching of life rafts. The witnesses have
confirmed this finding on their sworn statements.
There was miscalculation in judgment on the part of the
Captain when he erroneously navigated the ship at her last
crucial moment. x x x
To aggravate his case, the Captain, having full command and
responsibility of the M/V Princess of the Orient, had failed to
ensure the proper execution of the actual abandoning of the ship.

The deck and engine officers (Second Mate, Third Mate, Chief
Engineers, Second Engineer, Third Engineer and Fourth
Engineer), being in charge of their respective abandonship (sic)
post, failed to supervise the crew and passengers in the proper
execution of abandonship (sic) procedure.
The Radio Officer (spark) failed to send the SOS message in
the internationally accepted communication network (VHF
Channel 16). Instead, he used the Single Side Band (SSB) radio in
informing the company about the emergency situation. x x x x35
_______________
35 Rollo, pp. 56-57.

480

The aforestated negligent acts of the officers and crew of

M/V Princess of the Orient could not be ignored in view of
the extraordinary duty of the common carrier to ensure the
safety of the passengers. The totality of the negligence by
the officers and crew of M/V Princess of the Orient, coupled
with the seeming indifference of the petitioner to render
assistance to Sesante,36 warranted the award of moral
damages.
While there is no hard-and-fast rule in determining
what is a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages,
the discretion to make the determination is lodged in the
trial court with the limitation that the amount should not
be palpably and scandalously excessive. The trial court
then bears in mind that moral damages are not intended to
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer, or to enrich the
plaintiff at the expense of the defendant.37 The amount of
the moral damages must always reasonably approximate
the extent of injury and be proportional to the wrong
committed.38
The Court recognizes the mental anguish, agony and
pain suffered by Sesante who fought to survive in the midst
of the raging waves of the sea while facing the immediate
prospect of losing his life. His claim for moral and economic
vindication is a bitter remnant of that most infamous
tragedy that left hundreds of families broken in its wake.
The anguish and moral sufferings he sustained after

surviving the tragedy would always include the memory of
facing the prospect of his death from drowning, or
dehydration, or being preyed upon by sharks. Based on the
established circumstances, his survival could only have
been a miracle wrought by God’s grace, by
_______________
36 Testimony of Napoleon Sesante dated April 28, 1999, p. 46.

37 Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation, G.R.
No. 184315, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 392, 404; Cebu Country Club,
Inc. v. Elizagaque, G.R. No. 160273, January 18, 2008, 542 SCRA 65, 75.
38 Go v. Cordero, G.R. No. 164703 and G.R. No. 164747, May 4, 2010,
620 SCRA 1, 31; Cheng v. Donini, G.R. No. 167017, June 22, 2009, 590
SCRA 406, 421.

481
VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 481

which he was guided in his desperate swim for the safety of

the shore. But even with the glory of survival, he still had
to grapple with not just the memory of having come face to
face with almost certain death, but also with having to
answer to the instinctive guilt for the rest of his days of
being chosen to live among the many who perished in the
tragedy.39
While the anguish, anxiety, pain and stress experienced
by Sesante during and after the sinking cannot be
quantified, the moral damages to be awarded should at
least approximate the reparation of all the consequences of
the petitioner’s negligence. With moral damages being
meant to enable the injured party to obtain the means,
diversions or amusements in order to alleviate his moral
and physical sufferings,40 the Court is called upon to
ensure that proper recompense be allowed to him, through
his heirs. For this purpose, the
_______________
39 Justice Caguioa has contributed during the deliberations that most

victims like Sesante relive the events for years through nightmares and
flashbacks that later develop into sleeping disorders and serious
psychological issues that scar them for life; that many of them feel guilt
and resentment for being alive, unable to express their feelings on what
they could have done to save others, while others manifest acute stress
marked by agitation and panic attacks. He cites the 1997 study on the
prolonged traumatic impact of a disaster conducted by Clinical
Associate Professor Viola Mecke of the Department of Psychiatry and
Behavioral Sciences of the Stanford University School of Medicine, which
found that “man-induced” disasters were considered more harmful in their
psychological effects than “natural” disasters because the knowledge that
the disaster could have been avoided seemed to release a rage and anger
that were not observable in those affected by natural disasters. The study
opined that the victims’ experiences heightened distrust and suspicion of
others and their motives; and that their unresolved grief would bring
about personality changes that involved guilt, rage, demoralization and a
diminished elan vital.
40 Lorzano v. Tabayag, Jr., G.R. No. 189647, February 6, 2012, 665
SCRA 38, 48.

482

amount of P1,000,000.00, as granted by the RTC and

affirmed by the CA, is maintained.
The petitioner contends that its liability for the loss of
Sesante’s personal belongings should conform with Article
1754, in relation to Articles 1998, 2000 to 2003 of the Civil
Code, which provide:
Article 1754. The provisions of Articles 1733 to 1753 shall

apply to the passenger’s baggage which is not in his personal
custody or in that of his employees. As to other baggage, the rules
in Articles 1998 and 2000 to 2003 concerning the responsibility of
hotel-keepers shall be applicable.
x x x x
Article 1998. The deposit of effects made by travellers in
hotels or inns shall also be regarded as necessary. The keepers of
hotels or inns shall be responsible for them as depositaries,
provided that notice was given to them, or to their employees, of
the effects brought by the guests and that, on the part of the
latter, they take the precautions which said hotel-keepers or their
substitutes advised relative to the care and vigilance of their
effects.
x x x x
Article 2000. The responsibility referred to in the two

preceding articles shall include the loss of, or injury to the
personal property of the guests caused by the servants or
employees of the keepers of hotels or inns as well as by strangers;
but not that which may proceed from any force majeure. The fact
that travellers are constrained to rely on the vigilance of the
keeper of the hotel or inn shall be considered in determining the
degree of care required of him.
Article 2001. The act of a thief or robber, who has entered the
hotel is not deemed force majeure, unless it is done with the use of
arms or through an irresistible force.

483
VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 483

Article 2002. The hotel-keeper is not liable for compensation

if the loss is due to the acts of the guest, his family, servants or
visitors, or if the loss arises from the character of the things
brought into the hotel.
Article 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from
responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is not liable
for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation to the
contrary between the hotel-keeper and the guest whereby the
responsibility of the former as set forth in Articles 1998 to 2001 is
suppressed or diminished shall be void.

The petitioner denies liability because Sesante’s
belongings had remained in his custody all throughout the
voyage until the sinking, and he had not notified the
petitioner or its employees about such belongings. Hence,
absent such notice, liability did not attach to the petitioner.
Is notification required before the common carrier
becomes liable for lost belongings that remained in the
custody of the passenger?
We answer in the negative.
The rule that the common carrier is always responsible
for the passenger’s baggage during the voyage needs to be
emphasized. Article 1754 of the Civil Code does not exempt
the common carrier from liability in case of loss, but only
highlights the degree of care required of it depending on
who has the custody of the belongings. Hence, the law
requires the common carrier to observe the same diligence
as the hotel keepers in case the baggage remains with the

passenger; otherwise, extraordinary diligence must be
exercised.41 Furthermore, the liability of the common
carrier attaches even if the loss or damage to the
belongings resulted from the acts of the common carrier’s
employees, the only exception being where such loss or
damages is due to force majeure.42
_______________
41 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. V, p. 311 (1992).

42 Article 2000, Civil Code.

484

In YHT Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals,43 we

declared the actual delivery of the goods to the innkeepers
or their employees as unnecessary before liability could
attach to the hotelkeepers in the event of loss of personal
belongings of their guests considering that the personal
effects were inside the hotel or inn because the hotelkeeper
shall remain accountable.44 Accordingly, actual notification
was not necessary to render the petitioner as the common
carrier liable for the lost personal belongings of Sesante. By
allowing him to board the vessel with his belongings
without any protest, the petitioner became sufficiently
notified of such belongings. So long as the belongings were
brought inside the premises of the vessel, the petitioner
was thereby effectively notified and consequently duty-
bound to observe the required diligence in ensuring the
safety of the belongings during the voyage. Applying
Article 2000 of the Civil Code, the petitioner assumed the
liability for loss of the belongings caused by the negligence
of its officers or crew. In view of our finding that the
negligence of the officers and crew of the petitioner was the
immediate and proximate cause of the sinking of the M/V
Princess of the Orient, its liability for Sesante’s lost
personal belongings was beyond question.
The petitioner claims that temperate damages were
erroneously awarded because Sesante had not proved
pecuniary loss; and that the CA merely relied on his self-
serving testimony.
The award of temperate damages was proper.

Temperate damages may be recovered when some pecu-
niary loss has been suffered but the amount cannot, from
the nature of the case, be proven with certainty.45 Article
_______________
43 G.R. No. 126780, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 638, 658.
44 Id., citing De Los Santos v. Tan Khey, 58 O.G. No. 45-53, p. 7693.
45 Philippine Hawk Corporation v. Lee, G.R. No. 166869, February 16,
2010, 612 SCRA 576, 593; Canada v. All Commodities

485
VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 485

222446 of the Civil Code expressly authorizes the courts to

award temperate damages despite the lack of certain proof
of actual damages.47
Indubitably, Sesante suffered some pecuniary loss from
the sinking of the vessel, but the value of the loss could not
be established with certainty. The CA, which can try facts
and appreciate evidence, pegged the value of the lost
belongings as itemized in the police report at P120,000.00.
The valuation approximated the costs of the lost
belongings. In that context, the valuation of P120,000.00 is
correct, but to be regarded as temperate damages.
In fine, the petitioner, as a common carrier, was
required to observe extraordinary diligence in ensuring the
safety of its passengers and their personal belongings. It
being found herein short of the required diligence rendered
it liable for the resulting injuries and damages sustained
by Sesante as one of its passengers.
Should the petitioner be further held liable for
exemplary damages?
In contracts and quasi-contracts, the Court has the
discretion to award exemplary damages if the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner.48 Indeed, exemplary damages cannot
be recovered as a matter of right, and it is left to the court
to decide whether or
_______________
Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 146141, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA
321, 329.
46 Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more
than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
47 Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Paras, G.R. No. 161909, April
25, 2012, 671 SCRA 24, 43.

486

not to award them.49 In consideration of these legal

premises for the exercise of the judicial discretion to grant
or deny exemplary damages in contracts and quasi-
contracts against a defendant who acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner, the
Court hereby awards exemplary damages to Sesante.
First of all, exemplary damages did not have to be
specifically pleaded or proved, because the courts had the
discretion to award them for as long as the evidence so
warranted. In Marchan v. Mendoza,50 the Court has
relevantly discoursed:
x x x. It is argued that this Court is without jurisdiction to

adjudicate this exemplary damages since there was no
allegation nor prayer, nor proof, nor counterclaim of error
for the same by the appellees. It is to be observed however,
that in the complaint, plaintiffs “prayed for such other and
further relief as this Court may deem just and equitable.”
Now, since the body of the complaint sought to recover
damages against the defendant-carrier wherein plaintiffs
prayed for indemnification for the damages they suffered
as a result of the negligence of said Silverio Marchan who
is appellant’s employee; and since exemplary damages is
intimately connected with general damages, plaintiffs may
not be expected to single out by express term the kind of
damages they are trying to recover against the defendant’s
carrier. Suffice it to state that when plaintiffs prayed in
their complaint for such other relief and remedies that
may be availed of under the premises, in effect, therefore,
the court is called upon to exercise and use its discretion

whether the imposition of punitive or exem-
_______________

50 No. L-24471, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 888, 895-897; see also New
World Developers and Management, Inc. v. AMA Computer Learning
Center, Inc., G.R. No. 187930, February 23, 2015, 751 SCRA 331.

487
VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 487

plary damages even though not expressly prayed or

pleaded in the plaintiffs’ complaint.
x x x It further appears that the amount of exemplary
damages need not be proved, because its determination
depends upon the amount of compensatory damages that
may be awarded to the claimant. If the amount of
exemplary damages need not be proved, it need not also be
alleged, and the reason is obvious because it is merely
incidental or dependent upon what the court may award
as compensatory damages. Unless and until this premise is
determined and established, what may be claimed as
exemplary damages would amount to a mere surmise or
speculation. It follows as a necessary consequence that the
amount of exemplary damages need not be pleaded in the
complaint because the same cannot be predetermined. One
can merely ask that it be determined by the court if in the
use of its discretion the same is warranted by the
evidence, and this is just what appellee has done. (Bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)

And secondly, exemplary damages are designed by our
civil law to “permit the courts to reshape behavior that is
socially deleterious in its consequence by creating negative
incentives or deterrents against such behavior.”51 The
nature and purpose for this kind of damages have been
well-stated in People v. Dalisay,52 to wit:
Also known as ‘punitive’ or ‘vindictive’ damages, exemplary

or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent
to serious wrongdoings, and as a vindication of undue

sufferings and wanton in-
_______________
51 Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33

at p. 271.
52 G.R. No. 188106, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 807, 819-820,
citing People v. Catubig, G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA
621, 634-635.

488

vasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for

those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are
generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law,
there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the
award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of
indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an
injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the
theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt
caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant —
associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness,
malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or
fraud or gross fraud — that intensifies the injury. The terms
punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those
species of damages that may be awarded against a person to
punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these
damages are intended in good measure to deter the
wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the
future. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

The BMI found that the “erroneous maneuvers” during
the ill-fated voyage by the captain of the petitioner’s vessel
had caused the sinking. After the vessel had cleared
Limbones Point while navigating towards the direction of
Fortune Island, the captain already noticed the listing of
the vessel by three degrees to the portside of the vessel,
but, according to the BMI, he did not exercise prudence as
required by the situation in which his vessel was suffering
the battering on the starboard side by big waves of seven to
eight meters high and strong southwesterly winds of 25

knots. The BMI pointed out that he should have
considerably reduced the speed of the vessel based on his
experience about the vessel — a close-type ship of seven
decks, and of a wide and high superstructure — being
vulnerable if exposed to strong winds and high waves. He
ought to have also known that maintaining a high speed
under such circumstances would have shifted the solid and
liquid cargo of the vessel to port, worsening the tilted
position of the vessel. It was only after a few minutes
thereafter that

489
VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 489

he finally ordered the speed to go down to 14 knots, and to

put ballast water to the starboard-heeling tank to arrest
the continuous listing at portside. By then, his moves
became an exercise in futility because, according to the
BMI, the vessel was already listing to her portside between
15 to 20 degrees, which was almost the maximum angle of
the vessel’s loll. It then became inevitable for the vessel to
lose her stability.
The BMI concluded that the captain had executed
several starboard maneuvers despite the critical situation
of the vessel, and that the maneuvers had greatly added to
the tilting of the vessel. It observed:
x x x In the open seas, with a fast speed of 14 knots,

advance maneuvers such as this would tend to bring the
body of the ship in the opposite side. In navigational
terms, this movement is described as the centripetal force.
This force is produced by the water acting on the side of
the ship away from the center of the turn. The force is
considered to act at the center of lateral resistance which,
in this case, is the centroid of the underwater area of the
ship’s side away from the center of the turn. In the case of
the Princess, when the Captain maneuvered her to
starboard, her body shifted its weight to port. Being
already inclined to an angle of 15 degrees, coupled with
the instantaneous movement of the ship, the cargoes below
deck could have completely shifted its position and weight
towards portside. By this time, the ship being ravaged
simultaneously by ravaging waves and howling winds on

her starboard side, finally lost her grip.53

Clearly, the petitioner and its agents on the scene acted
wantonly and recklessly. Wanton and reckless are virtually
synonymous in meaning as respects liability for conduct to-
_______________
53 RTC Records, p. 172.

490

wards others.54 Wanton means characterized by extreme

recklessness and utter disregard for the rights of others; or
marked by or manifesting arrogant recklessness of justice
or of rights or feelings of others.55 Conduct is reckless when
it is an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a
situation in which a high degree of danger is apparent. It
must be more than any mere mistake resulting from
inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere
thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simple inattention.56
The actuations of the petitioner and its agents during
the incident attending the unfortunate sinking of the M/V
Princess of the Orient were far below the standard of care
and circumspection that the law on common carriers
demanded. Accordingly, we hereby fix the sum of
P1,000,000.00 in order to serve fully the objective of
exemplarity among those engaged in the business of
transporting passengers and cargo by sea. The amount
would not be excessive, but proper. As the Court put it in
Pereña v. Zarate:57
Anent the P1,000,000.00 allowed as exemplary damages, we

should not reduce the amount if only to render effective the
desired example for the public good. As a common carrier, the
Pereñas needed to be vigorously reminded to observe their duty to
exercise extraordinary diligence to prevent a similarly senseless
accident from happening again. Only by an award of exemplary
damages in that amount would suffice to instill in them and
others similarly situated like them the ever-present
_______________
54 44A Words and Phrases, pp. 473-474; citing Commonwealth v.

Welansky, 55 N.E. 2d 902, 910, 316 Mass. 383 (1944).
55 Id., citing Griffin v. State, 171 A.2d 717, 720, 225 Md. 422 (1961);
Harkrider v. Cox, 321 S.W. 2d 226, 228, 230 Ark. 155 (1959).
56 36A Words and Phrases, p. 322, citing Schick v. Ferolito, 767 A. 2d
962, 167 N.J.7 (2001).
57 Pereña v. Zarate, G.R. No. 157917, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 208.

491
VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 491

need for greater and constant vigilance in the conduct of a

business imbued with public interest.58

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on June 27, 2005 with the
MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the amount of moral damages
is fixed at P1,000,000.00;
(b) the amount of P1,000,000.00 is granted as exemplary
damages; and (c) the sum of P120,000.00 is allowed as
temperate damages, all to be paid to the heirs of the late
Napoleon Sesante. In addition, all the amounts hereby
awarded shall earn interest of 6% per annum from the
finality of this decision until fully paid. Costs of suit to be
paid by the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Perlas-

Bernabe and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modifications.
Notes.—In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that

the common carrier is at fault or is negligent when a
passenger dies or is injured. (Heirs of Jose Marcial K.
Ochoa vs. G & S Transport Corporation, 645 SCRA 93
[2011])
Court has ruled that formal substitution of parties is not
necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared,
participated and presented evidence during the
proceedings. (Sy vs. Fairland Knitcraft Co., Inc., 662 SCRA
67 [2011])

——o0o——
_______________
58 Id., at p. 236.
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11/25/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 798

G.R. No. 172682. July 27, 2016.*

Civil Law; Substitution of Heirs; Due Process; Substitution by

460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

action survives the death of the litigant. Section 1, Rule 87 of

property, or an interest from the estate; (2) enforcement of liens

VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 461

common carrier in the event of death or injury of its

462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

carriage only when: (a) death of a passenger results, or (b) it

VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 463

the consequences of the petitioner’s negligence. With moral

any protest, the petitioner became sufficiently notified of such

464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the vessel, the petitioner was thereby effectively notified and

Same; Damages; Exemplary Damages; In contracts and quasi-

VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 465

manner. Indeed, exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

holding the petitioner liable to pay temperate and moral

1 Rollo, pp. 49-59; penned by CA Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios

466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

money, jewelry, important documents, police uniforms and

VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 467

actual and moral damages of P500,000.00 and

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

The RTC observed that the petitioner, being negligent,

7 Rollo, pp. 51, 68.

468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

that the ship officers had failed to inspect the stowage of

Hence, this appeal.

11 Id., at pp. 77-80.

VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 469

THE ALLEGED LOSS OF SESANTE’S PERSONAL

470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel.—Whenever a

VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 471

tative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his

employees and gives ground for an action for damages.19

472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

against the petitioner involved his personal injury caused

Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death

acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may

VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 473

father of a family in the selection and supervision of their

Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,

20 Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers

474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sesante sustained injuries due to the buffeting by the

In order to be considered a fortuitous event, however, (1) the

constitute the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen it must be

25 Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or

VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 475

sible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it

[T]he principle embodied in the act of God doctrine

7. The Immediate and the Proximate Cause of the Sinking

476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED